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UNDERSTANDING THE BUDGET AND STRATEGIC 

AGENDA OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

DIRECTORATE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING 

THREATS, CYBERSECURITY AND 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 14, 2007 

Serial No. 110–6 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

------ 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

TODD GEE, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

AL GREEN, Texas 

------ 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

EX OFFICIO

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi PETER T. KING, New York 

JACOB OLCOTT, Director & Counsel 

DR. CHRIS BECK, Senior Advisor for Science & Technology 

CARLA ZAMUDIO-DOLAN, Clerk 

DR. DIANE BERRY, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 

Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology ...................................................... 1 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 

Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology ...................................................... 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 5 

The Honorable Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Tennessee ............................................................................................... 28 

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.s. Virgin Island ................................................................................................. 29 

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 26 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 31 

WITNESS

The Honorable Jay Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Accompanied by, 

Mr. Richard Williams, Chief Financial Officer, Science and Technology, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 10 

APPENDIXES

A. Additional Questions and Responses: 

Responses from Hon. Jay Cohen ..................................................................... 43 

B. Attachments ...................................................................................................... 59 

(1) 

UNDERSTANDING THE BUDGET AND 

STRATEGIC AGENDA OF THE SCIENCE 

AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE 

Wednesday, February 14, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY

AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m., in Room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James R. Langevin 

[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Langevin, Christensen, Etheridge, 

Thompson, McCaul, Lungren and Blackburn. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

The subcommittee meeting today is to receive testimony on understanding the budget and strategic agenda of the Science and 

Technology Directorate. 

Good afternoon and welcome to the first hearing of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and 

Technology in the 110th Congress. 

I would like to begin by telling Ranking Member McCaul that I 

look forward to working with him in this Congress on the issues 

that I think we all agree are absolutely critical to improving national security. 

I also welcome our two witnesses to the hearing today: Under 

Secretary for Science and Technology Jay Cohen, and S&T Chief 

Financial Officer Richard Williams. I would like to thank both of 

you for your service to our country and for your time today. 

This hearing is entitled Understanding the Budget and Strategic 

Agenda of the Science and Technology Directorate because, for 

many years, neither the Congress nor the public nor the employees 

working within the S&T itself could understand what was going on 

in the S&T Directorate. Put simply, the absence of a clear mission 

within the Directorate and a lack of oversight by the Congress contributed to serious deficiencies. 

Anecdotes shared by former S&T employees in 2006 offered a 

disturbing image of the Directorate. According to one former employee with whom my staff spoke in August last year, ‘‘what has 

occurred up to now at S&T is that, following an initial wonderful 

period when motivations and morale were super high, after a year 

or so turf battles developed, personal agendas dominated and many 

good people began to leave. Morale is now rock-bottom, and it apVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Dec 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-6\35265.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
2 

pears that many have lost sight of the mission: to defend the country, against the unspeakable.’’ 

Admiral Cohen, I understand that all this occurred before your 

confirmation, and I am well aware of your work in the Office of 

Naval Research and think very highly of your capabilities. I know 

you have testified many times in this very room where you have 

appeared before me and my work on the Armed Services Committee, and it is great to have you here again. You come to your 

new post with a great deal of credibility, and it is my hope that 

you will do for the S&T Directorate what you did for the Office of 

Naval Research. 

But while I have a great deal of confidence in your ability to turn 

things around, as the chairman of this subcommittee I will be diligent in ensuring that the widespread problems that existed prior 

to your tenure are corrected. 

I recognize that you have only been on the job for 6 months now, 

but it does trouble me that we still don’t have the strategic plan 

for the S&T Directorate, even though that was required by the 

Homeland Security Act in 2002. 

Admiral Cohen, I understand that you have been working on 

completing this report, and we look forward to hearing more on 

this report and receiving it. 

I do suggest to you that a strategic plan that does not include 

efforts to improve morale, minimize turnover, strengthen workforce 

recruitment and secure institutional memory is not a good plan. I 

suggest to you that a strategic plan that does not include a formal, 

Department-wide coordination plan on R&D, policy and procurement not be a good plan; and I suggest to you that a strategic plan 

that does not include the method by which RDT&E is prioritized 

and funded by S&T is not a good plan. 

It has also come to my attention that the Department has weak 

performance measures for the S&T divisions. I have taken the time 

to read the Performance and Accountability Report sections devoted to the S&T Directorate in 2005 and 2006; and I believe that 

the goals and measurements used to evaluate some of the programs are, by and large, weak and, in some cases, meaningless. I 

hope that you can improve on some of these measurements during 

your tenure. 

Finally, there is the issue of the budget. 

Admiral Cohen, I understand that your new R&D budget reflects 

the transfer of operations portions out of the S&T Directorate, but 

these transfers don’t change the fact that the 2008 budget is almost 

$100 million less than last year. 

During our hearing last week, Chairman Thompson warned Secretary Chertoff about homeland security on the cheap. These are 

critically important areas of research and development, and I am 

concerned that the President isn’t focusing his priorities on the 

areas that are truly important to securing our Nation. 

For instance, when I look at your cuts in cybersecurity and the 

infrastructure and geophysical division, for instance, I am concerned that this is homeland security on the cheap. Now, we can’t 

be satisfied with putting pennies into securing our Nation. 

3 

I am sure that we will dive into these issues a little bit more 

today, but I want to conclude by thanking both of you for appearing 

today, and we look forward to hearing your testimony. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It was an honor to serve with you last Congress on this important committee, and I look forward to working with you as the 

ranking member on this subcommittee, and I know that we will do 

great work together in a bipartisan spirit. 

I know that you bring a lot of experience on nuclear and biological threats that enables us to more fully explore these and other 

means of attack, but we must also devote more attention to potential attacks, targets of attack, ensure our Nation has the technical 

capability to thwart terrorists’ efforts to exploit vulnerabilities in 

our transportation systems, information and telecommunication 

networks, fixed infrastructure and borders. 

Under Secretary Cohen and Mr. Williams, I want to welcome you 

here today and thank you for your testimony; and I applaud you, 

also, on your choice of colors for your tie on Valentine’s Day, which 

matches with the chairman. I apparently didn’t get the memo on 

that today. 

But I look forward to hearing your testimony and vision for 

building a robust homeland security S&T capability and turning 

around a Directorate that has been plagued by personnel turnover 

and mismanagement, budget fluctuations and priority shifts. 

I would like to walk away with confidence that the Nation is 

making the most of its science and technology resources to bolster 

our homeland security strategy. 

We sit here today more than 5 years removed from September 

the 11th and 4 years since the Congress authorized the creation of 

the Department of Homeland Security. The attacks of 9/11 and the 

release of anthrax spores just weeks after revealed enormous 

vulnerabilities in this country, particularly in our surveillance, detection and public health response capabilities. 

During the 109th Congress, the committee focused much on the 

Department’s efforts to implement HSPD 10, the Biodefense for the 

21st Century. 

It is an important—part of the strategy is the detection of biological agent for which S&T Directorate plays a lead role. The biological program within the chem/bio division in fact consumes a 

large portion of the Directorate’s budget. It is $60 million in 2008, 

and this is after the transfer of the operational aspects to the Office 

of Health Affairs. This is more funding than most of the other divisions and involves only a single program. 

Currently, the biodetection technology is very time—and labor-intensive and not cost-effective, in my view; and I encourage you to 

continue pursuit of next-generation technologies which will be automated in near real-time. Because, in this game, timing is crucial. 

It is the difference between the detecting to treat and detecting to 

warn. It is a difference that will result in the saving of countless 

lives. 

4 

Another Presidential Directive released just last week is HSPD 

18, the Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. As the Directorate looks ahead at ways to implement this 

Directive, it should leverage its experience in conducting material 

threat assessments and material threat determinations under 

Project BioShield. 

The Directorate’s threat and risk assessment process should not 

be limited only to guiding acquisition of medical countermeasures 

as required, but clearly it can be also applied to prioritizing mid— 

and long-term research and development of such countermeasures 

by identifying risks ranging from immediate ones to those potentially emerging. 

Admiral Cohen, to borrow two out of your four Bs, technology is 

important not only in detecting bugs but also in detecting bad guys 

across our borders. With the long border such as that of my State 

of Texas to protect, the Custom and Border Patrol relies on the 

S&T Directorate to provide the technology they need to do their job 

effectively. 

Technology such as acoustic seismic magnetic and thermal infrared sensors, visual and infrared cameras, electromagnetic 

radiometry can detect people, vehicles and tunnels. It is not enough 

just to improve these technologies individually. We must also focus 

on research and development creating an effective border security 

system where sensors and surveillance technologies are interconnected in a smart network. 

Interoperability of information and communication technologies 

is a nationwide concern. The border communications present 

unique challenges that may require tailored technical solutions. We 

need to do a better job at securing our borders from illegal immigration, terrorism and drugs. Technology is part of the solution; 

and this Directorate, the S&T, is positioned to play a key role in 

that. 

In an effort to secure our borders beyond our shores, the Directorate should also place greater focus on developing and integrating 

biometric-based information and tamper-proof credentialing technologies in order to identify and authenticate travelers through better security scrutiny and reduced false alarms. 

The payoff of these efforts will be realized in supporting several 

homeland security missions such as TWIK for port workers, real ID 

for U.S. drivers and future passports and tamper-proof IDs. Biometric technologies will also enable the full benefits of the use of 

U.S. Visa Program by implementing the exit element, ensuring 

more complete tracking of our international visitors. 

I mentioned earlier the need for an interconnected network of 

systems. However, it is this interconnective nature of the Internet 

and information infrastructure that also makes us vulnerable to a 

cyberattack. Information technology is fast advancing. It is a fastadvancing technological field, and R&D activities will be needed to 

improve cybersecurity products and services to ensure we keep 

pace with changes in risk and advances in this technology. 

I have just touched on a few of these technologies that should be 

on your agenda today and should consume major portions of your 

budget. But I want to know about tomorrow. When certain counterterrorism technologies have become so sophisticated that terrorists 

5 

change tactics in order to evade them and while the Directorate 

needs to have short—and long-term strategic direction, it must be 

remain agile enough to keep ahead of the terrorists and readily 

adapt to an ever-changing threat landscape. 

They say agility comes with use, so I applaud the Directorate’s 

continued investment in the Scholars and Fellows Program which 

trains the next generation of public-service-oriented scientists and 

engineers. This effort is needed to build a strong science and technology community that will provide a critical advantage in the development and implementation of counterterrorist measures and 

other DHS objectives. 

Other vital university programs is the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence, which harnesses the Nation’s scientific knowledge and technological expertise in areas critical to homeland security. 

With the largest center just down the road from me at Texas 

A&M, I can attest that the National Center for Foreign Animal and 

Zoonotic Disease Defense draws upon the Nation’s leading experts 

and researchers to protect against the introduction of such highconsequences diseases. 

I am also concerned about the 20 percent reduction, though, in 

these university programs in the budget for 2008. With four new 

centers expected to come on line, I hope that existing centers’ funding won’t be compromised. The Directorate must continue to also 

not only invest in these centers but select through them a competitive merit-based process that awards the best in science. 

We have enormous scientific and technological expertise in this 

country that exists in our universities, the national labs and in the 

private sector. As you bring a customer focus to S&T, I hope the 

Directorate finds its niche as enablers of technology, and that is 

the link between the experts in the labs and the universities who 

are on the cutting edge of science and the customers—or the end 

users—who rely upon that science to translate it into useable and 

effective technology. 

In conclusion, let me say that I know we visited last week and 

I must say I was very impressed, and I do think the Department 

is very lucky to have a man of your caliber on board in this critical 

position. You weren’t hired for an easy job, and my job is to make 

sure your job doesn’t get any easier. 

But what I mean is, if you and I do our jobs right and raise the 

standard of excellence and reinvigorate this Directorate to think in 

new terms, generate innovative ideas and breakthrough technologies, then you will face tough decisions but the struggle will no 

longer be about correcting past mistakes and regaining confidence 

in the Congress but about deciding which technologies to pursue 

from an abundance of promising revolutionary ideas to better protect this nation. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Ranking Member. 

The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, 

the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for the purpose of 

an opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

6 

First of all, I would like to congratulate you on your first hearing 

as chairman of the subcommittee. The jurisdiction of this subcommittee is important, and I have every confidence that you will 

drive legislation and perform the oversight that these critical 

issues deserve for this subcommittee. 

As you pointed out, also, Mr. Chairman, the Department’s 

Science and Technology Directorate has struggled and underperformed pretty much since its inception. The Science and Technology Directorate has been criticized for being a hobby shop, 

where research and development are not driven by operational requirements but by the interests of the researchers. 

The Government Accountability Office has identified significant 

financial management deficiencies within S&T. 

Last year, the House Appropriations Committee referred to the 

Science and Technology Directorate as a rudderless ship where the 

committee decided to cut funding to the Directorate. 

Well, I suppose when you have a rudderless ship it makes sense 

to bring in an Admiral to fix the problem. I would like to welcome 

you here, Admiral; and I hope you like my pun, also. 

But, also, Mr. Williams, I want to recognize you and welcome 

you. We could stand significant help, as you know, on the financial 

side. 

I want you to give us your honest opinion today in your testimony. We have a lot of situations to address, but I think the issue 

that we have speaks to credibility of the operation. It speaks to 

real-time ideas being brought forward in a reasonable period of 

time. 

Companies come to us all the time saying I wish DHS was like 

DOD, kind of pushing new ideas out, invest in them in a real-time 

situation. We can see some return on investment, rather than just 

never hearing from them. 

So, Admiral, you have a real job ahead of you. I think you will 

find this committee both at the subcommittee and full committee 

level willing to work with you, want to move forward. I share our 

ranking member’s concern about Centers of Excellence. I have a 

question a little later on it. But, at this point, they have done a 

wonderful job. We just need to expand the participation mode in 

those Centers of Excellence to include all of our institutions, not 

just a precious few. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the comments from the witnesses and my opportunity to ask them some questions, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

opening statement and your comments. I appreciate your leadership and look forward to working with you as well. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded of the committee rules. Opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

I welcome the first panel of witnesses here today. 

First witness, the Honorable Jay Cohen, the Under Secretary of 

Science and Technology at the Department of Homeland Security. 

Jay M. Cohen is a Native of New York. He was commissioned in 

1968 as an ensign upon graduation from the United States Naval 

Academy. 

7 

He holds a joint ocean/engineering degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute and masters of science in marine engineering and naval architecture from MIT. 

Admiral Cohen has a long and distinguished career with the 

Navy, commanding several ships and submarines during his tenure. He was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October of 

1997. Prior to his arrival at the S&T, he served as Chief of Naval 

Research, where he coordinated investments with other U.S. and 

international S&T providers to rapidly meet warfighter combat 

needs. 

Under Secretary Cohen was sworn in to his current position at 

the Department of Homeland Security on August 10, 2006. 

Our second witness, Mr. Richard Williams, is the Director for 

Strategy, Policy and Budget and the Chief Financial Officer of the 

Science and Technology Directorate. 

Prior to coming to S&T, Mr. Williams established and served as 

the original Director of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation from May, 2003, to August, 2006. 

Like Admiral Cohen, he is a Navy veteran. From 1988 to 2003, 

he served on the staff of the Director, Naval Propulsion Program, 

work run jointly by the Department of the Navy and the Department of Energy. During his tenure there, he held various positions, 

including Director of Operating Nuclear Fleet Budget Division, Director of the Finance Division and Director of the Fiscal Division. 

From 1983 to 1993, he served on board two nuclear-powered submarines, the USS Kamehameha and the USS Pasadena. 

I understand that you have both collaborated on your testimony. 

So, without objection, the full witnesses’ statement will be inserted 

into the record; and I now ask the witnesses to summarize their 

statement in 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAY COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral Cohen, the floor is now yours. 

Mr. COHEN. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin and Chairman 

Thompson, Congressman McCaul, Congresswoman Christensen 

and Congressman Etheridge. 

First, I would like to congratulate you all on your new assignment; and we look forward very much to working with you. It is 

a personal honor for me to appear before you today and to update 

you on the progress that I believe we have made to date in the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate and also to discuss the President’s budget request for fiscal 

year 2008 and how I believe it will position us to develop and transition technology to better protect the Nation from catastrophic efforts. 

I thank you for entering my testimony into the record; and, for 

the that reason, I have very short remarks. 

I would like to especially thank Chairman Thompson. 

Just before coming here, my people shared with me a press release where you acknowledged the work and the dedication of the 

8 

men and women of the Department of Homeland Security and your 

commitment to them to give them the tools and the oversight to 

make their job more effective. We all serve not just for our Department but also for the Nation and thank you for that consideration 

on behalf of the those men and women. 

Today, I am joined, as the chairman has indicated, by my Chief 

Financial Officer, Dick Williams. We both reported to the Department of Homeland Security on 10 August. That was a momentous 

day. That was the day of the liquid explosives plot that was discovered in the United Kingdom, and it hasn’t slowed down since then. 

When we talk about the value of science and technology, we, as 

you all know from testimony that I gave in September on the 11th 

of August, established the rapid response team to address this very 

important threat. The liquid explosives engaged not only our Department of Energy labs, which you in the enabling legislation very 

wisely have shared with the Department of Homeland Security, but 

also our Center of Excellence in the universities as well as my 

small laboratories, including the Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New Jersey. 

And based on the efforts, the testing, the overture that we made 

to industry, testing real time both in Socorro, New Mexico, against 

real-world formulae and at Tyndall Air Force Base with the Transportation Security Authority using their screening devices, Kip 

Hawley, the Director of the Transportation Security Agency, was 

able in about 2 months to issue what is now known as a 311 rule 

which was able to get small amounts, approximately three ounces 

of liquids, back on board our aircraft carrier, board luggage and to 

help relieve the congestion that had developed in the checked baggage arena. 

So that is just one small example of how S&T can make a difference with risk-benefit analysis. 

The S&T Directorate is committed to serving our customers. Who 

are our customers? They are the Department of Homeland Security 

components, the 22 agencies and operating components that you so 

wisely put together in the enabling legislation. 

They are my customers. But I am also sensitive to the customer 

of my customers, and there I have two sets. In legislation, I have 

the first responders, our true heroes, the police, the firemen and 

EMT. But I also have, in the Coast Guard, the guardsmen, and, in 

TSA, the screeners, and, in Customs and Border Protection, the 

Border Patrol agents. They are the customer of my customers, and 

we interact with them, and we provide for them. 

I appreciate very much the leadership and the support of the 

Congress, the bipartisan support. The decision that you took in an 

election year to restore the fiscal year 2007 funding to the President’s requested level late in the congressional session is enormously helpful to my efforts to realign, refocus the Directorate, to 

develop a robust S&T capability for the Nation and with the continued bipartisan support that I have received since the election 

from both the Members and the staff; and I am very appreciative 

of that. I know that together we will enjoy further success. 

I would like to focus in my first 6 months on the job in laying 

the foundation to realign the Directorate so that it may excel in 

what I think are four key areas. I shared these with you back in 

9 

September, and I have remained focused on them ever since, and 

that was the four ‘‘gets‘‘: getting the organization, getting the 

books, getting the people all right. And when you do that, you are 

able to get the content right so that we can make the Nation safer. 

As Congressman McCaul indicated, he talked about two of the Bs 

I have indicated, that those threats are bombs, borders, bugs and 

business, where business is the underlying cyber that enables everything we do. 

I think you will see that we have made good progress in this in 

6 months. But we have a long way to go. We are striving to help 

the S&T Directorate become customer-focused and output-oriented. 

This is a cultural change, as you have already indicated. The S&T 

management organization should be as the Congress intended and 

the Nation deserves. 

To share just a few of the highlights of the realignment—and I 

briefed you on this previously—we have realigned in the six divisions and three portfolio investment areas. I am as concerned as 

you are about morale. This is a significant challenge. It comes 

down to leadership. We welcomed 20 new highly qualified experts 

and professionals on board. We are manned up to about 66 percent 

of the 100 percent staffing that I desire to have in place, and we 

will be there by the end of 2007. We have welcomed back four government-service employees who left earlier in the year and have 

asked to come back on board the S&T team; and, of course, we 

have welcomed them on board. 

I have been personally proactive in my outreach, as Chairman 

Thompson has indicated, welcoming businesses, large and small 

universities and vendors through SBI or Ma and Pa. I don’t know 

where good ideas come from, but they are welcome at our door, and 

I have an open door policy. 

I believe you will see we have made significant progress in getting the books right; and, in terms of our obligations, we have committed as of today 47 percent of our fiscal year 2007 budget. That 

compares with 6 percent the same time last year, which explains 

some of the language that was developing and was put into legislation last year by the Congress. 

We have enabled the customers through an integrated product 

team—my time is short. I know you will address this in many of 

your questions. I look forward to those, but I will tell you, if you 

are wondering how we are doing and the progress we have made, 

I encourage you—and I know you will in your oversight role—to 

ask my customers in DHS, are we meeting their needs? To ask the 

universities and laboratories, are they fully engaged and enabled? 

And to ask the entrepreneurs in this great country and around the 

world, are we providing the resources that they need in order to 

be agile and make a difference? 

So, again, I am honored to be before you today on Valentine’s 

Day. I welcome your oversight. I look forward to your questions 

and your concerns and working throughout the year with you and 

your staff to make the Nation safer. Again, thank you so much so 

much. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, thank you for your opening statement; 

and I want to thank, again, all the witnesses for their testimony 

today. 

10 

[The statement of Mr. Cohen and Mr. Williams follows:] 

PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAY M. COHEN AND RICHARD

WILLIAMS

Introduction 

Good Morning Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished 

Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today to update you 

on the progress of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate) and discuss how the President’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2008 will position us to develop and transition technology to 

protect the Nation from catastrophic events. Also invited to testify and joining me 

today is Mr. Richard Williams, Chief Financial Officer and Director of the S&T 

Strategy, Programming and Budget Division. Mr. Williams will testify about improvements to S&T’s financial management processes. 

The S&T Directorate is committed to serving our customers, the components that 

comprise the Department of Homeland Security—and their customers—the hardworking men and women on the front lines of homeland security, especially the first 

responders, who need ready access to technology and information to perform their 

jobs more efficiently and safely. I am honored and privileged to serve with the talented scientists, engineers and other professionals who support these dedicated 

Americans in our shared mission to secure our homeland and defend our freedoms. 

First and foremost, I am very appreciative of the leadership of the Congress in 

its support of the S&T Directorate, and of me personally, as I assumed the role of 

Under Secretary for Science and Technology last August. The informed counsel of 

Committee Members with homeland security oversight, and that of their staffs, has 

been invaluable to my efforts to position the S&T Directorate for accountability, tangible results and success, both for today and in the future. 

Also, thank you for your vote of confidence in the Directorate, evidenced by the 

decision to appropriate $848 million in FY 2007. This has been enormously helpful 

in my efforts to better align people with our mission to develop a robust science and 

technology capability to protect the Nation as Congress envisioned in the enabling 

legislation for the Department. We look forward to working with the 110th Congress 

in a bipartisan and non-partisan manner to use science to better secure the Nation. 

I am also grateful for the leadership of the President and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and for the vision and guidance that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson have contributed to the realignment process. 

