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S. HRG. 111–166 

THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT 

SUPPORT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 22, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

EVAN BAYH, Indiana, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND FORCES

APRIL 22, 2009

Page 

Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., USA, Vice Chief Of Staff, United States Army .......... 5 

Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, United States Marine 

Corps ..................................................................................................................... 8 

(III) 

(1) 

THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. GROUND 

FORCES 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2009 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Evan Bayh 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bayh, Udall, Burris, 

Inhofe, Thune, and Burr. 

Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 

and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker, security clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Peter K. Levine, general counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and William K. 

Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, research assistant; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; David M. 

Morriss, minority counsel; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jon Davey, assistant to 

Senator Bayh; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Chris Joyner, 

assistant to Senator Burr. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EVAN BAYH, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BAYH. Good morning, everybody. The hearing will please 

come to order. I’m going to have a brief opening statement, Senator 

Burr; then I’ll turn to you; and, Senator Burris, then to you. I understand Senator Udall may be on the way, and we’ll then turn to 

him. 

Gentlemen, I know you have prepared statements, but we’d love 

to hear you summarize them in some oral testimony, and then we’ll 

get to some questions and some answers. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to address the growing strain 

placed upon our Army and Marine Corps. We will receive testimony on the current readiness of ground forces with respect to deployed, deploying, and nondeployed units. We will also discuss the 

Army and the Marine Corps’ ability to meet the combatant commander’s requirements and to respond to unforeseen contingencies. 

2 

We are particularly interested in your assessment of the risks resulting from the continued commitment of combat forces to Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Additionally, the subcommittee will be interested 

to know your views of the current and projected readiness reporting system used by the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Over the last several years, we have observed total force readiness decline as a result of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and elsewhere around the globe. While our soldiers and marines 

continue to showcase their training and valor, the overall readiness 

of the Army and Marine Corps has steadily decreased. Generally, 

this comes at the expense of our nondeployed units. 

My concern is that in order to fully resource deploying units, we 

have chosen to cannibalize our forces at home and thus face an increased risk of being unable to respond to the full spectrum of global challenges, including potential domestic crises. Our current 

strategy is unsustainable and, if not properly addressed, we face 

added risks and serious long-term implications for our Army and 

Marine Corps. 

Additionally, we must shift away from a strategy that prioritizes 

reset only with supplemental funding. It is our shared responsibility to restore our Army and Marine Corps so that they can effectively and efficiently meet current and future threats. 

This morning we welcome General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief 

of Staff of the Army, and General James F. Amos, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Gentlemen, I sincerely thank you both for your dedicated service 

to our country. I thank you for your time in attending our hearing 

today. I know that it took some time and preparation on both your 

parts and your staffs’ parts, so I want to thank you for that. We 

look forward to receiving your testimony. I also want to thank you 

both for your courtesy in meeting with me and offering to meet 

with me before the hearing, and I look forward to having a very 

productive relationship with both of you. 

Having said that, Senator Burr, I’ll turn the mike over to you. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD BURR 

Senator BURR. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me express how I 

look forward to working with you on this subcommittee and on the 

Armed Services Committee, as do the other members. I thank you 

for your hospitality and generosity so far. I think we’ll carry this 

show on the road some and maybe get out across the country, and 

maybe to some of the North Carolina installations that we take 

great pride in. 

Let me welcome both Generals today. 

Senator BAYH. If you feed us, Senator, we will come. 

Senator BURR. We will feed you to where you probably won’t be 

able to leave. 

Senator BAYH. Very good. You’re going to test our lift capacity, 

is that right? 

Senator BURR. I do want to thank our witnesses for not only 

being here today, but for their dedication and, more importantly, 

their service to their country. 

Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee held a hearing last year on the 

same subject of current unit readiness. At the time, we had a full 

3 

range of combat units and support personnel totaling 165,000 engaged throughout Iraq. We had committed to a strategy of a surge 

of forces to clear, hold, and build in cities and towns, to restore a 

safe environment and prevent a civil war. At the same time, we 

were training Iraqi security forces so they could assume responsibility for the protection and security of their countrymen against 

terrorists. 

During that time we were working with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners in Afghanistan to bring security to the 

eastern provinces and increasing U.S. forces to over 32,000 to respond to an increasingly violent insurgency that was spreading to 

other parts of the country. At the time, the senior American commander in Afghanistan was requesting additional forces within a 

year to meet the emerging threats and Congress was asking military leaders if they had the available combat units to meet that request. General Cody, then the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, testified before this subcommittee: ‘‘The current demand for forces in 

Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply.’’ 

Since then much has changed and yet certain factors remain the 

same. The most positive change has been the vastly improved security environment in Iraq, as a result of the success of the surge and 

the rising competency of Iraqi security forces. This success has 

given our leaders the ability and flexibility to begin to responsibly 

draw down U.S. forces in Iraq, turning over security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces under the terms of a new agreement with Iraq that seeks a peaceful transition without threat to 

stability to the country. 

Because of the security and stability in Iraq, we have decided to 

commit additional resources in Afghanistan. The President recently 

announced an additional deployment of 21,000 Army soldiers and 

U.S. marines within the next 8 months. As we speak, the 82nd Airborne Division out of Fort Bragg, NC, is assuming command at 

Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan for the next year, and in the 

southern part of the country elements of North Carolina’s U.S. marines out of Camp Lejeune will be taking up the point to conduct 

operations against the Taliban. 

Congress faces critical decisions in the coming months on emergency supplemental appropriations and fiscal year 2010 defense 

spending. We cannot afford to delay emergency supplemental appropriations needed to support that expanded operation in Afghanistan, the drawdown of forces in Iraq, and the reset of combat units 

back home. 

Furthermore, we cannot afford to cash our check on success prematurely by reducing the funds available in the readiness of our 

forces. We must remember that our military forces continue to 

struggle to restore the balance in long-term readiness across a full 

spectrum of threats. In order to respond to their mission requirements, they need personnel who are ready, with adequate training, 

and have combat-ready equipment. They also need a robust investment in new equipment over the next 5 years to fully reset combat 

units with the best available technology and systems. 

I look forward to an update from our witnesses on efforts initiated last year to improve the readiness of our nondeployed forces, 

including the decision in January 2007 to increase the number of 

4 

combat ground forces in the Army and the Marine Corps. In the 

next 3 years the availability of additional forces will add time between deployments to allow for full spectrum training for missionessential tasks and more time spent with families, which we all 

know is lacking. 

Another area of interest is our witnesses’ plans for the transfer 

of units directly from Iraq to Afghanistan, especially what’s being 

done to ensure that personnel receive adequate training, intelligence, and equipment for their new area of responsibility. Given 

the strain on equipment in recent years, I’m also interested to 

know their services’ investment strategy to re-equip forces and to 

restore prepositioned stocks to levels required by our operational 

plans. 

Mr. Chairman, I once again thank you for this hearing, and I 

thank our witnesses for being here. 

Senator BAYH. Senator Burr, thanks to you and to your staff 

members. I look forward to working with you to ensure that our 

Armed Forces have the equipment, the training, and the troop 

strength to carry out the important mission of protecting America’s 

national security interests. I’m grateful for your devotion to achieving that result. 

Senator Burris, we would welcome any opening comments you 

might have. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have very limited 

opening comments. I want to thank you and Senator Burr as ranking member for being a part of this subcommittee. I just want to 

thank our military personnel for all that they do for us. I will have 

a few questions. 

I want all the military personnel to hear this statement: We are 

able to do what we do in America because of what you do across 

the world for our protection. Just keep that in mind. We appreciate 

your commitment and your effort and your dedication to making us 

the strongest country in the world. 

Every time I see one of you guys, whether you’re a private or a 

four-star general, I salute each and every one of you. God bless 

you, and I’ll have some questions for the witnesses during the 

question period, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Burris. I believe we all embrace your sentiments of pride in our Armed Forces. I think you 

have someone who’s a native of Illinois on General Chiarelli’s staff, 

so he has very capable staff with him here today. 

Gentlemen, thank you. We look forward to hearing from you. I 

think, just to recap, we all recognize the strain that’s been placed 

upon your brave soldiers by the duration and the pace of operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps the changing nature of the 

threats that face our Armed Forces. We’re here to make sure you 

have the tools to get the job done. 

So we look forward to hearing from both of you. We will enter 

your written statements in the record, so feel free, if you so desire, 

to summarize. We are interested in what you have to say. 

General Chiarelli, we’ll start with you. 

5 

STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY 

General CHIARELLI. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Burr, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee: I thank you for the 

opportunity to appear here today to discuss the current readiness 

of U.S. ground forces. This is my first occasion to appear before this 

esteemed subcommittee and I pledge to always provide you with an 

honest and forthright assessment and my best military advice as 

requested. 

I’ve submitted a statement for the record and I look forward to 

answering your questions at the conclusion of my opening remarks. 

As you are aware, President Obama is preparing to submit his fiscal year 2010 defense budget to Congress. Earlier this month, Secretary Gates outlined key recommendations and projected changes 

specific to Army programs and organizational structure, and I expect you have related questions. However, I believe it would be premature for me to provide much of the details ahead of our President, our Secretary, the Honorable Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff 

of the Army General George Casey. It would also be inappropriate 

for me to speculate on past or future decisions. Given these constraints, I will respond to your inquiries to the best of my ability 

and take the remaining questions for the record. 

As all of you know, it’s been a busy time for our Nation’s military. We are at war, and we’ve been at war for the past 7-plus 

years. During this period, demand has continued to grow and the 

Army’s level of responsibility has expanded considerably. At the 

same time, our forces became smaller in terms of the number of 

available personnel. The combined effect has been increased deployments, shorter dwell-time, and insufficient recovery times for 

our soldiers, their families, and our equipment. 

Today, as has been previously reported to this subcommittee, the 

Army remains out of balance. We continue to be consumed with 

meeting the demands of the current fight and overall we are consuming our readiness as fast as we are building it. Unfortunately, 

the Army cannot influence demand and the current level does not 

appear likely to improve significantly for the foreseeable future. 

In order to meet the demand, we are currently staffing many of 

the critical functions by reassigning authorizations and personnel 

from within our ranks. My concern is we cannot fully predict what 

the derivative effects of these decisions will be in the future. 

These are challenging times for our Nation and for our military, 

and although, with the support of Congress, we have deployed the 

best manned, best equipped, best trained and led forces in the history of the United States Army, it is my personal opinion that we 

simply cannot continue to meet the current demand, expand our 

agility and focus, and sustain the force, including soldiers and 

equipment, without making some corresponding adjustments. 

I assure the members of this subcommittee that is what the 

Army’s senior leaders are focused on right now. We are working 

these issues and determining the needs of our Army for the future, 

and we will continue to coordinate with senior DOD officials and 

Congress to identify both short- and long-term solutions. 

Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you again for 

your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to 

6 

the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and 

their families. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA 

Chairman Bayh, Ranking Member Burr, distinguished members of the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services. I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today 

to provide a status on the current readiness of U.S. ground forces. This is my first 

occasion to appear before this esteemed committee, and I pledge to always provide 

you with an honest and forthright assessment. 

On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable Pete Geren and our Chief of Staff, General George Casey, I would also like to take this opportunity to thank you for your 

continued, strong support and demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army civilians, and family members. 

Recently, Secretary Gates publicly presented key decisions that he will recommend to President Obama with respect to the fiscal year 2010 defense budget. 

Many of these recommendations concern programs that have a direct impact on 

readiness; and, I’m sure you have many relevant questions. Once the President’s 

budget is released, the Army’s senior leaders will address all of these issues. In the 

meantime, I will do my best to answer your questions on the current state of Army 

readiness within the limitations imposed by the current budget process. I apologize 

in advance for any inconvenience. 

As all of you know, it has been a busy time for our Nation’s military. We have 

been at war for the past 7-plus years, which has undeniably put a strain on our 

people and equipment. We have had our share of good and bad experiences; and, 

we are continually making adjustments and improvements to our tactics, training, 

and equipment based upon lessons learned. 

However, since the very beginning, this war has been in many ways different and 

more complex than past wars. We are dealing with less clearly defined and highly 

savvy adversaries in two theaters. In order to remain dominant, we have had to simultaneously and swiftly adapt our doctrine and organizational structure to effectively span the breadth of operational environments. It’s all part of a changing strategy we refer to in the Army as ‘‘Full Spectrum Operations.’’ 

Unlike the Army of previous generations—that had essentially a single mission 

focus of ground warfare—today’s Force has many more specialized capabilities and 

a much broader mission span. The centerpiece of our efforts is a shift to a modular 

construct focused at the brigade level. We have also expanded our capability by adding Civil Affairs, MPs, Special Forces, and other enablers. 

This ongoing transformation has greatly enhanced the Army’s ability to respond 

to any situation, quickly and effectively. However, reaching this point has not been 

easy, particularly for a tired and stretched force. The degree of impact continues to 

vary, for example, between Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), ‘‘enablers,’’ the Reserve 

components, and individual soldiers. 

The 15 combat brigades in theater understandably get the bulk of the attention, 

but when you look across the total Army today, the number of brigades committed 

is actually much higher. We have six National Guard brigades assigned to security 

forces; one brigade in Korea; one in Kosovo Force; one committed to the Transition 

Team Mission; one serving as the Global Response Force; one tied up as the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) Consequence 

Management Response Force (CCMRF); two tied up in Relief in Place/Transition of 

Authority, the approximately 40-day period when the incoming/outgoing units are 

either enroute to/from theater or onsite conducting battle hand-off; and, one battalion serving in the Sinai. 

Additionally, among all the components, there are approximately 30,000+ soldiers 

that are currently unavailable (∼9,500 are assigned to Warrior Transition Units 

(WTUs); ∼2,300 are assigned as cadre or health care providers at WTUs; ∼10,000 

are nondeployable (i.e., dwell, injury, pregnancy); and ∼10,000 are assigned as individual augmentees). 

Also, while we built BCTs to be self-sufficient, in reality there is still a relatively 

robust support system that augments them—as well as other Services, our coalition 

partners, and host nation forces—in the environments we fight in today. These 

‘‘enablers’’ include engineer, intelligence, fires, logistics, military police, civil affairs, 

and aviation. The demand on ‘‘enablers’’ is expected to grow even larger in Afghanistan, a country without the infrastructure and logistical capability that already existed in Iraq in 2003. The overall demand will also be further exacerbated by the 

7 

continued necessity for a large number of ‘‘enablers’’ in Iraq, even as units drawdown to meet the President’s guidance from 27 February 2009. 

Other capabilities have also been created out of hide in response to new requirements or because the appropriate government agencies have either been unable or 

unwilling to provide these critical functions—civil affairs officers, contract specialists, and health advisors are good examples. A case in point is Afghanistan, where 

National Guard AgriBusiness Development teams—made up of farmer-soldiers from 

eight States in Middle America—are teaching Afghans how to improve their farming 

methods in order to yield more crops and livestock. Agriculture accounts for 60–70 

percent of that country’s economy; however, the ‘‘how-to’’ knowledge that historically 

was passed down from generation to generation has been lost after years of civil war 

and tribal fighting. 

This nonkinetic piece is critically important, and these farmer-soldiers are doing 

an outstanding job. However, the fact is they do not exist on the National Guard’s 

Table of Organization and Equipment, and the manning shortfalls they create must 

then be backfilled from somewhere else. 

Ideally, teams of agronomists from land grant universities sponsored by the 

United States Agency for International Development would take on this particular 

mission. In their absence, the Army has had to provide these and other specialized 

teams. 

Over the past 7-plus years, demand has continued to grow and the Army’s level 

of responsibility has expanded considerably. At the same time our available Force 

structure has become smaller as the number of nondeployables has increased. The 

combined effect has been increased deployments and shorter dwell times for our soldiers. The Army is currently averaging a 1:1.3 ratio (12 months deployed and 16 

months dwell) for our Active component and less than a 1:3 ratio for Reserve component forces. 

People tend to focus on unit dwell time, while failing to appreciate that frequently 

a soldier will redeploy with one unit, go to school enroute to his next assignment, 

then have to deploy with the new unit in less than 12 months. The United States 

Military Academy’s Operations Research Center and the Army G–1 recently completed a very detailed analysis of unit and individual ‘Boots on the Ground’ (BOG)/ 

dwell times. They concluded that for every military occupational specialty (MOS) 

and grade (rank), more than 50 percent of the soldiers experience shorter dwell time 

compared to the BCTs. 

The current pace of operations is impacting every segment of our Force—Active, 

Guard, and Reserve. While our Reserve components are continuing to perform magnificently, many of these units have been assigned missions as an operational force, 

when they had been resourced and utilized as a Strategic Reserve for decades. Another challenge we are still dealing with is the impact of the surge. We are not 

scheduled to get our last combat brigade off of a 15-month deployment until June 

2009 and our last CS/CSS unit off of 15-month deployment until September 2009. 

As we have previously reported to this committee, the Army remains out of balance. We continue to be consumed by the demands of the current fight. Overall, we 

are consuming our readiness as fast as we are building it. Soldiers, families, support 

systems, and equipment are stretched and stressed by the demands of multiple, 

lengthy deployments, and with insufficient recovery time. Equipment used repeatedly in harsh environments is wearing out more rapidly than programmed. This 

lack of balance poses a significant risk to the All-Volunteer Force, and it affects our 

ability to provide ready forces as rapidly as we would like for other contingencies. 

Two years ago, the Chief, General Casey outlined a plan to restore balance to the 

Force by 2011; it included four imperatives: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. 

Since then, we have made definitive progress in each of these areas, but there is 

still much work to be done. The challenge continues to be complicated by changing 

circumstances and increased demand on the force. We simply cannot achieve desired 

‘‘BOG’’/dwell ratios until demand is reduced to a sustainable level. Unfortunately, 

the Army cannot influence demand, and the current level does not appear likely to 

improve significantly for the foreseeable future. So, the choice we are faced with is 

to continue to over-extend some of the lower-density MOSs or create additional capability. We are currently staffing many of the critical functions by reassigning authorizations and personnel from within our ranks. My concern is that we cannot 

fully predict what the derivative effects of this will be in the future. 

These continue to be challenging times for our Nation and for our military. With 

the support of Congress, we have deployed the best manned, equipped, trained, and 

led forces in the history of the United States Army over the past 7-plus years. However, the fact remains that we have asked a great deal from our soldiers and their 

families. 

8 

Unfortunately, the prolonged strain is already manifesting itself in an increased 

number of soldiers struggling with substance abuse and mental or behavioral health 

issues, such as depression, post-traumatic stress, and other types of anxiety disorders, as well as an increase in the number of suicides across the force. 

We must continue to address these and other urgent problems, and find ways to 

relieve some of the stress on the force by increasing the time between deployments. 

I assure the members of this committee—the Army’s senior leaders are focused 

and working hard to address these challenges and determine the needs of the Force 

for the future. As we continue this process, we will coordinate with senior DOD officials and Congress to identify both short- and long-term solutions. Your input will 

continue to be very valuable to us. 

Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again for your continued and 

generous support of the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and 

their families. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you very much, General. 

General Amos. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Sir, good morning, Chairman Bayh, Senator Burr, 

and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for this 

opportunity to report on the readiness of your United States Marine Corps. 

On behalf of the more than 239,000 active and Reserve marines 

and their families, I’d like to extend my warm appreciation for the 

sustained support Congress has faithfully provided its Corps of Marines. I would like to begin by highlighting a few points from my 

written statement. 

As we sit in this hearing room today, we have over 31,000 marines forward deployed across the globe. Despite high operational 

tempo, your marines are resilient, motivated, and performing superbly in missions around the globe. For the past 7 years, they 

have been fully engaged in winning in combat operations as part 

of a generational struggle against global extremism. 

This sustained effort and performance has not come without 

costs to the institution, to our equipment, to our strategic programs, and most importantly to our marines and their families. 

Our forward deployed units are manned, trained, and equipped to 

accomplish their assigned missions and these units continue to report the highest levels of readiness for those missions. 

To ensure our deployed and next to deploy forces maintain this 

high state of readiness, we have taxed our nondeployed forces and 

strategic programs for equipment and personnel. As a result, the 

majority of our nondeployed forces are reporting degraded readiness levels. 

Our equipment availability challenge was recently highlighted 

with the equipment sourcing effort for the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2nd MEB) that is currently deploying to Afghanistan. To resource the 2nd MEB with the required and most capable 

equipment, we drew equipment assets from across the Corps. Although a concerted effort was made to minimize the impact on 

home stationed unit readiness, we still needed to draw 14 percent 

of the necessary equipment from our home stationed operating 

forces. 

This degraded state of readiness within our nondeployed forces 

presents risks to our ability to rapidly respond to other unexpected 

9 

1Gates, Robert M. ‘‘A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age.’’ Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, No. 1, January/February 2009. 

contingencies around the globe. To mitigate this risk posed by our 

current state of equipment availability, we have developed a plan 

for the reset of equipment being redeployed from Iraq. The Operation Iraqi Freedom reset plan synchronizes Marine Corps reset efforts to ensure we effectively and efficiently provide equipment to 

support follow-on operations. Equipment being redeployed is inspected and a decision is then made on whether it will be sorted 

and redistributed in theater or redeployed to the continental 

United States for rework. Redeployed assets will then be repaired 

at maintenance facilities and distributed to fill shortfalls for established priorities. Equipment determined to be beyond economical 

repair will be disposed of and replacements procured. 

Because our equipment, personnel, and training priorities have 

been necessarily focused on counterinsurgency operations, we have 

experienced degradation in some of our traditional core competencies, such as integrated combined arms, fire and maneuver, 

and large-scale operations from the sea. These skills are critical to 

maintaining the Marine Corps’ full spectrum capabilities and primacy in forcible entry operations. Although the current security environment has justified the tradeoffs we have made to support 

overseas contingency operations (OCO), we must maintain a balanced force capable of responding to crises around the globe and 

across the full spectrum of conflict. 

With your continued and consistent backing, we will no doubt 

succeed in current operations, we will take care of our marines and 

their family members, reset and modernize our equipment, and 

train the Marine Air-Fround Task Forces for the future security 

environment. Your support will ensure the Marine Corps’ success 

as the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. 

I thank each of your for your faithfulness to this Nation, your 

faithfulness to our Corps, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Amos follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Bayh, Senator Burr, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

on behalf of your Marine Corps, I want to thank you for your generous support and 

for the opportunity to speak to you today about the readiness of the United States 

Marines. Recently, the Secretary of Defense outlined a strategy to return the Department to a balanced force capable of prevailing in current conflicts while preparing for other contingencies.1 Consistent with Secretary Gates’ strategy, my statement will address our efforts to achieve that balance, the readiness challenges facing marines today, and the critical steps needed to reset and reconstitute our Corps 

for today’s complex challenges and tomorrow’s uncertain security environment. 

Despite high operational tempo, your marines are resilient, motivated, and performing superbly in missions around the globe. They are fully engaged and winning 

in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a generational struggle 

against global extremism. This sustained effort and performance does not come 

without costs—to the institution, to our equipment, to our strategic programs, and 

most importantly to our marines and their families. Continued congressional investment in our marines and families, resetting and modernizing our equipment, and 

training Marine Air Ground Task Forces for the future security environment are 

critical to the Marine Corps’ success as the ‘‘Nation’s Force-in-Readiness.’’ 

10 

READINESS ASSESSMENT

The Marine Corps is meeting all Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF) requirements. In the course of the last 7 years, your Marine Corps has been battle-tested, combat hardened, and has accumulated tremendous experience in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations. Forward deployed units are manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions, and these units are reporting the highest levels of readiness for those missions. However, resources are limited and nondeployed units incur the costs of ensuring deployed and next-to-deploy units have sufficient personnel, equipment, and 

training. As a result, our nondeployed forces are currently reporting degraded readiness levels. This degraded state of readiness within our nondeployed forces presents 

risk in our ability to rapidly respond to other unexpected contingencies. 

Because our equipment, personnel, and training priorities are focused on counterinsurgency operations, we have experienced degradation in some of our traditional, 

full spectrum, core competencies such as integrated combined arms operations and 

large-scale amphibious operations. These skills are critical to maintaining the Marine Corps’ primacy in forcible entry operations that enable follow-on joint forces. 

The OIF/OEF demand for units has also limited our ability to fully meet combatant 

commander requests for theater engagement activities. The current security environment has clearly justified the tradeoffs we’ve made to support the Long War, but 

the uncertainty of the future makes it prudent to regain our capabilities to operate 

across the full range of military operations—to be that ‘‘balanced force’’ that Secretary Gates speaks of. 

In addressing the challenges facing the Marine Corps, I have structured my statement along the lines of our key readiness concerns—personnel and military construction, equipment, training, amphibious shipbuilding, and caring for our warriors 

and their families. I will discuss the positive steps and proactive initiatives we are 

undertaking, with your support, to reset, modernize, and reconstitute the Marine 

Corps for an uncertain future. Finally, I will conclude with some of our ongoing initiatives and programs that address the care and welfare of our marines and their 

families. 

STRESS ON THE FORCE: PERSONNEL CHALLENGES AND OPERATIONS TEMPO

The pace of operations for your marines remains high, with over 31,000 marines 

forward-deployed across the globe. In the U.S. Central Command area of operations, 

there are over 27,000 marines deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and 

Operation Enduring Freedom. Despite the recently concluded Status of Forces 

Agreement with Iraq and the plans for a drawdown of forces there, the demand and 

associated operational tempo for marines will remain high as we transition requested forces to Afghanistan. Meeting this global demand resulted in short deployment-to-dwell ratios for many units, with some deployed for as many months as 

they spend at home. Some of our low-density/high-demand units such as Intelligence, Communications, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and certain aviation units, 

remain at or below a 1:1 dwell, with only moderate relief in sight for the near future. Insufficient dwell negatively impacts our total force readiness because it leaves 

inadequate time to conduct full spectrum training and reconnect with families. 

Another readiness detractor has been the need to task combat arms units, such 

as artillery, air defense, and mechanized maneuver to perform ‘‘in-lieu-of’’ (ILO) missions such as security, civil affairs, and military policing. Shortages of those skill 

sets created the need for ILO missions to meet the requirements for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although these mission assignments 

are necessary, they have degraded our readiness because these combat units are unable to train to and maintain proficiency in their primary skill sets. 

In addition to unit rotations and ILO missions, the Marine Corps is tasked to fill 

a variety of assignments for forward-deployed staffs, training teams, and joint/coalition assignments that exceed our normal manning structures. The manning requirements for these Individual Augments (IAs), Training Teams (TTs) and Joint Manning Documents (JMDs) seek seasoned officers and staff noncommissioned officers 

because of their leadership, experience, and training. We understand that these 

augmentees and staff personnel are critical to success in Iraq and Afghanistan, but 

their extended absence has degraded home station readiness, full spectrum training, 

and unit cohesion. 

Personnel Initiatives 

In order to better meet the needs of a nation at war, the Corps has been authorized to grow to an active duty end strength of 202,000 marines. This increase in 

manpower will ultimately result in a Marine Corps with three balanced Marine ExVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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peditionary Forces (MEFs) and will help mitigate many of the operational tempo 

challenges described in the previous section. A balanced Marine Corps will provide 

combatant commanders with fully manned, trained, and equipped Marine Air 

Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) that are multi-capable, responsive, and expeditionary. Additionally, the end strength growth will increase our capacity to deploy 

forces in response to contingencies and to participate in exercises and operations 

with our international partners in support of the Nation’s broader security objectives. It will also allow more time at home for our marines to be with their families, 

to recover from long deployments, regain proficiency in core skills, and prepare for 

their next mission. 

The 202,000 growth plan is progressing well. The Marine Corps grew by over 

12,000 marines in fiscal year 2008 and is on pace to reach an active duty end 

strength of 202,000 by the end of fiscal year 2009—2 years ahead of schedule. 

Thanks to the continued support of Congress, we have increased our infantry, reconnaissance, intelligence, combat engineer, unmanned aerial vehicle, military police, 

civil affairs, and explosives ordnance disposal communities. Several of these units 

have already deployed to Iraq, mitigating the need for additional ILO missions. We 

have realized improvements in dwell time for a number of stressed communities. Although the plan is progressing well, the growth in end strength will not result in 

an immediate improvement in reported readiness because it takes time to train and 

mature our newly recruited marines and units. 

In addition to our end strength increase, the Marine Corps is examining other options to keep marines in the fight. For example, we are hiring over 1,700 civilian 

police officers and security support personnel to meet home station policing and security requirements at our bases and stations. After our first year of implementing 

this program, we are successfully blending traditional military police with Federal 

civilian police officers at the majority of our installations. This initiative enables us 

to free active duty military police for deployments in support of the MAGTF, further 

reducing the need for ILO assignments. 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

As the Marine Corps grows to 202,000, military construction is critical to supporting and sustaining the new force structure and maintaining the individual readiness and quality of life for our marines. Thanks to your support, we recently expanded our construction efforts and established a program that will provide adequate bachelor housing for our entire force by 2014. In fiscal year 2009 alone, Congress funded over 12,000 barracks spaces for our marines. Congressional support is 

still required to provide additional new barracks spaces to meet our 2014 goal. Concurrent with our new construction efforts is our commitment for the repair and 

maintenance of existing barracks to improve morale and quality of life. 

EQUIPMENT READINESS

Ensuring that our marines are equipped with the most modern and reliable combat gear is a necessity. However, the requirement to fully resource deployed forces, 

often in excess of our tables of equipment, has reduced the availability of materiel 

essential to outfit and train our nondeployed units. Approximately 25 percent of all 

Marine Corps ground equipment and 40 percent of our active duty aviation squadrons are deployed overseas. Most of this equipment is not rotating out of theater 

at the conclusion of each force rotation; it remains in combat, to be used by the relieving unit. 

Ground Equipment Readiness 

After 7 years of sustained combat operations, our deployed equipment has been 

subject to significant wear and tear, harsh environmental conditions, and increased 

operating hours and mileage. Additionally, the weight associated with armor plating 

further increases the wear on our deployed vehicle fleet and accelerates the need 

for repair and replacement of these assets. Despite these challenges and higher utilization on already aging equipment, our young marines are keeping this equipment 

mission-ready every single day. The high equipment maintenance readiness rates 

throughout the Marine Corps are a testament to their dedication and hard work. 

The policy to retain equipment in theater as forces rotate in and out was accompanied by increased in-theater maintenance presence; this infusion of maintenance 

support has paid great dividends, with deployed ground equipment maintenance 

readiness above 90 percent. However, the Marine Corps is experiencing challenges 

with the supply availability of a number of critical equipment items. Equipment 

supply availability varies depending on whether units are forward deployed or in 

dwell at home station. Supply readiness rates have decreased for home station 

12 

units, while we work to meet the demand of deployed forces, and those next-to-deploy. Shortages of critical equipment limit home station units’ ability to prepare and 

train to their full core competencies and present additional risk in availability of 

equipment necessary to respond swiftly to unexpected contingencies. 

The recent sourcing of equipment for the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

(MEB) deploying into Afghanistan illustrates our equipment availability challenge. 

Equipment assets were pulled from across the enterprise to accomplish this task. 

To ensure the 2nd MEB is provided the newest and most capable equipment, over 

55 percent of their equipment came via new procurement provided by Marine Corps 

Systems Command. Approximately 27 percent of the equipment came from within 

the Central Command area of operations, including items made available from units 

retrograding from Iraq; and about 4 percent of the required assets were sourced 

from our Logistics Command and the Marine Corps Prepositioned Program in Norway. Although a concerted effort was made to minimize the impact on home station 

unit readiness, 14 percent of 2nd MEB’s equipment needed to be drawn from our 

nondeployed operating forces. 

Ground equipment age continues to be a top readiness challenge as well. As 

equipment ages, more time, money, and effort are expended repairing it. Ultimately, 

the answer to achieving sustained improvements in ground-equipment readiness is 

to improve logistics processes and to modernize with highly reliable and maintainable equipment. The Corps is achieving efficiencies by improving supply-chain 

processes, adopting best practices, and by leveraging proven technological advances 

to facilitate responsive and reliable support to the Operating Forces. 

Aviation Equipment 

Our aviation capability is a critical part of the MAGTF. Just like our ground 

forces, deployed Marine aviation units receive the priority for aircraft, repair parts, 

and mission essential subsystems such as forward looking infrared (FLIR) pods. 

Nondeployed forces, on the other hand, face significant challenges for available airframes and supply parts. Exacerbating the readiness challenges in our aviation 

fleet, most Marine aviation platforms are ‘‘legacy’’ platforms which are no longer in 

production, placing an even greater strain on our logistics chain and maintenance 

systems. 

Our Marine Corps aviation platforms are supporting ground forces in some of the 

world’s harshest environments: the deserts of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of 

Africa. Our aircraft are flying at utilization rates far beyond those for which they 

were designed. We are nearly tripling the utilization rates of our workhorses—the 

F/A–18 C and D; the KC–130 cargo and aerial refueling platform; our EA–6B electronic warfare aircraft; and even the new MV–22 Osprey. Increased utilization 

causes aircraft to structurally age faster than programmed. As our legacy aircraft 

are lost or damaged in combat, the Marine Corps is faced with a shortage of available aircraft for training and future employment. To maintain sufficient numbers 

of aircraft in deployed squadrons, nondeployed squadrons have taken cuts in aircraft 

and parts. With our current force structure, our aircraft requirement, termed Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) is short 248 aircraft across all Type/Model/Series. These shortfalls include all modifications, intermediate maintenance events, 

depot maintenance, transition/procurement aircraft, and aircraft damaged beyond 

repair. 

Maintaining the readiness of aviation assets while training aircrew is an enormous effort and an ongoing readiness challenge. Our aviation Fleet Readiness Centers have been able to mitigate degradation of our aircraft materiel readiness 

through modifications, proactive inspections, and additional maintenance actions. 

These efforts successfully bolstered aircraft reliability, sustainability, and survivability. Nevertheless, additional requirements for depot-level maintenance on airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment will continue well beyond the conclusion of hostilities. Aircraft undergoing depot-level repairs are not available for 

training or combat. We are simply running short of aircraft on our flight lines due 

to age, attrition, and wartime losses. 

Prepositioning Equipment and Stores 

Marine Corps Prepositioning Programs are comprised of the Maritime 

Prepositioning Force (MPF), with three Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons 

(MPSRONs), and the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP–N). 

Since 2002, we have drawn equipment from our strategic programs and stocks to 

support combat operations, growth of the Marine Corps, and other operational priorities. While the readiness of the strategic prepositioning programs continues to improve, equipment shortages in our strategic equipment prepositioned stores have 

forced the Marine Corps to accept necessary risk in our ability to rapidly respond 

13 

to worldwide contingency operations. With Congress’ support, our end item shortfalls in the MPF and MCCP–N programs will be reset, in accordance with operational priorities, as equipment becomes available. 

In-Stores Equipment 

In-Stores Equipment refers to our pool of assets that serves as a source of equipment to replace damaged or destroyed equipment in the operating forces, and potentially fill shortfalls in the Active and Reserve components. This equipment was used 

heavily to source equipment requirements in Iraq and will be used to support our 

transition to operations in Afghanistan. The availability or supply rating for InStores assets has been degraded over the past years and limits our ability to rapidly 

respond to unexpected contingencies and to replace damaged equipment in the operating forces. 

Equipment Initiatives 

To counter the readiness impact of damaged, destroyed, or worn out equipment, 

the Marine Corps initiated a program to reset and modernize our force. The goals 

of our reset and modernization programs are: to sustain the current fight by repairing or replacing worn out or damaged/destroyed equipment while enhancing our 

support to the warfighter by reconstituting our force with newer, more capable, 

equipment. Over time, these initiatives will help to increase nondeployed unit readiness by enhancing home station equipment pools and predeployment unit training 

requirements. 

Equipment Reset 

Reset consists of actions taken to restore units to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with the unit’s mission. It encompasses maintenance and supply activities that restore and enhance combat capability to equipment that has 

been damaged, rendered obsolete, or worn out beyond economic repair due to combat 

operations by repairing, rebuilding, or procuring replacement equipment. Our cost 

estimate for resetting our force is over $20 billion. As we continue with Overseas 

Contingency Operations, we will update this estimate accordingly. We appreciate 

the generous support of Congress in appropriating over $12 billion to date to ensure 

that marines have the equipment and maintenance resources they need. We are 

committed to managing these resources wisely as we repair, reset, and modernize 

our force. 

