S. HRG. 111–100, PT. 7 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1390 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 7 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

MAY 20 AND JUNE 3, 2009 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010—Part 7 STRATEGIC FORCES 

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52–626 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 111–100 PT. 7 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

S. 1390 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 7 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

MAY 20 AND JUNE 3, 2009 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

MAY 20, 2009

Page 

Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs ..................................................................................................................... 4 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Command ..................... 9 

James, Lt. Gen. Larry D., USAF, Commander, 14Th Air Force, Air Force 

Space Command and Commander, Joint Functional Component Command 

for Space, United States Strategic Command ................................................... 15 

Harris, VADM Harry B., Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 

Communication Networks ................................................................................... 19 

Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 22 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS

JUNE 3, 2009

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy .................................................................. 49 

Alston, Maj. Gen. C. Donald, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration ............................................................................ 99 

Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Floyd L., USAF, Commander, 8th Air Force, Air Combat 

Command .............................................................................................................. 102 

Johnson, RADM Stephen E., USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs ....... 104 

(III) 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2010 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Sessions, and 

Vitter. 

Committee staff member present: Jennifer L. Stoker, security 

clerk. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, professional 

staff member; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Pete Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; and Michael T. Wong, assistant to Senator Vitter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good afternoon. I will insert my prepared 

statement for the record at this point, and now turn to our ranking 

member, Senator Vitter. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

I would like to welcome all of our witnesses today to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on military space programs and issues. Today we have Gary 

Payton, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space; General Robert 

Kehler, Commander of Air Force Space Command; Lt. Gen. Larry James, Commander of 14th Air Force and the Joint Functional Component Commander for 

Space; Vice Admiral Harry Harris, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communications Networks; and Cristina Chaplain, the Director of Acquisition and 

Sourcing Management at the Government Accountability Office. All of your statements will be included in the record. 

2 

I would also like to welcome Senator Vitter, who, as of last week, is the new ranking member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, replacing Senator Sessions. I 

look forward to a productive working relationship. 

It has been a pleasure to work with Senator Sessions over these past several 

years. We have tackled a lot of difficult issues together. I am glad he will stay on 

the subcommittee. 

Space is essential for modern life and for a modern military, but getting satellites 

built and on orbit is not easy and not cheap. 

Most of the space programs continue to struggle, although there has been improvement in some programs, others, such as Space-Based Infrared Satellite-Geosynchronous Orbit and the advanced extremely high frequency satellite continue to 

be delayed. What are the problems and how do they get fixed? 

While the United States has been very lucky that satellites, once launched, generally have a history of lasting longer than planned, in some cases much longer. 

With the delays in the replacement programs there is a potential for gaps in the 

various programs. This is particularly true for missile warning. 

We will also look at what role small satellites can play in meeting certain requirements, augmenting or replacing capabilities, and in reducing the overall size, complexity, and cost of space systems. 

We look forward to hearing from all of you this afternoon. 

We will have a very short closed session in the Office of Senate Security relating 

to the launch of the North Korean missile at the conclusion of the opening session. 

We will plan on moving over there at a little after 3 o’clock. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID VITTER 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is great 

to be here as the ranking member of this subcommittee for the first 

time. I look forward to working with you and all the other members 

on these significant issues. 

I will submit my full opening statement for the record, but I do 

want to highlight a number of concerns. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is here today, and 

I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses, including them. 

For sometime, they have highlighted a number of systemic problems associated with our major space acquisition programs. Generally, they have said that competition for dollars leads to low-cost 

estimation and unrealistic scheduling, and then that gets us in a 

bind down the line when the true costs of programs and true schedules come into clear focus. So I would like everyone’s reaction to 

that ongoing critique and what we should do in light of it. 

I want to thank Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain 

for their acquisition reform bill, which I am happy to support and 

would love folks’ reaction to what is in that bill, how that can make 

a difference and what more we need to do. 

I am also encouraged with many—not all, but certainly many— 

of Secretary Gates’ strong recommendations to cancel certain programs that were not proving out like the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program and to focus resources and certainly would 

like folks’ detailed thoughts on that and how we move forward in 

a productive way. 

Then finally, I would point out a recent Institute for Defense 

Analyses (IDA) report, chartered by the Department of Defense 

(DOD), to address significant congressional concerns. One conclusion of the report is an assertion that ‘‘no one is in charge,’’ that 

leadership is fragmented with respect to strategy, budgets, requirements, and acquisitions, and it recommends that the President establish and lead the execution of a much more focused national 

space strategy. It also recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul, and 

3 

I very much look forward to hearing everyone’s reaction to that critique and those recommendations. 

But, again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for your leadership and I look 

forward to working with you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses. This 

is my first hearing as ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and 

I look forward to working with you on the many important issues under this subcommittee’s jurisdiction. 

The administration’s fiscal year 2010 budget provided a significant funding increase for Defense-wide, ‘‘white space’’ programs. This year’s request at about $11.1 

billion—$9.2 billion of which is for Air Force space programs represents a $412 million increase over fiscal year 2009 appropriated levels. I look forward to hearing 

from our witnesses today how this money will be spent wisely and what will be done 

to guarantee that the programs we fund in fiscal year 2010 break away from past 

practices of cost overruns and long delays. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which I am pleased is here today 

to testify, has for some time highlighted a number of systemic problems associated 

with our major space acquisition programs. GAO has found that because the Department of Defense (DOD) starts more weapon programs that it can afford—competition for dollars lead to low cost estimation and unrealistic scheduling. GAO 

notes that DOD tends to start many of its space programs before it has a sound 

understanding and the appropriate assurance that the technologies it seeks are 

achievable within available funding. As a result of this broken acquisition process, 

the Department all too frequently puts itself in a bind with respect to supporting 

the warfighters’ needs. Not only are we constantly underestimating cost, but according to GAO, delays in schedule are increasing the overall risk for capability gaps 

in areas such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and weather 

monitoring. 

Under the leadership of Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain, this committee broadly recognized those problems in developing the ‘‘Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.’’ That bill emphasizes starting major weapons systems 

off right by having them obtain reliable and independent cost estimates and subjecting them to rigorous developmental testing and systems engineering early in 

their acquisition cycle. In so doing, the bill (which will likely be signed into law by 

the President within the next few days) intends to ensure that programs not proceed 

from one stage of the acquisition cycle to the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the risk of cost growth and schedule slippage. I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses how they believe the bill will help manage technology 

and integration risk in DOD military space programs. 

I am encouraged by Secretary Gates’ recommendation to cancel the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program, an example of an overly ambitious project, 

lacking a meaningful technology, schedule, and funding path. I am also pleased to 

hear that the Department will not let the $3.3 billion already invested in TSAT go 

to waste. With the recommendation to eliminate TSAT and purchase two additional 

advanced extremely high frequency satellites, it is clear that the Department recognizes that smaller, more incremental steps forward, are far less risky ventures, and 

are a significantly more responsible path forward with respect to the taxpayers’ 

money. I am encouraged that the Department does not plan to let our hefty investment in TSAT go to waste and does plan to harvest some of TSAT’s more successful 

research and development efforts. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses more 

about the plan to address our satellite communications needs, how we will utilize 

TSAT technologies on the procurement of already proven and technologically mature 

systems, and how TSAT can be a lesson moving forward for our future space acquisition endeavors. 

A recent Institute for Defense Analyses report charted by DOD to address congressional concerns with the leadership, management, and organization for National 

Security Space found that ‘‘significant improvements are imperative . . . in order 

to maintain U.S. space preeminence and advert the loss of the U.S. competitive national security advantage.’’ The report asserts that ‘‘no one’s in charge,’’ leadership 

is fragmented with respect to strategy, budgets, requirements, and acquisition, and 

recommends that the President establish and lead the execution of a national space 

strategy. The report recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul and I look forward to 

4 

hearing from the witnesses what steps are being taken to address the report’s recommendations. 

I recognize that space acquisitions are inherently risky and are like no other venture the DOD undertakes. The challenges are many and the unknown and need for 

pushing the technology envelope is great. However, we must do a better job at managing the risk and spending the taxpayers’ money wisely. Nonetheless, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses what is being done to address the space acquisition shortcomings, if you believe the condition is getting better, and what more 

needs to happen within the Department. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. As is the procedure, each of your statements will be entered in the record at this time. 

STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GARY E. PAYTON

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before this subcommittee as the Deputy Under 

Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs, and to discuss with you our military 

activities. I support the Secretary of the Air Force with his responsibilities as the 

Service Acquisition Executive for Space Programs. 

1I believe the overall soundness of our Air Force space program is best illustrated 

by our consecutive string of 61 successful national security space launches over the 

past 10 years and the sustainment of 4 distinct satellite constellations over the past 

3 decades (navigation, weather, missile warning, and military communication). This 

record is the result of a world-class team of space professionals across our government and industry, all dedicated to the single purpose of providing essential capabilities to our joint warfighters and allies around the world. As a Nation, we have 

cultivated, modernized, and integrated space capabilities for over a half century into 

our national instruments of power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic. 

The nation’s reward for this commitment is a space capability which tilts the geopolitical and military advantage to our leaders with the most current and accurate 

information around the world. With superior space systems we provide our leadership with intelligence that otherwise would be impossible to collect. Space enables 

us to employ military force in both irregular warfare and conventional situations— 

we see the battlefield more clearly and destroy targets with greater precision. While 

acknowledging the ever increasing advantages that these space capabilities provide, 

we acknowledge that many of the satellites and associated infrastructure have outlived their intended design lives. 

To ensure the availability of these systems, the military space portion of the 

President’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission is focused on the continuity of key 

mission areas including global missile warning, worldwide communication, global 

positioning and timing, weather, and launch. Simultaneously, we are taking added 

measures to enhance the protection of our space capabilities through improved 

Space Situational Awareness (SSA), defensive counterspace, and reconstitution efforts. 

Global Missile Warning through Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) is our 

unblinking eye ensuring that we know whenever a rocket launches from anywhere 

on Earth. Our missile warning system is fast, persistent, and accurate in determining missile vectors. At the strategic level, it quickly aids leadership as they determine courses of action to defend America and our allies, and at the tactical level 

our real-time warning provides theater commanders with superior battlespace 

awareness. 

Worldwide communication is enabled through a ubiquitous space-based system 

with government and commercial platforms. Our users stretch from the Oval Office 

to the mountains of Afghanistan. Using protected, wideband, or narrowband communications, the President can command the Nation’s nuclear forces, our UAV pilots can fly Predators over Iraq and Afghanistan from the United States, and Special Forces teams can call for exfiltration or tactical air support. 

Global positioning and timing is a free worldwide service. It provides position accuracy down to the centimeter and time accuracy to the nanosecond over the entire 

5 

planet, 24-hours a day, 7-days a week, and in any weather. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community depend on our Global Positioning System (GPS) to support a myriad of missions and capabilities including weapon system guidance, precise navigation, satellite positioning, and communication network 

timing. The civil and commercial communities are equally reliant on GPS as the underpinning for a vast infrastructure of services and products including search and 

rescue, banking, map surveying, farming, and even sports and leisure activities. 

Weather observation and forecasting has greatly improved over the last four decades primarily due to space-based environmental sensing. Global, high resolution 

measurements of atmospheric temperature, density, and humidity populate 

mathematic models for weather prediction. Our warfighters need accurate, time-sensitive weather data as a key enabler for maneuver planning, weapons employment, 

and intelligence collection. 

With events like the Chinese ASAT demonstration and the Iridium/Russian satellite collision as examples of the increasing political and physical complexity of the 

space environment, our on-orbit assets face greater threats that could deny, damage, 

or destroy our access to space capabilities. We must anticipate potential disruptions, 

either accidental or intentional, to our space operations or risk losing continuity of 

service. As such, we are expanding our ability to detect, identify, characterize, and 

attribute threats, as well as clearly discriminate between a hostile act and one that 

is naturally occurring. In parallel, we are developing the organizational, operational, 

and technical enablers including command and control architectures that will allow 

us to react swiftly and decisively when threats materialize. 

Though challenges remain, Congress’ support has been a vital component in improving our acquisition of space systems, maintaining continuity of service, and 

charting a course for the next generation of space capabilities that will enhance 

American security, freedom, and prosperity. 

UPDATE ON SPACE

I would like to briefly discuss some of the achievements we have had over the 

last year and the progress we are making with regard to the mission areas I described earlier. 

Missile Warning 

For over 35 years, our legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, in conjunction with ground based radars, have unfailingly met the Nation’s missile warning needs. This legacy constellation, however, continues to age, while threats such 

as the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles and advanced technologies continue 

to grow. These threats are driving the need for increased coverage and resolution 

provided by the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS). 

SBIRS supports four mission areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness, and is comprised of both geosynchronous 

earth orbit (GEO) satellites and highly elliptical orbit (HEO) payloads. In 2008, the 

first HEO payload was fully certified by United States Strategic Command to perform the strategic missile warning mission. The second HEO payload is on-orbit and 

proceeding through operational checkout. Launch of the first SBIRS GEO satellite 

is scheduled for late 2010. 