The First 180 Days—Aligned and Open for business 

My first six months on the job have been focused on laying the foundation in organization, people, and processes to enable the Directorate to skillfully apply the resources you have wisely provided in ways that best serve the American people and 

better secure our homeland. I am pleased to report that we are ‘‘open for business,’’ 

and your support of the President’s FY 2008 Budget Request will allow us to build 

upon that momentum. 

As I’ve said on many occasions, the S&T Directorate must excel in four key areas 

if we are to accomplish these goals: We must get the organization, the people, the 

books, and the program content right. These four ‘‘gets’’ are the cornerstones of the 

realignment effort and we’ve made significant progress in each of these areas. In 

addition to the four gets, the four Bs—bombs, borders, bugs and business—provide 

the thematic approach to help keep us focused on the priority areas for the S&T 

Directorate. 

I have realigned the S&T Directorate to help it fulfill its potential of becoming 

the customer-focused, output-oriented, science and technology management organization that Congress intended it to be and the Nation deserves. I thank Congress 

for its support of the new organizational structure that, in turn, is supportive of a 

broad and balanced range of activities that are aimed at identifying, enabling and 

transitioning new capabilities to our customers to better protect the nation. We have 

organized our program management into six technical divisions that are led by veteran S&T Directorate staff members and linked to three research investment portfolio directors in a ‘‘matrix management’’structure. The technical divisions are focused on the enduring homeland security disciplines of Explosives; Chemical and Biological; Command, Control & Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; 

Human Factors; and Infrastructure Protection and Geophysical Sciences. The portfolio directors—Director of Research, Director of Transition, and Director of Innovation/Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)—provide 

cross-cutting coordination of their respective aspects of the investment strategy 

within the technical divisions. 

11 

I am pleased to report that today the S&T Directorate has a strong leadership 

team in place with all key positions filled. Since August, we have also welcomed 20 

new highly qualified subject matter experts and professionals to the S&T Directorate, including three former DHS S&T employees who had previously left the Directorate and who have returned. Overall, we are 66 percent staffed and plan to 

have 100 percent of staff in place by the end of 2007. 

I have made significant strides in ‘‘getting the books right’’ by holding the S&T 

Directorate to a high standard of fiscal responsibility. Toward this end, I have established an Office of Strategy, Policy & Budget Division led by the S&T Chief Financial Officer that has put in place the systems and protocols that will enable the S&T 

Directorate to be fully responsive and transparent in the budget development process and in the sound fiscal management of S&T appropriations. This new office is 

enhancing the efficiency of S&T operations by integrating related functions of policy, 

planning, programming, budgeting and execution. Centralizing financial oversight 

has enabled the S&T Directorate to implement corrective actions to address financial management deficiencies and accelerate the distribution of funds to DHS Laboratories, Department of Energy National Laboratories, private industry and academia. As a result, the S&T Directorate has committed 47 percent of its FY 2007 

budget compared to 6 percent at the same time last year, significantly accelerating 

the distribution of funds to DHS Labs, DOE Labs, industry and academia, which 

will result in accelerated technology development and delivery to keep our Nation 

safer. 

In other developments, I have added a director of Special Programs to work in 

select, mission-critical areas. And a new director of Test & Evaluation and Standards is building upon the S&T Directorate’s previous work in homeland security 

standards and adding test and evaluation capabilities to advance this effort and 

draw greater industry participation in developing new technologies for homeland security applications throughout DHS. We have also established a Corporate Communications Office to inform and engage our customers and their customers in the S&T 

Directorate’s broad investment portfolios. 

I also know that we must look beyond our Department, indeed beyond our nation’s borders, for solutions in combating domestic terrorism. Therefore, consistent 

with DHS enabling legislation, I have established Interagency and International 

Program Offices responsible for, respectively, coordinating with other Executive 

Branch agencies to reduce duplication and identify unmet needs, and coordinating 

our international outreach efforts to help us tap into science and technology communities across the globe for solutions to counter domestic terrorism. Embedded S&T 

Directorate liaisons in Europe, the Americas and Pacific/Asia are casting a wide 


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global net to identify the most viable homeland security solutions and their providers. 

Last December, we saw the ‘‘physical manifestation’’ of our restructuring plan 

spring to life with the relocation of 340 of our staff members within the Directorate. 

Staff are now physically co-located within their new organizational alignments. At 

the same time, I issued the first S&T Organization and Requirements Manual 

(STORM) that defines functions, duties and responsibilities for the administration 

and management of the Directorate. The STORM tells our customers who we are 

and how we function so they may better understand the capabilities we can bring 

to bear in support of their protective missions. 

Throughout this process, it was very important to me personally that S&T staff 

be kept informed of our plans for the realignment and that they have a forum for 

asking questions and expressing their views and concerns. Since last August, I have 

held four ‘‘All Hands’’ meetings at regular intervals to brief all S&T staff, including 

teleconference links with staff in other locations such as the Transportation Security 

Laboratory in Atlantic City, Plum Island Animal Disease Center, and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New York City. These meetings also allow me 

to recognize the achievements of staff members, to answer questions and solicit 

input, and, most importantly, express my gratitude for their excellent work and for 

all the cooperation, support and patience they have exhibited during this transitional period. 

During the first six months of my tenure as Under Secretary for Science and 

Technology, I have focused on building the organization, team and processes that 

are necessary for any science and technology management organization to succeed. 

While our effort to completely institutionalize these changes continue, we now have 

a foundation in place that allows us to focus on delivering products to our customers 

as we execute our FY 2007 appropriation. The S&T Directorate is striving to be effective, cost-efficient, responsive, agile and flexible, and with your support of the 

President’s FY 2008 Budget Request we will build on our current momentum. 

CUSTOMER/OUTPUT FOCUSED 

The S&T Directorate functions as the science and technology manager within the 

Department. We invest in science and technology that supports DHS components in 

their efforts to protect our homeland against catastrophic events—technology that 

makes the Nation safer. In the last six months, we have established meaningful 

working relationships with our DHS operational component customers. As they appear before you this year, I encourage you to ask them about the ways that S&T 

is addressing their operational needs. Thanks to the support of the Congress and 

the leadership of the Department, we are gaining significant momentum, and I 

humbly ask for your continued trust and support so that we can build on those efforts. 

The S&T Directorate develops and manages an integrated program of science and 

technology, from basic research through technology transition to customers that are 

the operating components of DHS, State, local and tribal governments, first responders and private sector entities. The managers of this program are predominantly active scientists and engineers in the many disciplines relevant to Homeland 

Security. They are guided by a multi-tiered investment strategy and review process 

based on higher guidance, the stated needs of our customers, and technology opportunities. 

The President’s FY 2008 Budget Request includes $86 million for the basic research portfolio which addresses the long-term R&D needs for the Department in 

sciences of enduring relevance to Homeland Security. The transition portfolio, designed to provide mission-capability relevant technology in support of the Department’s acquisition programs, is driven by customer needs through a DHS customerled IPT process. The President has requested $343 million in FY 2008 for this effort. 

The Director of HSARPA administers the $73 million innovation portfolio (includes 

the Small Business Innovation Research program) to promote revolutionary changes 

in technologies with a focus on prototyping and deploying technologies critical to 

homeland security. This portfolio, balanced around risk, cost, impact and time to delivery, produces capabilities of high technical quality responsive to homeland security requirements. 

13 

DHS Science & Technology Investment Portfolio 

Balance of Risk, Cost, Impact, and Time to Delivery 

Product Transition (0–3 yrs) 

• Focused on delivering near-term 

products/enhancements to acquisition 

• Customer IPT controlled 

• Cost, schedule, capability metrics 

Innovative Capabilities (2–5 yrs) 

• High-risk/High payoff 

• ‘‘Game changer/Leap ahead’’ 

• Prototype, Test and Deploy 

• HSARPA 

Basic Research (>8 yrs) 

• Enables future paradigm changes 

• University fundamental research 

• Gov’t lab discovery and invention 

Other (0–8+ years) 

• Test & Evaluation and Standards 

• Laboratory Operations & Congstructor 

• Management & Administration 

DHS Science & Technology Investment Portfolio 

Basic Research (>8 years) 

The S&T Directorate’s basic research portfolio addresses long-term research and 

development needs in support of DHS mission areas that will provide the Nation with an enduring capability in homeland security. This type of focused, protracted research investment has the potential to lead to paradigm shifts in the 

nation’s homeland security capabilities. 

The S&T Directorate’s basic research program enables fundamental research at 

our universities, government laboratories and in the private sector. Approximately $95 million is allocated for basic research in FY 2007 and $86 million, 

13 percent, is allocated in FY 2008. Eventually, I would like up to 20 percent 

of the S&T Directorate budget allocated for basic research. It is critical that 

basic research be funded at consistent levels from year to year to ensure a continuity of effort from the research community in critical areas that will seed 

homeland security science and technology for the next generation of Americans 

and prevent technological surprise. 

Product Transition (0 to 3 years) 

The centerpiece of the S&T Directorate’s product transition portfolio are Capstone 

Integrated Product Teams (IPT) that function in mission-critical areas to identify 

our customers’ needs and enable and transition near-term capabilities for addressing them. These Capstone IPTs engage DHS customers, acquisition partners, S&T 

technical division heads, and end users as appropriate in our product research, development, transition and acquisition activities. 

The IPT process enables our customers to identify and prioritize their operational 

capability gaps and requirements and make informed decisions about technology investments. The S&T Directorate, in turn, gathers the information it needs to respond with applicable technology solutions for closing these capability gaps. The 

science and technology solutions that are the outcome of this process, referred to as 

Enabling Homeland Capabilities, draw upon technologies that can be developed, matured, and delivered to our customer acquisition programs within three years. 

Capstone IPTs have been established in 10 major areas: Information Sharing/ 

Management; Cyber Security; People Screening; Border Security; Chemical/Biological Defense; Maritime Security; Explosive Prevention; Cargo Security; Infrastructure Protection; and Incident Management (includes first responder interoperability). 

14 

The S&T Directorate’s product transition/IPT process ensures that appropriate 

technologies are engineered and integrated into the DHS acquisition system for our 

customers. Approximately $343 million is allocated for product transition for FY 

2008, a little over 50 percent of my budget. 

The IPT process has created an excellent forum for the S&T Directorate to gain 

a better understanding of the most important issues of our customer agencies. Another tangible benefit of this Capstone IPT process has been improved coordination 

in addressing common functional challenges across the Department. This is due in 

large measure to the enthusiastic participation of DHS agency heads such as TSA 

Administrator Kip Hawley, Secret Service Director Mark Sullivan, and Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar and many other DHS leaders who have all personally 

chaired the IPTs relevant to their interests. 

In FY 2008, the S&T Directorate plans to transition or transfer four programs 

that pre-date the IPT process. These programs have reached technical maturity and 

will be transferred to other DHS agencies who will be responsible for their continued operation. The budget request reflects the transfer to the Office of Health Affairs of the operations portions of BioWatch 1 & 2, the Biological Warning and Incident Characterization (BWIC) system, and the Rapidly Deployable Chemical Detection System, totaling $84.1 million. Moving the operations portions of BioWatch out 

of S&T allows us to focus on completing the development of BioWatch 3. BioWatch 

is a bio-aerosol monitoring system designed to provide cities the earliest possible detection of a biological attack. BWIC interprets warning signals from BioWatch and 

public health surveillance data using incident characterization tools (e.g., plume and 

epidemiological models) to quickly determine the potential impacts a release may 

have. Together, these two systems provide emergency personnel with the information they need to respond effectively and initiate life-saving medical countermeasures. In addition, the FY 2008 budget request reflects the transfer of the 

SAFECOM program to the National Protection and Programs Directorate, totaling 

$5.0 million. 

It is important that the S&T Directorate also engage the emergency responder 

community and address operational issues to help them do their jobs more quickly, 

effectively and safely. S&T’s Technology Clearinghouse and TechSolutions initiatives 

provide direct support to emergency responders’ technology needs. The Technology 

Clearinghouse, created in accordance with a provision of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002, is designed to be a ‘‘one-stop shop’’ for access to technology information for 

Federal, State, and local public safety and first responder communities. 

TechSolutions provides a Web-based mechanism for responders to register their 

input regarding capability gaps that need to be addressed to help them in their jobs. 

S&T responds by identifying existing technology that may meet the need, or if nothing is available, proceeding with the rapid prototyping of an appropriate solution to 

be fielded in less than 18 months. S&T also houses the Office for Interoperability 


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and Communications, which aims to increase levels of emergency responder interoperability by developing tools and methodologies, as well as advancing standards 

that emergency response agencies can put into effect. 

Innovative Capabilities (2 to 5 years) 

S&T’s Innovation/HSARPA portfolio supports a key goal of mine for the Directorate in its efforts to put advanced capabilities into the hands of our customers as 

soon as possible. It has made important inroads in research areas aligned with our 

DHS customers. Toward this end, S&T has introduced two important new initiatives. One of these, Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions (HIPS) are designed 

to deliver prototype-level demonstrations of game-changing technologies within two 

to five years. 

The second initiative, High Impact Technology Solutions (HITS), is designed to 

provide proof-of-concept solutions within one to three years that could result in 

high-payoff technology breakthroughs. While these projects are very high-risk, they 

offer the potential for ‘‘leap-ahead’’ gains in capability should they succeed. While 

projects are separately budgeted in ‘‘Innovation/HSARPA’’ (based on moderate to 

high risk with a high payoff, if successful), ALL are executed within the six technical divisions. 

The S&T Directorate also continues to manage an active Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program on behalf of DHS that currently issues two solicitations each year and generates multiple awards for the small business community. 

The first solicitation for FY 2007 opens in mid-February and the second solicitation 

is planned for release in May. The solicitations will address topics in areas that are 

aligned with the six technical divisions. 

The Innovation/HSARPA portfolio is receiving $60 million in FY 2008 funding for 

the innovative/leap-ahead HIPS and HITS projects. Because of the short timeline for 

HIPS and HITS, we anticipate that these projects will respond to the urgent needs 

of the DHS components for solutions to fill capability gaps. 

Enabling U.S. Leadership in Science & Technology 

University Based Centers of Excellence 

The S&T Directorate is developing a robust, results-oriented network of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence (COEs) to leverage the independent thinking 

and ground-breaking capabilities of the Nation’s colleges and universities. The 

COEs are conducting multidisciplinary research and education, each focused on an 

area critical to homeland security. The Office of University Programs is providing 

the communications and infrastructure to produce, share, and transition the Centers’ research results, data, and technology to customers and end users. 

Currently, seven pre-existing COEs connect experts and researchers at more than 

80 colleges and universities, including several Minority Serving Institutions (MSI). 

More than 20 partners representing industry, laboratories, think tanks, nonprofit 

organizations, and other agencies also participate. University Programs is coordinating COE efforts with other S&T Directorate-sponsored, university-based initiatives. Under the new S&T organizational construct, existing COEs are being strategically aligned with at least one S&T division, or to Directorate-wide activities such 

as Operations Analysis and the Homeland Security Institute, in a structure that 

will best support the Divisions’ fundamental research and development activities 

and other requirements. 

We are proceeding with plans to establish four additional COEs over the next two 

fiscal years to help round-out the Directorate’s need for university-based fundamental research. The new COEs will combine the research missions of some existing 

COEs and add new research areas under the division-aligned construct to meet 

DHS needs. S&T has released Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) regarding 

plans to establish new COEs in the areas of explosives detection, mitigation, and 

response; border security and immigration; maritime, island, and extreme/remote 

environment security; and natural disasters, coastal infrastructure and emergency 

management. The competitive selection process is designed to ensure that institutions of high quality and academic merit participate from as many areas of the 

United States as practicable. 

DHS Scholars and Fellows Program 

DHS education programs are helping to attract and nurture future scientific leaders for the homeland security workforce and to strengthen the expertise of our existing labor pool. University Programs is engaging high-performing students through 

the DHS Scholars and Fellows program. Increasingly, S&T’s scholarships and fellowships will become aligned to the Centers of Excellence and to the DHS mission. 

During this period of transition, we will honor our commitments to all currently participating Scholars and Fellows. 

16 

The FY 2008 budget requests $38.7 million for S&T’s University Programs, which 

includes the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence and the Scholars and Fellows 

Program. 

Office of National Laboratories 

In carrying out its mission, the S&T Directorate works to develop, sustain, and 

renew a coordinated network of DOE National Laboratories, Federal laboratories 

and University Centers, the infrastructure needed by multi-disciplinary teams of 

scientists, engineers and academics to discover, develop and transition homeland security capabilities to operational end-users. 

The FY 2008 budget request includes $88.8 million for the Office for National 

Laboratories (ONL), through which the S&T Directorate’s laboratory facilities 

programs are executed. ONL provides the Nation with a coordinated, enduring 

core of productive science, technology and engineering laboratories, organizations and institutions, which can supply knowledge and technology required to 

secure our homeland. In addition to oversight of laboratory operations in direct 

support of the Department and its missions, ONL also has the specific responsibility for coordinating homeland security-related activities and laboratory-directed research conducted within the DOE National Laboratories. 

Industry Participation in DHS Science & Technology 

Industry is a valued partner of DHS S&T and its continued participation in developing solutions for homeland security applications is vital to our effort to safeguard 

the nation. Consistent with S&T’s new structure, our Innovation/HSARPA portfolio 

and six technical divisions will be releasing BAAs that seek industry participation 

to address specific challenges in their respective areas. For example, Innovation/ 

HSARPA has already posted BAAs seeking expertise in tunnel detection technologies, container security (SAFECON program), and a mobile screening laboratory 

to support human screening R&D in the field. 

Innovation/HSARPA plans to release six additional BAAs shortly to address areas 

that include critical infrastructure protection, hostile intent detection and other key 

areas. No later than spring 2007, we intend to issue a BAA for longer-term efforts 

that cover our complete innovation topic area portfolio. 

No one knows where good ideas come from and for that reason I have been personally proactive in both seeking out and receiving technology briefs and opportunities. This is a culture I am working to instill throughout the DHS S&T Directorate. 

The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act of 

2002, administered in the S&T Directorate, is proving to be a valuable tool in expanding the creation, proliferation and use of cutting edge anti-terrorism technologies throughout the United States. Over the past year we have made significant 

improvements in implementing the Act, including a revised, streamlined Application 

Kit; new coverage for emerging technologies that are undergoing test and evaluation; increased use of pre-application teleconferences between SAFETY Act technology evaluators and applicants to review requirements and answer questions prior 

to submitting a full application; and procedures to expedite applications for technologies involved with pending government procurements. In 2006, 65 unique technologies and services were approved for coverage under the Act, with approximately 

40 currently under evaluation. I am mindful of the interest in this program in the 

Congress and across the Nation. 

As part of our outreach efforts to encourage greater industry participation, the Directorate is hosting the first Homeland Security Science & Technology Stakeholders 

Conference, May 21—24. The conference will inform government, industry and academia of the direction, emphasis, and scope of the research investments by the S&T 

Directorate, and provide information about business opportunities. The conference 

will present the Directorate’s new organization, explain how to do business with the 

DHS S&T research enterprise, and provide visibility into new and emerging technologies through an Innovation Gateway Marketplace. I hope you will join us for 

this event at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. 

FY 2008 BUDGET OVERVIEW 

Science and Technology Directorate’s budget request of $799.1 million includes 

$142.6 million for Management and Administration (M&A) and $656.5 million for 

research, development, testing and evaluation. M&A funds federal employees’ salaries, benefits, travel, and other expenses at Headquarters and the S&T laboratories. 

This staff maintains oversight of S&T’s extensive day-to-day technical and administrative operations. M&A also funds business operations, including working capital 

fund, and management support. Research, Development, Acquisition and Operations 

supports the needs of the operational components of the Department and is categorized to match the new S&T organization. 

17 

• The $25.9 million requested for Borders and Maritime Security will support 

technology development for the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a comprehensive 

multi-year plan to secure America’s borders. This Division is providing the tools, 

processes, and manpower to ensure SBI implementation is effective and affordable. 

We are working directly with the SBI program executive office to provide a transformation strategy for SBI; develop the next generation of modeling and analysis 

tools for strategic planning; and provide systems engineering support. The Division 

will also develop and transition technologies to industry to reduce risk and support 

border security programs like SBInet, a technology acquisition program under the 

Customs and Border Protection SBInet Program Management Office. 

We are also developing technologies to ensure the integrity of cargo shipments 

with known origins, and to better target suspicious shipments, and to enhance the 

end-to-end security of the supply chain—from the manufacturer of goods to final delivery. One of the most significant potential terrorist threats to the Nation is the 

vast numbers of shipping containers that flow through our borders each year, most 

of which enter without physical inspection. Technologies and processes developed 

within this area will assure government customs and shippers of the integrity of 

shipping containers and its cargo and communicate the container’s status as well 

as security information. By employing a system-of-systems approach, this will deliver technological capabilities to DHS customers and end users that address supply 

chain vulnerabilities. These capabilities are directed toward enhanced physical security and information management, and bound by a security architecture which encompasses the world’s supply chain. 

• The $228.9 million requested for Chemical and Biological will provide the basic 

knowledge, technologies and systems needed to protect against possible chemical 

and biological attacks on the Nation’s population, agriculture or infrastructure. The 

greatest emphasis is on those biological attacks that have the greatest potential for 

widespread catastrophic damage to the population. These include—but are not limited to—aerosolized anthrax, and smallpox. 

The Division conducts material threat and risk assessments on both naturally occurring and engineered agents; conducts experiments to close major scientific knowledge gaps that could have a large impact on how the Nation responds to a biological 

attack; and provides scientific support to the intelligence community. As such, the 

primary output is an intelligence-informed, scientific characterization and 

prioritization of the bio-terrorist risks to be used by the Homeland Security Council 

and partnering agencies (e.g. DHHS, EPA, USDA, and the Intelligence Community). 

Based on this knowledge, we are developing effective measures for deterrence, detection, and mitigation of biological terrorism acts against the U.S. population, infrastructure, and agricultural system. This includes developing tools to meet Federal, State, and, local emergency responder needs such as operational models to support Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). 

The Division is developing next-generation, biological-threat-agent detectors that 

recognize the signatures or fingerprints of biological agents. These detectors will be 

incorporated into the BioWatch system to substantially increase the system’s capabilities and significantly reduce the response time. Other significant program activities include developing biological aerosol detection and sensor systems for monitoring the Nation’s critical infrastructure such as government buildings, airports, 

subways, office buildings, shopping malls, sports arenas, hotels and hospitals. These 

‘‘detect-to-protect’’ systems detect biological agents within minutes (acting as reliable ‘smoke alarms’) to protect high value facilities and their occupants. Many of 

the technologies being developed in this program will be manufactured and used by 

the private sector. 

Chemical countermeasures work enhances the Nation’s capability to anticipate, 

prevent, protect from, respond to and recover from chemical terrorist attacks. The 

chemical threat spectrum comprises a broad array of chemicals, to include chemical 

warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, and non-traditional agents (NTAs). NTAs 

include highly toxic materials that have seen development interest by foreign entities but are not yet fully developed as weapons. The barrier to proliferation of critical NTA information into rogue states and terrorists is increasingly thin. Existing 

and emerging chemical warfare agents can potentially be used against virtually any 

civilian target resulting in significant loss of life and impedance in the use of key 

infrastructure. Chemical countermeasures addresses these threats by: enabling comprehensive understanding and analyses of chemical threats; developing pre-event 

assessment, discovery, and interdiction for chemical threats; developing warning, 

notification, and timely analysis of chemical attacks; optimizing technology and 

process for recovery from chemical attacks; and enhancing the capability to identify 

a chemical attack’s source. 