We expect to see reset requirements increase as a result of force reductions in 

Iraq and to sustain a growing presence in Afghanistan. To prepare for the reset of 

equipment redeployed from Iraq, we have created an OIF Reset Plan. The plan synchronizes Marine Corps reset efforts to ensure we effectively and efficiently reset 

equipment to support follow on operations. Equipment being redeployed is inspected, sorted, and redistributed in theater, or redeployed to CONUS to maintenance facilities. These assets will then be repaired and distributed to fill shortfalls 

for established priorities. Equipment determined to be beyond economical repair will 

be disposed of and replacements procured. 

Modernization 

As the Nation’s expeditionary force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps is required to 

prepare for the unexpected. We are making progress in repairing and resetting existing equipment, but this effort must be augmented with continued investment to 

modernize our capabilities. Equipment modernization plans are a high priority within our Corps. Our commandant’s recently published Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 will help guide our modernization efforts as we continue to be the agile 

and expeditionary force for the Nation. 

Ground Modernization 

Prompted by a changing security environment and hard lessons learned from 7 

years of combat, the Marine Corps recently completed an initial review of its Operating Force’s ground equipment requirements. Recognizing that our unit Tables of 

Equipment (T/E) did not reflect the challenges and realities of the 21st century disbursed battlefield, the Corps adopted new T/Es for our operating units. This review 

was synchronized with our modernization plans and programs, and provides enhanced mobility, lethality, sustainment, and command and control across the 

MAGTF. The new equipment requirements reflect the capabilities necessary not 

only for the Corps’ current mission, but for its future employment across the range 

of military operations, against a variety of threats, and in diverse terrain and conditions. The MAGTF T/E review is an integral part of the critical work being done 

to reset and reconstitute the Marine Corps. 

14 

Aviation Modernization 

We are modernizing the aircraft we fly; changing the way we think about aviation 

support to our ground forces; and changing our capabilities to conduct operations 

in any clime and place. To help meet the growing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements of our operating forces, the Marine Corps will field three 

levels, or ‘‘tiers,’’ of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Furthermore, we are committed to an ‘‘in-stride transition’’ from 12 type/model/series aircraft to 6 new aircraft. Programs such as the F–35B Joint Strike Fighter, the MV–22 Osprey, the 

CH–53K, and the H–1 upgrades will vastly increase the Corps’ aviation capability 

and ensure our warfighting advantage for decades to come. It is critical that these 

programs stay on track, and on timeline, with full funding support, due to the declining service life of our legacy tactical aviation platforms. 

TRAINING MARINES TO FIGHT

In preparing marines to fight in ‘‘any clime and place,’’ the perennial challenge 

to our Corps is to attain the proper balance between core warfighting capabilities 

and those unique to current operations. Decreased unit dwell times and shortages 

of equipment in our nondeployed forces translate to a limited ability to conduct 

training on tasks critical to our core competencies, such as integrated combined 

arms, large force maneuver, and amphibious operations. Short dwell times between 

deployments and the need for many units to perform ‘‘in lieu of missions’’ have resulted in a singular focus on counterinsurgency training. Our marines continue to 

be well trained for current operations through a challenging pre-deployment training program that prepares them for all aspects of irregular warfare. 

Predeployment Training Program 

In order to properly train our operating forces for the rigors and challenges they 

face in OIF and OEF, we have developed a very demanding, realistic and adaptive 

predeployment training program. The Predeployment Training Program (PTP) contains standards-based, progressive skills training which is evaluated by commanders 

and assessed by our Training and Education Command at the final Mission Rehearsal Exercise. The PTP includes counterinsurgency combat skills, as well as 

operational language and culture skills. Unit after-action reports and unit surveys 

conducted by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) are shared 

Corps-wide and have influenced training changes to keep PTP relevant. For example, the Afghanistan PTP, while similar in many facets to the PTP for Iraq, includes 

mountain warfare training and an increased emphasis on MAGTF combined arms 

training. 

During fiscal years 2007 and 2008, the PTP resulted in over 42,000 marines receiving theater-specific combined arms and urban operations training at Exercise 

Mojave Viper at Twentynine Palms, CA. Over 2,800 marines received mountain operations training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport, CA. Over 

12,000 marines participated in the aviation-focused Desert Talon Exercise in Yuma, 

AZ. 

While our PTP focuses on preparing Marine units for their next deployment, we 

are further enhancing our education and training programs to respond to ongoing 

changes in the security environment. Through the efforts of organizations such as 

the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, Marine Corps Tactics and 

Operations Group, the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, the Advisor Training Group, and the Marine Corps University, we are providing a holistic 

education to our marines across the range of military operations. Based on a continuous lessons learned feedback process, supported by the MCCLL, we are building 

an Enhanced Company Operations capability which will make our smaller infantry 

units more lethal, agile, and survivable. 

Preparing for Future Conflict 

As challenging as it is to prepare marines for the current fight, our forces must 

adapt to the ever-changing character and conduct of warfare to remain relevant. To 

meet the complex challenges in the emerging security environment, we are improving training and education for the fog, friction, and uncertainty of the 21st century 

battlefield. We are focusing efforts on our small unit leaders—the ‘‘strategic noncommissioned officers’’ and junior officers—who will operate more frequently in a 

decentralized manner and assume greater responsibility in operations against hybrid threats. 

To better prepare our Marine Air Ground Task Force to operate across the spectrum of conflict, we are developing an improved training and exercise program. 

When implemented, this program will increase our ability to maintain proficiency 

in core warfighting capabilities, such as combined arms maneuver and amphibious 

15 

operations, while continuing to meet current commitments. Two important training 

concept exercises being developed are the Combined Arms Exercise-Next (CAX– 

Next), and the Marine Air Ground Task Force Large Scale Exercise (MAGTF–LSE). 

The CAX–Next will be a live-fire training exercise aimed at developing combined 

arms maneuver capabilities from individual marine to regimental-sized units. It will 

incorporate lessons learned from today’s conflicts, while training adaptable and 

flexible MAGTFs for the future. The MAGTF–LSE will be a scenario-based, servicelevel training exercise, scalable from Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Marine Expeditionary Force levels. It will develop the Marine Air Ground Task Force’s capability 

to conduct amphibious power projection and sustained operations ashore in a combined, joint, whole-of-government environment. 

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPBUILDING

The Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps have determined that the force structure requirement to support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships. Due to fiscal constraints, the Department of the Navy has agreed to maintain a minimum of 33 total amphibious 

ships in the assault echelon. The 33 ship force accepts risk in the arrival of combat 

support and combat service support elements of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. 

Of that 33 ship Battle Force, 11 aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA/LHD) and 11 

LPD class ships are required to accommodate the Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s 

aviation combat element and part of the ground combat element. 

CARING FOR OUR WARRIORS AND FAMILIES

A critical part of our overall readiness is maintaining our solemn responsibility 

to take care of our marines and their families. While marines never waiver in the 

ideals of service to Corps and Country, the needs of our marines and their families 

are constantly evolving. Marines have reasonable expectations regarding housing, 

schools, and family support. It is incumbent upon us, with the generous support of 

Congress, to support them in these key areas. Marines make an enduring commitment to the Corps when they earn the title marine. The Corps in turn, makes an 

enduring commitment to every marine and his or her family. 

Putting Family Readiness on a Wartime Footing 

Last year, the Marine Corps initiated a multi-year plan of action to place family 

support programs on a wartime footing. We significantly increased training and support staff at the installation level, expanded the depth and breadth of family readiness training programs, and authorized full-time Family Readiness Officers in more 

than 400 units. We improved the command’s ability to communicate with marines 

and their families with state-of-the-art information technology tools. We continue to 

assess the efficacy of our Marine Corps Community Services programs to ensure 

that we are empowering our marines and their families to maintain a state of readiness while caring for their immediate needs. 

These initiatives and others demonstrate the commitment of the Marine Corps to 

our families and highlight the connection between family readiness and mission 

readiness. We are grateful to Congress for providing additional funding that enabled 

the initial set-up of our improved family readiness program. 

Improving Care for Our Wounded Warriors 

The Marine Corps is very proud of the positive and meaningful accomplishments 

of the Wounded Warrior Regiment in providing recovery and transition support to 

our wounded, ill, and injured marines and sailors and their families. Since the Regiment stood up in April 2007, we instituted a comprehensive and integrated approach to wounded warrior care, and unified it under one command. Our single 

process provides Active Duty, Reserve, and separated marines with nonmedical case 

management, benefit information and assistance, resources and referrals, and transition support. The Regiment strives to ensure programs and processes adequately 

meet or exceed the needs of our wounded, ill, or injured marines, while remaining 

flexible to preclude a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach to care. To ensure effective family 

advocacy, we added Family Readiness Officers at the Regiment and to its two battalions. 

While the Marine Corps is aggressively attacking the stigma and lack of information that prevent marines from asking for help, we are also being proactive in reaching out to those marines and Marine veterans who may need assistance. Our 

Wounded Warrior Call Center not only receives calls from active duty and veteran 

marines, but also initiates important outreach calls. Since November 2007, our call 

center has made over 44,000 calls and contacted over 8,800 wounded, ill, or injured 

marines and family members. 

16 

Our Job Transition Cell, manned by marines and representatives of the Departments of Labor and Veterans Affairs, has proactively reached out to identify and 

coordinate with employers and job training programs to help our Wounded Warriors 

obtain positions where they are likely to succeed and enjoy promising careers. One 

example is our collaboration with the United States House of Representatives to establish a Wounded Warrior Fellowship Program to facilitate hiring disabled veterans to work in congressional offices. 

The Marine Corps’ commitment to our wounded, ill, and injured is steadfast; we 

are grateful for the support and leadership of Congress on their behalf. I would also 

like to extend my personal thanks for congressional visits to our marines and sailors 

in the hospitals where they are being treated and convalescing. 

CONCLUSION

This Nation has high expectations of her Corps—and marines know that. Your 

marines are answering the call around the globe while performing with distinction 

in the face of great danger and hardships. The Corps provides the Nation unrivaled 

speed, agility, and flexibility for deterring war and responding to crises; our ability 

to seize the initiative and dominate our adversaries across the range of military operations requires the right people, the right equipment, and sufficient time to train 

and prepare appropriately. 

As your marines continue to serve in combat, we must provide them all the resources required to complete the tasks we have given them. Now more than ever 

they need the sustained support of the American people and Congress to maintain 

our readiness, reset the force during an extended war, modernize to face the challenges of the future, and fulfill our commitment to marines, sailors, and their families. 

On behalf of your marines, I extend great appreciation for your faithful support 

to date and thank you in advance for your ongoing efforts to support our brave warriors. The Corps understands the value of each dollar provided by the American taxpayer, and will continue to provide maximum return for every dollar spent. Today 

over 200,000 Active and 39,000 Reserve Force marines remain ready, relevant, and 

capable as the ‘‘Nation’s Force-in-Readiness’’. . . and with your help, we will stay 

that way. 

Senator BAYH. General, thank you for your devotion to both your 

soldiers and to our country. 

We’ve been joined by Senator Inhofe. Jim, thank you for your 

presence. He’s very graciously agreed to defer any comments to the 

question period, which we will now commence. We’re going to have 

8-minute rounds. Please let me know when my 8 minutes have expired. I don’t want to go on and on. 

General Chiarelli, I’ll start with you. You mentioned that we’re 

consuming our readiness as fast as we’re rebuilding it. I think 

that’s what you said. What must be done to change that, so that 

we’re no longer just kind of treading water? What needs to be done 

specifically to actually improve our readiness, so that we’re not in 

this constant state of tearing it down while building it up without 

really making long-term progress? 

General CHIARELLI. Two things I’d point out, Senator, would be: 

first of all, we need to complete the grow-the-Army plan and, that 

growth to the 45 brigade mark. We are that. 

Senator BAYH. That would be at the top of your priority list? 

General CHIARELLI. It is very, very important that we grow those 

45 brigades because this is a question of supply and demand. I 

can’t control the demand, and the demand right now shows that I 

have 26 combat brigades that are currently deployed. I have a total 

of 18 Active component brigades and 8 Reserve component brigades. When I have that many brigades deployed, I have what’s 

called friction, best explained by a Navy analogy, that when you 

have—— 

Senator BAYH. This is a first, the Army referencing the Navy. 

17 

General CHIARELLI. I have a rough time explaining friction if I 

don’t call on my other Services to help me out. 

When you have an aircraft carrier that’s sitting in the middle of 

the Persian Gulf and you want to go ahead and relieve it, an aircraft carrier casts off from someplace in the United States and at 

that particular point in time you have two aircraft carriers doing 

the job of one. The same thing happens with Army brigades. When 

I have 26 deployed, I have normally 6 that are also doing another 

job. So that total number goes up to 32 in a force right now of total 

brigades in that net 1.1 million force Army of about 70. 

That is causing my dwell time to be at about 1 to 3, 1 year deployed, 12 months, and 1.3 years back at home. I would also point 

out to you that the surge for the United States Army is not over. 

We won’t get our last combat brigade off a 15-month deployment 

until June of this year and I won’t get my last combat service support or combat support unit back off a 15-month deployment until 

September. 

So what has to change for us is the demand, the demand for 

forces. Right now it’s as high as it has ever been, with our continued commitment to Iraq and the increase in Afghanistan. 

Senator BAYH. I understood your answer to be, General, that the 

demand has gone up. Unfortunately, the world has a way of determining the demand. It’s somewhat beyond our control. But I understood your answer to be that we need to actually deal with the supply to meet the demand. You can’t meet an increased demand with 

a constant supply. It’s an increase in the force levels that will enable us to improve the situation. 

General CHIARELLI. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator BAYH. General, you used the term corresponding adjustments were going to have to be made to reconcile the different demands that we face. I think that’s the term that you used in your 

testimony. What did you mean by that? I took that in layman’s 

terms to be some tough choices we’re going to have to make. Is that 

a fair translation? 

General CHIARELLI. That’s a fair translation. We’re making tough 

choices every day. I think you know we’ve had great success with 

retention and recruiting and, quite frankly, the Army has reached 

its goal of 547,400, and before we could put the brakes on we even 

went a little bit over. So we have met our grow-the-Army goal of 

547,400. 

But when you look at that force, I have right now today 9,500 

soldiers that are in warrior transition units, soldiers who have 

been wounded in battle or in training to a degree where they are 

assigned to those units. I have another 10,000 soldiers that are 

nondeployable in units trying to heal from past rotations. I have 

another 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers that are serving in joint manning 

documents that aren’t necessarily the unit they were assigned to. 

Senator BAYH. That’s a total of about 30,000 if you add it all together. 

General CHIARELLI. That is, and that creates some real challenges for us. We’re finding that our nondeployable numbers are 

going up as we get into successive rotations for individuals. All that 

creates a challenge for us. It is a stretched and sometimes tired 

force that is meeting all the requirements, but at the same time 

18 

it is difficult to get our units up to the operating strength they 

need to before deployment. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, General. 

General Amos, in your testimony you said that—and I’m not the 

best note taker in the world, but I tried—the majority of nondeployed forces are reporting degraded readiness levels. So a majority of the nondeployed forces. Then I think you cited a statistic, 

I think it was 14 percent of the equipment we’ve had to cannibalize 

away from the nondeployed forces; is that correct? 

General AMOS. Sir, we took it from the nondeployed. These are 

whole cloth principal end items, but we outfitted the 2nd MEB 

with 14 percent of the equipment—— 

Senator BAYH. My question again for the public that’s interested 

in this, is to be sure we’re giving you what you need to make sure 

our forces are prepared: Just how unready are the nondeployed 

forces? I know it’s a subjective determination. It’s hard to put an 

exact figure on it. But if we’ve taken 14 percent of their equipment, 

is that about how unready they are? Or is it some sort of—— 

General AMOS. Sir, I would say I think the potential could be— 

it’s 14 percent of the equipment—there were 41,000 what we call 

principal end items that we brought together and deployed to Afghanistan for the 2nd MEB. So 14 percent of that 41,000 items 

came from home stationed units. 55 percent came right off the assembly line as a result of Congress’ graciousness to help reset the 

force. 

Senator BAYH. Maybe I should restate my question. If an ordinary citizen wants our marines and soldiers to have what they 

need to be ready, and they hear a majority of the nondeployed 

forces are unready, then I think somebody might ask you, General, 

just how unprepared are they? If they were called upon today to 

deploy, just what would your response be? What would it take to 

get them ready? 

General AMOS. Sir, I think it would take probably several 

months. I think it would take global sourcing for the Marine Corps. 

It would—— 

Senator BAYH. By global sourcing, you mean? 

General AMOS. I mean going to the western Pacific, bringing marines and equipment out of the western Pacific, going to Hawaii, 

taking them out of the Third Marine Regiment in Hawaii, coming 

to the west coast. 

Senator BAYH. So at least on a short-term basis, we’d have to 

continue to rob Peter to pay Paul? 

General AMOS. We do, sir. We do. That’s why the reset and the 

overseas contingency funds and your help to reset the force—and 

General Chiarelli talked about it in his statement. It is critical that 

we continue to feed the current operations with the generosity of 

Congress. You’ve given us over $12 billion over the last several 

years and we’re estimating today that our reset cost is probably 

right around $20 billion total, to include the $12 billion you’ve 

given us. 

But as we get these vehicles and equipment that we purchased 

last year to reset the force, we are sending those into Afghanistan, 

we’re sending them into Iraq because they’re being used. All those 

new up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles 

19 

(HMMWVs) that we bought last year to reset the force at home 

have been sent and expended and they’re en route right now. 

Senator BAYH. It’s like being on a treadmill. We’re running faster 

and faster, but we’re staying in place. 

General AMOS. Sir, we are. But I think there are several positive 

notes here. First of all, Congress has been very good about supporting us. So thank you for that. 

But the forces that are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan are at 

the very highest state of readiness. So what we do back at home 

in the Marine Corps is take those units that are about to deploy. 

We’ve identified them. We know who they are, and about 6 months 

out to 4 months out we get the people in there. We cobble together 

the equipment into kind of training pools, and we have enough to 

train them, but it’s not without great pain. 

So when they deploy they fall in on equipment that we have left 

there or that we are maintaining in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Senator BAYH. My time has expired, but in the second round I’d 

like to follow up on that, because I assume that you’re both doing 

a great job of making sure the soldiers on the front line are getting 

what they need, but that’s at the expense of our preparedness to 

meet some future unexpected contingency. So I’d just like to get to 

that in my next round of questions. 

Senator Burr, I’ll turn the microphone over to you. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a question for both Generals about the impact on military 

readiness and operations of support provided by contractors, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few of my colleagues have 

pressed this administration to curtail the use by the military of 

service contracts for base operating services, security, supply, and 

other mission support requirements. 

Can you briefly describe the impact of service support contracts 

on readiness and mission capability for the Army and the Marine 

Corps? Let me go to General Amos first. 

General AMOS. Sir, there’s no question we have some contract 

support in Iraq right now. Too soon for me to tell you what we’re 

going to have in Afghanistan. I don’t think it’s going to be a lot, 

but I suspect there will be some. We are just flowing forces in there 

now. 

But we have some in Iraq, and I’ll give you a good example. Honeywell has 100 contractors at Al-Taqaddum, which is our main logistics hub in the western part of the Al-Anbar Province. All the 

equipment comes in to Al-Taqaddum and those 100 contractors 

from Honeywell do the triage. They do the preliminary maintenance on these things, and then they make the determination, is 

this something that we need to retrograde down to Kuwait to send 

back home or not? 

They are critical to our combat support in Iraq. We certainly 

have contracting support back home. We have it at our depot in Albany, GA. We not only have our regular Federal employees, but we 

have contract employees, temporary employees, and we have contracts available that we can call on to speed this up. 

To be honest with you, a little over 85 percent of our contracts 

have been competed competitively. So I don’t think we are the target necessarily for perhaps what the President has talked about 

20 

with regard to contracting. So I think we’re actually in pretty good 

shape. 

Senator BURR. General, in the context of what you said about 

Honeywell and potentially other contractors, is it safe and correct 

for me to assume that as we go through the drawdown those contractors become even more crucial, those that are tied to the logistics side of it, for our need to assess what we’re bringing home, 

what is repairable, that type of thing? 

General AMOS. Sir, they absolutely are, because they will probably be some of the last folks who will actually retrograde out of 

Al-Anbar Province, because what we’d really like to be able to do 

is free up as many marines as we possibly can, reset their clocks 

so that they can flow through to the next deployment into Afghanistan. 

Senator BURR. General Chiarelli? 

General CHIARELLI. I would have to totally agree with Jim. I will 

tell you the best example that I can give you from my time in Iraq 

was the aircraft maintenance contractors that we had helping to 

take care of our rotary wing aircraft. Those contractors just did a 

magnificent job. They’ve done a magnificent job for 71⁄2 years in 

providing that kind of maintenance support and we and our fleet 

have had unprecedented high operational ready rates because of 

the great support that we’ve gotten in that one specific area. 

I think they’re unheard of for equipment that’s been flown as 

hard as our rotary wing aircraft has been flown, both in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. So I would argue that they are essential for much of 

what we do, and also provide the opportunity for our soldiers to get 

off the forward operating bases and do what soldiers need to do, 

and that’s getting out among the people as part of the joint campaign plan in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Senator BURR. Is it safe for me to assume, from what both of you 

have said, that if for some reason we eliminated the ability for the 

Services to contract certain aspects of what we need, that we’re 

then required to remove boots from the battle to handle the logistics and all of these other assessments, and we strain troop 

strength even that much more? 

General AMOS. Sir, that’s absolutely correct. They would then become what we classically call enablers. Those enablers would then 

come from marines wearing uniforms like this, soldiers wearing 

uniforms like that. A great example is the Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected (MRAP) vehicle. It’s been a huge success story and we 

enjoy over 90 percent up-ready or operationally ready MRAPs 

across the theater, I think for both our Services. That’s done because contractors are there taking care of them. 

If they are not there, then marines wearing digital cammies are 

going to have to be trained and they are going to be out there turning wrenches, and our deployment to dwell will only increase. 

General CHIARELLI. I might add, that’s a great example that Jim 

just teed up here, and it’s particularly important when you understand that many of those MRAPs have been assigned to units that 

aren’t used to taking care of heavy equipment. Your light infantry 

forces aren’t necessarily known for their ability to maintain heavy 

armor equipment like MRAPs, and those contractors who are able 

21 

to provide that direct support and maintenance are critical to the 

high OR rates that General Amos just quoted. 

Senator BURR. Something very quick at this point. Do you see 

the MRAP as significant a piece of equipment for use in Afghanistan as it was used in Iraq, given the difference in terrains between the two? 

General CHIARELLI. I would argue yes, sir. In the south for sure, 

some of the current variants of the MRAP that the theater has requested to be sent are doing yeoman’s work. I think you know 

we’re working on an MRAP all-terrain vehicle. That vehicle is currently in testing. The last I saw, that vehicle will be ready to begin 

moving into Afghanistan in the November time period. I think it’s 

going to be a great leap forward. 

We’re doing modifications on some of the current MRAPs to give 

them independent suspension. The early variants did not have 

them. I know the marines are doing this on one of their variants. 

But I see the MRAP as playing an important role in Afghanistan 

as well as in Iraq, and particularly so once we get the all-terrain 

vehicle available for those in the hilly east portion of that country. 

Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, USA Today ran a report in 

April titled ‘‘Battalion Shifted to Afghanistan,’’ that described how 

the Army’s Fourth Engineering Battalion, that had just arrived in 

Iraq, was now being redeployed to Afghanistan to perform a vital 

mission of clearing roads of bombs and other obstacles. 

The article went on to assert that, ‘‘The decision underscores how 

military commanders are scrambling to meet President Obama’s 

order.’’ 

What is the extent to which the Army units currently deployed 

to Iraq are in training for deployment—or currently in training for 

deployment to Iraq, will be redirected to Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. Senator, we have a total of four of our combat units that have been redirected. We have the 173rd out of 

Italy, but it won’t be going until January, so it will have time to 

do the necessary training for its new mission. We have the 5–2 

Stryker Brigade out of Fort Lewis, Washington. I will tell you that 

was one of the most difficult ones, 5–2 was one of those units that 

had taken aboard all the cultural lessons we’ve had over these last 

71⁄2 years. I think they had the highest number of Arabic speakers 

of any unit. 

We were getting ready to deploy to theater and when we 

switched their mission to Afghanistan the Arabic was no longer 

needed. That was a hard one, but they’ll be ready to go. 

We have 2–10 Mountain going in October, and the 82nd Cav, the 

aviation brigade, will be going in here in the next month. That was 

a difficult one because their dwell time was cut and we had to get 

them the high altitude training they needed. But we get all our 

units the training they need for the different conditions if they are 

redirected from Iraq to Afghanistan. 

Senator BURR. So you’re fairly confident that the training that 

we provided is sufficient for these troops either to transition from 

Iraq to Afghanistan or to be redirected to Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. I am, and I know the commanders 

downrange, if they get a redirected unit and feel that additional 

22 

training was needed before they put them out into actual operations, would ensure that in theater that training was conducted. 

Senator BURR. I thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Burr. 

Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just for clarification, Generals—and both of you may be able to 

respond to this. I just heard General Amos say that the equipment 

is coming right out of the factory, being shipped or being used right 

as it’s coming off. Now, this is really then going to the contractors 

to be inspected and they determine if this equipment is functional 

and that it will be military ready or combat ready when that equipment hits the battlefield. Is that the case? 

General AMOS. Sir, 55 percent of the 41,000 end items that I was 

telling you about that came off the assembly line, that actually— 

those were brand new pieces of equipment, and of course it almost—probably I would assume at all of those plants we have military contracting officers, we have folks that are there to keep track 

of the quality assurance. 

So when these things come off, they don’t actually just leave 

Oshkosh and then arrive into Kandahar. They actually pass 

through the Marine Corps. Most of them will end up going through 

Charleston, where we put all the electronic countermeasures 

(ECM) equipment on it. We will get our hands on this equipment 

and verify that everything is there. But it is brand spanking new 

equipment, and then we will through military transportation— 

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), will send this stuff into 

Afghanistan. 

So I don’t know if that answers your question. 

Senator BURRIS. So that means that when it hits the battlefield 

we don’t have our warriors out there with equipment that’s failing 

or misfunctioning or that hasn’t really been tested, like you get the 

automobile and—— 

General AMOS. Sir, it’s not. It would be if you pick your nicest 

car that you have the most confidence in when you buy it, that’s 

the way the equipment’s arriving in theater. That’s my perception. 

Senator BURRIS. Okay, and that’s your responsibility, to make 

sure that those boots on the ground out in those fields have the 

best equipment they can have to protect us. 

General AMOS. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator BURRIS. Are they dealing with any inferior, broken-down 

equipment? Are we sure they are up to date with the latest weaponry protection? The HMMWVs that you just mentioned, because 

you’re in Afghanistan where all those Improvised Explosive Devices 

are being used there now, are those HMMWVs transferable to Afghanistan at all now? 

General AMOS. They are, Senator. They’re the ones—in fact, this 

has been an iterative—HMMWV is a great example. When we first 

crossed the border in March 2003, most of our HMMWVs weren’t 

armored at all. So now we are doing what we call the enhanced capability vehicle, which is a HMMWV that has a bigger motor, bigger suspension, better air conditioning, better electric bus for all 

the ECM gear. That’s the progression of the kind of vehicle now 

23 

that is going into Afghanistan. So this is absolutely the very best 

that American money can pay for. 

Senator BURRIS. General Amos, I’ve been led to believe that a 

typical marine infantry battalion deployment is about 7 months on 

average, as opposed to a marine headquarters unit whose deployment is about 12 months. General Amos, does this difference in deployment length between the units cause morale issues, and would 

it be realistic to make all deployments for 12 months? 

General AMOS. Sir, actually the opposite is true. What happens 

is—— 

Senator BURRIS. Just the opposite is true? 

General AMOS. Well, the opposite is true from the standpoint 

that the morale on the units that are deploying for 7 months are 

very happy. They’re very grateful that the Commandant of the Marine Corps has said, okay, you’re an infantry battalion or a squadron and you’re only going to go for 7 months. The headquarters, 

usually made up of older guys like General Chiarelli and I and 

colonels and whatever, those whom we call colonel-level commands, 

the regimental commands, they go for 13 months, somewhere between 12 and 13 months depending on how the rotation goes. 

They provide the stability and they provide the continuity of that 

operation for that period of time. The operational units, the ones 

that are really out there doing the heavy lifting, the fighting, the 

flying, the supplying, and the repairing, they’re going on the 7- 

month rotation. So they’re very happy. Their families are very appreciative of the Commandant’s decision. All us old guys were in 

those units at one time, so now it’s time for us to go—and to be 

honest with you, the 12 to 13 months for the higher headquarters 

has not caused a problem in the Marine Corps. 

Senator BURRIS. General Chiarelli, in your statement for the 

record you addressed the lack of participation by civilian agencies 

in assisting in the nation-building process with these various commands. You cited the example of the National Guard farmers 

teaching farmers. In other words, if you’re in Africa you want farmers teaching farmers, rather than having the military personnel. 

Now, are you aware of any agency refusing a request to participate, and do you have recommendations regarding this participation involvement? 

General CHIARELLI. I would argue that no one has refused to participate. It’s a matter of capability. We took much of that capability 

down here in the last 10 to 12 years. A good example would be U.S. 

Aid for International Development (USAID). USAID used to be 

about 16,000 folks and it’s down now to about 3,000 or a little bit 

more than 3,000. It is really a contracting agency now that looks 

for other people to execute contracts. 

The specific example I gave you in my statement of our agricultural teams is a great success story. These are 60-man teams. I visited one at Camp Atterbury that had worked with Purdue University. Purdue University had brought these guys on board. These 

are National Guardsmen, brought together for this special agricultural team. They are farmers from Middle America, who know how 

to farm. They come to Purdue. Purdue teaches them the language, 

the dialect of Pashtun that they’re going to have to learn. 

24 

They dumbed down their farming techniques from the standpoint 

of, we’re not going to go over there and teach them how we do it 

here, but what techniques can Purdue give them to take over to Afghanistan so that they can make use of limited water and the 

amount of mechanization they have in farming. These 60-man 

teams go over and they’re strategic in nature, I would argue. 

They’ve been a great asset to the commanders on the ground. 

But when I take those 60 men out of the National Guard to form 

that team, I’m leaving 60 holes in National Guard units that I have 

to go ahead and fill. That creates issues for us. 

Senator BURRIS. So they’re not drawing down on your numbers 

of servicemen because they have to deal with the local community 

as we try to do nation building, especially an Africa man? General 

William Ward just took over the command of Africa, and we are 

now trying to do nationbuilding in some of those countries over in 

Africa. I understand you have to use military personnel to do that 

rather than civilian personnel that would be in there contracting 

to help them do it. 

So that’s not a problem in your eyes? 

General CHIARELLI. It does create holes. It is an asset that I am 

happy to go ahead and deploy and use. It provides force protection 

for my soldiers. Where we do that kind of work we are safer, and 

we must do it, albeit it would be good for us if other people could 

come to the table and do some of that work. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m going to have to run. I have another committee. I have to go over to another meeting, so I won’t be here in 

round two. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you for your line of questioning Senator 

Burr. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Generals. 

Senator BAYH. Any time a line of questioning brings to light the 

contributions of the Indiana National Guard and Purdue University, the chairman is delighted. So thank you for that. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m going to try to get everything in in this first round because 

we have our Environment and Public Works Committee hearing coinciding with this. 

General Chiarelli, I appreciate what you said about the agricultural efforts that are taking place up there on the border. It started 

out, I believe it was Nebraska, and then Oklahoma is actually en 

route right now. I was over there as they were making that movement up. They’re just getting great responses. 

That’s something that really is not out of the conventional book, 

but people are having good responses to that. 

Mr. Chairman, I chaired this subcommittee many years ago and 

I think the Readiness Subcommittee is so incredibly important. At 

that time, it was right after the drawdown of the 1990s and I don’t 

want to be overly critical of President Clinton, but as they were 

bringing down the forces and delaying our modernization programs, I was very critical during those times. 

Then, as we moved into the Bush administration, unfortunately 

September 11 came along. So we were in a position of trying to reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
25 

build what should not have been torn down in the first place while 

prosecuting two wars at the same time. So that’s why it is incredibly difficult. 

I happened to be over in Afghanistan when Secretary Gates 

made his announcement 2 weeks ago on Monday. I know I was 

overly critical, but when you stop and you think about the money 

that is being spent right now, $700 billion for the bailout and $789 

billion on a stimulus program, then our omnibus of $410—that’s $2 

trillion. Yet what we really need in order to stop the things that 

appear to be true is maybe $25 billion more for the military. I’m 

talking about things that are not directly involving you. The F–22, 

we have to keep that going. It’s the only fifth generation thing that 

we have out there. We know both the Chinese and the Russians 

are making something that would put our kids at a handicap down 

the road. So our modernization has to continue there. 

The C–17s the lift capacity, you have to have that. The National 

Missile Defense System, and then of course the Future Combat 

System (FCS). The word that was used was recocking the FCS. 

Well, we’ve been recocking the FCS for 6 years now, and when 

General Shinseki started this thing he was right. It goes back—and 

I hate to even say that this happened, but my last year on the 

House Armed Services Committee was 1994. We had someone testify at that time that in 10 years we’d no longer need ground 

troops. Now look what happened since that time. 

So the ground forces in the marines and the Army have been neglected in terms of, in my opinion, the modernization program. We 

are faced right now, General Chiarelli, with some of the elements 

that would have been in the FCS. It wasn’t real clear as to where 

the administration is going to go with this, but it is going to be delayed. 

You and I both know that one of the greatest weaknesses we 

have on the ground is in our artillery. We’re working with the Paladin. That was World War II technology, where you have to get out 

and swab the breech after every shot. Now, we’ve had some upgrades. We had one scheduled. I hope we can continue with that, 

because it’s unconscionable to me to think that our kids are out 

there on the battlefield against potential adversaries that have better artillery equipment than we do. Even South Africa is making 

a better piece than we have. 

So I am concerned about the modernization program. The first 

question I would ask you, General Chiarelli, is do you think we are 

going to be able to continue while they’re deciding what to do with 

the FCS, with an increase in our capability with perhaps the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program? 

General CHIARELLI. I do, Senator. I do. As you well know, the 

PIM program is an important Army program to improve the Paladin and to work off some of the issues with that older system. We 

are committed to that program. 

I would tell you that the Army is committed to a modernization 

program, and we are very pleased with statements made by the 

Secretary of Defense as he toured war colleges last week that indicated that he too is committed to an Army modernization program. 

We are going to move out as rapidly as we can to ensure that we 

put the pieces in place to use much of what has been developed 

26 

over the last years into that modernization program as we look at 

it and design it right now. 

But we are totally committed to a modernization program. 

Senator INHOFE. Let me ask you. You brought up just a minute 

ago the 173rd. I’ve spent some time at Vicenza and I think we all 

remember in the early stages of the Iraq war when we found out 

we couldn’t get across Turkey like we thought, and so at the last 

minute the 173rd came in, and did a great job. 

I was over there. At that time they didn’t really have a staging 

area, and we put in the authorization bill money and resources to 

give them the staging area that they could have, where it’s on concrete and all of that. Is that now at a point where it’s functional? 

General CHIARELLI. I’m going to have to take that one back and 

make sure I give you a correct answer. I do not have the specifics 

on that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Army has completed the personnel alert holding area and heavy drop rigging 

facility for the 173rd in Aviano. These fiscal year 2004 facilities became operational 

in November 2007 and March 2008 respectively. They will be used by the 173rd’s 

soldiers prior to loading on planes for deployment. 

Senator INHOFE. I think it is. But at that time they were getting 

ready in the rain out in the mud and all of that. So you might 

check on that. I want to be sure that that’s right. There were some, 

I think Jim Jones and others, and I was among them, who felt that 

we’re going to look at a time when our live ranges are going to 

have to be moved maybe to Eastern Europe, where they don’t have 

all the environmental problems and the restrictions that we have. 

Perhaps the last thing remaining in that area might just be 

Vicenza, and I think that’s a very valuable asset there. 

While we’re talking about equipment, General Amos, try not to 

be a marine for just a minute, because you never complain. You 

guys, you’re the only ones with retreads, and we know all that 

stuff. You’re still using the Harrier, the V–22, the CH–53. What do 

you think in terms of modernization, equipment, as you look out 

in the future, what you’ll need? 

General AMOS. Senator, you’ve flown on most of those airplanes, 

if not all of them, and been in all of our vehicles. Fortunately, we 

began a modernization program in aviation about 5 or 6 years ago, 

and it began with the new Huey Cobra, the then V–22. We invested money early on, skipped over the F–18 E and F and decided 

we would go with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 

So we have C–130Js that—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, but still, that’s out in the future. 

