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52–493 PDF 2009

RISK-BASED SECURITY IN FEDERAL 

BUILDINGS: TARGETING FUNDS 

TO REAL RISKS AND ELIMINATING 

UNNECESSARY SECURITY OBSTACLES 

(111–61) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

September 23, 2009 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chair 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania, 

Vice Chair 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Dowd, William G., Director, Physical Planning Division, National Capital 

Planning Commission .......................................................................................... 17 

Drew, John E., President, Drew Company, Inc. .................................................... 5 

Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government Accountability Office ......................................................................................................... 17 

McCann, Erin, Resident of the District of Columbia ............................................ 5 

Moses, Patrick, Regional Director, National Capital Region, Federal Protective Service ........................................................................................................... 17 

Peck, Hon. Robert, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services 

Administration ..................................................................................................... 17 

Porcari, John, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation ............... 17 

Schenkel, Gary, Director, Federal Protective Service, U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement .......................................................................................... 17 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 48 

Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, of the District of Columbia ..................... 49 

Oberstar, Hon. James, L., of Minnesota ................................................................ 52 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Dowd, William G. ..................................................................................................... 54 

Drew, John E. .......................................................................................................... 59 

Goldstein, Mark ....................................................................................................... 67 

McCann, Erin ........................................................................................................... 84 

Peck, Hon. Robert .................................................................................................... 97 

Porcari, John ............................................................................................................ 104 

Schenkel, Gary ......................................................................................................... 110 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Dowd, William G., Director, Physical Planning Division, National Capital 

Planning Commission, responses to questions from the Subcommittee .......... 57 

Peck, Hon. Robert, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services 

Administration, responses to questions from the Subcommittee ..................... 100 

Porcari, John, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, responses to questions from the Subcommitee ...................................................... 107 

Schenkel, Gary, Director, Federal Protective Service, U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, responses to questions from the Subcommittee ......... 122 

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(1) 

RISK-BASED SECURITY IN FEDERAL BUILDINGS: TARGETING FUNDS TO REAL RISKS 

AND ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY SECURITY OBSTACLES 

Wednesday, September 23, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC

BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton 

[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Ms. NORTON. We are going to reverse the order of the witnesses 

because, in all fairness, I would like the Federal witnesses to be 

able to respond to what I think is now the second panel. So you 

can stay where you are for the moment and our opening statements. 

But when we finish with the opening statements, I am going to 

ask John E. Drew of the Drew Company and Erin McCann, a District resident, if they would take the witness stand. And after their 

testimony—it is fairly brief—the agencies will have a sense of one 

of the reasons we have found it necessary to have this hearing. 

I want to welcome all of you to today’s hearing, especially our 

distinguished panels. 

I called this hearing as Chair of this Subcommittee and a Member of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. However, 

I also sit on the Homeland Security Committee. And I represent 

the high-target Nation’s capital. My committee work puts me in 

touch with the Nation’s security needs at the highest levels. This 

work and our experience since the Oklahoma City bombing leave 

no doubt that the complexities of risk-based security in an open society continue to elude us. 

Federal building security has little to do with risk-based threats 

today. The Government Accountability Office was recently able to 

get bomb-making equipment past security at several Federal buildings in this national capital region, where much of the new security 

has been focused because of 9/11. At the same time, tax-paying citizens are unable to enter some buildings to use the restrooms or 

restaurant facilities. 

The security in Federal buildings is not uniform where it should 

be and, sadly, not professional or even appropriately in the hands 

of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal ProtecVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:21 Jan 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\ED\9-23-09\52493.TXT JASON
2 

tive Service. Nonsecurity personnel control much of the security for 

many agencies. 

I introduced H.R. 3555, the ′′United States Commission on an 

Open Society With Security Act,′′ on the eighth anniversary of 9/ 

11 this month, as an increasing variety of security measures have 

proliferated throughout the country without any expert or uniform 

guidance on evaluating risks to security and without much thought 

about the effect on common freedoms and citizen access. 

Federal facilities, where millions of Federal employees work and 

citizens come for service, have been the chosen target for major terrorist attacks on our country. After the attacks on the Pentagon 

and the Alfred P. Murrah Oklahoma City Federal Building, terrorists have left no doubt that Federal facilities, as symbols of the 

United States Government, are their chosen targets. 

Consequently, this documented pattern of terrorist assaults on 

Federal assets and consistent threats since 9/11 with arrests made 

even this very week have required continuing high levels of vigilance to protect both Federal employees and the visitors who use 

Federal facilities. 

When the Department of Homeland Security was formed in 2002, 

the Federal Protective Service, or FPS, charged with protecting 

Federal sites, was transferred from the General Services Administration to the newly created Department and placed within the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE. Although the Committee supported the transfer, we insisted that FPS officers and 

guards be used exclusively by the FPS to continue the necessary 

protection of Federal sites and those who work and use them. 

However, starting in February 2005, the Chairman and I have 

had to send a series of letters to DHS and this Subcommittee has 

held hearings questioning the placement of FPS within ICE, inappropriate use of funds, and a major shift from protection to inspection. These concerns have strong bipartisan support, with both 

Chairman Oberstar and Ranking Member Mica expressing their 

own views about the gravity of the FPS situation. 

Now comes the GAO report to confirm that the FPS, the Nation’s 

first Federal police force, established in 1790, and its contract 

guard force have been rocked by inadequate funding, staffing, and 

training that casts doubt on its ability to carry out its core mission: 

to protect facilities, to complete building security assessments in a 

timely and professional manner, and to monitor and oversee contractors. 

GAO reports, ominously, that pro-active patrols have been eliminated at many GSA facilities in spite of the fact that—and here I 

am quoting GAO—′′multiple governmental entities acknowledge 

the importance of proactive patrol in detecting and preventing 

criminal incidents and terrorist-related activities,′′ end quote. 

Given the radical changes at FPS at odds with its statutory mandate, who can be surprised that today the GAO will testify concerning how GAO testers were able to get bomb-making equipment 

past security at several Federal agencies? 

At the same time, taxpayers are unable to enter some Federal 

buildings without escorts or other obstacles to the access to which 

they are entitled. Surely, we are smart enough to keep terrorists 

3 

out without making it virtually impossible for U.S. Tax-paying citizens to get into Federal buildings. 

Risk-based security will be impossible as long as the requirements are set by a hodgepodge group who can choose their own security requirements without regard to evaluated risks and the bigpicture concerns of each and every region. What passes for security 

today lacks the needed consistency, rationality, and accountability 

outside the particular agency. Non-security personnel are setting 

the agenda and calling the shots, building by building. 

We can do better, but only if we recognize and then come to grips 

with the complexities associated with maintaining a society of free 

and open access in a world characterized by unprecedented terrorism. 

Following the terrorist attack on our country, the first on the 

continental shores, all expected additional and increased security 

adequate to protect citizens against this frightening threat. However, the American people also expect government, their government, to undertake this awesome new responsibility without depriving them of their personal liberty. 

The place to begin is with a high-level presidential commission 

of experts from a broad spectrum of relevant disciplines, not military and security experts alone, who can help chart the new course 

that will be required to protect our people and our precious democratic institutions and traditions at the same time—something we 

have never had to do before and something we do not yet know 

how to do. 

When we have faced unprecedented and perplexing issues in the 

past, we have had the good sense to investigate them deeply in 

order to resolve them. Examples include the National Commission 

on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/ 

11 Commission, and the Kerner Commission that investigated the 

uprising that swept American cities in the 1960s and 1970s. 

The important difference in my bill is that the commission would 

seek to act before a crisis-level erosion of basic freedoms takes hold 

and becomes entrenched. Because global terrorism is likely to be 

long-lasting, we cannot afford to allow the proliferation of security 

that does not require and is not subject to expert oversight or analysis of technological advances and other alternatives that can do 

the security job as well and without the severe repercussions on 

freedom and on commerce. 

Following today’s hearing, I intend to move H.R. 3555 to help us 

find the necessary balance by establishing a presidential commission of experts from a broad spectrum of disciplines to investigate 

the threshold question of how to maintain democratic traditions of 

openness and access while responding adequately to continuing 

substantial security threats posed by global terrorism. 

The need for a high-level commission is imperative to look at 

issues from makeshift security and make-work security, such as 

checkpoints that are posed in the streets even when there are no 

alerts to the use of on-the-shelf technology without regard to effects 

on privacy and openness. 

We are open to all suggestions and recommendations concerning 

what we also do not yet know and do not yet fully understand, and 

that, of course, is the still-developing work of keeping us safe and 

4 

open. We have confidence that our people and those in Federal 

agencies can do both, keep us open and keep us safe. We have tackled and mastered strong contrasts before. 

We will listen carefully to how the agency officials plan to balance keeping citizens safe in an open society. We welcome all the 

witnesses. Each of you is essential to this hearing, and we particularly appreciate your time and effort in preparing testimony on 

what we understand to be a very difficult and precedent-setting 

subject. 

I am pleased to ask our Ranking Member, Mr. Diaz-Balart, if he 

has any opening remarks at this time. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Let 

me thank you for the opportunity, let me thank you for holding this 

hearing today on the security in the Federal buildings. 

If anybody had any doubt, the Oklahoma City bombings and the 

9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated that the Federal buildings 

clearly are huge targets for anybody who is out there trying to 

harm us, the United States, and our interests. And the recent arrests in that terror probe I think should also serve to remind us 

that that danger is still very, very real. 

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security, as the Chairwoman has just stated, 

and transferred the Federal Protective Services from GSA to Homeland Security. Now, the intention was to improve security in our 

Nation’s Federal buildings and facilities. However, despite the importance of security, the GAO has found that serious, serious problems continue to persist. In recent years, the GAO has conducted 

a number of investigations and reviews of the security in our Federal buildings. Unfortunately, these investigations revealed very 

significant vulnerabilities. 

As highlighted last year before this Subcommittee, the GAO 

found significant issues with respect to the management and oversight, for example, of contract guard programs. The GAO also 

found that FPS does not use risk management approaches to link 

threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements, raising, obviously, questions as to whether resources are used as efficiently and 

as effectively as possible. 

The potential results of these vulnerabilities, well, is obviously 

apparent. During a recent review—and the honorable Chairwoman 

just mentioned this—during a recent review of building security, 

GAO investigators carrying bomb-making components successfully 

passed through security checkpoints at 10 Federal buildings—facilities. I am not quite sure if they were buildings, but 10 facilities, 

Federal facilities. 

Now, obviously, resolving these issues is critical to protecting the 

people that work in those facilities, those that visit the facilities, 

the tourists, whatever. And that is obviously essential. Ensuring 

security policies are consistent with and not only consistent but 

also effective will obviously help balance security with appropriate 

public access, which is something that we all want to have. 

So I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today. I want to 

thank you. I echo the words from our distinguished Chairwoman 

about thanking you for being here. I look forward to hearing from 

you, and these are very important issues. 

5 

So I thank you, Madam Chairman, for the hearing. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I appreciate your remarks, Mr. Diaz-Balart. 

Of course, the Nation’s capital is the easiest site to see. The FPS 

went far beyond the Nation’s capital, however—sorry, the GAO 

went far beyond the Nation’s capital to do its tests. And I see we 

have the Member from Louisiana, Mr. Cao. If you have any opening remarks, we would be pleased to receive them. 

Mr. CAO. I don’t have an opening remark, Madam Chair. Thank 

you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Cao. 

Now we will ask our first two witnesses: John E. Drew, president 

of Drew Company, Inc., and Erin McCann, a resident here in the 

District of Columbia. 

Mr. Drew? 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN E. DREW, PRESIDENT, DREW COMPANY, 

INC.; ERIN MCCANN, RESIDENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

Mr. DREW. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and Members of 

the Committee. My name is John Drew. I am the chairman of 

Trade Center Management Associates, known as TCMA. We appreciate the opportunity to appear here today, and thank you very 

much for having us. 

I have some prepared remarks, and I will just read from them, 

if that is all right with you. 

Ms. NORTON. Please do. 

Mr. DREW. TCMA has had the privilege of being the operator of 

the public portion of the Ronald Reagan Building in the International Trade Center since the building opened in 1998. We are 

proud to work with GSA, who is the owner of the building. And, 

as some of you know, after the Pentagon, we are the largest Federal building, 3.1 million square feet, in Washington, D.C., and the 

largest in the country. 

No one knows better than you, Madam Chairman, that when the 

Reagan Building was created, it was created with the unique congressional mandate that it was to function as a mixed-use building. 

One of the main functions included in that mandate is a trade promotion program that we organized to create and enhance opportunities for American trade and commerce. 

It is TCMA’s responsibility to support GSA in the implementation of this mandate. Specifically, our responsibility is limited to 

the International Trade Center portion of the building, which consists of public spaces, both inside and outside of the Ronald Reagan 

Building. It is often referred to as a building within a building. Our 

team operates the International Trade Center with a diverse workforce and passionate workforce of over 550 full- and part-time staff 

members. 

We are proud to say that the Reagan Building is now Washington’s busiest conference and special event location. We produce and 

provide a wide range of services to over 1,000 meetings and events 

each year, and we welcome over 1 million visitors to our facilities. 

Our meetings and events are diverse and range from the recent 

U.S.-China economic recovery dialogue that President Obama and 

Secretary of State Clinton and Treasury Security Geithner orgaVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:21 Jan 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\ED\9-23-09\52493.TXT JASON
6 

nized this July to something that is taking place this weekend, 

which is a wedding that is taking place this weekend which has 

been organized by US magazine and the Wedding Channel. So it 

is a wide variety of activities that are taking place within the 

building. 

In addition, we operate D.C.’s largest parking garage within the 

building, and that accommodates nearly 2,000 vehicles. This includes hundreds of cars each day that are visiting the Reagan 

Building for conferences or attending meetings at Federal agencies 

or driven by people who are touring the city. 

We also produce a number of activation projects that help the 

building fulfill its mission of connecting the central business district with the National Mall. In particular, we host Live on Woodrow Wilson Plaza, which is a free summertime concert series, enjoyed this year by over 75,000 people. 

It is worth mentioning that, in order to fulfill the mission of the 

building and to foster trade, we have a staff devoted to organizing 

and promoting upwards of 150 trade-related events that take place 

within the building. 

We have a diverse tenant mix within the building. Our public 

food court has 20 vendors. It serves as a cafeteria for our Federal 

workforce in the building. It also hosts hundreds of thousands of 

visitors each year. Many of these visitors are school children who 

are on organized tours of Washington. 