18 

• The $63.6 million requested for Command, Control and Interoperability will 

fund programs focused on cyber security; communications, compatibility and interoperability; and knowledge management. 

Cyber security research, development, testing and evaluation is focused on improving the security of the existing cyber infrastructure and providing a foundation 

for a more secure infrastructure through coordinated efforts with other Government 

agencies and private industry. Cyber attacks on U.S. information networks can have 

serious consequences such as disrupting critical operations, causing loss of revenue 

and intellectual property, or loss of life. The Division also addresses cyber security 

requirements from internal Department customers in support of the DHS’s operational missions in critical infrastructure protection. It also addresses related aspects of national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications. 

Communications, interoperability and compatibility programs within Command, 

Control and Interoperability strengthen interoperable wireless communications, improve effective information sharing, and develop tools to enhance overall coordination and planning at all levels of government. Currently, the Nation’s capacity for 

interoperable communications is hindered by suboptimized planning and coordination, and Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, and Integrated Federal, 

State and local information sharing are working to strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility. 

We are also developing knowledge management tools to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks and to prepare for and respond to natural and man-made disasters. 

This will provide new capabilities for the DHS Intelligence & Analysis Directorate 

and the DHS information enterprise for the integration, management, analysis, and 

dissemination of actionable information. This knowledge management research provides tools and methods to handle massive amounts of information that is widely 

dispersed in a great variety of forms. Being able to find such information, understand its meaning, and then use it to assess an actual threat and determine the 

level of risk before an attack or incident occurs is the best way to save lives and 

preserve our way of life. 

• The $63.7 million requested for Explosives will fund programs focused on the 

detection, mitigation, and response to explosives threats such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers. The Division employs a broad range of existing and emerging approaches to detect and lessen the impact of explosive materials. These include baggage-screening devices as well as the capability to identify 

explosives residue. Terrorist events like the Madrid rail bombing, the London Underground attack, and the recent disclosure of planned attacks on U.S.-bound flights 

from the United Kingdom, all involved explosive threats. Those events underscore 

the operational need for a unified approach to the detection of, response to, and 

mitigation of explosive threats across all modes of transportation. 

In explosives detection, we are improving existing explosive detection methods, 

developing new technologies, and integrating improvements and technological developments into both deployed and new systems. Detection is a key defense against 

successful attacks. For example, the Check Point Program applies to multiple 

venues where real or virtual portals exist. Historically, airports have received the 

most attention, but similar portal situations can be found at rail stations and cruise 

ship terminals. Check point programs address suicide bombers, carry-ons, leave-behind IEDs, and vehicle-borne IEDs. The two other principal programs in this area 

are checked baggage and cargo. Like aviation, rail and ship modes share checked 

baggage and cargo screening challenges. 

The check point program addresses the risk of catastrophic loss of mass transit 

resulting from small IEDs detonated in passenger cabins and the catastrophic loss 

or hostile takeover of mass transit resulting from the presence of certain weapons 

in passenger cabins. The principal objective of the program is developing advanced 

technology for integration with future check point systems to detect explosives and 

concealed weapons, while meeting requirements for automation, efficiency, and cost 

reduction. Longer-term objectives include applying systems integration and a seamless flow of information with reduced impact to the checkpoint operations environment. The program also strives to upgrade currently deployed technologies to address emerging threats and concealment methods. 

The checked baggage program identifies and develops the next generation of 

checked baggage screening systems, and supports continuous improvements toward 

the Congressionally directed goal of 100-percent screening of aviation checked baggage by electronic or other approved means with minimum or no impact to the flow 

of people or commerce. Checked baggage will focus on continuing work with Manhattan II by conducting system development and integration of the Manhattan-II 

19 

checked baggage program, complete the preliminary system architecture test and 

evaluation, and conduct detection-technology test and evaluation. 

The cargo program is developing the next generation of air cargo screening systems, with transition targeted for FY 2011. • The $12.6 million requested for Human Factors will apply the social and behavioral sciences to improve detection, analysis, and the understanding of threats posed 

by individuals, groups, and radical movements. This knowledge will support the preparedness, response and recovery of communities impacted by catastrophic events 

and to advance national security by integrating human factors into homeland security technologies. Further this will enhance the capability to control movement of 

individuals into and out of the United States and its critical assets through accurate, timely, and easy-to-use biometric identification and credentialing validation 

tools. • The $24.0 million requested for Infrastructure and Geophysical will develop 

technical solutions and reach-back capabilities to improve State, local, tribal, and 

private sector preparedness for and response to all hazardous events impacting the 

population and critical infrastructure. 

The Division’s focus is on identifying and mitigating the vulnerabilities of the 17 

critical infrastructure sectors and key assets that keep our society and economy 

functional. The Division models and simulates the Nation’s critical infrastructures 

to determine how various scenarios will affect each sector, provides decision support 

tools to guide decision makers in identifying gaps and vulnerabilities, and develops 

predictive tools and methods to aid in preparing for and responding to various catastrophes. Additionally, the Division focuses on responder preparedness and response 

capabilities that improve the ability of the Nation to prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from all-hazards emergencies. Applying the best available science and technology for the safety and security our emergency responders and homeland security 

professionals ensures they may effectively perform their jobs—saving lives and restoring critical services. 

The Division is also developing a capability that will enable owners and operators 

of the most vital critical infrastructure sites to implement affordable and reliable 

blast and projectile mitigation measures improving capabilities to withstand these 

threats. The program is developing suites of advanced materials, design procedures, 

and innovative construction methods that can be used to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. 

In addition, the Division is developing decision-making and information-sharing 

tools to aid responders. This will dramatically enhance the information management 

and information sharing capabilities of incident commanders and emergency responders as emergencies increasingly demand more highly coordinated responses. • The $73 million requested for Innovation/HSARPA, 59.9 million of which will 

focus on homeland security research and development (R&D) that poses a risk of 

failure, but if successful would lead to significant technology breakthroughs that 

would greatly enhance DHS operations; the remainder includes the SBIR program. 

HSARPA carries out its activities in two areas: (1) Homeland Innovative 

Prototypical Solutions, which are designed to deliver prototype-level demonstrations 

of game-changing technologies in two to five years. These programs are moderate 

risk, but offer high pay-off and (2) High Impact Technology Solutions, which are designed to provide proof-of-concept answers that could result in high-payoff technology breakthroughs. Though there is a considerable risk of failure, these projects 

offer the potential for significant gains resulting from success. 

The $88.8 million requested for Laboratory Facilities will fund operation of the 

S&T laboratory facilities, including Plum Island, the Transportation Security Lab, 

Environmental Measurements Laboratory, the Chemical Security Analysis Center, 

and the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. Laboratory Facilities also funds design work on the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility and upgrade of the Plum Island facility. 

• The $25.5 million requested for Test & Evaluation and Standards funds two 

areas Test and Evaluation (T&E) and Standards. T&E works across DHS and ensures that systems meet the capability needs of users, validates performance and 

provides measurable improvement to operational capabilities. Effective testing and 

evaluation programs provide crucial information to decision makers for acquisition 

and deployment of technology. Standards are consensus based measures—from basic 

specifications to performance criteria—that give DHS and its customers confidence 

that technology and systems will perform as required. The S&T Directorate works 

across DHS and with numerous external partners to build consensus and support 

development of needed standards. 

• The $24.7 million requested for Transition programs will expedite technology 

transition to deliver near-term products and technologies to meet DHS component 

20 

requirements. This area also funds the Office of the SAFETY Act Implementation, 

transition support programs such as the Technology Clearinghouse, and the S&T 

Directorate’s international and interagency programs. 

• The $38.7 million requested for University Programs will allow the S&T Directorate to engage the academic community to support current DHS priorities and enhance homeland security capabilities by providing ground-breaking research, analyses and educational approaches. The program is designed to bring together the best 

scientific talent and resources from U.S. academic institutions to help solve complex 

and technologically challenging homeland security problems facing our Nation. Program activities simultaneously focus on building homeland security expertise in the 

academic community, creating strategic partnerships, and fostering a new generation of homeland security experts. 

The program works to: 

• Strengthen U.S. scientific leadership in homeland security research; 

• Generate and disseminate knowledge and technical advances to aid homeland 

security frontline professionals; 

• Foster a homeland security culture within the academic community through 

research and education programs; and 

• Build a highly-trained science and engineering workforce dedicated to homeland security that will sustain progress over time. 

This program invests in two areas: the university-based Centers of Excellence, 

and student Scholarships and Fellowships intended to build and develop the next 

generation of academic researchers in disciplines that are relevant and essential to 

homeland security. 

CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, I am pleased to report that the S&T Directorate is well positioned 

today to mobilize the nation’s vast technical and scientific capabilities to enable solutions to detect, protect against and recover from catastrophic events. 

Our plans for restructuring the organization have been implemented and it is indeed gratifying to see that they appear to be working as we advance to the critical 

phase of product transition. Increasingly, our DHS customers are recognizing the 

substantial value that S&T’s technical expertise brings to their operations. We have 

engaged them, eliciting participation at the highest levels, to join us at the table 

to work constructively on solutions for countering the formidable threats this nation 

faces. 

We appreciate the many demands on the taxpayers’ precious dollars and you have 

my commitment that the S&T Directorate will be wise stewards of the public monies you have entrusted to us. We are steadfast in our resolve to serve the best interests of the nation by investing in the talent and technology that will provide America with a sustainable capability to protect against acts of terror and other highconsequence events for generations to come. 

Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to meet with you 

today to discuss a newly realigned Science & Technology Directorate that is meeting 

homeland security challenges with a renewed sense of purpose and mission. I look 

forward to working with you throughout the 110th Congress. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I will remind each member that he or she will 

have 5 minutes to question the panel, and I will now recognize myself for questions. 

Admiral with respect to personnel and morale problems at the 

S&T Directorate, Admiral Cohen, I have a question about these 

issues. A government agency, as you know, is only as good as its 

employees; and we are seeing some extremely disturbing trends in 

the Department, as I said in the past. The recently released Office 

of Personnel Management survey ranked DHS at or near the bottom in job performance and job satisfaction. 

Though I know that the Department’s employees are, by and 

large, extraordinarily capable and dedicated, I am concerned that 

the best and the brightest are either no longer willing to come to 

the agency or are leaving in droves because they are fed up with 

poor management. 

Anecdotes shared by former S&T employees are disturbing, as 

you can imagine. Committee staff has spoken with several former 

21 

employees last year, admittedly at the early stages of your tenure, 

which I acknowledge. Most spoke about their high hopes for the organization. Which eventually yielded the disappointing realities of 

deficient leadership and bureaucratic morass. 

Now I mentioned the quote by the former employee in August , 

2006, which deeply concerns me. I am also concerned about the Department’s efforts to hire more government workers and less contractors. 

In reviewing your budget, I see that there are a large number of 

employees at the GS–14 level, actually, about 133 employees, and 

GS–13 employees, 89 or so on the scale, compared to employees at 

the middle levels of the schedule. 

You previously stated that one of your priorities is to establish 

an organization composed primarily—or predominantly, rather—of 

government employees, with a small number of contracting support 

staff and IPAs. I am concerned that the current organization, composed mostly of upper-level employees, does not encourage longterm stability. 

So my question is this, will you provide the subcommittee will 

your plan to improve morale, minimize turnover, strengthen workforce recruitment and secure institutional memory within your Directorate? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. Good answer. Thank you. 

Let me turn now to delay of issuing the national S&T strategic 

plans. Homeland Security Act, section 302, part 2, that suggests 

that Congress pass the 2002, requires the Secretary to develop, 

one, a national policy on homeland security science and technology 

and, two, a strategic plan for the Science and Technology Directorate. 

Unfortunately, neither of these plans has ever been produced. I 

understand that the S&T strategic plan, but not the national plan, 

will finally be delivered to the Congress by the end of March. I 

think this strategic plan must explain the method by which longterm and short-term projects are prioritized and funded within the 

Directorate. 

As you know, the S&T is working with a very limited budget 

right now. S&T needs to make sure that its investments will more 

than likely lead to procurement requests by the Department components. Similarly, the Department components need to be able to 

discuss their requirements with S&T through the process to ensure 

that S&T is providing them with what they need. Therefore, there 

must be some formalized Department-wide coordination on R&D 

policy and procurement. 

Now I studied your Integrated Project Team, IPT, structure; and 

I believe that this is a definitely a step in the right defection. The 

IPT allows the communication between acquisition component and 

S&T program manager to make sure that everyone is working together. But I would like to see some formal documents or agreements that S&T and the components enter into to really ensure 

that the expectations of both parties are clearly spelled out ahead 

of time. So I would like to know how these projects would be 

prioritized. I think that we were all bewildered, actually, last sumVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Dec 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-6\35265.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
22 

mer when we found that liquid explosives were not a high-priority 

issue for the Department at the time. 

So the strategic plan must explain how projects are prioritized on 

the corporate review board, which oversees large acquisitions, and 

the old Management Directive 1400, which previously recreated coordination between S&T and the components. 

So my questions are these: 

First, will these issues be addressed by your strategic plan; and, 

second, when can we expect the release of the national plan for 

science and technology? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, chairman, first of all, as you know, I believe 

in full transparency. The enabling legislation indicates that the 

vast majority of the S&T and the research that I do in my Directorate be unclassified. We have provided, as you know, in the new 

organizational construct for special access programs and classified 

programs, but I believe that my priorities and the adjustment portfolio needs to be transparent so that the best can contribute. 

Concerning the National Research and Development Plan, I have 

had a chance to review that draft, and it is quite thick, as you can 

imagine, because it involves almost all of the Federal agencies that 

was prepared in both 2005 and 2006. I will make that available to 

the Congress. I have no participation in that. 

But the enabling legislation was very wise. You did not intend, 

as I read those 19 pages, to have me recreate the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, the DOD or the 

DOE labs; and I believe that was a very good model. You did give 

me access to leverage, and I appreciate that very much, the DOE 

labs and my own small labs. 

But you did want and encourage me and the other departments 

of government to have me leverage their tens of billions of dollars 

of S&T science and technology investment, whether it is basic research, applied research or advanced technology, without further 

investment by me so that I could then harvest it and apply it to 

the needs of the homeland security mission. 

I cannot specify to those other departments where or how they 

invest. They have their own requirements process. They have their 

own appropriations law and oversight. But, to the extent they do, 

they give that to me; and then I can leverage that. 

Our integrated product team, for instance, we have the Technology Support Working Group, TSWG, which is the central focus 

in the Department of Defense, at the table offering technologies to 

my customer. We have brought the Department of Energy and others, HHS, USDA, on board likewise. 

So the national plan had difficulty—and I am going now on information that I have received—in getting approval by all of the departments throughout the Federal Government because there was 

a perception—I believe an incorrect perception—that the S&T Directorate in Homeland Security was trying to mandate how and 

where they should invest, which is not provided for in the enabling 

legislation. 

So on the national plan, I will work—as you know, in my organization I have a liaison for agencies and a foreign liaison who are 

already very active in doing this—to bring to you a coordinated 

plan that leverages what they are doing but focused on homeland 

23 

security; and I hope to do that under Dr. Marburger, who is responsible, in large measure, for coordinating S&T across the government. 

As for my strategic plan, I have put in place in the last 6 months 

an organizational construct and processes which, as we did in 

Navy, very quickly aligned to the goals and the requirements of the 

customer and the mission of the organization. Then what we do is 

we take excursions, whether that is an innovation, higher risks, 

sometimes too high a risk, for acquisition, but also where we can’t 

solve problems or we don’t have the enabling technology, that is 

the basis for basic research. That is where we invest in the universities and the laboratories. 

So what you will see—and you will get this no later June of 

2007—my strategic plan as we go forward—and it will be comprehensive—addressing the concerns that you have addressed this 

afternoon, because I share those concerns—you will see would follow the processes I have put in place. 

Finally, we have been going very fast, as you know, because the 

Nation is at war and I want to get the deliverables to my customers and the customer of my customers. Organizationally, I have 

established—and it is in writing, and it will become a Management 

Directive—what I call the STORM, Science and Technology Organization Regulation Manual; and it clearly specifies in writing without question what the roles and responsibilities are to support the 

organization. I briefed the committee and you on that. 

We are operating under—that is the basis for our budget, that 

the Congress very kindly allowed me to come in with an omnibus 

reprogramming for fiscal year 2007 to initiate these programs as 

well as OMB, who aligned the 2008 budget to do this. 

But we in the IPT process, which we have in large measure 

taken from what we did in the Navy, we have informal documents 

now. We are glad to provide to you the memorandums of understanding. 

We are in the fourth round now in all of the capstone—11 capstone integrated product teams, with Kip Hawley, Mark Sullivan, 

Vice Admiral Johnson, Chief Aguilar, sit as the customer. They 

have not delegated this. They sit there. They tell us their needs. 

We tell them when the money—we will translate that into a Management Directive now that we have Paul Schneider, the new 

Under Secretary from management on board; and I am so pleased 

to be working with him because he and I had the same tag team 

in Navy and we expect the same results in Homeland Security. 

So we will give you the formal documents, but I will not allow 

the administration and the bureaucracy to get in the way of the 

deliverables for my customer. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. I have great confidence in 

you and look forward to our working with you. 

It is now my pleasure to recognize my ranking member of the 

subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to welcome the witnesses again. Admiral Cohen, after our 

visit last week, I am convinced the Department has hired the right 

man at the right time; and I know, as we say in the Navy, you will 

be able to turn this ship around. 

24 

I come from a State, as you know, that has more international 

border with Mexico than any other; and it has one of the largest 

ports in the world, Port of Houston. I think our greatest fear on 

this, sitting on this committee, is the thought that a weapon of 

mass destruction could somehow get into this country. I know you 

share that concern, which is why you are where you are doing the 

great service you are to this country. 

I want to hit on three areas that I want you to address from a 

technology standpoint but also from a budgetary standpoint in 

terms of what you intend to do about it. 

The first has to do with detection capabilities. I know that 

DNDO is primarily focused on nuclear detection at the ports and 

at the border. They had made some progress which I am happy to 

see. But BioWatch obviously is a program that is under your jurisdiction that has to do with detecting biological weapons possibly 

getting in either through ports or at the ports of entry, land ports. 

The second issue is the biometric and credentialing technologies 

that I believe are so important to determine who is coming into 

this country, how can we keep track of these individuals, and how 

can we enforce an exit program which I think is severely lacking, 

if you will, today. And if we are going to discuss any sort of temporary worker program, that is obviously going to be a key element 

to that. 

Then, finally, as you know, we passed in the last Congress a Secure Fence Act which does call for physical barriers at strategic 

points on the border. I have always been a believer that technology 

can be our best friend here and technology between those barriers 

can provide a virtual wall, and we are just not quite there yet. 

If you can comment on the status of that. I know I am throwing 

a lot in into one question. Comment on these three key points and 

where are we in terms of budgeting for these issues? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Well, all of these, of course, are very, very important issues that 

the Congress has shown leadership and worked closely with the administration on. You have indicated that in the nuclear radiological 

area that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, which 

with the concurrence of the Congress under section 872, was divested from the S&T Directorate last year and now stands as a cradle-to-grave organization very similar to naval reactors in the Department of the Navy. 

I know that Vayl Oxford, who heads DNDO, testified with me 

last year. I am sure he will testify with me again and independently of me this year. And I know that Secretary Chertoff in the 

hearings he has already had this year has addressed the significant 

efforts that we have made in nuclear radiological screening at the 

ports, not only seaports but the port of entry and the plans to go 

forward over the next couple of years. 

I know that there have been some press articles on this for some 

of the experimentation which I salute Vayl Oxford for leaning forward in the New York City area. But, as I briefed you, I have responsibility. While Vayl is inch wide and a thousand miles deep, 

I am one inch deep and a thousand miles wide. That is the nature 

of S&T, and I think that is appropriate. 

25 

So in our innovation portfolio, under what I call our homeland 

innovative prototypical solutions, we have proposed in the budget 

that I go forward with an initiative which we call SAFECON, for 

safe container. We have to be mindful not only of the security but 

also of the economic impacts of what we do. 

So in the 30 seconds it takes for the claw to take that 20—or 40- 

foot container off a ship and then land it on the trailer as we go 

forward, it is my goal, in at least two different ports, to go ahead 

and experiment with nuclear radiological scanners which we will 

ask DNDO to help us with, but also chemical, biological as well as 

explosives, meaning conventional explosives, and also looking for 

stowaways, looking for people who are illegally trying to come into 

the country through these means. So that in the 30 seconds that 

a claw is on that container, as it is being moved it will do all of 

those scans. 

It may require that we have a composite top instead of a steel 

top on containers. But we know how to do that in legislation. It 

may require that there be rubber-sealed puncture holes at specified 

points where probes can go in and sense what is inside the container. But the goal would be in the 30 seconds all these scans 

would be done. 

If the operator gets a green light, it is clear. It lands. Commerce 

goes on. 

If the operator gets a yellow light, it means scanning complete. 

It goes to the holding area. We inspect it by other means. 

If they get a red light, it means there is something nefarious; and 

in my mind, although I am not operational, it will go back on the 

ship and we will consider the ship’s sailing. There are a lot of people who don’t like that solution, but there are other things you can 

do. The ship doesn’t necessarily have to sail. 

So that is what we are looking to do to bring technology to bear. 

Now some people have told me some of these technologies don’t 

exist. Others may take 30 hours, others may take 30 minutes. I am 

a big believer in competition. Leadership by embarrassment. Build 

it and they will come. So if we can’t get everything in 30 seconds 

it tells me where I need to change my basic research. It goes to the 

chairman’s point of how do we focus where we invest to find a phenomenology. 

You asked about biometrics. This is a very important area. The 

Secretary, Secretary Chertoff, has already testified to the desire to 

get the 10 fingerprints. Candidly, I didn’t understand why you 

needed 10 fingerprints before I came to the Department. But I do 

now understand that there are so many latent fingerprints, you 

know, that are unidentified that now with 10 fingerprints we can 

better identify identities to events, crimes, other events that have 

occurred, as part of keeping one of Secretary Chertoff’s top priorities, bad people, out of the United States. 

We are committed to this. And I think if you ask the Commandant of the Coast Guard, he will share with you, if he hasn’t 

already, a testimony. His handheld detector that we provided that 

they take on board ships, it takes a picture of the individual. In 

his case, it takes one finger. We are going to give him 10 fingers 

here before too long. Ideally, we will give him 10 fingers without 

even having to touch the screen, and they are then connected wireVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Dec 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-6\35265.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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lessly. The Commandant has told me that he gets a 14 percent hit 

rate with individuals that they are scanning as they board ships 

who are people of interest. 

And I will leave it at that. 