General AMOS. Some of it is, sir. Certainly the V–22 is not. 

Senator INHOFE. No, I’m talking about the JSF. That is a great 

need you have now and you’re still using the F–18s, I guess? 

General AMOS. We are, sir. If you just look at service life, we 

have about 5 or 6 more years left on our single-seat F–18s and 

about the same amount on our F–18 two-seaters. So we began this 

thing, there is a plan in motion, and it’s actually I think working 

pretty well for the Marine Corps. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. I just want you to know that there are 

a lot of us here who are so appreciative of you two guys and what 

27 

you’re doing with the hand that’s dealt you. Our job is to deal you 

a better hand. 

General Amos, I was fortunate to be in Fallujah for the first two 

elections that they had, and I watched your marines. I watched the 

door-to-door activity, and it made me very proud. I would say the 

same thing, General Chiarelli. I was a product of the draft and I 

never believed that an All-Volunteer Force could do what these 

guys are doing over there. We’re just really, really proud that they 

are. 

One of you said—and I wrote this down, but I’m not sure which 

one of you said it—we can’t continue to meet the demands; we have 

to make corresponding adjustments. Which one used that term? 

General CHIARELLI. It was me, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Can you suggest a few corresponding adjustments? 

General CHIARELLI. What we have to do is find a way to work 

the demand issue. I mean, the demand issue is critical for us, and 

if we see the savings in troops if the drawdown in Iraq occurs as 

scheduled, we see current demand lasting for the Army until the 

middle of fiscal year 2010 and into the fall of 2010. We can make 

that, and we should start to see about that time some corresponding decreases in the requirements in Iraq and increased 

dwell for forces back home. 

But if something were to happen that caused demand to remain 

the same as it is today or to increase in the upcoming months, it 

becomes very, very difficult for the United States Army to meet 

those requirements. 

I just toured six installations in 7 days, from Fort Jackson to 

Fort Bragg, Fort Campbell, Fort Lewis, Fort Hood, and Fort Drum. 

I met with spouses of soldiers who were deployed and returning. 

I met with junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and senior 

leaders. It is a resilient force. It is an amazing force. But I have 

to tell you, it’s a tired and stretched force. 

To turn around and go back to either Iraq or Afghanistan just 

under 12 months or just over 12 months, and have it be your third 

or fourth long deployment, is difficult. It’s difficult on soldiers and 

families. So the key to me as I see it is seeing demand come down 

as projected. But if it doesn’t, we’ll have some issues. 

Senator INHOFE. I know my time has expired. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman. 

On this idea of the brigade combat teams (BCTs), I haven’t really 

heard specifically. I guess we have 43 now and we were going to 

go to 47. Now it’s going to be 45. How is that going to work, and 

can we maintain our efforts with that change, and how is that 

going to work? 

General CHIARELLI. As Secretary Gates indicated, stopping at 45 

will allow us to thicken our forces. It will allow us to ensure that 

forces that are deploying are deploying at their prescribed strength. 

But the Secretary did indicate that if demand changed and went 

up, that there could be a reevaluation period down the road. 

Stopping at 45, if you just do the simple math, if demand were 

to remain the same would cut into dwell time. It’s just simple 

mathematics. But allowing us to thicken our forces and use those 

soldiers to ensure that our units are going out close to their authorVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
28 

ized strength I think is critical. It will also assist us in January 

coming off of stop-loss, which we will begin coming off stop-loss. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

I’d like to pick up where Senator Inhofe left off with your last 

response, General Chiarelli. The term you used was very difficult 

in terms of managing demand. I understood your answer to say we 

can make it through the middle or the end of next year, it’s tough 

but you can make it, but we’re looking forward to the demand from 

Iraq decreasing even as there’s a little bit of an increase in Afghanistan, but that’s then going to give us an opportunity to really try 

and regenerate our force capabilities. 

You said that if something happened to keep demand constant or 

to increase demand, I think the words you used, it would be very 

difficult to meet those demands. You’re a good soldier, you’ll follow 

orders and you’ll do your best, you’ll try and get the job done. But 

the words you used, so the American public can understand, ‘‘it will 

be very difficult.’’ 

So that if, God forbid, if there’s a confrontation with North Korea 

or Iran that would require some commitment from our Army, or in 

some other spot that we can’t even anticipate, it would be very difficult, to use your words, to meet those contingencies. Is that a fair 

summary of what you’ve said today? 

General CHIARELLI. That’s a fair summary. It would be very difficult on the force. It would be very difficult on families if we were 

to see dwell time, the time at home, remain at the levels it is now 

and not improve with folks coming off of three, four, and sometimes 

five deployments. 

Senator BAYH. That affects retention and recruitment, particularly for some of the NCOs, sergeants, and then even lieutenants, 

captains, people like that, does it not? 

General CHIARELLI. It does. But it’s a function also, Senator, of 

the economy. I will tell you our retention rates have never been 

better than they are right now. Our recruiting quality points 

are—— 

Senator BAYH. We’d prefer that to not be because there are no 

good alternatives. 

General CHIARELLI. We too prefer that to be that way. 

Senator BAYH. But the broader point, and one of the purposes 

from the hearing, you guys have been doing a great job under adverse circumstances, but I think the American public has a right 

to know that if something else comes along we’re going to have a 

very difficult time meeting the national security threat that faces 

the country. We’ll do our best, but it puts you folks in a very difficult situation. I would assume that the policymakers understand 

that, and so that our responses to some of these contingencies that 

are out there may be in some way shaped by our ability or lack 

thereof to deal with it. 

General Amos, anything you’d like to add to the discussion? 

Would you use similar terms, ‘‘very difficult,’’ from the Corps’ 

standpoint? 

29 

General AMOS. Sir, I think it would be very challenging. Difficult, 

challenging, to me they mean the same thing. I don’t think there’s 

any question about it. This is not—— 

Senator BAYH. It’s not an abstract problem we’re dealing with 

here. 

General AMOS. It’s not, sir, and I think it’s a very worthwhile 

question. In the case of the Marine Corps, if something happened 

in Iran or North Korea, we would end up freezing the forces in 

place. You’d freeze the ones you have in Iraq and Afghanistan, hold 

them in there, and then, as we said earlier on in the testimony, you 

would bring together—you would build a fighting force that you 

could deploy. But you’d have to train it, you’d have to figure out 

how you’re going to get the equipment. 

We in the case of the Marine Corps would emasculate all our 

strategic Reserves, which are in our maritime prepositioned squadrons, whatever is left up in the caves in Norway. We would pull 

all that together and deploy that force. But we’d have to train it, 

we’d have to figure out what we’d need to do in that environment 

that we’re not training people for right now, because we’re predominantly a counterinsurgency, irregular warfare focused Marine 

Corps right now. So all those other skills—combined arms, fire maneuver, forcible entry—those things would have to—we’d have to 

figure out, okay, what do we need to do for this new contingency? 

Is it possible? 

The answer is yes. Your military, both your Army and Marine 

Corps, Navy and Air Force, would come together and we’d make it 

happen, just like we did prior to the onset of Korea. We did exactly 

the same thing. But it would be painful. 

Senator BAYH. As I recall, in the beginning stages of Korea it 

also meant that our performance suffered because we were just trying to make the best of a bad situation. We shouldn’t consciously 

put ourselves in that spot. 

General AMOS. Sir, that’s absolutely correct. In the case of—just 

instructive for me as I think about this, we went—after the President and the Secretary of War, after World War II and the great 

successes of World War II, emasculated the Marine Corps—in fact, 

they even went public and said, we don’t even—we’re not even sure 

we need a Marine Corps any more, and for certain we’ll never do 

an amphibious operation. 

Yet in 1949 we took a 5th Marine Regiment from the west coast 

which was down to about 15 to 20 percent of what it should have 

been, cobbled together marines from the east coast all across, 

brought them into 5th Marines, blew that balloon up, trained them, 

and then brought ships together and made the largest amphibious 

operation and probably the most difficult one we’ve ever done 

shortly thereafter. 

So sir, I think your concerns are very valid. 

Senator BAYH. When a marine uses a term like ‘‘emasculate’’ the 

situation must be fairly dire. 

General AMOS. Well, yes, sir. I think it certainly was then. I 

think it was almost on the verge of—— 

Senator BAYH. It puts you in a position of trying to cut and paste 

and make do, and that’s certainly not an optimal situation for us 

to be in. 

30 

I think that’s the broader issue here today. Looking out, if there 

are threats to our Nation’s security, unexpected contingencies or 

things that might happen, that we hope don’t happen, that just 

puts you in a very difficult situation. You’ll try and make do, but 

that’s not really fair to your forces, and it really in some respects 

jeopardizes our national security. 

A couple other questions I have, gentlemen. I think, General 

Chiarelli, this would be in your territory. A few days ago, there was 

an article in the New York Times you’re probably familiar with regarding new body armor that we had hoped would lighten the load 

for some of our combat folks. I think we’ve all been impressed by 

the load that our soldiers carry out there in combat. It might reduce the weight they have to carry by as much as 20 pounds, which 

is not insignificant when you’re going up and down hills wearing 

your hot desert terrain gear. 

The article suggested that there were delays that were keeping 

that body armor from getting to our troops in the field. Are you familiar with this issue, and if so can you address what’s going on 

with that and what we need to do if the equipment is actually 

going to be good to get it to the soldiers who need it? 

General CHIARELLI. I had a meeting on that yesterday, Senator, 

and I will tell you that particular plate carrier—and that’s what it 

is. The official name is MBAB, and I don’t know what ‘‘MBAB’’ 

stands for. But it is a plate carrier, and it literally is a carrier 

made to carry those ceramic plates that we wear on the front and 

the back. 

It saves 3.77 pounds. 

Senator BAYH. 3.77 pounds? 

General CHIARELLI. 3.77 pounds. It was part of a total package—— 

Senator BAYH. So the 20 pounds that was reported was a little 

overstatement? 

General CHIARELLI. It was part of a total package of equipment, 

to include lighter machine guns and individual equipment, that, depending on what position you had in the unit—from a machine 

gunner, it would save, this total package would save 23 pounds; for 

a rifleman it would save 14 pounds. 

Senator BAYH. What are the prospects for getting this done and 

how long will it take if we can’t get it done? 

General CHIARELLI. The machine guns have already gone 

downrange. They are already in Afghanistan, and more are going 

to be shipped to Afghanistan. But we already have the machine 

guns down. 

The M240 machine gun saved, the lighter model, saved a total 

of 9 of those 23 pounds, with 3.77 pounds in the body armor, and 

another approximately 10 pounds in individual equipment. Now, 

that individual equipment and body armor is pre-stationed at Fort 

Carson, CO, and will be distributed from May 11 to May 15 to the 

next unit to go into Afghanistan. 

This is civilian off-the-shelf individual equipment that we need 

to test. The Secretary of the Army directed yesterday we expand 

that test, given the 10 pounds of savings. But I think it was unfair 

to characterize this as it was characterized. 

31 

Senator BAYH. How long do you think the testing process will 

take? 

General CHIARELLI. It’s done. 

Senator BAYH. Oh, it’s done. 

General CHIARELLI. The testing is done, and the unit has asked 

that the equipment be distributed May 11 to 15. 

Senator BAYH. So in a matter of weeks. 

General CHIARELLI. We’re meeting the unit’s request. We could 

do it right now, but based on where they are in their training 

phase they’ve asked to wait until the 11th to the 15th. 

But we had to test this integrated system to make sure that 

when we put our very good Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) 

plates in this carrier and when we tested that whole system, we 

got the levels of protection that we needed to ensure, to make sure 

our soldiers were as safe as possible. 

Senator BAYH. My time has expired. If I could just slip one more 

in, and then Senator Udall has joined us and we’re grateful for his 

presence here today. 

There have been a number of published reports I’m sure you’re 

both familiar with about some of the difficulties we’re having getting equipment into Afghanistan through Pakistan, some of the 

challenges, security challenges that exist in that arena. Does this 

concern either of you? There are some alternative routes we’ve explored. Either of you have any thoughts about relying upon, for example, Russia as a place through which we can ship our equipment 

to Afghanistan? 

General Amos? 

General AMOS. For the Marine Corps, the equipment will either 

fly into Kandahar for what we call sensitive type of things, things 

that we would not want to put on a commercial carrier, or it’ll come 

up through Pakistan, through Karachi, it’ll be offloaded down at 

the port of Karachi. All that equipment that flows up, that you see 

on the television every now and then when a convoy gets blown up, 

that’s all by commercial carriers. In other words, there are no U.S. 

soldiers or U.S. marines involved in that. They offload it, put it on 

the commercial carriers, and they actually drive it up north. 

There are two main routes up from that direction coming up 

from Pakistan. 

Senator BAYH. Do you have concerns about the reliability of 

those routes, General, with some of the attacks that have taken 

place there, the increasing instability in some parts of Pakistan? 

General AMOS. I think the bulk of the attacks have taken place 

up in the very northern part of the route. When you enter Afghanistan, you enter either the southern part, which is almost adjacent, 

just due east of Kandahar, and you come across the mountains that 

way. That’s actually proven to be very safe thus far. I would suspect that it’s only a matter of time when that starts becoming 

frisky as well, but right now the bulk of the stuff that’s going up 

north into that part of Afghanistan, that’s the more dangerous 

area. It goes across I believe the Khyber Pass and that area, and 

that’s where the enemy is focusing its efforts. 

This is an open hearing, so I can’t tell you, but I saw some numbers that TRANSCOM, who is responsible for all that stuff that 

moves, even when it goes into Afghanistan, and the numbers are, 

32 

even though the pictures are dramatic on television and the papers, 

the numbers are actually almost insignificant. Nothing’s insignificant when you lose several hundred million dollars worth of equipment, I understand that. 

Senator BAYH. So it’s something to keep our eye on, but at this 

point not having a material impact on our operations? 

General AMOS. Sir, it’s not. Certainly in the Marine Corps it’s 

not. I’ll let Pete talk about in the Army. But I’ll tell you that General McNabb at TRANSCOM and General McKiernan in Afghanistan have their eyes on this thing, and they’re trying to work very 

carefully to try to mitigate that. 

Senator BAYH. General Chiarelli. 

General CHIARELLI. From the dramatic pictures you saw in January, I think things have gotten better, particularly on the routes 

coming through Pakistan to Afghanistan. I think our logisticians 

have worked miracles to look for other lines of communication that 

they can use to continue to supply the force. 

I think that Army Material Command (AMC), TRANSCOM, are 

all over this. It is less a worry today than it was a few months ago. 

Senator BAYH. Good, good. 

Senator Burr, and then Senator Udall. 

Senator BURR. Generals, I thank you both for your comments on 

the ability to access Afghanistan for supply or resupply. I think one 

of the things that the chairman and I strongly are concerned with 

is, as you have this tremendous plus-up of U.S. presence, the requirements then on the resupply side are significantly more than 

what they currently are. 

I know there are some great minds working on alternative routes 

that come from north, that come from the south. At any point that 

you feel that our strategy does not accommodate our needs, please 

let us know. We truly look at this with a sense that we want to 

make sure that the right decisions are in fact made, and we believe 

the planning is in place. 

General Chiarelli, let me turn to also a press article, and I don’t 

want to catch you off guard because it’s one from today. If in fact 

you’re not up to speed on this, you certainly don’t have to comment. 

But it’s an article in Politico that reports that the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs supports a proposal by his staff to change the method 

for selection and timing of Army units deployed to Afghanistan. 

The article notes a concern that the current rotation schedule requires Army units to redeploy back to home stations just as they’re 

becoming familiar with the terrain and culture in Afghanistan. The 

proposed change would have the Army adopting a shorter deployment tour, similar to the Marines and Special Forces, but using the 

same units repeatedly to return to those familiar areas. This proposal seems to be a significant change from the Army’s traditional 

generation process. 

Do you care to comment on it at all? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, I would have to say that one of the 

things the Chief of Staff of the Army is trying to get the Army to 

is 27 months at home, 9 months deployed. We would like to go to 

the shorter deployment schedules that the marines have. But as I 

explained earlier today—I talked friction. Given our requirement 

for deployment right now, if we were to go to a 7-month deployVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
33 

ment as the marines have now, as many people have asked, that 

would double the amount of friction that we had. Rather than have 

31 brigades that are currently employed with 12-month deployments, I would be up between 35, 36, and 37 brigades needed to 

maintain that shorter deployment. 

So if you’re talking about large units with the current demand, 

if we were to make deployments shorter it would raise my friction 

and demand on the force, which could be an issue for us. 

Senator BURR. I think clearly this article alluded to the fact that 

the force size would be much smaller, but it would be repeated visits. I question, one, if that meets the target time back home. But 

two, this is quite a departure from the typical rotation that the 

Army’s looked at. 

General CHIARELLI. It would, Senator. I’d really have to have 

more details to be able to sit down and analyze it, to give you the 

kind of answer that I think would be the Army position. I’m sure 

we have people that are looking at it. I’m just not as familiar with 

this particular piece as I probably should be. 

Senator BURR. To both of you for a very brief response, if you 

will. The second portion of the President’s request for emergency 

supplementals, which totals $83 billion plus for overseas contingency, was transmitted to Congress last week. Understanding that 

pay, operation and maintenance funding to support deployed forces 

are at the top of the priority list, what other crucial needs are 

funded in this supplemental? 

General AMOS. Sir, I’ll be able to tell you precisely. We asked for 

$4.9 billion. A small portion of that is what we call blue in support 

of green, which is Navy. It’s money that we share kind of back and 

forth with the Navy with regards to aviation assets, because we 

share the aviation program with the Navy. But $4.9 billion. 

$1.5 billion of that was for military personnel. Those were just 

decremented, special pays, imminent danger pay, family separation 

allowance, that kind of thing. It also helps with the acceleration of 

our growth to 202,000, and we’re just about there. We’ll sustain 

that for the rest of the year. 

$1.1 billion in operation and maintenance (O&M) money to support those 29,000 marines that are forward deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

An investment of $1.9 billion for equipment; these are things 

such as new lightweight 155 howitzers, electronic organic destruction systems, new HMMWVs, the enhanced capability variant that 

I talked about, LAV production improvement plan, physical security, add-on armor kits, rockets, and 7-ton Medium Tactical Vehicle 

Replacements. 

Finally, the last thing was we actually bought a few airplanes 

with this. So four brand new Hueys, which are the new upgraded 

four-bladed, two-engine Huey, because we’ve lost a lot of those in 

combat. 

So it’s those kinds of things that fill out, flesh out that $4.9 billion. 

Senator BURR. Is it safe for us to assume, General, that any 

delay by Congress in approving this supplemental would have an 

impact on deployment? 

34 

General AMOS. Sir, well, here’s what we would do for the deployment, and that’s what you’re specifically asking. We would end up 

reprogramming other moneys to pay for that moneys for those 

29,000 forces. We would make that fit, and we would take that 

from other pieces of the budget if the OCO fund was not funded. 

Senator BURR. General Chiarelli? 

General CHIARELLI. We currently project we can make it through 

payday July 1. We would like to see the supplemental approved 

weeks prior to that, which would ensure that we had continuity of 

operations. That’s our current projection, payday July 1. 

A majority of that money is not only for operations downrange— 

and I totally agree with General Amos, we would make that happen. We would do whatever we had to to make that happen. But 

the supplemental is critical for us, as I know you know, Senator, 

for our reset of equipment, which is critical. When I have to turn 

around a combat aviation battalion in 11 months 22 days, it’s hard 

on the people, but it’s also hard to turn that equipment, particularly high tech equipment like helicopters, rapidly through the 

reset requirements it must go through. 

Senator BURR. The last is not a question; it’s an observation. 

When you represent the State that has the Pentagon and the 

Army, and I think the Pentagon and the Marine Corps, though 

California may challenge me on that one—the President’s made it 

clear that this is the last emergency supplemental, this is the last 

war funding outside of the normal budget process. I think that’s 

been clear. 

General Amos, you said in your written statement that the Marine Corps will need approximately $20 billion for replacing, repairing, rebuilding equipment to reset Marine Corps. General Chiarelli, 

you’ve been very open on what the needs are going to be. 

It concerns me greatly that at a time we have troops deployed 

in two theaters, we have hot spots around the world that on any 

given day could reach a heat hotter than where we currently have 

forces, that we would limit ourselves to what is projected to be a 

4 percent increase in the normal DOD process for the foreseeable 

future. I purposely am not asking this in the form of a question because I don’t think it’s fair to ask you to respond, but there is a 

disconnect on my part to believe that we can accommodate all of 

the things that are outside of just readiness today, but having a 

force strength with the equipment to be able to be trained and respond anywhere they might be needed if in fact we’re trying to do 

it with the limitations of an annual appropriations and limited to 

a 4 percent increase. 

I think it is impossible for us to expect that any service will have 

the equipment that they need, with the sufficient training that’s required, clearly anything in addition to the two theaters that we 

have active engagement in today. It makes me feel very questionable about just how much training on those potential other hot 

spots might be able to be accomplished, given the need to shepherd 

the funds and not necessarily devote them in a way that broadly 

places those assets there for the military. 

I want to once again thank both of you for your willingness to 

come in, but also for the great insight you’ve provided us. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

35 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Burr. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was fortunate enough to serve on the Armed Services Committee on the House side and to serve on the equivalent subcommittee, the Readiness Subcommittee, on the House side. So I’m 

excited to be able to serve in the same capacity over here, and I 

look forward to adding hopefully a little bit of value to the committee’s work with the ranking member and the chairman. 

Senator BAYH. I’m sure your experience in this area will prove 

to be invaluable. 

Senator UDALL. I appreciate the confidence. 

If I might turn to General Amos and General Chiarelli. General 

Chiarelli, I think the last time I saw you, and I wouldn’t expect you 

to remember, you were serving a de facto role as mayor of Baghdad. Thank you for your service in that situation. I hope we’re, as 

a country and as a military institution, taking advantage of what 

you learned about counterinsurgencies and the nationbuilding, if 

you will, that attends the kinds of challenges we face in places like 

Afghanistan and Iraq. 

If I might, I’d like to begin with a comment and then throw some 

questions your way. I understand you’re working on energy, that 

is the Army, and electricity grid security. I’m pleased to hear that 

because of the growing concerns over cyber and physical threats to 

the power grid and transformers. I don’t have any questions right 

now, but I look forward to working with you and building on the 

Army’s interest in energy security, and would like to offer my help 

in that regard. 

I know a number of Senators attended a closed briefing recently 

about cyber security, particularly when it comes to our grid. So 

thank you for that work. 

General CHIARELLI. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator UDALL. If I might, let me turn to an interview you gave 

to Defense News recently. In it you addressed the importance of 

evaluating lightweight equipment, weapons, and body armor for 

our soldiers in Afghanistan. Last week I was at Fort Carson in Colorado Springs, CO, and I heard specifically about the needs of our 

soldiers in Afghanistan when I met with Colonel Randy George, 

who is the Commander of the 4th BCT, the 4th I.D. 

He’s preparing to deploy to Afghanistan next month. One of the 

first topics we discussed was the need for lightweight equipment 

and body armor in Afghanistan. Colonel George and others with 

him that day agreed that speed is the best protection—I think 

that’s exactly how he put it—in a mountainous environment like 

Afghanistan, and that we should do anything we can to lighten our 

soldiers’ loads so the Taliban can’t outmaneuver them. 

They noted this debate about light versus heavy vehicles and 

body armor can get political, because soldiers’ families and the general public and those of us in Congress push for our soldiers, our 

marines, to have the strongest vehicles and body armor, even as 

that same equipment makes it more difficult in some settings for 

soldiers to get around. 

I think the Russians were at some points of that conflict in the 

80s in Afghanistan called ‘‘turtles’’ by the Mujahedin because they 

36 

were so burdened by their armor. If you could flip them on their 

backs, literally and figuratively, they were helpless. 

Could you share your views on how to strike that balance in Afghanistan, and as a follow-on do you believe the soldiers going to 

Afghanistan have all the lightweight equipment they need? Is the 

Rapid Equipping Force (REF) helping individual units deploying to 

Afghanistan? 

Forgive me for throwing three questions at you. 

General CHIARELLI. I’ll take the last one first. I think the REF 

has been absolutely critical in the Army’s ability to get lightweight 

equipment and look for commercial off-the-shelf solutions to what 

we’re doing. We’re getting ready to issue equipment to Randy’s brigade from May 11 to May 15 that will save anywhere from 13-plus 

pounds to 23-plus pounds, depending upon the position that the individual soldier has in the formation. A heavy machine gunner, 23- 

plus pounds; a rifleman, 14-plus pounds. 

We’ve made great strides with body armor, and the MBAB carrier, or the plate carrier that will carry our standard SAPI accept 

enhanced small arms protective insert plates, will save 3.77 

pounds. Randy’s will be the first Army unit that will have that 

ability. Now, he will go into Afghanistan with both sets of body 

armor. He will have his heavier improved outer tactical vest, which 

weighs 3.77 pounds more, and he will have the lightweight plate 

carrier. 

I would not pretend to try to make the call from Washington, 

DC, which he should wear. That’ll be up to him based on the conditions, both friendly and enemy, that he sees on the ground to make 

that decision. Our goal is to provide him with that weight savings 

as rapidly as we possibly can. 

The savings of upwards of 23 pounds I think would not have 

been possible without great support from AMC and our REF in getting commercial off-the-shelf things that we could rapidly get to 

soldiers to save weight. 

Senator UDALL. We talked at some length as well about where 

that responsibility lies and where the discretion lies when it comes 

to making those decisions. I hear you suggesting he would have a 

fair amount of discretion as to what kind of body armor and protective equipment he requires of his men and women in the field. 

General CHIARELLI. That’s exactly right. It’s our job to point out 

to him what the risk factor is, and we’ve worked very, very hard 

to lay that out and show him exactly what it would mean to go to 

the lighter body armor. But at the same time, when you’re at 8,000 

to 11,000 feet working in the terrain that he’s working in, I don’t 

think any of us down here near sea level can understand what it 

means in a soldier’s ability in the 10th month of a rotation to have 

almost 4 pounds less weight and agility to be able to fire his individual or crew-served weapon. 

That’s what the MBAB with SAPI plates gives him, is an ability 

that we had not been able to give him before. 

Senator UDALL. General, at the risk of sounding immodest, I 

would add to your comments. It also may be drawing into question 

my own personal judgment, but through the years I’ve participated 

in nine Himalayan climbing expeditions in that part of the world, 

and I went there for recreation and for other reasons. Some people 

37 

think I killed so many brain cells I went into politics, at those high 

altitudes, but that’s another discussion. 

But the idea of carrying, as I did, 45, 50, 55 pounds on your back 

in those high mountains and being shot at at the same time is 

something I don’t want to really contemplate. But I know the effect 

of even an additional pound on your ability to maneuver, to stay 

fit, to stay healthy. So I commend you for what you’re doing. 

There was also talk, by the way, about foot gear, and there are 

efforts under way to get the best possible foot gear for mountain 

environments, which weren’t necessarily standard Army issue. So 

I would encourage that flexibility as well. The Army and the Corps 

move on their feet, and if your feet aren’t healthy, you don’t have 

the right foot gear, you’re at a disadvantage. 

General CHIARELLI. The boot we’re going to be testing with 

Randy’s unit will save just over 2 pounds. But again, we want to 

get some good data on the reliability of that boot and whether or 

not soldiers feel that it does the job at 2 pounds lighter. But again, 

we’re not leaving any stone unturned to try to get at lighter gear. 

Senator UDALL. The new materials and technologies in mountain 

boots have gone from in the old days of 10 to 12 pounds a pair to 

a third of that. I think you can find an excellent pair of heavy duty 

boots for 4 pounds. They’re not cheap, but I know the Army and 

the Marines have some elements to bring to the table, including an 

interest in volume. So I would think that we could find a way to 

provide that great foot gear. 

Colonel George, by the way, is a phenomenal leader. I think you 

know that, but I just wanted for the record to note how impressed 

I am with him and his grasp of all of what we’re going to ask him 

to do over there. 

If I might, I’d like to turn to some testimony you gave earlier in 

the year about the alarming increases in suicides in the Army and 

how the Army is looking to address the crisis. Fort Carson has seen 

its rate increase and it’s a big concern of mine. You talked in that 

testimony about comprehensive soldier fitness, and you mentioned 

the Battlemind training with its pre- and post-deployment modules. You said it’s the only mental health and resilience program 

demonstrated to reduce symptoms of post-traumatic stress upon redeployment. 

I heard last week from General Graham, who by the way as well 

is just a phenomenal leader and American, and Colonel George and 

other leaders about the importance of this pre-deployment training. 

The Fourth BCT as I understand it is the first major Army unit 

to get this mental toughness training. They’ve received very good 

feedback. They suggested that such training might be conducted all 

the way across the Army, perhaps expanding the Battlemind program and setting up traditional pilots all over the country. 

Would you care to comment on such training and where else we 

might apply it? 

General CHIARELLI. Brigadier General Rhonda Cornum is running an effort for the Army, total soldier fitness resiliency training. 

Battlemind will be a key and critical piece of that. In fact, we currently have train the trainers being trained as we speak to go out 

throughout the Army to help provide this as part of her overall program, which we hope to roll out here in the next couple of months. 

38 

It is a critical piece of suicide prevention, as are so many things, 

as I found out. 

I was not able to visit Fort Carson on my recent trip because the 

snow was so bad there that Mark asked me not to come in because 

we’d pull in additional soldiers, but I did meet Mark in Fort Lewis 

and he briefed me on some of the efforts that he has going on at 

Fort Carson. But it is a multi-disciplinary approach that we have 

to go after this with. 

We just published our campaign plan this week. It’s a lot of process, but it’s process that I’m personally driving, 250 taskers that 

we are driving through the service by 1 September, some of them 

very, very difficult things, to get at this problem. We are committed 

to driving the rate of suicide down throughout the Army. 

Senator UDALL. General, I need to work with you on that. Thank 

you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Thune I understand is on a tight time line, so, John, if 

there are questions you want to submit for the record, we’d be 

happy to take those. I know you’re multi-tasking here today. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BAYH. A challenge we can all relate to. 

Senator THUNE. I thank General Chiarelli and General Amos for 

your service to our country. Be sure you convey our appreciation 

to all of those that you work with. 

Just a couple of quick questions, if I might. It got touched on a 

little bit earlier by Senator Burr, but I want to come back to this 

whole process now of going away from supplementals and including 

everything in the annual defense budget. Does that create in your 

judgment concerns about areas that might suffer without the flexibility that supplemental funding provides? 

I’m sort of curious about your general view of how we have done 

this in the past and the way that we’ve responded to specific needs 

that come up, and the way that we have funded operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan through supplemental budget requests, and now 

trying to absorb all of that in the annual general budget process. 

Do you anticipate any issues related to that in terms of the needs 

that you have? 

General AMOS. Sir, I’ll take the first stab at it and Pete can clean 

up the battlefield after I’m done. 

About 2 years ago, the Commandant made a purposeful decision 

to try to get as much what we would call things that would be 

above the line, things that we would not normally be able to pay 

for in what we call the baseline budget, things that would be in the 

supplementals—to try to force ourselves on a diet so that we could 

bring some of that supplemental kind of things into the baseline. 

We’ve been successful on things such as manpower. The typical 

cost of manpower in this fiscal year alone, when we finish the end 

of fiscal year 2009, the 202,000 marines that Congress has given 

us authorization to grow to and money to buy them and all that 

stuff will in 2010 and beyond be forced into the baseline. In other 

words, we will not be trying to pay manpower bills with 

supplementals. 

39 

So that’s what I’m talking about, forcing ourselves to get on a 

diet. You can only do that so much when you’re wearing equipment 

out. If we were in static, if this was 1978 or 1985 and our equipment and our people were static, then we could probably figure out 

how to keep everything within a baseline. But when you’re getting 

it destroyed, you’re wearing it out at seven times the rate that you 

paid, that you programmed for that equipment, and you have the 

extra O&M costs of combat in two theaters, or one theater but in 

two major areas of that theater, it will be difficult. It will be very 

difficult to do this and put it in the baseline, unless the baseline 

itself increased, if that makes sense. 

Senator THUNE. It certainly does. 

General? 

General CHIARELLI. I would echo those comments. We’ve been 

able to move our military personnel into the base, but two things 

that concern me: the first is one that we just talked Rapid Equipping Task Force. Their money that they use to go find these offthe-shelf solutions, to be able to go and lighten the soldiers’ load 

from 14 to 23 pounds, is directly out of the supplemental or OCO 

funding, and I have to find a place for that in the base because I 

think they do such critical work and it moved us ahead so rapidly. 

I also worry about reset. So much of what we have in the supplemental is in fact reset. I think that General Cody and General 

Casey have testified long before me that we see that reset requirement going on for 2 to 3 years after we bring the last forces back. 

It just takes time to rebuild that equipment and get it back. I 

would only echo Jim’s comments about how difficult that would be. 

Senator THUNE. I appreciate the answer to that. What I hear you 

saying is it’s going to be very difficult to do this in the annual baseline—a question that if I might have him answer for the record, 

having to do with the different terrain that you’re seeing in Afghanistan, the way that the infrastructure needs, the poor roads 

and everything, unique requirements relative to Iraq. General 

Chiarelli, if you could identify additional equipment requirements 

that would better serve our forces in Afghanistan that are currently underfunded or unfunded, I’d be interested if you would at 

least furnish that for the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BAYH. We’ll include your questions in the record, Senator. I would ask, gentlemen, if your staff could prepare some answers for Senator Thune. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Udall, anything else from you? 

Senator UDALL. No, thank you. 

Senator BAYH. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This is the first 

hearing that I’ve had the privilege of chairing as the subcommittee 

chairman, and I want this to be a very cooperative relationship. 

Consider us to be your partners, and I am well aware of the demands on your time that hearings like this present to both you and 

your staff, so we will attempt to make the times we have you up 

here modest and no more than necessary. That’s number one. 

Number two, while there’s much too much partisan divisiveness 

in Washington, I don’t want that to be any part of this subcommittee. We’re not really Democrats or Republicans here. We’re 

40 

American. We want to make sure that you and your soldiers have 

everything that you need to carry out the missions that our country 

is asking you to fulfill. 

I look forward to working with Senator Burr and members on 

both sides of the aisle in cooperation with you to accomplish that 

mission. 

I’d like to thank you for your and your staffs’ time today, and 

look forward to working together. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH

ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE BRIGADES AND SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, last month in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Petraeus spoke about 

Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) which will train the Afghan National 

Army and Police forces. He specifically mentioned the 4th Brigade Combat Team 

(BCT) of the 82nd Airborne Division, and the marines deploying to Regional Command-South area. What is the additional end strength requirement for your forces 

as we see an increasing trend and operations tempo (OPTEMPO) with respect to 

AABs and Security Force Assistance (SFA)? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps’ planned reduced footprint in Iraq will offset 

force sourcing stress even with the increasing requirement in Afghanistan. The authorized 202,000 active duty end strength will be sufficient to meet 1:2 Active Duty 

dwell and 1:5 Reserve Force dwell in the mid-term. The Marine Corps will be challenged to meet these goals in the near term because of residual Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) requirements concurrent with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

build-up. However, this would not be mitigated by even immediate additional end 

strength authorization because of the training pipeline. 

General CHIARELLI. There is no impact on the Army’s needed end strength, just 

some internal organizational changes to meet SFA mission requirements. Currently, 

the Army has not formally templated an AAB augmentation package for OEF. However, we do have a template for Iraq. Organizational changes needed to mission an 

Army BCT as an AAB is the augmentation of 48 field grade officers, the attachment 

of a 15-Soldier Facilities Engineer Detachment, and a 16-person interagency Civil 

Capacity Team. The specific ranks of the 48 field grade officers is 4 colonels, 20 lieutenant colonels, and 24 majors; and the specifics of the Engineer Detachment and 

Civil Capacity Team is yet to be fully defined. These additions to the BCT will allow 

the brigade commander to internally task organize to meet SFA mission requirements. Even though the Iraq AAB package has not been formally adopted for OEF, 

the Afghanistan package will most likely look about the same. 

2. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, where is the SFA or AAB 

doctrine with respect to specific mission requirements and characteristics? 