The building is also home to EPA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and USAID. In addition, we have private tenants. Tenants 

are located throughout the building and in the office towers. And 

they represent private-sector global organizations; the University of 

Maryland has its business school located in D.C. in the building. 

International affairs offices of multinational companies are within 

the building, with foreign trade businesses within the building. We 

have not-for-profit organizations within the space and, also, international trade consultants occupying the space. 

Now that you know more about the facility, my testimony this 

afternoon will focus on the building security and how it is created 

and sustained. My remarks are limited to the security environment 

for the public spaces in the building. 

The security is provided by the Department of Homeland Security through the Federal Protective Service using Federal police officers and an armed contract guard force. During normal business 

hours, the Reagan Building has perimeter security stations at 

seven different street entrances, including an entrance at the Federal Triangle Metro station. These stations all have X-ray and 

magnetometers, and everyone entering the premises is required to 

present a picture ID to a uniformed guard. Some entrances are 

open around the clock. 

In addition, all vehicles entering the Reagan Building are 

screened using technical means for detecting explosive devices. 

And, in addition, every trunk and cargo space is inspected by 

guards. 

We also get a large number of trucks making daily deliveries to 

us and to our food court, restaurants, catering kitchens, and to support events at the conference center. Also, many trucks come to 

service our Federal tenants. One hundred percent of the larger veVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:21 Jan 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\ED\9-23-09\52493.TXT JASON
7 

hicles are now scanned using a drive-through X-ray machine operated off-site a few blocks from the Reagan Building. It is operated 

by FPS. All of the drivers have to have been precleared, produce 

proper ID. And then the vehicles are inspected, and then they are 

sealed, and then they are reinspected when they enter the Reagan 

Building before they go to our loading docks. In 2008, 20,000 trucks 

were inspected through the remote screening location. 

In addition to these human and technical security barriers, we 

also have K-9 officers present on site for random checks, and they 

respond to any issues that may arise. 

As I said, this is just the security apparatus for the public space. 

The Federal office towers have their own separate security stations 

and procedures. 

Turning back to the public space and International Trade Center, 

security was increased after 9/11, and perimeter security was installed. Up until then, all 61 doors to the public space were open 

and accessible with no perimeter security. After 9/11, the measures 

I described above were implemented. 

Initially, we feared that this comprehensive perimeter screening 

would prove to be an impediment to our conference center guests 

and our tourist visitors. As it has turned out, everyone seems to 

have understood the heightened risk and now, I think, believe that, 

actually, perimeter security is a positive aspect for the Reagan 

Building. 

Of course, this generally positive view of security in the building 

is made possible because of significant resources and coordination 

committed by GSA, FPS, and ourselves to make it happen. We 

have developed a terrific working relationship at the building level 

and a mutual understanding that security comes first but that the 

business of government in the Ronald Reagan Building has to continue. We all firmly believe that the building must be open to the 

public. 

Through this cooperation, we have held over 10,000 secured 

events, with literally millions of visitors. We have developed a 

strong institutional knowledge that allows everyone to work and 

function together. This working partnership at the Reagan Building between Homeland Security, GSA, and with the support of our 

organization, literally continues to grow at all times and every day. 

We have established protocols for the visits by the President of 

the United States, working with the Secret Service. We are also 

ready for weekly visits by foreign dignitaries to both the Federal 

space and to the International Trade Center. This is coordinated 

with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The Reagan Building also 

stands ready for busloads of schoolchildren who come daily to the 

food court and see the Berlin Wall that we have on display within 

the building. 

Every visitor is security screened through an airport-style X-ray 

machine, and all packages, backpacks, et cetera, are put through 

a magnetometer. This kind of seamless and layered security would 

not exist without close coordination, communication, and cooperation. We have regular weekly and monthly meetings that take 

place between the Federal tenants and the Reagan Building security staff that meet and talk about security issues and follow 

through on any updated procedures and other issues. 

8 

Members of our own staff participate in a weekly security meeting with the building security to describe all upcoming events. We 

look 21 days out into the future, and we talk about every event 

that is coming in within those 21 days. Each event is talked about, 

it is organized, and then we coordinate each event and event orders 

for additional guards, deliveries, requests for K-9 after-hours 

screeners, and we coordinate all VIP parking. This is just to name 

a few of the security-related requests that we get daily that have 

to beaddressed, and this requires constant communication and coordination. 

In conclusion, I think it is worthwhile reiterating that all parties 

involved recognize that the safety of everyone who works or visits 

the Reagan Building demands and deserves our daily attention. All 

parties involved seek practical solutions to maintain the level of security, while ensuring the safety of both the tenants and the 

guests, and pursuing the mission of the Ronald Reagan Building, 

to keep it open and accessible, are met. 

This concludes my remarks, Madam Chairman. Thank you very 

much. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Drew. 

Ms. McCann? 

Ms. MCCANN. Chairwoman Norton, Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak 

to you today. I have a short statement, and then I will be happy 

to answer your questions. 

My name is Erin McCann, and I am an amateur photographer. 

I am also an active member of a group called D.C. Photo Rights, 

which exists to document and discuss incidents in which photographers have been harassed by security officers or police. 

In April, I became aware of a series of incidents at the Department of Transportation headquarters in southeast D.C., during 

which security guards had stopped members of the public from taking pictures of the building. A photographer had written into a 

forum on the Washington Post Web site asking a columnist for 

help, and word of the incident spread through the D.C. Photography community. Others shared their own similar incidents, and 

many headed to the building to see for themselves what would happen when they took their cameras out. 

What we have documented since then is a series of incidents 

going back at least until 2007 during which security officers have 

stopped photographers for doing nothing more sinister than holding 

a camera on DOT property. I have attached the details of some of 

these incidents, including my own. It is important to note that this 

list is not exhaustive. For every incident someone shared, another 

photographer would chime in with agreement and say, ′′Yes, that 

happened to me there, too.′′ 

Many of the officers are polite, but they are firm in their belief 

that photography of the Department of Transportation or any other 

Federal building is illegal. Others obscure their names, refuse to 

provide contact information for supervisors, threaten to confiscate 

cameras, and issue contradictory orders when questioned. 

My own experience started on May 20th. I phoned the DOT security office and spoke with a Lieutenant Hulse, who referred my call 

to a supervisor. When that supervisor failed to call me back by the 

9 

end of the day, I decided to go to the building to see for myself 

what would happen. Soon, I was standing in a lobby waiting for a 

supervisor, Lieutenant Butler, who, after taking down the details 

from my driver’s license, made the following points: 

When told that DOT seems especially zealous among Federal departments in systematically training its guards to harass photographers, Lieutenant Butler said that made him proud. He said 

DOT is doing it right and everybody else is doing it wrong. 

Lieutenant Butler conceded that most of the people taking photographers of his building are harmless. The number he suggested 

was 90 percent. If I lived in the version of Washington where 10 

percent of the people carrying around cameras were terrorists, I 

would never leave home. 

Lieutenant Butler said his employees are trained to intercept all 

photographers, collect their contact information, and forbid them 

from taking any more photographs of the building. This rule is an 

invasive attempt to collect personal data from law-abiding citizens. 

Thankfully, the security team often fails to collect such data from 

the people that it stops. 

After this conversation, I contacted the American Civil Liberties 

Union of the national capital area, which sent a letter to the DOT 

general counsel’s office on May 27th asking for an explanation. I 

have attached that letter to my testimony. It took 3 months for the 

Department of Transportation to respond. They apologized for my 

incident, and they said the guard was in error. They made no mention of the pattern of documented harassment, and there was no 

indication that any guards would be retrained to end their systematic harassment of anybody with a camera. 

By way of defending their attitude toward photographers, the 

DOT response included a 2004 Homeland Security bulletin regarding photography at Federal buildings. It is a flawed document, 

claiming that, quote, ′′a widely known reconnaissance activity of 

criminal and terrorist organizations has been to gather photographic information about prospective targets.′′ In the age of 

Google Maps and freely available satellite images, the idea that 

someone intending to harm a building needs first to conduct his 

own photographic reconnaissance is laughable. It is also an embarrassing waste of everybody’s time. 

The DOT is not unique in regarding photographers with suspicion. All around this city and the country, courthouses, train stations, and Federal office buildings have been deemed off-limits to 

people with cameras. They do so under the mistaken belief that 

taking pictures in public place is illegal or requires a permit or is 

an indication that the person holding a camera is somehow a 

threat. In many cases, people have been detained, handcuffed, and 

arrested for failing to move along when a guard tells them to. 

It is my belief that the time and energy spent questioning every 

camera-toting tourist could, and should, be put to a more constructive use. 

Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Ms. McCann. 

I would like to question both of you. 

Ms. McCann, I can only say to you that, as a person who practiced constitutional law, I have seldom, in the years I have been 

10 

in Congress, heard testimony that, if true, would amount to a violation of the Constitution of the United States subject to a temporary 

restraining order if the Federal Government had been sued. 

The notion that Federal officers would restrain American citizens 

from exercising their right to express themselves in public, including taking of photographs, is, on its face, unconstitutional. I say 

that without fear of contradiction. And let me tell you, it is seldom 

that a careful lawyer would say something as openly as that. 

I say it also with deep regret that such a practice has gone on 

and with apologies to you and those whom you know who have had 

this to occur. We will try to get to the bottom of it. 

I don’t want to say—particularly since you have been dealing 

with people who are only following orders, what your testimony illustrates is responsibility at a far higher level than they. They are 

people who simply have been told, make sure that you help us protect this building. It is the absence of high-level guidance, even to 

Cabinet officials, that results in people doing whatever occurs to 

them, they who have no truly expert terrorist security background, 

whatever occurs to them. Bearing in mind that we are making it 

up as we go along, 8 years after 9/11, it is time to try to be more 

professional than that. 

Let me go to Mr. Drew first. 

Mr. Drew, I listened, indeed you have been invited here, because 

we are also going to hear from those who control of the other side 

of the Ronald Reagan building, but we invited you here precisely 

because perhaps the Ronald Reagan Building provides us with the 

best example of contracts, only this time we are not dealing building-to-building contracts, as we see throughout the region, where 

you do not know and where there is absolutely no consistency 

building to building. 

Here we have a real test case within the same facility, a highly 

secured facility at that, on the one hand with the Federal agencies. 

And then, on the other hand, I can tell you, because as I entered 

Congress this was part of the first work I did, was to say to the 

Ronald Reagan Building, ′′Pay for yourself. Run it like a private enterprise. Get as many′′—I was cheered to hear there would be weddings there—′′Get as many different kind of people who can pay 

the price in.′′ And, by the way, also to insist, as we did, that this 

had to be a trade facility and not an ordinary office building. So 

you will get pretty highly placed foreign officials who, were we unable to protect them, would embarrass the United States of America very severely. 

So you give the word ′′mixed use′′ new meaning. Normally we 

don’t mean mixed secure and highly secure use. And you also give 

new meaning, the notion ′′public-private,′′ because you have a private facility as part of a large landmark public facility, at the time 

the largest since the Pentagon. 

Let me, therefore, ask you a set of questions. I was particularly 

interested to hear you talk about the parking garage. Who may 

enter that? What kinds of clientele enter that garage? 

Mr. DREW. It is open to the public. 

Ms. NORTON. So does that mean Federal workers on the one 

hand and people who are coming for events on the other? 

Mr. DREW. Yes. 

11 

Ms. NORTON. Now, if people are coming for an event, there is a 

premium put on making sure they get there in time for the event 

to take place. How are you able to accomplish that, if you are, 

while keeping the building secure for all its purposes and all of its 

uses may flow through there for parking purposes? 

Mr. DREW. Madam Chairperson, the way it is done in our case 

is that our people who are involved in sales and events make it 

known to anyone who is attending events or running events at the 

building that we are in a secure building. And we describe the security and—— 

Ms. NORTON. So when they are contracting for the building. 

Mr. DREW. Exactly. So it really is part of the communication that 

we have with someone who is going to be using the building. And 

so they are aware of it before they ever—and their guests, we hope 

they make their guests aware of it before they ever come to the 

building. 

The protocol that I described, that FPS put together, about 

checking the vehicles and examining the trunks and looking with 

mirrors below the vehicles has been established and put in place 

after 9/11, and it is followed for every vehicle that is coming into 

the building. 

So people know that this will take place. It doesn’t mean they 

have to take extra time, but we also explain, quite frankly, that 

once you are in the building you are also in a protected environment. And that we turn into as much of a positive as possible. 

In our case, I think the secret is a day-to-day and week-to-week 

working relationship, where there is constant communication and 

these weekly meetings that take place. 

Ms. NORTON. And who is in on those weekly meetings? 

Mr. DREW. The FPS is in on those meetings. The contractor, CIS 

is in on those meetings, and our staff is in on those meetings, as 

well as the GSA. 

And we, in fact, we have learned by literally working together 

since 9/11 how to, in fact, brief one another, I think, very thoroughly. We also, in those weekly meetings, look at the past week’s 

experience, of the past 10 days’ experience, and we talk about 

events that have taken place. And so, if there are any learnings 

that we have from what we did last week, we are sharing those 

learnings. So it makes, I think, for a very collaborative operation. 

And to give credit to the team that we have, we, as a staff, pay 

particular attention to the fact that we are part of the security operation, too. Our people keep their eyes open, keep their ears open, 

and if there is anything they think is unusual they make it known 

to the security team. 

Vice versa, what we work with the security team on is trying to 

see, in their policing and security function, how we can introduce 

some hospitality there, so that people are moved through quickly 

but the work is done thoroughly, and have people understand, for 

example, if we have a lot of people coming between 6:00 and 7:00 

tonight, that we expect to have so many hundreds of people that 

might be coming in, the entrances that they will be using, and 

what they can anticipate—what type of people they are and what 

they can anticipate. 

So there is an awful lot of time—— 

12 

Ms. NORTON. You mentioned protocols of the Secret Service. That 

is set protocols, is that right? 

Mr. DREW. Those are set protocols. 

Ms. NORTON. That means if the President of the United States 

were to come tonight, you wouldn’t have to start all over again—— 

Mr. DREW. Not at all. 

Ms. NORTON. —to figure out how to make sure he could sit in 

the same building with others. 

Mr. DREW. Right. 