Finally, a secure fence area, the Secretary has testified that 

under SBInet he drove for proven technologies, and that was to get 

the solution out there at a reasonable and a predictable cost. Boeing and others subs went ahead and won that contract, and they 

are in the process of putting that solution in place. 

But, Congressman, you have it exactly right. We can go a lot farther in technology. 

Again, with what we are doing, we talked a little bit about a 

Project CLOE, and there are other things to bring unmanned aerial 

vehicles, persistent surveillance. I think the Under Secretary has 

testified that, by using microwave radars between two mountain 

peaks, that Customs and Border Protection were able to identify 

day and night everybody going through and then with helicopters 

and vans able to intercept everybody. 

So I think your focus is very well defined. We have investments 

in all of those areas, and we are pushing them pretty hard, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

The Chair will now recognize other members for questions they 

wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our committee rules 

and practice, I will recognize members who were present at the 

start of the hearing based on seniority in the subcommittee, alternating between majority and minority. Those members coming in 

later will be recognized in the order of their arrival. 

It is now my pleasure to recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman 

from North Carolina, Mr. Etheridge, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, welcome. Thank you for being here. I know you have 

been working hard to reorganize the S&T Directorate, and we appreciate that. Obviously, a lot of issues have come up as the best 

way to utilize the S&T personnel, and we are appreciative of that 

also. 

Let me ask you a question about some particular issues with the 

use of Intergovernmental Personnel Act employees, known as the 

IPAs. Because there is—as you just said, we can deal with all the 

gadgets we want, but at the end of the day it really comes back 

to the people we have in our agency who work with us. 

This committee is familiar with the December 05 GAO report 

that describes the significant problems with the way that S&T handled its IPAs. As you know, IPAs are paid by the Department of 

Homeland Security but actually are not employees of the DHS. 

They are essentially on loan to the Federal Government from universities or State and local government. 

This is a great way of not paying in and—I think you agree— 

to utilize the expertise and get the much-needed talent into the Department that we need very quickly; and we are thankful for the 

hard work that many of these IPAs have brought to the staff and 

the work that they do every day. 

27 

Unfortunately, as the GAO points out, the Department does not 

have adequate ethical procedures or ethics procedures to utilize 

these IPAs. In response to a query by committee staff, DHS legislative affairs wrote October 12, 2006, and I quote, S&T is working 

with the Chief Human Capital Officer and the Office of General 

Counsel on a guide that will provide the comprehensive information needed for the hiring of IPA detailees and administering their 

assignments. 

My question to you is this: What are your plans for integrating 

IPAs into DHS workforce? Number two, how do IPAs fit into your 

overall strategy for reorganizing the Directorate? Third, has a 

guide been produced? And, if it has, has it enabled you to fully utilize these IPAs? And if it has been provided and produced, will you 

please provide the committee with a copy of that type? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

First of all, I would like to thank the Congress for providing for 

the Interagency Personnel Act. This is invaluable, not just in 

science and technology but throughout the government, to get the 

best of the best, as you have indicated, on a rotational basis, 

whether it is from laboratories or universities. In my case, the enabling legislation very wisely paralleled the legislation, unique legislation, for the defense advance research projects and you allowed 

me to have DARPA like IPAs; and I am fully utilizing that in my 

innovation portfolio. 

But I was very familiar with IPAs when I got to the Office of 

Naval Research; and, as you know, I was there for 6 years. And 

in the 6 years I was there I reduced IPAs from 60 to under 30. We 

produced a Management Directive—I will use the DHS term instead of the Navy term—that was very clear, and I brought that 

Directive with me to the Department of Homeland Security. Because if you don’t apply the highest ethics and the highest standards to the IPA program, while you may not have a statutory problem, you certainly have a perception problem. 

So when individuals come as IPAs to my organization, they must 

sign clear nondisclosure to their parent organization. They must 

recuse themselves from any dealings, whether it is contractual or 

otherwise, with the parent organization. But, even with those constraints, the IPAs are far too important to the safety of the Nation 

for us not to utilize those. 

Mr. COHEN. So I will as soon as I turn my Navy management 

directive, which I have been following, vetted by the OGC, vetted 

by the IG, et cetera, and let me just say, Chairman Langevin, so 

you understand, as we talk about integrated product teams or anything else I do, I have invited the DHS IG, and they have willingly 

and actively sat in as observers to all the processes I have put in 

plan, and I extend that invitation, as I did in Navy, to the staff majority and minority, whenever is convenient for them, whether it is 

my budget reviews, anything that is not executive department proprietary, which is very small in my portfolio, they are welcome to 

see how these things work. 

I have already reduced the number of IPAs in Homeland Security by five. IPAs are well worth what we pay for them, but the 

very ability of the cost is significant depending upon who their 

sponsor might be. We can end up paying twice or more the salary 

28 

that the individual is getting for overhead at the parent organization, and as a custodian of the taxpayers’ precious investment and 

with the limits that I have on my M&A account, I just cannot afford that. So I will share with you the directive that I use if you 

will accept the Navy version first. I am glad you can hold me accountable for that. I will then put it into DHS language. But I have 

my director of research has come to me from Los Alamos. Many of 

you know Dr. John Vitko, created the world class BioWatch program which, you know, 3 years ago, was poorly received and now 

just transitioned to the Office of Health Affairs. I have in test and 

evaluation, an area that is critically important, a world expert that 

comes from southern Maryland; he actually comes to me on the 

cheap. 

So they are peppered throughout the organization, but everyone 

knows who they are, and we are going by the letter of the law, and 

I welcome the oversight. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you very much. We would welcome the 

material, and you are a breath of fresh air. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The gentlelady from Tennessee, Ms. Blackburn. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

our witnesses for being here. Admiral, I love hearing you talk 

about deliverables and talk about the expectations that we and you 

have. And I think that is an important dialog for us to continue 

because our constituents certainly are concerned about security. I 

would say it is the number one issue as they look at the security 

of this Nation, both home an abroad. And we appreciate the work 

that you are doing and the task you have taken. 

I loved your enthusiasm when you were talking about the ten 

fingers and getting the print there as we fight—look for our bio 

vulnerabilities if you will and BioWatch. And I recently had the opportunity to view the new vein imaging technology that is coming 

online and was amazed with the accuracy rate with that. I am 

hopeful, as you are, that there are possibilities there. 

I want to discuss four separate areas with you, one is the IEDs 

and then another one is SBI Net, the screenings and then cyber security. So we will go through these as far as we get in the 5 minutes allowed. We will submit to you in writing if we don’t get 

through them. Looking at your testimony and considering IEDs, 

and you spoke to this a little bit talking about your cargo screening, and I imagine some of the technology that you are using there 

looking through, looking at screening cargo and then at cargo carrier protection, you are also applying that to vehicles. And I would 

like to know if you are or what you are doing that would look at 

the vehicle protection. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, ma’am. As you are well aware, IEDs and vehicle-borne IEDs are in large measure the weapon of choice today by 

terrorists around the world. You see the carnage that they are 

causing in Iraq. I am not in DOD anymore, but in the paper they 

indicate upwards of 70 percent of all the casualties are associated 

with IEDs. 

The Congress has been very generous with General Montgomery 

Migs and the joint IED task force in the Department of Defense. 

I believe you have invested over $6 billion over the last— 

29 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. If I may interrupt, sir. Specifically what are 

you all doing, what are you targeting there? Are you at liberty to 

tell us what kind of timeline you are on for producing something 

that will give extra protection to vehicles for these explosive devices? 

Mr. COHEN. The short answer is that the $6 billion has been 

spent on the here and now, what you would call the low-hanging 

fruit. And we have had enormous success, but the leakage, the 

leakage, and I will leave it at that without percentages, still causes 

the carnage that you see. 

I had lunch with Secretary Gordon England in December at his 

request. As you know, he was secretary of the Navy, then deputy 

secretary of Homeland Security, then back and forth and 3 years 

ago, he started what he called the Manhattan Project to predict, 

detect, defeat and destroy IEDs at range. That includes vehicle 

IEDs, and he defined it as 100 yards. 

The reason that he wanted to do that was to change the calculus 

so that we and our first responders as well as our military would 

be able to detect, and while there still might be collateral damage 

with these explosions, they would be set off when we desired, not 

when the bomber desired. 

This is an area we today do not yet have the technology, and so 

why I have budgeted for this and what I am working with DOD 

is for me to take the basic research working with our laboratories, 

DOE, working with our universities, in short, Congresswoman, I 

am looking to replicate a dog’s nose that our first responders can 

use to go ahead and do this. The technology is not there today. We 

have many means to thwart IEDs, but we have got to do better, 

and I am committed to that. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Okay. Then on the SBI Net, are you all coordinating with Boeing on the SBI Net project? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, ma’am. As you are well aware, this comes under 

customs and border protection, Boeing is the prime. And as one of 

my 11 capstone IPTs, I have border protection. Chief Aguilar and 

Director Basham sit as the customer on that. They then provide to 

me what their capability gaps are that perhaps the SBI Net is not 

fulfilling or were too high-risk for that contract. And they then direct me to slave my S&T dollars to de-risk and provide examples, 

proof of concept, so that they then can offer that with adequate risk 

tolerance to Boeing to include in the technologies used on the border. 

So we are in a one-to-one correspondence. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. Chairman, I will submit my screening 

questions. I did have one on the article today in USA Today on the 

rail test and then some questions on practices and processes with 

cybersecurity. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms. 

Christensen, is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome the witnesses. 

Admiral Cohen, I am impressed with some of the progress that 

you have reported thus far, especially when you talk about people 

coming back, asking to come back to the Directorate. 

30 

I notice, under your budget, the proposed budget for 2008, under 

chem and bio, there is a drop that, if my BlackBerry calculator is 

working correctly, is about 28 percent. I am concerned about that 

drop, especially given the problems we are having with BioShield, 

the slowness of developing new counter agents to respond to biological terrorism and also decrease in bioterrorism preparedness 

funding. It seems to put a lot of responsibility on your Department 

for surveillance, detection, protection, and you have those three 

areas, ag, bio and chem to fit into that. 

As you looked at what the budget was providing you for your Directorate, did you have to sacrifice some of your objectives to fit 

within that budget? And as you are answering, I am also not clear 

what exactly is left after—what did BioWatch take away and leave 

because we are still talking about surveillance and detection under 

the Directorate. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, ma’am. As in our personal lives and our professional lives, we always have to make a balance in our investments. 

But I would like to address the chem-bio because you very accurately represented what has happened. The Congress last year, I 

believe, very wisely established the Office of Health Affairs which 

now has Dr. Runge as the chief medical officer, and you also established the Office of Emergency Communications. 

Now one of the problems that you have in S&T is it can become 

a self-licking ice cream cone. If in S&T we are responsible for not 

only discovering the solutions, then maturing the solutions, but 

also operating the solutions beyond prototypical demonstration, operations are time intensive and take a disproportionate amount of 

money. And so without the Office of Health Affairs, and this is why 

I thank you for it, I didn’t have a customer for my BioWatch. And 

as you know, BioWatch 2 has been largely successful, and it is in 

30 of our major cities. We have had over 3 million samples of which 

we have had, I think, 15 or 16 positives which have been reacted 

to. And in fact, just a month ago, the stink bomb that occurred in 

New York City, within an hour of that, Mayor Bloomberg was able 

to say to the good people of New York: We don’t know what it is, 

but we know it is not hazardous, and in part, that was because of 

the BioWatch investment. 

So what I did was, and it is in a one-time adjustment to my budget, was an $81 million transfer, which is totally the operational cost of BioWatch 2 to the Office of Health Affairs under Dr. 

Runge. And what it does is allows Dr. Vitko and his good people 

and my laboratories to now focus on BioWatch 3, which we think 

will be four times cheaper to operate. It will be real-time microchip 

determination as opposed to what we have now, the little disks 

that have to be collected and analyzed, and it will be wireless connected so that we will be able to cover many more cities in real 

time. 

So I would prefer to have the $81 million on top of my S&T, but 

it was not S&T, and what we have done is a one-time proper alignment. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I really think that is what you are to do, to 

do the research, and then once the product is developed, turn it 

over to your customer. Is there any work being done at S&T on 

shortening the time from the time an agent presents itself to develVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Dec 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-6\35265.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
31 

oping counter measures? We have introduced some legislation before, thinking about introducing it again to foster and support that 

kind of research. Are you doing anything like that now? 

Mr. COHEN. Absolutely. In fact, on Monday, I was at Plum Island 

where we do foot-and-mouth disease. Genomics and what we see 

around the country and in so many of the States represented here 

is an incredible growth industry, and the rate of problem-solving is 

increasing exponentially. 

So I am very encouraged and very enthusiastic. I am not sure 

legislation is required here. In a free-market society, you see what 

is happening, you see where the jobs are being created. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I just wasn’t sure it was being done. And 

knowing that it has in the past taken a long time and we don’t 

know what we are going to be faced with specifically, it becomes 

increasingly important to shorten the time to be able to provide 

something to treat or a vaccine to a newly developed or mutated 

agent. 

Mr. COHEN. You are exactly right, and one of the exciting areas 

is what we call DNA, or it has been renamed now agile vaccines, 

that do exactly what you are talking about. Because of genomics, 

we can analyze what the pathogen is, and we then can design or 

tailor the vaccine, and then when the bad guys modify it, which regrettably more people and more people have access to in a flat 

world, we then can rapidly respond. There is an area that DOD has 

been very active on, but it is spilling over into all areas. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am pleased to recognize now the gentleman 

from California, Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for testifying and thank you for your service. Admiral, can you tell me what the Department’s plan for cybersecurity research and development is? This is an area that, among 

other areas, I think needs a lot of work both here on the Hill and 

also within the Department and within the private sector. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. As you know, this is the fourth of my Bs; 

the bombs, borders and bugs are tangible, but the business is not 

tangible. And I don’t know, I am close to it, but I don’t have personal knowledge, but the papers say that we live in a negative savings rate society, which means we live from ATM withdrawal to 

ATM withdrawal; 401(k)s now are all in cyber. Everything we do 

is enabled by cyber, not only our security but the underpinnings of 

our society. 

And so while we can’t touch or feel it, we understand the consequences of it, and this is an area where, again, because the world 

is flat, there are a lot of evil people who would like to do damage 

to our society and to our economy. So this is an area that we take 

very seriously. 

As you know, in Homeland Security, we now have a cyber czar. 

This represents one of the 11 Capstone IPTs, Integrated Product 

Teams, where my command, control and interoperability division is 

focused. Interestingly enough, the leadership of Homeland Security 

made me bifurcate this particular IPT even though it falls under 

FEMA, and the reason they did that, and this was with the input 

of the bipartisan staff from the Congress, was it was concerned 

32 

that if I had interoperability competing with cybersecurity, that 

interoperability would take all the money. And whether that is true 

or not, we have put protections in place. 

And so, as I have indicated in the integrated product teams with 

the cyber czar sitting, Mr. Salazar, in fact sitting as my customer, 

I have a prioritized list from him with a cut line as to what we can 

afford that go to secure protocols, process control systems, wireless 

security, automated vulnerability, discovery tools, lack of worldwide data for research continuity, and I could go on, but the bottom 

line, sir, is that I expect my customer to hold me accountable in 

S&T for cost, schedule and technology readiness level metrics 

which we review together on a semi-annual basis. And to deliver, 

I get to take risk with millions to prevent putting their systems 

and their acquisition at risk in billions so that we can provide the 

solutions they need. But this is an area that we must stay on top, 

and the challenges will only get greater, not less. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me ask you a question about cyber security 

and innovation. As I look at the budget, out of the $20 million designated for cyber security, about 38 percent are directed towards 

innovation, $7.5 million. That is the highest, at least on my cursory 

look, percentage of any of the program areas; a third of funding for 

cybersecurity directed towards innovation. But then there don’t appear to be any projects within the innovation office that are focused 

on cybersecurity. That seems to be inconsistent. Is there any way 

to clear up my confusion? 

Mr. COHEN. What I have done here in the command, control and 

interoperability, and that is the supporting of my six divisions and 

divisions that support cybersecurity and HITS on that integrated 

process team along with infrastructure protection because interoperability is shown mostly under command, control and interoperability, but the Department views cybersecurity more as an infrastructure protection issue. What we have done is laid out the 

change detection for what we may see, people attempting the physical attacks on cybersecurity, because it is copper; it is fiber optics; 

it is wireless, et cetera. But I will take that for the record so that 

we can get you the specific details. 

I will tell you that, in the 6 months I have been on board, the 

definition of innovation has been a little bit of a challenge. My definition of innovation is where we have a known need and we take 

a higher risk in a shorter period of time than acquisition might be 

able to ingest, but we de-risk it and then bring it in where acquisition can use it. 

The customary definition of innovation before I got to this Directorate was anything that didn’t have a customer. That is not an 

adequate definition of innovation. So I will take this for the record, 

and I am glad to come by, talk with you or your staff, and I welcome your input in this area, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With the agreement of the ranking member, we 

are going to go for a second round if you will bear with us. 

Mr. COHEN. Absolutely, 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, we have already sunk nearly $300 million into the Counter-MANPADS Program, and we now have the 

technology ready to deploy and no interest among the commercial 

carriers to use it mostly due to the cost figures of around $1 million 

33 

per airplane to install. And then you have the maintenance and 

add fuel costs on top of that. I know that you are looking at other 

ways to protect commercial aircraft. What is the point of your 

doing this research and testing this equipment if the airline industry won’t partner with us just to keep their own airplanes safe. And so my other question is would you say it is just a $300 million boondoggle, and will your new management structure ensure 

this doesn’t happen again? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, the short answer is, I am not into boondoggles. 

And in my setup, as you know, I believe in transparency, and so 

I think if I would suggest something like that, you would nip it in 

well in advance of that investment. 

My understanding, as a citizen watching this before I came to 

the Department, I think this was one of the mandates jointly from 

the Congress and from the administration because of the threat, 

the credible threat of MANPAD shoulder-fired weapons against 

commercial as well as military aircraft. As you are well aware from 

your other committee assignments, on the military side, we have 

advanced counter measures and systems that are already deployed 

and employed and just get better. And so this was to show the efficacy of this for commercial aviation. 

The counter measures do work. We have demonstrated those. 

The $300 million was in large measure used—as I understand it, 

this pre-dates me—to apply that to wide body and other commercial aircraft, both cargo and now passenger. I think, as you are 

aware, last year, shortly after I came on board, there was an alternative solution at the $10 million level, again, encouraged by the 

Congress to look at alternative solutions because of the resistance 

of the airlines for all the reasons that you said to equipping the 

planes with this, and we in fact went to contract on that. I think 

the three providers are Northrup Gruman, BAE and Raytheon, if 

my memory serves me right, a total of $10 million. They are looking at a ground-based off-plane solution but we are looking as you 

know, and we have presented in this fiscal year 2008 budget as an 

off-plane solution but using persistent surveillance flying above and 

airport where we can use a high-performance, high-endurance unmanned vehicle as a decoy, so to speak, and if that is successful 

in testing, we may be able to offer the Congress, the administration, Federal Aviation and the industry an alternative solution 

which would give us not only the counter-MANPADS using the 

technologies that we demonstrated on the plane but, now on the 

UAV, would also give us the ability for the more advanced 

MANPADS to have a decoy which would allow the MANPADS to 

operate to exhaustion, fuel exhaustion, without putting the landing 

and taking off planes at risk. So I think this is an area where we 

are taking a slightly different approach than DOD did, this is an 

area of innovation. I am excited about it. Will it work? Stay tuned. 

I can’t address whether $300 million is a boondoggle, and I certainly can’t address why the aviation industry has not embraced it 

to date. I will leave that to others. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Just a point, not to ask another question on this 

topic, but obviously, closer working with the customers ensures 

that once we feel that they are actually going to take us up on it 

and work with us to implement it. Admiral, just briefly, your budgVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Dec 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-6\35265.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
34 

et request includes 20 percent reduction in university programs, at 

the same time you are touting the creation of four new university 

Centers of Excellence. I know that the existing centers are forward 

funded with 3-year money, but it is my understanding that you are 

going to abandon this practice for annual appropriations. I would 

like to ask—I would like to see these new centers succeed, but I 

am also worried that you may end up spreading yourself too thin. 

And both the new and existing centers will suffer. Can you explain 

how this is supposed to work? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

As you are aware, as I came into the job in August, there was 

some very strong language in the pending appropriations bills relative to the Centers of Excellence. For whatever reason, my Directorate was not able to show the alignment of the Centers of Excellence that existed at that time with the mission requirements of 

not only the Department but also the Directorate. And there was 

also great concern throughout the Congress in a bipartisan way 

that the Centers of Excellence did not adequately represent the intellectual basis around the country, and I won’t get into the details 

of that. This was the perception on the Hill, and it was reflected 

in the legislation. 

As you know from our prior dealings and public statements I 

have made, I feel very strongly about the responsibility I have. It 

is one of my three strategic goals, and that is to proactively invest 

in the underlying workforce development. This includes the student 

bodies. 

We are in crisis in this country in science and technology. People 

in middle schools in all States are turning away from science and 

math. My understanding is 80 percent of all science and math 

today in the middle schools and high schools are taught by good 

teachers, but 80 percent of them are not trained as science and 

math teachers. 

So this is an area we have got to turn around. To the extent that 

I can dual-use the precious dollars that you give me for universities, for students, for fellowships and scholarships, I want to 

make the most of that and, again, I want it to be transparent. And 

so working with both sides of the aisle and both the other body and 

the House in August and September, I think you are aware we 

were able to come to a proposal that aligned the Centers of Excellence, which all of the existing Centers of Excellence enthusiastically, I met with all of the directors—in September, as you know, 

we had a display here on the Hill in the middle of September. And 

because I had six enduring divisions, which you are familiar with, 

they aligned to one or more of those divisions. And what that did 

was it gave me an underlying foundation so that, as we have said, 

with the customer if I didn’t have a technology solution, I could 

now go to a Center of Excellence or to a laboratory to do the underlying basic research. You don’t know what you don’t know, and that 

is a very important area of what we do. 

And so I found that two of my areas didn’t have aligned Centers 

of Excellence, and I had several in bio of a wide variety, several 

in communications, command and control, and interoperability, and 

so we asked them to combine and align while establishing four new 

Centers of Excellence which were aligned and will be aligned. Now 

35 

those broad agency announcements are out there. We look forward 

to the competition. In my model, I want to see universities aligned 

with national labs, because they bring so much to that, but on top 

of that, I am also aligning my fellowship and my scholarships, 

which were totally independent of the COEs. Here I have 82 universities and colleges who stepped up to the plate, who established 

curricula that was supportive of the mission needs of Homeland Security in their universities, and I was not aligning my fellowship 

and scholarships to those schools. That didn’t make any sense to 

me. 

So what I have done now is, we are going to use, and I am not 

going to do it all, we will work with you, 60–40, 70–30. I don’t 

know what the number will be, but I want to give those fellowships 

and scholarships to the COEs and associated had colleges and universities for them to invest in the students that are taking those 

courses. For the other students who go to other universities that 

I don’t want to disenfranchise, we will go ahead and make sure 

they get fellowships and scholarships, as we did in Navy, but they 

must take Homeland Security related curricula. 