General AMOS. The baseline of ‘‘advise and assist’’ strategy outlined by General 

Petraeus in the counterinsurgency (COIN) manual has been incorporated in the Marine Corps guidance to operational commanders and the supporting establishment 

to certify Blocks I–IV in preparation for deployment to Central Command 

(CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). While ‘‘train and assist’’ is not and will 

not be a USMC core competency, it is a necessary skill for the current fight. The 

Marine Corps will continue to adapt predeployment training to prepare for the current fight based on lessons learned. Additionally, at no time in recent history have 

we had so many staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers that have first 

hand experience in this type of combat. After 8 years of war, clearly our training 

commands are filled with marines that understand these principles. 

General CHIARELLI. Army Regulation 11–31, Army International Security Cooperation Policy, establishes policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures 

for the planning, integration, programming, budgeting and execution of Army security cooperation activities. 

The Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, KS, is the Army proponent 

for all doctrine related to SFA and in May 2009 published Field Manual (FM) 3– 

07.1, Security forces Assistance to provide a conceptual framework for Army forces 

to conduct SFA within the context of full spectrum operations. It addresses the operVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
41 

ational and tactical levels while focusing on the modular brigade in the conduct of 

SFA activities. 

The doctrine of FM 3–07.1 is nested within that of FM 3–07, Stability Operations, 

published by CAC in October 2008. 

CAC is also responsible for the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Center for 

International SFA and, in July 2008, published the Commander’s Handbook for SFA 

to distill and distribute best practices and lessons learned from current SFA operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

3. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiareeli, is the SFA or AAB functions an additional duty or a core competency of ground forces today? 

General AMOS. As outlined in question 2 above, ‘‘advise and assist’’ remains a necessary skill-set for both the current fight and the ‘‘long war’’ as outlined by the Secretary of Defense. However, the Marine Corps fundamentally remains a unique expeditionary force employable via amphibious shipping or committed in conjunction 

with a decision to employ the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) assets. While the 

Marine Corps will always adapt to meet the Nations needs, SFA/AAB functions currently performed do not alter our Title 10 mission. 

General CHIARELLI. Stability operations are a core competency of all Army formations and SFA is a component part of stability operations. 

Army FM 3–0, Operations, establishes full spectrum operations as the Army’s fundamental operational concept that Army forces combine offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint 

force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to generate 

decisive results. 

Army organizations assigned to operational missions will, as part of their preparatory training in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, be organized, 

trained, and equipped to perform these missions. Brigades assigned SFA missions 

will be fully prepared for that mission prior to deployment. 

END STRENGTH

4. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, last month, both of you 

testified at a Personnel Subcommittee hearing on suicides. There, you both noted 

that one significant contributing factor to the rise in suicides in your Services is the 

stress on the force caused by lengthy and frequent deployments. That same day, the 

Secretary of Defense announced he had approved a plan to end the Army’s practice 

of stop loss. I think we can all agree that mobilization and dwell time goals are very 

important to the overall health of the force—but we are still falling short of meeting 

those goals. In your statements today, you acknowledged that until the demand for 

forces decreases, these challenges will remain. General Chiarelli, the target end 

strength of 547,400 by fiscal year 2011 is projected to be achieved 2 years earlier 

than expected, and some in Congress are even calling for an additional 30,000 beyond the currently authorized 547,400. General Amos, similarly in your opening 

statement you spoke of the Marine Corps also achieving its end strength goal of 

202,000 2 years ahead of schedule. What is the total number of troops necessary 

to reduce the operational demand upon the Army and Marine Corps, and what is 

the estimated cost of rebuilding and transforming both Services? 

General AMOS. The Commandant continues to stress that the growth to 202,000 

active-duty marines will enable the Corps to meet current and future challenges in 

an increasingly demanding operational environment. As stated before, the Marine 

Corps is 2 years ahead of schedule with the aggregate increase in end strength 

growth to 202,000. This growth can be attributed to three factors: quality recruiting, 

exceptional retention levels, and reduced attrition. The accelerated growth in aggregate numbers has met the end strength requirement; however, time is still needed 

to implement the original 202,000 build plan. Specifically, time is required for procuring equipment, building permanent facilities and shaping the inventory of the 

force. A standing Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities Working Group is overseeing the implementation 

and synchronization of this plan. This working group which consists of a cross section of the Commandant’s staff and Marine forces commanders continues to seek efficiencies in accelerating the build plan. 

The Marine Corps estimates that it will cost approximately $33 billion between 

fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2013 to fund the incremental costs of growing the 

force. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army does not have control over operational demand, but 

has improved our ability to meet the demand we are experiencing now and anticiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
42 

pating in the future. With national leadership support, our Army has achieved our 

manpower growth goals in all components during 2009, although we will not complete growing the number of brigade combat teams (BCTs) to 73 (45 Active component (AC) and 28 Reserve component (RC)) until 2011. This growth in the force, 

combined with reduced operational deployments from 15 months to 12 months, has 

eased some of the strain on soldiers and families. The current AC BCT boots on the 

ground to dwell ratio is about 1 year deployed to 16 months at home or 1:1.3. This 

is based on an OIF/OEF demand for 15 BCTs (AC). Based on the Grow the Army 

objective of 45 BCTs (AC) and a reduction in global demands, we anticipate reaching 

a 2 year dwell in 2011. So long as we continue the trend of increasing dwell, stress 

on the Army will stabilize and diminish over time. 

To rebuild our force, we are providing additional support to soldiers and families; 

repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing equipment; and retraining soldiers. In the effort to transform our force, we have converted 83 percent of our units to modular 

formations, accelerated delivery of advanced technologies, kept Base Realignment 

and Closure and restationing on schedule, and developed relevant doctrine for leaders to operate effectively in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 

environments. We are continuing efforts to build and sustain Reserve component 

readiness and to increase predictability of deployments for soldiers, their families, 

employers, and communities. 

The Army has sufficient support in the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget to meet 

projected operational demand and to rebuild and transform the force—all while preserving our All-Volunteer Force. 

5. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, how will the Army balance 

near-term operational risks with the need for prudent long-term investments? 

General AMOS. The OPTEMPO of OIF and OEF has stressed the Marine Corps. 

The land-based nature and irregular warfare (IW) environment increased the operational risk that the Marine Corps had to accept in its core competencies of amphibious operations, high-end combined arms capability, and MPF operations in support 

of contingency operations. Those factors degraded our ability to source combatant 

commander requirements, particularly in shaping operations and contingency response outside the CENTCOM area of operations. To mitigate near-term risks of the 

current fight while developing the Marine Corps of the future, the Commandant is 

addressing three areas to ensure a Marine Corps which will engage in the full range 

of military operations whenever the Nation calls. 

First, we are successfully right-sizing the force with an authorized end-strength 

expansion to 202,000. A right-sized Marine Corps not only reduces the stress on the 

individual marine and sailor by increasing time between deployments, but it also 

reduces the stress on the Marine Corps as a whole and enables the second area: 

providing high-end unit and individual training. 

We are initiating the Combined Arms Exercise Next program at Marine Corps Air 

Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, CA, which integrates COIN specific 

skills with intensive combined arms training, significantly enhancing core 

warfighting functions for all elements of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

(MAGTF). We are revitalizing our naval amphibious competency which will lead to 

full scale Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)-level amphibious exercises. We are 

developing the capability to conduct large-scale MAGTF exercises within a joint, 

interagency, and coalition context. We are engaged in training and education programs to build the capacity of allied and partner nations, as well as developing the 

cultural and language ability of our own force, which allow us to shape the environment and execute our mission more effectively. The Marine Corps is enhancing 

training capabilities gained for the current fight in COIN Operations, Civil-Military 

Operations, Advisor Training, Urban Operations, Intelligence Fusion, and Information Operations in order to better employ our forces across the full range of military 

operations. 

The third area, modernization of the force, speaks more directly to the question 

of prudent long-term investment. We are committed to providing marines and sailors with the very best warfighting equipment and capabilities with which to train 

and fight so that they are ready, relevant, and capable. Sustaining current operations requires the Marine Corps to ‘‘modernize on the march’’ by replacing gear 

consumed in combat while fielding next-generation technology. We are providing our 

warfighters with the best personal protective equipment—including light body 

armor, lightweight helmets, and flame-resistant organizational gear—and continue 

to procure Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and up-armored 

High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) for current operations 

while investigating lighter weight MRAPs and Light Tactical Vehicles (LTVs) to better support our expeditionary posture. We are moving ahead with programs to imVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
43 

prove our fire support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and command and control capabilities. The majority of Marine Corps aviation assets are legacy airframes that are no longer in production, and aircraft procurement programs 

for the MV–22, KC–130J, F–35B, UH–1Y, AH–1Z, and CH–53K are critical to the 

MAGTF of the future. 

Right-sizing, training, and modernization are mitigating our near-term operational risks while providing for the long-term investment that will build the balanced MAGTF—America’s 911 force—to meet the demands of the future security environment. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army does not have control over operational demand, but 

has improved our ability to meet the demand we are experiencing now and anticipating in the future. With national leadership support, our Army has achieved our 

manpower growth goals in all components during 2009, although we will not complete growing the number of BCTs to 73 (45 Active component and 28 Reserve component) until 2011. This growth in the force, combined with reduced operational deployments from 15 months to 12 months, has eased some of the strain on soldiers 

and families. 

To rebuild our force, we are providing additional support to soldiers and families; 

repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing equipment; and retraining soldiers. In the effort to transform our force, we have converted 83 percent of our units to modular 

formations, accelerated delivery of advanced technologies, kept Base Realignment 

and Closure and restationing on schedule, and developed relevant doctrine for leaders to operate effectively in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 

environments. We are continuing efforts to build and sustain Reserve component 

readiness and to increase predictability of deployments for soldiers, their families, 

employers, and communities. 

The Army has sufficient support in the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget to meet 

projected operational demand and to rebuild and transform the force—all while preserving our All-Volunteer Force. 

STRATEGIC DEPTH

6. Senator BAYH. General Chiarelli, General Schoomaker used to talk a lot about 

restoring the strategic depth of the Army. He first spoke of it several years ago and 

I wonder if we are any closer today than we were then. For example, a field artillery 

unit could feasibly report C4, yet then deploy to conduct convoy security operations. 

While they will likely perform that mission with success, it is a directed mission, 

not their core function. Is it possible to achieve given the current pace of deployments? If so, how? 

General CHIARELLI. Strategic depth is the Army’s ability to prosecute another contingency operation. This requires the force to be full spectrum capable. Currently, 

demand is exceeding the Army’s supply and we are consuming readiness as quickly 

as we can provide it to the force. Additionally, unit dwell time has only permitted 

time for units to train on COIN or their directed mission. The Chief of Staff of the 

Army’s guidance is that units with at least 18 months of dwell utilize 90 days to 

focus on conventional tasks-combined with the COIN skill sets enable units to be 

full spectrum ready. Units with less than 18 months of dwell remain focused on 

training to their COIN/directed mission. Rebalancing the Army, coupled with a decrease in global demand will provide units and soldiers more dwell time to train for 

full spectrum operations, thus restoring the Army’s strategic depth-enabling the 

Army to meet the challenges of the uncertain future. In order to meet the dwell requirement that will allow us to rebuild strategic depth, boots on the ground (BOG) 

to dwell will need to be 1:3 for the Active component and 1:5 for the Reserve component. 

7. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, if the preparedness of our 

forces has come at the expense of strategic depth for some potential future missions, 

how does this affect our National Military Strategy (NMS) and our ability to respond to various operation plans and unforeseen domestic disasters? What level of 

risk are we accepting by doing so? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps’ ability to respond to other contingencies outside 

of the CENTCOM area of operations is facing increased risk due to degraded home 

station readiness and a limited ability to adequately train for the full spectrum of 

operations due to the demand for Marine forces. The military risk to our NMS is 

that the Marine Corps may not have the people, equipment, or training at the right 

place and time to meet combatant commanders’ needs. The Marine Corps’ ability 

44 

to meet operational plan timelines could be delayed, possibly resulting in an increased loss of life to friendly forces. 

General CHIARELLI. Preparedness or readiness for full spectrum operations provides our strategic depth. The Army ascribes to creating general purpose combat 

forces that can operate across the spectrum of conflict from disaster relief and peace 

keeping operations to general war. Currently, unit dwell time is only sufficient for 

units to train on COIN/directed mission and not conventional tasks. Although the 

required tasks we ask of our soldiers in irregular warfare and COIN operations are 

applicable across the spectrum of conflict, there is some conventional training not 

being conducted for other operational themes on the spectrum of conflict. The Chief 

of Staff of the Army guidance is that units with less than 18 months of dwell remain 

focused on training to their COIN/directed mission. Units with at least 18 months 

of dwell utilize 90 days to focus on conventional tasks and remainder on the COIN/ 

directed mission. The Army maintains a global reaction force that could be committed to an emerging contingency. Rebalancing the Army, coupled with a decrease 

in global demand will provide units and soldiers more dwell time to train for full 

spectrum operations, thus restoring the Army’s strategic depth and increasing our 

ability to respond to an uncertain security environment. Until then, given the lower 

readiness of our next-to-deploy forces in full spectrum operations, it could take 

longer to execute contingency plans in accordance with planning timelines. In such 

cases, joint capabilities will mitigate those ground force capabilities delayed by force 

generation timelines. The Army can respond to domestic disasters and has designated units prepared to execute this mission. 

8. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, given the current operating environment and focus of training on preparing for ongoing operations, how 

does the Army and Marine Corps plan to maintain the full spectrum of combat 

skills that could be needed if it was called upon to respond to a crisis outside of 

Iraq or Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. Our Training and Education Continuum for both current and future operations begins with entry level training, ascends through formal schools, 

home station training, Professional Military Education, and culminates with a final 

unit Pre-Deployment Training Program assessment. This ascending-levels-of-competency approach allows marines of all ranks to be trained at the right level, at the 

right time, and the right place. To maintain the full spectrum of combat skills, the 

Marine Corps is developing a MAGTF Training Program that includes individual, 

unit and MAGTF component training, and integration with joint, interagency and 

multinational organizations in order to prepare multi-capable MAGTFs for expeditionary operations against hybrid threats in complex environments. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army has adopted a warfighting doctrine (FM 3–0, Operations) that recognizes contemporary operations require a balance of offense, defense, and stability operations, regardless of where they occur along the spectrum 

of conflict. At the same time, the Army has re-designed our approach to training 

so that units build general proficiency in the fundamental tasks required of full 

spectrum operations (i.e. offense, defense, and stability operations). Proficiency in 

full spectrum operations conducted in Iraq or Afghanistan provides a foundation 

from which units will be able to quickly prepare for full spectrum operations in another theater or for different points on the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, the 

Army has published training guidance which, as time between deployments increases, requires units to initially spend time training on fundamental tasks for full 

spectrum operations focused more broadly than the specific mission they have been 

given. Furthermore, the scope of Army professional military education continues to 

prepare leaders for operations anywhere along the spectrum of conflict. Finally, the 

Army has embraced adaptability as an important capability of our force generation 

process. Once a mission requirement is identified the Army works diligently to support unit preparations by using mobile training teams and distributed learning to 

fill any locally unavailable shortcomings. 

9. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, have you analyzed the extent of skill degradation given the shift in focus and the time it will take to rebuild 

and retrain? 

General AMOS. Yes, our Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM) has conducted 

a study analyzing the extent of core skill degradation and time to retrain for several 

unit types. Currently, our Training and Education Command is sponsoring a Training Reset Study, which, when completed in February 2010, will provide a recommended training posture for the future. 

General CHIARELLI. Yes; our analysis was based on interviews and feedback from 

officers and NCOs, and senior leaders in the field. It has been a number of years 

45 

since our forces have had the time to train on the broader range of operations across 

the spectrum of conflict, rather than only on the current fight. force modularity has 

contributed to the broader capabilities of our units. As the Army continues to reduce 

forces in OIF, we eventually expect to realize a modest increase in time that units 

have for training between deployments with corresponding improvement in skill 

degradation. As units experience more time between deployments they can address 

skill degradation through reinvestment of our combat experienced soldiers and leaders, a doctrine that instills the broader focus associated with full spectrum operations, and a progressive combined arms training strategy that rapidly rebuilds and 

retrains our units following combat rotations. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERFORMANCE REPORT

10. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, last month the Department released the Fiscal Year 2008 Performance Report where it assessed the strategic goals and objectives of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Of the five 

goals, goal #3, reshape the defense enterprise, evaluated the readiness of the Armed 

forces. The report rated Army land forces readiness as ‘‘effective, last evaluated in 

2004’’ while Marine Corps expeditionary warfare was rated as only ‘‘moderately effective, last evaluated in 2006’’. Do you have any updates to this report and how 

it affects your overall readiness? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps is based on an expeditionary mindset—providing MAGTFs that are fast, austere, and lethal. The ability to deploy rapidly to 

any clime and place and commence operations with minimal existing infrastructure 

is one of the primary reasons the Marine Corps is ideally suited for the Afghan theater. 

Seven years of sustained land combat have degraded the Corps’ critical core competencies. The Marine Corps expeditionary capability depends upon our amphibious 

nature and combined arms integration as much as our ability to deploy via strategic 

lift. Our readiness levels in our traditional core competencies have clearly decreased, 

primarily driven by the high OPTEMPO and demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is accurate, then, to describe our expeditionary warfare capabilities as 

‘moderately effective’ since two key pillars of that capability have been severely limited. 

The Marine Corps maintains amphibious capability primarily through the regular 

deployment of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). This trains one battalion, 

squadron, and logistics combat element at a time, but does not provide the same 

experience needed to coordinate a brigade, or larger, sized amphibious assault. We 

have attempted to maintain a core of trained leaders via professional military education, and through involvement with amphibious exercises and studies sponsored 

by the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group-Atlantic. With a decrease in demand 

in CENTCOM and an increase in dwell time, the Marine Corps will be able to provide amphibious operations training to those units and higher headquarters organizations that have not had those training opportunities in the recent years. 

As we accomplish the Corps’ end strength growth, continue the reset and modernization initiatives, and achieve balance across our three Marine Expeditionary 

Forces, our ability to train and regain our core competencies will be enhanced. This 

in turn will improve the readiness of the Marine Corps. 

General CHIARELLI. The 2004 Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) evaluation 

of Army Land forces Readiness was the source for the fiscal year 2008 Performance 

Report effective rating. The PART was developed by the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) in 2002 to assess and improve program performance so that the Federal Government can achieve better results. A PART evaluation helps identify a program’s management strengths and weaknesses to inform decisions to make the program more effective. The PART looks at all factors that affect and reflect program 

performance including purpose and design, strategic planning, program management, and program results. 

The 2004 assessment was the last full PART evaluation completed by OMB for 

Army Land forces Readiness. The Army provides semi-annual updates to the budget 

and performance results for this program. The semi-annual updates do not include 

updates on program purpose and design, strategic planning, and program management. OMB is currently revising guidance on performance measurement and the use 

of PART evaluations of Army programs. 

The Army Land forces Readiness program contributes to the live and virtual 

training that units complete at home station and combat training centers. The primary PART performance measure tracks the OPTEMPO program execution. Execution of OPTEMPO enables units to achieve a high level of readiness, sufficient to 

46 

prepare them for COIN operations. OPTEMPO is measured using an annual mile 

metric for training performance and establishes the baseline metric (miles) units 

execute each year in order to maintain combat proficiency. 

The Army continues to train effectively to meet current operational requirements, 

as reflected in the fiscal year 2008 Performance Report rating as ‘‘effective, last 

evaluated in 2004.’’ 

FUNDING RESET OPERATIONS

11. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, I believe our depots and 

arsenals are a national treasure and provide with a truly unique capability critical 

to our national security and the workers there continue to do a tremendous job. 

Since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have begun, reset operations have been 

funded mainly in the supplemental. This trend frankly disturbs me because for several years now the Services have underfunded their annual depot maintenance requirements and punted them to the supplemental. We will need to fully fund reset 

for years after we are out of Iraq and Afghanistan. When will the Army and Marine 

Corps fully fund reset operations into the base budget request? 

General AMOS. Reset costs have not been in the baseline budget because both 

Congress and OSD have generally agreed that war related costs should be a part 

of supplementals. As part of that trend, our war related cost depot maintenance 

funding requirements for fiscal year 2010 are included in our fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request. Because we are resetting equipment to 

support current and future combat needs we’re committed to fully funding our depot 

maintenance requirements to ensure that we Reset and Reconstitute the force as 

quick as possible. I would strongly advise against trying to fund both our Rest and 

Modernization effort within the current baseline budget funding levels, especially 

while we’re still fighting. To do so would put at risk our ability to recover from this 

conflict at the expense of modernization necessary to meet future threats. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army expects that our reset requirements will be in the 

range of $13 to $14 billion per year as long as we have forces deployed and for 2 

to 3 years thereafter to ensure readiness for the future. Reset is a cost of war and 

therefore we expect that our reset requirements will not integrate into the base 

budget until 2 to 3 years after the end of the war and forces redeploy. Beyond that 

timeframe, the extent to which reset will be funded in the base budget will be determined through future administration and congressional guidance. 

12. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, are the Army depots and 

Marine Corps logistics bases operating a full capacity and are they experiencing any 

backlogs or constraints with respect to their throughput capability to repair equipment? 

General AMOS. We’re not operating at full capacity, but that’s mostly because we 

don’t have all our equipment back yet. We’re prepared and committed to ensuring 

that the depots are funded to meet the increased demand caused by the coming retrograde of our equipment from Iraq. 

We do have several constraints that we’ve addressed in our fiscal year 2010 Unfunded Programs List. These include our capacity to offload equipment at Blount 

Island Command and process it for transportation to our depots. There are four 

projects worth $40 million that would help us increase capacity and speed this transition effort. In addition, we’ve highlighted one vehicle repair facility in need of improvements at Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow that could also expand our capacity to quickly repair combat vehicles. 

General CHIARELLI. None of the Army’s depots are operating at full capacity. The 

depots’ current production rates are based on the rate of return of equipment from 

theater and the Army’s need to equip units for training and deployment. The depots 

can increase production if the rate of equipment return accelerates. 

The only above normal depot maintenance backlog is approximately 500 Medium 

Tactical Vehicles. This backlog is not due to depot capacity; it is due to repair parts 

shortages. The repair parts issues are being worked with the manufacturer and the 

backlog will begin to reduce starting in June 2009. 

13. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, recently Congress received the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request which asks for $11.6 billion to reconstitute the force in addition to the $11.6 billion from the fiscal year 2009 bridge 

appropriation. Are the amounts requested by the Army and Marine Corps sufficient 

and executable by the depots and logistics bases or do you require additional resources? 

47 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps’ reset and reconstitution funding requests in the 

fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 OCO are sufficient and executable by our depots. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army’s fiscal year 2009 supplemental request of $13.3 

billion is sufficient and executable. Our industrial base, depots and original equipment manufacturers have the capacity and resources to accomplish our Reset requirements. 

The Army requested $13.3 billion for Reset as a part of the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental Request. This is comprised of $7.9 billion for Operations and Sustainment 

funds as well as $5.4 billion for Procurement. As part of the fiscal year 2009 Bridge 

Supplemental, the Army received $9.8 billion for Reset; $7.9 billion for Operations 

and Sustainment, but only $1.9 billion for Procurement. 

The Army has requested the remaining $3.5 billion for Reset Procurement in the 

fiscal year 2009 Main Supplemental. This request funds the remaining procurement 

of battle losses/washouts. 

RESET PILOT PROGRAM

14. Senator BAYH. General Chiarelli, last year the Army began the Reset Pilot 

program which aimed to validate the reset process and restore capabilities of eight 

Active component BCTs and five Reserve component BCTs returning from deployment. Last year, Daniel Egbert, the force Management Program Manager for G–3 

and lead integrator for the reset pilot said, ‘‘Standardizing the reset processes is key 

to restoring balance in the Army and maintaining the quality of capabilities the 

Army provides the Nation.’’ Has the Reset Pilot program succeeded in this regard, 

and what is the standard for reset? 

General CHIARELLI. The Reset Pilot has been a success. The Reset Pilot was established in order to implement a process Army-wide to restore deployed units to 

a level of personnel and equipment readiness that permits resumption of training 

for future missions and identify how the Army institution needed to adapt to support units in ARFORGEN. The Army developed a set of metrics to track execution 

of tasks while a unit is in Reset. The fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 pilot 

units have demonstrated that accomplishing reset tasks sets the conditions for unit 

manning and equipping and affords time for the soldiers to begin to focus on individual and collective training. The Reset Pilot efforts continue to focus on sustaining 

the supply of ready forces to the combatant commanders while the Army adapts our 

institutional systems and processes to make future reset efforts more effective and 

efficient. 

15. Senator BAYH. General Chiarelli, how will the Army plan and implement reset 

as a standard practice? 

General CHIARELLI. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) established 

a Reset Pilot to implement a process Army-wide to restore deployed units to a level 

of personnel and equipment readiness that will permit resumption of training for 

future missions. The success of the 30 units in the fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 

2009 Reset Pilots has demonstrated that reset tasks can be accomplished, and that 

execution of those tasks facilitates the building of unit readiness. Many of the ‘‘best 

business practices’’ realized by the pilot units have already been applied to the rest 

of the Army through publication of follow on HQDA directives, effective on January 

15, 2009. Soon the Army will publish its new Readiness regulation which will codify 

reset reporting requirements for all Army units. 

16. Senator BAYH. General Chiarelli, has the pilot program been independently 

certified or was this purely an Army decision? 

General CHIARELLI. General Casey began his tenure as the Chief of Staff, Army 

by identifying four imperatives by which the Army will achieve balance by 2011. 

The Reset Imperative was independently developed by the Army Staff as a mechanism to prepare our soldiers, families, units, and equipment for future deployments 

and other contingencies. Reset Pilot efforts continue to focus on sustaining the supply of ready forces to combatant commanders while the Army adapts institutional 

systems and processes to make future force Generation efforts more effective and 

efficient. 

17. Senator BAYH. General Amos, as you know the Marine Corps takes almost an 

entirely opposite approach from the Army when it comes to reset, favoring approximately a 90 percent procurement and replacement strategy versus a 10 percent 

48 

reset strategy. Does the Marine Corps intend to continue in this manner of procurement versus reset strategy? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps does have a different approach to reset (repair/ 

replace) than the Army as a result of the service’s employment of forces. When OIF 

began, the Marine Corps ground equipment inventory was not designed to equip or 

sustain the unique demands of a 7-year land war. As a result, the Marine Corps 

efficiently managed inventory by maintaining unit sets of equipment in theater at 

the expense of home station units and strategic programs. There was not enough 

equipment to rotate 100 percent of the forward deployed inventory, therefore the 

service relied upon unit maintenance, contractor support, Army maintenance capabilities in theater, and selective rotation of equipment for depot maintenance. As a 

result, the bulk of equipment deployed to OIF has been in combat for an extended 

period of time. 

Initially, the Marine Corps relied more heavily on procurement for reset. Today, 

as the Marine Corps continues to execute reset, every piece of equipment redeploying from OIF is deliberately inspected to determine the appropriate reset action. 

Once inspected, equipment is repaired, replaced, or in some cases, receives no reset 

at all. The Marine Corps reset strategy remains flexible in order to maintain and 

sustain the demands for equipment and ensure that we are postured for the uncertainty of the future. 

18. Senator BAYH. General Amos, what is the strategy with respect to forces in 

Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps will continue to rotate our forces in Afghanistan 

and fall in on equipment sets maintained in theater. Our force deployment and 

equipping strategy is no different in Iraq, and will be even more appropriate in Afghanistan. The logistics of moving equipment in and out of Afghanistan is much 

more challenging than Iraq, since Afghanistan is a land locked country with a 

primitive infrastructure, extreme weather, and difficult terrain. Combined with a 

highly kinetic environment, we believe this strategy is the right approach to managing our forces and equipment. 

AFGHANISTAN AGRICULTURE AND COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS

19. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, last month in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Petraeus commented 

on the importance of the National Guard agricultural teams operating out of 

Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. Their mission to provide Afghan farmers with alternatives to poppy is critical to success there. How are these teams structured, 

trained, and supported in order to fulfill CENTCOM’s requirements? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps does not have agricultural teams in its inventory. 

General CHIARELLI. The primary mission of the Afghan Agri-business Development Teams (ADTs) is to bridge to future expanded interagency support, from the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID). The teams partner with USDA, USAID, and other agencies 

to ensure maximum use of resources and deconfliction of projects. Teams are composed of 34 security forces soldiers, 10-person agriculture teams with specialties in 

marketing, soil, agronomy, horticulture, animal husbandry, and food processing. The 

rest of the team is a headquarters element with combat medics, mechanics, and engineers. The teams train in their home State then deploy to Camp Atterbury, IN, 

for more formal training prior to theater deployment. The ADTs are operationallycontrolled by the brigade level task force with administrative control by the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). 

20. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what is their operational 

footprint and how do they fit into CENTCOM’s increase of forces and what resources do they require? 

General AMOS. The 2nd MEB has requested a National Guard ADT in order to 

assist in the development of licit crops and a robust agribusiness in Helmand Province. The development of a robust and licit agriculture sector is essential to the 

long-term success of our efforts in Regional Command-South. MEB operational planning identified this need and articulated it in message (S) DTG 281442Z Apr 09. 

General CHIARELLI. There are currently six operational teams deployed in Regional Command-East and Central with three in each command. Two additional 

teams will deploy and become operational this fall. One of the two new teams is 

designated for Regional Command-South, while the other is slated for Regional 

49 

Command-East. Each ADT is comprised of 58 soldiers and airmen from a particular 

State, and all are volunteers. The team is commanded by a Colonel. However, the 

ADT is operationally controlled by the BCT Task Force (TF) Headquarters in that 

region. Each ADT is assigned to a particular province to support the BCT TF’s area 

of responsibility and works out of a designated Forward Operating Base (FOB). The 

ADT is usually collocated with a PRT and together these teams share in the dayto-day routine of securing the FOB, maintaining vehicles and equipment, and synchronizing their efforts to ensure mission success. The ADT requires similar resources as the PRT, to include various classes of military supply from food to fuel 

and ammo to medical and Close Air Support on call when required. 

21. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, since poppy plants themselves are not illegal, would these teams ever consider buying them directly from 

Afghan farmers instead of the Taliban drug trade, thus cutting off their supply 

source? 

General AMOS. We recommend that this answer be referred to the Joint Staff. 

General CHIARELLI. A decision to directly purchase poppy plants from Afghan 

farmers should be addressed by other Federal agencies. The National Guard Afghan 

ADTs are not involved in the direct Poppy Eradication mission in Afghanistan. The 

mission of the ADT is to provide Afghan farmers with alternative livelihoods. The 

ADT operational objectives are: to improve access to technology, capital, market access, and to restore irrigation and crop land capacity. Other key objectives include 

food storage, food supply and conservation practices. It is imperative for the long 

term success of the teams that we focused on this mission. 

22. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what alternatives to 

poppy are they providing Afghan farmers? 

General AMOS. USAID reports cumulative results from 2002–2008 as follows: 

Over 1,500 Metric tons of fruit and vegetable exports valued at $6 million 

in sales 

Over 30,000 farmers under legal farming contracts 

Over 300 rural farm stores/Agricultural depots established 

National and regional market information system established 

Over 3.2 million forestry cuttings, saplings, and fruit trees planted 

58 Kabul university students involved in masters degree programs 

Over 240,000 Afghan farmers trained benefitting 90,000 families 

Almost 300,000 Afghans paid cash-for-work programs totaling $37 million 

Over 5700km of irrigation and drainage canals rehabilitated benefitting 

250,000 hectares 

977km of rural roads constructed 

Over 414,000 farmers have received improved seeds and fertilizer 

These are interesting statistics that show promise given security and stability but 

do not address the untamed Regional Command-South battlespace where the Marine MEB will operate. A good example is the 2008 deployment of 24 MEU and 2d 

Bn 7th marines. While 2/7 was brought to Afghanistan to ‘‘train and mentor,’’ neither environmental conditions nor density of Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF)/Awami National Party (ANP) allowed them to execute this task; they conducted a combat mission. Twenty four MEUs were brought for combat and conducted combat until conditions allowed for community outreach at which time traditional COIN principles applied including a civil military operations center and opportunity for USAID engagement. This is how we see the next year in Regional 

Command-South. Security must come first concurrent with adequate numbers of 

partnered ANSF and mentored ANP, then relationships with local leaders, then 

we’ll be able to address alternative crops. After action from 24 MEU, 2/7, and now 

Special Purpose MAGTF Afghanistan all point towards a willingness by the local 

Afghan population to accept alternative crops once the threat of retribution from autonomous Taliban and narco-traffickers subsides due to coalition operations and continued presence. 

General CHIARELLI. The ADTs deploy out to provincial level to identify and promote access to local and regional markets. The ADTs successfully provide the Provincial Agri-business extension agents with structured agricultural technical advice 

establishing a functional extension based service to the local farmers, plan, build, 

and provide sanitary livestock slaughtering facilities. Additionally, the teams expand irrigation capacity and technology in the local river basins within assigned 

provincial areas. Each team establishes a demonstration farm showcasing advanced 

farming techniques, equipment and technology. Utilizing these methods provide Afghan farmers different livelihoods and the potential to increase efficiency and profit. 

50 

23. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what about the possibility 

of introduced biofuel crops or establishing an industry that could grow and boost 

the Afghan economy? 

General AMOS. We would support any viable crop program or industry, endorsed 

by the interagency, that could grow and boost the Afghan economy. 

General CHIARELLI. The goal of producing bio-fuel crops or establishing a bio-fuel 

industry in Afghanistan is a worthwhile goal. The production of petroleum fuels 

from biomass from agricultural and forest resources have potential, but there are 

many obstacles must be overcome. The farmers of Afghanistan face incredible challenges: soaring or fluctuating prices for food, seeds and other supplies; outdated 

technology; unfavorable or limited access to markets and financial services; and poor 

soil and water resource management. 

The establishing of viable genomics platforms and conversion technologies for biofuel crops is now being done in the United States. However, essential elements 

needed for the large scale production of biomass from agriculture have yet to be addressed: the logistics of producing, harvesting, transporting, and storing this material require significant improvements in the infrastructure of Afghanistan. Issues 

such as electricity, road networks, land availability, equipment technologies, seed 

stocks availability, logistics, producer acceptance, and progress on cellulose conversion technologies will determine if bio-fuel crops are a viable alternative for agriculture in Afghanistan. 

In addition, dedicated energy crops compatible with sustainable agriculture practices must be identified. Research would be required to optimize production and logistics capabilities for dedicated nonfood bio-energy crops, as well as agricultural 

residues, forest products, municipal waste, and other sources. Small scale bio-fuel 

projects done as a cooperative effort between groups of agriculture producers might 

be a viable alternative at this time. 

USE OF RESERVE COMPONENT

24. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, as I understand, land and 

space for military training ranges remain at a premium. How will the Army and 

Marine Corps handle this constraint in the context of the growth of our ground component forces? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps relies on an extensive portfolio of range resources to meet its training needs. This portfolio includes our major training bases 

at its core. We also rely extensively on other-Service ranges for training, and as appropriate make use of land managed by other Federal agencies such as the Bureau 

of Land Management (BLM). Increasing demands are, in fact, being placed on available training land. Over the last several decades, the operational capabilities and 

reach of our forces have evolved significantly with the introduction of new doctrine, 

weapons and systems, and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. This has 

resulted in a steady expansion of the training footprint necessary to provide realistic 

training. At the same time, requirements to utilize Marine Corps installations land 

for infrastructure development such as housing and facilities, and external constraints on land uses due to encroachment, have continued to reduce available training land. Marine Corps installations are managed to maximize efficient use of training land and resources. In the past decade, the Marine Corps has made unprecedented investments in range sustainability programs, to ensure our lands remain 

available and accessible for training. We have also continued to invest in range 

modernization programs to ensure our marines are trained using state-of-the-art 

ranges and training technologies. However, deficits in available training land currently exist at many of the Marine Corps’ operational ranges, as well as at ranges 

of other Services that are used by the Marine Corps. These shortfalls present important challenges that remain to be addressed. Many of our installations cannot be 

expanded, due to surrounding development. These geographical constraints, as well 

as fiscal constraints will prevent the Marine Corps from addressing shortfalls in 

training land. The Marine Corps will continue to rely on the resources it has and 

access to other Services’ and allied nations’ ranges to meet most of its training 

needs. We will also examine opportunities to acquire the additional resources needed to accommodate planned growth. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army continuously evaluates its land requirements 

against doctrine, force structure, and unit stationing. Units at most Army installations are currently training across areas that are considerably smaller than the 

areas they might be assigned for operations based on doctrine, or that they are required to operate across in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an attempt to improve training 

capabilities, the Army seeks opportunities to acquire land where it appears feasible 

51 

to do so. Feasibility is based on the availability of large, contiguous parcels adjacent 

to, or near, major Army training installations, low land costs, low population density, and few environmental issues. However, the Army’s existing lands are increasingly encroached upon, further reducing the usefulness for training. External urban 

growth often comes up to installation boundaries. Internal environmental compliance reduces land available for training. Therefore, in addition to acquisition, the 

Army also implements other strategies to handle these constraints: 

Focused management 

Land shortfalls can be addressed using internal Army or Federal Government 

mechanisms. An example of this approach can be seen at Fort Bliss, where the 

Army reassessed the traditional relationship between the Fort Bliss mission and the 

White Sands Test Range mission to enable more training activities on the White 

Sands Range, and thereby mitigate training burdens on Fort Bliss lands. 