Ms. NORTON. Question for Ms. McCann before I ask the Ranking 

Member and before I go forward: Have you been able—you described how others came out, as well. Did they come together with 

their cameras, or were they testers, also, one at a time? 

Ms. MCCANN. Mostly one at a time. The deal with the DOT headquarters building is that it is right next to the Nationals Stadium, 

and people cut through next to the building on their way to baseball games. So there are certain nights where there are massive 

numbers of people walking by, many of them carrying cameras. 

Ms. NORTON. Were any of them able to, in fact—of course, those 

games take place in the day and take place in the evening. Were 

any of them able to photograph the building without interference? 

Ms. MCCANN. Yeah, it does happen—— 

Ms. NORTON. There is no consistency on when you can or not 

based on the time of day or any of the rest of it? 

Ms. MCCANN. In my experience, it depends on what guards are 

working. And that is kind of the way it works at other Federal 

buildings. I had a friend who was told in front of the Justice building that he couldn’t photograph in front of that building, but that 

was a one-time incident. He went back the next night, and a different guard was working and didn’t stop him. And that is—— 

Ms. NORTON. And no one told you about a policy or cited to you 

a policy or cited to you a document or cited to you a law that governed their discretion? 

Ms. MCCANN. The guard that I spoke with, Lieutenant Butler, 

cited Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which I believe is the entire U.S. 

Criminal Code. 

Ms. NORTON. I believe you are right. 

Ms. MCCANN. And that was the best that he could give me. 

Ms. NORTON. And, again, I stress that he is only doing the best 

he can. And I also stress that I think the agency heads are only 

doing the best they can. 

There is no central authority that consistently advises agencies 

or guides them, so that while you see some of this as laughable, 

it all comes back to the Federal Government, which is why this 

hearing is being held, not because we think any fool would know 

what to do. On the contrary. If you don’t know what to do, then 

make it up so that you protect as much as you can. 

I want to ask the Ranking Member if he has any questions. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. No. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am fine. 

Ms. NORTON. Let me go back for this question to Mr. Drew. 

Is there an agreed upon—here you have very secure and secure. 

And let me just say, Mr. Drew, that I am looking at what you are 

doing because I think what you are doing is instructive for the very 

large private sector in this city and in the Nation. Equally uninVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:21 Jan 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\ED\9-23-09\52493.TXT JASON
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formed and without guidance are the far greater number of private 

facility owners, and they have been out there doing catch-as-catchcan. They can’t call upon the government. They have to do whatever they can. They, like you, have a bottom line, which is: We better be open for people, or else we stop commerce in our building 

and in our jurisdiction. 

But one of the reasons that I want a presidential commission or 

some high-level commission, frankly, is not simply to guide Federal 

officials but because I don’t think there is a lot of difference—and 

I think you show it—between the private and public sectors. 

Most public agencies are pretty low-level targets, quiet as it is 

kept, for terrorists. And yet many of them, I would say in their hubris, but I think in an overabundance of caution, regard themselves 

as susceptible tomorrow. 

So my question becomes, you have one building; conceivably, you 

could have something happen in the public or private side, and 

then it is everybody who is affected. Is there a security plan for the 

entire building? 

Mr. DREW. Yes, there is. And that is with the FPS is responsible 

for. We are working on our side of that building, but FPS is working with the Federal agencies for the other side of the building, and 

they bring it together. 

I think there is a lot of—I can’t speak to specifically what is taking place within the Federal space, because that is not where we 

go. But the—— 

Ms. NORTON. Well, and some of that would be secure. And you 

meet and have discussions. I am now hypothetically envisioning 

something happening in one part of the building that technically 

didn’t happen at all and perhaps wasn’t even known about in the 

other part of the building. I am trying to see how those who are 

not affected, those who are directly affected would respond to such 

an incident. 

Mr. DREW. That is a very good question. What we would do in 

that case is that we would either notify, if it was on our side of 

the building and we find something was occurring, we notify the 

command center. The command center would work with FPS, and 

the entire building would be in fact then engaged. 

Ms. NORTON. And the command center is run by whom? 

Mr. DREW. The command center in our building is run by the 

contracting service. But I must point out, one of the, I think, special features of the building is it is immediately next-door to FPS, 

so they are side by side. So even though they are manning the command center, staffing the command center, it really works as one 

unit. 

Ms. NORTON. You are leasing—sorry. You have a contract? 

Mr. DREW. We have a contract with GSA. Under that contract, 

what we have responsibility for is the public space. But that is the 

sale—that is basically event sales, leasing the private-sector parts 

of the building, overseeing the parking garage from an operations—— 

Ms. NORTON. So you lease the garage yourself? 

Mr. DREW. No, we operate it for GSA. So we are below GSA operating it. So the protocols for—— 

Ms. NORTON. Okay. So within the GSA lease—— 

14 

Mr. DREW. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. —you have responsibility for the garage. 

Mr. DREW. Within the GSA contract that we have, as opposed to 

a lease, we have responsibilities for the garage. 

Now, those responsibilities are in providing service in the garage. 

So we manage, you know, you when you come to the garage, collect 

your money, help you park your car, all of those things, get your 

car back and then leave. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, have you been given guidelines, Federal 

guidelines? How does GSA or DHS evaluate whether or not what 

you are doing in the private side makes that building safe for the 

public side? 

Mr. DREW. We are not evaluated on safety. We are evaluated on 

service, by GSA. 

Ms. NORTON. So how do we know that the building is secure if 

you are not evaluated on security? Is anybody in charge of doing 

that? 

Mr. DREW. The FPS is team is in charge of doing that. 

Ms. NORTON. So what do they do? 

Mr. DREW. Well, they, in fact, have a very rigid program and, I 

think, a pretty thorough program established, where every vehicle 

is inspected. And if you are a tenant in the building and you have 

an ID, you can show your ID and you can proceed into the garage. 

If you are a tourist or a visitor coming to the building, you, in 

fact, show your driver’s license, but then your car is inspected, your 

trunk is opened, cargo space is inspected. In addition, there is a 

mirror put below your car to see if the car is also safe. And then 

they have a way of checking the car for explosives, which I can’t 

explain to you, Madam Chairman, but they have a technique set 

up there where they will wipe the car and make sure there is no 

explosives around that car before they let you proceed into the garage. 

Any large truck cannot come into the garage or come into the 

loading dock unless it has gone through the off-site X-ray system. 

Ms. NORTON. That interests me very much. Do you know whether or not there are other buildings, Federal buildings, that use this 

inspection service for garages? 

Mr. DREW. I believe they do. FPS can speak to it, but I believe 

the other buildings use it, as well. 

So a small truck can come in and be inspected on site, but anything that is larger, a cargo truck—and it is because of the quantity that the larger trucks can contain. So those are all taken off 

site. And they are checked, they are inspected for cargo, they are 

sealed. They have 20 minutes to come to the building. If they don’t 

get to the building within 20 minutes, they have to go back 

through the procedure again. The seal is checked at the building 

to make sure it hasn’t been tampered with. The driver’s ID has 

been checked, and the driver has been recorded. 

So it is pretty thorough program in place to manage the garage 

to make sure it is safe. 

Ms. NORTON. If someone went out into that large, beautiful 

courtyard by the Ronald Reagan Building and decided to take pictures, Ms. McCann or anybody else, would anyone stop such a person today from doing that? 

15 

Mr. DREW. I don’t believe so. I mean, and the reason I can say 

that with some certainty is that, for example, today—— 

Ms. NORTON. Do you have guards separate from their guards? 

Mr. DREW. No, we don’t. All the guards are connected with the 

building. We don’t have our own guards as part of TCMA. 

But the guards within the building go out into that courtyard for 

lunch. We have a concert, a free concert, going on there today. 

There are many people out there with cameras, and they are taking pictures of the concert as well as, I presume, the building. 

Ms. NORTON. Have you had complaints from members of the public about how tough it is to get into the building? 

Mr. DREW. Once in a while, yes. But, again, I think we defend— 

we take those on directly, and, quite honestly, we are not apologists 

for the security. We really explain why the security is beneficial to 

them if they are coming into the building and beneficial to us. 

Ms. NORTON. Have you ever found yourself with the cars backed 

up out into Pennsylvania Avenue trying to get in? 

Mr. DREW. Once in a while. 

But I will give you the opposite of that. We have had some 

events where there has been a lot of trucks bringing in exhibits, 

for example, that are going to be displayed within the building. 

And the FPS has worked with us to keep the X-ray site open afterhours. We pay for that extra expense; it is at our cost. But they 

have done that on large events. But it is because it is coordinated, 

we have told them in advance, and we have planned it. We have 

also used dogs and K-9s on trucks that are coming in after-hours 

as a way of expediting people coming in and out of the building. 

You know, I must say, it is a work in—it is a work every day 

that is in progress. And I think every day we try better to make 

it easier. But at the same time—— 

Ms. NORTON. And you weren’t a security expert when you took 

over this building. 

Mr. DREW. I am not. 

Ms. NORTON. So you, essentially, worked hand in glove with 

whom? 

Mr. DREW. We worked hand in glove with the team at GSA, in 

particular, and then with—— 

Ms. NORTON. So you all figured it out. You worked it out. GSA 

understood, or FPS, whoever, that you had a mandate to hold 

events there. And was there a great deal of friction among you on 

this matter? 

Mr. DREW. I must tell you that, first of all, because of the legislation, because of the work that you did and others did, but you in 

particular did, in creating the Reagan Building, we have a special 

piece of legislation that is there that was created, a Pennsylvania 

Avenue development group. And so the purpose of the building has 

never been questioned because of that legislation. It is meant to be 

open to the public. It is meant to be, as you said, profitable, paying 

for itself, et cetera. So, with that guideline, I think people have respected that guideline, and that has made it possibly easier, in our 

case. 

But I do recall that, right after 9/11 and with all of the anxiety, 

we had some that felt that the building was best if it was sealed 

off and closed. But because of the legislation and because of the beVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:21 Jan 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\ED\9-23-09\52493.TXT JASON
16 

lief in the legislation that the team, in particular GSA, had, they 

stood by us. And then, once we said, ′′No, the building has to be 

kept open to the public,′′ it became a question of how to do it. And 

then I think the minds all got together and the cooperation began. 

And we had some stumbles. I mean, we have worked together 

and, I think, have helped each other out. And we have learned, as 

I said, on a daily basis how to do it better. And I don’t know if we 

are doing it to anyone’s complete satisfaction, but we try to do it 

better every day. 

Ms. NORTON. And you make an important point. You had a mandate. You follow the mandate. It was a public-private mandate, but 

it was an unprecedented mandate. Instead of throwing up your 

hands or using the public mandate to defeat the private mandate, 

you did what we can only expect Federal agencies to do now. 

There is no template for this. We have to create the template and 

to be open and flexible enough to do it, rather than slam on the 

brakes and close up the society. 

Ms. McCann, you gave testimony before us concerning use of 

cameras at another monumental site, the Union Station, where we 

have heard some of the same things you have said about the DOT 

building. 

First I have to ask you whether or not, since you testified in 

March of 2008 on what appears to be the same things you are now 

finding at DOT—guards stopping people from taking pictures, no 

text or guidance to point to, no training—have you seen any measurable change in the policy at Union Station? 

Ms. MCCANN. Absolutely, yeah. I walk through there every single 

day, and I am always looking for people with their cameras. And 

I walk through every couple of weeks with my own camera and 

walk upstairs and downstairs just to check, because I am genuinely 

surprised that it hasn’t reared up again. But it is been consistently 

open regarding photography since we had the hearing last year. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I have to give you and your testimony credit. 

And, of course, we use that to say to Union Station, one, take down 

the sign that said, ′′This is private property′′—— Ms. MCCANN. It took them about 2 months to take that sign 

down, too. 

Ms. NORTON. Absolutely. That bothered us. Two months to take 

down a sign saying that a monumental public possession of the 

United States of America is private property. 

Okay, you all got that done. Let’s say whether or not people can 

take pictures, pictures of what we want them to take pictures of, 

the extraordinary new rendering of the historic Union Station. 

And I think the Union Station knew it also required new training for guards. We had everybody before us, including Amtrak, 

those who use the station in any way. And we have seen that oversight does produce—and we didn’t have to do any new law, we 

didn’t have to do any new regulation—that oversight has been 

enough to get changes in one monumental site. 

Without a lot of oversight on this issue—we have done oversight 

on Ronald Reagan Building—we see that the agency is using the 

statute, have figured out how to do it. I say that the Federal agencies have lacked that oversight. And even as I have been very critical, the buck stops right here, right in the Congress, and right 

17 

with the agencies who have some oversight, including Department 

of Homeland Security, including our own transportation agency. 

But we caution agencies, again, that people sitting in Congress 

are not always alert to difficulties until you bring it to our attention. Then the agency is in a much better position than to have 

people like Ms. McCann bring it to our attention. And then we then 

have to say to the agency, how come you haven’t done something 

about this? 

So we sit here today to use your examples to help us who know 

least about this and to help the agencies across the United States, 

and particularly in this high-targeted region, find the balance. And 

I alert you that, in the region struck by 9/11, I can’t afford to err 

against homeland security. And I think you have showed us that 

we need not choose to do that. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. We will call the next set of 

witnesses. Thank you for your patience. We will just proceed right 

across the board beginning with Deputy Secretary Porcari, of the 

U.S. Department of Transportation. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN PORCARI, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; MARK GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; HON. ROBERT PECK, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES 

ADMINISTRATION; WILLIAM G. DOWD, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL 

PLANNING DIVISION, NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION; GARY SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; AND PATRICK MOSES, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE 

Mr. PORCARI. Thank you. Chairwoman Norton, Ranking Member 

Diaz-Balart, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of Secretary Ray LaHood, thank you for inviting us here to discuss the 

security practices and the policies for the Department of Transportation headquarters. 

I am pleased to say that the Department of Transportation is enjoying its new headquarters building. It is working out very well, 

and we are excited to be part of the redevelopment that is occurring in the Capital Riverfront area of Southeast Washington. There 

was a strong commitment by the Department of Transportation 

leadership at the time to provide a safe and secure environment for 

its employees and to comply with post-9/11 recommended security 

measures in the design and construction of the facility to mitigate 

risks. The requirements for the DOT headquarters represented the 

government’s security consultants recommended industry practices, 

and were reviewed and adopted in collaboration with the Federal 

Protective Service and the General Services Administration. The 

DOT headquarters security requirements were developed consistent with the prevailing Interagency Security Committee security design criteria, the GSA policy guidance on 50-foot setbacks 

issued on April 2002, and a detailed risk assessment and analysis 

that was conducted specifically for the Department that validated 

that the requirements were appropriate for a cabinet agency with 

mission essential functions. 