Our funding request continues development of the GEO satellite, HEO payloads, 

plus the necessary ground elements. Additionally, this budget requests advanced 

procurement for a fourth GEO satellite, and procurement of our fourth HEO payload. We continue to work with our industry partners to resolve challenges on the 

SBIRS GEO–1 spacecraft, specifically with respect to the Flight Software Subsystem. Our budget request also funds Wide Field-of-View (WFOV) technology development within the Third Generation Infrared System funding line. By partnering 

with the commercial space industry, we will have the opportunity to conduct early 

on-orbit scientific experiment of WFOV infrared data phenomenology using a Commercially Hosted IR Payload (CHIRP) in 2010. WFOV offers considerable potential 

for reducing cost, schedule, and performance risks for the next generation of missile 

warning satellites. 

Communications 

The United States military is a highly mobile and dispersed force that relies heavily on wideband, protected, and narrowband satellite communications (SATCOM) for 

command, control, and coordination of forces. SATCOM enables forces to receive 

real-time images and video of the battlefield, thereby accelerating decision-making 

from the strategic to the tactical levels. These images and video often come from 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) controlled via SATCOM links, allowing the 

6 

UAVs to fly far beyond the line of sight and to collect information without endangering U.S. forces. 

On April 3, 2009 we successfully launched the second Wideband Global SATCOM 

(WGS) satellite as part of the Department’s constellation of wideband satellites providing increased capability for effective command and control of U.S. forces around 

the globe. In August 2009 we are planning to launch the third WGS satellite. As 

we populate the WGS constellation, each individual satellite provides greater wideband capacity than the entire legacy Defense Satellite Communications System 

(DSCS) III constellation. Our fiscal year 2010 funding request continues on-orbit 

support for WGS–2 and WGS–3, as well as, non-recurring engineering development 

and advanced procurement for WGS–7. 

In the protected SATCOM portfolio, we are completing testing of the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system with a projected launch in late 

2010. This initial AEHF launch will complete the worldwide Medium Data Rate 

(MDR) ring, increasing the data-rate for low probability of intercept/detection and 

anti-jam communications from tens-of-kilobytes per second to approximately a 

megabyte per second. Last September, the Secretary of the Air Force declared a critical breach of the average procurement unit cost (APUC) against the AEHF Acquisition Program Baseline. The cost growth was dominated by the 4-year production 

break between the SV–3 being placed on contract in January 2006 and SV–4 contract award projected for early 2010. Subsequently, the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) led a team of DOD organizations that reviewed the AEHF program to determine if: (1) the program was essential to national security, (2) there were any alternatives that could provide equal 

capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the unit cost were reasonable, and 

(4) the management structure was adequate to control costs. On 29 December 2008, 

USD (AT&L) certified the AEHF program as a four satellite constellation with the 

launch dates of: SV–1 in September 2010, SV–2 in September 2011, SV–3 in September 2012, and SV–4 in September 2016. Also as part of the recertification, AEHF 

costs were rebaselined per DOD Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimates. Our 

funding request supports the assembly, integration, and test of AEHF SV–1 through 

SV–3 as well as the launch and start of on-orbit check out of SV–1, continued development, integration, and test of the AEHF Mission Control Segment, and the production contract award for SV–4. 

On 6 April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced key decisions and recommendations for the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget submission. Among them 

was the cancellation of the Transformational Satellite Communications program in 

favor of two more AEHF satellites (SV–5 and SV–6). This recommendation was the 

result of careful consideration to balance valid warfighter requirements against fiscal constraints. The Air Force plans to work closely with the other Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the combatant commands to meet 

the DOD’s protected and wideband communication needs. To this end, the Air Force 

will evolve the MILSATCOM architecture to provide connectivity across the spectrum of missions, to include land, air and naval warfare; special operations; strategic nuclear operations; strategic defense; homeland security; theater operations; 

and space operations and intelligence. 

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 

The United States Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to be the world 

standard for positioning, navigation, and timing. As a result, GPS has been incorporated into military, commercial, and civilian applications, to include navigation, 

agriculture, banking, cartography, telecommunications, and transportation. Last 

year the GPS Program Office seamlessly implemented the Architecture Evolution 

Plan upgrade to the existing GPS Operational Control System. This upgrade increased sustainability and provided the ability to control the new GPS IIF satellites. 

Perhaps most notably, these upgrades were implemented with no impact to day-today operations and did not require any modifications to existing user equipment. 

This year we are going to launch the final GPS IIR satellite, a program which 

was initiated over 20 years ago and represents one of our most successful, enduring 

space acquisition programs. This year, we will also begin launching the next generation GPS IIF satellites which will sustain the constellation over the next 10 years. 

GPS IIF will also populate the GPS constellation with additional M-code capability 

and introduce a new ‘‘L5’’ civil signal. 

Moving beyond GPS IIF, GPS III will offer significant improvements in navigation 

capabilities by improving interoperability and jam resistance. The procurement of 

the GPS III system will occur in multiple blocks, with the initial GPS IIIA contract 

award in May 2008. GPS IIIA includes all of the GPS IIF capability plus up to a 

ten-fold increase in signal power, a new civil signal compatible with the European 

7 

Union’s Galileo system, and a new spacecraft bus that will support a graceful 

growth path to future blocks. 

Weather 

The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) continues to be the Nation’s workhorse for terrestrial forecasting and space environmental sensing. We 

have three DMSP satellites remaining with DMSP Flight 18 scheduled for launch 

this October. Flight 19 and 20 are currently undergoing a Service Life Extension 

Program to repair, replace, and test components that have exceeded their shelf life. 

Flight 19 will launch in October 2012 and Flight 20 will launch in May 2014 or October 2016, depending on operational requirements. 

In the future the Nation will transition to the next workhorse for terrestrial 

weather—National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS)—a tri-agency effort with National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) and Department of Commerce. Similar to the previous generation of satellites, NPOESS will provide visible and infrared cloud imagery and other atmospheric, oceanographic, and terrestrial information. It will become the Nation’s primary source of global weather and environmental data for operational military and 

civil use. 

Seemingly a straightforward idea to integrate DMSP and POES (Polar Operational Environmental Satellite) in the early 1990s, the NPOESS program has encountered unforeseen engineering challenges. Integration of requirements across the 

spectrum of space and terrestrial weather into several ‘first-of’ sensors partially 

caused the 2006 Nunn-McCurdy breach whereby two sensor suites were de-manifested from the program. Currently, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite 

(VIIRS) sensor has bedeviled the program, but it is planned to deliver later this 

year. As a result, NASA’s NPP (NPOESS Preparatory Project) satellite will become 

a defacto operational spacecraft when it is launched in 2011. Like the DSP/SBIRS 

missile warning architecture, NPOESS C–1 and C–2, scheduled to launch in 2013 

and 2016, respectively, will initiate the phase out of four decades of DMSP service 

to the country. 

Operational Responsive Space 

As a complement to the Nation’s assured access to space, the Operational Responsive Space (ORS) program builds on the ‘‘back-to-basics’’ approach we have cultivated over the past several years by providing enhanced mission capability 

through incremental blocks of small satellites and integration of other responsive 

space capabilities. Key tenants of the ORS program are to keep costs low, react rapidly to urgent warfighter needs, and reconstitute capability in contested environments. A clear example of these tenants is exemplified in the first ORS (ORS–1). 

It is being built for United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to monitor denied areas and will be taskable like other USCENTCOM organic airborne ISR assets. 

Leveraging on the ORS–1 experiences, the Air Force will apply this model to other 

mission areas like communications and space situation awareness. In the fiscal year 

2010 budget request we will begin the steps of on-demand space support with Rapid 

Response Space Capability, whereby plug-and-play satellite busses will be assembled, integrated, and tested with Modular Open System Architecture payloads. 

Launch and Ranges 

National Space Policy requires assured access to space. Currently this requirement is satisfied by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program from 

the United Launch Alliance (ULA) consisting of the Delta IV (developed by Boeing) 

and Atlas V (developed by Lockheed Martin) launch vehicles. The first 23 EELV 

launches have all been successful, and are part of our consecutive string of 61 successful national security space launches. ULA achieves efficiencies through combined engineering, production, and launch operations while maintaining the separate Delta IV and Atlas V families of launch vehicles. The fiscal year 2010 budget 

request funds EELV launch capability, or infrastructure activities for two EELV 

launch systems and on going support for over twelve launch services ordered by the 

Air Force that are working toward launch. In addition, DOD requests funding for 

five EELV launch services which will take place in 2012. 

Space Protection 

The need for increased space protection of our space assets is paramount and requires enhanced SSA capabilities—improved accuracy, responsiveness, timeliness, 

and data integration to support the warfighter. To do this we must combine various 

inputs into a single picture for decision makers. Currently, operators and 

warfighters must assemble an understanding of the global space picture from many 

8 

disparate sources, including e-mails, telephone calls, classified chat rooms, intelligence web sites, and imagery feeds. We have acknowledged this shortcoming, and 

in our fiscal year 2010 budget request we are consolidating the Integrated Space 

Situational Awareness, Rapid Attack Identification Detection Reporting System 

Block 20, and Space Command and Control (C2) programs into a new program element—the Joint Space Operation Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS). The JMS 

program will continue risk reduction engineering and focus on incremental deliveries to deploy a services-oriented architecture (SOA) environment and tools to progressively advance operational capabilities toward an integrated JMS. JMS produces and delivers services in four major categories: Infrastructure provides a SOA 

net-centric collaborative information environment at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information, Secret, and Unclassified levels; Mission Applications enhance and modernize accuracy, sustainability, and responsiveness of space surveillance capabilities from the legacy functionality; Command & Control (C2) provides 

design, development, and integration functions that create, visualize, and share decision-relevant views of space operational environment at all echelons; and, Data Integration migrates non-traditional sensors and data sources into a net-centric based 

enterprise enabling distribution of data obtained across traditional sensors within 

the space surveillance network critical to the JSpOC mission. 

Two programs critical to providing SSA data to the JMS are the Space Fence and 

Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS). The Space Fence is a three station, worldwide, radar system to detect and track smaller sized space objects, while the SBSS 

satellite is an optical system to search, detect, and track objects in earth orbit, particularly those in geosynchronous orbit. The Space Fence replaces the Air Force 

Space Surveillance System and SBSS builds upon our success with the Space Based 

Visible technology demonstration. In the fiscal year 2010 budget, the Space Fence 

program will complete a System Design Review and the SBSS program will support 

on-orbit operations of SBSS Block 10 which is expected to launch this summer. 

Space Industrial Base 

A stable industrial base is vital to successful space systems. Numerous studies 

and reports have documented that the U.S. market share of the global space business is steadily decreasing (CSIS Study, January 2008). Maintaining a stable space 

industrial base is not solely an Air Force or even DOD concern, and must be addressed with our civil and commercial partners as one team. 

We are working with our agency and service partners to strengthen interagency 

awareness and support processes to better synchronize efforts across the civil, commercial and national security space domains. The Space Industrial Base Council 

and its subsequent working groups consistently address industrial base and critical 

technologies risks and opportunities. Their efforts lead to better management practices, identification of cross-cutting technology risk areas and subsequent mitigations, and improve communication with industry. Specifically, the DOD is working 

to support U.S. industrial capacity in several areas key to space including batteries, 

radiation hardened read out integrated circuits, energy efficient solar cells, and 

traveling wave tube amplifiers. 

Continued and enduring attention to the space industrial base, particularly the 

sub-tier industry, is vital to maintaining a robust and viable capability to respond 

to national security space interests. 

Space Cadre 

DOD has over 15,000 military and civilian space professionals. They are essential 

to our full spectrum of operations from keeping the peace to fighting the overseas 

contingency operations, or engaging a peer competitor. Consequently, we are committed to providing the best possible education, training, and career development to 

these professionals who operate, acquire, and enable our systems. Institutions like 

the Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force Institute of Technology, Defense Acquisition University, and the National Security Space Institute are at the forefront 

of our efforts to educate and train these warriors. These organizations provide education and training throughout a space professionals’ career. 

We recognize that we must be able to measure how we are doing with respect to 

Space Professional Development. We have a set of metrics that help us gauge the 

numbers of cadre needed, our current supply, and the health of our cohort in terms 

of accessions and separations. All of these measures will help make us more efficient 

and better at developing our cadre, and ensuring we have the right professionals 

to fill billets across DOD. 

9 

CONCLUSION

Our space systems are the envy of the world. Our infrared surveillance satellites 

are able to detect missile launches anywhere in the world; no other nation can do 

that. Our strategic communications systems allow the President precise and assured 

control over nuclear forces in any stage of conflict, and our wideband SATCOM systems rapidly transmit critical information between the continental U.S. to our front 

line forces; no one else has global, secure, anti-jam communications. Our weather 

satellites allow us to accurately predict future conditions half a world away as well 

as in space. Our GPS constellation enables position knowledge down to centimeters 

and timing down to nanoseconds; no one else has deployed such a capability. These 

sophisticated systems make each deployed soldier, sailor, marine, and airman safer, 

and more capable. 

In the fiscal year 2010 budget, continuity of service across our space portfolio and 

improved space protection is paramount. Our ‘back to basics’ strategy over the recent years is demonstrating results, as we continue toward securing the world’s best 

space capabilities today and ensuring the same for our Nation’s future. 