Now, in the area of minority-serving institutions, when I came 

on board I can tell you, and all you have to do is look at the universities who are associated with the COEs, they were significantly 

under represented. And when I met with the students, I wasn’t 

seeing the face of America. And we have got to go to the best of 

the best. You are very familiar with what we did in Navy with the 

summer intern program which allowed students to come with a 

$3,000 to $5,000 stipend to the warfare center at Newport, Rhode 

Island, and Pax River and elsewhere on an annual basis. And we 

went to almost 70 universities all around the country. 

It is not surprising that the best of the best at University of 

Houston were Hispanic and the best of the best after Hampton 

University were African-American. So we had the face of America 

just by throwing out a broader net. This is critically important, and 

so one of the things I did in the 2007 budget, with the help of the 

Hill and the OMB, was we set aside, and I think it was appropriate, $4 million focused on minority-serving institutions to kick 

start this new paradigm. And in the 2008 budget, that is $3.75 million. 

Now you asked why I had a 20 percent reduction. The reason 

was with the language on the Hill, with the lack of alignment of 

student programs and COEs to the output function of the Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security leadership had 

also lost confidence in this program. And so I was fighting a twofront battle. Number one, I had to restore the confidence of the 

Congress in these important programs. And now as you know, sir, 

we have divided all of the COEs into a class system very similar 

to the Congress where every 2 years one-third will be up for a 6- 

year recompetition. And as I was required to and did brief the Appropriations Committees within 60 days after the passage of the 

fiscal year 2007 appropriations law, they will be able to recompete 

for one 6-year term, but then we have term-limited them to 12. 

And I was following the manufacturing technology model of 5 

years, but 6 years was more appropriate for the universities. 

36 

We will continue to fund—when we commit to that 6 years, we 

will fund at agreed-upon levels, assuming the appropriations from 

the Congress, to those levels for those COEs. But we now have 

strong minority-serving commitment that I am personally committed to do and in the broad agency a announcements that he we 

just put out we strongly encourage not only the participation but 

the leadership of MSIs as appropriate, whether it is on borders, explosives or in other areas. 

So I brought back, B-R-O-U-G-H-T, a lot of the money to get us 

to 80 percent of where we were previously, and I look forward 

based on the success of the program to continue to grow that part 

of my portfolio. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I recognize the ranking member, the gentlemen 

from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, share your concerns over the cut in funding for the Centers of Excellence, and Admiral, I know you agree with that. You 

submitted—had a budget that was higher. I have several universities in my district, one close by that isn’t a Center of Excellence. 

I think it is a great symbiotic relationship with the Department. 

I think, given your realignment of fellowships and scholarships, 

your leadership, perhaps it will restore the confidence of the Congress and the administration so we can look at restoring that funding for you. 

Also to echo my colleague from California, the concern over cybersecurity, I think most people don’t understand the grave threat 

that cyberspace can pose to not only this country but the world, far 

more than a single weapon of mass destruction. It could shut down 

this entire country. 

So I am glad to hear that you provide the leadership on that as 

well. In terms of the cybersecurity czar, I would continue to ask 

that you make that a priority under your watch. I understand that 

you do have a briefing that will be a closed door briefing for the 

members of this subcommittee, and I look forward to that briefing 

as well. 

The other members have touched on most of the topics. The other 

one I wanted to mention was interoperability. This comes up a lot 

for us when we go back home in our districts. Why, more than 5 

years since September 11th, have we not been able to become interoperable? If you could answer that question, but also as it deals 

with technology, is this a technology issue, our problem, or is it a 

human turf problem or maybe both is my guess? 

Admiral? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, it is a combination, and I know because of your interest in this area that you are familiar with the 

scorecard that came out at Christmas, and because it is not an 

area that I was focused on, we are 20 years in the Department of 

Defense under Goldwater-Nichols, and we still have interoperability challenges. Some of those are technical, and some of those 

are cultural. 

But I just didn’t appreciate the governance issues with the first 

responders. When I look at the scale issues that I have, I have to 

deal with the sheriff of Mayberry. And I have to deal with the New 

York City Police Department. And I have to deal with a volunteer 

37 

fireman on a tribal reservation with a 1939 LaFrance pumper, and 

I have to deal with the Chicago Fire Department. Those scale 

issues are significant. 

The technology is there. Today, if we wanted to buy it, we can 

buy digital programable radios, but I wouldn’t begin to suggest either to the administration or to the Congress that we refurbish all 

of the 35,000 fire departments in this country, of which 80 percent 

are volunteer, or the more than 7,000,000 uniformed policemen 

that we have. It would be a temporary fix. 

Today, if you can get on the internet, and some of you probably 

have voice-over IP. If you can get there by copper, by fiber, by radio 

frequency, by any means, it doesn’t matter if you are Windows or 

Mac, we have interoperability. Where I am focused now is really 

in the RF. And Secretary Chertoff has committed that we will be 

interoperable in voice by the end of this administration, but we are 

also looking, and this is S&T, at data, which is bandwidth, and 

streaming video, which gives you the common operating picture. 

Today with iPod and V-Cast we have the technical capability. 

And so I am most focused on the disenfranchised user. This is 

the individual where we have to worry about the last mile. And it 

always comes down to the last mile. And whether it is the rural 

policemen or the Border Patrol, once we can get them, and it is 

generally by radio frequency, onto the Internet backbone by any 

means, which has vulnerabilities and cyber challenges, we are 

doing okay. 

The governance issue that I found and I think shining light on 

this will help enormously is we have some chiefs of police in their 

cities where the patrolmen and firemen have the ability to talk to 

one another technically, but the governance requires the police only 

to talk to police headquarters and the chief of police to the fire 

marshal, who then passes the information down to the firemen. 

That is not how you win wars, even wars against terror. 

So I think the score card will suffer as well, but it will be a balance of technology and governance. And we look forward to your 

leadership in this area to help. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The gentleman from North Carolina is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral again, thank you. Talking about score cards and that 

last mile and the person out there at the end, let me ask a question 

on that for just a moment because I know that you have done much 

to reorganize as you pursue the S&T Directorate as you developed 

it to make it work better, I commend you for that and thank can 

you for it. I understand, as you put your new organization structure together, it is designed to serve those people in the organization that make use of the technologies and capabilities to use to 

protect the homeland. And I applaud your effort in that and thank 

you for it. 

But the first responders and others who use Homeland Security 

in the field, they also appreciate the effort for those they get, the 

efforts they get, because they really are the front line when it 

comes to protecting the homeland. I remind my colleagues, and I 

don’t need to remind you because, you know, because if someone 

has a fire or emergency or something happens in their community, 

38 

whether it be manmade or natural, and they dial 911, it normally 

does not ring up here; it rings in their hometown. 

So with that, let me ask you how are you are ensuring that the 

work is in fact aligned with local needs. In particular, I know that 

you are establishing integrated project teams that are making excellent progress in defining customer needs. However, in looking at 

the IPT membership, it looks like your customer base is Federal. 

There are no stakeholders outside the Department. 

So my question is three-fold: How are you involving State and 

local governments? And number two, do you have the ability to 

form an IPT with a non-governmental agency, such as a private 

sector owner of critical infrastructure? Thirdly, can you give me 

some examples of your IPT’s, priorities and what gaps that are 

there that may need to be addressed or something we may need to 

help with? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. The short answer is I can form an IPT with 

just about anybody, and again, the enabling legislation, I think, 

was very, very wise. As you know, in my organizational construct, 

I do have a directorate for agency and foreign liaison. Initially, it 

was my intent to also have, as I discussed, association liaison, because I talked about the scale. It is much better for me to deal with 

fraternal order of police or fire prevention or firemen organizations, 

and they are well represented of course in the Congress. But what 

I found out in DHS was a common complaint from State and local 

as well as first responders—and first responders are our heroes; 

they are my customers—was that there were too many entry 

points. There were too many people trying to engage with them, 

and there was great confusion. And of course, the first responders 

are focused on providing the mission that they do, and this was 

part of overhead. And so I am satisfied now that I have gotten 

smarter on the construct of the Department of Homeland Security 

that we have the appropriate organizational people who come from 

that background, whether they are the Paulsens or the Forsemans 

or others who understand how to deal with State and local communities as well as associations, and so then while they are not formally identified in my IPT structure. I can deal with them and get 

to the first responders and the associations without causing this 

left hand, right hand problem. 

But that is not enough for me. We have to be able to empower 

the first responders. They have to have faith that the science and 

technology is there for them and not just the bureaucracy of Homeland Security. And so one of the things I did in Navy, because I 

had this same challenge, there my customer was the system commands that procure the items and maintain the weapons systems 

in ships but also the sailor and Marine. And we established a Webbased text solutions, that is what we called it, and made it available with 1 percent of my budget where they could come in on the 

web, and these kids are smart, and they know solutions. And they 

read Popular Science and Popular Mechanics, and they have been 

there, and they have college degrees, et cetera. And they would 

then come in and tell me the problems they had, offer solutions if 

they knew, I would then broker that to my warfare centers in 

Navy, we would stay in touch with that sailor, and we then would 

provide the solution. 

39 

And the Chairman is familiar with one of these. We had a young 

kid from the Persian Gulf. It is very hot in the Persian Gulf in 

summer, 130 degrees. He is on an aircraft carrier, and he says, you 

know, 4.5 acres takes several hundred people to degrease the flight 

deck, and it is really dirty work, like holystoning the old sailing 

ships. He said, I am from Boston. And when I go to the Bruins, 

he said, after each period, they have got a Zamboni, and they resurface the ice. Why can’t we have a degreasing Zamboni? 

I have got to tell you, this was right on the edge of S&T. And 

I justified it, not that we were developing a Zamboni. We weren’t, 

but we had to treat the petrochemicals and not put them over the 

side. And so we spent a million dollars, and God bless, through our 

warfare centers and industry, we provided a degreasing Zamboni 

to that aircraft carrier. Now you can imagine this young sailor 

never had to buy another beer with that crew in his life. 

So that was an example. What I am telling you is, I have now 

established text solutions. We have the Web site for first responders. We are getting the word out. And I will do with my DOE labs, 

with national labs and my own labs the same thing for first responders that I did for the sailors, but that is not enough. You very 

wisely provided for a tech clearinghouse. Now, this, regrettably, 

was not fully enabled by my Directorate. I am very pleased that 

I understand that the tech clearing house has hired a very good 

person who knows how to do this from Sandia labs. I look forward 

to sitting down with this person. We are going to take the unspent 

moneys, which are considerable, and we are going to focus directly 

on the first responders. 

So we are going to take a two-faced approach, and I will be glad 

to get back to you on the details of those projects, but they will 

come from the first responders, not from me. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Good. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Finally, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I didn’t know how we were going to get into 

Zambonis. A friend of mine is actually the nephew of Mr. Zamboni 

who owns the Paramount ice rink in Paramount, California who 

figured out somebody had to figure out how to do the resurfacing 

of the ice rather than doing it the old way. I am glad to see it also 

helped in the Navy. 

Admiral I see that you commanded the USS Hyman Rickover, 

and I notice that you graduated from Naval Academy the same 

time I graduated from Notre Dame. Did you ever undergo the famous Admiral Rickover interview? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir, I did, and I would like to publicly acknowledge that, in the entire time I have been in the Navy, which was 

1964 through 2006, Navy played Notre Dame every year, and we 

have yet to defeat you, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I know. 

Mr. COHEN. So I congratulate you. But I did go through the 

interview. 

Mr. LUNGREN. My good friend, Admiral Tom Lynch, was the captain of the last team to beat Notre Dame. 

Mr. COHEN. 1963. 

40 

Mr. LUNGREN. We don’t forget those things. I am not an expert 

on this but I am starting to look at it, the configuration of the 

internet IPV4 versus IPV6. We are the ones who invented the 

Internet. We are stuck in the old protocols, so to speak. It is limited compared to the tremendous expansion of what I would just 

call very simply Internet Web sites, for want of a better term. It 

appears that is the nature of the future. It also gives us, because 

of its expanded volume, tremendous opportunity in the area of security and yet do you think that we have the emphasis in the Federal Government to move in that direction. And the reason I ask 

that is we have made a decision in the television industry to move 

to digital so that we can open up bandwidth. We as a Federal Government have made decisions that basically are going to result in 

the American people buying new televisions or having convertors 

because we thought that was important from a standpoint of opening up bandwidth and also product improvement to the public. But 

from my standpoint, this other issue is a far more serious issue in 

terms of potential security needs. And are we going to, in that new 

world, build in the kind of security we need against terrorist attacks on cyber security that we didn’t when we first started with 

the Internet because, frankly, we weren’t in that world? And what 

is your office doing to take this challenge seriously? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, I would like to thank you for your 

personal interest in this area. This is critically important, and 

there is always a balance between access and security and putting 

a damper on innovation by regulation, et cetera. This is the wild, 

wild west, and this curve hasn’t even started bend over. In fact, I 

think it is accelerating, and it is exciting. And the same advantages 

that we have that enable the business, regrettably, give the terrorists access to do widespread harm, as you have indicated. I don’t 

know if our government is organized for this new world and this 

new threat. And I am glad to work with the Congress and with the 

administration to help, and anyone else, industry of course. In the 

enabling legislation, you made me responsible for standards, standards Department-wide. We talked a little bit about interoperability, 

and I am having to balance IEEE versus ANCI versus NIST standards, and what you find is people are coming to me and saying, 

look, in some ways, standards are things of the past. With middle 

wear, it doesn’t matter what standard. We can design a program 

that will give us the interoperability. So I have 6 pages from the 

IPT, from my cyber czar customer, many of which, Congressman 

Lungren, address exactly the issues you are talking about. And we 

were able to fund about half of these, and half I have budgeted in 

the out years because this fund, as you know, zero to 3 years, refreshes itself. 

I think this issue is much bigger than this particular hearing 

and might be best if we discussed this off line, and I am glad to 

do that, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I want to thank the witnesses for very valuable 

testimony and the members for their questions. 

Admiral on a personal note, I am glad that my first hearing as 

chairman of this subcommittee was with you as our witness. Thank 

you for your testimony. 

41 

The members of the committee may have additional questions for 

the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. Hearing no further business, this committee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(43) 

1 ‘‘The Committee is extremely disappointed with the manner in which S&T is being managed 

within the Department of Homeland Security. Despite the efforts of the Acting head of S&T, 

this component is a rudderless ship without a clear way to get back on course.’’ The Committee 

directs the Secretary to immediately develop a 5-year research plan, including performance 

measures, which reflect DHS’s research and funding priorities, and brief the Committee no later 

than 60 days after the date of enactment of this act. Developing and implementing this 5-year 

plan is the only way S&T will be successful. 2Washington Post, Aug. 20, 2006. 

Appendix A: Additional Questions and Responses 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE

ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

Question 1.: Regarding cuts in funding, last year, Congressional appropriators 

expressed frustration with the Directorate’s production by slashing the budget and 

withholding funds.1 An August 2006 article in the Washington Post said that the 

organization is ‘‘hobbled by poor leadership, weak financial management and inadequate technology,’ stating that S&T ‘‘has struggled with turnover, reorganizations 

and raids on its budget.’’ 2 The President’s budget included some reductions in the 

areas of University Programs (which includes the University Centers of Excellence) 

and the Infrastructure and Geophysical programs (including the Southeast Regional 

Research Initiative (SERRI) and the Community Based Critical Infrastructure Protection Institute). 

Can you explain why these programs were singled out for such large 

cuts? 

Response: Program level increases and decreases in FY 2008 are a reflection of 

the transition or transfer of mature technologies to other DHS Components, the 

completion of programs, reduction of funding needs for construction and laboratory 

operations, and better alignment of some programs and leveraging of others. 

The Department will continue to balance research and development needs and 

funding resources so that the S&T Directorate’s budget reflects the priorities of the 

Department. The development of new technologies and measuring the potential impact they have on our operations and acquisitions are more critical as we are committed to operate more efficiently and accomplish more with fewer resources. 

Question 2.: Regarding cybersecurity, the President’s budget cuts cybersecurity R&D funding this year from its request of $22.7m last year. 

In light of all of the executive reports that have been released highlighting the importance of spending federal dollars on cybersecurity R&D, 

how can this Administration continue to justify its meager spending in the 

field? 

Cybersecurity research and development (R&D) has been and will continue to be 

a priority in the President’s budget, the Department of Homeland Security and in 

the newly formed Command, Control and Interoperability Division within the S&T 

Directorate. The FY 2008 cybersecurity R&D request is $14.88 million, a 32 percent 

increase over the FY 2007 enacted level. Based on the capability gaps that have 

been generated by the Department and other Federal agencies, the S&T Directorate 

in coordination with the DHS Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Communications has developed a focused budget that addresses the Nation’s critical cybersecurity needs where the government can have the greatest impact. 

Question 3.: Regarding basic research, S&T seeks to balance risk, cost, impact, 

and time to delivery. Your goal for Basic Research investment is 20% of the budget. 

When we talked with your staff, they expressed how this particular area is difficult 

for the customer to envision the long term investment needed in basic research. 

44 

How will you get your customers to understand the importance and support Basic Research investment? 

Response: The S&T Directorate is working closely with its customers to build an 

understanding of the importance of basic research. For example, the S&T Directorate, in its interactions with customers through a capstone Integrated Product 

Team (IPT) process, is providing guidance on which types of research are likely to 

produce results that will lead to technology development that will fill customer’s 

needs. Basic research may be required when: 

• The S&T Directorate’s Transition program may only be able to fulfill a partial 

gap requirement and would require basic research to develop a deeper understanding of the science and technology needed to fulfill the entire gap; or 

• There may not be current or near term technical solutions available to address identified future threats. A basic research program would investigate 

science to provide the fundamental understanding that could be used by scientist and engineers to develop practical solutions. 

We are educating our customers about our capability to quickly tap into areas of 

basic research that can be exploited for homeland security solutions. The basic research program is attuned to new scientific developments in many communities 

through domestic and international technical exchanges, symposia, various publications and leverages science used to develop solutions and funds projects of specific 

interest to exploit collaborative and interdisciplinary relationships to solve fundamental issues to advance needed technologies. 

Question 4.: Regarding contracting officers, for FY 2006 funds, S&T had a $125m 

rescission because they were not committing and obligating funds in a timely manner. I understand that one of your top priorities is for S&T to become more efficient 

at executing their FY 2007 funds with a goal of 100% commitments by the end of 

May. It seems that you are making good progress and I commend you for that. S&T, 

and the Department in general, has historically had trouble getting money out the 

door due, in part, to limited numbers of DHS contracting officers available. 

Do you have an adequate number of DHS contracting officers assigned 

to S&T to execute in a timely manner? 

The DHS S&T Directorate and the Office of Procurement Operations (OPO) have 

agreed to a staffing plan that will serve all of the S&T Directorate’s needs. OPO 

is currently hiring to fill that staffing plan. 

Question 5.: I understand that DHS Contracting Officers are detailed to various 

component agencies including S&T. The Contracting Officers are on-site to S&T, but 

their performance assessments do not include input by S&T. How can you effectively work with DHS contracting officers detailed to S&T if the process 

does not allow for S&T’s input regarding their performance? 

Response: The DHS Office of Procurement Operations (OCO) personnel, assigned 

to DHS S&T, are collocated with the S&T organization; the S&T Directorate has 

provided working space for contracting offices at the Vermont Avenue location. This 

day-to-day working arrangement provides opportunity for the contracting officers to 

quickly gain familiarity with the S&T Directorate’s mission and objectives and address issues as they arise—all within a team environment. The performance goals 

flow directly from the goals of Chief Procurement Officer to the Head of the Contracting Activity to the contracting specialists. S&T leadership does provide evaluation commentary and feedback on those collocated at Vermont Avenue. However, 

OPO believes that the evaluation of the quality of the work performed by contracting professionals is best performed by other contracting professionals because 

of the complexities involved in the work. The OPO branch chiefs, division directors 

and oversight team provide a significant portion of the input on the performance 

of the contracting professionals. Additionally, the contracting professionals are thoroughly trained and certified in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security Management Directives. Further, the OPO workforce management team monitors the contracting professionals’ initial training as well as determines required 

skills currency training. 

Question 6.: Regarding integrated project teams, the Integrated Project Teams 

(IPT) established and currently ongoing are making excellent progress in defining 

customer needs. In looking at the IPT membership, your customer base is Federal; 

there are no stakeholders outside of the Department. I have questions about the following: 

How are you involving State and Local governments? 

Do you have the ability to form an IPT with a non-government agency, 

such as private sector owners of critical infrastructure? 

45 

Can you give me some examples of your IPTs priorities and what gaps 

they address? 

What parts of the customer’s mission is the IPT priority addressing? 

I know you have introduced the IPT concept to ensure customer collaboration 

and buy-in. 

What is the formal agreement in an IPT? Do all members of the IPT 

sign an MOU, for instance? 

Response: (1) The first phase of establishing Capstone Integrated Product Teams 

(IPTs) focused on developing and strengthening the relationship with Departmental 

component customers to ensure that the S&T Directorate focused on technology that 

would best support DHS components? strategic mission priorities. We know that the 

DHS components have long-standing relations with their appropriate State and 

local representatives and interest groups that already address the mission requirements and capability gaps in the IPT functional areas and therefore felt it was best 

at the beginning of the IPT process to have the Departmental Components choose 

how to address the priority needs of their customers. 

As the Capstone IPT process is maturing, the S&T Directorate is reaching out to 

the National Guard Association and other representative State and local groups to 

communicate technology requirements and priority mission capability gaps as identified by Departmental Components. The S&T Directorate has invited these groups 

to join the IPT process to ensure that the capability gaps of the end-user community 

are properly understood as well as ensure these organizations understand the process by which technology requirements are vetted and prioritized for science and 

technology investments. From a procurement integrity standpoint, some caution 

must be exercised about involvement of contractors in the requirements-setting 

phase of contracting. The IPT can and will obtain the best ideas of the private sector, but must be careful not to create a competitive advantage by involving only a 

few contractors in this process. 

First Responder and State and local governments can also make their technology 

requirements known to the S&T Directorate through the Tech Solutions program 

where their input on current capability gaps and technology requirements is received by the S&T Directorate via a website. We will pursue technology solutions 

directly through this approach, as well as bring forward these requirements to the 

appropriate Capstone IPT for inclusion in the Capstone IPT process. 

(2) At this stage, the S&T Directorate has not included private sector organizations in its formation of IPTs; however, when appropriate, input from the private 

sector is sought and incorporated into the IPT process. For example, the S&T Directorate’s Infrastructure Protection Division brought into the Capstone IPT process 

the priority requirements generated with the 17 Sector-Specific Agencies, which represent the private sector’s critical infrastructure priorities. These requirements were 

then addressed within the appropriate Capstone IPTs to ensure the private sector 

owners’ priorities are known and considered. 

(3) Attached are representative technical priorities for each of the 11 Capstone 

IPTs and the mission capability gaps that these solutions will address. These priorities have been set by the component leads of the IPTs. (See attachment A) 

(4) The customer-led Capstone IPTs are addressing those parts of the mission 

space where customers believe that technology is a significant contribution and provides value to their operations. Attached is a list of focus areas that the IPTs addressed during their discussions. The Capstone IPTs are focused on identifying programs that will develop near-term (0—3 years) deliverables that improve mission 

capability. (See attachment B) 

(5) Charters will be executed for each Capstone IPT that will identify the representatives and mission areas under that IPT’s authority. Technology Transition 

Agreements (TTAs) will be executed between the S&T Directorate and the project 

customer to formalize in detail the technologies to be transitioned to the customer. 