18 

Madam Chairman, DOT learned well the lessons of Oklahoma 

City and was directly affected by the loss of valued employees in 

that senseless act of violence. Prior to the Oklahoma City bombing 

in 1995, as you pointed out, there were no governmentwide standards for security at Federal facilities. Today, in this facility that is 

designed to the best available standards, the Department strives to 

not only provide a safe and secure environment for its employees 

but also to be a good neighbor. Our 5,900 employees in the building 

support local businesses, and I am pleased to say that DOT has 

been recognized by the Capital Riverfront Business Improvement 

District for our efforts to be a good neighbor. 

We host a farmer’s market open to all in the neighborhood every 

Tuesday, in season. 

On Wednesdays at lunchtime we host local musicians while vendors provide food and refreshments, and in the evening movies are 

shown behind our building for the benefit of neighborhood residents. 

Thursdays are open market days where local vendors can offer 

their wares. 

And beyond those daily good neighbor activities, we have also accommodated planned special events like the District of Columbia’s 

Presidential Inaugural event which was held in the building in 

January. 

The security practices and policies for the Department of Transportation headquarters building conform to Federal standards. Because of the new construction opportunity we have been able to integrate post-9/11 security measures that have greatly enhanced the 

security posture of the DOT headquarters building compared to 

many existing government facilities, and we are grateful for that. 

Overall, the security practices and policies for the Department’s 

headquarters building are equivalent to other cabinet agency headquarters here in the District of Columbia. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I will be happy to 

answer any questions. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Secretary Porcari. 

Next, Mark Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government Accountability Office. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Madam Chair and Members of Subcommittee. We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Federal 

Protective Service’s efforts to ensure the protection of over one million government employees as well as members of the public who 

work and visit the Nation’s 9,000 Federal facilities. 

There has not been a large scale attack on a domestic Federal 

facility since the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the 1995 

bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 

Nevertheless, the recent shooting death of a guard at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, though not a Federal facility, demonstrates the continued vulnerability of public buildings to domestic terrorist attack. 

My testimony today discusses issues from completed GAO reports as well as ongoing work we are conducting for the Subcommittee. Overall we have found that FPS faces a number of challenges that hampers its ability to protect government employees 

and the public in Federal facilities. These challenges include, develVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:21 Jan 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\ED\9-23-09\52493.TXT JASON
19 

oping a risk management framework, developing a human capital 

plan and better oversight of its contract guard program. A summary of our finding follows. 

First, as our July 2008 report showed, FPS’ approach to protecting Federal facilities did not use a risk management approach 

that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. 

While FPS has conducted risk-related assessments such as building 

security assessments, we have reported concerns with the quality 

and approach that FPS uses to conduct these assessments. For example, FPS’ approach is not allowed to compare risk from building 

to building so the security improvements in buildings can be 

prioritized. 

Further complicating FPS’ ability protect Federal facilities is the 

building security committee structure. In some of the facilities that 

we visited, security countermeasures were not implemented because building security members could not agree on what countermeasures to implement or were unable to attain funding from their 

agencies. 

Second, as discussed in our recently released July 2009 report, 

the absence of a strategic human capital plan to guide its current 

and future work force planning efforts is another significant challenge confronting FPS. The agency has begun taking steps toward 

developing a work force transition plan to reflect its work force reductions that have been required several years ago. However, in 

2008 FPS discontinued this plan because its objective was no 

longer relevant because of Congressional mandate to increase its 

work force. FPS experienced difficulties meeting this mandate in 

part because of challenges to shifting its priorities from downsizing 

the work force to increasing it to comply with the mandate and 

delays in the candidate screening process. 

Additionally, we found that FPS headquarters does not collect 

data on its work force’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. Consequently, FPS cannot determine what its optimal staffing levels 

should be or identify gaps in its work force needs or determine how 

to modify its work force planning strategies to fill these gaps. 

Third, as we testified in a July 2009 congressional hearing, FPS 

does not fully ensure that its contract guards have the training and 

certifications required to stand post at Federal facilities. While FPS 

requires that all prospective guards complete 128 hours of training, 

including 8 hours of x-ray and magnetometer training, it was not 

providing some of its guards with all the required training in the 

regions we visited. For example, in one region, FPS had not provided the required 8 hours of x-ray or magnetometer training to its 

1,500 guards since 2004. Insufficient x-ray and magnetometer 

training may have contributed to several incidents at Federal facilities where guards were negligent in carrying out their responsibilities. 

In addition, FPS has limited assurance that its contractors and 

guards are complying with the terms of contract and post orders 

once they have deployed to a Federal facility. For example, with 

the components for an improvised explosive device concealed on 

their persons, our investigators passed undetected through access 

points controlled by FPS guards at 10 level IV facilities in four 

major cities where we conducted tests. Of the 10 facilities that we 

20 

penetrated, eight were government owned and two were leased, 

and they included the offices of a U.S. Senator, a U.S. Representative, as well as agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. Once our investigators 

passed the access control point they assembled the IED from the 

materials they were able to get past the guards. 

We also noted that CERTS, FPS’ primary system for monitoring 

and verifying whether guards have the training and certifications 

required to stand posts at Federal facilities is also not fully reliable. We reviewed training and certification data for 663 randomly 

selected guards in six of FPS’ 11 regions and found that 62 percent 

of the guards who were to deploy to a Federal facility had at least 

one expired firearm qualification, background investigation, domestic violence declaration, or a CPR first Aid training certification. 

Without a domestic violence declaration in place, guards are not 

permitted to carry a firearm. FPS requires almost all of its guards 

to carry such weapons. 

Finally, while FPS has taken steps to improve its ability to better protect Federal facilities, it is difficult to assess the impact of 

these actions because most of them occurred recently and have not 

been fully implemented. Moreover, there are a number of factors 

that will make implementing and sustaining these actions difficult. 

First, FPS does not have adequate controls to monitor and track 

whether its regions are completing the new requirements. 

Second, FPS has not modified any of its 129 guard contracts to 

reflect these new requirements. 

Third, FPS has not completed any work force analysis to determine if the current staff of 930 law enforcement security officers 

will be able to effectively complete the additional inspections and 

provide the x-ray and magnetometer training to 15,000 guards in 

addition to the current physical and security law enforcement responsibilities. And while we are pleased that the new RAMP system will modernize how FPS manages it mission, we remain concerned about the accuracy and reliability of the information that 

will be entered into RAMP, including data from CERTS where we 

have noted problems. 

Madam Chairman, this completes my statement. I will answer 

any questions that you may have later. 

Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. 

Robert Peck, Commissioner, Public Building Service of the GSA. 

Mr. Peck. 

Mr. PECK. Thank you. Madam Chairman, Mr. Diaz-Balart and 

Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Robert Peck, and I am, 

once again, the Commissioner of the Public Building Service at 

GSA. I have been here before. Thank you for inviting us to the 

hearing today. I have a statement for the record. I am going to 

summarize it and invite you to ask questions. 

We have no more important responsibility in GSA then safeguarding the one million Federal tenants in our buildings and the 

people who come to visit them. It is the most difficult responsibility 

to undertake because we have the responsibility both of safeguarding them and also of maintaining the freedoms that are the 

very reasons that our buildings and our government exists. 

21 

It is somewhat easier to secure a high security facility somewhere in the middle of nowhere, put a huge fence around it, say 

nobody can get in and authorize your guards to use deadly force 

to keep out intruders. We are in the opposite position. We want 

people to visit. We want people to feel like these are their buildings. It is a very tall order. 

Can I just say as an aside to Ms. McCann, as a student in the 

early 1970s working on a paper on government architecture, I also 

tried to take a picture of a government facility in downtown Washington and was thrown out by a guard. So it is not just a new phenomenon and it is something that has been going on a long time. 

I also thought it was totally illogical. 

I will just say this is an important enough responsibility to me 

that one of my first actions coming back into GSA was to attend 

a national meeting of the Federal Protective Service in Kansas City 

and to talk to their regional heads and to Mr. Schenkel, their National Director. When I came to GSA the last time it was 8 months 

after the Oklahoma City bombing, and I spent a lot of time on security. We were in the process of developing security standards and 

spending a lot of money on countermeasures, and we learned a lot 

over the 5 years after that I was at GSA. 

The events of September 11, 2001, obviously, increase the urgency of security measures in government and other facilities and 

there have been lots of changes since then, I think mostly for the 

better. The Interagency Security Committee, on which GSA sits 

and on which we are the only agency with a primary real estate 

responsibility, has in fact tightened its standards and attempted to 

make those standards more based on risk of the kind of agencies 

in the building, the location of buildings, and the very structure of 

the building themselves. I think there is still a lot of work to be 

done. 

Obviously since then the Federal Protective Service has moved to 

Homeland Security, and although we are no longer totally joined 

at the organizational hip, there is no less important a call on all 

of us for GSA and Federal Protective Service to work together. 

Our job with the Federal Protective Service and our customers, 

the agencies who occupy our buildings, is to balance the risk, the 

resources we have available, functioning in the buildings as government agencies, and allowing in the public. How are we doing with 

all of that? I would say, as I said, better than we have before. I 

think there is a lot of work remaining to be done. 

I will say that you have raised some important issues at the 

hearing today about whether there is consistency in the way we go 

about doing that among our agencies. And so let me focus on that 

just for a brief moment. 

It is very important that we have an overall framework in which 

we assess the vulnerability of our buildings and in which we assess 

the risks and balance those risks against the resources we have 

available. It is also important to customize the security in our 

buildings because some agencies require more vulnerability, some 

locations require more vulnerability, more or less rather countermeasures against those vulnerabilities. I have some questions 

about the way we have gone about it and I think they parallel 

yours. 

22 

I believe that in many cases the way in which the building security committees are organized and the authority that building security committees have, now called facility security committees have, 

to assess their own countermeasures is perhaps misplaced. I question—one of the suggestions I would make is that at a higher level 

inside our government I believe we need to have the kind of a 

framework that will allow FPS and GSA to go to the individual security committees and have an overlay in which we say, we understand your concerns, but we have experts who know how to do this 

kind of work and we are going to balance those kinds of concerns 

of yours as tenants with the resources and the expertise that we 

have as security experts. 

I will say again I am brand new to the job. This is my sort of 

first assessment of what is happening in our security business, and 

I look forward to working with you to figure out a way to make 

those changes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Peck. 

William Dowd, Director of Physical Planning Division, National 

Capital Planning Commission. Mr. Dowd, you are next. 

Mr. DOWD. Yes, ma’am. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Norton and 

Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Bill Dowd and I am the 

Director of the Physical Planning Division at the National Capital 

Planning Commission, which is the Federal Government’s central 

planning agency for the Nation’s capital. It includes representatives from the Department of Interior, the Department of Defense, 

General Services Administration, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Council of the District of Columbia, United States 

House and Senate Committees with oversight responsibilities in 

the District, and individuals appointed by the President of the 

United States and the Mayor of the District of Columbia. I am very 

pleased to have this opportunity to speak with you today about 

NCPC’s role in trying to balance legitimate needs for physical security with the undesirable impacts to important public spaces in our 

Nation’s capital. 

Unlike other cities across the country, as the seat of our Federal 

Government, Washington, D.C. Has a significant concentration of 

Federal office buildings, museums and national icons that warrant 

levels of protection. The most typical and visible form of physical 

security in the city is vehicle barriers located in our treasured public spaces. These public spaces include sidewalks and building 

yards, accommodate a vast range of uses, and provide for mobility 

and enjoyment by the public; however, barriers sometimes detract 

from sense of openness that is so important to our capital city. 

In the National Capital Region, NCPC is responsible for the oversight of all physical development proposals on Federal land and, as 

such, has developed extensive firsthand experience with the challenges of providing physical security in a city known around the 

world for its distinct public spaces. Our commission understands 

that access to our government, as well as the important public 

spaces that define our Nation’s capital is worthy of our protection. 

NCPC is concerned about the continuing challenges of balancing 

security and accessibility. Over the past decade we have worked 

hard to minimize the impacts that physical security measures have 

23 

on the public spaces that define the city and represent our democratic values. 

In response to the unsightly security futures erected in Washington, D.C. After the tragic 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City, 

NCPC prepared and adopted Designing for Security in the Nation’s 

Capital. Released in 2001, this report identified an approach to designing future security features in Washington that would reduce 

their impact on public spaces. 

Following 9/11, NCPC published the National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan in October of 2002. This plan provided 

physical guidance for the design of contextually sensitive physical 

security features appropriate for use in the monumental core of the 

city. 

In our review capacity, NCPC has regularly worked with applicant agencies over the past 10 years to reduce the impacts of proposed security improvements on the environment and public space. 

For example, NCPC was instrumental in guiding development of 

the landscape security solution on the Washington Monument 

grounds that is widely praised as successfully marrying landscape 

amenities and improved security. 

And most recently, in 2008, NCPC assembled a security task 

force to address the impacts that security projects were continuing 

to have both individually and cumulatively on the city’s important 

public spaces. The task force included members of our commission, 

but also included participation from government security professionals, including the Department of Homeland Security and the 

United States Secret Service. 

Through this 1 year effort, NCPC’s security task force reached 

several conclusions regarding the challenges of physical security. It 

also developed alternatives to better balance the need for security 

with the value of providing and maintaining openness in the Nation’s capital. 

The security task force found that, one, because the probability 

of any specific type of attack on a facility is so difficult to quantify, 

the current determination of risk is based primarily on the vulnerability of a facility and the potential consequences of an attack. 

This approach to assessing risk often leads to proposals for extremely robust security solutions. 

Two, that existing security standards may seem appropriate in 

cities with only a few facilities that need protection. But these 

standards which are focused on increasing protection and physical 

standoff at individual facilities are more challenging in cities with 

many assets such as Washington, DC. 

Three, because individual Federal agencies are responsible for securing only their individual facilities, area wide security improvements that could benefit the entire city or monumental core are 

less likely to be identified and implemented. 

And four, security proposals for individual buildings are often developed specifically to satisfy existing security standards, not balancing improved security against other public or environmental impacts. 