The space constellations and the space professionals that deliver these capabilities 

are our critical asymmetric advantage. We must ensure the recapitalization and 

health of these constellations and continue the professional development of our future space leaders. Delivering space capabilities is complex, challenging, costly, yet 

rewarding. Although we have faced significant challenges, we are also making significant progress. I am honored to represent a dedicated cadre of space professionals 

who are delivering space capabilities that support our deployed warfighters, our allies, and our Nation. 

I look forward to continuing to work with this committee and thank you for your 

continued support of military space programs. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE COMMAND 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

it is an honor to appear before you today as an Airman and as the Commander of 

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). 

I am proud to lead and represent the nearly 40,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve airmen; government civilians; and contractors who assure strategic deterrence 

and deliver space-based capabilities to United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM), Joint Force Commanders, the Services, the Intelligence Community, civil agencies, commercial entities and allies. The men and women of AFSPC 

serve around the globe from AFSPC Headquarters, 14th Air Force (14 AF), 20th Air 

Force (20 AF), the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), the Space Innovation 

and Development Center (SIDC), and a host of deployed and forward locations. 

This has been an exciting and eventful year for AFSPC. Within the Air Force, we 

witnessed two historic decisions in 2008: the assignment of cyberspace responsibilities to AFSPC and the establishment of Air Force Global Strike Command 

(AFGSC). While in the midst of implementing these decisions for the nuclear and 

cyberspace missions, reinvigorating the Air Force’s Nuclear Enterprise remains the 

highest priority for the Air Force and Air Force Space Command. 

Our mission is to provide an integrated constellation of space and cyberspace capabilities at the speed of need, and our vision is to be the leading source of emerging 

and integrated space and cyberspace capabilities. At AFSPC, we look forward to assuming the lead role for cyberspace within the USAF. Air Force operations in the 

air, space, and cyberspace domains are mutually-supporting and reciprocally-enabling; the cyberspace domain is inextricably linked to the other domains in which 

the U.S. military operates. Not only must we protect these domains, we must also 

properly integrate them with the other operational domains to create joint 

warfighting effects significantly greater than the sum of the parts. Our capabilities 

are woven through Joint operations, weapons networks, and civil and economic activities ranging from missile warning to the position, navigation, and timing signals 

we provide both for military use and as a free, international utility. 

Space and cyberspace capabilities shape the American approach to warfare, are 

embedded in an ever-more effective arsenal of modern weaponry and are threaded 

throughout the fabric of our warfighting networks. Our space-based capabilities are 

10 

absolutely vital to the joint fight. Yesterday’s irregular warfare is today’s regular 

warfare; asymmetric warfare is the new norm. Space capabilities contribute across 

the spectrum of regular and irregular combat and non-combat operations and provide Joint commanders a decisive advantage. Space is no longer just the high 

ground; it is a critical joint enabler and force multiplier. 

The airmen of AFSPC provide land-based strategic deterrence through our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) fleet led by 20 AF, conduct space operations 

and acquisition via 14 AF and SMC, and will soon execute cyberspace operations 

as part of the future 24 AF. These missions are being accomplished by our space 

professionals every day at 15 wings and 44 locations spanning the globe. It is my 

distinct pleasure to outline the strategic way forward for AFSPC and to describe for 

you our plan to develop, acquire, employ and execute Air Force space, missile, and 

cyberspace capabilities in an increasingly complex, dynamic and challenging global 

environment. The space, nuclear, and cyberspace capabilities acquired with your 

help and support, and delivered by AFSPC airmen, will help maintain America’s 

freedom, security, and prosperity. 

THE WAY FORWARD

AFSPC activities in 2008 included comprehensive, concerted efforts to deliver 

space and missile capabilities, develop and care for our airmen and their families, 

and encourage collaboration across the space enterprise. In addition, we made significant progress in modernizing our force and made great strides toward improving 

our acquisition processes with new strategies and actions. AFSPC is proud of its 

2008 achievements; achievements that will serve as building blocks towards 

progress in 2009. AFSPC’s strategic way forward will focus on delivering the space, 

nuclear, and cyberspace capabilities our Joint Force Commanders require today and 

into the future. To do this, we have outlined five goals that serve to guide our efforts. 

AFSPC Goal: Guarantee a Safe, Credible, Ready Nuclear Deterrent Force with 

Perfection as the Standard 

To support the Air Force’s priority of ‘‘Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise,’’ AFSPC will guarantee a safe, credible, ready, nuclear deterrent force with 

perfection as the standard. Nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate backstop of 

U.S. security, dissuading opponents and assuring allies of America’s military commitment to defend our Nation, its allies and friends. Our Nation’s security relies 

heavily on the remarkable attributes of the ICBM force and the dedication and professionalism of those who proudly secure, maintain, and operate the Minuteman III 

weapon system. Over the course of 2009–2010, we will meet daily USSTRATCOM 

operational requirements; invest in sustainment, infrastructure, and our industrial 

base; continue to restore our nuclear culture; and transition the ICBM force to Air 

Force Global Strike Command. 

In response to feedback and direction from the Secretary of Defense, Air Force 

Blue Ribbon Panel, Defense Science Board, Admiral Donald Investigation and others, we undertook a comprehensive set of actions to address deficiencies and re-establish excellence across the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Our roadmap, ‘‘Reinvigorating the USAF Nuclear Enterprise,’’ is the strategic plan to restore a culture of 

discipline, establish clear organizational structures, and increase investment in critical operational and sustainment areas. Perfection, precision, and reliability are our 

performance standards. In recent months, all of our missile wings have undergone 

rigorous Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI) to ensure the utmost standards—and all 

three wings satisfactorily passed their follow-on inspections. 

As for the Minuteman III fleet, we are within 2 years of completing an extensive 

10-year sustainment effort. As part of this comprehensive initiative, all three solid 

propellant motor stages have been removed and re-poured. In addition, the guidance 

systems and post-boost vehicles have been replaced with current technologies. These 

upgrades will ensure the Minuteman III is fully operational until at least 2020. 

The American people depend on the U.S. Air Force to deliver safe, credible and 

reliable nuclear deterrence capabilities, and we will do so. Our airmen perform the 

nuclear deterrence mission with pride, professionalism, and a solemn commitment 

to the highest standards. 

AFSPC Goal: Deliver Assured Combat Power to the Joint Fight 

AFSPC will continue to deliver assured combat power to the joint fight. In addition to the airmen deployed ‘‘in-place’’ manning ICBM launch control centers and 

space operations centers around the clock, in 2008 we forward-deployed nearly 4,000 

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AFSPC airmen to Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom and Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa in support of ongoing counterinsurgency operations. As a result, 49 

AFSPC airmen were awarded Bronze Stars while engaged in military operations in 

the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility. Today, 

we have over 1,200 AFSPC airmen continuously forward-deployed. 

In an environment that’s more uncertain, complex, and changing than ever before, 

most historic military leaders would not recognize today’s irregular warfare landscape. Although our Nation and its interests must still be protected from hostile 

forces and strategic threats, today’s security challenges are more diverse and dispersed. Emerging threats are fleeting, scattered globally, may strike anywhere, anytime, and increasingly take advantage of the space and cyberspace domains. There 

is a growing reliance from Joint Force Commanders on space-based capabilities to 

provide vital services across the global commons. Our airmen are enabling GPS signals to ensure we’re putting Joint Direct Attack Munitions on targets from aerial 

platforms and assuring the reliability of Blue Force Tracking for soldiers on the 

ground. Warfighters depend on military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) in 

austere environments for data, imagery, and streaming video feeds from Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems (UAS). Today, our forces are interconnected, have world-wide cognizance, and strike with greater speed and precision than any military in history 

providing overwhelming and decisive results with minimal collateral damage. Our 

continuous need for global communications, GPS, missile warning, weather forecasting and world-wide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance continues to 

be met by space systems in the face of evolving warfare. 

In 2009–2010, we will continue to improve Space Situational Awareness (SSA), 

execute the Space Protection Strategy, increase GPS navigational accuracy and signal security, modernize MILSATCOM, assure and exploit new Overhead Persistent 

Infrared (OPIR) capabilities, and transform the launch enterprise. 

Space Protection Program 

Another history-making ‘‘first’’ occurred in March 2008 when AFSPC and the 

NRO established the Space Protection Program (SPP). The purpose of this program 

is to develop an integrated approach to protect critical defense, intelligence, civil, 

and commercial space systems that support national security. 

In response to Congressional direction, AFSPC and the NRO delivered the first 

Space Protection Strategy to Congress in August 2008. The SPP strategy was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and identified mission critical investments, capability improvements, and critical interdependencies. Complementing the 

SPP Strategy, AFSPC also finalized a new roadmap for the SSA mission area along 

with an interim architecture. 

Space Situational Awareness 

In concert with the SPP initiative, AFSPC continued efforts to develop a cost effective strategy to protect space capabilities, while striking the right balance among 

awareness, hardening, countermeasures, reconstitution, and alternate means. The 

Integrated Space Situational Awareness (ISSA) program provides USSTRATCOM, 

Joint Functional Component Command for Space and the joint community an integrated source of historical, current and predictive space events, threats, and space 

activities. 

In a dramatic display of teamwork and excellence, AFSPC developed the first-ever 

training procedures and exercises for a real-world intercept mission, Operation 

Burnt Frost. We ensured personnel at the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) 

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, were properly trained and our senior leaders 

possessed accurate and timely location of the target satellite, potential impact locations, and possible environmental effects. During the mission, we provided a glimpse 

of the future by transforming the legacy ‘‘hub and spoke’’ space surveillance network 

into a collaborative, net-centric operation providing real-time SSA and sensor-to-sensor hand-offs. Through subsequent orbital tracking and cataloguing efforts, we’ve 

determined every bit of debris created from the intercept has since de-orbited. 

The importance of SSA continues to grow as the space domain becomes an increasingly contested and crowded environment. Issues common to other domains remain unresolved for space. As a Nation, we have gaps in the operational space domain not found in other domains across the global commons. The Iridium collision 

with a Russian communication satellite is a recent example highlighting the critical 

need for advanced Space Situational Awareness. 

Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) support is one of our top initiatives. The 

CFE Support Program was created in 2004 to focus on safety of flight in orbit for 

government, commercial, and foreign satellite operators in the US and around the 

world. Under our current pilot program, we are equipped, manned, and resourced 

12 

to provide Conjunction Assessment (CA) analysis for capabilities critical to national 

security and homeland defense. An ever-changing space environment continues to 

become further crowded with increasing amounts of debris and new entrants. This 

has challenged our capability in the midst of declining resources and greater demand for basic CA and advanced services. 

In an effort to improve our capabilities, we are augmenting our CFE resources 

and communicating the expanded services to the CFE community. AFSPC will expand and automate our processing and analytical capabilities thereby enabling expanded CA services and in the fall of 2009, we will transition our CFE pilot program to USSTRATCOM to continue long-term operations and support from the 

JSpOC. Our goal remains to provide SSA services to legitimate and trusted CFE 

users ensuring space flight safety and freedom of action in space. 

Schriever War Game Series 

The recurring AFSPC Schriever Title 10 War Game series has proven insightful 

in identifying key operational and policy issues. Having just wrapped up our 

Schriever V War Game in March 2009, we are now reviewing key issues involving 

space deterrence, capability employment, and national space policy considerations 

with senior Air Force and other national decisionmakers. Schriever V clearly identified areas requiring additional emphasis, policy development, resources and analysis. It also demonstrated the far-reaching importance of space to combat operations, policy execution, and diplomacy. We are now underway with plans for 

Schriever VI, and we look forward to increased international and industry participation. 

Position, Navigation and Timing 

The Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to provide highly accurate position, navigation and timing signals enabling Joint combat operations around the 

world. GPS is a free global utility that serves as an enabler for economic transactions influencing the global economy by more than $110 billion annually. 

Throughout 2008, AFSPC operated the most precise, largest-ever GPS constellation 

and took its first big step towards deploying GPS III when we awarded a contract 

in May 2008 to build eight of the Block IIIA satellites. Complementing the space 

segment, we replaced the unsustainable legacy GPS Master Control Station ground 

segment with the Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP) and Launch Anomaly and Disposal Operations (LADO) Systems. AEP improves GPS accuracy, provides the 

capabilitiy to operate the GPS IIF satellites, and affords increased protection of the 

military’s GPS M-code. LADO provides critical launch operations support and onorbit operations for the GPS constellation. The transition to both the AEP and 

LADO system was seamless and transparent to users across the globe. In 2008, our 

acquisition team began developing the Next-Generation Operational Control Segment (OCX). This segment is not only required to launch and sustain GPS IIIA 

space vehicles on orbit, but is essential to moving the GPS towards robust, effectsbased operations. 

At the same time, plans are well underway to launch, deploy and begin operating 

the first GPS IIF space vehicle by December 2009. These new vehicles will broadcast the first operational L5 signals, thereby providing civilian users an additional, 

higher powered signal. This signal is protected by internationally recognized safety 

of life spectrum rules ensuring robust quality of service with minimal interference. 

Military Satellite Communications 

As our MILSATCOM capability continues to grow, so does the age of our fleet. 

Aged in many cases beyond their design lives, the Military Strategic and Tactical 

Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) and the Defense Satellite Communications System-III 

(DSCS–III) will have to continue to provide critical communications services for the 

Nation’s protected and non-protected military and diplomatic activities while we deploy the next generation of advanced MILSATCOM capabilities. 