Buffering through Partnerships 

Army Compatible Use Buffers (ACUBs) allow the Army to preserve or enhance 

an installation’s current training land capabilities by minimizing encroachment. 

This is accomplished through partnerships that secure off installation land-use 

agreements that are compatible with Army training mission. ACUBs serve to insulate Army training from encroachment and can be used to reduce environmental restrictions to training. 

Utilization of other Federal lands 

The Army examines the land status of other Federal entities to mitigate land deficits at Army installations. Land that borders Army installations, and is held by the 

BLM, Department of Energy or Forest Service, may be transferred or made available to the Army after a comprehensive approval process that includes National Environmental Protection Act and other public reviews. Both Fort Carson and Fort 

Polk utilize U.S. Forest Service lands under a special use permit. 

25. Senator BAYH. General Amos and General Chiarelli, how has the Active component of the Army and Marine Corps leveraged training ranges in the Reserve 

component, especially for urban training? 

General AMOS. The Reserve component of the Marine Corps does not have its own 

range inventory. Marine Corps Reserve units utilize the same Marine Corps installations used by their Active component counterparts to meet training requirement. 

Marine Corps units in both the Active and Reserve components also make extensive 

use of other-Service training ranges (including training ranges of other Services’ Reserve components). Reserve units also access training opportunities afforded by local 

law enforcement facilities, or allied nations’ ranges in the course of major exercises. 

Many of these ranges provide facilities for training in Military Operations in Urban 

Terrain which are generally available to the Active component and Reserve component on the same basis. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army’s urban training strategy is focused on providing 

a home station capability that enables individual and collective skills. The term 

‘‘home station’’ includes local training sites for Reserve component units as these 

units do not typically conduct maneuver training and live fire qualifications at home 

station armories. Along with home stations, the Army must modernize its Combat 

Training Centers and power projection/mobilization centers to provide critical urban 

training capabilities for the appropriate levels of unit readiness. 

Training ranges and urban facilities are critical to mission readiness as the Army 

transforms. Since 2000, the Army has embarked on a basic facility construction plan 

to create a minimum set of urban conditions at Army home stations that will prepare soldiers to conduct missions in urban environments. The Army provides three 

standard urban training facilities at home stations: Shoot Houses (SHs), Urban Assault Courses (UAC), and Combined Arms Collective Training Facilities (CACTF). 

These three types of facilities provide the necessary conditions to train soldiers individually and collectively on the fundamentals of operating in an urban environment. 

Since 2000, the Army has constructed 26 SHs, 24 UACs and 24 CACTFs at 30 installations. 

An example of a converted urban training facility in the Reserve component is the 

Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC). Muscatatuck was developed in conjunction with the State of Indiana as a large urban training site that leveraged existing buildings that were once a large hospital complex. The Muscatatuck site supports Camp Atterbury Reserve component urban training requirements while also 

providing a unique training venue for other Army units, joint exercises, and other 

Federal and local agencies. Using careful planning, Muscatatuck illustrates how 

Army can fulfill Reserve component home station and mobilization requirements 

52 

while leveraging a unique infrastructure opportunity. The Army has nominated the 

MUTC as a DOD Regional Training Facility in accordance with OSD’s Urban Operations Training Strategy. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK UDALL

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND CORE CAPABILITY

26. Senator UDALL. General Chiarelli, it is my understanding that General Casey 

has recently halted the Army’s plan to replace the percent Effective (PCTEF) level 

with Directed Mission Level, or D-Level, and Core function reporting, or C-Level. 

Additionally, Lieutenant General Caldwell recently announced eight Army brigades 

will be tapped to become AABs under the umbrella of SFA. Do you believe we have 

the right mission essential tasks lists (METLs) in keeping with full spectrum operations, and what is the SFA and AAB doctrine with respect to specific mission requirements and characteristics? 

General CHIARELLI. Plans to implement Army unique D-level reporting requirements that would translate into the PCTEF levels required by the Joint Staff have 

been placed on hold until the relation and linkages between operational doctrine, 

training doctrine, and readiness reporting policy can be reexamined during a series 

of senior leader conferences this summer. Army doctrinal METLs enable units to 

perform fundamental tasks associated with full spectrum operations (offense, defense, and stability tasks) to provide the foundation for successful execution of any 

mission, to include BCTs that are to serve as AABs. Training doctrine requires unit 

commanders to adjust their doctrinal METL, if required, to zero in on specific requirements and conditions of an assigned operational mission. SFA/AAB units are 

no exception. 

Army Regulation 11–31, Army International Security Cooperation Policy, establishes policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the planning, integration, programming, budgeting and execution of Army security cooperation activities. 

The CAC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, is the Army proponent for all doctrine related 

to SFA and in May 2009 published FM 3–07.1, Security Forces Assistance to provide 

a conceptual framework for Army forces to conduct SFA within the context of full 

spectrum operations. It addresses the operational and tactical levels while focusing 

on the modular brigade in the conduct of SFA activities. 

The doctrine of FM 3.07–1 is nested within that of FM 3–07, Stability Operations, 

published by CAC in October 2008. 

CAC is also responsible for the DOD Joint Center for International SFA and, in 

July 2008, published the Commander’s Handbook for SFA to distill and distribute 

best practices and lessons learned from current SFA operations in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. 

27. Senator UDALL. General Chiarelli, I am also concerned that we have not made 

any adjustments with respect to overall end strength to accommodate the new mission of SFA on by these AABs. For example, do you envision needing more than 

eight AABs? 

General CHIARELLI. The combatant commander determines the appropriate number of Advise Assist Brigades (AABs) required for the theater. However, because the 

AAB is built using the modular BCT that is simply augmented for stability operations, the Army can create more with proper levels of augmentation and 

resourcing. The Army’s BCTs are designed specifically to adapt to a changing security environment rather than specialized for a single point on the spectrum of conflict. Growing the Army for a specific mission limits the Army’s ability to operate 

across the spectrum of possible operations. However, a BCT augmented for SFA retains the capability to conduct full spectrum operations—offense, defense, and stability operations. Any of the three modular BCTs—heavy, infantry, or Stryker, can 

support SFA. The Army’s success in adapting BCTs for stability operations is evident in BCT employment in Afghanistan versus Iraq. In Afghanistan, with the high 

threat and nascent ability of the Afghan Security Forces (ASF), commanders employ 

the BCT widely throughout the southern provinces to train and mentor the ASF 

below the brigade-level together in combat operations. These BCTs with their organic leadership are sufficient (primarily company grade officers and NCOs) to meet 

mission requirements, train and conduct combat operations, with the ASF. In Iraq, 

commanders are employing six modular BCTs augmented for stability operations to 

continue training and mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces at brigade-level and 

above. The brigades in Iraq are augmented with additional field grade officers to 

53 

provide greater flexibility for the BCT commander to mentor more Iraqi leaders at 

the more senior levels. 

28. Senator UDALL. General Amos, how has the Marine Corps coordinated with 

the Army with respect to advisory units as our mission shifts from combat operations to an advisory role? 

General AMOS. The U.S. Army has considerably more ‘‘train and assist’’ experience in Afghanistan as a whole than the Marine Corps. Marine Forces deployed in 

support of ‘‘train and assist’’ missions, to date, have operated under the mentorship 

if the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. The experience of 24 

MEU and 2/7 led to the crafting of RFF920 for the MEB which includes both COIN 

and ‘‘train and mentor’’ in its mission statement and the MEB commander has 

planned for both these requirements accordingly. However, the U.S. Army experience and continued coordination serve as the baseline for Marine Corps planning 

in preparation for this part of the mission. 

ARMY BRIGADE LEVELS

29. Senator UDALL. General Chiarelli, last February General Casey testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that ‘‘15 deployed Active component brigades’’ are required to stay at 12-month deployments. Does that statement still hold 

true given the changes in force levels as we withdraw from Iraq and increase in Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. Since General Casey’s testimony in February 2008, force demands in Iraq have decreased from unsustainable surge levels, which necessitated 

15 month deployments, to a more sustainable surge level of 12 Active component 

BCTs. Therefore, the Army has returned to 12 month deployments, although the 

last BCT on a 15 month deployment will not return until June 2009 and the last 

enabling brigade will not return until October 2009. 

Presently, there are 3 Active component BCTs in Afghanistan; combined OIF/OEF 

Active component BCT totals equal 15 Active component BCTs that represent a 

BOG to dwell ratio of 1:1.3. Later this summer, the Army will deploy an additional 

BCT to OEF which pushes the Army above 15 BCTs deployed and drops the BOG 

to dwell ratio to 1:1.2 reversing the positive trend of improving dwell for soldiers 

and families. 

Proactively, the Army has taken steps to mitigate a return to longer deployments, 

primarily by using in-lieu-of sourcing from other Services and selectively employing 

the Reserve component to fill Active component missions. These steps, buttressed 

by the Army completing our personnel growth, will maintain deployments of 12 

months, provided global demand does not increase. 

30. Senator UDALL. General Chiarelli, is 15 BCTs still the requirement? 

General CHIARELLI. The current global requirement is 37 BCTs. The current global commitment of BCTs stands at 28 BCTs which includes both the Active component and Reserve component supporting COIN operations, security forces, Global 

Response Force/Rapid Response Force, Homeland Defense, Korea, Kosovo Forces/ 

Multi-Force Observers, and training teams. 

Since General Casey’s testimony in February 2008, force demands in Iraq have 

decreased from unsustainable surge levels, which necessitated 15 month deployments, to a more sustainable surge level of 12 Active component BCTs. Therefore, 

the Army has returned to 12 month deployments, although the last BCT on a 15 

month deployment will not return until June 2009 and last enabling brigade will 

not return until October 2009. 

Presently, there are 3 Active component BCTs in Afghanistan; combined OIF/OEF 

Active component BCT totals equal 15 Active component BCTs that represent a 

BOG to dwell ratio of 1:1.3. Later this summer, the Army will deploy an additional 

BCT to OEF which pushes the Army above 15 BCTs deployed and drops the BOG 

to dwell ratio to 1:1.2 reversing the positive trend of improving dwell for soldiers 

and families. 

Proactively, the Army has taken steps to mitigate a return to longer deployments, 

primarily by using in-lieu-of sourcing from other Services and selectively employing 

the Reserve component to fill Active component missions. These steps, buttressed 

by the Army completing our personnel growth, will maintain deployments of 12 

months, provided global demand does not increase. 

31. Senator UDALL. General Chiarelli, does this account for the eight AABs? 

54 

General CHIARELLI. The combatant commanders will provide the required number 

of AABs needed for the operation, but yes, the Active component BCT demand in 

OIF and OEF includes the current requirement for AABs. 

32. Senator UDALL. General Chiarelli, when will we allow our soldiers to maintain 

a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio (2 years at home for every 1 year deployed)? 

General CHIARELLI. The only way the Army can achieve this goal within the current force structure is the global demand must decrease. The deployment length 

versus home station time, or the BOG to dwell ratio, is driven by global demand 

versus the supply of available forces. The Army’s long-term sustainable goal is to 

allow Active component units and soldiers three times the amount of time home as 

they are deployed (1:3 ratio), but demand and available forces ultimately drives 

dwell. 

On average, Army Active component BCTs currently deploy for a year and receive 

approximately 15 months at home, although dwell will slightly decrease due to an 

additional Army BCT deployment to Afghanistan prior to further reductions in Iraq 

in fiscal year 2010. By the end of fiscal year 2010, given projected demands, the 

Army anticipates average Active component BCT dwell improving to approximately 

20 months at home, improving to 24 months early in fiscal year 2011. By the end 

of fiscal year 2011, the Army expects the average Active component BCT dwell to 

improve to about 29 months. 

33. Senator UDALL. General Chiarelli, how long can we sustain these commitment 

levels for BCTs? 

General CHIARELLI. The BOG to dwell ratio of 1:2 is sustainable over the short 

term, although the long term goal for the Army is to reach an Active component 

BCT BOG to dwell of 1:3 and Reserve component BCT BOG to dwell of 1:5. While 

1:2 enables a more balanced Army, it still presents challenges to readiness. This 

high demand shortens dwell time for units, consumes equipment at a higher than 

programmed rate, and stresses all components of the All-Volunteer Force. 

• Truncated dwell times negatively impact training of core competencies to 

conduct missions across the spectrum of conflict and shorten the time available to properly reset personnel and equipment to be ready for the next deployment or provide strategic depth. 

• Transition Teams, unprogrammed Joint Headquarters positions, security 

forces, and other nonstandard formations exacerbate stresses on the AllVolunteer Force, particularly for the mid-grade officers and NCOs. 

• Reserve component access within the context of current 12 month mobilization policy stresses the National Guard and Reserve and creates uncertainty in sourcing to meet the high rotational demand. 

• The OPTEMPO in theater, coupled with the high demand for forces, is 

stressing the Army’s ability to equip the force by accelerating the aging of 

material above programmed lifecycles, lengthening reset, and incurring battle losses that must be replaced. 

READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS

34. Senator UDALL. General Amos and General Chiarelli, the decision was made 

to switch from Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) to the Defense 

Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) back in 2002, yet it still has not been fully integrated and implemented by the Services. What constraints and obstacles have you 

faced with DRRS and why do you believe it has taken so long to implement? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps supports the development and implementation 

of DRRS. In an effort to speed implementation of the DRRS Enterprise, we are 

working closely with the Army to develop a DRRS-Marine Corps (DRRS–MC) which 

will leverage the successful fielding of DRRS-Army—saving time and development 

dollars. DRRS–MC will expedite the implementation of the DRRS Enterprise and 

will meet the needs of the Service, and the readiness stakeholders throughout the 

Department. We anticipate our units and installations will be reporting in DRRS– 

MC before the end of 2009. 

Each readiness reporting system has its own advantages and disadvantages. The 

Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) remains the readiness 

reporting system of record. GSORTS does the better job, from the Service perspective, of reporting the Service Title 10 responsibilities for manning, training, and 

equipping ready forces for their designed missions in support of combatant commanders. However, GSORTS does not give us the degree of clarity we desire to assess a unit’s capabilities for specific missions and mission essential tasks—particuVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
55 

larly if the missions assigned are not the same as the units’ designed missions-for 

example, an artillery battalion assigned a civil affairs mission. 

DRRS is still in development and we are working closely with the rest of DOD 

and the readiness community to help it meet its requirements to provide: 

• Business tools that support data analysis for readiness management, 

planning, Title 10 functions, data sharing, and the integration of readiness 

information for resources and mission essential tasks. 

• Aggregated DRRS readiness data and easy access to archived readiness 

information, which is retrievable via the business tools identified above. 

• Near real-time information data feeds from Service authoritative data 

sources that have been tested and validated. 

• The integration of GSORTS mission and resource information. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army supports the DRRS. However, since the system is 

still under development and has not been fully implemented, the Army chose to refine and improve its existing readiness reporting system. It did this by developing 

an advanced web-enabled reporting system to meet the reporting requirements for 

the Chairman’s Readiness System, as specified in DOD Directive 7730.65 ‘‘Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)’’ and all serial guidance requirements issued by OSD. This system is called DRRS-Army. Its development and 

implementation was accomplished through internal program management/funding 

and achieved full operational capability in October 2006. DRRS-Army ensures the 

Army is able to meet the Joint Staff and OSD requirements, yet preserves the capability to effectively measure and manage unique Army readiness equities. DRSSArmy meets the Army’s readiness reporting needs; it feeds more data into DRRS 

than that system can absorb. 

With respect to how long it has taken to implement DRRS: we believe one major 

drawback is the absence of a Program Management Office to provide oversight. Currently, the program is internally managed by OSD Personnel & Readiness. 

Another issue is that the Joint Staff has not published a Chairman’s Joint Chief 

of Staff Instruction or Manual for DRRS. The DOD instruction lacks detail for a 

project of this size and scope. DRRS is an emerging system and will require validation and testing for full integration into the Global Force Management processes. 

To date, most baseline assessment and performance milestones have not been 

achieved. 

35. Senator UDALL. General Amos and General Chiarelli, is our visibility with respect to readiness reporting diminished in any way by reporting against directed 

mission readiness rather than core functions? 

General AMOS. No. The Marine Corps reports on designed and assigned (directed) 

mission readiness per the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ Instructions. 

General CHIARELLI. Commanders of Army units continuously assess and report 

the readiness of their units to accomplish their core functions and also, when applicable, their directed missions. Hence, having units report directed mission readiness 

when operational requirements are formally assigned and while operational requirements are under execution does not diminish the visibility of the unit’s readiness 

status to perform core functions, since both of these discrete assessments are reported concurrently. Army doctrine in FM 7–0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, establishes that units train on only one mission essential level task at a 

time—the one for the unit’s directed mission or, if none, the one for the unit’s asdesigned mission. While it is logical to presume that the readiness assessments reported by commanders will be most accurate for those missions on which their units 

currently are training or that currently are under execution, the readiness reporting 

requirements of Army units are established via Army Regulation 220–1, Unit Status 

Reporting, to comply with DOD and Joint Staff policies and to satisfy Congressional 

mandates. Army unit status reporting requirements that commanders continuously 

assess and report the status of their units to execute their core functions also facilitate effective assessments of strategic risk and strategic depth and provide the basis 

for various sourcing, resourcing and funding decisions. 

36. Senator UDALL. General Amos and General Chiarelli, how has U.S. Joint 

Forces Command (JFCOM) responded to this change in readiness reporting? 

General AMOS. We are confident that the policies and procedures established by 

U.S. JFCOM regarding readiness reporting will result in the most efficient and effective system possible. 

General CHIARELLI. Senator, this question would be better addressed by U.S. 

JFCOM. 

56 

37. Senator UDALL. General Amos and General Chiarelli, commanders are allowed 

to subjectively upgrade their unit’s overall readiness by one level and two with general officer approval. Are you concerned at all that this ability obfuscates a unit’s 

true readiness status, specifically, if a unit operates with a limited amount of equipment or people? 

General AMOS. No. To accurately assess the unit’s level of readiness, the commander must consider both the measurable and intangible components of readiness. 

Commanders take into account morale, leadership, sustainability, and a variety of 

other factors, which are not always measurable by the metrics built into our readiness systems. Through the daily monitoring of SORTS reports and recurring education the Marine Corps is able to guard against capricious adjustments. Most Marine Corps commanders do not subjectively upgrade or downgrade their C-levels in 

the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) or their mission and 

mission essential task assessments in the DRRS. 

General CHIARELLI. No, I am not concerned that this ability obfuscates a unit’s 

true readiness. The Army’s readiness reporting system (DRRS-Army) combines the 

benefits of both quantitative measurements for people and equipment with the commander’s best professional judgment and experience in determining training and 

other overall assessments. 

Army units report readiness in accordance with Joint Staff regulatory requirements as well as serial guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 

Included in the Joint Staff’s guidance are procedures that allow commanders to provide their best military judgment during the monthly assessment of the unit. 

Current readiness metrics support both quantitative measurements—i.e. the 

amount of people and equipment available to the unit, combined with training assessments; with qualitative and or subjective overall assessments. These policies 

and procedures are routinely updated and incorporate input from subordinate commands, units, as well as periodic reviews from outside agencies. Currently, we believe we have the optimum mixture of subjective and quantitative assessments in 

our unit status reporting system. 

The Army remains committed to providing detailed, accurate, and commandercentric assessment of unit capabilities. Our readiness reporting procedures will continue to measure the core functions of Army units to meet the wartime requirements. Additionally, Army units will report readiness assessments to complete assigned missions when directed by combatant commanders. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

USAID FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS INCREASES

38. Senator BURRIS. General Chiarelli, in your testimony, you pointed to the success of the National Guard’s AgriBusiness teams. At the same time, you note that 

‘‘teams of agronomists from land grant universities sponsored by the United States 

Agency for International Development’’ are best suited to teach Afghans to improve 

their farming methods, thus contributing to stability operations in Afghanistan. You 

noted that your teams were successful, but stated that the use of soldiers for AgriBusiness teams caused holes in various units. 

The Senate is currently considering the Increasing America’s Global Development 

Capacity Act of 2009, legislation that would increase significantly the number of 

Foreign Service Officers at USAID. In your opinion, if the USAID is increased, how 

would an increase in USAID Foreign Service Officers best be used to help the Army 

conduct its ongoing stability operations? 

General CHIARELLI. An increase in USAID Foreign Service Officers could best assist in the conduct of stability operations thru assignment to teams whose principal 

mission is development of host nation government capability and capacity at national, provincial, and local levels. Examples of USAID competencies include advice 

and assistance to host nations in developing capacity for economic development, humanitarian response, agriculture, health and human services, democracy and governance, and conflict management and mitigation. 

39. Senator BURRIS. General Chiarelli, what other civilian agencies do you think 

have an appropriate role in stability operations? 

General CHIARELLI. Any number of Federal agencies could contribute to stability 

operations but the determination of the best way to organize to provide that support 

should be determined by the Department of State including USAID, which has been 

assigned the lead role for coordinating reconstruction and stabilization efforts of the 

U.S. Government. 

57 

There are broad range of capabilities required to enable these efforts—and a number of options for the State Department to execute this role. One option could be 

to rely on the full range of Cabinet-level agencies for direct support. Another viable 

option would be for the State Department to develop internal capacity for that effort. A third option would be for the State Department to contract for that support. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BURR

BODY ARMOR

40. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, a recent New York Times article from April 

18 reported on the Army’s delay in testing a new, lightweight body armor that could 

reduce a soldier’s load by nearly 20 pounds, a potentially significant improvement 

for those serving in the harsh, mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, where mobility 

is at a premium. The Modular Body Armor Vest (MBAV), already in use by Special 

Operations Command, uses smaller bulletproof plates on the chest and back, making it significantly lighter than the current Army-issue Improved Outer Tactical 

Vest (IOTV). An Army research team was sent to eastern Afghanistan in early 

March to field test this new body armor with a unit of 500 soldiers, only to be ordered back to the United States shortly after their arrival, leaving nearly $3 million 

worth of this new body armor sitting in a warehouse in the United States. Can you 

please explain the decisionmaking process on field testing of the MBAV? 

General CHIARELLI. The safety of our soldiers is paramount in our decision-making process to provide them with new equipment and this is especially true when 

it comes to Personal Protection Equipment such as body armor. Soldiers can focus 

on their mission because they are confident the body armor they depend on has 

been thoroughly tested and evaluated for safety, effectiveness and suitability. 

In the specific case of the MBAV, although it had been tested by Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to SOCOM requirements and standards and was in use 

by Special Operation Forces, it had not been tested to Army requirements and test 

standards. This is not to suggest that the SOCOM requirement and testing standard 

is worse or that the Army’s is better, it is recognition that they are different. Having 

multiple test standards for body armor is an acknowledged problem that is being 

addressed by OSD DOT&E. We anticipate a DOD-wide standard will be issued for 

testing body armor by the end of this year. Until then, out of an abundance of caution, the prudent action for the Army is to adhere to its current testing standards, 

which to date, have produced body armor that has never failed to perform to required standards during the entire time of OIF and OEF. 

Subsequent to the hearing on April 22, 2009, Aberdeen Test Center has completed 

the ballistic testing of the MBAV. The Rapid Equipping Force (REF), in conjunction 

with Program Executive Office soldier, has begun conducting a limited fielding to 

an Army Infantry BCT selected to deploy to Afghanistan in support of OEF. The 

MBAV plate carrier is one of 14 equipment items that comprise the REF’s Lightening the Soldier’s Load Project. 

In parallel with the Lightening the Soldier’s Load Project, the Army is assessing 

several ‘‘plate carrier’’ designs to include the MBAV. The results of the assessment 

will inform the Army’s decision for a plate carrier design to be fielded on a larger 

scale that will provide commanders on the ground another option for tailoring Personal Protection Equipment. 

41. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, how does the Army assess risk when fielding 

new technology, specifically body armor? 

General CHIARELLI. Composite Risk Management (CRM) is the Army’s primary 

process for identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of 

army mission, functions, operations, and activities. The CRM is used to mitigate 

risks associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, 

damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. 

Body Armor is the critical personal protective equipment for the soldier. Fielding 

of equipment designed to protect human life from injury or death is a deliberate 

process that is driven by requirements, understanding of the threats and emerging 

technology. At every decision point in the process to develop new technology and 

then field and sustain equipment, risks are identified and are mitigated to an acceptable level. 

For fielding of new technology relating to Body Armor, the primary risk mitigation tool is live fire ballistic testing. This is conducted prior to production as part 

of First Article Testing and also at Lot Acceptance Testing during production. This 

constant vigilance is the primary means to maintain high confidence in the body 

58 

armor fielded and is the main reason the body armor fielded in OIF and OEF to 

date has never failed to perform 100 percent of the time and has on many occasions 

exceeded the approved requirements. 

42. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, how does the Army weigh the tradeoffs between the need for greater protection and the need for greater mobility? 

General CHIARELLI. Soldier survivability is a function of mobility, protection, 

lethality and leadership. Within this context, commanders must weigh the trade-offs 

between mobility and protection based on factors such as mission, enemy, troops, 

time, and terrain. In recognition of this fact, the Army must provide commanders 

with the tools necessary to make those decisions such as armored vehicles and personal protection equipment. 

In the case of the MBAV with Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI) 

plates, the Army responded to commander requests for lighter body armor in Afghanistan so that soldier survivability could be enhanced though greater mobility 

and lethality with minimal, if any, reduction in protection in the face of extreme 

mountainous terrain and a lightly equipped and unencumbered enemy. 

43. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, are you concerned that a one-size-fits-all approach to equipping our soldiers doesn’t take into account the drastically different 

environments our soldiers face in a country like Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. We recognize varying environments our soldiers experience 

requires that we relook how we are equipping our soldiers. Specifically, we are focusing on two main efforts to reduce the soldier’s load: reducing body armor weight 

and reducing equipment weight. These two efforts will inform the Army as to the 

optimum body armor configuration for use in Afghanistan. 

In May, the Maneuver Battle Lab conducted a Soldier Plate Carrier Demonstration at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, to test the performance of lighter ballistic plate 

carrier vests against the current IOTV. The plate carrier candidates are currently 

undergoing ballistic and burn testing by the Army Test and Evaluation Command. 

The results of the assessment will be used to recommend the best commercial offthe-shelf or Government off-the-shelf lightweight plate carrier for fielding to soldiers. 

In addition, the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force is teaming with the Asymmetric 

Warfare Group to conduct a soldier load assessment in Afghanistan. This assessment will evaluate 14 lighter items of equipment including the MBAV (plate carrier). The Army seeks to achieve significant weight savings with the continued acquisition of lighter weapons, night vision devices and soldier clothing items. 

44. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, please provide an update on the Army’s body 

armor testing and acquisition program. 

General CHIARELLI. 

Body Armor Testing: 

All body armor passes stringent First Article Testing (FAT) and Lot Acceptance 

Testing (LAT) before being issued to soldiers. Along with those two levels of testing, 

there is a third level of evaluation, Soldier Preventative Maintenance Checks and 

Services (PMCS) and a fourth level, Non-Destructive Test Equipment (NDTE). 

NDTE utilizes digital X-ray to determine the serviceability of fielded hard armor 

plate inserts. All of these evaluations (FAT & LAT Testing, PMCS and NDTE) ensure that the Army’s body armor meets or exceeds performance standards. 

Body Armor Acquisition: 

(1) X-Small Arms Protective Inserts (XSAPI): 

The current Army requirement for XSAPI is 120,000 sets, designated as a Theater 

contingency stock. XSAPI is designed to meet current and emerging small arms ballistic threats. As a result of the increased ballistic protection provided by XSAPI as 

compared to ESAPI, an XSAPI plate is 6–11 ounces heavier than ESAPI depending 

on plate size. 120,000 sets of XSAPI were ordered in March 2009. 

(2) Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV): 

In May 2007, the Army introduced the IOTV to replace the 966,000 fielded Outer 

Tactical Vests (OTVs). The IOTV is 3lbs. lighter, provides increased coverage and 

offers improved performance and comfort. The IOTV also offers a one stage quick 

release and a medical access system not previously available on the OTV. To date, 

the Army has procured 455,000 IOTVs. The procurement of the balance of IOTVs 

is scheduled for award in July 2009. 

59 

(3) Long Term Strategy for Body Armor Improvements: 

The long-term strategy for body armor is to continue the research and development of materials at the Army Soldier Systems Center, Natick, MA, with support 

from the Army Research Laboratory and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies, which will reduce the overall weight 

of the system while achieving the same or better ballistic protection. As improved 

material technologies become available, the Army will rapidly transition the technology into body armor production. 

45. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, with a possible delay in the acquisition of 

the next generation of body armor, do you foresee any risk or the possibility of an 

inability of the Army to provide adequate body armor to deploying forces? 

General CHIARELLI. No, the Army will provide adequate body armor to deploying 

forces. The currently fielded ESAPI worn with the IOTV protects against the current Theater threat and provides an increased area of coverage over the OTV with 

a weight reduction of greater than three pounds. We have fielded 966,000 OTVs, 

268,000 IOTVs, and 891,000 ESAPI sets. We are now procuring additional IOTVs 

to replace OTVs on a one for one basis. The long term acquisition strategy for body 

armor is to continue the research and development of materials that will achieve 

better ballistic protection while reducing the overall weight of the system. As improved material technologies become available, the U.S. Army will rapidly transition 

the technology into body armor production. At this time, current materials technology is challenged to achieve significant weight savings for the same or better 

level of performance. 

TRANSITION FROM IRAQ TO AFGHANISTAN

46. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, a recent press report (USA Today, April 17, 

2009 titled ‘‘Battalion Shifted to Afghanistan’’) described how the Army’s 4th Engineering Battalion that had just arrived in Iraq, was now being redeployed to Afghanistan to perform their vital mission of clearing roads of bombs and other obstacles. The article went on to assert that ‘‘the decision underscores how military commanders are scrambling to meet President Obama’s orders.’’ What is the extent to 

which Army units currently deployed to Iraq, or in training for deployment to Iraq, 

will now be redirected to Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army continues to meet Secretary of Defense requirements with trained and ready forces. Given the OIF drawdown and the continued 

need for enabler forces there, and the burgeoning requirements in Afghanistan, the 

Army has re-missioned some units to maintain the flexible and adaptive capacity 

to meet Commander, CENTCOM requirements. CENTCOM has currently remissioned 3,990 Army Combat Support/Combat Service Support Soldiers deploying 

to or in Iraq to Afghanistan. The Combat Support/Combat Service Support enablers 

include Engineers (1,557), Military Police (837), Transportation (501), Signal (332), 

Ordnance (302), Quartermaster (268), Civil Affairs (102), Command and Control 

(89), Fire Support (6), and Medical (1). The need for additional forces in Afghanistan 

combined with shortfalls in external sourcing solutions requires internal sourcing of 

specific Combat Support and Combat Service Support enablers. This enabler repositioning is to support increased presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and 

CENTCOM’s force requirements. The Army cannot clearly state the extent to which 

this re-missioning effort may continue given the dynamic nature of the counter-insurgency fight in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army will continue providing 

trained and ready forces to meet the challenges faced by ground commanders in 

both combined Joint Operational Areas. 

47. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, how has the Army modified training for 

units being diverted from Iraq to Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army prepares units to conduct missions based on established conditions and standards and then adapts to a given environment as required. If a unit is given a new mission then training will shift to focus on that new 

mission. For units executing the same mission, the differences encountered in executing these missions in Afghanistan instead of Iraq is the operational environment 

where they are being conducted. All soldiers receive a country orientation brief prior 

to deployment that includes a general overview of military, political, cultural, religious, and economic conditions; receive rules of engagement training/rules for use 

of force training specific to that area of operations; and complete basic language and 

culture training specific to the area they are being deployed. Additionally, though 

high-altitude oxygen levels are difficult to replicate prior to arriving in theater, solVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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diers adjust their physical fitness training activities before deploying and upon arrival in theater to ensure they are in the best physical condition. 

48. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, are you confident the training provided to 

these soldiers for the Iraq mission will be adequate for service in Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. Yes, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) coordinates 

with U.S. CENTCOM to identify theater-specific training requirements. These are 

published in pre-deployment training guidance for units sourced to deploy to either 

Iraq or Afghanistan. However, important to note, the operational conditions in 

which units operate in Afghanistan are significantly different than those in Iraq. 

Therefore, regardless of whether a unit is deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan, it receives all theater-specific training prior to deployment. In all cases, FORSCOM validates units for deployment. 

49. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, does the Army have the resources necessary 

to augment the forthcoming troop increases, particularly in the case of linguists, 

etc? 

General CHIARELLI. INSCOM has existing linguist contracts in both theaters. Currently there are 9,445 linguists in OIF and the requirements will be adjusted downward as the force structure changes over time. In OEF, we have programmed future 

requirements based on approved additional forces. Currently there are 3,546 linguists on the ground and a plan is being implemented to increase the linguist force 

capacity in stages for a requirement of 5,133, in concert with the troop flow. 

Cat I—No clearance 

Req’t/Fill/Percent/Fill 

Cat II—Secret Req’t/Fill/Percent/Fill Cat III—TS/SCI 

Req’t/Fill/Percent/Fill 

Total Req’t/Fill/Percent/Fill 

Total OEF Support 1 4,393/3044 

(69 percent) 

574/550 

(96 percent) 

166/66 

(40 percent) 

5,133/3,660 

(71 percent) 

1 OEF has an ongoing revalidation which is expected to result in increased linguist requirements. These figures include backend support. 

Cat I—No clearance 

Req’t/Fill/Percent/Fill 

Cat II—Secret Req’t/Fill/Percent/Fill Cat III—TS/SCI 

Req’t/Fill/Percent/Fill 

Total Req’t/Fill/Percent/Fill 

Total OIF Support 2 7,585/7,652 

(100 percent) 

1,859/1,608 

(86 percent) 

341/293 

(86 percent) 

9,785/9,553 

(98 percent) 

2 Includes backend support. 

50. Senator BURR. General Amos, the increase in ground forces in Afghanistan announced last month by President Obama falls heavily on the Marine Corps. As I 

understand it, the Marine Corps will provide about 10,000 of the roughly 21,000 additional forces that will begin to arrive in Afghanistan in May. Last year at this 

hearing, your predecessor, General Magnus, described a much smaller increase of 

marines in Afghanistan as a difficult proposition, saying it was like ‘‘having a foot 

in two boats.’’ I am particularly concerned about not only the combat forces that will 

flow to Afghanistan as part of the 2nd MEB, but also their critical enablers because 

those capabilities will also be in high demand as we drawdown in Iraq. What are 

the greatest challenges you see in accomplishing this transition? 

General AMOS. Last year we were operating with different priorities. Secretary 

Gates stated ‘‘In Iraq we do what we must, but in Afghanistan we do what we can.’’ 

The Commandant has always maintained that increases in Afghanistan must come 

with commensurate reductions in Iraq. However, the President’s strategy articulated this year clearly shifts our operational priorities; the timeline laid out for complete marine withdrawal from Iraq mitigates mid-term concerns over force tempo. 

Our greatest challenge currently is managing deployment to dwell of critical 

enablers (rotary wing assets and their pilots/crews and well as intelligence and explosive ordnance marines) during the transition from Iraq to Afghanistan. 

51. Senator BURR. General Amos, what sort of forces and capabilities will the Marine Corps bring to Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps is currently deploying a 10,000 Marine MAGTF 

built around a Headquarters, Regimental Combat Team, Marine Air Group, and 

Combat Logistics Regiment complete with all the enabler augmentation learned 

from 6 years of combat in Iraq and three deployments of Marine units to Regional 

Command-South. 

61 

52. Senator BURR. General Amos, what is the plan for sourcing the enabling capabilities in Afghanistan when those forces will also be needed in Iraq to support the 

drawdown of forces there? 