Additionally, the S&T Directorate is drafting a Management Directive for consideration by the Department that will codify this process. 

Question 7.: Regarding personnel problems within S&T, he recently released 

OPM (Office of Personnel Management) Survey ranked the Department at or near 

the bottom in four major personnel categories, including performance and job satisfaction. During the hearing, Under Secretary Cohen stated that that he will provide 

the Committee with a plan to improve morale, minimize turnover, strengthen workforce recruitment and secure institutional memory within the Directorate. 

When will that plan reach the Committee? 

Response: The S&T Directorate received the results from the Chief Human Capital office for the Office of Personnel Management Federal Human Capital Survey 

on January 30, 2007. We reviewed both the Departmental responses and the S&T 

46 

Directorate’s responses and were able to identify four findings that point to areas 

in the S&T Directorate that require improvement. Below you will find the plan 

which identifies the four findings, actions taken to improve dissatisfaction, and 

metrics for measuring our success. 

The first area cited is lack of respect for and honesty conveyed by senior leaders. 

To improve in this area of dissatisfaction, senior leadership has taken proactive 

measures to communicate the S&T Directorate’s vision, mission, and path forward 

as well as provided feedback opportunities for all staff by: 

• Holding regular ‘‘All Hands’’ staff meetings every four to six weeks (previous 

meetings have been held August 11, September 12, October 20, December 19, 

and February 9); 

• Holding weekly ‘‘Corporate Board’’ meetings composed of senior staff, which 

began on October 25, 2006; 

• Releasing S&T Snippets, a newsletter touting recent S&T Directorate activities; 

• Published a ‘‘Corporate Calendar’’ in January 2007; and 

We will measure our success using input received from these meetings, releases 

and publications, which, to date, have been very positive. 

The second finding is the lack of recognition for performance, to include promotions/raises/awards not based on merit. To improve in this area of dissatisfaction, 

we are providing training for all employees in performance management and leadership. We offered Performance Leadership Training, Goal Writing Training and Performance Training. The S&T Directorate’s leadership team has also initiated the 

presentation of awards to employees at the ‘‘All Hands’’ meetings. To date, we have 

given five awards and will continue to acknowledge the special performance of employees at other ‘‘All Hands’’ meetings. 

The third finding is lack of sufficient personnel on board to get the job done. To 

improve on this problem, we are currently developing a staffing plan to address critical needs and gaps to fulfill our mission requirements. The S&T Directorate intends 

to measure the staffing plan through execution and will continue to evaluate and 

seek the needed resources for staff to do their jobs. 

The final area of concern is the lack of opportunity to improve skills. The S&T 

Directorate is committed to employee development and has launched an aggressive 

set of initiatives to develop learning opportunities for staff. We have implemented 

a training initiative that encourages and facilitates employee training. For example, 

the S&T Directorate encourages employees to participate in program management 

training opportunities such as the S&T’s new Homeland Security Acquisition Course 

101, which was piloted in November 2006, and offered again in March, and April, 

and slated for June. We had several other learning and development opportunities 

available to S&T Directorate employees, to include the Graduate Education Program, Senior Executive Service (SES) Development Program, Fellowships, and the 

SES Career Development Program. The S&T Directorate has approved 30 requests 

for employees to take job related training in fiscal year FY 2007. Finally, we are 

in the early stages of discussion concerning intern development opportunities and 

student hiring plans. We will measure the success of the training program by the 

number of employees who avail themselves of the training, obligation/expenditure 

rates, and program review results (cost, schedule, and capability); however it is too 

early to provide results at this time. 

In conclusion, we believe that the actions taken to date as well as future measures to improve the satisfaction level of staff will result in positive feedback and 

improvement over time. We expect that results from the next DHS survey, anticipated for September 2007, will show a marked improvement in the Directorate’s 

survey scores. 

Question 8.: We believe it is important to have a Federal workforce within the 

Department, especially in a directorate like S&T where institutional knowledge is 

needed. Instead, we see an over-reliance on contractors with just a few Federal 

project managers. Are you committed to shifting from such a contractorbased operating picture to one that hires and grooms Federal workers? Are 

you actively recruiting younger members and not just proven program 

managers? 

Response: The S&T Directorate agrees that institutional knowledge is critical to 

meeting the mission of Directorate and DHS. The S&T Directorate initiated a realignment that is structured not only to develop a workforce with the skill sets to 

meet our mission, but also to provide a supportive structure to ensure a collaborative team focused environment. 

The S&T Directorate is allocated 383 (FY 2007)/ 381 (FY 2008) full-time equivalents (FTE). Our goal is to reach the level either on hand or in the hiring pipeline 

47 

1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ‘Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) Program Reference Guide, April 30, 2007. [Maintained in the Committee file.] 

by the end of the year. The S&T Directorate relies on contract support and the talent brought to the organization through detailees from other Federal agencies and 

those members through the Inter-Governmental Personnel Act. These various methods of bringing onboard the leading talent in the Nation to address new issues in 

areas of research, development, test and evaluation helps the S&T Directorate 

maintain a highly skilled, flexible and agile workforce. This mix of highly skilled 

talent is critical in creating a dynamic environment; one in which employees will 

thrive. To enhance the recruitment process the S&T Directorate developed Scholars 

(undergraduate) and Fellowship (graduate) programs aimed at students with backgrounds in the science and technology areas. In addition, the S&T Directorate is in 

the early discussion/planning stage to develop an internship program. 

Question 9.: Regarding personnel (ethics) issues at the S&T Directorate, this 

Committee is familiar with the December 2005 GAO report that described the significant problems with the way that S&T handles its IPA (Intergovernmental Personnel Act) employees. The IPA issue is important to resolve because IPAs are actually not employees of the Department of Homeland Security, but are essentially on 

loan to the federal government from universities or state/local government. The Department usually pays their salary. This is a great way to get much-needed talent 

into the Department, and we are thankful for the hard work that many of the IPAs 

that are on your staff put in every day. Unfortunately, as the GAO pointed out, the 

Department does not have adequate ethics procedures to utilize their IPAs. In response to a query by Committee staff, DHS Legislative Affairs wrote on Oct. 12, 

2006, that ‘‘S&T is working with the Chief Human Capital Officer and the Office 

of General Counsel on a guide that will provide the comprehensive information 

needed for the hiring of IPA detailees and administering their assignments.’’ 

Will you please provide the Committee with that guide? 

Response: Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) employees are a critical component of the S&T Directorate’s workforce and have been since the organizational 

was created. The Directorate is aware of the ethics issues that may occur in this 

talent sharing relationship between the Federal sector and universities/national laboratories/state and local entities. The S&T Directorate has developed and drafted 

several process documents and/or guides to assist managers and our partners in understanding the requirements involved in an IPA position. In developing these documents the S&T Directorate collaborated with the DHS Chief Human Capital Office 

(CHCO) and the Office of General Counsel (OGC) representatives matrixed to the 

S&T Directorate. In addition to the ethics program the guide addresses a broad 

range of administrative requirements including travel. The Directorate believes the 

best practices have been captured as they relate to the S&T Directorate’s environment. The draft IPA policies and procedures were developed f7ollowing the Office 

of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance and by benchmarking best practices 

across the Federal agencies. The S&T Directorate analyzed and compared the IPA 

policies and procedures used by the Department of Energy, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, National Institutes of 

Health and the Office of Naval Research. These are the premiere users of Intergovernmental Personnel Act and have the most mature policies and procedures. Currently, the S&T Directorate is testing the adequacy of the draft guidance as we 

await the publishing of the DHS Management Directive on the IPA program. The 

S&T Directorate is pleased to share with you our draft guide with the understanding that revisions may result from further review. (See Attachment C) 1

Question 10.: Interoperability depends on several factors, one of which is technology. Others have to do with governance and standard operating protocols. Last 

year you made technology recommendations on how to fix the problem. Can you 

explain what the technology solution you outlined and what needs to be 

done to finally fix this problem? 

Do you have any role in that process, or do you feel that you have now 

made your recommendation and it is up to others to implement? 

In the Fall of 2006, the Under Secretary Cohen testified before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology 

on the reorganization of the Department’s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate. In his testimony, Under Secretary Cohen discussed the establishment of 

technological standards for interoperable communication among emergency responders. Technological differences in equipment have become a major factor that cripples 

the ability of the Nation’s emergency responders to communicate during a crisis. 

48 

To combat this problem, the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) 

within the S&T Directorate has been actively involved in Project 25 (P25) standards 

development, an initiative that will help produce voice communications equipment 

that is interoperable and compatible, regardless of manufacturer. OIC was established to serve as the office within the S&T Directorate to strengthen and integrate 

interoperability and compatibility efforts to improve Federal, State, local, and tribal 

emergency response preparedness and recovery. The P25 suite of interface standards is a major building block for achieving interoperable communications. P25 is 

part of a voluntary consensus standards development process led by the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA). Over 20 interested parties (government 

and commercial entities) meet regularly to negotiate and document the P25 standards suite. While OIC promotes the acceleration, completion, and wide-spread adoption of P25 standards, neither OIC nor DHS has the authority to set standards. 

With support from Congress, the S&T Directorate’s OIC has worked closely with 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to establish a clear vision and communicated key priorities for standards. As a result, industry has dramatically accelerated the development of key standards. OIC has helped develop initial standards for six of the eight major system interfaces associated with P25. All 

key component standards that comprise the P25 suite are nearing completion and 

work continues on test protocols to validate interoperability. Through the work of 

OIC and NIST, the P25 standards suite should be completed within the next 18— 

24 months. 

Since October 2005, OIC has also worked with NIST to develop a P25 Compliance 

Assessment Program. This program will ensure that equipment from different manufacturers not only interoperates, but also meets minimal requirements for performance and conformance. In addition, the program will work with manufacturers so 

that their voice communications products supposed to comply with published P25 

standards actually do. Finally the program will help ensure that Federal grant dollars are being used appropriately by State and local governments. 

Though the S&T Directorate’s OIC has made significant progress toward standards development, the work is far from complete. As standards are developed and 

tested, OIC will continue to actively engage stakeholders and congressional leaders. 

With continued cooperation of industry, the emergency response community, and 

the Federal Government, interoperable P25 equipment will be available across the 

Nation. 

Question 11.: I have a question about the method by which the Department evaluates the performance of the programs within your Directorate. Every year, the Department provides the President and Congress with the Performance and Accountability Report, also known as the ‘‘PAR,’’ which is an audit conducted each year by 

KPMG designed to assess the effectiveness of the Department’s mission performance 

and stewardship of resources. The goals and measurements used to write the 2005 

and 2006 reports are, by and large, weak and meaningless. Allow me to offer a few 

examples to explain what we mean. For example, the PAR looks at the Explosives 

Countermeasures portfolio, where the stated performance goal is to ‘‘improve explosives countermeasures technologies and procedures to prevent attacks on critical infrastructure, key assets, and the public.’’ That’s a good goal. But the performance 

measure is to count ‘‘the number of pilot programs that the Department has initiated.’’ KPMG explained that the Explosives Countermeasures portfolio met their 

performance goal because they initiated 4 pilot programs. My point is that the number of pilot programs initiated, by itself, is not a significant measurement of how 

this program is performing. This measurement, coupled with follow-on measures or 

reporting on how these pilots have positively impacted running the program would 

make this reporting more meaningful. Here’s another example from your Directorate. The SAFETY Act performance measure is to count ‘‘the percentage of full 

applications that receive SAFETY Act coverage? The target in 2006 was 65%. Again, 

this measurement is meaningless. Who is to say that these applicants even merited 

SAFETY Act coverage? We want to judge the SAFETY Act Office by how many applications were filed, or how many applicants found the application process to be 

user-friendly, or how quickly the Department is able to turn around applications. 

So again we have an example of a meaningless performance measurement. 

I have the following questions: 

What efforts are underway at S&T to modify the way that some of these 

programs are being assessed? 

Are you discussing ways to improve these assessments with KPMG? 

How can you evaluate performance over time if you have a constantly 

changing baseline? 

49 

Can you provide us with your future goals and where are these documented or stated? 

Response: Performance measures are a key piece in our efforts to get the content 

right and to that the end the S&T Directorate has initiated a number of changes 

to ensure that programs are assessed in a more meaningful manner. For example, 

a set of basic cost, schedule and performance measures have been developed that 

will be used to assess the health and progress of programs and projects across the 

S&T Directorate. These measures are to be tracked in the S&T Plan Database, a 

new system used to manage, track and execute customer driven S&T Directorate 

investments. 

A more effective way to assess programs across the S&T Directorate is to measure 

how well they meet customer-driven milestones. Achieving milestones and delivering capabilities to our customers are key to the overall performance of the S&T 

Directorate. Therefore, the S&T Directorate has developed a consistent measure 

across each of the new budget lines that ties directly to the work and milestones 

identified in its comprehensive Execution Plan for FY 2007—2008. For example, 

Chemical and Biological Countermeasures has identified several milestones in the 

FY 2007—2008 Execution Plan such as: 

• Completing BioWatch (Gen 3) studies and working with local BioWatch users 

to develop preliminary concepts of operation (CONOPS) to better characterize 

and respond to biological attacks. 

• Completing the Project BioShield material threat determinations for all traditional bio-threat agents of significant public health concern. 

• Initiating the prototypes of an integrated CB detection systems—the system 

is targeted for use in subways, high-profile office buildings, and for deployment 

at special events. 

The S&T Directorate will measure how well it is meeting the program milestones 

and goal as identified in the document, and will provide this information to Congress in its performance-related documents such as the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), Performance Budget Overview (PBO), and the Performance and Accountability Report (PAR). This information, coupled with specific programmatic measures, will enable a comprehensive assessment of how well the Directorate is executing its programs and meeting its customer’s needs. 

To help ensure we meet customer needs, the S&T Directorate has established the 

Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to identify our customers’ needs and 

transition near-term capabilities for addressing those needs. The Capstone IPTs engage DHS customers, acquisition partners, S&T Directorate technical division 

heads, and end-users in our product research, development, transition and acquisition activities. This process, which began late in 2006, will provide a way to measure the success of the programs via the development of Technology Transition 

Agreements (TTAs). TTAs document the technologies to be transitioned to the customer, and commit the customer to funding to deployment of technologies that the 

S&T Directorate develops. The technologies available for transition either have to 

be accepted or meet user-defined criteria. This funding commitment by the customers will provide a clear indication of customer satisfaction with the products developed by the S&T Directorate. 

Finally, the S&T Directorate is currently outlining its business model, which addresses plans for program performance, in the Five-year Research and Development 

(R&D) plan required by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2007 which will be delivered to Congress in early summer 2007. The S&T 

Directorate considers performance vital to the management of strong programs and 

will continue to review and evaluate performance throughout the year as well as 

during the S&T mid-year review. The S&T Directorate will also develop processes 

and measures for different levels and types of performance-related, data-based reviews of programs and projects. The S&T Directorate plans to work with KPMG 

through the Department’s Program Analysis and Evaluation office to ensure that 

they are aware of the changes that are being implemented and seek input throughout the yearly assessment. 

Question 12.: Regarding the PART, I also have a question about the effectiveness 

of some of your S&T programs. You are no doubt familiar with the OMB’s Program 

Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which was developed to assess and improve program performance so that the Federal government can achieve better results. 

Severak S&T programs have been rated by this tool, and the results have varied 

from ‘‘Effective’’ to ‘‘Results not Demonstrated.’’ For example, the Biological Division 

has been rated ‘‘Effective,’’ while University Fellowships, Rapid Prototyping, and 

Emerging Threat Detection are all ‘‘Moderately Effective.’’ Threat and Vulnerability, 

50 

Testing and Assessment received a ‘‘Results not Demonstrated.’’ In each report, an 

Improvement Plan is outlined. 

What is S&T doing now to address these areas, so they are all considered 

‘‘Effective’’? 

Are Improvement Plan suggestions part of the measures within the Performance Accountability Report or other document? 

Response: The S&T Directorate is taking actions to address the scores and results of the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART). In addition to the improvements being made at the program level, the S&T Directorate is implementing 

several Directorate-wide initiatives to ensure that all of its programs are managed 

efficiently and effectively. 

To better address overall program management, the S&T Directorate has designed an information tool, the S&T Plan Database (PDB) that enables more efficient management of research and development (R&D) budget resources. The PDB 

is part of the S&T Directorate’s ‘‘one set of books’’ and will be used to manage, track 

and execute customer- driven R&D investments. The S&T Directorate is also implementing program management training that will include modules on financial and 

budget processes. This will ensure that all program managers in the S&T Directorate are well trained for the management of their programs. 

To better address performance measures and the results, the S&T Directorate, 

through the PDB, will collect and report performance on schedule, cost, technical 

maturity and customer satisfaction. It will also report on how closely programs are 

adhering to their plans for milestones and deliverables. Progress on these detailed 

project-level milestones and deliverables will in turn be linked to higher level PART 

milestones and outcomes. The ultimate measure of effectiveness of our work will be 

how well we meet the needs of our customers. 

To help ensure we meet customer needs, the S&T Directorate has established the 

Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to identify our customers’ needs and enable and transition near-term capabilities for addressing those needs. The Capstone 

IPTs engage DHS customers, acquisition partners, S&T Directorate technical division heads, and end users in our product research, development, transition and acquisition activities. This process not only provides a clear customer, but will provide 

a way to measure the success of the programs via the development of Technology 

Transition Agreements (TTAs). TTAs formalize in detail the technologies to be 

transitioned to the customer, and commit to the customer to funding to deployment 

of technologies that the S&T Directorate develops. This funding commitment by the 

customers will provide clear indications of customer satisfaction with the products 

developed by the S&T Directorate. 

The following is a chart summarizing the scores and improvement actions that 

have been taken to ensure that these programs become stronger and managed efficiently and effectively. (Chart—Attachment‘ D) 

Question 13.: Regarding minority serving institutions, on an application for 

scholarship and fellowship programs for students there is a list for ‘‘Fields of Study 

with Codes.’’ 

Is this list deemed an exhaustive list of Homeland Security-related curricula? 

If it is, why is foreign language not included? 

If it is not an exhaustive list, please provide us with a copy of such list. 

Response: For the current year, the list of Homeland Security-related curricular 

is exhaustive, but the S&T Directorate will revisit the list for 2008. Specific to foreign language, since they are considered humanities they are outside the scope of 

the S&T Directorate’s mandate. However, linguistics studies of the interaction of 

language and terrorism would fall within the accepted social science disciplines. Additionally, having a foreign language component of some disciplines, such as computer science-based textual analysis, would also fall within the scope. 

Question 14.: Admiral Cohen, you have indicated that you have significant interest in ensuring quality partnerships with minority-serving institutions (‘‘MSIs’’) and 

Centers of Excellence (‘‘COEs’’). However, in addition to the overall twenty percent 

reduction to university programs, MSIs generally receive a very small portion of 

funding given to the various COEs (i.e. tens of thousands as compared to the hundreds of thousands). 

If MSIs are not given the funding to be ‘‘quality partners,’’ how do you 

expect MSIs to become stronger partners with less funding available? 

Response: The COE program has evolved since its establishment. The solicitations for the first COEs did not explicitly encourage MSI partners, nor did they include meaningful participation of MSIs as an evaluation criterion to ensure that the 

homeland security mission is bolstered by the diversity of viewpoints and research 

51 

MSIs may offer. As a result, when the first consortia were formed, MSIs were not 

explicitly sought by lead institutions as partners. UP issued later solicitations which 

encouraged MSIs to compete and submit proposals with the result that the last two 

COEs both have MSI partnerships. 

All new and extended COEs are encouraged to have meaningful partnerships with 

MSIs and MSIs are encouraged to submit competitive proposals to lead new COEs. 

Demonstrated ability and commitment to establishing meaningful partnerships with 

MSIs is now an explicit criterion for evaluating new COE applications and awarding 

extensions. Of course, MSIs should also submit proposals to serve as lead institutions. The evaluation criteria for new COEs include the following language: 

Minority Serving Institution Partnerships: The demonstrated ability and commitment to establish meaningful partnerships with MSIs to develop a quality 

MSI research and training program, and the quality of the proposed program. 

The application should demonstrate the proposed COE’s ability to create a highquality and enduring education and research program capabilities at minorityserving institutions in disciplinary areas important to homeland security. 

[NOTE: Lead institutions seeking MSI partners and MSI researchers wanting 

to participate in this COE should register their respective needs and qualifications at: www.sciencetosecurity.org. 

Further, we encourage MSI’s to submit proposals as lead organizations for our future COEs, and we will encourage all new COEs to have substantial partnerships 

with MSIs. 

Question 15.: For FY 2007, you implemented a targeted outreach plan to MSIs. 

Can you provide a copy of your current MSI outreach plan that includes 

your accomplishments? 

How has MSI participation increased since you began the outreach plan? 

Response: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate’s Minority Serving Institutions (MSI) strategy is a flexible approach to develop new initiatives, retain 

those that work, and modify others based on feedback from MSIs. The MSI program 

has a number of components, described below, to increase MSI involvement in the 

S&T Directorate’s activities. 

In 2005 and 2006, University Programs (UP), within the S&T Directorate, held 

a series of regional MSI workshops to introduce MSI opportunities and encourage 

MSIs to work with UP. In the summer of 2005, as a result of these workshops, ten 

teams of faculty and students participated in the MSI Summer Research Team 

(SRT) program. This program provides opportunities for teams of MSI students and 

faculty to spend 10 to 12 weeks conducting a research project at a DHS Center of 

Excellence (COE) facility. Similarly, in 2006, six teams participated in a redesigned 

SRT program. Moreover, these outreach efforts contributed to the development of 

additional criteria for newer COEs. As a result, the most recent COE at John Hopkins University (JHU) had two MSI partners with significant roles included in the 

grant applications, compared with no proposed MSI partners at the first COEs, 

when such participation was not explicitly encouraged. 

In 2007, following establishment of a new MSI Program by Under Secretary 

Cohen, UP hosted three regional MSI workshops, which took place on February 4 

in Baltimore targeting Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), on 

February 21 at Broward Community College (Florida) targeting Hispanic Serving 

Institutions (HSIs), HBCUs and MSI community colleges and on February 28 at 

USC (California) targeting HSIs and tribal Colleges. At these workshops, DHS: 

• Introduced the MSIs to the new COE solicitations, explained the opportunities those represent and encouraged the MSIs to participate, including as lead 

institutions, 

• Explained the ideas and expectations for the new MSI program that U/S 

Cohen initiated, and solicit the MSIs input. Note: UP revamped the MSI Leadership Grant program significantly in response to comments received from MSIs 

at these workshops, 

• Described the 2007 Summer Research Team program, 

• Described DHS Scholarship and Fellowship Programs and the DHS 

Postdoctoral Research Associateship Program, and 

• Invited the MSIs to a ten-day summer workshop on teaching terrorism 

(SWOTT) specifically developed for MSIs. Note: DHS is supporting the attendance of interested MSI faculty to this workshop until capacity is reached. 