With the commencement of mission operations over the first Wideband Global 

SATCOM (WGS) satellite in April 2008, we demonstrated a ten-fold increase in our 

wideband SATCOM capabilities providing the warfighter increased data, voice, 

video, and imagery. Additionally, we validated and accepted the geographically separated Backup Satellite Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base. This $2.7 

million effort supports MILSTAR, DSCS, and WGS operations. 

Looking towards the future of MILSATCOM, we began preparations to accept the 

first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications satellite in 2010. 

We look forward to the AEHF system as it will increase the protected communications data rate more than five-fold and afford more coverage opportunities than 

what MILSTAR provides today. Not only will AEHF provide enhanced national command and control satellite networks for the President, Secretary of Defense, and our 

13 

combatant commanders, it will also ensure warfighters receive critical information 

such as the air and space tasking orders, operational plans, and time-phased force 

and deployment data. We transitioned to an innovative $1.25 million operations center and began training Subject Matter Experts (SME) in preparation for our next 

generation satellite system. Deployment of WGS and AEHF allows us to close the 

gaps in the areas of volume, data rates, protected communications, and net-centricity for the warfighter and our Nation’s leadership. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) will provide the Nation with critical 

comprehensive missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and 

battlespace awareness information well into the 21st century. 

In November 2008, the SBIRS Mission Control System Backup—Highly Elliptical 

Orbit (HEO) facility and HEO–1 payload were accepted for operational use, followed 

by USSTRATCOM certification in December 2008. The second HEO payload is now 

on-orbit and undergoing checkout. The exceptionally high quality of HEO infrared 

data has led to additional exploitation initiatives providing major long-term benefits 

to our Joint Force Commanders. 

As the SBIRS HEO–1 system was certified for operations and is providing critical 

data to warfighters, the SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO–1) and GEO–2 

space vehicles made significant assembly, integration and test progress. We will continue satellite testing and integration and look forward to launch readiness testing 

in fiscal year 2010. 

The future of OPIR is the Third Generation Infrared Satellite currently undergoing research and development. In 2009–2010, we will continue down the path of 

wide field of view technology maturation activities. We have received wide field of 

view sensor prototypes and are on contract for a scientific experiment on a commercial rideshare mission in 2010. 

Space Control 

As the Air Force enters its 18th year of continuous combat operations in the Persian Gulf, AFSPC continues to provide sustained counterspace capability to 

USCENTCOM and is in its fifth year of continuous presence in theater with the defensive counterspace system—Silent Sentry. The resounding success of the Silent 

Sentry has led to the Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System 

(RAIDRS) Block 10 program, which detects and geolocates satellite communications 

interference via fixed and transportable ground systems. 

Operationally Responsive Space 

The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program is also focused on the joint 

fight. AFSPC partnered across the space enterprise and responded to three urgent 

warfighter needs in communications, SSA, and ISR. We addressed the warfighters’ 

requirements through a variety of innovative approaches to include: accelerated delivery of demonstration efforts, explored alternative uses of on-orbit capability, expanded use of commercial assets, and military utility experimentation with a tactical communications satellite. In addition, we began development of ORS Sat–1 to 

meet a critical USCENTCOM ISR requirement. 

Launch Enterprise Transformation 

Assured access to space is paramount to providing space capabilities to the 

warfighter. AFSPC continues to deliver 100 percent space launch mission success— 

one mission at a time. Within our launch community, we witnessed the continuation 

of our winning streak with an unprecedented string of 61 successful national security space launches including the 23rd consecutive successful launch of the Atlas V 

and Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs). Following a 22-month, 

$300 million launch site modification effort, the first west coast Atlas V successfully 

delivered a critical NRO satellite into orbit. We recently launched the GPS IIRM– 

20 onboard a Delta II in March, as well as the second WGS satellite in April onboard an Atlas V. Additionally, AFSPC supported two world-wide tests of the 

Ground-based Mid-course Defense long-range missile interceptor system. 

In a broader context, AFSPC continues to advance our Space Launch Enterprise 

Transformation (LET) effort to posture our command for the future of assured access to space. The LET focuses on three initiatives: transformation of launch services acquisition, upgrading the launch range architecture, and fully leveraging Total 

Force Integration (TFI). While the military launch business has long been recognized as a key contributor to space, we understand the significance of fostering the 

growth of commercial launch capabilities. 

14 

AFSPC Goal: Forge a Battle-Ready Team by Attracting, Developing and Retaining 

America’s Best 

To support the Air Force’s priority of ‘‘Developing and Caring for Airmen and 

Their Families,’’ AFSPC is forging a battle-ready team by attracting, developing and 

retaining America’s best. During 2009–2010, we will improve training and professional development programs, establish viable career pathways, and guarantee quality of life programs for our members and their dependents. We are taking the necessary steps to care for our airmen and their families. While we undertake comprehensive organizational realignment, AFSPC is working hard to ensure a seamless transition of the land-based nuclear deterrent to Air Force Global Strike Command and to establish processes for deliberate development of nuclear expertise 

among our ICBM professionals. At the same time, we’re preparing for the integration of the cyberspace mission by carefully crafting a professional development program that guarantees appropriate education, training and skill sets for this unique 

and challenging mission area and its synergies with our space professionals. 

Developing Airmen 

AFSPC further defined space and missile training as well as professional qualification and development relationships with Air Education and Training Command 

allowing us to focus on our Organize, Train and Equip (OT&E) activities. Contributing to our educational efforts, the National Security Space Institute (NSSI) continued to enhance its reputation as the center for top-quality space education and 

training for students of all ranks across the Department of Defense and related government agencies. In 2008, the NSSI taught 77 courses to over 1,500 students. We 

also established an ICBM Advanced Course at the NSSI providing 2 weeks of mission-focused education for the operations, maintenance, security and helicopter personnel who operate, sustain and secure our ICBM force. Furthermore, we institutionalized attendance at the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center’s Nuclear Management Fundamentals Course for all inbound commanders who will serve at our nuclear units, and we are developing a focused ICBM Weapons Instructor Course 

(WIC) at the USAF Weapons School (USAFWS) at Nellis Air Force Base, NV. 

Families and Quality of Life 

AFSPC recognizes the critical roles our families play as integral members of the 

Air Force team. In AFSPC, we extended the Air Force’s wingman culture to our 

families to help nurture success on the home front. AFSPC aggressively improved 

the quality of life where airmen work and live by awarding $143 million in 2008 

for a host of revitalization initiatives to include family housing, a dormitory, and 

child development center. In addition, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

stimulus funds of $145.5 million are being invested across the command for modernization of base infrastructure and military construction (MILCON). For 2009, we 

have $31.5 million in MILCON projects for dorm renovation, facilities construction, 

and other key projects across the Command. 

AFSPC Goal: Modernize and Sustain AFSPC’s Enduring Missions and Mature 

Emerging Missions 

To support the Air Force’s priority of ‘‘Modernizing Our Air and Space Inventories, Organizations and Training,’’ AFSPC will modernize and sustain AFSPC’s 

enduring missions and mature emerging missions. Throughout 2009–2010, we will 

transition cyberspace capabilities to AFSPC and standup a new operational Numbered Air Force (NAF). We will also finalize a basing location and establish cyberspace training and acquisition processes through which we will present cyber forces 

to the Joint Force Commanders. 

In 2008, AFSPC increased the depth and breadth of Air Reserve Component 

(ARC) support to AFSPC missions. AFSPC’s first-ever TFI Strategy was developed 

to fully leverage the unique strengths of the ARC in both existing and emerging 

missions. New TFI partnerships are underway across the launch, SSA, space control, and cyberspace operational mission sets. In April 2008, we activated the 310th 

Space Wing at Schriever Air Force Base, CO, as the Air Force’s first-ever Reserve 

space wing. In addition, we activated the 380th Space Control Squadron at Peterson 

Air Force Base, CO, as the Reserve Associate Unit for the RAIDRS mission. 

AFSPC Goal: Reengineer Acquisition to Deliver Capability at the Speed of Need 

To support the Air Force’s priority of ‘‘Acquisition Excellence,’’ AFSPC will reengineer acquisition to deliver capability at the ‘‘speed of need.’’ During 2009–2010, we 

will continue working a ‘‘back to basics’’ philosophy and block-build approach, fund 

15 

to the most probable cost, increase our acquisition work force, improve relations 

with industry, and control requirements. Our Space and Missile Systems Center will 

deliver five major new systems and mission capabilities in the next 6 to 24 months 

for SBIRS, AEHF, WGS, GPS IIF, and the Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) 

system. The GPS III and OCX programs are on the right vectors for success, and 

we are improving our space development expertise, processes and culture. 

In today’s world of rapid technological advancement and proliferation, we cannot 

afford to do business as usual when it comes to delivering space capabilities. The 

nature of warfare, as influenced by the information age, has changed dramatically 

in terms of symmetry, ambiguity, time, distance, and boundaries. This environment 

requires a paradigm shift necessary to deploy space capabilities at the ‘‘speed of 

need’’ while still executing efficient acquisition practices. 

CONCLUSION

Defending the United States of America and its allies and friends is a continuous 

mission that requires the utmost planning and execution. As technology advances, 

so do the means that can be employed by those who threaten our way of life. AFSPC 

seeks to perfect the most formidable, capable and remarkable military space, missile 

and cyberspace force the world has ever known. This will allow warfighting commands to meet the challenge of protecting the American people, their livelihoods 

and interests with precision at the moment of need. With the continued support of 

Congress, AFSPC is postured to maintain a crucial leadership role as we realize our 

vision to be the leading source of emerging and integrated space and cyberspace capabilities. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LARRY D. JAMES, USAF, COMMANDER, 14TH AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General James follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. LARRY D. JAMES, USAF 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today for my first opportunity to appear before 

you as United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) Commander of the 

Joint Functional Component Command for Space (CDR JFCC SPACE). 

It’s a distinct privilege to address you on our space posture, and to represent the 

men and women of JFCC SPACE who employ space capabilities around the globe 

every day. These soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are a dedicated and innovative joint force, working hard to ensure efficient and effective space operations. 

Their professionalism ensures our joint forces can exploit space-based capabilities to 

the maximum extent. 

Today I will focus my discussion on employment of space capabilities, the events 

shaping our future planning, and identify some of the challenges we face as we work 

to operate effectively and safely in an increasingly complex and congested space environment. 

EMPLOYMENT OF SPACE CAPABILITIES

USSTRATCOM provides space effects to Department of Defense (DOD) global 

users that are critical to military operations. CDR JFCC SPACE is designated by 

CDRUSSTRATCOM as the single point of contact for military space operations. As 

such, I am tasked to provide tailored, responsive, local, and global space effects to 

the various combatant commanders. My USSTRATCOM-delegated authorities include Global Space Coordinating Authority, which makes me the primary interface 

with supported joint commanders for operational-level planning and execution to 

provide space effects in support of those combatant commanders’ objectives. CDR 

JFCC SPACE also is assigned Operational Control and Tactical Control authorities 

for designated worldwide space forces. These authorities provide USSTRATCOM a 

single, globally focused component commander to enhance functional integration of 

space capabilities for the joint warfighter and for the Nation. 

Every significant military operation uses space capabilities in some way—space 

capabilities are truly integral to military operations in the 21st century. The criticality of space effects to the warfighter is readily apparent in ongoing operations in 

Afghanistan where Global Positioning System (GPS) services provide foundational 

data, enabling us to track the location of U.S. and coalition forces. But it is not just 

16 

Blue Force Tracking; for the military users, there are multiple examples of spacebased successes. 

For example, precision accuracy of the GPS-guided Excalibur artillery rounds 

have enabled the U.S. Army to strike top al Qaeda operatives in close proximity to 

our infantrymen, without exposing soldiers to undue risk. On 27 March 2009, following an enemy ambush against a coalition unit, a B–1B Lancer used GPS-guided 

500 lb. bombs to destroy a series of enemy fighting positions and a fortified heavy 

machine gun position near Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan. On 26 April 2009, four F/A– 

18 Super Hornets flown from the deck of the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group delivered four 500 lb. GPS-guided JDAMs onto enemy fortified compounds and machine gun fighting positions, ending a fire fight with coalition forces. Clearly, the 

GPS constellation enables our forces worldwide to maneuver into a militarily advantageous position and then, through various GPS-aided munitions, exploit that tactical advantage to create effects ranging from tactical to strategic. 

Our military satellite communications capabilities provide ample, readily accessible bandwidth, delivering joint warfighters secure military communication, and enabling the free-flow of battlespace characterization data and critical intelligence. 

The recent introduction of Wideband Global Satellite Communication operations 

boosted area of responsibility communications tenfold for 140,000 warfighters. Wideband satellites allowed theater commanders to rely on real time, high-capacity 

broadcast video feeds from Predators to enhance their execution of tactical 

battlespace management, and to providecombat support information for deployed 

forces. 

Our space-based missile warning systems were absolutely essential to providing 

tracking and assessment of the latest Taepo-Dong 2 (TD–2) missile launch from 

North Korea. Multiple space-based missile warning systems provided initial launch 

detection, enabling rapid threat/non-threat characterization, and confirming the 

event as a space launch. Clearly, space-based assets provide critical data to produce 

effects for successful military operations across a multitude of engagements. Strong 

communication links, operational relationships, and reach back to the Joint Space 

Operations Center (JSpOC) ensure USSTRATCOM is able to provide users the effects they need. 