NCPC’s security task force determined that bringing together the 

views of planners, designers, security professionals, Federal landholding agencies and Federal and local oversight agencies to guide 

24 

the planning and development of future security improvements can 

help meet these challenges. These groups need to work together to, 

one, prioritize security improvements at Federal facilities; two, 

identify the most cost efficient way to address our most critical security needs; and three, coordinate future security improvements to 

make sure that they address and respect the needs of Federal and 

local facilities in the city; and finally, four, ensure that individual 

and cumulative impacts to public space, public access and the environment, are fully considered before implementing physical security projects in the future. 

While it is important to make sure that we protect our Nation’s 

most valuable assets, we must do so in a way that considers the 

impacts of our actions and which does not unduly harm the public 

spaces or the public access to our government. 

Thank you for inviting me to share NCPC’s perspective on the 

challenging work to balance the need for improved physical security with the potential impacts that physical security projects have 

on public spaces and access to our government. We would be happy 

to answer any questions following the panel. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Dowd. 

Next we will hear from Gary Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, which is a part of the U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement. Mr. Schenkel. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Chairwoman Norton, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss FPS mission, riskbased security in Federal buildings, as well as describing the steps 

we have taken to address the concerns raised by the Government 

Accountability Office. 

As you know, to serve customer agencies in Federal facilities, 

FPS must effectively balance the need for security with the need 

for ready public access to government services. This means that 

FPS, in conjunction with the agencies that occupy the facilities, 

must provide security solutions and ensure safe and secure environments that do not deter people from conducting regular business. FPS offers comprehensive physical security operations, installs security systems, alarms, x-rays, magnetometers, entry control systems, monitors those systems 24 hours a day, 7 days a 

week, and provides uniform police response and investigative follow-up. The provision of contract security guard services crime prevention seminars tailored to individual agency and employee needs, 

facility security surveys, integrated intelligence gathering and 

sharing, and special operations capabilities are all part of the broad 

FPS mission. 

Upon my arrival in 2007, it was apparent FPS was experiencing 

some challenges. The agency transferred from GSA to DHS in 2003 

with a full-time equivalent work force of over 1,400 spread across 

the country in 11 different regions. And I saw that FPS needed to 

focus on becoming a single standardized organization. This required a new operational construct and new business practices. 

However, FPS simultaneously faced budget constraints due, in 

part, to poor financial and contract management, as well as fee collection, requested in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget that 

supported fewer personnel than we had on board and at the time 

the budget was sent to Congress. To avoid having to reduce the 

25 

numbers of Federal employees, FPS sought to realize savings in 

other areas. 

Consequently, many programmatic elements, such as training 

and equipment purchases had to be rescheduled until such time 

that FPS could determine it had sufficient funding. FPS of course 

remained obligated and dedicated to protect the almost 9,000 GSA 

owned and leased facilities and overseeing 15,000 armed contract 

security guards and managing over 150 contracts. 

During this period, FPS carefully assessed its organization and 

made difficult decisions. This refocusing effort culminated in the 

development of a strategic plan to shape future activities. FPS now 

focuses on critical issues within its protective mission and is developing a sound strategic path forward focused on facility security 

and the safety of the occupants and of the visitors who visit those 

facilities. 

With respect to the GAO report released in July, we took many 

steps to improve the visitor and employee screening process at Federal facilities, including improved training of contract guards and 

oversights of those guards. In addition, I believe that more work 

is needed to improve the training of contract guards and additional 

study is required to determine whether contract guards are maintaining constant vigilance. To that end, FPS is taking steps to bolster training and performance, increase oversight and supervision 

and create a more uniform protective system. After reviewing the 

problems identified by the GAO, I believe that the steps we have 

taken will redress these problems and the proposed future steps 

will ensure the improved protection of nearly 9,000 GSA owned and 

leased facilities protected by the FPS work force and our contract 

guards. 

I think it is important to note that FPS has limited authority 

with regard to the 9,000 or so facilities it protects. Although responsible for securing the facilities, FPS cannot set standards or require a particular facility to have the best available security equipment. Instead, building tenants make those decisions. Each building facilities security committee, or FSC, makes the final determination on the facilities security level and sets the building’s access and security policies. 

Thus, FPS, although expert in physical security, faces challenges 

in protecting facilities and their occupants as FPS may deem appropriate. Tenants may select security controls and options that 

FPS’ physical security experts have neither recommended nor endorsed. The GAO reported recently that only 12 percent of the leaders of these FSCs have any security experience. 

Chairwoman Norton, I applaud your leadership role and the effort to strike the right balance between security and access to our 

Federal buildings, and look forward to working with you and this 

Subcommittee on addressing those challenges. I want to express to 

you my personal sense of urgency and commitment to the important responsibility I share with the men and women of the Federal 

Protective Service in keeping our Nation safe. I can tell you that 

they, as are Secretary Napolitano and Assistant Secretary Morton, 

are dedicated, determined and committed to developing, implementing and maintaining the highest level of physical security to 

26 

ensure that the facilities they are charged with protecting are secure and their occupants are safe. 

I thank you again, Chairwoman Norton, for holding this important oversight hearing. I will be pleased to answer any questions 

you may have. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Schenkel. 

Mr. Patrick Moses, the Regional Director for the National Capital Region of the FPS. Mr. Moses. 

Mr. MOSES. Chairwoman Norton, thank you for the invitation to 

appear before you today. I currently serve as the Regional Director 

of the National Capital Region of the Federal Protective Service. I 

was appointed to this position in September 2008, and I have 

served in the Federal Protective Service for 14 years. 

As part of my responsibilities I direct the regionwide infrastructure protection program by mitigating risk to Federal facilities and 

the occupants for 772 facilities operated by the General Services 

Administration, including a number of high profile facilities such 

as the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center 

and the Nebraska Avenue Complex. 

Since Director Schenkel has provided the Subcommittee with a 

written statement on behalf of the Federal Protective Service, I will 

forego making a formal statement at this time, but will be happy 

to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Moses. 

Mr. Peck, Mr. Porcari cites, page 2 of his testimony, based on a 

delegation of authority provided by the Department of Homeland 

Security through the Federal Protective Service, the Secretary of 

Transportation is solely responsible, without limitation, for protecting the DOT. 

Should GSA be delegating authority to agencies to set up security? Agencies like the Department of Transportation don’t have a 

smidgeon of expertise on security of the kind we are talking about 

here. Should that be the practice? I am not asking you. I know you 

weren’t there. Most of you at this table weren’t there, and that is 

why I am looking less for apologies than I am for people who would 

want to take on this unprecedented activity with me. But I am asking, as a matter of practice, should the agency be delegating such 

security authority to an agency regardless of its background or expertise in security? 

Mr. PECK. My short answer is no. You know, for 20 some years 

we have delegated the management of major Federal headquarters 

buildings, mostly in Washington, to the agencies. And I suspect—— 

Ms. NORTON. You know, I can understand certain kinds of management notions being delegated. So, no, I accept that. We are not 

trying to, you know, centralize everything. I serve on the Homeland 

Security Committee and they have centralized the world in Homeland Security in order to protect us. So I accept what you are saying. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. PECK. Correct. And what I was going to say is I just suspect 

that since when that program first came in, I think building security was considered an aspect of building management. That has 

probably been the way delegations have happened. What I am tellVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:21 Jan 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\ED\9-23-09\52493.TXT JASON
27 

ing you now is I think that we should reconsider whether that is 

a part of a delegation to an agency. 

What is important, of course, is that we consult with the agencies, because only the agencies can know how they actually use a 

building and what they need and what kinds of visitors they have 

and what requirements they have on deliveries and loading and all 

those things. 

But, again, as I suggested in my testimony, and I think you hear 

from Director Schenkel’s also, that the balance of responsibility, of 

decision making about security in buildings is probably something 

that we ought to move back a little bit more, maybe even a lot 

more, toward those who have the security expertise. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you agree, Mr. Goldstein? You, who are an expert from the GAO, where should the responsibility lie? Should it 

be with the HHS? Should it be with the Department of Education? 

Should it be with the Department of Transportation? Or is there 

some authority that is specialized enough within the Federal Government to advise agencies in consultation with them about our security for millions of Americans and Federal employees? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have not looked at the question specifically. 

But I would have to say in the work that we have done examining 

FPS and Homeland Security and some other agencies as well, it 

seems to us that some greater centralization, as you say, with consultation is probably useful at this point in time. The whole building security committee apparatus, the way in which risk management is approached as well, does not provide an avenue for GSA 

and FPS to look at the entire portfolio of Federal buildings and determine where the risks truly lie and how to protect them in a riskbased case. 

Ms. NORTON. Isn’t there a difference between some buildings and 

other buildings in the GSA inventory? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. Absolutely. Even, you know, while 

there is currently under the standards a level I through V category 

distinction that separates risk—— 

Ms. NORTON. Because most cabinet agencies will be at least level 

IV, won’t they? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Most, certainly their headquarters buildings will 

be, absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. So we understand we are all high level. We are all 

very important. And we think that if some have higher level security than others it is not because they are more important; it is because terrorists and other criminals may seek access to those buildings more often than to others. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. And one of the issues there is 

that the Federal Protective Service historically has not had great 

access to threat information and also does not have terribly useful 

crime statistics coming out of its own mega centers to help to determine where those greater risks lie. 

Ms. NORTON. Say that again. I am sorry. You know, I can’t always understand you. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. Two points I was making. One is the Federal Protective Service has not always had great access to threat 

information from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

28 

Ms. NORTON. What do you mean? They are part of the Homeland 

Security Department. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. But in the conduct of our audits 

over the last couple of years, we had many FPS officers and officials out in the regions tells us that their access to Joint Terrorism 

Task Force information was very limited. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you need access to Joint Terrorism Task Force 

information to do what was done at the Ronald Reagan Building 

by the private sector, working with the FPS? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I can’t answer that question. What I am suggesting—— 

Ms. NORTON. I guess it is a rhetorical question. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. They do lack significant information that they 

would need to develop a better risk-based model—— 

Ms. NORTON. I question that, Mr. Goldstein. I really question 

that because we gave very detailed questions to the witnesses that 

preceded you and they didn’t anymore have expertise and background than the FPS before, for that matter, Oklahoma City. Nobody knew how to do this. But they were given a mandate by statute, and that was to make this building private to the greatest degree possible and FPS, you better make sure that the public part 

of it is as safe and secure as need be. 

And I guess I should ask if anyone else at the table thinks that 

there has been difficulty figuring that out without access to the 

highest level information, because the next thing we are going to 

hear, Mr. Goldstein, is unless we know all the threat information 

that the Secretary knows, don’t expect us to be able to guard these 

buildings in the way you want. 

But, I mean, you all didn’t have that at Ronald Reagan. And yet 

you have got a million visitors coming to Ronald Reagan. And the 

highest profile building outside of the Capitol and the monuments 

and the White House, and the President can go in there today and 

I am not sure who has access to all that highly classified information. 

So I hear you, Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Peck. 

Mr. PECK. Well, let me see if I can make a distinction. The point 

in the Ronald Reagan, which is, by the way, a great example of 

how you can get the tenant agencies and a private vendor and FPS 

and GSA to work together on this. However, is that the Ronald 

Reagan, we assume, is a very high risk target and we have had 

protocols developed with the Secret Service. Whether FPS has access to the information now or not I don’t know. I know they did 

have trouble at one point in time. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, FPS doesn’t need to if it is in consultation 

with people who do have access and they are acting reasonably. 

Mr. PECK. That is correct. And on the Ronald Reagan Building 

since we assume it is very high risk, we assume that we need a 

very high level and we have been able to assume that. I think the 

issue becomes a little bit more important, what Mr. Goldstein is 

talking about, where we have buildings that are probably in a 

lower risk category, and there we need to have the people—our tenants need to have the confidence that FPS knows what it is talking 

about when it sets a risk level because if we are—may I just say 

one other thing. You put your finger on something before. That if 

29 

a facility security committee run by people who aren’t security experts, don’t know what the risk is, don’t know what the best practices are, they are going to naturally go to the highest level of security that they have seen in some other building. To be able to convince them that in some buildings we don’t need things ratcheted 

up that high, they need to have confidence in us that we know 

what the risks are, we know what the proper countermeasures are. 

Ms. NORTON. That point is very well taken. And yet, Mr. Peck, 

it looks like the GSA or the FPS is buried when it comes to security. We have got something called the Interagency Security Committee, ISC. Now, you are the only agency who has the mission of 

managing, you are the PBS of managing property. So far as I 

know, you are neither Chair, you of the GSA or of the Federal Protective Service, either Chair or even have a particular leadership 

position. I don’t even know, maybe Mr. Goldstein or somebody 

knows, whether your even being at the table matters. Who is in 

charge of this committee? 

Mr. PECK. Well, I think Homeland Security is chairing the ISC 

at the moment. 

Ms. NORTON. Who? Who is that? What agency? Is there a Chair? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Madam Chairwoman, the Assistant Secretary for 

Infrastructure Protection is the actual Chair of the ISC. 

Ms. NORTON. Assistant Secretary for—— 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Infrastructure Protection. 

Ms. NORTON. And of course, Mr. Schenkel, you don’t even come 

under that division. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. No, ma’am. No, ma’am. 

Mr. PECK. If I may say, one of the problems—— 

Ms. NORTON. So that is the—and everybody else is kind of at the 

table; is that it, Mr. Schenkel? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. It is, I think it is a group of 24 members, actual 

voting members. Everyone has access to the meetings and certainly 

has to abide by the decisions. 

Ms. NORTON. Where are their decisions published? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. They are published in their own directives that 

they put out at the facility’s security level. 

Ms. NORTON. Could you get to this Committee within 30 days 

their directives that all agencies under their jurisdiction must apparently use this guidance? Mr. Peck. 

Mr. PECK. May I just say, at least, when I was in the private sector, a good number of the ISC criteria are actually on-line. They 

are not classified. So they do have them. Can I just say though—— 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Schenkel, would you get to us within 30 days 

the material on-line or off-line and tell us whether it is agency wide 

so that we may see what guidance the agencies have been given? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, everyone at the table should know that we 

are not here to say why haven’t you done X, Y, or Z, or why did 

you do X, Y, or Z. We know the reason. We do not believe, despite 

whatever is on-line, that the agencies consider that there is an authority, nor has Mr. Goldstein testified to any authority that agencies look to. So I am not saying how come you are doing this, that 

or the other. I believe the agencies are doing the best within their 

discretion. I also understand that not everybody has been at the 

30 

table the whole time. Some had to be at the table to make it up 

as they went along. That is how—that is what we are doing right 

now. We are just trying to see if there is a better way to do it. So 

I would caution everybody, since I am not holding those who put 

it in place without guidance or sufficient guidance responsible, I 

don’t think anybody at the table at all ought to put that monkey 

on your back because then you are going to own it if you want to, 

in fact, use it as the reason for what you are doing. 