Other UP MSI Activities have included: 

• Participation in the White House Initiative on HSIs’ conference planning committee in Fall 2006; 

52 

• Meeting with Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities and HBCUs 

at their annual meetings and at UP’s requests on ways to disseminate information, engage HSIs and HBCUs, and present at their major conferences; 

• Participation in a workshop for Native Americans on the risk of terrorism for 

Casinos; 

• Meeting with a number of other Federal agencies on ways to collaborate and 

leverage MSI resources; 

• Collaboration with the White House Initiatives on HBCUs and TCUs on ways 

to disseminate information and provide speaking opportunities at their key 

venues; and 

• Reaching out to MSIs to encourage MSI students to apply for DHS Scholarships and Fellowships. 

Question 16.: Regarding ‘‘Get Backs’’ from the hearing, please provide the Committee with dates for the release of the following items that the Under Secretary 

pledged to provide the Committee: 

Science and Technology strategic plan (required by Homeland Security 

Act) 

Copy of Science and Technology Organization Regulation Manual 

(STORM) 

Date for National Homeland Security R&D plan (required by Homeland 

Security Act) 

IPA Directive (the Under Secretary mentioned that this might come in a 

Management Directive, though in the meantime he would provide the Committee with the language he used while at the Office of Naval Research) 

Response: The Science and Technology’s (S&T’s) 5 year R&D Plan required within 180 days of enactment of the FY 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act is 

in development. The S&T Directorate received a two month extension from the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The report is scheduled to be delivered in June 

2007. 

The Science and Technology Organization Regulation Manual (STORM) is available. A copy has been provided to your staff. 

The National Homeland Security Research and Development plan will be available in June of 2007. 

Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) employees are a critical component of the 

S&T Directorate’s workforce and have been since the organizational was created. 

The Directorate is aware of the ethics issues that may occur in this talent sharing 

relationship between the Federal sector and universities/national laboratories/state 

and local entities. The S&T Directorate has developed and drafted several process 

documents and/or guides to assist managers and our partners in understanding the 

requirements involved in an IPA position. In developing these documents the S&T 

Directorate collaborated with the DHS Chief Human Capital Office (CHCO) and the 

Office of General Council (OGC) representatives matrixed to the S&T Directorate. 

In addition to the ethics program the guide addresses a broad range of administrative requirements including travel. The Directorate believes the best practices have 

been captured as they relate to the S&T Directorate’s environment. The draft IPA 

policies and procedures were developed following the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance and by benchmarking best practices across the Federal agencies. The S&T Directorate analyzed and compared the IPA policies and procedures 

used by the Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health and the Office of Naval 

Research. These are the premiere users of Intergovernmental Personnel Act and 

have the most mature policies and procedures. Currently, the S&T Directorate is 

testing the adequacy of the draft guidance as we await the publishing of the DHS 

Management Directive on the IPA program. A copy of this draft guide has been provided to your staff. 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MCCAUL, RANKING MEMBER SUB- COMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

Question 17.: Is biometrics a part of the Science and Technology Directorate’s Human Factors Division or Border Division? What is the relationship between the Human Factors Division and Border Division in pursuing 

biometric and credentialing technologies? What percentage of the S&T 

53 

budget in FY 2008 covers biometrics and credentialing projects—it appears 

to be only a small fraction of the budget. 

Response: Biometrics and credentialing projects in the S&T Directorate are managed by the Human Factors Division, with the exception of programs dealing with 

development of standards in the area of biometrics and credentialing, which are 

managed by the Test & Evaluations and Standards Division. 

The Human Factors Division coordinates activities with all of the divisions and 

offices in the S&T Directorate including the Borders and Maritime Division as well 

as interagency coordination bodies in DHS such as the DHS Biometrics Coordination Group and the People Screening CAPSTONE IPT and government-wide NSTC 

Subcommittee on Biometrics. One example activity is the partnership with the 

Coast Guard’s Mona Pass Project to pilot the use of at-sea mobile biometrics in an 

operational setting. Information gathered from this pilot will be used to inform the 

S&T Directorate’s transitional mobile biometrics work beginning in FY 2009 so that 

the S&T Directorate can ensure future mobile biometrics devices meet not only the 

Coast Guard’s operational needs, but the needs of other DHS users as well. For FY 2008, $6.5 million or 1 percent of the President’s Budget Request for the 

S&T Directorate’s Research, Development, Acquisition and Operations budget is 

dedicated to biometrics and credentialing activities. 

Question 18.: The FY 2008 budget request for the Centers of Excellence has de- creased by $9.9 million (20%), yet a recent BAA called for 4 new Centers of Excellence this year. Does this mean that some of the existing Centers will receive 

less money or have their funding terminated when their contract is up for 

renewal? 

Response: The existing Centers of Excellence (COE’s) will not receive any less 

money during their current period of performance. As they are being extended, each 

Center is informed of its available budget and develops a workplan for the extension 

period accordingly. To date, each Center has voluntarily opted for an extension at 

the level of funding available from the S&T Directorate. In some cases, that amount 

will be less than they received annually for their initial 3-year period of performance, based on current budgets. However, the COEs planned from the outset for an 

initial period of performance of three years. As a result, many of the projects that 

the COEs supported in the initial period are being completed within that period and 

do not require further funding. Moreover, the COEs have become successful at 

leveraging other sources of funding by using their positions as COEs and funds from 

the S&T Directorate. We anticipate that the existing COEs will re-compete to continue as Centers as their first terms end. 

Question 19.: The Centers of Excellence are a vital part of the S&T program, 

with leading experts providing the genesis of ideas for the next generation of homeland security technologies. These Centers focus on basic, long-term research which 

can take on the order of 8 years, yet these Centers must re-compete for funding 

every 2 to 3 years. How does S&T reconcile the difference in timeframes? 

Specifically, how will S&T judge performance and progress of basic research after just a couple of years? Will this deter some Universities from 

applying to become Centers because funding is not guaranteed from start 

to completion of research projects? 

Response: Initially, the period of performance for the five original Centers of Excellence (COEs) was three years, with the possibility of an extension depending on 

performance and the availability of funds. Three of these COEs have already been 

reviewed for performance and extended for either two or three years, for total periods of performance of five to six years, which is commensurate with Centers supported by other federal agencies. 

With the S&T realignment initiated by Under Secretary Cohen, all of the COEs 

ultimately are moving to a six year period of performance, with the potential for 

re-competing for a COE in the same topic area one additional time. That is, the existing Centers will be eligible for a total tenure of 11 or 12 years, if they are successful in winning a re-competed COE grant. The new COEs being initiated in FY 2007 

and beyond have initial periods of performance of four to six years, with the possibility of winning a six-year re-competition once for a total period of performance of 

10 to 12 years. The initial periods vary in order to get all nine planned COEs on 

a schedule of one-third of the centers re-competed or competed every two years. This 

enables the S&T Directorate to spread the administrative workload and provides for 

continuity within the community (network) of Centers. 

Regarding judgment of performance, the S&T Directorate conducts reviews of the 

Centers on their second anniversary to ensure they are on track, focusing on the 

right research and well-managed. We use both academic subject matter experts and 

the potential end users of research products for these reviews. The results of these 

54 

reviews provide direction for course corrections, if necessary. The S&T Directorate 

plans to continue conducting these reviews periodically to fulfill its oversight responsibilities. We do not anticipate that periodic reviews will deter universities from applying; so far, the academic response to past solicitations has been strong even with 

the initial 3-year performance period and prospect of reviews after the second year. 

Question 20.: What criteria does S&T use for selecting Centers of Excellence? 

Response: The S&T Directorate uses the following criteria to evaluate full proposal submissions for a Center of Excellence (COE). The first six criteria (a—f) are 

critical elements of the proposal and of equal significance. Proposals that do not provide satisfactory responses to all of these essential criteria will be declined. The remaining criteria (g—k) also are important to meeting the S&T Directorate’s overall 

objectives and, while they are listed in approximate descending order of importance, 

each should be fully addressed by applicants. 

a. Technical Merit and Quality: the degree to which the proposed research focus 

will achieve excellence (to offer results capable of commanding the respect of active researchers and of probing a frontier area well). The originality and creativity of the proposed research questions and the appropriateness and adequacy of the proposed research methods. For example, the following questions 

may be considered during the evaluation: Is the research approach practical and 

technically defensible, and can the projects be performed within the proposed 

time period? Will the research contribute to scientific knowledge in the topic 

area? Will the results be disseminated broadly to enhance scientific and technological understanding? What are potential benefits of the proposed research to 

society? Is the proposal well-prepared with supportive information that is selfexplanatory or understandable? 

b. Mission-Related Significance: the degree to which the proposed research focus 

can yield results that overcome existing and difficult technical limitations, or 

that offer the scientific basis to enable major technological advances in the foreseeable future. The responsiveness of the proposal to the research needs identified in this announcement and the willingness and ability of the applicants to 

consult with Federal, state, local and private stakeholders to refine research 

questions and design to make results applicable to homeland security issues or 

policy. For example, the following questions may be considered during the evaluation: Does the proposal adequately address the objectives specified by the 

S&T Directorate for this topic area? Can the applicants communicate their results in formats accessible to and understandable by Federal, state and local 

end users? 

c. Geographical distribution of all Centers of Excellence and major partners. The 

Centers of Excellence program’s authorizing legislation states: ‘‘. . .the Under 

Secretary for Science and Technology, shall operate extramural research, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation programs so as to ensure that 

colleges, universities, private research institutes and companies from as many 

regions of the United States as practicable participate.’’ Geographical location 

of the lead institution and its major partners will be a factor in evaluating proposals submitted in response to this COE. 

d. Qualifications of Investigators: The qualifications of the principal investigator(s) and other key personnel, including training, demonstrated knowledge 

of pertinent literature, experience, and publication records, and the extent to 

which key personnel will make a significant time commitment to the project. 

e. Facilities and Equipment: The availability and/or adequacy of the facilities 

and equipment proposed for the project. For example, the following questions 

may be considered during the evaluation: Are there any deficiencies that may 

interfere with the successful completion of the research? 

f. Management: The ability of the lead institution to manage a complex Center 

of Excellence in terms of achieving research results when due, managing large 

and complex budgets and communicating research outcomes, and the adequacy 

of the proposed management plan to ensure quality research and education programs from researchers at both primary and partner institutions. Note: Applicants are advised to designate a qualified, full-time Center Director with the 

ability to manage a large results-oriented research program. 

g. Knowledge of Current Research: Evidence that the applicant is familiar with 

the research and resources of existing DHS COEs, other DHS S&T, federal 

agency or National Laboratory research and development programs, and other 

relevant university programs and can demonstrate its ability to take advantage 

of these resources. Information about the existing COEs is available at 

55 

www.sciencetosecurity.org. S&T programs are described in general terms at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xres/programs/. 

h. Education: The adequacy of education plans and supporting materials demonstrating the proposed COE’s ability to establish an enduring and comprehensive program of study in disciplines related to the specific research areas cited 

in this announcement. This plan should demonstrate how it will contribute to 

the development of new generation of scientists and professionals working in 

homeland security fields, as well as developing continuing education for current 

professionals. 

i. Minority Serving Institution Partnerships: The demonstrated ability and commitment to establish meaningful partnerships with MSIs to develop a quality 

MSI research and training program, and the quality of the proposed program. 

The application should demonstrate the proposed COE’s ability to create a highquality and enduring education and research program capabilities at minorityserving institutions in disciplinary areas important to homeland security. 

[NOTE: Lead institutions seeking MSI partners and MSI researchers wanting 

to participate in this COE should register their respective needs and qualifications at: www.sciencetosecurity.org.] 

j. Results Transition: The effectiveness and soundness of a strategy to transition 

research results to end users and mechanisms to accomplish this transition, and 

demonstration of a clear and effective plan for transitioning research results for 

each project or research area ultimately to homeland security mission agencies. 

k. Budget: Although budget information does not reflect on the application’s scientific merit, the evaluation will include the appropriateness and/or adequacy 

of the proposed budget and its implications for the potential success of the proposed research. Input on requested equipment is of particular interest. 

Question 21.: Is the ultimate goal to have only one Center supporting 

each S&T Division? What happens, for example, if there are unique research areas within a Division and one Center doesn’t have the needed expertise to cover the basic research needs to support each distinct mission? 

For example, within the Chemical and Biological Division, elements of 

chemical defense are distinct from biodefense which are distinct from food 

and agriculture security. How will you base decisions on how many Centers are needed to support a single Division’s mission? 

Response: The S&T Directorate’s ultimate goal is to create as many Centers of 

Excellence as the S&T Directorate and its customers believe are needed to develop 

the fundamental science essential to improve or extend homeland security. There 

are currently nine Centers planned for the foreseeable future, but as requirements 

are refined and resources allow, more may be planned. Every Center will be aligned 

with the mission and activities of one or more S&T Divisions, with no less than one 

per division. 

Question 22. The funding request in FY 2008 for laboratory facilities has decreased by $16.8 million. However, the Committee understands that because of 

delays in the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) site selection process 

(which has delayed the establishment of the NBAF until 2014) and the limited space 

at Plum Island Animal disease Center, S&T plans to increase capacity at Plum Island to provide interim animal and zoonotic disease research capabilities. Since the 

fundingd does not apprear to be accounted for in your FY08 budget, where 

will this funding come from? 

Response: The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008 includes $17 million for upgrades to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). The laboratory facilities reduction in FY 2008 is not a cut to the program; it simply reflects 

the funding needs for that year. We are requesting lower funding levels for PIADC 

upgrades as we are nearing completion of the corrective actions as well as less funding for the NBAF project in FY 2008 than in FY 2007 as we are completing the 

preliminary phases of the project. The corrective actions and upgrades at PIADC 

will allow the use of the facility through the transition to NBAF. The operational 

funding for all of our laboratories is intact and our plans for FY 2008 accommodate 

all of our needs for laboratory facilities operations including PIADC. Future funding 

for operational cost increases associated with increased work load will appear in the 

Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) and the appropriate year’s 

budget request. 

Question 23. Please explain the decrease in the Infrastructure/Geophysical Division’s budget request for FY 2008. The Committee understands 

that this reduction is the result of the elimination of a number of programs 

including the Southeast Regional research Initiative (SERRI) and the ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Dec 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-6\35265.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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munity Based Criticval Infrastructure Protection Institute and reduction 

of other programs such as the Regional Technology Integration Intitiative 

(RTII). Please explain why these programs were eliminated and what the 

impact will be? 

Reponse: The Southeast Regional Research Initiative (SERRI) and the Community Based Critical Infrastructure Protection Institute each have un-obligated funds 

remaining from prior fiscal years appropriations. Both entities have periods of performance that extend into fiscal year 2008 that will use these un-obligated balances 

to continue their projects. Both entities were expected to expire once all currently 

appropriated funds have been obligated, however work that might be assigned to 

SERRI in the future will most likely be assigned to one or more of the newly formed 

University Centers of Excellence, as posted in recent Broad Agency Announcements. 

S&T will stretch the funds requested in fiscal year 2008 for to the Regional Technology Integration Initiative by deferring some projects and scaling down others. 

Question 24. The Committee understands that there is a new focus on leap 

ahead, innovative technologies through your HITS and HIPS. DARPA was set up 

to do something similar and to keep fresh ideas coming, they rotate program managers every 3 years or so. Does S&T anticipate doing the same, when the Directorate has experienced difficulty retaining personnel? How will S&T balance the 

need for continuity versus the need for fresh ideas? 

Response: We do not intend to use the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA) program manager rotation model. The Director of Innovation of 

Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) has projects that 

will range from 1 to 5 years. When a project is complete, the S&T Directorate will 

have the opportunity to move a program manager into a new project. HSARPA’s 

projects come from DHS leadership, from DHS component customers, and from creative unsolicited ideas from industry and laboratories. Starting in FY 2009, the Director of Innovation anticipates about a 33 percent refresh of projects every year. 

We expect to retain program managers longer. 

Question 25. Within the FY 2007 budget, out of the $20 million that was des- ignated for Cybersecurity, over $7.5 million or 38% was directred towards ‘‘Innovation’’. This percentage is by far the highest of any of the program areas. Over a 

third of funding for Cybersecurity was directed towards Innovation and yet there 

does not seem to be any projects within the Innovation office focused on cybersecurity. Please explain this discrepancy. 

Response: The Under Secretary’s priorities for the S&T Directorate include producing technologies to increase the security of our Nation’s Business Sector. During 

the realignment of its FY 2007 Budget, the S&T Directorate conducted an in-depth 

review of all programs and their alignment to the Department and its priorities to 

identify those programs that lacked clear deliverables and Departmental customers. 

Those efforts were cut to fund accelerated and high impact programs in the Innovation Division that address key gaps identified by DHS leadership. One of those 

projects is a Resilient Electric Grid that will provide a more robust and flexible infrastructure for the transmission of power. This project directly impacts the cyber 

infrastructure and allows for more resilient operation during a natural or man-made 

disaster. The remaining Cyber Security programs address the highest priority areas 

where the Federal Government can have the greatest impact. 

Question 26.: Does the S&T Directorate have any projects focused on 

moving the U.S. Government toward the utilization of Internet Protocol 

version 6 (IPv6)? 

Response: The S&T Directorate does not have projects directly focused on moving the Federal Government toward the utilization of Internet Protocol version 6 

(IPv6) although the Department is implementing IPv6 as part of the Administration’s effort to transition to IPv6 by June of 2008. The S&T Directorate is exploring 

the impact of IPv6 on new solutions for domain name system (DNS) security and 

routing security, which the President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace calls 

out as critical Internet infrastructure components with vulnerabilities that need to 

be addressed. The S&T Directorate has projects focused on moving the Federal Government toward deployment of solutions for these areas, which each interact with 

IPv6. In these activities, the S&T Directorate is working with the Department of 

Commerce and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which 

are the lead agencies charged with the deployment of IPv6. The S&T Directorate 

is also working with the Department of Defense (DoD) as they deploy IPv6. 

Question 27.: What tradeoff analysis was conducted to determine that the 

proposed HITS/HIPS are more of a priority than projects/programs currently below the funding cut line for FY 2008 and beyond? Is there a sepaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Dec 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-6\35265.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
57 

rate Integrated Products Team (IPT) process for HITS/HIPS versus the individual Division IPT process and if so, which Department components are 

the lead considering the HITS and HIPS span mutiple Division mission 

area? 

Response: The initial (current) set of HIPS and HITS projects were selected in 

early FY 2007, prior to the initial meeting of the S&T Directorate’s Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). They were selected as a result of the Undersecretary 

for Science and Technology’s interaction with Department leadership. The Undersecretary was able to identify the priority gaps in capability as described by leadership 

and those gaps became the initial HIPS and HITS. The list of HIPS and HITS 

projects has been extremely well received by our customers and has generated tremendous interest among industry. 

New HIPS and HITS will be selected from various inputs including the IPT process, unsolicited input from industry and laboratories, and from teaming opportunities with other agencies. The S&T Directorate’s Corporate Board will review all potential candidates for HIPS and HITS categories and make final program decisions. 

Question 28.: How are the actual end-users, such as the first responders 

and infrastructure providers (as opposed to DHS customers) engaged in 

the Integrated Products Team (IPS) process? How are end-user’s capability 

needs included in the requirement setting process? 

Response: End-users are included at the discretion of the IPT leads. The Infrastructure Protection (IP) and Incident Management (IM) Integrated Product Teams 

(IPTs) provide two examples of how end users were brought into the initial Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) process. The Infrastructure Protection (IP) and 

Incident Management (IM) Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) used robust and established processes for engaging and eliciting requirements from end-users, such as 

First Responders, infrastructure providers and industry owner/operators. Within the 

IPT construct, the Preparedness Directorate in the IP IPT and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the IM IPT, representing their respective 

customers, are charged with collecting, vetting and prioritizing user requirements. 

The input to the IP IPT is developed in coordination with the Sector Specific 

Agencies (SSAs) who, in partnership with the Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) 

and Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs), determine sector-specific priorities 

and requirements for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CI/KR) protection. 

The SSAs submit their priorities and requirements to DHS in their sector annual 

reports which inform the National Critical Infrastructure Protection (NCIP) Research and Development (R&D) Plan and its technology roadmap. 

The input to the IM IPT is developed from the results of Project Responder, input 

from responder communities through workshops, outreach venues such as conferences and symposiums, coordination with the Technical Support Working Group 

(TSWG) and the Inter-Agency Board, requests generated through the Grants and 

Training process, and the Regional Technology Initiative (RTI) Program which directly gathers requirements from responders in several representative urban areas. 

As the Capstone IPT process is maturing, the S&T Directorate is reaching out to 

other representative groups to join the IPT process to ensure that the capability 

gaps of the end-user community are properly understood as well as ensure these organizations understand the process by which technology requirements are vetted 

and prioritized for science and technology investments. 

First responders and State and local governments can also make their technology 

requirements known to the S&T Directorate through the Tech Solutions program 

where their input on current capability gaps and technology requirements is received by the S&T Directorate via a website. We will pursue technology solutions 

directly through this approach, as well as bring forward these requirements to the 

appropriate Capstone IPT for inclusion in the Capstone IPT process. 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

Question 29. There was a recent GAO report on the failure of technology to 

screen airport passengers for weapons and bombs (GAO–07–448T). Please describe the reasons for this failure and discuss what S&T is doing to address 

the need for explosive detection technologies, and liquid detection technologies in particular. 

Response: Detecting weapons and explosives within the transportation systems 

of the United States requires a process that not only includes a reliance on techVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:46 Dec 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-6\35265.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
58 

nology, but also on intelligence and surveillance activities, passenger pre-screening, 

pat-down searches of individuals, and physical searches of property. This layered, 

multidimensional approach to transportation security and passenger screening 

drives our efforts to improve security. As the GAO report ‘‘AVIATION SECURITY: 

Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but 

More Work Remains’’ (GAO–07–448T) indicates, more can be done procedurally and 

with technology. The S&T Directorate is working with the Transportation Security 

Administration on several efforts to improve detection of weapons and explosives at 

airport checkpoints. Those efforts include: 

• Improving the reliability and detection capability of two explosive trace portal 

(ETP) configurations; 

• Evaluating two new sets of technologies, one based on back scatter X-ray and 

one based on millimeter wave technology with a much higher possibility of 

weapons detection hidden on the body as well as explosives; 

• A multi airport testing of a liquid explosives detection device; 

• Advanced Technology X-ray units to detect liquid threats in carry-on luggage; 

• Hostile Intent Detection methods and systems; and 

• Automated checkpoint explosives detection systems (Auto EDS) program. 

These efforts support the existing risk-based, layered approach to transportation 

security. The S&T Directorate goal is to improve existing technologies and develop 

new technologies, while working with TSA and vendors to increase detection capabilities and throughput, while reducing costs, down-time, and false alarms. 

Question 30.: There was a recent failure of a pilot program focused on detection 

of explosives for rail passengers and systems. Please discuss S&T plans to develop effective detection technologies aimed at rail systems? 