Space capabilities are no longer just the province of large nations. Access to space 

and space products becomes cheaper and more widely available every year. The 

commercialization of space has allowed many developing nations and non-state actors to acquire space-based capabilities, such as imagery and satellite communications, that were previously the exclusive purview of superpowers. With more space 

players, space is more crowded than ever. In 1980 only 10 countries were operating 

satellites in space. Today, 9 countries operate spaceports, more than 50 countries 

own or have partial ownership in satellites and citizens of 39 nations have traveled 

in space. In 1980 we were tracking approximately 4,700 objects in space; 280 of 

those objects were active payloads/spacecraft, while another 2,600 were debris. As 

of 1 May 2009 we are tracking approximately 19,900 objects; 1,300 active payloads 

and 8,700 pieces of debris. In 29 years, space traffic has quadrupled. We have already seen one catastrophic collision in space with the Iridium/COSMOS conjunction, and as the number of objects in space increase, so do the chances of another 

collision. Clearly, managing this environment and our assets is a key focus of our 

efforts. 

KEY EVENTS OF 2008/2009

Although we have made progress in improving our space situational awareness 

(SSA), February’s unfortunate collision between an active Iridium communications 

satellite and an inactive Russian satellite, and last month’s test of another North 

Korean TD–2 missile, continue to tangibly demonstrate the complexity of the environment, the challenge of emerging space faring nations, and the demands on our 

space systems. To date we have cataloged over 940 pieces of debris that resulted 

from the Iridium/COSMOS collision and there are likely thousands of smaller pieces 

our sensors can’t track. Only 18 items of debris have reentered so far, with the remainder expected to be in orbit for decades. This debris will slowly decay due to 

natural forces, but it will remain a hazard to manned and unmanned spaceflight 

in low Earth orbit, and to satellites transiting that region, for several years. 

We’ve derived many lessons from the TD–2 missile event, chief among them the 

requirement to integrate and fuse many sources of space, ground and intelligence 

data, in many disparate systems and security channels. This is a lesson we identified during the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, and experienced again during the 2008 NRO satellite intercept, and although we have implemented tactics, 

techniques, and procedures to mitigate potential delays in information flow, the 

17 

challenge of collecting, integrating and fusing this data still exists. It again took the 

significant efforts of many to manually assemble information and then pass it to 

senior decision makers. While we were very successful once again due to outstanding cooperation between the intelligence and operations communities, we clearly need improved processing and analytic systems that can continually compile and 

automatically fuse SSA, intelligence and other all-source information in real-time to 

keep us abreast of space events. Our lessons learned from the TD–2 test will continue to guide future improvements and our developmental efforts for the JSpOC 

to ensure USSTRATCOM is able to provide users the effects they need. 

However, collisions and space traffic growth are not the only challenges or threats 

to our space assets. The January 2007 Chinese test of an ASAT demonstrated the 

kinetic kill capability of space assets and this capability will continue to be a threat 

in the future. Even more ubiquitous is the capacity to jam satellite communications 

links; this is within the capability of many nations, as well as non-state actors. 

Space-related ground sites can be damaged by direct attack. Several nations are 

working on high-energy lasers that could damage or destroy our satellites. With the 

exception of the high-energy laser, all of these threats to our space systems exist 

today. Our Nation’s growing dependence on space-based capabilities, coupled with 

the increasing threats and operational risks we face, creates corresponding potential 

military and economic vulnerabilities. We must protect our space assets against intentional and unintentional acts in order to preserve our essential space capabilities, 

and accordingly, we must change our mindset from passive to active protection 

measures to ensure USSTRATCOM’s ability to execute and integrate operations 

across all lines of operations. 

SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Space situational awareness is more than understanding the space environment, 

tracking objects, and conducting conjunction assessments. We need to be able to discriminate between natural and manmade threats. We need to understand the location, status and purpose of these objects, their capabilities, and their owners’ intent. 

This comprehensive knowledge enables decision makers to rapidly and effectively 

select courses of action to ensure our sustained freedom of action and safety in what 

is clearly a contested space environment. 

The U.S. space surveillance architecture currently detects and tracks thousands 

of objects, but critical gaps remain in our ability to fully track and characterize all 

on-orbit objects, analyze and predict conjunctions, and protect not just military satellites, but also the commercial and civil satellites that are critical to national security. The Space Surveillance Network provides acceptable coverage in the northern 

hemisphere, but we have a significant coverage gap in the southern hemisphere. By 

filling this gap we increase the JSpOC’s ability to rapidly detect, track, and characterize new payloads and maintain awareness of maneuvering spacecraft. 

Our sensor network is currently able to track objects as small as 10 centimeters 

across. We do this well for low Earth orbits; however, our ability decreases as we 

track objects in the more distant geosynchronous orbit. We need to improve our capability to track and assess smaller objects in all orbits if we are to keep pace with 

the potential threats from emerging small satellite technologies, and to gain better 

awareness of the hazards posed by small space debris. 

We must sustain the momentum gained through investments such as the Space 

Fence and Space-base Space Surveillance system and strive to close SSA gaps, 

bringing us ever closer to combining an operational picture of space with command 

and control systems, and moving us from ‘‘watching and reacting’’ to ‘‘knowing and 

predicting’’ in the space domain. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Obtaining intelligence of other nations’ intentions in space is a particularly challenging issue. Our Intelligence Community is working towards building the necessary foresight to improve our ability to anticipate what others may do in space, 

whether to use the space environment to benefit their military operations, terrorist 

attempts, or to deny the U.S. space-provided services which we have grown dependent on. 

Improved analytic systems and connectivity will help us fuse operations and intelligence data. Backing that up must be a cadre of space intelligence experts, both 

within the Intelligence Community (IC) and within the JSpOC, who can readily 

focus and apply information to support our command and control activities, and ultimately provide necessary support to the warfighter. The DOD, IC, and National Air 

and Space Intelligence Center are working together to improve systems and develop 

18 

our intelligence experts. These efforts are a tremendous start, but must remain a 

priority in order to provide near real time, actionable intelligence to the warfighter. 

Furthermore, we have barely begun to scratch the surface in terms of the potential data to be exploited from current and future space systems. Air Force Space 

Command (AFSPC) has recognized this need and formed a Battlespace Awareness 

and Technical Intelligence Capability Team to develop the exploitation and dissemination systems, processes and architecture that will allow us to more fully integrate 

AFSPC sensor capabilities with those of the rest of the Air Force, our sister Services, and the IC, to provide multi-source intelligence from DOD space-based sources 

to support joint warfighters and national decisionmakers. We fully endorse these efforts and are partnering closely with AFSPC to prepare ourselves for the key role 

JFCC SPACE will play in commanding and tasking these assets. 

SPACE AND CYBERSPACE INTEGRATION

Emerging threats may originate anywhere, at anytime, and increasingly take advantage of space and cyberspace domains. Global effects, speed of attack, availability of information, and the ability to strike from remote locations are common 

attributes across both domains. As such, our adversaries have unprecedented, immediate access to information utilizing minimal resources. Space and cyberspace are 

truly contested domains, and our Nation’s critical information is more vulnerable 

than ever and must be protected. 

Space and cyberspace capabilities continue to shape the world’s approach to warfare. They are embedded in an increasingly, diverse arsenal of modern weaponry, 

and are threaded throughout warfighting networks. When integrated, space and 

cyberspace operations will become an even more powerful force multiplier. We must 

take actions to integrate space and cyberspace operations to protect the United 

States’ freedom of action and information. 

We will continue to face many challenges in space and cyberspace. To ensure their 

integration, we must take the same operational mentality we have of the space environment and apply this mindset to cyberspace. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL

JFCC SPACE commands and controls worldwide space forces to ensure spacebased effects meet warfighter needs. To ensure we can continue to effectively support the warfighter and senior decisionmakers, we require more automated, net-centric capabilities to command and control space forces, and networked sensors and 

information systems that seamlessly share information to more effectively leverage 

our current resources. This will give us the ability to rapidly react via real-time 

dataflow to the JSpOC for processing and analysis, and then real-time flow of the 

refined product back to the user. 

We are aggressively pursuing command and control capabilities to consolidate intelligence information, predict adversary threats to U.S. space systems, improve our 

ability to monitor assigned and attached force status, and predict impacts to operational users due to system outages. Together, these capabilities provide a predictive knowledge of the space operating environment and impacts to operations, as 

well as enable a broader set of options to proactively posture U.S. space forces to 

mitigate threats. 

The U.S. must continue to lead the community of space-faring nations and encourage responsible behavior in all facets of space operations. The JSpOC is the focal 

point for ensuring safe, effective operation of our space forces and those of our partners. We need to gather real-time, quality data, have the ability to exploit that data 

rapidly and accurately, and then export decision-quality information across a range 

of customers from the intelligence community to deployed forces to produce effects 

for the warfighter in an integrated, holistic way. 

Finally, we must continue to focus on capability requirements of the joint 

warfighter. Matching future users’ requirements with technological advances will 

allow USSTRATCOM to provide the most advanced and reliable space effects in response to the growing demands of the Nation’s warfighters. 

CONCLUSION

The nature of space operations is rapidly evolving, as is the United States’ and 

coalition partners’ dependence on space. While we continue to exploit current spacebased capabilities to the maximum extent, we still need increased efforts to close 

intelligence and SSA gaps, and increased efforts to enhance our command and control capabilities, ensuring USSTRATCOM’s ability to continually provide the right 

effect, to the right user, at the right time anywhere on the globe. Working in collaboration with other departments and agencies in the U.S. Government, the DOD 

19 

must continue to build the relationships, processes, and capabilities within the global space community that allow us to operate effectively together to meet our national security objectives. I am truly honored to lead such a talented group of men 

and women. Perfection is our standard and you can be proud of your soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that expertly tackle the challenges we face every day. I 

thank the subcommittee for your continued strong support as we work to preserve 

our vital space capabilities for our Nation. 

STATEMENT OF VADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 

[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Harris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY VADM HARRY B. HARRIS, USN 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, as the Deputy Chief 

of Naval Operations for Communication Networks, I am honored to appear before 

you today to address your Navy’s space activities. Let me begin by thanking Congress for its sustained and significant support to the men and women in our Armed 

Forces. I am the Navy’s resource sponsor for space; in that capacity, I am responsible for funding Navy space programs. This sponsorship includes the Mobile User 

Objective System (MUOS), which is the next generation Ultra High Frequency 

(UHF) Satellite Communication system. MUOS will provide more capable tactical 

communications to our joint, mobile warfighter. I am also responsible for developing 

the Navy Space Strategy, writing the Navy’s Space Needs letter, and supporting the 

Navy Space Cadre. 

If I had to summarize my testimony to you today in a one sentence sound bite, 

it would be that the Navy is critically dependent on space to conduct not only our 

wartime mission, but also our core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea 

control, power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster 

response. A day without space is a long day, indeed. A wide array of national, joint, 

and commercial satellites currently provides Navy commanders with essential 

worldwide communication capabilities; navigation; missile warning; meteorological 

data; and over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Although 

the Navy is one of the largest ‘users’ of space in DOD, we rely on the Air Force 

and the Intelligence Community to develop and field the majority of our space systems. 

NAVY SPACE STRATEGY

Let me now address the Navy Space Strategy. One of the Navy’s primary goals 

is to shape the outcome of joint deliberations on future space capabilities to maximize naval combat effectiveness. Within the Navy, space-related functions and responsibilities are distributed among different commands, which together constitute 

a functional ‘‘Navy Space Team’’ that works collaboratively to advance our many 

goals in space. 

In 2008, the Chief of Naval Operations published the Navy Space Strategy, which 

provides key elements and guidance to implement the DON Space Policy. The Navy 

Space Strategy focuses on two broad themes. First, to influence the large DOD and 

national investments in space systems through direct, active participation in the 

National Security Space enterprise. Second, to leverage DOD and national space resources through improvement of the integration of space systems capabilities into 

the Navy’s combat systems. Our strategy addresses five key goals: (1) mitigating the 

impact of the risk that adversaries pose to critical space systems upon which the 

Navy depends; (2) identifying, documenting, and advocating Navy’s specific requirements for future space systems; (3) posturing the Navy Space Cadre to ensure we 

place the right person in the right job at the right time; (4) prioritizing and funding 

essential science, technology, research and development efforts to meet Navy’s needs 

in space; and (5) expanding Navy leadership engagement with senior Department 

of Defense, Joint, and National Intelligence Community space leaders to better advocate for, and positively influence, Navy issues in space. 

Your Navy is actively engaged with key national and joint space-related organizations to ensure current and future Navy needs in space are identified. Venues for 

this engagement include the DOD Space Posture Review, the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, and National Security Space Program assessments. 

A specific example of this is our active participation with other Services and the 

intelligence community in addressing the current and future electro-optical satellite 

architecture. Secretary Gates’ and Director Blair’s recent decision on electro-optical 

20 

modernization validates the importance these systems play in our national security. 

Through this modernization we will create an enabling collection of capabilities to 

support current and future naval operations. In addition, we continue to assess the 

military utility of commercial sensing capabilities to support our current operations 

worldwide. For example, within the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility we are currently looking at the value of commercial sensing to support Theater Security Cooperation and Maritime Domain Awareness. 