And I say that to you, Mr. Porcari, because I don’t believe you 

have testified before us. But you did say, quite truthfully, I have 

cited it to Mr. Peck, that you are doing what has been delegated 

to you. But on page 2 of your testimony, you also said that the 

DOT headquarters security was developed, and you go on, and a 

detailed risk assessment analysis conducted specifically for the Department that validated our requirements were appropriate for a 

cabinet agency with mission essential functions. 

Now, mind you, I know fully what your mission is. This Committee is part of the Department of Transportation and Infrastructure, and I am on the Homeland Security Committee, so I am not 

in doubt what your mission is. And your mission is very important 

to the United States. But let me tell you and ask you whether you 

think this can be improved. You heard Ms. McCann testify about 

what I think could be called arbitrary treatment. Some guards let 

you take pictures. Some guards don’t let you take pick pictures. 

And she said, she quoted a 2004 Mr. Schenkel security bulletin regarding photography at Federal buildings. And this is what she 

quoted from a 2004 Homeland Security bulletin that was apparently published right here for the public to read. 

Widely known reconnaissance activity of criminal and terrorist 

organization has been—I am sorry. Claiming, the document 

claimed that a widely known reconnaissance activity of criminal 

and terrorist organizations has been to gather photographic information about prospective targets. 

Agreed. Do you think it is appropriate today for the Department 

of Homeland Security to keep a citizen from taking a picture or 

that you are endangered if somebody takes a picture of the front 

or the back or the side of the Department of Transportation headquarters? 

Mr. PORCARI. Madam Chairman, let me first apologize to Ms. 

McCann. I know that we did respond in writing. That action was 

inappropriate. We said so at the time. I just want to reiterate that 

personally. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you for that. 

Mr. PORCARI. And the November 10, 2004, Federal Protective 

Service bulletin is what we have been following. And I would also 

add that we have, since that incident, given written guidance to 

the security personnel at the building that references that and that 

is very specific about how they should be. 

Ms. NORTON. Saying what? Would you just characterize how, because you know what happens? And I warn you. People who 

brought this to our attention were young people. They are going to 

start snapping the pictures left and right. 

Mr. PORCARI. I do understand. 

31 

Ms. NORTON. And you are presumed to be under oath here. We 

don’t, and I may have to do this. I may, you know every other Committee they make people stand up. I exercise a presumption in 

favor of the truthfulness of anybody who appears before me. So be 

careful about your answers. They will test you out. 

Mr. PORCARI. You should be able to rely on that assumption in 

the roles that we are in. That is an explicit part of the job. 

Let me just characterize some of the important points that is in 

that guidance. It says first please understand there is no prohibition against photographing the DOT or FAA headquarters buildings. Second, however, because reconnaissance activity of criminal 

and terrorist organizations has been to gather photographic information about prospective targets, security personnel should follow 

the procedures. That wording is directly from the Federal Protective Service 2004—— 

Ms. NORTON. That is good. So far so good. 

Mr. PORCARI. One, approach anyone within DOT or FAA boundaries taking photographs of the building and identify yourself. In 

other words, as a security officer. Two, conduct a field interview to 

determine the purpose for taking photographs of the facility and 

endeavor to ascertain the identity of the individual. That, again, is 

wording directly from the FPS 2004 guidance. If the field interview 

does not yield a belief of criminal behavior or terrorist reconnaissance activity, the photography should be permitted without further action. 

Ms. NORTON. What is going to happen, Mr. Porcari and Mr. 

Schenkel and Mr. Peck, as you can see from Ms. McCann, I don’t 

even know if she is a lawyer. All I know is she is typical of the 

people I represent. Smart. So I am going to have to ask you, does 

that directive apply, if you are taking pictures on the property or 

if you are taking pictures a few feet back from the property? 

Mr. PORCARI. This applies, to my knowledge, on the property. 

The property extends to the curb line. 

Ms. NORTON. So, I understand, and I understand, Mr. Porcari, 

you are quoting from what the directive says. And you are abiding 

by the directive. And Mr. Goldstein, that is why I believe security 

isn’t worth a tinker’s damn, if you will forgive the expression, because I believe you can get a better reconnaissance picture of DOT 

by getting across the street and using one of the new-fangled or for 

that matter old-fashioned cameras. And I think you could get something that would be virtually like a blowup of every part of it. And 

yet, Mr. Porcari, according to the guidance he has, has got people 

who could be looking for some people who are trying to get into the 

buildings, going up to American citizens and questioning them 

about what they are doing there. 

Now, I say, and putting on my old hat as a constitutional lawyer 

who has argued before the Supreme Court of the United States, I 

say that there is a serious risk, and we have already seen Union 

Station, inside the Union Station, they understood you had better 

not do that. There is a serious risk to go up to a law abiding person 

who is exercising her first amendment rights to take a picture of 

the building she owns as a taxpayer, and interrogate her to make 

sure who she is, unless there is a risk that can be demonstrated. 

32 

I have just tried to give you the kind of law school hypothetical 

I use still as a tenured professor of law at Georgetown University. 

I say to you that not only have I found it difficult to see the risk, 

but it is far from, not only is there no overriding risk to infringe 

upon the first amendment right of the citizen, I believe the terrorist is better able to take pictures off the property and that no 

U.S. attorney would do anything if a suit was brought but give up. 

That is just how off the mark, given the so-called preferred rights, 

first amendment rights are, and I am denominating the right to 

take a picture as a first amendment right. 

So I am trying to find out whether or not what is printed out so 

that Mr. Porcari is only following the directives that Mr. Schenkel 

and Mr. Peck’s organizations have said he should follow, I am asking you, as security expert, whether or not you believe that a justification can be, and ask you to stretch now and help them out because they could find themselves in court. Is there a justification 

that could be made for keeping somebody on Federal property 

where you have a right to be because it is Federal property which 

itself is not off limits as secure property, is there, could you argue 

that it is justified to begin interrogation of a citizen taking pictures? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have certainly not looked at the issue in any 

of its facets, Madam Chairman. I would say though that many of 

the policies that FPS promulgates are not enforced in any kind of 

uniform standard, and that is part of the problem that you do face 

even with those standards that ought to be enforced, no less those 

that may have some questions about whether they should be enforced or not. 

Ms. NORTON. So we are looking for, to help the agencies get some 

kind of guidance to take seriously. Now obviously some don’t take 

it seriously at all. The testimony was that DOT doesn’t take it seriously some of the time and take it seriously—in other words, the 

guard in his discretion can the see silliness of this perhaps and say 

I am not going to let that come out of my mouth that you better 

not take pictures, so maybe he lets it go. Another guard says I am 

by the book so I do it. That is where risk comes in, where you have 

that kind of inconsistency. 

But, Mr. Porcari, I am going to tell you about an experience we 

had. Let me first thank you on behalf of and ask that you thank 

those at DOT who have been very kind to us. We have had, we 

have been into your courtyard, we love it, where you are good 

enough to have a farmer’s market if you still do. Certainly you did. 

Mr. PORCARI. We do. 

Ms. NORTON. We have had events, as you indicated, in your 

building. But let me tell you what has not changed. You work very 

closely with the business community in your area and this applies 

to them as well as to others. When we first went to use this beautiful facility which came through this Committee, I might add, my 

staff, staff of the United States Congress, which have this ID 

around them, were not allowed, who have a higher, I would argue, 

security clearance than most in your building, were not allowed to 

enter the building even with their ID and even after a magnetometer. So somebody, they were told, from the building had to 

come down and let them in. And the same way we are informed 

33 

by people who actually work with you on a cooperative basis, because DOT has done very good work in working on the M Street 

corridor, with those agencies and private entities, that even they, 

people in the business community, in the local BID, what do you 

call it, the BID, Business Improvement District, were required to 

get an escort to get into the building from the courtyard. When we 

held an event there, while there were people stationed at various 

doors, we were told that if they happen to come from another area 

they could only enter from the other door until I personally intervened since the door they were supposed to enter into was the furthest from where the event was being held. The guards were only 

doing what they were supposed to do, but it was an exasperating 

and frustrating experience, and the DOT became the poster child 

in one sense, for this hearing when we saw that people who had 

passed the highest security even in the Congress of the United 

States couldn’t get in the building. And people with whom you were 

familiar couldn’t get in the building unless somebody came down 

and escorted them into the building. And who knows, that might 

be a different person each time, for that person was pulled out of 

her work in order to come down to do what the magnetometer or 

the guards could do. 

This is what I mean by make work, and I need to know whether 

you are prepared to look closely at the DOT building in particular 

and to make sure that it does what page three of your testimony 

says, overall the security practices and policies of the Department’s 

headquarters building are equivalent to other cabinet agency headquarters in Washington, DC. 

Nonsense. You heard Ronald Reagan, which has cabinet agencies, you heard the testimony there. I know of no—I can tell you 

that I know of no agency, perhaps the CIA, where it is harder to 

get into than the Department of Transportation. And while people 

may try to get to parts of your agency over which you have jurisdiction, and trains and airports, we do not believe that your headquarters are nearly as high profile a target as many headquarters 

in Washington, which are identifiably higher terrorist targets. 

So I am not asking you to justify it. You weren’t here. But you 

do say that you meet—you do what others do. I don’t know anybody else who pulls people out of their work to come down in order 

to escort people in. I don’t know anybody else where you can’t use 

the john and you have a kid and you say, but isn’t this a Federal 

building? I know very few Federal buildings where you can’t get in 

to do a restaurant. I tell you one thing. Mr. Porcari, you can get 

into the Reagan Building, Longworth Building, and Cannon building in order to use our facilities and in order to go to the restaurant. You can get into the Capitol of the United States across 

the street in order to use the facilities. How are we able to allow 

the DOT to continue to have a stricter protocol than in the building 

where you are now sitting? 

And all I am asking you to do is not to justify. God help you if 

you are going to justify it. I am asking you, are you willing to look 

at it so that we do not have testimony that says you are equivalent 

to other buildings, when this Member of Congress has entered 

other buildings and had staff members enter other buildings and 

34 

have them enter this building and know firsthand that it is not 

equivalent to other buildings. That is all I am asking. 

Mr. PORCARI. Madam Chairman, a couple of things. First, you 

started your opening statement by making what I think is a very 

important point, which is this is an issue of balance and that balance is different given the circumstances and the particulars of it. 

I think that is certainly true in the case of the DOT headquarters 

building. You are correct. 

Ms. NORTON. Excuse me. And how—why is it balanced? You 

can’t just make a blanket statement like that. 

Mr. PORCARI. I am trying to get to that. 

Ms. NORTON. Okay. 

Mr. PORCARI. An escort is required in the building and it is a 

function of the building design. It is fundamentally an open office 

environment. When you go through the security, past the 

magnetometers, you can go anywhere, unfettered access to the 

building. It is a building that also has—— 

Ms. NORTON. That is the case in every building, sir. Once you get 

through the magnetometers here, guess what? You can go, you can 

get to the Speaker’s office. You can go through the tunnel because 

once you have come through Rayburn, you now have access to all 

of us. So I want to know why that puts you in a different position 

than it puts me. 

Mr. PORCARI. This security procedure was set up at the time 

based on an open office environment and some of the functions that 

are within it, including the crisis management center which is opposite the cafeteria on the first floor of the East Building, including 

the SCIF facilities that are in the building. And—— 

Ms. NORTON. I know exactly how this was built. It took me 10 

years to get the darn building up. Frankly, I don’t like the building 

very much. But I don’t like the architecture in my hometown very 

much, and I am a third generation Washingtonian. If I had to 

start, I would blow up the place, give it to Mr. Dowd and say, let’s 

start all over again. But these buildings are built within the security constraints and particularly within the budget constraints. So 

we are going to be building more buildings like that. 

Are you testifying that the only way to do business in an open 

office environment is to pull people off their work every time somebody comes down and wants to use the john in the building? 

Mr. PORCARI. No, I am testifying that that is why it was set up 

that way, with an escort required because of the open office environment function. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, is it still set up that way? 

Mr. PORCARI. It is still set up that way. 

Ms. NORTON. You don’t have to justify what happened. I don’t 

justify what my predecessor did, nor do I throw him under the bus. 

That was then. I am trying not to look backwards. I am trying to 

be prospective. Now, if you want to take that burden on, Mr. 

Porcari, you take it on. I understand what happened in the past. 

I am trying to see if we can make things better now. 

Mr. PORCARI. Madam Chairman, about 110 days ago when I was 

in a different role I had a very different perspective of this, including what these security procedures mean for mixed use transit oriented development, the need to mix both governmental functions 

35 

and other functions like the Reagan Building does with the food 

court and the other public portions of it. I would, again, go back 

to the balanced part of it. I am not going to tell you today that we 

have that balance perspective because I am not sure that that is 

true. And it certainly changes over time. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Porcari, and of course I am not asking anybody 

that. I started this question off I think the right way. I asked you 

were you willing to look at the current procedures, not whether or 

not you had it right. It wasn’t yours in the first place. It wasn’t 

even the people at DOT in the first place. They got it out of the 

guidance and, you know, Mr. Schenkel doesn’t know who in the 

hell that guidance came from, for that matter. 

Mr. PORCARI. Working with FPS, GSA and others, we are very 

happy to look at those procedures. One of the points I was trying 

to make is that this, none of this is static. I don’t think anyone believes that a process that you set up at a point in time would be 

the most valid one forever. 

Ms. NORTON. Forever is a long time. 

Mr. PORCARI. Absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. And you will find that this Committee is only looking for what human beings can do in the short term. That is why 

I ask for a review and why I get impatient if people are not willing 

to go through the same head process I am going through. I don’t 

know what you should do. I also believe that building by building 

is very different. I have given you examples of practices that you 

have not attempted to justify, and I think that is appropriate. I am 

only asking since you are a new regime, if you will forgive me, if 

you would be willing to look at things like whether or not a taxpayer, finding herself with her kid on M Street, which is still being 

fleshed out, could enter the building to use the facilities and whether or not you might think through a way to do that, whether or 

not, in one of the few eating places on the whole of M Street, it 

might be, it might be possible to open that cafeteria to people who 

will not find restaurants yet on M Street, but will find a building 

that costs them billions of dollars to build. I am asking you if you 

are willing to do that. And all I need is a straight answer on that. 