Response: The Rail Pilot Program was a series of studies to determine if off-theshelf equipment and prototype stand-off imaging technologies would work in passenger rail systems. During the pilot, we tested and evaluated numerous technologies. Although we did not adopt or endorse any of the technologies as ‘‘ready 

for deployment,’’ we gained valuable information that indicated which technologies 

will not work and which technologies have potential to work in rail transit systems. 

The S&T Directorate has several ongoing stand-off detection technology evaluation projects that could be used within rail and other transportation systems to 

screen passengers. These could also be applied to a follow-on pilot program should 

one be directed. Examples of projects that could be used include the development 

of: 

• A spectroscopic and trace detection technologies (IR, Fluorescence-based, etc.) 

for standoff or remote suicide bomber detection; 

• Explosives screening stations which can be rapidly deployed and remotely operated; and 

• An accurate, near-real-time, contactless, biometrics-based, card-and-reader 

system. 

Further, in order to develop a system that could aid in the standoff detection of 

concealed explosives on persons, a series of field demonstrations will be held in conjunction with the Secret Service, the FBI, other Federal, State, and local law enforcement and first responder agencies. 

Question 31.: Please address what type of spectrum analyses and jamming frequency technology S&T is developing to detect IEDs and the new 

IED systems being found in Iraq? 

Response: In collaboration with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the S&T Directorate funded the Remote 

Control IED Electronic Counter Measures National Capability (frequency jamming) 

effort in FY 2005 and FY 2006. Program plans include additional funding for this 

effort in future years. 

The new IEDs that have been written about recently in the press typically refer 

to sophisticated insurgent attacks on armored U.S. military vehicles using homemade anti-tank weapons with ‘‘shaped’’ explosive charges. Other-wise known as 

EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators), these devices are primarily used to defeat 

armored vehicles traveling in convoy. Currently, the S&T Directorate does not have 

a development effort to counter the road-side bomb threat because our customers 

do not perceive this to be a priority threat within the continental United States relative to other threats. 

(59) 

Appendix B: Attachments 

Attachment A: Response to Question #6 

Capstone IPT Representative High Priority Technology Areas 


11006-1.eps
60 

Border Security: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need improved ballistic protection via 

personal protective equipment.

Ballistic Protection: Provides improved ballistic protection for 

personnel (Borders/Maritime Division Lead) 

Need to improve detection, tracking, 

and identification of all threats along 

the terrestrial and maritime border.

BorderNet: Provides improved surveillance and data integration 

tool for real time detection, tracking, identification and classification of targets in land, maritime, air (Borders/Maritime Division Lead) 

Need ability to access ICE databases 

in which voice information is entered; 

provide analytical, reporting, and 

automated case deconfliction; classify, 

identify voice samples.

Voice Linking System Modernization: Provides improved identification, analysis, sharing and storing of telephone voice data 

(C2I Division) 

Need non-lethal compliance measures 

for vehicles, vessels, or aircraft allowing for safe interdiction by law enforcement personnel.

Pursuit Termination: Provides non-lethal compliance measures 

for vehicles, vessels, and personnel to allow safe interdiction by 

law enforcement personnel (Borders/Maritime Division Lead) 

Need non-destructive tools that allow 

for the inspection of hidden or closed 

compartments to find contraband or 

security threats.

Hidden Compartment Inspection Device: Provides non-intrusive 

inspection tools to identify hidden compartments in vehicles 

and containers (Borders/Maritime Division Lead) 

Need improved analysis and decisionmaking tools that will ensure the development/implementation of border 

security initiatives.

SBI Systems Engineering and Modeling and Simulation: Provides 

Modeling and simulation decision-making tools to inform development and implementation of border security initiatives 

(Borders/Maritime Division Lead) 

Need the ability to non-intrusively determine the intent of subjects during 

questioning.

Project Hostile Intent: Provides determination of intent devices 

for interviews (Human Factors Division) 

Need the ability for law enforcement 

personnel to quickly identify the origin 

of gunfire and classify the type of 

weapon fired.

Gunfire Locator: Provides the capability to locate gunfire and 

classify weapons (Borders/Maritime Division 

Lead) 

Need the ability for law enforcement 

officers to assure compliance of lawful orders using non-lethal means.

Less-Lethal Compliance Measures: Provides improved less-lethal 

capabilities to law enforcement personnel (Borders/Maritime Division Lead) 

Cargo Security: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need enhanced screening and examination by non-intrusive inspection.CanScan: Provides enhanced capability to detect or identify terrorist or contraband items (Borders/Maritime Division) 

Need increased information fusion, 

anomaly detection, Automatic Target 

Recognition capability.

Automatic Target Recognition: Provides information fusion, 

anomaly detection, and automatic target recognition systems to 

identify high threat cargo and ensure its delivery (Borders/ 

Maritime Division) 


11006-2.eps
61 

Cargo Security: Representative Technology Needs—Continued 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need to detect and identify WMD materials and contraband.Requirements Analysis for WMD Sensor: Develop requirements 

for developing WMD sensors applicable to the cargo security environment, with multimodal considerations 

Need capability to screen 100% of air 

cargo.

Requirements Analysis for Bulk/Break-Bulk: Analysis to develop 

methods for securing and monitoring bulk/break bulk cargo 

shipped by air or maritime (Borders/Maritime Division) 

Need to test the feasibility of seal security; Detection of intrusion.Secure Carton Testing: Develop and test advanced non-intrusive 

inspection methods (Borders/Maritime Division) 

Need to track domestic high-threat 

cargo.

Domestic High Threat Cargo Tracking: Enhances Marine Asset 

Tag and Tracking System capability (Borders/Maritime 

Division) 

Need to harden air cargo conveyances 

and containers.

Air Cargo Composite Container: Develop materials for hardening 

air cargo conveyances (Borders/Maritime Division) 

Need Positive ID of cargo & detection 

of intrusion or unauthorized access.

Advanced Container Security Device: Provides improved cargo 

security devices including container intrusion detection (Borders/Maritime Division) 

Chem/Bio Defense: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need tools to detect and mitigate animal disease breakouts.Foreign Animal Disease Modeling: Provides tools to detect and 

mitigate catastrophic animal disease outbreaks (Chem-Bio 

Division) 

Need policy net assessments to provide fresh perspectives on fundamental elements of the national biodefense strategy.Bio-Defense Net Assessments: Provides recommendations for rebalancing and refining investments among the pillars of our 

overall biodefense policy (Chem-Bio Division) 

Need improved tools for integrated 

CBRN Risk Assessment.

Bio-Threat Characterization Center (BTCC): Provides improved 

tools for integrated CBRN risk assessments to include traditional and emerging bio, chem and agricultural threats and 

human health and economic effects (Chem-Bio Division) 

Need an incident characterization capability for response & restoration.Systems Approaches for Restoration: Provides a systems approach to rapidly restore large areas after bio or chemical attack (Chem-Bio Division) 

Need improved ChemBio Forensic 

Analysis capability.

Bio Forensics R&D Near Term: Provides improved biological and 

chemical forensic capabilities, including sample handling and 

extraction, and bio-phys-chemical characterization (ChemBio Division) 

Need national-scale detection architectures and strategies to address 

outdoor, indoor (e.g., highly trafficked 

transportation hubs) and critical infrastructure.

Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC): Provides analysis and 

scientific assessment of the chemical threat against our civilian 

population (Chem-Bio Division) 

Need consequence assessments of attacks on chemical facilities and Chem 

Bio attacks on other critical infrastructure.

Chemical Infrastructure Risk Assessments: Consequence assessments of attacks on chemical facilities and chem bio attacks 

on other critical infrastructure, including cascading effects on 

other sectors (Chem-Bio Division) 

62 

Chem/Bio Defense: Representative Technology Needs—Continued 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need Integrated CBRNE Sensor Reporting capability.Integrated CBRNE Detection System: Provides an integrated 

CBRNE sensor reporting capability in support of a common operating picture (Chem-Bio Division) 

Need handheld rapid biological and 

chemical detection systems.

Next Gen Low Vapor Pressure Chemicals Detection Systems 

(LVPCDS): Provide handheld, rapid, biological and chemical detection systems with broad agent coverage and extremely low 

false alarm rates (Chem-Bio Division) 

Need detection paradigms and systems for enhanced, emerging and 

novel biological threats.

Next Generation Biological Detection System: Develop technologies and systems to identify unknown and emerging biological threats (Chem-Bio Division) 

Cyber Security: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need secure protocols Securing the Infrastructure: Provide secure protocols including 

standard security methods (C2I Division) 

Need Process Control Systems (PCS) 

Security.

Securing the Infrastructure: Provide Process Control Systems 

(PCS) Security (C2I Division) 

Need large-scale cyber security test 

beds.

Enabling Technologies for Cyber Security & Information Assurance R&D: Provide improved capability to model the effects of 

cyber attacks and understanding of internet topography (C2I 

Division) 

Need composable and scalable secure 

systems.

Advanced and Next Generation Systems & Architectures: Provide 

comprehensive next-generation network models; (C2I Division) 

Composable and scalable secure systems (C2I Division) 

Explosives Prevention: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need standoff detection on persons 

(portable solutions).

Suicide bomb detection: Provide standoff portable explosive detection system for all operating environments (e.g., suicide 

bombers, backpack-sized explosives, ferries, cruise ships, and 

field operating environments) (Explosives Division) 

Need system solution for detection in 

baggage (checked & carried).

Automated Carried Bag EDS: Provides system solution for detection in baggage (checked & carried) including air cargo (Explosives Division) 

Need capability to detect VBIED / 

large threat mass (container, trailer, 

ship, vessel, car, rail).

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / Large threat mass 

detection for the transit environment: Provide capability for 

Large threat mass detection for the transit environment (Explosives Division) 

Need capability to detect homemade 

or novel explosives.

Stand-alone technologies for detection of homemade or novel 

explosives: Provide homemade/ novel explosives detection characterization and detection capability (Explosives Division) 

Need the capability to assess, render 

safe, and neutralize explosive threats.

Render Safe Technologies: Provide capability to assess, render 

safe, and neutralize explosive threats (Explosives Division) 

63 

Explosives Prevention: Representative Technology Needs—Continued 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need to optimize canine explosive detection capability.Canine explosive detection optimization: Optimize canine explosive detection (Explosives Division) 

Need a systems solution for detection 

in baggage (checked & carried).

Manhattan II: Provides a system solution for detection in baggage (checked & carried) (Explosives Division) 

Incident Management: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need an integrated Modeling, Mapping 

and Simulation capability.

Simulation Based Incident Planning and Response: Provides integrated and enhanced modeling and simulation for incident 

planning and response (IP/Geophysical Division) 

Need a Personnel Monitoring (Emergency Responder Locator System) capability.Advanced First Responder Locator System: Provide emergency 

responder locator systems for rapid identification of downed or 

at risk responders in complex threat environments (IP/Geophysical Division) 

Need a Personnel Monitoring (Physiological Monitoring of Firefighters) capability.Advanced First Responder Physiological Monitoring System: Provides a physiological monitoring capability (IP/Geophysical Division) 

Need an Incident Management Enterprise System.Advanced Incident Management Enterprise System: Provides an 

Incident Management Enterprise System that includes webbased collaboration and tracking tools that are field deployable 

and interoperable across multiple agencies (IP/Geophysical Division) 

Need a logistics management tool ...... Incident Logistics and Resource Tracking System: Provides Logistics management tools and improved in-transit logistics visibility (IP/Geophysical Division) 

Information Sharing: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need Data Fusion from multiple sensors.COP Data Fusion Technologies Pilot: Provides capability to fuse 

data from multiple sensors into Common Operating Picture 

(COP) (C2I Division) 

Need to improve real-time Data Sharing across agencies on encounters.Suspicious activity reporting and Pilots: Provides ability to improve real-time data sharing of law enforcement information 

(C2I Division) 

Need to manage identities and establish interoperability with Identity Adjudication Support Systems.Network Identity Management and Pilot: Provides ability to manage user identities, rights and authorities (C2I Division) 

Need distribution capability for Intelligence Products.Multi-Level Intelligence Dissemination: Provides ability to support distribution of intelligence products (C2I Division) 

Need capability to share information 

within and across sectors on terrorist 

threats.

Threat Dissemination Standards: Provides standards and protocols for information sharing within and across sectors on terrorist threats (C2I Division) 

Need real-time Data Processing and 

Visualization.

Real Time Data Processing and Visualization: Provides automated, dynamic, real-time data processing and visualization 

capability (C2I Division) 

64 

Information Sharing: Representative Technology Needs—Continued 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need analytic capabilities for structured, unstructured, and streaming 

data.

Integrated Data Processing and Analysis: Provides analytic capabilities for structured, unstructured, and streaming data 

(C2I Division) 

Need information sharing capability 

for Situational Awareness between 

USCG and Partners.

USCG Collective Situational Awareness Pilot: Provides capability 

for the USCG to exchange information across disparate National 

System security networks (C2I Division) 

Need Sensor Fusion between Law Enforcement and Intelligence Partners.Sensor fusion between law enforcement and intelligence partners (C2I Division) 

Infrastructure Protection: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need analytical tools to quantify interdependencies and cascading consequences as disruptions occur across 

critical infrastructure sectors.

Unified Blast Analysis Tool: Provides ability to identify existing 

vulnerabilities to blast, evaluates protective measures, and provides design guidance for blast resistant construction (IP/ 

Geophysical Division) 

Need analytical tools to quantify interdependencies and cascading consequences as disruptions occur across 

critical infrastructure sectors.

Real-Time Decision Support Tools: Provides tools for federal decision-makers that update models dynamically during crises 

(IP/Geophysical Division) 

Need effective and affordable blast 

analysis and protection for critical infrastructure; improved understanding 

of blast failure mechanisms and protection measures for the most vital 

CI/KR.

Protective Measures Advanced Materials Design Tools: Provides 

capability to address high consequence critical assets, as identified by the Office of Infrastructure Protection, including mitigation and hardening technologies and advanced materials 

(IP/Geo 

Need analytical tools to quantify interdependencies and cascading consequences as disruptions occur across 

critical infrastructure sectors.

Real-Time Decision Support Tools: Provides rapid and automated 

response technologies to limit damage from disruptions of critical infrastructure and prevent cascading effects (IP/Geophysical Division) 

Need advanced, automated and affordable monitoring and surveillance 

technologies.

Advanced Surveillance Systems: Provides advanced, automated, 

affordable monitoring and surveillance technologies to provide 

situational awareness at CI/KR (C2I Division) 

Interoperability: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need to research, test, and evaluate 

IP-enabled backbones.

IP Enabled Backbone Evaluation: Develops and evaluates Internet Protocol (IP) enabled backbones (C2I Division) 

Need test and evaluation on commercially available and emergent wireless 

broadband data.

Wireless Broadband Standards and Broadband Productization: 

Provides test and evaluation of emergent wireless broadband 

data systems (C2I Division) 

Need to accelerate the development 

and testing of P25 IP-based interfaces.

P25 Interface: Accelerates test and evaluation of P25 IP-based 

interfaces (C2I Division) 

Need to develop messaging interface 

standards that enable emergency information sharing and data exchange.

EDXL Data Standards Initiative: Identifies and develops messaging interface standards (C2I Division) 

65 

Maritime Security: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need for wide-area surveillance from 

the coast to beyond the horizon; port 

and inland waterways region—detect, 

ID, and track.

Affordable Wide Area Surveillance System: Provides persistent, 

integrated sensor systems that can detect, track, and identify 

vessels (especially small vessels) between the port regions and 

beyond the horizon in all weather conditions (Borders/ 

Maritime 

Need data fusion and automated tools 

for command center operations.

Advanced Automated Scene Understanding: Provides Tactical Information Fusion and Situational Assessment tools that improve 

operator performance (Borders/Maritime Division 

Lead) 

Need for vessel compliance through 

non-lethal compliance methods.

Pursuit Termination: Provides non-lethal compliance measures 

for vessels (Borders/Maritime Division Lead) 

Need an enhanced capability to continuously track contraband on ships or 

containers.

Covert Illegal Contraband Tracker: Provides improved system for 

tracking contraband shipments and aliens including at night 

tracking or rough seas tracking (Borders/Maritime Division) 

Need improved ballistic personal protective equipment for officer safety.Ballistic Protection: Provides improved ballistic protection and 

communications tools for agents (Borders/Maritime 

Division Lead) 

Need improved WMD detection equipment for officer safety; improved 

screening capability for WMD for maritime security checkpoints.

Technology to screen passengers, baggage, and vehicles for explosives, contraband and CBRN in the high volume environment 

of maritime ferries and cruise ships (Borders/Maritime 

Division Lead) 

People Screening: Representative Technology Needs 

Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability 

Need systematic collection and analysis of information related to understanding terrorist group intent to engage in violence.Group Violent Intent Modeling: Provides tools for understanding 

terrorist group intent to engage in violence (Human Factors Division) 

Need non-invasive monitoring: Identifying and tracking unknown or potential threats from individuals at key 

checkpoints. Real-time detection of 

deception or hostile intent through integrated system of human and machine methods.

Hostile Intent Detection: Provides non-invasive monitoring technologies to allow identification and tracking of potentially 

threatening individuals at key checkpoints (Human Factors Division) 

Need the capability in real-time for 

positive verification of individual’s 

identity utilizing multiple biometrics.

Biometrics Spiral II: Provides real-time, positive verification of 

identity using multiple biometrics (Human Factors Division) 

Need the capability for secure, noncontact electronic credentials; 

contactless readers or remote interrogation technologies for electronic credentials.

Credentialing: Provides secure, non-contact electronic credentials capability (Human Factors Division) 

Need mobile biometrics screening capabilities, to include hand-held, wireless, and secure devices.Mobile Biometrics Screening: Provides mobile biometrics screening capabilities to include hand-held, wireless, and secure devices (Human Factors Division) 

Need high-speed, high-fidelity tenprint capture capability.Ten Print Capture: Provides high-speed, high-fidelity ten-print 

capture capability (Human Factors Division) 

66 

Attachment B: Response to Question #6 

Focus Areas 

Information Sharing/Management 

Information Interoperability (class to unclass, disparate database 

Reconnassance, Surveillance, and Investigative technology 

Common Operating Picture systems and tools 

Knowledge Management Information analytic tools 

Border Security 

Land border Enforcement 

SBI Systems approach 

Immigration Enforcement 

Non-intrusive Detection at Borders 

Chem/Bio Defense 

Bio and Chem Threat Assessments 

Bio and Chem risk decision support tools 

Chem 

Forensics and Analysis 

Surveillance and Detection systems 

Response and Recovery systems 

Bio 

Agricultural Security 

Bio Forensics 

Surveillance and Detection systems (including Biowatch) 

Maritime Security 

Boarding Officer tools and protection 

Maritime surveillance technologies 

Command Center data fusion 

Explosive Prevention 

Counter-MANPADS 

IEDs 

Standoff Detection 

Explosives Detectors 

Blast Mitigation 

Personnel Screening for explosives 

Incident Management 

Personnel monitoring and tracking 

Situational awareness 

Logisitics issues 

Protection of emergency personnel 

People Screening 

People Screening at Checkpoint 

Hostile Intent and Deception 

Identity Management (includes Biometrics) 

Credentialing 

Social and Behavioral Threat analysis 

Insider Threat 

Human systems integration into technology 


11006-3.eps
67 

Focus Areas 

Infrastructure Protection 

Critical Infrastructure modeling and simulation analysis 

Risk Reduction Technologies 

Protection and mitigation for critical IP sectors 

Response and restoration of CI/K 

Advanced surveillance and detection to protect CI/KR 

Cargo Security 

Security Devices 

Cargo tracking systems 

Supply chain architecture 

Integration of detection systems specific to cargo 

Interoperability 

first Responder communications 

Cybersecurity 

68 

1See committee file. 

Attachment C: Response to Question #9 

Science & Technology Directorate, Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) Program Reference Guide, April 2006.1

Attachment D: Response to Question #12 

CHART SUMMARY

Program Rating Improvement Actions 

Taken 

Actions planned for FY 

2007 and FY 2008 

Biological Countermeasures 

(Chemical and Biological) 

Effective (1) Developed qualitative 

and quantitative metrics 

(2) Developed a 5 year 

plan based on requirements identified through 

the IPT Capstone process 

that was chaired by the 

Chief Medical Officer and 

the Assistant Secretary of 

Infrastructure Protection. 

(3) Reviews the programmatic and technical 

progress of key projects 

that contribute to the PART 

on a monthly basis -conducted by the Division 

Head. 

(4) Chem Countermeasures 

underwent independent 

evaluation with positive 

findings 

(1) Develop efficiency 

metrics 

Standards (T&E and Standards) Adequate (1) Developed quantitative 

metrics 

(2) Convened the standards 

council to ensure agency 

wide gathering of standards needs. 

(1) Develop efficiency 

metrics 

Threat Awareness Portfolio 

(C2I and Human Factors) 

Results Not 

Demonstrated 

(1) Developed quantitative 

metrics 

(2) External evaluation of 

program commenced summer 2005 

(1) Develop efficiency 

(1) Develop additional 

quantitative and qualitative metrics 

University Programs 

(Research Division) 

Moderately 

Effective 

(1) Developed quantitative 

metrics 

(2) External review of program and one DHS Center 

of Excellence held in 2005 

and 2006 respectively 

(3) External assessment of 

program planned for the 

fall of 2006 

(4) Independent review of 

two centers planned for fall 

2006 

(1) Continue external review of program and 

Centers of Excellence 

69 

Program Rating Improvement Actions 

Taken 

Actions planned for FY 

2007 and FY 2008 

Emerging Threats (C2I) Moderately 

Effective 

(1) Developed quantitative 

metrics 

(1) Develop efficiency 

Rapid Prototyping (Transition) Moderately 

Effective 

(1) Developed quantitative 

metrics 1) Develop efficiency 

(2) Plans for regular 

independent reviews are 

scheduled to begin in FY 

2007 

Chemical and Explosives 

Countermeasures (Explosives) 

Results Not 

Demonstrated 

(1) Developed metrics for 

major chemical projects 

(2) Scores and recommendations discussed 

with planning staff and 

senior management 

(4) Completed Countermeasures expenditure plan 

in October 2006 

(1) Development of expenditure plan in process 

(2) Engage in dialogue 

with the GAO, IG and 

other independent evaluators 

Interoperability and Compatibility (C21) Results Not 

Demonstrated 

(1) Scores and recommendations discussed 

with planning staff and 

senior management 

(2) Engaged in dialogue 

with the GAO throughout 

the fall. 

(3) Engaged an independent evaluator to conduct a study of OIC effectiveness and coordination 

with its partners and 

stakeholders. The study is 

currently in progress. 

(1) External review of 

program planned 

(2) Development of strategic plan 

(3) Engaged in dialogue 

with the GAO, IG and 

other independent evaluators 

(4) Develop efficiency 

and additional metrics 

SAFETY Act (Transition) Results Not 

Demonstrated 

(1) Scores and recommendations discussed 

with planning staff and 

senior mangement 

(2) External (IG) review in 

August 2006 resulted in 

certified and accredited 

computer system 

(3) Streamlined evaluation 

process, improving FY 2006 

performance by 27% 

(1) Development of 

stategic/program plan 

(2) Development of additional metrics planned 

(3) Develop efficiency 

metrics 

Æ