Navy is also working with the newly established Space Protection Program sponsored by Air Force Space Command and the National Reconnaissance Office. 

ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY NARROWBAND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

The Navy’s major space segment responsibility to the joint community is the UHF 

narrowband satellite communications constellation. Today this constellation consists 

of eight UHF Follow-On satellites, two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one 

Leased Satellite (LEASAT 5), and leased capacity on SKYNET 5C. The MUOS will 

begin to replace these systems in 2011. 

MUOS, which is designated as a Major Defense Acquisition Program, is the next 

generation UHF satellite constellation; it will consist of four operational satellites 

and an on-orbit spare. MUOS will support Unified Commands and Joint Task Force 

Components, DOD and non-DOD agencies, and allied and coalition users. With both 

a legacy UHF payload that provides the same capability as the current UHF FollowOn satellite, and a new UHF waveform payload, MUOS will significantly increase 

the number of accesses and throughput available to the warfighter by more than 

an order of magnitude while retaining backward compatibility with legacy UHF terminals. It will provide tactical narrowband netted, point-to-point, and broadcast 

services of voice and data worldwide in challenging environments including double 

canopy foliage, urban environments, and high sea states, as well as mitigate threats 

to deny use of the satellite. 

MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite communications. 

During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the UHF system (UHF 

Follow-On, FLTSAT, and LEASAT 5) was only able to support 20 percent of the 

narrowband tactical UHF satellite communication capability requested by operators 

even though 80 percent of the capacity was devoted to these operations. LEASAT 

5 will reach its end of service life in early 2011, and the UHF Follow-On constellation is predicted to reach an unacceptable level of availability in May 2010. The 

good news is that the FLTSAT and UHF Follow-On satellites are operating well 

past their design lives—we are getting every bit of our investment out of them . . . 

and then some. In order to minimize the operational impact of any gap in UHF satellite availability, we are executing a mitigation plan, and developing further paths 

to maximize system capability until MUOS satellites and MUOS-capable terminals 

come online. We have increased the use of leased commercial bandwidth on 

LEASAT 5, and have recently added a lease on Skynet. One of our major mitigation 

efforts involves the maximization of available satellite communications channels on 

the newest UHF Follow-On satellite. The program office for UHF Follow-On took 

advantage of the satellite’s digital capability and component redundancy to allow 

use of 10 additional channels, beginning 5 months ago in December 2008. This was 

achieved at virtually no cost. Similar gains may be possible on the legacy payload 

that MUOS satellites will carry, once on orbit. We are now exploring this option as 

part of our effort to maximize accesses during the transition from legacy to MUOScapable terminals. The MUOS advanced waveform will deliver capabilities such as 

increased capacity, higher data rates, and ability to operate with smaller terminals. 

The fielding of MUOS-capable Joint Tactical Radio System terminals, and/or the upgrade of existing UHF legacy software-programmable terminals, are required for the 

use of this new MUOS capability. 

Today, the UHF Follow-On satellite supports approximately 600 simultaneous accesses worldwide. Based on evolving warfighting concepts in support of the Guidance for Development of Forces, UHF satellite communications requirements are expected to grow, and MUOS, as designed, will be able to support that requirement. 

The MUOS program office currently projects a schedule delay to satellite #1’s onorbit capability, from March 2010 to no earlier than February 2011. The prime contractor has experienced challenges with two of the key pieces of technology. Several 

challenging technical hurdles still remain, including final satellite assembly and certification. The program office has been aggressively addressing and mitigating cost 

and schedule issues. 

The delivery of MUOS is a high priority for Navy. Warfighters need MUOS not 

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critical legacy payload, which will replenish our rapidly aging UHF Follow-On constellation. 

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

With regard to Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), satellites provide global access and are a key enabler for our Navy’s worldwide missions. To maintain our 

asymmetric expeditionary advantage, we must be able to surge additional spacebased capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; position, 

navigation, timing; and satellite communications, on accelerated timelines. We must 

be able to add capabilities in any area of focus, as well as rapidly reconstitute lost 

capability. ORS solutions have the potential to fill the gaps for warfighters going 

in harm’s way, and represent a capability which the Navy needs to maintain our 

operational advantage. 

We are excited about the potential of the ORS concept, as it offers maritime forces 

the flexibility to meet critical warfighting capabilities and counter increasingly agile 

adversaries. As part of the joint Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) and ORS effort, the Office of Naval Research invests $15 million of science and technology funds each year 

in moderate-to-high-risk projects that result in significant prototypes through the 

Space Innovative Naval Prototype program. Investments are focused on naval capability gaps that space-based systems can fill, such as ship tracking, acoustic data 

exfiltration from sonobuoys, mobile communications, submarine detection, red force 

cueing, and littoral environment characterization. The Naval Research Laboratory 

is managing the ORS Payload Technology initiative for the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense. 

TACSAT–3, which is scheduled to launch this month, includes a payload sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, which provides an IP-based data exfiltration 

capability to collect information from a wide variety of underwater, surface, and 

land-based sensors. 

The Office of Naval Research and the Naval Research Laboratory are leading development of TACSAT–4 for the joint community, and funding a UHF Communications payload which will support mobile communications as well as sensor data 

exfiltration. TACSAT–4 uses a prototype spacecraft bus which was designed as part 

of a government-industry team effort to develop and mature standards for increased 

modularity. The TACSAT–4 spacecraft is scheduled to be launched this September. 

It will primarily support the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility, although other combatant commanders may benefit from its coverage as well. 

The TACSAT series of experiments reflect the partnerships that must be developed and nurtured between the services, combatant commanders, the Intelligence 

community, and industry, to produce innovative solutions that leverage the best talent available across the national security space community to solve warfighting 

challenges. 

The ORS attributes of flexibility and agility not only provide advantages in the 

current operational environment but also have the potential to positively affect the 

space industrial base. The shorter project cycles should provide a broader base of 

rapid response experience for the space industry and space cadre, and will establish 

a faster acquisition rhythm in the long run. 

SUMMARY

In summary, space systems are a critical enabler for maritime operations. Your 

Navy has a long and proud history in space, having developed a number of technological breakthroughs. The list of Navy ‘firsts’ in space includes: the first space communications used for operations; the first controllable space launch vehicle; the first 

satellite tracking system; the first successful electronic intelligence reconnaissance 

satellite; the first space object tracking system; the first demonstration of on-orbit 

atomic clocks; the first military broadcast satellite; and the first astronauts to orbit 

the earth, orbit the moon and crew the Space Shuttle. The Navy looks forward to 

more innovative space ‘‘firsts’’ to come in the decades ahead. 

The Navy’s mission of keeping air and sea lanes open and ensuring the security 

of our citizens at home and abroad requires a global reach and persistent presence. 

We must be constantly ready, whether it is to deliver on a mission of mercy on one 

hand, or more lethal measures in combat on the other . . . and everything in between. Our ability to respond, as well as work with our Sister Services and coalition 

partners, depends on space capabilities with inherent flexibility and speed to support our worldwide responsibilities. 

The Navy must leverage DOD’s and the intelligence community’s space capabilities and must be involved in future space developments to ensure our ability to successfully conduct maritime operations. Future U.S. satellite programs are now being 

22 

1 Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and 

Management of National Security Space (Alexandria, VA: July 2008). 2 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture (Washington, DC: October 2008). 

developed that promise additional benefit and capabilities to Navy warfighters. Due 

to the long lead times involved in complex space programs, it is even more critical 

that naval requirements and maritime missions continue to be factored into the prelaunch design and planned on-orbit operation of all future satellite systems being 

considered for acquisition. Without active Navy involvement today in ongoing deliberations over future satellite programs, your Navy risks operating in future scenarios with space systems not optimized for the maritime environment and illequipped to contribute to key important issues affecting our national security. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today. So let me end 

as I began—the help of Congress in general, and this subcommittee in particular, 

is deeply appreciated. 

STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today 

to discuss the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space acquisitions. The topic of today’s hearing is critically important. Despite a growing investment in space, the majority of large-scale acquisition programs in DOD’s space portfolio have experienced 

problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and 

increased technical risks. The cost resulting from acquisition problems along with 

the ambitious nature of space programs has resulted in cancellations of programs 

that were expected to require investments of tens of billions of dollars, including the 

recently proposed cancellation of the Transformational Satellite Communications 

System (TSAT). Moreover, along with the cost increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays—at least 7 years—resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; 

and weather monitoring. 

My testimony today will focus on the condition of space acquisitions, causal factors, and recommendations for better positioning programs for success. Many of 

these have been echoed by the Allard Commission,1 which studied space issues in 

response to a requirement in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2007, and by a study by the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence (HPSCI),2 among other groups. The two studies highlighted concerns 

about diffuse leadership for military and intelligence space efforts and declining 

numbers of space engineering and technical professionals. Members of the Allard 

Commission were unanimous in their conviction that without significant improvements in the leadership and management of national security space programs, U.S. 

space preeminence will erode ‘‘to the extent that space ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage.’’ 

SPACE ACQUISITION PROBLEMS PERSIST

Figure 1 compares original cost estimates and current cost estimates for the 

broader portfolio of major space acquisitions for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The 

wider the gap between original and current estimates, the fewer dollars DOD has 

available to invest in new programs. As shown in the figure, estimated costs for the 

major space acquisition programs have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial 

estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The declining investment in the later 

years is the result of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program’s no 

longer being considered a major acquisition program and the cancellation and proposed cancellation of two development efforts that would have significantly increased DOD’s major space acquisition investment. 

23 

Figures 2 and 3 reflect differences in total life-cycle and unit costs for satellites 

from the time the programs officially began to their most recent cost estimate. As 

figure 2 notes, in several cases, DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability 

in the face of escalating costs. For example, two satellites and four instruments 

were deleted from National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and four sensors are expected to have fewer capabilities. This will 

reduce some planned capabilities for NPOESS as well as planned coverage. 


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520str2.eps
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Figure 4 highlights the additional estimated months needed to complete programs. These additional months represent time not anticipated at the programs’ 

start dates. Generally, the further schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk of not 

sustaining current capabilities. For this reason, DOD began a follow-on system effort, now known as Third Generation Infrared Surveillance, to run in parallel with 

the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program. 


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3 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for unit cost reports. If certain unit cost thresholds are exceeded (known as Nunn-McCurdy breaches), DOD is required to report to Congress 

and, in certain circumstances, if DOD determines that specific criteria are met, certify the program to Congress. 

This fiscal year, DOD launched the second Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite. WGS had previously been experiencing technical and other problems, including improperly installed fasteners and data transmission errors. When DOD finally 

resolved these issues, it significantly advanced capability available to warfighters. 

Additionally, the EELV program had its 23rd consecutive successful operational 

launch in May. However, other major space programs have had setbacks. For example: 

• In September 2008, the Air Force reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost 

breach of the critical cost growth threshold 3 for the Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency (AEHF) communications satellite because of cost growth 

brought on by technical issues, schedule delays, and increased costs for the 

procurement of a fourth AEHF satellite. The launch of the first satellite has 

slipped further by almost 2 years from November 2008 to as late as September 2010. Further, the program office estimates that the fourth AEHF 

satellite could cost more than twice the third satellite because some components that are no longer manufactured will have to be replaced and production will have to be restarted after a 4-year gap. Because of these delays, 

initial operational capability has slipped 3 years—from 2010 to 2013. 

• The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) communications satellite estimates an 11-month delay—from March 2010 to February 2011—in the delivery of on-orbit capability from the first satellite. Further, contractor costs 

for the space segment have increased about 48 percent because of the additional labor required to address issues related to satellite design complexity, satellite weight, and satellite component test anomalies and associVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB

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ated rework. Despite the contractor’s cost increases, the program has been 

able to remain within its baseline program cost estimate. 

• The first Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite is now expected 

to be delayed almost 3 years from its original launch date to November 

2009. Also, the cost of GPS IIF is now expected to be about $1.6 billion— 

about $870 million over the original cost estimate of $729 million. (This approximately 119 percent cost increase is not that noticeable in figures 2 and 

3 because the GPS II modernization program includes the development and 

procurement of 33 satellites, only 12 of which are IIF satellites.) The Air 

Force has had difficulty in the past building GPS satellites within cost and 

schedule goals because of significant technical problems—which still threaten its delivery schedule—and challenges it faced with a different contractor 

for the IIF program, which did not possess the same expertise as the previous GPS contractor. Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new 

GPS IIIA program to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air 

Force is aiming to deploy the GPS IIIA satellites 3 years faster than the 

IIF satellites. We believe the IIIA schedule is optimistic given the program’s 

late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the new 

contractor. 

• Total program cost for the SBIRS program is estimated around $12.2 billion, an increase of $7.5 billion over the original program’s cost, which included 5 geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites. The first GEO satellite has been delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor oversight, 

technical complexities, and rework. Although the program office set December 2009 as the new launch goal for the satellite, it is currently assessing 

the satellite launch schedule and expects to have a new plan in place by 

June 2009. Subsequent GEO satellites have also slipped as a result of flight 

software design issues. 