Mr. PORCARI. The answer is yes. And I have—— 

Ms. NORTON. That is all I need, sir. And I ask you within 30 days 

to give this Committee not what the answer is, but what your procedure will be for looking at the examples I have given you and 

others that your security people will tell you, the example from Ms. 

McCann. I need to know what training you intend to do to the 

guards so that they are consistent. I need to know what the training is now that is already written someplace. And I need to know 

how you intend to consult in order to revise, if necessary, current 

procedures. Let me just warn people. Don’t make—I am outraged 

at what has happened, but I am not your adversary unless you 

want me to be one. And I know how to do that. And I certainly 

don’t expect Mr. Porcari says, you know, you expect things to 

change over time. Mr. Porcari, 8 years after 9/11 we are still using 

many of the procedures that we used on day one on 9/11. 

That is from whence cometh my frustration. If you had sat where 

I sat and saw the streets closed up, and it took me months to get 

the streets opened up, largely because people didn’t know what to 

36 

do. And I don’t know what to do. If you live in a continental country, surrounded by water on each side, you have no reason to know 

what to do until you were hit on your own soil. 

So we don’t have to be apologetic for that. We just have to do, 

and here I go to Mr. Dowd. The NCPC has been very forward looking and thinking, maybe because it didn’t have to do the security. 

But that is why we need them. But NCPC has been important to 

us because they look at best practices. We believe we are not asking the Federal Government to do what Europe hasn’t learned to 

do. We are very fortunate. We haven’t been struck. When we are 

struck we are struck very mightily. But if you go to the capitals 

of Europe, you want to see struck, go to the European countries 

and you will see spectacular, spectacular threats, risks and actual 

strikes. 

I am going to ask Mr. Dowd, because one of the things this Committee is going to do is to try to better incorporate your work as 

administrative agency into the work of our agencies. Are you aware 

of best practices for building security in major, I don’t know, European capitals that work any better than what appears to be ad hoc 

approaches here? 

Mr. DOWD. I can share some of the information, Madam Chairman, that we have. We held a workshop last July and we invited 

some other countries. Actually England came and spoke with us. 

And one of the things that they do there is it is more of a layered 

approach to security. They pointed out that in our country we have 

a lot of assets and we invest heavily in trying to protect them all. 

And they felt that we were rich and we are able to make those 

larger investments. But they struggle more with how do they do 

more with less to protect the assets they have. One of the approaches that they identified was in London, their ring of steel, 

which is a circumferential border around downtown London where 

they check license plates and have license plate recognition and 

sort of meter the traffic in. And they can identify if vehicles of 

threat are approaching the city. 

Now, that is not the only way to address physical security. I 

guess—let me back up. Our approach was really just on physical 

security, so I respect there are many other aspects of security that 

each individual agency protects. But as you know, our commission’s 

purview is on the physical aspects. But we did learn that there are 

other approaches to doing that. And like I said, in London they 

looked at a layered approach where they tried to manage security 

for the entire area and then for their most critical assets, which 

they prioritized, provide additional physical security at that site. 

We are hopeful that we can learn from some of those experiences 

as we introduce security here in the monumental core. Domestically we have a similar approach in New York City, the Lower 

Manhattan Security Initiative, where they have limited access 

points to Lower Manhattan and approaches like that work. It will 

be a little bit more of a struggle here, but we can clearly learn from 

those lessons. 

Ms. NORTON. Very limited approaches anywhere in downtown 

Washington, sir. The whole city is limited. I ask because we always 

have to tailor what we learn elsewhere, but those places at least 

have the experience of being far closer to places where the risks 

37 

exist. And I don’t expect that you will have any particular model 

that fits perfectly. 

Let me ask, I guess, Mr. Goldstein, Mr. Peck, Mr. Schenkel, 

about the fee for service approach to Federal Protective Service because we realize that funds have been at the core of many of the 

FPS problems. That is one reason it would appear that they decided to get out of the protection business altogether and just inspect things, don’t do proactive patrols, which if you want to prevent terrorism I thought was one of the standard ways to do it. So 

we are not laying all of this at your feet. We ourselves, for example, 

Mr. Schenkel, had to request a minimum number of FPS officers. 

By the way, is that minimum number, Mr. Goldstein or Mr. 

Schenkel, still enforced? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am, it is. 

Ms. NORTON. But here you needed the authorizing and appropriation Committee, because the agency was being literally drained 

of personnel. So again, I stress, I am not laying this at the feet of 

the people at the table, but unless we find out what the facts are, 

we won’t be able to be of any help. 

Now, the fee for service based financing, I take it, does not take 

into account things like square footage, like Mr. Porcari has a very 

large facility now. Does it? How does fee for service work? How do 

you even decide what service you ought to have if you have got 

agencies that contrast in size the way our agencies do? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Madam Chairman, we are not fee for service, but 

we are fee funded. And it is basically—— 

Ms. NORTON. So what is the difference? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. You get the same service, the formulation put together is actually based on some of the facilities services that we 

provide. The square footage is just a basic security fee which is the 

presumption that you would receive some basic functions from the 

FPS. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, between the three of you, you have got to 

make me understand how do we decide how many FPS agencies 

Mr. Porcari ought to have and HHS ought to have? If it is not fee 

for service, if it is something else, as Mr. Schenkel says, it is fee, 

if it is not square footage, then please make me understand what 

it is that—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Madam Chairman, it is at $0.66 per square foot, 

which is charged to all the tenants in the Federal buildings that 

FPS protects. 

Ms. NORTON. So it is square footage. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. So is that a rational basis then for doing it? Is it 

based on size then? The more square footage? The more what? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, regardless of, one of the things we have 

been concerned about, and we wrote in our last report to you last 

July we have been very concerned about this approach because regardless of whether you are located in a level I facility or whether 

you are located in a level IV facility, whether you have FPS officers 

who visit you and are with you virtually all the time, or whether 

you don’t see them for 6 months, you have to pay the same amount. 

Ms. NORTON. That would be based on what? Whether they visit 

you often or not would be based on what today? 

38 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Whether they are anywhere near you. In other 

words, if you are a level I facility in Iowa, or you are a level IV 

facility in Manhattan, you are still paying $0.66 per square foot. If 

you are in Manhattan you are likely to see FPS officers pretty frequently because most of them are urban based. There is more in 

urban areas because FPS has decided based on its risk management approach that that is where most of its officers would be. But 

you are still going to pay the same amount of money. 

Ms. NORTON. Let me understand. Because, you know, per square 

foot makes some sense. But are you saying that it is not risk based 

per square foot? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. One of the problems we have is 

there is no equity in the situation. Everyone is paying the same 

amount. 

Ms. NORTON. So I could be where terrorists were given to believe, 

based on the intelligence before me as a Member of the Homeland 

Security Committee, I could be in some place in a rural area which 

maybe because it is in a rural area has a particularly large Federal 

facility, but that facility houses agencies that have never been considered targets for terrorists but because it is a large facility for efficiency purposes, it could receive more FPS coverage than say a 

smaller square foot facility that is more highly targeted? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. In our report last year to you, 

ma’am, we recommended that FPS improve the use of the fee system by developing a method to accurately account for the cost of 

providing for security services and to evaluate whether the current 

use of the system made sense or whether they should develop an 

alternative funding mechanism. But those recommendations, along 

with other recommendations in that report, have not been closed 

yet. They have not reported back yet. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, you state at page 2 of your testimony, Mr. 

Goldstein, that FPS does not use a risk management approach. 

Your words, a risk management approach that links threats and 

vulnerabilities to resource requirements. 

What approach do they use? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. They mainly use the building security assessment process to determine what the risks are in their 

view on a building-by-building approach. But as you know, we have 

reported about problems about the building security assessment 

program itself over, in our report. 

Ms. NORTON. So what is the problem with the building assessment if they are looking at it building by building? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, there are specific problems with how they 

are doing the assessments. And then more broadly there are problems with doing it on a building-by-building approach as opposed 

to assessing risk across the portfolio. 

Ms. NORTON. So if they assess risks across the board, wouldn’t 

they also have to do some building-by-building assessments? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. You would certainly have to do some building by 

building assessment, but the tools they have do not let them compare the risks across the buildings today. 

Ms. NORTON. Would you consider the Department of Transportation a high risk facility for terrorist attack? 

39 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I have not looked specifically at that. I couldn’t 

answer the question, ma’am. I mean, obviously their headquarters 

building. I presume is a level IV because it is a headquarters building. 

Ms. NORTON. So every level IV facility is equally a target for terrorist attacks? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Well, that is, I think, part of the issue that I am 

trying to raise. It is equally categorized in terms of risk, but every 

level IV building in the Federal portfolio may not have the same 

level of risk associated with it. 

Ms. NORTON. Are the buildings, in fact, characterized in terms of 

actual risk based on function? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Not really. It is mainly in terms of size of building, the numbers of employees in those buildings, generally speaking, the kinds of agencies inhabiting those building. It is not specifically based on risk. 

Ms. NORTON. Is sounds like you need a new matrix or grid in the 

first place to look at buildings so that agencies aren’t—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The new security standards that have been promulgated but are not in effect yet go further than the old Department of Justice standards. 

Ms. NORTON. Promulgated by whom? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. By the Interagency Security Committee. They go 

further than the old Department of Justice standards in trying to 

establish some risk parameters, but it is still questionable as to 

whether they go far enough and it may be something we should 

look at at some point. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Peck. 

Mr. PECK. Yes, ma’am. I don’t want one of Mr. Dowd’s points to 

get lost because it has a relationship to the whole—— 

Ms. NORTON. First of all, do you know anything about what Mr. 

Goldstein is talking about? There are some promulgated but not 

issued new—— 

Mr. PECK. Yes, the ISC has developed new physical security criteria. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you have anything to do with those? 

Mr. PECK. GSA has been on the committee that has been working on them and I—— 

Ms. NORTON. Should they be promulgated as they are right now? 

Mr. PECK. They are still being worked out. There are some questions I gather about whether we have—within the administration 

about whether we have taken enough of a look at how much the 

criteria may cost in compared to how much more of a threat countermeasure they will provide. But they are on the way. I will say 

that I am told and I have to say, I haven’t read them. I am told 

that they are more risk based than what we had seen before. 

But you know, what Mr. Goldstein is getting to, and this is sort 

of the big question here is how do you measure risks? What are the 

risks by agency? 

Let me make one point about the fee if I may. One of the problems with, and to defend FPS, I think what happened was we used 

to have a security fee tacked on to the rent that GSA charges. 

When FPS was taken out of GSA and put in Homeland Security, 

I think everyone said, well, we will fund them through a separate 

40 

little rent piece here. And I think it probably wouldn’t be a bad 

idea to take a look at whether that makes sense because some of 

the inequity that we are talking about here will result. You get 

charged the same amount no matter how much stuff or people we 

are putting in the building for security. 

But the other thing that that does is it discourages us to the extent this is a building by building security fee based system it discourages us from taking a look at the kinds of suggestions Mr. 

Dowd makes that you could create a security zone and not based 

on a building and you provide some of the building security by saying we are going to screen people someplace else. 

So let me make two points about that. You see that system here 

on Capitol Hill. At the foot of Capitol Hill and elsewhere around, 

you will see Capitol police officers making sure that buses and big 

trucks don’t get into this complex at all. That means that certain 

levels of security don’t have to be borne by the building. And the 

same thing happens at the Ronald Reagan Building. Because we 

can screen trucks somewhere else we don’t have to worry quite as 

much about getting them into the loading dock. 

Ms. NORTON. Do you use that for other Federal buildings as well? 

Mr. PECK. Pardon? 

Ms. NORTON. Do you use what you are doing at the Ronald 

Reagan Building for trucks or other Federal buildings? 

Mr. PECK. I am saying the trucks for the Ronald Reagan Building are screened. 

Ms. NORTON. No, for other Federal buildings. 

Mr. PECK. Oh, in this—— 

Ms. NORTON. Yeah, for the Department of Transportation trucks, 

for EPA trucks. 

Mr. PECK. Actually, I think just the Capitol, the White House. 

I don’t know if State Department. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Porcari, do you have to do the trucks on your 

own? 

Mr. PORCARI. Yes, we do. Our loading dock facility has, for example, x-ray facilities for packages coming in. It has bollards. 

Ms. NORTON. See what I mean. You know what a waste that is. 

Whereas the Ronald Reagan building has, I hate to say this, a 

higher level security in my view. They figured it out. 20 minutes, 

if you are not there in 20 minutes bye bye, you don’t get in. But 

there is a central facility for doing it. Mr. Porcari, and probably we 

did this, or at least the facility, it was possible to do it when we 

created the building. So if there is no central facility then they are 

not going to be caught with trucks coming in that had not gone 

through the right security. So I would bet you that every agency 

is somehow trying to screen these trucks. This goes to what Mr. 

Dowd said about some central place. 

Mr. PECK. If what you are saying is we have not shared best 

practices across our buildings in Washington, I think you are absolutely right. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, what does the ISC do if they don’t do that? 

Mr. PECK. Well, you know, I don’t know enough to say. I think 

they have been looking at kind of high level security criteria and 

the more fine grained security practices that are really important 

41 

are—have somewhat been left to be customized agency by agency 

and building by building. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. For most of its history, Madam Chairman, the 

ISC has been an organization of really a one part time person. 

They have not really provided staff to that committee, so it has not 

always moved as quickly as might be hoped. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, that is important to know. Where does that 

staff come from? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It comes from the Department of Homeland Security. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Schenkel, on page 5 I noted in your testimony 

you say you took steps immediately after the GAO report was 

issued in early July. This has to do with the bomb making materials, et cetera. How do you track implementation and progress of 

the steps you have taken? Understand that GAO didn’t go to one 

or two buildings. They went and not just in one city, and that is 

why it was disturbing. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. It was very disconcerting and as 

soon as Mr. Goldstein and his team came and briefed us we took 

immediate steps. We formed a tiger team and started doing a gap 

analysis in regard to what things had to be covered. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, let’s start with the magnetometer. It looked 

like even the training at the magnetometer basis, for example, liquids coming into Federal buildings, I don’t know if the 

magnetometers can capture that or what you can do about that. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Well, we did do a blanket purchase agreement on 

new x-ray machines that will differentiate between water and then 

more viscous liquids. 