General AMOS. Last year we were operating with different priorities. Secretary 

Gates stated ‘‘In Iraq we do what we must, but in Afghanistan we do what we can.’’ 

The Commandant has always maintained that increases in Afghanistan must come 

with commensurate reductions in Iraq. However, the President’s strategy articulated this year clearly shifts our operational priorities; the timeline laid out for complete marine withdrawal from Iraq mitigates mid-term concerns over force tempo. 

Our greatest challenge currently is managing deployment to dwell of critical 

enablers (rotary wing assets and their pilots/crews and well as intelligence and explosive ordnance marines) during the transition from Iraq to Afghanistan. 

SUPPORT FOR MARINE CORPS UNITS IN THEATER

53. Senator BURR. General Amos, the plan for deploying Marine Corps forces calls 

for them to be highly decentralized, meaning that the integrated Marine Corps unit 

structure will be stretched to cover more ground with smaller units. This presents 

special challenges in terms of supporting those combat forces with logistics, intelligence, and supporting arms. What special demands do you foresee to support this 

decentralized deployment plan? 

General AMOS. The terrain and relative lack of infrastructure development in Afghanistan compared to Iraq calls for the ability of operational units to operate with 

relative autonomy in the near to mid-term, particularly in Regional CommandSouth. This was highlighted by the demand for rotary wing assets in the last year 

but less visible is the density of communications and intelligence resources (both 

personnel and equipment) to be sourced down to the company and platoon level that 

were previously at the battalion and regimental level. Part of the solution is manpower (special skills) enablers and the other part is rapid procurement of these assets. Both are being addressed from a service perspective. Additionally, skills such 

as air delivery, expeditionary airfield construction and management, contingency 

contracting, and heavy engineering capability resident in other services (USN Construction Battalion and USAF Red Horse) are critical to our near term success in 

Regional Command-South. All of these are part of the planning, execution, and enabling of the current MEB deployment. None of these are foreign to the Marine Corps 

and all were part of success in Anbar but they are more acute in Afghanistan because it is a landlocked country complicating logistics support and because Iraq was 

far more developed in 2003 than Regional Command-South is today. 

54. Senator BURR. General Amos, how are Marine Corps units adapting their 

training, tactics, and command and control in order to address this employment 

plan? 

General AMOS. Adaptation of training, tactics, and command and control has been 

focused in two basic areas: 

• The first focus area has been the increase in command and control capabilities of lower echelon units (i.e., companies and platoons) required to execute decentralized operations. This training revolves around command and 

control systems training and staff training. Under the Enhanced Company 

Operations concept, specific training has been developed to provide lower 

echelon units with the capabilities that previously resided at the battalion 

and above. 

• The second focus area revolves around the preparation of unit leaders to 

execute decentralized operations. The Marine Corps is currently developing 

a plan to improve their intuitive ability to assess, decide, and act while operating in a more decentralized manner across the MAGTF. This plan will 

address virtual and physical methods for developing unfamiliar training environments, physical and virtual, which expose junior leaders to uncertainty, fog, and friction. In addition, the Marine Corps is developing training devices and systems that enhance our ability to immerse marines in 

time-constrained scenarios that closely replicate combat situations as well 

as professional military education initiatives that will enhance the junior 

leader’s ability to more effectively operate and lead in complex environments with hybrid threats. 

62 

EQUIPMENT IN THEATER

55. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, the mountainous terrain, 

poor road infrastructure, and size of Afghanistan in comparison to Iraq require 

equipment that is unique from Iraq. Do you have the right types of equipment and 

in sufficient quantities to fully equip our forces for success in Afghanistan? If not, 

what shortfalls exist? 

General AMOS. Yes. We have upgraded our MTVRs (7 ton trucks). We possess all 

categories of MRAPs and have provided our requirements for the MRAP All Terrain 

Vehicle (MATV). These assets enable us to compensate for the poor road conditions 

in Afghanistan. Communications are very difficult in mountainous terrain and we 

require more sophisticated radios to enable our forces to communicate. We can field 

more radios, but at the expense of radios needed by CONUS Operating Force units. 

This also applies to increased requirements for vehicles and weapon systems. Due 

to the enormous weight of armor and stress on equipment frames, we cannot readily 

move from location to location unless it’s on a tractor trailer. As you know, there 

is no mature infrastructure in Afghanistan, so the communications, expeditionary 

airfield, tent camps, camp protection, and all that goes with these things must be 

brought in and/or built. MILCON will play a large role in how quickly our tent camp 

support (ablution plants, bottled water plants), maintenance facilities for aviation 

(props) and ground equipment, communications infrastructure, etc. are built and 

placed in service. Sir, you asked if we can fully equip our forces for success in Afghanistan and the answer remains ‘‘yes,’’ but at a cost to CONUS units and with 

congressional support for MILCON projects. 

General CHIARELLI. Yes, we have the right type equipment or actions in place to 

address units’ equipment requirements for Afghanistan. We conduct weekly video 

teleconferences with Theater to set conditions for success in support of equipping 

our forces in Afghanistan. Efforts have resulted in a significantly reduced amount 

of last minute equipment sourcing issues. The Army equips units based on their theater assigned mission—Mission Essential Equipment List. Commanders can also request additional equipment based on unit-specific needs in an Operational Needs 

Statement. Finally, the Army is building an Afghanistan Theater Provided Equipment set to resource unit equipment requirements in Afghanistan. These collective 

efforts will ensure that units have the best available equipment, in sufficient quantities, for success in Afghanistan. 

Because of the rugged and mountainous terrain in Afghanistan, we will place a 

greater reliance on aviation to conduct combat operations. Based on the current Improvised Explosive Device threat, we will continue to use Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protective vehicles (MRAPs) to protect soldiers as they travel around the country. 

However, the areas in which these vehicles operate are limited by their size and 

weight. In an effort to overcome these challenges, the Army is pursuing the MRAPAll Terrain Vehicles to provide the off-road capability necessary for combat operations in the rugged Afghanistan terrain. The unique and austere environment will 

also require a greater quantity of select equipment (mortars, precision fire artillery, 

blue force tracking, and machine guns) for specific combat and support forces. The 

Army has the necessary equipment to sustain the higher quantities in select units. 

The short-term impact will be on the readiness of nondeployed units. This redistribution of equipment from nondeployed units will reflect in the readiness reporting 

of those units until replacement equipment arrives in conjunction with a responsible 

draw down of equipment from Iraq. 

56. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, have you identified any 

additional equipment requirements that would better serve our forces in Afghanistan that are currently unfunded? 

General AMOS. We have noted several specific items on our Unfunded Programs 

List that can help us in the future. That includes engineering equipment, reliability 

and maintainability and equipment upgrade funding for the MV–22, and more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment. We’ll continue to monitor the 

urgent need requests of our operating forces as we executed fiscal year 2009 and 

fiscal year 2010 to adjust for emerging requirements. 

General CHIARELLI. As mentioned previously, we have the right type equipment 

or actions in place to address units’ equipment requirements for Afghanistan. We 

conduct weekly video teleconferences with Theater to set conditions for success in 

support of equipping our forces in Afghanistan. Efforts have resulted in a significantly reduced amount of last minute equipment sourcing issues. The Army equips 

units based on their theater assigned mission—Mission Essential Equipment List. 

Commanders can also request additional equipment based on unit-specific needs in 

an Operational Needs Statement. Finally, the Army is building an Afghanistan TheVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ater Provided Equipment set to resource unit equipment requirements in Afghanistan. These collective efforts will ensure that units have the best available equipment, in sufficient quantities, for success in Afghanistan. 

MARINE CORPS AIR ASSETS IN THEATER

57. Senator BURR. General Amos, in view of the limitations on the legacy Marine 

Corps helicopter assets such as the CH–46 and CH–53, will the MV–22 be deployed 

to Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. The answer is yes. However, the deployment of the V–22 is not 

related to the limitations of legacy platforms. MV–22 is the most capable platform 

for an austere, widely dispersed theater of operations, and its speed, range and altitude capabilities mean our Marine commanders will be able to maximize the 

MAGTF. 

58. Senator BURR. General Amos, what other aviation assets do you believe will 

be in high demand? 

General AMOS. We believe all our assets will continue to be in high demand, as 

they have been over the last several years. Communities in the highest demand categories will likely be H–1s, V–22, VMU, and EA–6B. That said, all of our platforms 

are deploying at a significantly increased tempo than that of prior to September 11. 

59. Senator BURR. General Amos, do you have adequate aviation resources considering the challenging environment and the plan to spread the forces out to cover 

large amounts of territory? 

General AMOS. In the short term, we rely on our commanders in the field to determine the aviation requirement. The Marine commanders in both Iraq and Afghanistan believe we have adequate aviation resources to accomplish the mission. We also 

maintain the ability to surge more assets to those commanders if required. A 

‘‘surge’’ would likely result in the further degradation of readiness and operational 

flexibility among the units left behind. 

In the long term, our acquisition programs must remain intact in order to reset 

the force and fulfill our anticipated global commitments. 

60. Senator BURR. General Amos, Congress just approved a reprogramming request to add a long-duration ISR and close air support (CAS) capability to a limited 

number of KC–130J tankers to support operations in Afghanistan. What is the plan 

for employing that capability? 

General AMOS. Mission kit-configured aircraft will address the urgent requirement to provide extended-duration ISR and aviation fires as an added measure of 

force protection for ground forces. Their ability to provide suppressive area fires and 

low-magnitude precision fires affords the MAGTF commander with additional 

means to counter enemy ambush operations and provide covering fires in mountainous terrain. In the ISR role these airframes can provide counter-IED support 

with persistent surveillance coverage and reactive fire support. Mission kit-configured KC–130Js have the potential to fill a number of other roles for the MAGTF; 

however, the intent of the mission kit is to provide a tertiary mission-set capability 

for the KC–130J, which also supports the MAGTF with aerial refueling (primary) 

and assault support (secondary). 

The KC–130J with mission kit was conceived as a means to provide support to 

ground forces in two specific scenarios—operations in mountainous terrain and operations which required extended periods of continuous over-watch support. 

The extreme elevations in Afghanistan preclude the use of rotary-wing platforms 

in support of ground operations. Specifically, rotary-wing attack aircraft that normally provide fire support and aerial reconnaissance for ground forces are unable 

to conduct these missions at altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet above mean sea level 

(MSL). However, the KC–130J can operate easily in these elevated areas but does 

not have the requisite tools to provide ISR and fire support to ground forces. The 

ISR/Weapons mission kit provides an efficient and quick resolution to this shortfall. 

Kit-configured aircraft can provide reactive fire support to forces operating at these 

elevations, while on-station in over-watch as an ISR platform. 

Operations in Afghanistan require aviation support that rotary-wing assets have 

difficulty fulfilling in terms of capacity. Traditional fixed-wing aircraft are helpful 

in fulfilling some of these requirements, but they are also incapable of satisfying the 

MAGTFs requirements for persistent ISR and fire support. The KC–130Js inherent 

capability to fly for extended periods enables it to support ground operations at exVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
64 

tended ranges and for extended periods of time, a desired attribute for aviation support in both AOs. 

The integration of armed KC–130Js into the MAGTF’s arsenal of aviation weapons will require deliberate thought, but not great effort. Mission kit-configured aircraft will be tasked and employed in the same manner as other aviation platforms 

that have multiple mission sets. Assignment of ISR/CAS missions to the KC–130J 

will be weighed carefully against use of the platform as a force multiplier for the 

ACE in the aerial refueler role or as an intratheater lift asset. 

The MAGTF commander will provide clear guidance for tasking of these limited 

assets. In sourcing joint tactical airstrike requests, both preplanned and immediate, 

mission kit-configured KC–130Js would be used as an alternative, not a primary option. Most requests for fire support can be met with the use of traditional fire support assets such as Marine TACAIR and H–1 helicopters—assets specifically designed for those missions. For preplanned missions, KC–130J aircraft would only be 

employed to support the niche requirements for long-duration over watch and/or fire 

support when it cannot be met by primary ISR and CAS platforms. Similarly, fulfillment of immediate requests would use the normal MACCS processes for diverting 

aircraft that are best suited to provide the support required; kit-configured KC–130J 

will normally be a last resort in these scenarios as well. 

RESET COSTS AND THE SHIFT OF WAR FUNDING TO THE BASE BUDGET

61. Senator BURR. General Amos, the President has made clear that he intends 

this to be the last supplemental budget request to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan outside the normal DOD budget. Your written statement indicates that 

the Marine Corps will need approximately $20 billion for replacing, repairing, or rebuilding equipment to reset the Marine Corps equipment stocks to acceptable readiness levels. Your statement also says that the Marine Corps will need depot-level 

maintenance on airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment well beyond 

the conclusion of hostilities in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you believe that we 

know what our reset costs actually are at this point, or will that depend on how 

quickly we are able to draw down in Iraq and the extent and length of combat in 

Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. It is hard to predict what the Marine Corps reset costs are going 

to be because it is unknown how long the Marine Corps will be fighting in Afghanistan and it is difficult to estimate the cost of reset for our gear returning from Iraq 

until that evolution is complete. The most important thing is that or marines are 

equipped with the best gear that the Marine Corps can provide. To do this, additional funding will be required as new threats arise on the battlefield. We know in 

the near term that we need an additional $8 billion in Reset funding. This includes 

the elements of Reset in our fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 OCO requests. 

However, as long as the war continues, our costs will continue to grow. 

62. Senator BURR. General Amos, how will the Marine Corps be able to meet 

these extensive and costly war-related funding needs within the normal DOD budget which is only projected to grow about 4 percent in fiscal year 2010? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps would not be able to meet its all its war-related 

funding requirements within the normal baseline budget. Our fiscal year 2009 OCO 

request was 32 percent of our total fiscal year 2009 baseline budget and is a critical 

to supporting the operational needs of our marines in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without the OCO the Marine Corps would be hardpressed to continue its mission in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

63. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, what steps is the Army taking to ensure its 

true budgeting requirements for contingency operations and reset are adequately 

addressed in the base budget? 

General CHIARELLI. In the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request, the Army 

realigned enduring missions to the base budget that were previously executed in the 

OCO. Those missions include the family support programs (with the exception of the 

Yellow Ribbon Program which remains in OCO for the USAR and is split between 

base and OCO for the National Guard) and transportation costs for Combat Training Center rotations. The extent to which reset will be funded in the base budget 

will be determined through future administration and congressional guidance. Contingency operations and reset will continue to be accounted for in the OCO budget 

until that time. 

65 

MARINE CORPS READINESS STANDARDS

64. Senator BURR. General Amos, Marine Corps unit readiness has normally been 

rated in terms of the ability of units to perform full-spectrum combat operations in 

a high intensity conflict. For the last 7 years, we have been engaged in a counterterrorism and COIN fight. As discussed in last year’s hearing, the Marine Corps rates 

the readiness of its deployed units against the missions they are assigned, but rates 

its nondeployed units against their ability to execute their traditional full-spectrum 

missions. Explain this difference in evaluating readiness. 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps assesses the readiness of all of its units for both 

their designed missions (full spectrum operations) and assigned missions (upon receipt of a mission). This is an effective approach for our deployed forces that enables 

us to analyze their readiness and resource levels for any potential reassignment. 

Our nondeployed forces are the primary units that will be called upon to respond 

to contingencies, hence the emphasis on reporting their designed readiness for fullspectrum missions. 

65. Senator BURR. General Amos, do the different ways of expressing unit readiness adequately convey the true readiness of our forces? 

General AMOS. Yes. In coordination, we believe they do. This is a primary reason 

why the Marine Corps has supported the implementation of the DRRS, but insisted 

on retaining the readiness resource ratings provided by the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). This combination of readiness information, 

in conjunction with the commander comments that quantify and clarify their readiness report, will be included in the implementation of DRRS–MC, scheduled for initial operational capability by fall of this year. 

66. Senator BURR. General Amos, how much risk are we taking in the full-spectrum mission? 

General AMOS. The risk is significant. We have not had sufficient time, equipment, and continuity of personnel to fully train to some of our critical Marine Corps 

core competencies. We have not trained to the full extent of our doctrinal amphibious capabilities in years, nor have we conducted the type of large-scale integrated 

combined arms exercises we used to do before 2002. Certain low-supply, high demand units and personnel are routinely deployed to support OCOs which preclude 

them from being available for other contingencies. Additionally, the requirement to 

assign combat and combat support units to provisional/in-lieu-of missions has also 

degraded designed training proficiencies. Our end strength growth coupled with the 

retrograde from OIF will help to minimize this challenge. 

67. Senator BURR. General Amos, as highlighted in your written statement, I am 

concerned that the Marine Corps has now, through necessity rather than by choice, 

developed a generation of mid-grade officer and enlisted leaders who have had to 

sacrifice training in combat specialties such as artillery, air defense, amphibious operations, and mechanized maneuver in order to provide other capabilities in high 

demand in a COIN war, such as security, civil affairs, and military police. I believe 

you share this concern. How do we rebuild 7 years of lost training and experience 

in our mid-career leaders? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps has continued to provide our leaders with core 

competency training in our schoolhouses during the post-September 11 era. While 

we have added emphasis on irregular warfare, at the same time we have maintained a balanced emphasis on conventional warfare. The 202,000 end strength increase that was authorized by Congress will allow the Marine Corps to reduce the 

number of personnel that are applied to operational requirements which are outside 

of their combat specialties. For example, the addition of civil affairs personnel to the 

structure of some artillery units will allow the Marine Corps to retain the civil affairs capability in the Active Force, while not compromising the training of the unit 

in its core competencies. As dwell time increases to a ratio of 2:1, units will have 

a greater ability to conduct sustainment training in both core competency skills as 

well as those mission specific skills which may be outside of their core competencies. 

FUTURE OF MRAPS

68. Senator BURR. General Amos, in order to provide the maximum protection for 

our forces, the Marine Corps requested and Congress provided extensive funding for 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to defeat the threat of Improved 

Explosive Devices in Iraq. Such a heavy vehicle is not as well-suited for the poor 

66 

infrastructure and more rugged, mountainous terrain in Afghanistan. What is the 

future of the MRAP within the Marine Corps? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps currently plans to use a number of MRAPs in 

AFG to the greatest extent possible and practical, to maximize upon the protected 

mobility they provide. MRAP vehicles are already integrated into the equipment 

density list that will be used in the theater. Current planning figures for the MEB 

and Regimental Combat Team (RCT) being introduced during early 2009 is 473 

MRAPs of all categories, and an additional 273, likewise representing all categories, 

upon the addition of a second RCT planned during early 2010. A recent upgrade to 

the suspension of the Cougar Category I is expected to significantly improve the vehicles off road performance and durability, and in doing so the usefulness of these 

vehicles in the demanding Afghan terrain. Likewise a number of MAXXPRO Dash 

variant vehicles (category I) have been allocated to the Marine Corps by recent Joint 

Allocation and Distribution Board actions. These vehicles have proven to handle the 

Afghan terrain well. 

A number of MRAP vehicles will remain in Iraq to support Marine Units throughout the duration of their presence in that theater. This number will be drawn down 

appropriately based on threat and on site commanders desires as units depart. As 

these vehicles are drawn down, each will be assessed and repaired as required in 

existing facilities in Kuwait. Once completed these vehicles will either be deployed 

to AFG to meet the requirement there, maintained in a theater Reserve most likely 

located in Kuwait for the near term, or returned to CONUS and other locations in 

accordance with the Marine Corps Enduring Requirement plan for MRAP vehicles 

which will be presented to the senior leadership of the Marine Corps during June 

2009 for approval. 

The recommended Course of Action that will be presented to the senior leadership 

of the Marine Corps for approval in June 2009, proposes that all MRAPs presently 

allocated to the Marine Corps and determined to in an appropriate operational condition, will be retained and designated for one of three locations. (It is assumed for 

planning purposes that approximately 2000 MRAPs will remain in serviceable condition upon the completion of hostilities.) 

• A small portion, ∼745 vehicles, will be maintained in the operating forces 

to support home station training (∼145), vehicles for the Route Clearance 

Sets (∼140), Explosive Ordnance Disposal vehicles (∼86), and the Combat 

Engineer Vehicle (∼374) missions. 

• An addition number of the remaining MRAPs (∼733) equal to a MEBs requirement will be placed in prepositioned short-term storage (accessible 

within 30 days worldwide). This would potentially place MRAP vehicles on 

Maritime Preposition Shipping (∼48), as well as War Reserve, Albany, GA, 

(∼642) and Depot Maintenance Float Allowance (∼27), and Norway (∼16). 

• The remaining MRAP vehicles (∼710) will be placed in long-term storage 

(accessible within 90 days worldwide) at existing Marine Corps Depot locations, most likely Barstow, CA, based on cost and climate. 

The final distribution and location for these vehicles is presently being examined 

and a recommendation will be presented to the senior leadership in June 2009, in 

conjunction with the recommendation to retain the entire Marine Corps fleet of 

MRAP vehicles. 

Though Foreign Military Sales is always a consideration and possibility, the current Marine Corps plan (pending approval) has all serviceable MRAP vehicles being 

retained for at least the near-term years. 

69. Senator BURR. General Amos, what alternatives are being sought to provide 

a lighter vehicle and how well-protected would such a vehicle be? 

General AMOS. In the near-term MATV is being procured in support of an approved Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement from CENTCOM. The MATV requires effective force protection (MRAP level protection) and mobility performance 

(comparable to the HMMWV) for off-road missions. The lack of established roads in 

the OEF AOR requires the MATV be moderately lighter than current MRAP vehicles. The vehicle will include integral and/or removable kits for both EFP and RPG 

protection. There are currently five vendors competing in a selection process. Under 

this best value MATV acquisition, vendors are expected to maximize both protection 

levels and off-road mobility attributes and balance the effects of size and weight in 

support of stated requirements. 

In the longer term, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), which is currently in 

the technology development phase of the acquisition cycle, is a key component of the 

Marine Corps’ ground combat tactical vehicle strategy. The program is driven by the 

need to reduce weight of our tactical vehicle fleet in order to regain expeditionary 

67 

capabilities, particularly shipboard compatibility and rotary wing transportability. 

Another goal of the JLTV program is to regain payload capacity lost in our current 

HMMWV fleet due to the installation of heavy armor kits that have taken the 

HMMWV past its gross vehicle weight rating. At the same time, the JLTV program 

will capitalize on lessons learned during OIF and OEF and by our experience with 

the MRAP vehicles to incorporate armor and other protective features into the vehicle design. The JLTV will include integral and/or removable kits for both EFP and 

RPG protection. The JLTV will provide marines with a very high degree of protection on all aspects of the vehicle against many of the most prevalent mines and improvised explosive devices. 

END STRENGTH GROWTH

70. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, Secretary Gates strongly 

endorsed increasing the Army and Marine Corps end strength during his discussion 

of priorities for the fiscal year 2010 budget. Some view this as too expensive, and 

others are concerned that large ground forces will not be needed once we withdraw 

from Iraq and Afghanistan. Does the Army and the Marine Corps need the additional forces regardless of the duration of our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. While force reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan may occur in the 

future, no decisions have yet been solidified. After we reduce our presence in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, it is clear that the realities of the Long War will continue to keep 

marines and soldiers deployed around the globe at an increased level. The Nation 

is currently accepting risk through our inability to meet the other combatant commander’s theater engagements and shaping requirements outside of CENTCOM. To 

build security cooperation relationships across all theaters and prepare for contingencies outside of CENTCOM, the increased endstrength is critical to accomplishing 

Combatant Commander Theater Security Cooperation activities. 

As America’s expeditionary ‘‘force in readiness’’ the Marine Corps must remain 

fast, austere, and lethal, capable of responding with extraordinary speed and 

versatility to contingencies across the range of military operations, against a variety 

of threats, and in diverse operational environments. This ability requires a forward 

presence in peacetime and in times of conflict. Our 202,000 force provides the capacity to deploy forces for operations, broadens the engagement options available to national leadership, and improves overall readiness. 

General CHIARELLI. While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue at a 

significant level for the foreseeable future, the Army will need to reach and maintain its projected end strength regardless of the duration of our OIF/OEF commitments. Currently, the global demand for Army forces exceeds the supply. This demand includes combatant commander requirements to conduct security cooperation 

activities and SFA missions that have consistently gone unfulfilled due to current 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we draw down forces in OIF/OEF, these 

manpower-intensive requirements will gain in importance, supporting the Secretary 

of Defense’s objective of building ally and partner capacity. Therefore, regardless of 

our commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan, demand for forces will remain high for 

the foreseeable future as the U.S. remains persistently engaged around the globe. 

71. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what do your Services 

gain from this increase in terms of skills and capabilities, units, and increased dwell 

time between deployments? 

General AMOS. See attached slide for 202,000 build. 

68 

General CHIARELLI. Increasing the Army end strength improves our strategic 

depth. It enables the Army to rebalance by fiscal year 2011 and achieve a BOG to 

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69 

ations while timely and consistent funding assists in resetting war worn equipment. 

Full Spectrum Readiness requires 18 months dwell for units to train beyond COIN 

mission requirements before their next deployment. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s 

guidance is that units with less than 18 months dwell before their next deployment 

will stay focused on the COIN mission. Units that have 18 months or longer before 

their next deployment are to focus on conventional skills training for 90 days. 

72. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, do you see a reduction 

in demand over the near-to-long term for Individual Augment assignments, training 

teams, and other joint requirements for mid-grade officer and enlisted leaders? 

General AMOS. Since 2007 the Marine Corps equity in ordered JMD requirements 

has increased by 81 requirements. Growth for majors and lieutenant colonels has 

increased by 15 percent with 28 new requirements. For SSgts and Gunnery Sgts it 

has increased by 22 percent with 19 requirements. These figures are based upon 

snap shots taken from May of each year (2007, 2008, 2009). Demand is anticipated 

to grow with the USMC contribution to the Regional Command-South JMD and the 

AF/Pak strategy. There is a reconciliation plan with Iraq but the savings is still to 

be determined with the formation of the USFI JMD. The four pay grades represented above make up 55 percent of JMD requirements for each calendar year. 

General CHIARELLI. Army sees a potential reduction in Training Team requirements beginning in the October/November 2009 timeframe for Iraq Transition 

Teams as we convert to the Advise and Assist BCT concept. The Advise and Assist 

BCT concept yields a reduction in NCO requirements in support of OIF but field 

grade officer requirements will remain about the same. For Afghanistan, we do not 

see the transition team requirements decreasing. Given the change in priorities to 

OEF, it is anticipated transition team requirement there will increase as we build 

Government of Afghanistan capacity to provide for their internal and external security. Army will see a 17 percent reduction in individual augmentee requirements in 

Iraq. However, this savings will not be a reduction in CENTCOM manpower requirements for the Army as it is anticipated the reduction will be applied to the 

currently identified additional requirements in Afghanistan. US Forces-Afghanistan 

and its subordinate commands currently require 556 individual augmentees of 

which 354 are mid-grade officers and enlisted leaders. Again, it is anticipated individual augmentee requirements will increase during fiscal year 2010. 

PREPOSITION STOCK REPLENISHMENT STATUS

73. Senator BURR. General Amos, the Marine Corps has had to draw heavily from 

its afloat preposition equipment in the three Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) 

Squadrons and the Marine Corps Preposition Program-Norway to meet its equipment needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. This has increased the strategic risk if a major 

commitment of Marine Corps forces were required elsewhere. What is the status of 

replenishing our strategic stores of equipment on our MPS ships and in Norway? 

General AMOS. Withdrawal of equipment from our strategic programs has been 

a key element in supporting combat operations, growth of the Marine Corps, and 

other operational priorities. Generous support from Congress has enabled long-term 

equipment solutions, and as a result, shortfalls within our strategic programs will 

be reset as equipment becomes available from industry. 

Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSRON) 

Our MPSRONs will be reset with the most capable equipment possible, and we 

have begun loading them with capabilities that support lower spectrum operations 

while still maintaining the ability to generate MEBs capable of conducting major 

combat operations. The MPSRONs are currently rotating through Maritime 

Prepositioning Force (MPF) Maintenance Cycle-9. MPSRON–1 completed MPF 

Maintenance Cycle-9 in September 2008 and is currently at 86 percent of its full 

equipment set. As I addressed in my 2008 report, equipment from MPSRON–1 was 

required to outfit new units standing up in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 

as part of our end strength increase to 202,000. MPSRON–1 is expected to be fully 

reset at the completion of its next maintenance cycle in 2011. 

MPSRON–2 is currently undergoing its rotation through MPF Maintenance Cycle9. Equipment from MPSRON–2 was offloaded to support OIF and much of that 

equipment still remains committed to forward operations today. With projected deliveries from industry, MPSRON–2 will complete MPF Maintenance Cycle-9 in June 

2009 with approximately 90 percent of its planned equipment set. Our intent is to 

fully reset MPSRON–2 when it completes MPF Maintenance Cycle-10 in fiscal year 

2012. MPSRON–3 was reset to 100 percent of its equipment set during MPF Maintenance Cycle-8 in March 2007 and remains fully capable. 

70 

We are currently in the process of replacing the aging, leased vessels in the MPF 

with newer, larger, and more flexible government owned ships from the Military 

Sealift Command fleet. Two decades of equipment growth and recent armor initiatives have strained the capability and capacity of our present fleet—that was designed to lift a Naval Force developed in the early 1980s. As we reset MPF, these 

changes are necessary to ensure we incorporate hard fought lessons from recent 

combat operations. 

Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway 

The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP–N) was also used to 

source equipment in support of current operations in both OIF and OEF and to provide humanitarian assistance in Georgia. The Marine Corps continues to reset 

MCPP–N in accordance with our operational priorities while also exploring other locations for geographic prepositioning that will enable combat and theater security 

cooperation operations in support of forward deployed Naval Forces. 

74. Senator BURR. General Amos, does the Marine Corps have an investment 

strategy in the defense budget to fully restore these stores of equipment? If so, 

please provide a review of this investment strategy. 

General AMOS. Our baseline budget is structured to support the stock replenishment plans outlined in answer #73. For the distribution of equipment however, our 

deployed warfighters still get first priority, so we may have situations where we’re 

delayed in restocking. These costs will be covered by both our baseline budget and 

our supplemental requests. Over the long term, the Marine Corps will continue to 

incorporate our prepositioning equipment sets into our modernization plans and our 

acquisition objectives. As an element of the USMC Approved Acquisition Objective, 

MPF is modernized along with the rest of the force to ensure the equipment aboard 

MPF is as capable as possible given other operational priorities. 

MOVEMENT OF MARINES FROM OKINAWA TO GUAM

75. Senator BURR. General Amos, during one of her first international trips after 

being confirmed as Secretary of State, Secretary Clinton, signed an agreement with 

the Government of Japan regarding the relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam. What is the status of crucial decisions, such as the environmental 

assessment needed to build an airfield for the marines to replace the existing runway at MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, and funding by Japan to support this move? 

General AMOS. [Deleted.] 

76. Senator BURR. General Amos, what is your level of confidence that the move 

to Guam can be completed on schedule? 

General AMOS. While we are committed to the relocation to Guam, we foresee significant challenges with meeting the completion timeline of 2014. Of note, the original concept for the Guam buildup was a 7 year construction schedule to begin in 

2007. We are currently on a 4-year construction schedule to begin in 2010. Issues 

that impact the 2014 timeline include Japanese construction of the FRF, the Guam 

Environmental Impact Statement, the physical movement of 8,000 marines, and 

programming. However, perhaps the key issue with the 2014 timeline is construction capacity on Guam. A completion timeline of 2017 or beyond is more realistic 

based on an assessment of equipment, material, workforce, infrastructure, and 

transportation requirements available on Guam. 

77. Senator BURR. General Amos, what is being done to ensure that Guam has 

adequate resources to make the necessary infrastructure improvements to its port 

and roads to support the buildup of marines and other U.S. forces? 

General AMOS. [Deleted.] 

78. Senator BURR. General Amos, given the current plan, do you believe the marines stationed on Guam will be able to fulfill the full range of training requirements? If not, what shortfalls exist and what arrangements will need to be implemented to satisfy training requirements? 

General AMOS. Without CNMI ranges and training areas, Marine Corps units stationed on Guam will not be able to maintain operational readiness along their core 

competencies without extensive travel to other Marine Corps, DOD or allied nation 

ranges. 

Current NEPA efforts and other key elements such as funding do not include all 

Marine Corps training-range requirements for units to be relocated to Guam. Specifically absent are the facilities to support enhanced unit-level, live-fire training. 

71 

Training facilities on Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands 

would reduce our dependency on foreign training facilities, which is often complicated by status-of-forces agreements, quarantine procedures, and political sensitivities 

The Marine Corps continues to work with the Secretary of the Navy and DOD 

to address our training requirements. 

CHANGES TO THE MARINE CORPS’ TABLES OF EQUIPMENT

79. Senator BURR. General Amos, what has the Marine Corps learned about needed changes to its unit Tables of Equipment over the course of the last 7 years? 

General AMOS. We have rigorously reviewed our tables of equipment, using feedback received from our Urgent Universal Need Statements, our Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, and the results of a Corps-wide evaluation of all Tables of 

Equipment by our own subject matter experts who have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of this review, we have revised our tables of equipment to 

reflect the capabilities required for success in the missions we are assigned today, 

as well as the full range of missions we anticipate in the future. 

While our new tables of equipment provide for increased capabilities in many 

areas today—particularly protected mobility, tactical level communications, and 

crew-served weapons—they also serve as the basis for future force development. We 

continually refine our requirements to exploit new technology and to continue to 

adopt new lessons. As a result, we see trends reflective of irregular warfare, such 

as requirements for increased capabilities in command and control and persistent 

ISR, as well as requirements to further enhance the organic ability of small units 

to perform a wide array of missions traditionally associated with higher echelon 

headquarters. 

The Marine Corps recently completed an initial review of its Operating Forces’ 

ground tables of equipment (T/E) requirements, which took into account the changing security environment and hard lessons learned from 7 years of combat. This review was synchronized with our modernization plans and programs, and addressed 

for enhanced mobility, lethality, sustainment and command and control needed 

across the MAGTF. The MAGTF T/E review was also an integral part of the critical 

work being done to reset, reconstitute and revitalize the Marine Corps. The resultant T/Es reflect the capabilities required not only for the Corps’ current mission, but 

for its future employment across the range of military operations, against a variety 

of threats, and in diverse terrain and conditions. 

80. Senator BURR. General Amos, how are these changes being implemented and 

funded? 

General AMOS. We are in the process of conducting a detailed comparison of our 

new tables of equipment with our equipment stocks currently on hand or contracted 

and the equipment that is currently programmed for procurement in future years. 

This will provide us a complete picture of our equipment shortfalls in all categories, 

including our actual unit table of equipment requirements, as well as our requirements for prepositioned stocks, training, war reserve, and rotational stocks to support our depot level maintenance programs. At the same time, we continually assess 

our procurement priorities to ensure that our resources are being applied wisely. 

When our detailed review is complete, we will apply the results to our planning 

processes for near-term reset and reconstitution, as well as our far-term force development planning processes. This will enable informed decision-making with regard 

to future programming, prioritization, and acceptance of risk. 

TRAINING RANGE ADEQUACY

81. Senator BURR. General Amos, do the existing Marine Corps’ training ranges 

provide sufficient land area and capability to conduct realistic predeployment training for the proposed increased end strength of Marine Corps units? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps has identified Service-level deficits in its ability 

to train to the many missions that it faces. Continued analysis and the fielding of 

new systems may cause other requirements to surface in the future, but today the 

projected operational range requirements at the Service level focus on the following 

critical deficiencies. 

• The inability of Marine Corps ranges to fully exercise a large MAGTF in 

a realistic, doctrinally appropriate training scenario. 

• Inadequate training opportunities for the Marine units stationed in the 

western Pacific and Hawaii. 

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• Inadequate aviation training facilities on the east coast of the United 

States with range capabilities such as those provided by MCAS Yuma on 

the west coast. 

As noted, increasing demands on training ranges and risks of constrained access 

to the existing range inventory from encroachment pressures present complex challenges. In the future, the Marine Corps expects these challenges to increase, resulting in additional deficiencies to the three critical shortfalls identified above. 

82. Senator BURR. General Amos, are you seeking to make any changes or expansions to training ranges? 

General AMOS. As noted, the Marine Corps has identified three critical deficiencies in available land area to support required training. 