• The NPOESS program has experienced problems with replenishing the 

current constellation of aging weather satellites and was restructured in 

July 2007 in response to a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical 

cost-growth threshold. The program was originally estimated to cost about 

$6.5 billion for six satellites from 1995 through 2018. The restructured program called for reducing the number of satellites from six to four and included an overall increase in program costs, delays in satellite launches, 

and deletions or replacements of satellite sensors. Although the number of 

satellites has been reduced, total costs have increased by almost 108 percent since program start. Specifically, the current estimated life-cycle cost 

of the restructured program is now about $13.5 billion for four satellites 

through 2026. This amount is higher than what is reflected in figure 2 as 

it represents the most recent GAO estimate as opposed to the DOD estimates used in the figure. We reported last year that poor workmanship and 

testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the delivery of a complex imaging 

sensor. This late delivery caused a delay in the expected launch date of a 

demonstration satellite, moving it from late September 2009 to early January 2011. 

This year it is also becoming more apparent that space acquisition problems are 

leading to potential gaps in the delivery of critical capabilities. For example, DOD 

faces a potential gap in protected military communications caused by delays in the 

AEHF program and the proposed cancellation of the TSAT program, which itself 

posed risks in schedule delays because of TSAT’s complexity and funding cuts designed to ensure technology objectives were achievable. DOD faces a potential gap 

in ultra high frequency communications capability caused by the unexpected failures of two satellites already in orbit and the delays resulting from the MUOS program. DOD also faces potential gaps or decreases in positioning, navigation and timing capabilities because of late delivery of the GPS IIF satellites and the late start 

of the GPS IIIA program. There are also concerns about potential gaps in missile 

warning and weather monitoring capabilities because of delays in SBIRS and 

NPOESS. 

Addressing gaps in any one of these areas is not a simple matter. While there 

may be opportunities to build less complex ‘‘gap filler’’ satellites, for example, these 

still require time and money that may not be readily available because of commitments to the longer-term programs. There may also be opportunities to continue 

production of ‘‘older’’ generation satellites, but such efforts also require time and 

money that may not be readily available and may face other challenges such as restarting production lines and addressing issues related to obsolete parts and materials. Further, satellites on orbit can be made to last longer by turning power off 

28 

at certain points in time, but this may also present unacceptable trade-offs in capability. 

UNDERLYING REASONS FOR COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH

Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD 

starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding 

that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify 

and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at 

the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many programs 

in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to and from programs—particularly as programs experience problems that require additional time and money 

to address. Such shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects. 

Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it 

has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding 

process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating 

solely on proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, when this approach is followed, cost estimators are not well positioned to develop accurate cost estimates because there are too many unknowns. Put more simply, there is no way to accurately 

estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system 

when critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively early stages 

of discovery and invention. 

While our work has consistently found that maturing technologies before a program’s start is a critical enabler of success, it is important to keep in mind that this 

is not the only solution. Both the TSAT and the Space Radar development efforts, 

for example, were seeking to mature critical technologies before program start, but 

they faced other risks related to the systems’ complexity, affordability, and other development challenges. Ultimately, Space Radar was cancelled, and DOD has proposed the cancellation of TSAT. Last year, we cited the MUOS program’s attempts 

to mature critical technologies before the program’s start as a best practice, but the 

program has since encountered technical problems related to design issues and test 

anomalies. 

Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single 

step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD has preferred to make fewer but heavier, 

larger, and more complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather 

than larger constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that gradually increase 

in sophistication. This has stretched technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increased the complexities related to software. Programs also seek to maximize capability because it is expensive to launch satellites. 

A launch using a medium- or intermediate-lift EELV, for example, would cost 

roughly $65 million. 

Fourth, several of today’s high-risk space programs began in the late 1990s, when 

DOD structured contracts in a way that reduced government oversight and shifted 

key decisionmaking responsibility onto contractors. This approach—known as Total 

System Performance Responsibility (TSPR)—was intended to facilitate acquisition 

reform and enable DOD to streamline its acquisition process and leverage innovation and management expertise from the private sector. Specifically, TSPR gave a 

contractor total responsibility for the integration of an entire weapon system and 

for meeting DOD’s requirements. However, because this reform made the contractor 

responsible for day-to-day program management, DOD did not require formal deliverable documents—such as earned value management reports—to assess the status 

and performance of the contractor. The resulting erosion of DOD’s capability to lead 

and manage the space acquisition process magnified problems related to requirements creep and poor contractor performance. Further, the reduction in government 

oversight and involvement led to major reductions in various government capabilities, including cost-estimating and systems-engineering staff. The loss of cost-estimating and systems-engineering staff in turn led to a lack of technical data needed 

to develop sound cost estimates. 

ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SPACE AND WEAPON ACQUISITION PROBLEMS

Over the past decade, we have identified best practices that DOD space programs 

can benefit from. DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems on 

29 

which we have reported. These include initiatives at the department level that will 

affect its major weapons programs, as well as changes in course within specific Air 

Force programs. Although these actions are a step in the right direction, additional 

leadership and support are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun 

will take hold. 

Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial sector—has 

recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology discovery 

from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program’s start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We have also identified 

practices related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, 

technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition-program management that could benefit space programs. Table 1 highlights these practices. 

DOD is attempting to implement some of these practices for its major weapon programs. For example, as part of its strategy for enhancing the roles of program managers in major weapon system acquisitions, the department has established a policy 

that requires formal agreements among program managers, their acquisition execuVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB

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30 

tives, and the user community that set forth common program goals. These agreements are intended to be binding and to detail the progress a program is expected 

to make during the year and the resources the program will be provided to reach 

these goals. DOD is also requiring program managers to sign tenure agreements so 

that their tenure will correspond to the next major milestone review closest to 4 

years. Over the past few years, DOD has also been testing portfolio management 

approaches in selected capability areas—command and control, net-centric operations, battlespace awareness, and logistics—to facilitate more strategic choices for 

resource allocation across programs. 

Within the space community, cost estimators from industry and agencies involved 

in space have been working together to improve the accuracy and quality of their 

estimates. In addition, on specific programs, actions have been taken to prevent mistakes made in the past. For example, on the GPS IIIA program, the Air Force is 

using an incremental development approach, where it will gradually meet the needs 

of its users, use military standards for satellite quality, conduct multiple design reviews, exercise more government oversight and interaction with the contractor and 

spend more time at the contractor’s site, and use an improved risk management 

process. On the SBIRS program, the Air Force acted to strengthen relationships between the government and the SBIRS contractor team, and to implement more effective software development practices as it sought to address problems related to 

its flight software system. Correspondingly, DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is asking space programs to take 

specific measures to better hold contractors accountable through linking award and 

incentive fees to program milestones. DOD interim space guidance also asks space 

programs to make independent technology readiness assessments at particular 

points in the acquisition process and to hold requirements stable. 

Furthermore, the Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, and other key organizations 

have made progress in implementing the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. This initiative encompasses several separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical capabilities as well as identifying and implementing longterm technology and design solutions to reduce the cost and time of developing and 

delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. ORS provides DOD with an opportunity to work outside the typical acquisition channels to more quickly and less expensively deliver these capabilities. In 2008, we found that DOD has made progress 

in putting a program management structure in place for ORS as well as executing 

ORS-related research and development efforts, which include development of low 

cost small satellites, common design techniques, and common interfaces. 

Legislation introduced in recent years has also focused on improving space and 

weapon acquisitions. In March, the Senate Committee on Armed Services introduced 

an acquisition reform bill which contains provisions that could significantly improve 

DOD’s management of space programs. For instance, the bill focuses on various 

measures, including increasing emphasis on systems engineering and developmental 

testing, instituting earlier preliminary design reviews and strengthening independent cost estimates and technology readiness assessments. Taken together, these 

measures could instill more discipline in the front end of the acquisition process 

when it is critical for programs to gain knowledge. The bill also requires greater involvement by the combatant commands in determining requirements and requiring 

greater consultation among the requirements, budget, and acquisition processes. In 

addition, several of the bill’s sections, as currently drafted, would require in law 

what DOD policy already encourages, but it is not being implemented consistently 

in weapon programs. In April, the House Committee on Armed Services introduced 

a bill to similarly reform DOD’s system for acquiring weapons by providing for, 

among other things, oversight early in product development and for appointment of 

independent officials to review acquisition programs. Both bills are moving forward 

in the Senate and House. 

The actions that the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense have been 

taking to address acquisition problems are good steps. However, there are still more 

significant changes to processes, policies, and support needed to ensure reforms can 

take hold. With requirements, resource allocation, and acquisition processes led by 

different organizations, it is difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable for saying no to a proposed program or for ensuring that the department’s portfolio of programs is balanced. This makes it difficult for DOD to achieve a balanced 

mix of weapon systems that are affordable and feasible. For example, diffused leadership has been problematic with the GPS program in terms of DOD’s ability to synchronize delivery of space, ground, and user assets. GPS has a separate budget, 

management, oversight, and leadership structures for the space, ground, and user 

equipment segments. Several recent studies have also concluded that there is a need 

to strengthen leadership for military and intelligence space efforts. The Allard ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
31 

4Department of Defense. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security 

Space Management and Organization (Washington, DC: Jan. 11, 2001). 

mission reported that responsibilities for military space and intelligence programs 

are scattered across the staffs of the DOD and the Intelligence Community and that 

it appears that ‘‘no one is in charge’’ of national-security space. The HPSCI expressed similar concerns in its report, focusing specifically on difficulties in bringing 

together decisions that would involve both the Director of National Intelligence and 

the Secretary of Defense. Prior studies, including those conducted by the Defense 

Science Board and the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 

Management and Organization (Space Commission) 4 have identified similar problems, both for space as a whole and for specific programs. While these studies have 

made recommendations for strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no major 

changes to the leadership structure have been made in recent years. In fact, an ‘‘executive agent’’ position within the Air Force that was designated in 2001 in response 

to a Space Commission recommendation to provide leadership has not been filled 

since the last executive resigned in 2007. 

In addition, more actions may be needed to address shortages of personnel in program offices for major space programs. We recently reported that personnel shortages at the EELV program office have occurred, particularly in highly specialized 

areas, such as avionics and launch vehicle groups. Program officials stated that 7 

of 12 positions in the engineering branch for the Atlas group were vacant. These 

engineers work on issues such as reviewing components responsible for navigation 

and control of the rocket. Moreover, only half of the government jobs in some key 

areas were projected to be filled. These and other shortages in the EELV program 

office heightened concerns about DOD’s ability to use a cost-reimbursement contract 

acquisition strategy for EELV since that strategy requires greater government attention to the contractor’s technical, cost, and schedule performance information. In 

previous reviews, we cited personnel shortages at program offices for TSAT as well 

as for cost estimators across space. While increased reliance on contractor employees 

has helped to address workforce shortages, it could ultimately create gaps in areas 

of expertise that could limit the government’s ability to conduct oversight. 

Further, while actions are being undertaken to make more realistic cost estimates, programs are still producing schedule estimates that are optimistic while 

promising that they will not miss their schedule goals. The GPS IIIA program, for 

example, is asking the contractor to develop a larger satellite bus to accommodate 

the future GPS increments and to increase the power of a new military signal by 

a factor of 10, but the schedule is 3 years shorter than the one achieved so far on 

GPS IIF. We recognize that the GPS IIIA program has built a more solid foundation 

for success than the IIF program. This foundation offers the best course to deliver 

on time, but meeting an ambitious schedule goal should not be the Air Force’s only 

measure for mitigating potential capability gaps. Last year, we also reported that 

the SBIRS program’s revised schedule estimates for addressing software problems 

appeared too optimistic. For example, software experts, independent reviewers, as 

well as the government officials we interviewed agreed that the schedule was aggressive, and the Defense Contract Management Agency has repeatedly highlighted 

the schedule as high risk. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, senior leaders managing DOD’s space portfolio are working in a 

challenging environment. There are pressures to deliver new, transformational capabilities, but problematic older satellite programs continue to cost more than expected, constrain investment dollars, pose risks of capability caps, and thus require 

more time and attention from senior leaders than well-performing efforts. Moreover, 

military space is at a critical juncture. There are critical capabilities that are at risk 

of falling behind their current level of service. To best mitigate these circumstances 

and put future programs on a better path, DOD needs to focus foremost on sustaining current capabilities and preparing for potential gaps. In addition, there is 

still a looming question of how military and intelligence space activities should be 

organized and led. From an acquisition perspective, what is important is that the 

right decisions are made on individual programs, the right capability is in place to 

manage them, and there is someone to hold accountable when programs go off track. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have at this time. 

32 

CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina Chaplain at 

(202) 512–4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Pubic Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Maria Durant; Arturo Holguin; Laura Holliday; Rich Horiuchi; Karen 

Sloan; Alyssa Weir; and Peter Zwanzig. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Once Senator Vitter and I get through 

with our questions, we are going to adjourn to the Office of Senate 

Security for a discussion on classified matters. So I will start out 

with just a couple of questions, and then flip it to you, and we will 

just keep going back and forth. 

Ms. Chaplain, GAO recently issued a report about a potential 

gap in the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites. Can you explain that gap and what happens in the gap period and the assumptions that you made in determining there is potential for a 

gap? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Thank you. We recently reported on the GPS, and 

the bottom line, in terms of the gap analysis we did, we did an 

analysis that replicates what the aerospace corporation does, and 

we even matched up our results with the aerospace corporation. So 

we have a lot of confidence in the results of our gap analysis. 