Ms. NORTON. Very important. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. Between water and other liquids. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. Yes, ma’am. In addition—— 

Ms. NORTON. What have you done to assure that the FPS guards 

and contract guards are properly trained since part of this had to 

do with people and their training at the magnetometer? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. There are several things that we 

have done. We initially issued an immediate training bulletin that 

provided information to each individual security guard as to—— 

Ms. NORTON. What good is that? Don’t they need some retraining? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. I am getting to that. Yes, ma’am. In 

addition to that, part of the tiger team in addition to the actual 

bulletin we also produced a training video that every one of the single guards had to go through. In addition to that we have also retrained cadres of inspectors that are in process right now of actually doing hands-on training to all of our contract security guards. 

Also, when we conduct our operation shields or our guard post inspections. If we find discrepancies we make remedial training an 

urgent mission right on the spot. We don’t wait or report it later 

on. We take immediate action and retrain the guards. 

As part of the tiger team’s review we have determined that yes, 

we do need to be much more involved and more actively involved 

in the training of the contract security guards. We are in the procVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:21 Jan 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\ED\9-23-09\52493.TXT JASON
42 

ess now of actually determining the appropriate numbers of inspectors and trainers that would be necessary to enact that. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, some of this is quite reassuring. And I thank 

you, Mr. Schenkel. I know, not only on behalf of the Committee, 

but on behalf of people in these unknown buildings. For security 

reasons we of course will not name the buildings. And we know you 

will take these reports seriously. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Schenkel, and for that matter Mr. Peck, Mr. 

Goldstein, I experienced the shock of 9/11. And believe me, we went 

through trial and error. I am also on the Aviation Subcommittee, 

so I think I have just seen it all in terms of us stabbing at what 

we can do, trying it out, not often enough, pulling it back, seeing 

wonderful cooperation on both sides of the aisle, trying to keep the 

country open. 

One thing that we did after 9/11 was to federalize the security 

at airports. Before that it was much like what I hear the Federal 

buildings are doing, you know everybody try to do it the best you 

can. There is some overall guidance. You can believe the airports 

had some overall guidance. But in our judgment, security was important enough to at least have some uniformity. And that uniformity goes across the board. It fits Washington, D.C. And it fits 

far smaller cities, medium size cities. Yes, it is tailored and particularized, but this is a model for the United States of America. 

And all I can say is we haven’t been struck again and it is had a 

deterrent effect we think at least. 

Why can’t FPS set up a model that is similar to the TSA model 

which standardizes certain elements of security even given the vast 

differences between a New York, a Washington, D.C., for that matter, and I don’t know, a Nashville, Tennessee and a Podunk, call 

its name out. If we can do that across this vast Nation, why isn’t 

there a standard model and then we work up from there or down 

from there? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Ma’am, that has been the effort of FPS over the 

last several years. 

Ms. NORTON. But you heard testimony here that shows that that 

is not the case. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. There is the Ronald Reagan Building and then 

there is the DOT. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I think the Ronald Reagan Building probably 

represents the optimum of what we are all trying to get. Mr. Peck 

and I have already entered in discussions since just his recent arrival and prior to that his predecessors and his security office and 

FPS have been working on minimal security standards. Inconsistency is one of the most challenging things when it comes to security. Inconsistency. 

Ms. NORTON. You have been working on minimal—— 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Security standards. 

Ms. NORTON. Since when and when will they be out? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We have no idea when they will be out because 

we don’t know that we can enact them. Currently there are not the 

authorities. 

Ms. NORTON. You have no idea when they will be out because, 

say that again? 

43 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I have no idea when they will be out because we 

don’t have the authorities to actually—— 

Ms. NORTON. So you are doing what you don’t have the authority 

to do. Who has the authority? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. At some point the ISC would have the authority 

to publish that. But what we are trying to determine is a minimal 

standard that would be consistent—— 

Ms. NORTON. I am not asking you to tell me when Secretary 

Napolitano will sign off on something. I am asking you when you 

will be ready. I am asking you within your power. You can’t speak 

to maybe ICE. I will speak to ICE especially on my Homeland Security Committee. You have got the agency that is under scrutiny 

here. So if you have been working, I need to know when you think 

you will be ready with a minimal security model that we can begin 

to work from in the Congress. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Ma’am, I really couldn’t answer that because 

there is a couple of other things—— 

Ms. NORTON. Well, let me tell you what, Mr. Schenkel. You are 

going to within 30 days provide this Committee with information 

on your goal for getting a plan, doesn’t have to get done, getting 

a plan to ICE so that we can then hold those accountable beyond 

you. You alone are accountable because—not ICE, but you have the 

authority to look at the agency under your control. I am not asking 

you when you are going to get it done. I am asking you, I am telling you this much. If it is open ended it is going to get done whenever you get ready. I am also telling you that this is a matter of 

security. And therefore, I need to know when you intend to have 

a plan. Do you intend to have a plan within 5 years, do you intend 

to have a plan within 5 months? Do you intend to have a plan 

within 5 weeks? I only know how to work in a system by goals and 

timetables. 30 days. That is all you have to get to us. 

I want to ask Mr. Moses a question. You have within your jurisdiction the quintessential model, you have just heard others say 

that they would like to see that model looked at more closely for 

possible application elsewhere. You have also heard that the DOT 

is operated under a model which puts everybody virtually, except 

its employees, off limits. Yet the Ronald Reagan welcomes a million 

people. And you are responsible for security in this region. 

Would you favor a model that is more standardized based on 

what apparently has been worked out at the Ronald Reagan Building? 

Mr. MOSES. Chairwoman, inconsistent with the Director—— 

Ms. NORTON. I understand by the way your boss is sitting there. 

I am asking you, since you are the one that has been closest to the 

model, you don’t know whether Mr. Schenkel is going to be able to 

use it or not. But he is going to look to you to say is this something 

you think has utility outside of this one building in the United 

States or not? 

Mr. MOSES. Yes, ma’am. As the previous witness mentioned on 

the earlier panel, that requires close coordination and certainly, 

within the National Capital Region of the Federal Protective Service we are willing to work with the Department of Transportation 

to ensure, as you mentioned with the Deputy Secretary, that we 

44 

are willing to consult with them to ensure that we can have the 

same application that we have in the Ronald Reagan Building. 

Ms. NORTON. Now you know there may be flaws in this model. 

The reason I keep holding it up is normally when we find models 

for the Federal sector they are outside of the Federal sector. We 

were delighted that the Federal sector had created, without any 

model of its own, what appeared to be a security within security, 

you know, we usually ask for just security one by one. And here 

we looked and found the most complicated security had been 

worked out fairly well, it seemed to us, in this one building. And 

we thought, wow, wouldn’t we want to grab on that model. And we 

even thought that some of our colleagues in the private sector with 

whom we work so closely would be interested in the model. That 

is why I want to know more about the model and I would like the 

NCPC to look at the model in that light whereby you almost look 

like you have got a test case, like somebody said, and they didn’t, 

let’s test it to see whether or not within the same facility we can 

look at one facility as a control group, almost, and another one and 

let’s see how it comes out. Without meaning to do so, it looks like 

you have done it. Mr. Dowd? 

Mr. DOWD. Yes, Madam Chairman. What I think this points out 

from NCPC’s perspective is the important of balancing security 

with other values. And what I think the Ronald Reagan Building 

points out to us is that if we create a value of access to that building then we can work with the security and make sure we accomplish both. Just like we do on some of the physical security 

projects. Around the Washington Monument, for example, the initial proposals were for a ring of bollards around the monument. 

And our commission said no, that is not acceptable. We value this 

space too much to let that security intrude upon it. And so we 

worked hard and ended up with a security solution that is just as 

secure, but yet we retain those other values that are important to 

us. 

So I think that is kind of the common thread that I see in these 

challenges, that we have to make sure we respect those other values that are important to us. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, what you have said is very important. I 

would phrase it this way. I believe that everybody working on security has done what he has supposed to deal with security. They 

have been given only one mission. What you call a value, I call a 

mission. Mr. Moses has two missions. Mr. Moses, I know how to 

keep everything secure. Just shut all y’all out of it. So keeping 

buildings secure is not rocket science. The great American innovative spirit could come out in glorious ways if, in fact, agencies regarded their mission as two-sided; that security without openness 

is unacceptable, openness without security is unacceptable. Here 

you don’t see me quantifying the two because I don’t know how to 

do that. All I know is that initially in the Capitol, this was a terrible place afterwards, and even though sometimes there are long 

lines, I don’t complain a lot about the Capitol. We are always looking at it. We have complaints about the Capitol Visitor Center, 

based on experience. 

Mr. Porcari’s point that, you know, it is not static. My only correction is that it has been, for the most part. We haven’t heard of 

45 

changes that have occurred. We have heard of some regulations 

that may make changes occur. We didn’t know when they were 

going to be issued. It hasn’t been a continuing review, because 

frankly it hasn’t been anybody’s business. There has been this 

large group, the ISC, which means that all of them are responsible 

so nobody’s responsible. We are going to see to it that somebody is 

responsible and accountable, and that the mission is a two-sided 

mission. 

Before I let you go, there has been a big concern about something 

that otherwise I regard as a very important part of what security 

in every building should be. After we get some kind matrix about 

how to keep a building secure, then go to the next set about how 

to keep this building in particular secure, we would not begin to 

have put together what was needed until we had done the vital 

consultation with those who go to work every day in the building, 

and who, in some sense, knows it best. Well, our experience has 

been that they not only know it, at least from the point of view of 

going to work every day, they do it. These so called building security committees which have people from the agencies to sit on 

building security, they may be from, you know, the IT department, 

dealing with matters that have nothing to do with security. They 

may be from, somebody from the Secretary’s office who is special 

assistant whose job really is to keep track of Members of Congress. 

But nevertheless, they sit together and we have been astounded at 

their influence. 

What should be the role of the building security committees? Mr. 

Peck? 

Mr. PECK. As I said before, I think the building security committees have been asked to perform a function that they should not 

have been asked to perform. They have been put in a position, 

whether overtly or it just grew that way, of making the decisions 

about security practices in a lot of buildings. And so, I mean, I 

have seen, I saw it before and this may have changed. But there 

were times when the Federal Protective Service and GSA together 

would say there is really a best practice that would allow you to 

have all the security you need in your building by doing this set 

of practices. And sometimes building security committees say but 

we were in another building and we saw them do something else 

so we would rather do it. And sometimes the other building they 

saw was a building with a different mission, a different level of security, a different level of needs. And so I believe that some of what 

you are talking about is—— 

Ms. NORTON. And GSA couldn’t say, well, had no power to do 

anything about these civilians telling you that they want the same 

thing they have across the street. 

Mr. PECK. Correct. And to be frank, the only way in which we 

have ever been able to say, we can’t or won’t do that is to say we 

don’t have the resources to do it, and you don’t have the resources 

to do it. 

Ms. NORTON. Not only do we not have the resources to do it, but 

we work closely in conjunction with the Appropriations Committee. 

Nobody is going to have the resources to do it. 

Mr. PECK. Correct. 

46 

Ms. NORTON. What we are doing here is the beginning of work 

that the Congress is going to do. If the agencies want to straighten 

it out themselves, that is the best way to do it. But we believe that 

the agencies are spending money because they can. After all, it is 

within their budget. They might spend it on something else. But 

we will be working with the Appropriation Committee as well. We 

would rather see you spend it on your mission. We believe that 

DOT does trucks because no central part of the Federal Government helped DOT to find a better way to do it and, therefore, they 

had no alternative. 

So we are looking to work with all of you, not DOT nearly as 

much as with Mr. Peck. Mr. Peck, Mr. Goldstein, Mr. Dowd, Mr. 

Schenkel and Mr. Moses. Not so much the individual agencies, because we know that they have been left on their own to guard their 

own security and to take advice from their own employees. I don’t 

believe—I am a small ′′d′′ democrat—believe in bottom up democracy. But I also am a Member of the Homeland Security Committee, and believe that at some point security trumps everything. 

After 9/11, security trumped everything as far as I was concerned 

until we figured out some way to make sure that we at least had 

a handle on not letting them come right back at us. 

You will not see me among the Members of Congress advising 

the President that we ought to get out of Afghanistan right away. 

You will not see me saying that. I am sitting in the region that was 

struck. I hope none of my folks in New York are saying just walk 

away, Mr. President. You will see me telling him that there are 

some things to do besides start another Iraq, but you won’t see me 

unmindful of the security concerns that each of you have raised. It 

would be only an authoritarian regime that would say once you 

have looked at what the agency wants, at its professional level, 

once you have looked at the template, go to it. That is not this 

country and that is not this Federal Government. It seems to me 

that the input of Federal employees is critical to the success of the 

homeland security mission. 

Federal employees will be just like those who find today that 

there are new security alerts and so they have gone, television has 

gone out into the streets and saying, well, you know, what do you 

think that now that it is a little more inconvenient and it is interesting, almost across the board people are saying, look, we understand that they are trying after these arrests in New York to keep 

us all safe. After a while, people lose patience and they begin saying, well, why are they still doing this? Why are they still slowing 

up? 

The building security people who talk to employees will be able 

to say to you what you would otherwise never know, that they 

have, in fact, seen people get through security with the guards 

talking to somebody instead of looking, or they don’t know how 

somebody who appeared to need help and to be homeless got in the 

same elevator with them. How are you going to know unless the 

building security committee is alert? And how are you going to 

know things about the building? You can only know if you sit in 

that office and see ways that could be shored up without some of 

the ways that are being used now. 

47 

So I don’t want to be heard to say that we want to professionalize everything any more than I am saying that what we have 

pointed out as issues for us can be laid at the table of anybody except the Congress of the United States. It is our oversight responsibility to bring these out and then to work with you. We bring them 

out. We are concerned and frustrated with them somehow but we 

do not stop with well, we have shown the world that this doesn’t 

work. We use the hearing as a template to task staff to then go 

and help us help the agency find the way out that may have come 

forward from the hearings. 

I am going to take this opportunity to thank you for spending so 

much time with us, understanding that you are educating us, helping us figure out what all of us are still trying to understand, and 

to thank you very much for your written testimony and for your 

willingness to sit with us as we ask you questions and learn from 

you and the experiences you have. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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