• To address the inability of Marine Corps ranges to fully exercise a large 

MAGTF in a realistic, doctrinally appropriate training scenario, the Marine 

Corps is evaluating the potential expansion of Marine Corps Air Ground 

Combat Center (MCAGCC) at Twentynine Palms. MCAGCC is the center 

of excellence for developing and executing combine-arms live-fire training of 

the MAGTF; however, MCAGCC cannot accommodate a full-scale, live-fire 

MEB exercise. Expansion of MCAGCC would significantly enhance the ability of the Marine Corps to continue to provide trained marines, Marine 

units, and MAGTFs in furtherance of national security objectives. Having 

obtained necessary authorizations from DOD, the Marine Corps is proceeding with analysis and assessments in support of land expansion. 

• To address inadequate training opportunities for the Marine units stationed in the western Pacific and Hawaii, the Marine Corps is engaged in 

the planning initiative to relocate units from Okinawa to Guam, in order 

to influence that initiative to include development of training ranges and 

infrastructure on Guam and selected islands of the Commonwealth of the 

Northern Mariana Islands. Development of adequate range facilities for the 

conduct of enhanced small-unit live-fire training will help alleviate training-related deficits experienced by marines stationed in Okinawa and Hawaii. 

• To address the need for an aviation training range on the east coast of 

the United States with range capabilities such as those provided by MCAS 

Yuma on the west coast, a preliminary study of the Marines Corps’ Townsend Range in Georgia is underway. This study is assessing the feasibility 

of expanding Townsend to support aviation training utilizing current and 

emerging weapons, systems and platforms in a doctrinally appropriate 

training environment. 

In addition to these focused initiatives, at the direction of the Commandant, an 

initiative is underway to establish an overarching land acquisition strategy addressing current, emerging, and future training requirements and associated land and 

airspace needs (through 2060) to ensure the Marine Corps remains fully missioncapable. 

83. Senator BURR. General Amos, what additional investments are required to improve training for Marine Corps forces? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps has made unprecedented investments in its 

training infrastructure during the past 5 years. The primary focus of this modernization effort to date has been to meet the training requirements emerging from 

the theaters of operation, particularly those relating to urban and counter-IED tactics. As we look to the future, the Range Modernization Program will shift some of 

its emphasis to increase investment in providing realistic, immersive training environments for our marines using integrated systems for tactical engagement, range 

instrumentation, inter-active targetry, threat simulators, and after-action review. 

The program is funded through the Future Years Defense Program in a manner 

that will allow us to address many of our deficiencies and improve training at all 

of our home stations. 

ADEQUACY OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING

84. Senator BURR. General Amos, during his discussion of the fiscal year 2010 

budget, Secretary Gates indicated that the issue of amphibious shipping and seabasing programs, such as the 11th Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship, will be delayed until fiscal year 2011 in order 

to assess the costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the Nation needs. 

What are your views on the steady-state requirements for amphibious shipping? 

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General AMOS. The MPF (Future) (MPF(F)) program is a critically essential element of the Marine Corps warfighting capability, and the Corps cannot withstand 

any additional shipbuilding programmatic delays. 

The Marine Corps requires three MEB’s worth of expeditionary warfighting capability and lift. We have already accepted risk in our amphibious lift capacity by 

agreeing to fiscally constrain shipping availability for each of our 2 MEB assault 

echelons from 17 to 15 ships. And, the fiscal year 2009 30-year shipbuilding plan 

does not provide the exact mix of required LHA/LHDs, LPD–17s, and LSD–41/49 

equivalents, which further amplifies the risk we’re taking in our amphibious forcible 

entry capabilities. 

The Marine Corps intends to fight any major contingency operation as a Marine 

Expeditionary Force (MEF), which consists of three Regimental Landing Team 

(RLT)-size operational maneuver elements. The first two of those RLTs are intended 

to be employed from the amphibious Assault Echelon shipping described above, and 

the third RLT maneuver unit will operate from MPF(F) to reinforce and support the 

amphibious Assault Echelon units. 

The 30 operationally available amphibious ships required for 2.0 MEB Assault 

Echelon, coupled with MPF(F)s 1.0 MEB-level reinforcing and support echelon, and 

the Assault Follow-On Echelon (lifted by Military Sealift Command black-bottom 

shipping) provide the 3.0 MEB necessary to enable a sea based, MEF-level 

warfighting capability. 

FAMILY READINESS INITIATIVES

85. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, in your opinion, how are 

military families handling the extremely intense deployment schedule in support of 

overseas contingencies? 

General AMOS. There can be little doubt that nearly 8 years of high OPTEMPO 

have put stress not only on our forces but on our families as well. The Commandant 

and all Marine Corps leadership remain concerned about the impact on our families, 

and we have committed unprecedented resources to putting our family readiness 

programs on a wartime footing. In fiscal year 2010, many of the initiatives and improvements that were funded in supplemental budgets are now sustained in our 

baseline funding. We continue to carefully monitor our family health indicators. 

To mitigate the stress on military families and children facing the multiple challenges of having a loved one at war, the Marine Corps is partnering with the U.S. 

Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) and UCLA’s Center for Community Health and the National Center for Child Traumatic Stress to sponsor a program called Project FOCUS, ‘‘Families OverComing Under Stress,’’ at our major deploying bases. The family-oriented program is designed to work with marines, 

spouses and children to improve family communications post deployment through 

specialized resiliency training. Working with the existing teams of dedicated military family services personnel, FOCUS staff will assist families to better understand 

how combat operational stress affects them and their service family member, how 

to manage it, and how to strengthen themselves and their children in readiness for 

tomorrow. FOCUS is currently being provided at Camp Pendleton, Twentynine 

Palms, Camp Lejeune, MCB Hawaii, and MCB Okinawa. Next year, it will be expanded to include MCB Quantico, the Wounded Warrior Regiment and Battalions, 

and Marine Corps Reserve units in the Los Angeles Basin. 

We also know from our last Quality of Life Study (2007) that despite the global 

war on terror and the high OPTEMPO, marines and their families are generally 

pleased with the program services and support they are receiving from the Marine 

Corps. The study also found that there was an increase in overall and specific satisfaction across the board for spouses when compared with the results from the preOIF/OEF 2002 study. In fact, the overall Quality of Life score for the spouses was 

the highest seen for any of the respondent groups (marines assigned to an installation, independent marines, and recruiters) considered in this study. Spouses greatly 

appreciate the health care benefits provided by the Marine Corps, the quality of professional child care they receive, and the educational opportunities for their children. These factors and others had a positive impact on the family decision to remain part of the Marine Corps. 

General CHIARELLI. Army families are feeling the impacts of persistent conflict, 

but remain resilient in the midst of extraordinary sacrifices as their loved ones advance the cause of freedom around the world. Family members have set aside careers, interrupted their education, and when living far from a military base, struggled to locate child care equal to the price and quality available at military installations. Quality of life programs continue to contribute to soldiers’ and families’sense 

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of belonging to a caring military community, mitigate stress, and assist geographically dispersed soldiers and families which all reinforce their desire to remain in the 

Army as a way of life despite the serious military stressors and strains they experience. 

86. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, are you seeing any trends 

that would point to changes in the overall health and support of our Marine Corps 

families? 

General AMOS. There were year-on-year increases for 2008 in suicide incidents, 

sexual assault incidents, substantiated child maltreatment incidents, and domestic 

abuse incidents. We also know that divorce rates have increased. When we did a 

‘‘Financial Health Quick Poll’’ last summer to determine the level of financial stress 

among marines and their families as a result of recent economic changes, we 

learned that our Marine Corps families, like families in the civilian world, were experiencing some financial stress. 

The survey indicated that of those who responded to the Quick Poll, 15 percent 

of enlisted marines and 5 percent of Marine officers were classified as being in ‘‘financial distress.’’ Respondents reported that the most frequent financial problems 

experienced within the past year were utility rate increases, rent increases, and 

property tax increases. Over half of enlisted marines respondents stated they have 

borrowed money from family or friends, and 38 percent have skipped payment on 

their bills. 

To alleviate stress on marines and their families facing financial difficulties and 

help them develop financial management skills, we are providing personal financial 

management (PFM) counseling services and workshops. To date, 7,228 marines and 

2,077 family members have received one-on-one financial counseling, while 115,993 

marines and 5,055 family members have attended our PFM workshops/classes. 

General CHIARELLI. Never before in the history of our Army have we asked so 

much of our families, who make incredible sacrifices and remain steadfast while enduring the stress of almost 8 years at war. In response, the Army continues to enhance programs and services to enable soldiers and families to become resilient and 

ready to address the challenges of deployment and separation. 

From 2001 to 2008, overall soldier satisfaction with the quality of Army life rose 

from 63 percent to 79 percent for officers and from 52 percent to 65 percent for enlisted (fall 2008 Sample Survey of Military Personnel). We measure the effectiveness 

of Army support programs by surveying soldiers and families on a regular basis to 

seek their opinions, assess their satisfaction, and most importantly, monitor their 

adaptation to the unique challenges of Army life. These trends help us match the 

capabilities of Army programs to the expectations of our soldiers and families— 

keeping the Army strong, ready, and resilient. 

In 2007, the Army unveiled the Army Family Covenant, a commitment to provide 

soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with their level of service and 

sacrifice to the Nation. In the 2 years since the Covenant was unveiled, the Army 

has moved out with aggressive improvement strategies that have reaped significant 

improvements in soldier and family quality of life including family programs and 

services, increased accessibility to health care, improved housing, excellence in 

schools, youth and child services, and expanded education and employment opportunities for family members. We believe the Army Family Covenant is making a difference, and while we are moving in the right direction, there is still much work 

to do. 

87. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what has the Marine 

Corps done to improve and invest in family readiness programs given the enormous 

strain the force has been under? 

General AMOS. Over the past year, the Marine Corps initiated a multi-year strategy to transition family support programs to a wartime footing, per the Commandant’s directive. To achieve this, we conducted a series of assessments and received feedback from our marines, their families, and our commanders to measure 

the effectiveness of our services and family support programs. 

As a result, we implemented key reforms at every level of command and aboard 

each installation. Central to our transformation efforts, we expanded the depth and 

breadth of our family readiness training and support programs and established the 

Unit Personal and Family Readiness Program to educate our marines and their 

families and to empower them to achieve and maintain a high state of personal 

readiness and resiliency. Specific program enhancements: 

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Unit Personal and Family Readiness Program 

• Authorized full-time civilian Family Readiness Officer billets in more 

than 400 units, who serve as the focal point for families of our marines; 

• Redesigned Marine Corps Family Team Building to focus on the development and promulgation of high-quality training that supports the life cycle 

of marines and their families through mission, career and life events in 

support of the Unit Personal and Family Readiness Program; 

• Developed comprehensive training for pre, during, and post-deployment 

to address the increased demands and potential impact of multiple, sustained deployments on marines and their families; 

• Developed an inventory of Lifeskills training courses that address the 

specific challenges of military life, as well as those of personal and family 

life; 

• Expanded family readiness support to include parents of single marines 

as we acknowledge the role extended family members play in fostering personal and family readiness; 

• Utilized the Mass Communication Tool to enable Family Readiness Officers to expand communications between marines and their families through 

simultaneous broadcast of communication via email, text messaging, or 

telephone; 

• Initiated the Family Readiness Assessment Tool to provide unit commanders with the ability to assess the resiliency of their marines and families; 

• Conducted research and analysis to assess the effectiveness of current 

communication methods, to identify communication needs of marines and 

their families, and to develop a formal organizational communications system that will facilitate three-way communication: commands to marines 

and families; marines and families to commands; and marines and families 

to each other; 

• Initiated substantial infrastructure and quality of life programming improvements at remote and isolated commands to promote the sense of community required to form strong bonds among our marine families; and 

• Installed wireless networks and access points at over 230 facilities across 

the Marine Corps to better connect marines and their families, as well as 

enhance morale and recreation capabilities on installations. We are also 

testing a Morale-Portable Satellite Communications Suite that provides an 

internet and web-cam capability to FOBs in Afghanistan where traditional 

‘‘Internet Cafes’’ are unavailable. 

Exceptional Family Member Program 

Restructured the program and established a continuum of care for our Exceptional 

Family Member Program families. Specifics: 

• This program, which is fully staffed at both the installation and headquarters levels, is helping nearly 6,500 families gain access to medical, educational, and financial services that may be limited or restricted at certain 

duty stations. 

• A Marine Corps-funded Respite Care Program provides up to 40 hours of 

care per month to all enrolled families, and can be used in conjunction with 

the TRICARE Extended Care Health Option benefit. 

• We are working with the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and TRICARE 

to resolve health care access and availability issues at several bases. 

• Legal counsel is now on staff to advise our exceptional family members 

on State and Federal entitlements and processes. 

School Liaison Program 

Established a school liaison capability at every Marine Corps installation to help 

parents and commanders mitigate education transition issues by interacting with 

local schools and advocating for school-age children to insure access and availability 

to quality education and special needs services. In addition, the Marine Corps supports the DOD effort to develop an ‘‘Interstate Compact on Educational Opportunity 

for Military Children’’ with states to enable reciprocal acceptance of entrance, subjects, testing, and graduation requirements. To date, 18 States have passed the 

Interstate Compact, which accounts for 62 percent of all military children. Other 

states are moving toward passing the compact as well. 

Children, Youth and Teen Programs 

Adopted multiple strategies to increase our child care capability: 

• Expanded hours to address increased OPTEMPO; 

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• Developed partnerships with organizations on and off base, such as the 

National Association of Child Care Resource & Referral Agencies, to provide 

long and short-term support for marines and their families who are geographically dispersed, deployed, and severely injured; and 

• Started providing 16 hours of reimbursed respite care per month for families with a deployed marine. 

• Currently, we are providing 11,757 child care spaces and meeting 63.6 

percent of the calculated total need. It is important to note that the Marine 

Corps has initiated rigorous data collection and analysis improvements. As 

a result, it will be necessary to correct the 2007 annual summary due to 

identified reporting errors. Our reported rate of 71 percent of calculated 

total need last year is more accurately stated as 59.1 percent. 

• To meet the DOD standard of 80 percent of potential need, we would require slightly over 3000 additional spaces. To address this requirement, 

Congress has funded 915 additional spaces in fiscal year 2008/2009. The 

ARRA and 2009 Overseas Contingency request would provide an additional 

1,700 spaces. We are also considering additional modular Child Development Centers, subject to more detailed planning and availability of funds. 

As the needs of our families change, our program is committed to grow and 

adapt to meet these needs. 

These initiatives and others not only demonstrate the commitment of the Marine 

Corps to our marines and their families, but also underscore the significance of Marine and family support to mission readiness. 

General CHIARELLI. Under the Army Family Covenant, the Army began to implement aggressive improvements to a broad range of family-oriented quality of life 

programs and services to standardize and fund existing family programs and services; increase accessibility to health care; improve soldier and family housing; ensure excellence in schools, youth, and child services; and expand education and employment opportunities for family members. 

Since the Covenant’s inception, the Army has made significant progress and improvements in quality of life programs including implementation of the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program to minimize the stress of military service, deployed 

200,000 training products to strengthen resilience in military children; increased 

staff for the New Parent Support Home Visit Program; added additional respite care 

funding for Families with Exceptional Family Members and those with a deployed 

sponsor; established soldier and Family Assistance Centers; and placed thousands 

of spouses in jobs—just to name a few. 

While we are moving in the right direction with the Army Family Covenant, there 

is still much work to be done. The Army remains determined to provide a strong 

and supportive environment where soldiers and their families can thrive. 

RECRUIT QUALITY

88. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, both the Army and the 

Marine Corps have surpassed all expectations by achieving its growth targets as it 

expands respective end strengths. How has this expansion impacted recruit quality? 

General AMOS. The quality of our recruits is at a historical high. The Marine 

Corps has been and remains committed to recruiting only the most highly qualified 

young men and women into our Corps. We continue to believe, and the evidence 

bears out, that recruiting high quality applicants results in decreased attrition from 

recruit training during the marine’s first term. High quality applicants become high 

quality marines, who perform well during all aspects of their military careers and 

maintain the high standards our Nation expects from her marines. Because of this 

commitment to quality, the Marine Corps has not, and will not, reduce our quality 

standards or enlistment criteria. 

General CHIARELLI. The performance of young soldiers in combat and reports of 

their performance from leaders in the field attest to the fact that the quality of the 

young men and women volunteering to serve in America’s Army remains of the 

highest caliber. The recruiting environment—which in previous years yielded recruiting cohorts that significantly exceeded the Army’s and the DOD’s recruiting 

quality standards—has impacted our ability to meet DOD quality mark goals for the 

past 5 years. However, despite these shortfalls, we are now experiencing a return 

to favorable conditions and the result is a marked increase in fiscal years 2008 and 

2009 recruit quality. The Army’s percentage of new enlisted soldiers considered 

‘‘high quality’’ with a Tier 1 education (high school diploma) increased by 2.1 percent 

in 2008. Additionally, recruits who scored highly (50 percent to 99 percent) on the 

Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) increased 1.6 percent; and recruits who 

77 

scored poorly (30 percent and below) on the AFQT decreased 1.2 percent. The Army 

is expected to meet every DOD quality mark goal in all components for fiscal year 

2009 and remains committed to recruiting the best qualified volunteers who desire 

to serve our Nation as soldiers. 

ARMY NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER AND MID-LEVEL OFFICER SHORTFALL

89. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, as a result of nearly 7 years of war, multiple 

deployments, and increasing strain on military families, the Army is experiencing 

a shortfall of young officers and NCOs—positions that many consider the backbone 

of the operational military. In an attempt to address this shortfall, the Army began 

in 2005 automatically promoting enlisted personnel in the rank of E–4 to E–5 without requiring them to appear before a promotion board. In April 2008, the Army extended this policy to include automatic promotions from E–5 to E–6. While a soldier’s name can be removed from the promotion list by his or her commander, it 

will be automatically returned to the pending promotions list the following month. 

This change in policy reduced the NCO shortfall by nearly 70 percent; however, it 

also led to an influx of unqualified and untested soldiers filling leadership roles in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. What is the current rate of promotion from E–4 to E–5? From 

E–5 to E–6? 

General CHIARELLI. Soldiers previously denied Department of the Army directed 

promotion list integration are automatically re-integrated quarterly, not monthly, in 

support of Army quarterly leader/ professional developmental counseling requirements. In fiscal year 2009 (year to date), on average, the monthly Army selection 

rate for promotion to sergeant is 5.55 percent with a selection rate for Soldiers automatically integrated to sergeant at 0.34 percent. The monthly selection rate for promotion to staff sergeant is 4.22 percent with a selection rate for Soldiers automatically integrated to staff sergeant at 0.16 percent. 

90. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, are you concerned that soldiers are being 

promoted based on numerical requirements rather than on their qualifications and 

service record? 

General CHIARELLI. Commanders, Command Sergeants Major, and First Sergeants throughout our Army are upholding their inherent responsibility to ensure 

only highly qualified soldiers remain integrated onto the recommended list for promotion to sergeant and staff sergeant. I believe our leaders are taking this responsibility with the highest regard. 

The promotion system, as an administrative process, is designed to ensure promotion of sufficient numbers of qualified soldiers to satisfy requirements and it 

works very well. I trust that commanders are not allowing integration to promotion 

lists of any unqualified soldier. 

91. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, are there any plans pending to eliminate the 

automatic promotion of sergeants and staff sergeants without requiring them to appear before a promotion board? 

General CHIARELLI. There are no automatic promotions and there are no plans to 

terminate the provisions of the program. We are considering renaming the program 

‘‘Commander’s List Integration’’ so the term ‘‘automatic’’ is not mistakenly applied 

to a promotion. While the Army automatically integrates qualified soldiers, they remain on the list only if the commander approves integration. Soldiers integrated to 

the promotion list based on this policy receive the minimum number of promotion 

points and they must compete for promotion with those who are integrated through 

normal promotion board processes. Consequently, the likelyhood of a soldier automatically integrated onto the promotion list is much smaller. Army standards are 

retained and enforced by commanders. Automatic list integration does not guarantee automatic promotion. There is no provision or intent for automatic list integration to result in automatic promotion. 

92. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, these shortfalls extend to the junior and 

mid-level officer corps, as well. In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, military analyst Andrew Krepinevich noted that the Army is projected to experience a shortfall of approximately 3,000 captains and majors until at 

least 2013 as the Army increases its Active-Duty end strength by 65,000. Do you 

believe this projected shortfall is accurate? 

General CHIARELLI. No. The Army currently projects to be at full strength for captains by fiscal year 2013, but will have a shortfall of 1,355 majors that year. The 

Army’s company grade retention continues to improve, but our growth in structure 

78 

and capabilities requires the Army to retain captains and majors at rates well above 

historical averages. 

93. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, can you elaborate what consequences this 

shortfall will have on the Army’s ability to meet its requirements? 

General CHIARELLI. Our aggressive focus on shortages over the past several years 

will allow us to be at or over strength slightly for captains by fiscal year 2011, but 

we are likely continue to be short for majors through fiscal year 2015, barring any 

subsequent drop in required force structure. 

94. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, can you describe what steps the Army is taking to address this shortfall through the Captain’s Incentive Program, as well as 

any other relevant efforts? 

General CHIARELLI. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, we implemented a pre-commissioning program, which allows cadets to select a branch, post of choice, or graduate 

school for an additional service obligation of 3 years. This program has proved successful over the past 3 years with over 4,500 participating cadets to date. The Army 

expects this program to reduce loss rates among U.S. Military Academy (USMA) 

and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship commissioned officers beginning in fiscal year 2010 when officers from the earliest year group will have completed their normal active duty service obligation (5 years for USMA and four for 

ROTC officers). As a result of this program, the participating officers will be retained for 8 and 7 years, respectively. 

95. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, how do you gauge the effectiveness of these 

programs? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army’s Captains Retention Menu of Incentives program 

began in September 2007. This program targeted Army Competitive Category and 

selected Medical Service and Army Nurse Captains, and offered officers from year 

groups 1999 through 2005 the opportunity to select a branch of choice, post of 

choice, military school, graduate level education, or Critical Skills Retention Bonus 

in exchange for an agreement to serve 3 additional years past any existing service 

obligations. This program closed in November 2008, and has guaranteed obligations 

through the beginning of fiscal year 2011 for over 15,300 captains. In 2006, at the 

beginning of our most significant modular growth, the Army was projected to be 

short almost 7,000 captains and majors in the summer of 2009. The projected shortage for the end of summer 2009 is now less than 3,000 at these grades. We are confident that our Menu of Incentives played a significant part in reducing our shortages. 

For the future, The Army is developing nonmonetary retention tools for commanders at all levels that provide direct comparisons between the benefits of service 

careers and careers in the civilian sector, as well as web based interactive information sites, and personal outreach tools that enable the direct interaction between 

senior leaders and their junior officers to maximize the potential to retain our best 

and brightest young officers. 

READINESS RATES OF SUPPORT FORCES

96. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, much attention has been given to the current readiness of our combat units. However, can you briefly comment on the difference between the current readiness rates of combat units, combat support units, 

and combat service support units for both Active and Reserve component forces? 

General CHIARELLI. FM 3–0, Operations, establishes the Army’s six ‘‘warfighting 

functions’’ and no longer uses combat, combat support or combat service support to 

categorize forces. There is, however, no doubt that the readiness of the entire Army 

has been stretched and the implications of that stress are available through classified responses or from the Chairman’s Risk Assessment. 

The Army closely monitors the readiness of all its forces—movement and maneuver units as well as intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control and protection units. All forces have experienced degraded readiness ratings due to prolonged rotations resulting from more than 8 years of armed conflict. For units other 

than movement and maneuver units, this strain has been more pronounced, particularly in the Reserve component, where the majority of these units are included in 

the force structure. 

To remedy this decline and to meet the combatant commander’s demand for 

forces, the Army has developed the ARFORGEN process. The purpose of the process 

is to synchronize resourcing of units to meet routine and predictable periods of 

79 

availability and deployment. A major objective of the process is to accurately track 

and resource the readiness of all Army units across all three components (Active 

Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve). This approach ensures that the 

Army is capable of providing the best trained and led formations to meet current 

and future demands. 

The Army remains committed to providing detailed, accurate, and commandercentric assessment of unit capabilities. Our readiness reporting procedures will continue to measure the core functions of Army units to meet wartime requirements. 

Additionally, Army units will report readiness assessments to complete assigned 

missions when directed by combatant commanders. 

97. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, does the Army’s plan to restore a balance 

to the force by 2011 include sustaining, preparing, resetting, and transforming all 

Army units, or is the Army just concentrating on major combat units? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army is committed to providing every deploying soldier 

and unit regardless of component, with the best training, equipment, and formations 

and ensuring these deployed units are reset to restore all deployed units to a level 

of personnel and equipment readiness to permit resumption of training for future 

missions. The Army transformation plan includes all units in all components-Active, 

Guard, and Reserve, and is scheduled to be 97 percent complete by the end of 2011. 

98. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, is the Army differentiating between the Active and Reserve components in your rebalancing plans? 

General CHIARELLI. The rebalance plan is predicated on the assured access to 

units and the different ARFORGEN Model deployment rates utilized by the Active 

component and the Reserve component. The Army focuses rebalance plans on ensuring the required forces are available to the combatant commanders and Governors 

in a timely manner. The rebalance plan considers capability placement within components based on these factors. 

Since 2003, the Army has adjusted the mix in combat, combat support, and combat service support force structure by over 88,000 across all three components, to 

include reductions in field artillery and armor units and growth in military police, 

engineers, civil affairs, and psychological operations. During the latest Army force 

sizing analysis in 2008, no major rebalancing efforts occurred between components 

to allow the Reserve component the time needed to build readiness. 

The Army continuously makes adjustments to the balance of capabilities between 

components as new requirements emerge. The Army remains committed to ensuring 

the interoperability of these units through standardized design and uniformed fielding regardless of component. 

MODULAR REDESIGN OF ARMY

99. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, the Army has undertaken a restructuring of 

its combat and support forces to a more flexible, brigade-centric force thought to be 

better suited for the 21st century security environment. At the same time, the Army 

underwent a revision to Army FM 3.0 Operations, to reflect an increased emphasis 

on stability and civil support operations. However, some critics have raised concerns 

that these smaller, modular brigades with diverse mission sets are inadequately designed and ill-equipped to execute the full range of missions they have been assigned (from testimony from March 26, 2009, Airland Subcommittee hearing on the 

Future of U.S. Ground forces). Please discuss the progress of this restructuring and 

describe what changes, if any, you would recommend. 

General CHIARELLI. Operations today require versatile, well-trained units and 

tough, adaptive commanders. There is no set formula for applying landpower. Each 

campaign and major operation requires an original design and flexible execution. 

Army forces must be able to operate as part of a joint or multinational force anywhere on the spectrum of conflict. Army modular elements have the ability to be 

organized and scaled to build a task force uniquely tailored to a specific operation. 

These modular formations, though some may be smaller, far outstrip the capabilities from previous organizations. These capability increases are a direct result of applying lessons learned from combat operations. The Army will continue to incorporate these combat insights as well as listening to the concerns and desires of commanders in the field to ensure future formations are even more capable. 

By the end of fiscal year 2009, the Army will have completed 87 percent of its 

transformation from a division-centric force to a brigade-centric modular force. The 

Army will have transformed 70 of 73 BCTs, 192 of 227 modular support brigades, 

and increased Special Operations Forces force structure from 26,000 to 37,000. 

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100. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, have combat assessments of modular brigades returning from overseas deployments revealed any concerns with the structure and effectiveness of these units? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army assesses force sufficiency based on lessons learned, 

requests for forces to meet current operational requirements, and the analysis of 

projected strategic demands. The Army’s concept of full spectrum capability requires 

Army forces to be prepared to meet the demands of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The existing operational environment sets the emphasis for which 

capability is needed to meet those demands and refocus Army design efforts. Employing lessons learned from combat experience and addresses strategic, operational, 

and tactical realities has allowed the Army to better protect and care for soldiers 

and guarantee mission success through changes in doctrine, organization, training, 

and equipment. 

DWELL TIME

101. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, during testimony in February, Secretary 

Gates stated the Department’s goal for the Army to increase dwell time to approximately 1 year deployed and 15 months at home by the end of 2009, 1 year deployed 

and 2 years at home by fiscal year 2010, and by fiscal year 2011, 1 year deployed 

and 30 months at home. Given the current plans for a drawdown of brigades in Iraq 

and sustained force in Afghanistan, do you believe this is an achievable goal? 

General CHIARELLI. BOG to dwell ratio is driven by global demand vs. the supply 

of available forces. The Army’s goals for soldier dwell are consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s January 27, 2009, testimony, but demand and available forces 

will ultimately drive the dwell. In fiscal year 2011, the Army will achieve 45 Active 

component BCTs. As long as demand does not exceed 11 Active component BCTs, 

we will achieve a BOG to dwell of 1:2.5. 

The Army’s long-term sustainable goal is to allow Active component units and soldiers three times the amount of time home as they are deployed (1:3 ratio). The 

Army’s long-term goal for the Reserve component is 12 months mobilized for every 

5 years not mobilized (1:5 ratio). Improving the deployed dwell ratio depends on reducing the global demand for BCTs which is currently at 27 BCT equivalents. The 

Army’s current Active component BOG to dwell is 1:1.3. 

102. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, besides the current OPTEMPO and the potential for other contingencies, what factors will affect the Army’s ability to meet 

this dwell time plan? 

General CHIARELLI. Demand for Active component BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan 

will continue at a significant level for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the high 

global demand for forces also includes combatant commander requirements to conduct Security Cooperation activities and SFA missions outside of the USCENTCOM 

area of responsibility that have consistently gone unfulfilled due to lower 

prioritization compared to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we draw 

down forces in OIF/OEF, these manpower-intensive requirements will gain in importance, supporting the Secretary of Defense’s objective of building ally and partner 

capacity. Therefore, regardless of our commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan, demand 

for forces will remain high for the foreseeable future as the U.S. remains persistently engaged around the globe. 

MEDICAL EVACUATION POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

103. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, Secretary Gates testified 

on January 27, 2009, that in Afghanistan the time required to move a wounded soldier or marine to a hospital for definitive care is closer to 2 hours than the ‘‘golden 

1 hour’’ standard in Iraq. 

In a recent interview with CNN, General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, predicted that as a result of increasing the number of marines in Afghanistan, coupled with the increasingly aggressive actions of the Taliban, ‘‘we are 

likely to see our casualties rise over what they have been,’’ and went on to express 

serious concerns on whether there will be enough helicopters to evacuate wounded 

marines quickly off the battlefield. Are you concerned that there will be insufficient 

airlift resources to quickly evacuate wounded soldiers and marines from the battlefield? 

General AMOS. ISAF/USFOR–A hosted a U.S. Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) 

bed-down strategy in February 2009 in response to the testimony referenced above. 

MEDEVAC is not a Marine Corps capability so the projected offset was met with 

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U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force assets that will work in Regional Command-South 

with no command relationship to the MEB. However, a COMUSCENTCOM FRAGO 

immediately transferred assets from Iraq in conjunction with the SECDEF authorization for a U.S. Army CAB and the MEB Marine Air Group as part of RFF920. 

These assets increase U.S. MEDEVAC and USMC CASEVAC capacity in our assigned battlespace. The allocation of these resources in conjunction with the streamlining of request processes and directive from CENTCOM and COMUSFOR-A for reporting procedures improves the current status from the January testimony. How 

much improvement remains to be seen; data will be taken throughout the early employment of the MEB and other US Forces operating specifically in Regional Command-South as well as Afghanistan as a whole. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army’s analysis has not identified any remaining shortages or inabilities to evacuate wounded soldiers and marines with current 

MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan. Although survivability rates of Afghanistan are 

higher than those of Iraq, the Army is implementing several initiatives to improve 

MEDEVAC performance. These initiatives include increasing additional assets, 

fielding improved aircraft capabilities, improving procedures, and establishing new 

data collection and reporting requirements. Additional Army assets have already 

been employed in Regional Command-South in order to support the U.S. troop buildup. These assets include one forward surgical team, four additional MEDEVAC aircraft and crews from Iraq, and one 12-ship MEDEVAC company. From the Army’s 

perspective, the marines deploy with organic capabilities which include Forward Resuscitate Surgical Systems and rotary wing casualty evacuation aircraft as an acceptable ‘‘in lieu of’’ solution for additional MEDEVAC aircraft requirements. 

104. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what is being done to 

level the playing field between the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters with respect to 

medical evacuation and care of the wounded? 

General AMOS. See answer to question 103. 

General CHIARELLI. Since the two areas of operation pose different challenges and 

characteristics, Multi National Forces Iraq (MNF–I) and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Afghanistan until recently applied different planning standards for acceptable risk. The differing factors were based on terrain, mission assessment, medical assets, and maturity of the infrastructure. Additionally, in Afghanistan, the participating NATO countries operate using their own country’s rules 

which differ from those in the U.S. military. The Army is implementing several initiatives to achieve medical evacuation parity between Iraq and Afghanistan. These 

initiatives include increasing medical evacuation assets, fielding improved aircraft 

capabilities, improving procedures, and establishing new data collection, and reporting requirements. The Army’s additional assets include two Army forward surgical 

teams, a medical brigade command and control headquarters, four additional 

MEDEVAC aircraft and crews from Iraq, and one 12-ship MEDEVAC company, 

which have already arrived. These Army assets are part of a joint effort to increase 

overall MEDEVAC capability in Afghanistan. 

105. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, are members who serve 

in Afghanistan at greater risk of dying from their wounds than those who serve in 

Iraq, because of insufficient airlift resources? 

General AMOS. See answer to question 103. 

General CHIARELLI. Using the Joint Theater Trauma Registry, Army analysis indicates that survivability rates in Afghanistan and Iraq are 95 percent and 94 percent, respectively. This translates to cumulative ‘‘died of wounds’’ rates of 5 percent 

in Afghanistan and 6 percent in Iraq. The Army has not identified a link between 

current MEDEVAC asset shortages and a greater risk of soldiers dying from their 

wounds in Afghanistan versus Iraq. From a medical perspective, our experiences in 

both Theaters suggest far-forward resuscitation and stabilization rendered during 

the platinum 10 minutes by combat lifesavers, medics, and corpsmen has contributed significantly to our survival rates. Although survivability rates in Afghanistan 

are higher than those in Iraq, the Army is implementing several initiatives to improve MEDEVAC performance. These initiatives include providing additional assets, 

fielding improved aircraft capabilities, improving procedures, and establishing new 

data collection and reporting requirements. These Army initiatives are part of a 

joint effort to increase overall MEDEVAC capability and reduce average MEDEVAC 

mission response times in Afghanistan to achieve parity between Theaters. 

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MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE GROUND FORCES

106. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, according to the DOD’s Individual Medical 

Readiness data, overall medical readiness of the Armed forces has seen some recent 

improvement, but dental readiness of the ground forces, especially the Army Guard 

and Reserve, remains low. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, nearly 52 percent 

of the Army Guard and Reserve were in dental readiness class III or IV, and thus 

technically nondeployable. This situation remains relatively unchanged, in spite of 

efforts by Congress and the Department to improve dental readiness. What is the 

problem in achieving dental readiness, especially in the Guard and Reserve? 

General CHIARELLI. 

Army Active Component 

The Army Dental Command (DENCOM) provides dental services to the Army Active component through direct and referred private sector care options, resulting in 

a current dental readiness of 88 percent (percentage of Soldiers in Dental Fitness 

Classification (DFC) 1 or 2 who are deployable). Our dental readiness goal is 95 percent; however, the dynamic OPTEMPO across the force, combined with the challenge of filling contracted dental provider positions at some locations, has impacted 

DENCOM’s ability to generate higher percentages. In general, installation dental 

commanders work closely with unit commanders to ensure priority of effort and 

resourcing to support mobilizations/demobilizations. Two DENCOM initiatives significantly assist in achieving and maintaining dental readiness in the Active component. The First Term Dental Readiness (FTDR) program provides Initial Entry 

Training (IET) soldiers with dental care to establish baseline DFC 1 or 2 for soldiers 

before they leave Basic or Advanced Individual Training (AIT) sites, so they arrive 

at their first duty station in a deployable status. The goal of FTDR is 95 percent. 

Second, private sector care funding through the Oral Health Initiative leverages the 

private sector dental market to expand capabilities to deliver dental treatment as 

a supplement to direct care. 

The DENCOM is positively affecting the readiness of the Reserve component 

through both the Demobilization Dental Reset (DDR) mission and the FTDR program, which is conducted for all IET soldiers, regardless of component. In accordance with the Department of the Army Execution Order for DDR, demobilizing Reserve component soldiers are reset to DFC 1 or 2 by DENCOM providers at redeployment platforms. Approximately 35,000 Reserve component soldiers have demobilized through DENCOM facilities and been reset to deployable standards in fiscal 

year 2009, achieving a reset rate of 89.1 percent and assisting in the overall rise 

in dental readiness in the Reserve component from 52 percent to 58 percent. Additionally, Reserve component soldiers who are not on active duty can achieve and 

maintain dental readiness through the new Army Selected Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS) program, which the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs established in September of 2008. ASDRS is the strategic 

policy guidance that allows Selected Reserve soldiers to seek dental readiness care 

at their ‘‘home station’’. Dental Readiness encompasses a dental examination and 

the treatment of indentified DFC 3 conditions. 

United States Army Reserve (USAR) 

The USAR is very concerned about the dental readiness of USAR soldiers. The 

USAR is aware that dental readiness is a commander’s and individual soldier’s responsibility. The USAR has worked extensively with USAR commanders in order to 

communicate recent initiatives that will increase overall dental readiness. The 

ASDRS was a positive step forward. The USAR is currently working to fund 2 medical/dental readiness days that were recently authorized. It is expected that these 

additional days, in conjunction with ASDRS, FTDR and DDR, will result in increases in dental readiness as all of the initiatives mature. The most recent data 

shows that the USAR has a comprehensive dental readiness of 55.7 percent, a 

steady improvement since the inception of the dental readiness initiatives. 

Army National Guard (ARNG) 

Currently 57 percent of the ARNG are in DFC 1 or 2, and 43 percent are DFC 

3 (not ready) and 4 (dental status unknown). This is an improvement from the 45 

percent dental readiness rate in May 2008, which was prior to the approval of the 

ASDRS. The ASDRS program enables states to provide dental treatment to guardsmen throughout the ARFORGEN cycle, and it leverages DENCOM’s DDR and 

FTDR programs. FTDR places citizen-soldiers in their units at DFC 2 after completing AIT. DDR is returning 90 percent of our citizen-soldiers to their states as 

DFC 2 after deployment. ARNG dental readiness will continue to improve with the 

ongoing support of the ASDRS program and the other dental readiness initiatives. 

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107. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, from a readiness perspective, are individuals still being found nondeployable for medical and dental reasons, and if so, why? 

General CHIARELLI. Soldiers are still being found nondeployable for medical and 

dental reasons. Some of the reasons for this include lack of education on the behalf 

of commanders and leaders regarding health and medical issues; the fact that some 

Soldiers choose not to disclose health-related issues or attempt to conceal them, so 

that they can deploy with their units; late cross leveling of required personnel; and 

professional disparities between pre-deployment readiness checks and the professional interpretation of readiness standards at the Soldier Readiness Processing 

(SRP) site. The medical standards for retention are not the same as the medical 

standards for deployment. A soldier may be fit for retention with a certain medical 

condition, but not deployable. We increase the likelihood of this scenario by selectively retaining wounded warriors who do not meet retention standards or deployment medical standards. When Theater-specific medical deployment standards 

change, commanders are often not aware that a retainable soldier may not be 

deployable until he is screened at the CONUS Replacement Center or SRP site. 

Based on statistics compiled by Army Medical Command from October 2008 

through February 2009, for all components and other military service personnel undergoing SRP supported by Regional Medical Centers, approximately 3 percent of 

service members undergoing SRP for deployment are found nondeployable for medical reasons. Although soldiers are deemed nondeployable for various medical and 

dental reasons, many issues are corrected at the SRP site, to include drawing DNA 

samples, administering immunizations, providing dental treatment, issuing glasses, 

etc. Only a small percentage of soldiers are unable to resolve medical/dental issues 

identified during the SRP process and, as a result, are unable to deploy. 

MENTAL HEALTH CONCERNS IN THE ARMY

108. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, you mentioned in your opening statement 

your concern about trends in mental and behavioral health issues for our soldiers. 

A DOD Task Force on Mental Health Report in 2006 asserted the following: ‘‘Every 

military leader bears responsibility for addressing (the stigma associated with seeking mental health care); leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness of the 

servicemembers they lead.’’ 

Two years later we still see evidence that military commanders sometime discourage members from seeking needed care. The Personnel Subcommittee recently received testimony that in 2008, 780 callers to a non-DOD suicide prevention hotline 

identified themselves as Active Duty military. Thus far this year, nearly three callers a day identify themselves as being on Active Duty. 

This tells me that there is still significant stigma—and fear—associated with 

seeking needed mental health care by members of the Armed forces. What efforts 

have you initiated within your Service to address this problem? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army’s approaches to stigma include Senior Leader messages encouraging help-seeking behavior and assurances that seeking behavioral 

health treatment will not interfere with security clearances, promotions or ratings. 

We are working to inform soldiers that seeking care often improves work performance and therefore may actually help with promotions and ratings. I have sent a 

message to all Army activities strongly encouraging all NCOs and officers to address 

in their initial and subsequent performance counseling how effectively the rated soldier addresses behavioral health issues and its impact on the overall command climate of the unit. I have issued guidance directly to the field emphasizing the importance of not allowing soldiers to belittle other soldiers for seeking behavioral health 

care. In addition, a council of senior leaders, convened by me, is working to more 

fully integrate behavioral health providers into our units. The goal is to increase informal contacts between the care providers and soldiers to enhance their communication and emphasize the performance enhancement aspects of our behavioral 

health team members. 

109. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, how are you measuring your success? 

General CHIARELLI. We are vigorously developing outcome measures for existing 

and new programs to ensure the adoption and expansion of best practices and evidence based treatments. Surveys will be done to assess changes in attitudes and 

programs will be modified as needed to achieve the desired outcomes. Of course, the 

rate of suicide is a key indicator and we will need to carefully watch that number 

recognizing that the contributors to an individual’s decision to end his or her life 

are many and that we as an organization cannot impact all of them. 

84 

We recognize that many of the changes we are making will take some time to 

show progress. We are determined to stay the course and work in a holistic fashion 

to promote health and reduce risk knowing the rates of suicide will drop as the overall health of our Force improves. The goal is to improve our soldiers’ ability to cope 

with life stressors whether those stressors are related to mission, other work stress, 

relationships, family, money, health concerns or other areas, by optimizing current 

policies and procedures and setting the conditions for future changes. 

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT IN THEATER

110. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, I have a question about 

the impact to military readiness and operations of support provided by contractors 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few of my colleagues have pressed the current Administration to curtail the use by the military of service contracts for base operating services, security, supply, and other mission-support requirements. Can you briefly describe the impact of service support contracts on readiness and mission capability 

for the Army and the Marine Corps? 

General AMOS. Success in Afghanistan is dependent upon service contracts— 

whether provided by U.S. or local contractors/personnel. These personnel bring enduring capabilities that are not resident in the Services in any significant numbers. 

Their abilities to build base camps and provide associated services free the operating forces to focus on their assigned mission. Equipment Field Service Representatives assist in removing and/or maintaining specialized equipment. If we lose these 

services, our readiness will decline. We will need to deploy and increase the number 

of military personnel in harms way to support these missions. 

General CHIARELLI. The use of contractors for mission support services is not only 

a proven force enabler, but also provides a significant surge capability during contingency operations. Contractors at our Forward Repair Activities help to maintain 

the readiness of important combat systems. In addition, by leveraging the private 

sector for certain activities such as the operation of dining facilities or laundry services, our soldiers can focus on their core mission—defending our Nation and its interests. In context, contractor-provided support services improve readiness because 

the military can respond rapidly to insurgencies and in greater numbers with equipment they can trust. In terms of mission capability, hot meals, a clean uniform, and 

other contractor-provided, quality of life services helps to maintain the strong morale of our Nation’s sons and daughters who proudly serve extended and/or multiple 

deployments. While difficult to measure, morale is a fundamental element of military culture, leadership, and the overall willingness of our All-Volunteer Force to 

defend their Country. The military could still perform their core mission without 

contractors, though I believe degradation of morale over time could pose a significant risk to mission capability. 

111. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, to what extent will you 

be relying on service contracts to carry out the drawdown of forces from Iraq? 

General AMOS. We will use service contracts to assist in base closure and provide 

long haul drivers thereby eliminating the requirement for marines to perform these 

missions. These same service contracts (LOGCAP 3 and soon LOGCAP 4), currently 

feed our marines and perform base support duties. Along with LOGCAP 3 and 4, 

we also use Equipment Field Service Representatives on select equipment such as 

MRAPs. They will assist in removing or maintaining these items during retrograde 

and/or redirection of equipment to Afghanistan. We also have service contracts at 

our ports to perform equipment wash down and clean-up to meet Customs and Agricultural inspections and assist in loading and unloading trucks and vessels. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army currently expects to use a combination of existing 

service contracts and organic support units to retrograde equipment and materiel 

from Iraq. Once we have completed our current assessment, leadership in theatre 

will determine if existing contracts will be augmented, or if additional enabling service contracts will be required to retrograde out equipment. Should a service contract 

be used as part of these efforts, the government will maintain oversight responsibilities. 

112. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, can you assess the impact to Army and Marine Corps operations in Iraq and Afghanistan if you were prohibited from using service support contracts such as the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)? 

General AMOS. Devastating. We would require a sizeable increase in forces and 

associated capabilities. Service support contract personnel perform a myriad of theVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ater and base support functions from food service to equipment maintenance to line 

hall transportation. We would be hard pressed, if not impossible, to deploy and replicate the support provided by theater service support contracts. 

General CHIARELLI. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) has 

been an effective force enabler for our units in Iraq and Afghanistan and has provided excellent support to our soldiers. The use of Operational Contract Support effectively expands the capability of the deployed forces by reducing the additional 

work load placed upon our soldiers. The Army would certainly be able to accomplish 

its mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without LOGCAP. However, the loss of these 

service support contracts would cause our deployed forces to operate at a significantly reduced level of intensity, as they would now have to flex to meet these service support missions. By providing for the base operations support, trash pickup, 

laundry and bath services and other important but ancillary responsibilities, the soldiers are able to concentrate their efforts on the primary mission at hand. 

113. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, how would you compensate for the loss of the use of these service contracts? 

General AMOS. We would have to increase the number of military personnel to 

perform these Service functions at a reduced level. As an example, rather than three 

hot meals a day served by LOGCAP personnel, we might go to one a day; rather 

than washing clothes weekly, it might be biweekly; and, rather than equipment 

maintenance at/or above 90 percent, we would do the best we could since some of 

our overflow maintenance support is handled by LOGCAP. Nevertheless, the Marine 

Corps is still an expeditionary force, and we would adapt as required to meet theater needs and the needs of our forces to enable them to effectively carry out their 

missions. 

General CHIARELLI. While the Army can accomplish its mission without LOGCAP 

contractors, the loss of these service contracts would place a greater demand on our 

soldiers, of whom much is already asked. The absence of these capabilities would 

require the Army to either place a greater demand on its organic capability or risk 

a reduction in the Quality of Life standards for our soldiers operating in an austere 

environment. 

SAFETY OF EXPEDITIONARY FACILITIES

114. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, one area of concern I have with the performance of service contractors has to do with the safety of our military personnel 

living and working in expeditionary facilities provided by contractors in theater. The 

fact that we have lost military personnel to accidental electrocution is a tragic circumstance that must not be allowed to persist. 

Are you confident that current efforts to provide facilities for our forces in theater 

incorporate generally accepted industry standards for the safety of personnel, including standards for fire protection and structural integrity, and standards with respect to electrical systems, water treatment, and telecommunication networks? 

General CHIARELLI. It is the Army’s goal that each contract, task and delivery 

order contain all necessary requirements and clauses to protect the safety of all personnel as well as to ensure that the government receives the best value for our contract dollars. The Army works hard to ensure the safety of our personnel in all arenas by providing them with safe facilities as well as educating our personnel to observe safety practices on, as well as off, duty. Our people are our most valuable and 

important asset. 

The award of contracts and task and delivery orders for construction is a complex 

process in any environment, and more so in a warzone with contracts that are often 

awarded to indigenous contractors in accordance with the Iraqi First and Afghani 

First programs. Each project requires the development of a Statement of Work 

which must contain the appropriate safety and construction standards for the 

project. The contracting offices do not have construction or safety expertise and 

must rely on the project engineers/program managers to identify all necessary 

standards that must be met as well as the development and submission of a comprehensive and appropriate Quality Assurance Plan for construction oversight. As 

you know, the contract award is only the first step. The Army has also been working 

hard to develop and deploy qualified Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) 

who are responsible for providing the oversight of the contractor during the construction, installation, repair, maintenance, or operation of facilities. While extensive progress has been made in training and deploying qualified personnel as CORs, 

the Army is continuing to work this issue to ensure the safety of our troops. 

86 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) requires compliance to industry 

standards for the safety of personnel, including standards for fire protection, electrical, structural, water and telecommunication networks in all contracts awarded 

by USACE. Compliance is ensured by our quality assurance personnel at the project 

site. Currently, district commanders are responsible for ensuring compliance. For 

added assurance, USACE is in the process of standing up the Trans Atlantic Division in Winchester, VA, in September 2009 that will have the responsibility to ensure quality processes and adequate capability is available at the project sites to ensure compliance to national standards in the CENTCOM area of operation. This is 

USACE normal business model for all USACE operations. It should be noted that 

USACE is not the sole design/construction/facility management agent that has full 

responsibility for the entire life cycle of all facilities built in the theaters where our 

soldiers and Army Civilians live, work, and train. Other organizations such as the 

Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, the Navy Sea Bees, Red Horse, and 

Army Materiel Command assets perform and occasionally NATO Maintenance and 

Supply Agency provide a variety of design/construction/facility management services 

as well for a variety of reasons. 

115. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, can I get your assurance that each contract 

or task or delivery order carried out in the future for the construction, installation, 

repair, maintenance, or operation of expeditionary facilities for the Army incorporates generally accepted industry standards for the safety of personnel utilizing 

such facilities? 

General CHIARELLI. It is the Army’s goal that each contract, task and delivery 

order contain all necessary requirements and clauses to protect the safety of all personnel as well as to ensure that the government receives the best value for our contract dollars. The Army works hard to ensure the safety of our personnel in all arenas by providing them with safe facilities as well as educating our personnel to observe safety practices on, as well as off, duty. Our people are our most valuable and 

important asset. 

The award of contracts and task and delivery orders for construction is a complex 

process in any environment, and more so in a warzone with contracts that are often 

awarded to indigenous contractors in accordance with the Iraqi First and Afghani 

First programs. Each project requires the development of a Statement of Work 

which must contain the appropriate safety and construction standards for the 

project. The contracting offices do not have construction or safety expertise and 

must rely on the project engineers/program managers to identify all necessary 

standards that must be met as well as the development and submission of a comprehensive and appropriate Quality Assurance Plan for construction oversight. As 

you know, the contract award is only the first step. The Army has also been working 

hard to develop and deploy qualified Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) 

who are responsible for providing the oversight of the contractor during the construction, installation, repair, maintenance or operation of facilities. While extensive 

progress has been made in training and deploying qualified personnel as CORs, the 

Army is continuing to work this issue to ensure the safety of our troops. 

FUTURE FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY

116. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, in your written statement regarding efforts 

within the Army to restore balance to the force by 2011, you state ‘‘The challenge 

continues to be complicated by changing circumstances and increased demand on 

the force.’’ You then state ‘‘Unfortunately, the Army cannot influence demand, and 

the current level does not appear likely to improve significantly for the foreseeable 

future.’’ 

Due to the success of a surge of Army Brigades and other U.S. forces into Iraq 

last year that resulted in a vastly improved security environment, the President announced on February 27 a plan to reduce forces in Iraq to commence immediately 

and be completed by September 2010, with a residual force of 35,000 to 50,000 to 

remain through 2011. That equates to a redeployment of at least 115,000 troops in 

the next 16 months. 

Since most of those returning forces will be Army combat brigades and a majority 

of the forces being deployed to Afghanistan currently are U.S. marines, do you foresee an overall increased demand on the Army force in the next 16 months? If so, 

where? 

General CHIARELLI. The Army and the Marine Corps presence in Afghanistan are 

different in size. In Afghanistan, the Army currently has 33,563 deployed soldiers 

compared to 9,211 marines currently serving there. Growth in Afghanistan requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\BORAWSKI\DOCS\53693.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ments will continue to be largely filled by the Army. In the near term, to include 

the next 16 months, global demand will increase for the Army because the new 

surge of troops into Afghanistan occurs prior to major reductions in Iraq. Over the 

longer term, demand will begin to decrease as units are withdrawn from Iraq by 

the end of 2011. 

117. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, how would you define a significant improvement in the current level of demand? 

General CHIARELLI. A significant improvement in the current level of demand is 

a level which allows the Army to meet our long term goal of Active component soldiers at home station three times as much as they are deployed (BOG to dwell ration of 1:3). For Reserve component soldiers, the long term goal is 12 months mobilized for every 5 years not mobilized (BOG to dwell of 1:5). In terms of BCTs, this 

equates to a demand of 11 Active component BCTs and 4 Reserve component BCTs. 

This level of global demand will allow units to train for full spectrum operations 

to better meet the requirements of the Joint Force. 

118. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, in your opinion, will the Army’s share of 

a residual force of 35,000–50,000 in Iraq continue to be a significant strain on the 

Army’s ability to restore their balance? 

General CHIARELLI. OIF demand for BCTs will reduce to the six BCTs augmented 

for stability operations. Redeploying BCTs will be reset to meet global demands, including the expanded Afghanistan commitment and geographic combatant commander requirements that have previously been validated but were not sourced. Potentially, the greatest impact on the Army’s share of residual forces in Iraq will be 

on enabler units which are currently in low density and in high demand. These 

units generally provide theater level support and MNF–I requirements may prevent 

us from reaching a favorable BOG to dwell ratio for those type units. The Army continues to conduct parallel planning with CENTCOM and its subordinate commands 

to synchronize drawdown plans with rebalancing the Army. 

119. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, has the Department of the Army developed 

a withdrawal and reset plan based on a reduced presence in Iraq to raise the readiness levels over time for all combat brigades? 

General CHIARELLI. Yes. The Army’s planning to improve readiness and reset the 

force is guided by the ARFORGEN model and informed by CENTCOM’s drawdown 

planning. However, readiness and BOG to dwell ratios are driven by the global demand for forces of which Iraq is just one component. It is important to realize that 

the global demand for Army forces is at 37 BCT equivalents while the current commitment of Army BCTs stands at 28 BCTs equivalents. The global demand for 

forces includes units for COIN, training teams, and security forces in OIF and OEF; 

Korea, Homeland Defense, consequence management response, global response 

force, rapid response force, Multinational Force Observers, Kosovo, and validated 

but unmet Global Force Management Board requirements, most of which are outside the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Rebuilding readiness in the Army will 

take time and resources. Units returning from combat operations will require 24 

months dwell and consistent and timely funding to realize full spectrum training 

and readiness. 

120. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, how many BCTs need to be rated C–2 or 

above in order for the Army to declare a restoration of the desire rebalancing? 

General CHIARELLI. Achieving an acceptable level of full spectrum readiness is a 

necessary part of restoring balance but it is not sufficient. The Army has accumulated a significant amount of institutional risk during the past 7 years while operating at a tempo that requires us to take extraordinary measures to man, equip, 

and train our units, usually just in time to deploy. This risk is a function of the 

stress on our soldiers and leaders and their families of multiple deployments. It is 

also a function of insufficient time for our units to train on other potential missions 

and for our soldiers and leaders to attend professional military education (PME) and 

gain other broadening experiences necessary to strengthen the integrity of the Army 

profession. To restore balance we need to address all these risks by balancing the 

demand for forces with the supply of forces so that we can operate at a sustainable 

tempo as measured by the ratio between time deployed and time not deployed 

(BOG:Dwell). 

The number of units that need to be C2 or above depends the number of units 

we are already providing to meet global demand, the number of units that are required by our high priority contingency plans (operational depth), and the degree 

of risk deemed to be acceptable. These numbers are always changing. For the past 

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7 years, the Army has operated at a tempo that required us to use our operational 

depth to meet and sustain OIF and OEF demand. 

Today the Army is operating at a BOG to dwell tempo of 1:1.3. At a BOG to dwell 

tempo of 1:2 for the Active component and 1:4 for the Reserve component, we believe we cross the threshold from preparing units just in time for deployment to beginning to be able to train for other potential missions and get our people to PME. 

At this tempo we could provide up to 20 BCTs to meet global demand and up to 

20 BCTs could be prepared to meet contingencies with 90–180 days notice. We hope 

to achieve this BOG:Dwell tempo by the end of 2011. 

The Army’s ultimate goal is to achieve a BOG:Dwell tempo of 1:3 for the Active 

component and 1:5 for the Reserve component. At this tempo, with a 73 BCT force 

(Active component and Reserve component), we project we can sustain the All-Volunteer Force, continuously strengthen the profession, and meet a global demand of 

up to 15 BCTs, with an additional 15 BCTs that could respond to contingencies in 

less than 90 days. Additional strategic flexibility would be provided by another 15 

BCTs that could be available between 90 and 180 days with the remainder of our 

BCTs requiring greater than 180 days to prepare for commitment if required. 

121. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, furthermore you state ‘‘We simply cannot 

achieve desired BOG dwell ratios until demand is reduced to a sustainable level.’’ 

What do you consider to be a sustainable level of demand in order to balance the 

force? 

General CHIARELLI. A ratio of 1:3 for the Active component and 1:5 for the Reserve component BOG to dwell ratio allows the Army to maintain full readiness to 

meet global demands and allows for the development and sustainment of the AllVolunteer Force. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request enables the Army 

to commit over 70,000 enabler personnel at a sustainable BOG to dwell ratio. In 

fiscal year 2011, when the Army has completed our growth to 45 Active component 

BCTs and 28 Reserve component BCTs, at 1:3 Active component/1:5 Reserve component cycles, we will be able to meet the demand for 11 Active component BCTs and 

4 Reserve component BCTs. 

122. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, what impact will the increase in the end 

strength of the Army have on dwell time? 

General CHIARELLI. Increasing the Army end strength improves our strategic 

depth and enables the Army to rebalance by fiscal year 2011, a BOG to dwell ratio 

goal of 1:2. Rebalancing the Army, coupled with a decrease in global demand will 

provide units and soldiers more dwell time to train for full spectrum operations 

while timely and consistent funding assists in resetting war worn equipment. Full 

Spectrum Readiness requires 18 months dwell for units to train beyond the COIN 

mission before their next deployment. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s guidance is 

that units with less than 18 months dwell before their next deployment to stay focused on the COIN mission. Units that have 18 months or longer before their next 

deployment are to focus on conventional skills training for 90 days. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION EFFORTS

123. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, you testified recently at 

a Personnel Subcommittee hearing along with the other vice chiefs about suicides 

among soldiers and marines and the preventative measures your Services were taking. The incidences of suicides, particularly in the Army, were increasing at an 

alarming rate. What are the current trends with respect to suicides in the Army 

and Marine Corps? 

General AMOS. The loss of any marine through suicide is a tragedy for the marine’s family and unit, and can never be accepted. Through April of this year, there 

have been 12 suspected or confirmed suicides and 54 reported suicide attempts. 

With 42 suicides recorded in 2008, the Marine Corps experienced its highest suicide 

rate since the start of OEF and OIF. Marine Corps leadership is taking proactive 

action, focusing on the important role of leaders of all ranks in addressing this 

issue. The number of confirmed marine suicides has increased from 25 in 2006 to 

33 in calendar year 2007 to 42 in calendar year 2008. Our suicide rate in 2008 of 

19.5 suicides per 100,000 approaches the National civilian suicide rate for a demographic similar to the Marine Corps. 

General CHIARELLI. The Army is continuing to experience an increasing rate of 

suicides across the Active, Reserve, and National Guard. It is expected that the calendar year 2009 numbers and rate per 100,000 will exceed that of calendar year 

2008. We are working diligently to investigate each suicide. I have convened a group 

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of subject matter experts, which works in tandem with the G–1’s Army Suicide Prevention Program as an integrated operation, to review each suicide, develop lessons 

learned and to distribute these lessons to leaders across the Army. 

124. Senator BURR. General Amos and General Chiarelli, please explain what 

steps you have taken to better understand how to prevent suicides among soldiers 

and marines. 

General AMOS. Suicide prevention is a high priority. We are actively engaged in 

prevention and early identification of problems that may increase the risk of suicide. 

Marine Corps leadership is taking proactive action, focusing on the important role 

of leaders of all ranks in addressing this issue. Understanding that there is no single suicide prevention solution, we are committed to having an effect on the individual marine through leadership and command involvement at all levels and we 

recognize that we must reduce the stigma sometimes associated with seeking help. 

Suicides are monitored monthly and annually for deployment related trends such 

as the number of deployments and dwell time. Although it is not unreasonable to 

assume that one or more deployments may cause an increase in suicides, to date 

we have been unable to establish a direct relationship between the two. The Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command Studies and Analysis Division is conducting 

further analysis of the data on dwell time and deployments. Additionally, we will 

participate in the Army longitudinal study being conducted by the National Institute for Mental Health. Regardless of duty station, deployment, or duty status, the 

primary stressors associated with marine suicides are: problems in romantic relationships, physical health, work-related issues such as poor performance and job dissatisfaction, and pending legal or administrative action. This is consistent with 

other Services and civilian findings. Multiple stressors are almost always present 

in a suicide. 

The Commandant and Marine Corps leadership are taking proactive action to address this issue. The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps selected a senior enlisted 

Marine leader to add unique insight to our efforts in suicide prevention and, 

through the Executive Safety Board, is directing a series of initiatives that are currently in accelerated development: 

• Training: Since 90 percent of suicides have tended to occur in the ranks 

of E1–E5 marines, a half-day, high impact, relevant workshop has been designed to reach the NCO/FMF Sailor community and facilitate their work 

with junior enlisted marines. This training is expected to be ready by this 

summer. In March, I directed that an all-hands training on suicide prevention be conducted throughout the Corps. 

• Leadership Suicide Prevention Video Messages: All O–6 and higher commanding officers have been directed to produce videos focusing on leadership and suicide prevention to set the tone for stigma reduction and an imperative of prevention. 

• Integration of Suicide Prevention and the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP): A prevention message was incorporated in the MCMAP 

program in a manner appropriate and engaging to reach all marines. 

• Relationship Distress Hotline: Relationship problems, both romantic and 

marital, remain the number one associated stressor related to suicidal behavior. Suicide is complex and while this is not the only problem, it is the 

most common. A hotline by phone, email and live internet chat that is marketed specifically to assist with relationship distress and questions may reduce risk of suicide related behaviors that result from this type of stress. 

In the interim, we have partnered with The Outreach Call Center of the 

Defense Center of Excellence on Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain 

Injury, and Military OneSource to strategically market their relationship 

building resources to marines and family members. 

The Marine Corps will continue to aggressively pursue suicide prevention initiatives; reevaluate existing programs designed to reduce the stressors most correlated 

with suicidal behavior; develop and distribute new prevention programs; and refresh 

and expand training materials. 

General CHIARELLI. I have taken several steps to improve my understanding of 

how to prevent the tragedy of suicides within our ranks. In March and April 2009, 

I conducted an 8-day, six-installation factfinding visit in order to listen to the voices 

from the field. I learned first-hand from discussions with soldiers, mental health 

professionals, commanders, and other personnel in the installations and garrisons 

that the problem of suicide cannot be addressed solely in terms of preventing suicides. The Army must address the problem in terms of mitigating the risk factors 

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itual health and resiliency of soldiers and their families. I decided to enlarge the 

aperture of the Army’s view of the problem and take a holistic approach to combating it. 

Subsequently, I stood up a multi-disciplinary team of experts in April 2009 to review my findings and develop a holistic approach. The team reviewed not only my 

trip findings, but also Army programs and policies relating to suicide, behavioral 

health, and suicide risk factors. The team developed approximately 250 actions to 

be taken to improve existing systems and programs. I reviewed those actions and 

the recommendations of my team. The tasks they recommended form the nucleus 

of the Army’s strategic approach to the suicide issue: the Army Campaign Plan for 

Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention. I signed the Plan in 

mid-April. A senior level council meets every 2 weeks to review and refine the plans 

to implement the action tasks. My understanding of suicide prevention continues to 

develop and refine based on what I learn from the council. 

I receive daily briefings from my multidisciplinary team and hold frequent, periodic briefings with commanders and a Senior Review Group on Army suicides. I 

have met with the commanders of soldiers who have died from suicide in an effort 

to ascertain—to the extent possible—what went wrong in each case. I am briefed 

on every soldier suicide. 

For the long-term, in October 2008, the Army entered into an agreement with the 

National Institute of Mental Health for a 5-year longitudinal study of suicides, designed to assess factors contributing to suicide and identify training to reduce suicides and other mitigation techniques. My team and council inform the intermediate 

goals and milestones of that study. 

EFFECTS OF STOP-LOSS CESSATION

125. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, last month, Secretary Gates announced 

that the practice of stop-loss, or involuntarily keeping soldiers on Active Duty beyond the end of their obligated active service, would come to an end by March 2011. 

He based this change on planned reductions of troops in Iraq and the Army’s ability 

to accelerate its growth to 547,000 troops. The practice of stop-loss was used during 

the first Persian Gulf War and has been a critical element in being able to achieve 

unit manning. As of January 2009, according to Secretary Gates, over 13,000 soldiers were in a stop-loss status. Does the Army intend to modify its unit manning 

practices with individual replacements or cross leveling in order to achieve the goal 

of ending stop-loss? 

General CHIARELLI. Each Army component has a comprehensive plan to achieve 

the goal of ending the use of Stop Loss, taking into consideration the circumstances 

unique to each component. The intent is to cut the number of Stop Lossed soldiers 

in half by June 2010, and to discontinue the use of Stop Loss by March 2011. 

The Active component will begin deploying units without Stop Loss in January 

2010. Some of the manning practices that will be adjusted include increasing the 

level of fill for deploying units, adjusting deployment policies, and adjusting the individual replacement process. BCT manning will increase from 102 percent to 105 

percent. Deployment policies will be adjusted to permit certain soldiers to deploy for 

portions of the unit deployment. Army Human Resources Command will provide replacements prior to deployment for soldiers who will not deploy due to insufficient 

time remaining in service and in-theater replacements for losses, dependent on unit 

strengths, available inventory, and projected redeployment dates. Additionally, the 

Active component will implement an incentive program to encourage soldiers to extend to complete the deployment. 

The Army Reserve will begin mobilizing deploying units without Stop Loss in August 2009. The Army Reserve will increase their use of voluntary cross-leveling and 

implement special pay for mobilizing units to assist in stabilizing units for deployment. Soldiers in units identified for mobilization who have insufficient time to complete the deployment will be encouraged to extend. Soldiers who do not commit to 

complete the mobilization will be transferred to another unit until separation, and 

the Army Reserve will seek volunteers in other units to replace these soldiers. 

The Army National Guard will begin mobilizing deploying units without Stop Loss 

in September 2009. The Army National Guard will adjust mobilization and deployment policies, utilize voluntary cross-leveling, and implement an incentive program 

to encourage soldiers to extend to complete the deployment. For those not extending, 

soldiers with an Expiration of Term of Service (ETS) prior to the projected demobilization date will not be mobilized. Soldiers with an ETS after demobilization but 

prior to the post-mobilization stabilization period (90 days post-mobilization) will be 

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ration for transition. Additionally, the Army National Guard will seek volunteers in 

other units to replace soldiers not mobilizing; volunteers will also be able to take 

advantage of the incentive program. 

126. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, the Army Reserve has decided to give extra 

pay to all soldiers in one of its deploying units rather than just to those Reserve 

soldiers who have been stop-lossed. Could you explain the rationale for this decision 

and whether the Army will take this approach in the future in order to avoid disparity of treatment among soldiers? 

General CHIARELLI. Each Army component has developed a comprehensive plan 

to achieve the goal of ending the use of Stop Loss that best promotes stability in 

their deploying formations. Compensation programs are managed separately by 

each component, and they differ to the extent that desired outcomes differ. Each 

component must leverage its program to achieve desired effects appropriate to its 

circumstances. Perceived disparity of treatment can be attributed to a lack of understanding of the differences among the programs for each component. 

As part of its program to stabilize deploying units, the Army Reserve will offer 

Designated Unit Stabilization Pay (DUSP) under High Priority Unit Pay authority. 

This program is a special pay program; it utilizes existing authority to compensate 

soldiers in units alerted for mobilization. Soldiers must commit to complete the mobilization, to include reenlistment or extension for those soldiers with insufficient 

time remaining in service and resolution of any other issues which would prevent 

the soldier from being mobilized. Then, all soldiers in designated deploying units receive DUSP pay at the rate of $50 per drill period from mobilization minus 6 

months to mobilization date. Soldiers are paid during the pre-mobilization period in 

order to stabilize units preparing for mobilization. 

The Army National Guard will offer Deployment Extension Stabilization Pay as 

part of its plan to man units alerted for mobilization. This is an incentive program; 

it utilizes Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) authority to incentivize soldiers to extend 

to complete a mobilization and deployment. Soldiers with an ETS between 180 days 

prior to Mobilization Day and Demobilization are eligible to voluntarily extend their 

service obligation to complete mobilization and post-mobilization reintegration requirements. Soldiers receive $500 per month for each month of mobilization if they 

commit 180–365 days prior to mobilization and $350 per month if they commit 90– 

179 days prior to mobilization. Soldiers must extend their service obligation for at 

least 12 months to be eligible. Soldiers are paid during the mobilization period in 

order to incentivize soldiers to extend for at least 12 months and complete a deployment. 

As part of its plan to reduce Stop Loss, The Active Army will offer Deployment 

Extension Incentive Pay (DEIP). This is an incentive program; it utilizes AIP authority to incentive soldiers who do not intend to reenlist to extend in order to complete a deployment with their unit. DEIP will be offered to units deploying without 

Stop Loss beginning 9 months prior to Latest Arrival Date (LAD) at a rate of $350 

to $500 per month. Soldiers with an ETS between LAD and return plus 60 days 

are eligible. Soldiers who commit between LAD–9 months and LAD–6 months receive $500 per month. Soldiers who commit after LAD–6 months but before ETS– 

90 days receive $350 per month. Soldiers must extend their service obligation for 

the duration of the deployment plus 60 days. Soldiers are paid during the period 

of extension (original ETS through separation) in order to incentivize soldiers to extend for the duration of the deployment. 

ACTIVE-DUTY ARMY END STRENGTH

127. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, the Secretary of Defense announced on 

April 6 that the total number of Active-Duty BCTs that the Army would grow to 

would be 45 instead of 48, while maintaining the planned increase in end strength 

of 547,000. He stated that this was necessary to ‘‘ensure that we have bettermanned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of stop loss. 

This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force.’’ In view of the demand for 

combat units, do you think that 547,000 is the right end strength number, or should 

it be higher? 

General CHIARELLI. The right size and appropriate structure of the Army depends 

on what our Nation’s leaders want the Army to do (the demand) and what they consider an acceptable level of deployment (BOG/dwell) while maintaining a quality, 

All-Volunteer Force. We understand our Nation’s resources are finite, and we are 

seeking to strike the right balance between the size of the Army and what the Nation can afford. 

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If operational demand on the Army remains at, or near, current levels (27 BCTs 

with enablers) and the desired rotation rate was 1:2 for the Active component (1 

year deployed to 2 years at home) and 1:4 for the Reserve component (1 year mobilized, 9 months deployed, to 4 years at home), the force would have to grow in order 

to resolve existing critical capability shortfalls and increase rotational capability 

while achieving strategic depth. 

128. Senator BURR. General Chiarelli, what effect will this decision regarding the 

number of BCTs have on deployment length and dwell time, i.e., the number of 

months spent at home station following a deployment? 

General CHIARELLI. With the total supply of Active component BCTs going from 

48 to 45, the Army will reach its Active component BCT growth in fiscal year 2011. 

At an OIF/OEF demand for 11 Active component BCTs, Army dwell will be approximately 30 months. Additional BCT growth would not have been accomplished by 

this point, so it would have had little impact on near-term dwell. Our rotational 

force generation readiness model, ARFORGEN, effectively and efficiently generates 

trained and ready forces for combatant commanders at sustainable rotational levels. 

ARFORGEN also provides ready forces for unforeseen contingencies. At the Army’s 

long term goal of a BOG to dwell ratio of 1:3 Active component and 1:5 Reserve component, ARFORGEN would meet a demand for 11 Active component BCTs and 4 

Reserve component BCTs. BCTs now deploy for 12 months, although there is one 

BCT remaining in theater under an extended deployment. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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