With regard to the potential gap in satellite capability, our analysis showed that if both the GPS IIF and the GPS IIIA programs 

are executed on schedule, there is still just an 80 to 90 percent 

probability that the constellation will stay above 24 satellites, 

which is the commitment the United States has to provide. If there 

were a 2-year delay—our analysis in the 2-year delay in the GPS 

IIIA program, that is—our analysis showed that the probability 

would drop to as low as 10 percent. 

I have a couple parameters on this. I think our analysis has been 

exaggerated in some of the recent media reports. They are painting 

a bit more dire picture than we had in our report. There are also 

measures that can be taken to extend the life of satellites, such as 

turning off secondary payloads, but they need to be discussed 

among all the players involved with that action. 

Our concerns are with the issue of aging satellites in the constellation, the delays in the IIF program, and whether that schedule can even be achieved as it is now because they still have some 

technical problems they are working on. 

Then on the IIIA program, we were very pleased to see the Air 

Force has taken a lot of actions to prevent mistakes that were 

made on the IIF programs, and those actions mirror the things 

that we all want done for all the space programs, including trying 

to keep requirements manageable, hold more design reviews, follow 

military design standards, and things of that nature. 

But even with that, the schedule, in our view, will be challenging, given the nature of satellite development, the fact that 

they want a bigger satellite bus on the IIIA program, they are increasing the signal by a power of 10. It is a lot of challenge for the 

contractor to meet and there may be not enough room in the schedule to accommodate problems that could come up. So that is where 

we had a concern on the IIIA program. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Secretary and General, what is your 

assessment of a probability of a gap, and how can you mitigate it? 

33 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. The GAO concerns are the same concerns 

that we had initially going back 3 years ago as we were 

architecting the IIIA program, the GPS III program. That was the 

first program where the Air Force applied what we call ‘‘back-tobasics’’ in our space acquisition. Back-to-basics includes intense 

conversations with the warfighters to understand their needs. It includes evolutionary block deliveries of new capabilities and GPS 

III, for example, has three separate blocks, and each one delivers 

more capabilities for the warfighter as opposed to trying to leap 

dramatically to a brand new, almost Battle Star Gallatica kind of 

a delivery. 

So additionally, we have gone through independent cost estimates. We went through 4 years of systems engineering and technology risk reduction in a competitive industrial environment to 

buy down the risks on the program and to better understand how 

different designs can satisfy the warfighters’ needs. So we have 

much more confidence in the acquisition of GPS III due to these 

back-to-basics fundamentals that we are implementing compared to 

the systemic problems that prior space programs had suffered. So 

GPS III, IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC is the first and currently still successful implementation of the back-to-basics philosophy in our space acquisition. 

To date, it has IIIA. The GPS III design work has been progressing faster than schedule. In fact, today is the first major design review on the IIIA spacecraft, and the program is progressing 

much faster and with much higher confidence simply because of 

those 4 years we spent before we settled on a particular industry 

team and before we settled on a particular spacecraft design. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General, do you have anything to add? 

General KEHLER. Sir, just a couple of things. First of all, thank 

you for inviting us today—you and Senator Vitter both. We appreciate the committee’s attention and concern on all the space issues. 

I would just add a couple things to what Secretary Payton has said. 

First, the world depends on GPS. We know it. We are responsible 

for it. We take that responsibility seriously and we are committed 

to keeping the level of service and actually improving the level of 

service that the world has come to expect out of us. 

The second thing I would point out to you is that today we have 

the largest, most capable GPS constellation on orbit that we have 

ever had. There are over 30 satellites on orbit today, and they are 

performing well. They are not all in the same state of health. Some 

are older than others. Some have some problems that others that 

are newer do not have, but it is a large and very robust constellation on orbit today. 

That gives us a little bit of breathing space, if you will. We understand where the problems are here. We know and believe that 

we have worked through the problems on the IIF satellites. We are 

not disagreeing with GAO over the nature of the problems that 

have arisen, but we are ready by the end of the summer/early fall 

to put the first GPS IIF satellite on orbit. We believe, as Mr. 

Payton said, that GPS III is progressing very well. There are other 

steps that we can take and will take to work through the gap if 

this gap arises. 

34 

By the way, it is not a gap in terms of coverage. It is a reduction 

in the global coverage. It is hard to explain, but characterizing it 

as a gap, I think, is a little bit of a mischaracterization. 

But having said that, we are not pushing back on where the 

issues have been. We do think that we have measures in place to 

work our way through this time period. We are looking forward to 

GPS III because we have brought forth the very acquisition improvements that have been suggested to us into that program and 

believe that will be very helpful for us. 

I think as we look at this today and we look at IIF now getting 

ready to launch, III going through its acquisition cycle, and us having committed the right people, the right funding, the right cost estimates, et cetera, sir, as you had mentioned earlier on, the fact 

that we have new signals entering into the constellation, the fact 

that we have some ways to manage power and other things, we 

think that we can manage our way through this. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Vitter? 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. 

Just to follow up directly on that, Mr. Secretary, in general, what 

would be your bottom line on this in terms of, what do you think 

the probability is of any sort of gap, however broadly defined developing? Is there, in fact, a backup plan besides just the roll-out of 

what you have scheduled? If that slows, if that fails to continue to 

meet targets, what is the backup plan to mitigate or avoid any socalled gap? 

Mr. PAYTON. Senator, I would suggest we push that question to 

General James because he is the operator of the constellation, the 

warfighter that delivers that GPS capability, and he has those 

sorts of operational mitigations that you referred to. 

General JAMES. Yes, sir. Just to address that, there are several 

things that we look at. First of all, we manage the constellation in 

totality, as General Kehler said, 30 satellites. If we start to lose 

satellites before we can launch replacements, we can adjust those 

orbits to ensure that we provide the best possible coverage for GPS. 

The fundamental requirement is 24 satellites. So we will continue 

to manage that constellation to make sure that we adjust orbits to 

improve and provide the best possible GPS capability we can. 

In addition, we actually have—— 

Senator VITTER. I do not mean to interrupt. But the best capable. 

What is the possibility of falling short of what is our expectation 

and defining a gap as anything short of that? 

General JAMES. Sir, again, the fundamental requirement is 24 

satellites. We are at 30 now. Plus, we have three on-orbit spares 

that we can actually bring back into the mix. So again, just an 

opinion that the probability is relatively low that you would see 

major problems with a GPS signal worldwide. There could be areas 

where, for example, over the poles or northern latitudes that you 

have less accurate coverage, but still within requirements, et 

cetera. So again, it is a very dynamic position, as the satellites 

move around in the sky, in terms of the coverage you get and what 

you would see. But you would really have to drop from 33 today, 

30 plus 3 on-orbit spares that we have, down to that 24, which is 

the very basic requirement that we are required to meet and provide from the United States. 

35 

Senator VITTER. Gentlemen, any of you can respond. What are 

your general thoughts regarding this IDA report and the specific 

conclusion that we suffer from no one really being in charge in a 

global sense with regard to space? Do you think there is some fairness in that? What should be done about it? How can we bring 

more focus in terms of developing an overall space road map and 

investment plan? 

Mr. PAYTON. I would say, Senator, when we say no one is in 

charge, that is a misnomer. I would say the warfighter is in charge. 

Those of us on the acquisition side turn to the warfighter to determine what capabilities we deliver, at what pace we deliver those 

capabilities, and at what price. Again, part of our back-to-basics is 

a very tight integration of warfighter conversations with the acquisition community so that we do satisfy those needs that they advertise. 

Senator VITTER. Let me ask it a little differently. Warfighter is 

a lot of different people, and we salute them and we certainly want 

to service them. Who is in charge of integrating all of that input 

and those needs into a clear, unified road map? 

Mr. PAYTON. Since space is global inherently, we turn to Strategic Command for that. 

Senator VITTER. Do you think they are effective in truly integrating that into an overall road map and investment plan? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Where is that sort of overall road map laid out 

and defined? 

Mr. PAYTON. Through the normal Pentagon planning processes. 

Strategic Command quantifies their priorities, representing the 

theater combatant commanders. They quantify their priorities and 

the pace that they need those priorities filled, and whether it is Air 

Force or Navy or even the National Reconnaissance Office, we 

marry our deliveries to those warfighter needs. 

General KEHLER. Sir, if I could add a little bit to that as well. 

Again, on the DOD side of this equation, Strategic Command, as 

a combatant command, sits in a very critical place in terms of 

space operational capabilities. That is where the requirements 

originate, and when the warfighting requirements for space-related 

things originate, there is a process that ultimately hands those requirements, once they’re validated, in large part—not exclusively, 

but in large part—to the Air Force. When they come to the Air 

Force, then the Air Force Space Command, my command, is responsible for taking those requirements and turning them into actual capabilities. 

On the operational side, a very similar thing happens. Strategic 

Command is responsible for the day-in and day-out operations of 

our space assets as well, our DOD space assets. General James is 

the commander day-in and day-out that exercises that operational 

responsibility, the operational control, if you will, over those assets. 

So there are two chains here. In terms of the warfighters and 

warfighting requirements, we think this works pretty well. This is 

something we have arrived at after a great deal of effort to get us 

into this particular position where warfighting requirements follow 

the standard chain that other warfighting requirements follow, and 

space operations follow a standard set of activities that actually 

36 

puts the capability in the hands of the people who are forward who 

need it. 

So we are pretty comfortable that, as we sit here today, we understand how requirements turn into programs that turn into capabilities and who is responsible for that. We are also pretty comfortable today that the operational use of these platforms and how 

we make that available to the warfighters is also pretty well understood. 

General JAMES. Sir, if I could just expand quickly. Again, under 

the Joint Forces Component Commander, then we have responsibility for Army, Navy, and Air Force space forces. We also reach 

out to the combatant commanders around the globe. We receive inputs from them on a daily basis in terms of what are the requirements for current operations today, and we build all that into a 

tasking order and provide those capabilities on a regular basis. So 

we are, indeed, integrating those space capabilities across all the 

Services, provide that combatant commander with what he needs 

on a regular basis. 

General KEHLER. I would add one final point, sir, if I may. The 

IDA reports and other reports have really not just looked inside the 

DOD, but they have looked across the interagency where they have 

raised some of their concerns. You have a defense activity. You 

have an intelligence activity. You have other activities. The question that they have raised is how do those interact, and those are 

questions that, among other things, will be looked at in the space 

posture review. 

Senator VITTER. The final question for now. I would love 

thoughts from any of you, including the GAO, about the suggestion 

by some that we do not have enough focus—it is not all or nothing—but enough focus on small satellites, things that are more focused, simpler, much cheaper, and we focus too much on mega, extremely complex systems, and that we could get some benefit in 

certain areas from focusing on smaller, simpler things, including 

spurring more entrants in the field and more competition because 

not everyone is going to get in the business of building the mega, 

most complicated satellites. Do you have reactions to that very 

broad suggestion? 

Mr. PAYTON. It is a very timely topic, Senator. Last night we 

launched out of Wallops Island a spacecraft called Tactical Satellite 

(TACSAT)–3, a small satellite launched off of a Minotaur to lowearth orbit. It was a project run by Air Force Research Lab but 

with participation from Navy Research Lab, and it was part of our 

operational responsive space program. Again, a technology demonstration, but demonstrating that we can field and deploy a spacecraft for a particular theater combatant commander’s needs. 

So that demonstration, again launched last night, will have 

about a year of on-orbit operation to demonstrate some new technologies, but mostly how to operate more efficiently with an onorbit asset. So, again, that is one example of small satellites 

through the operational responsive space program, how small satellites can benefit military combatant commanders. 

General KEHLER. Sir, we would agree. We see that there is great 

potential in smaller platforms that do single-purpose kinds of 

things that can be put up faster and at lower cost. The warfighters 

37 

have said that there are requirements for platforms like that. The 

Commander of Strategic Command has told us that he is interested 

in being able to augment or reconstitute pieces of the constellations 

that the warfighters depend on. 

As Mr. Payton said, this is a next step that we just took last 

evening on this road. We are very encouraged by what we are seeing so far. We would like it to go faster, and we are trying to work 

on that in terms of investment, but we see the great potential in 

being able to put another strategic arrow in our quiver with smaller satellites. In some cases, we may be able to do a substantial 

amount of some of these missions. In some cases, we are going to 

have to have larger platforms. 

General JAMES. Sir, just from an operational perspective, we are 

preparing, once they are done with the experimental phase of 

these, to actually take them over operationally and build the concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures to actually provide that 

data right into the theater and develop those procedures where we 

accept requests from the theater and use these operationally as 

well as experimentally. So we are all on board with moving forward 

in that arena. 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, from the Navy’s perspective, we are a 

strong believer in the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept. Our Navy Research Lab, in conjunction with the Office of 

Naval Research and the Air Force Research Laboratory and various applied physics labs across the country—we partner with them 

to participate in the ORS program. We think it is great for the 

country. It is great for industry, and it gives the warfighter the potential for on-call services down range. So we are committed to it, 

and we happily participate in it. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We have been generally supportive of the ORS 

program, not just because of the focus on small satellites, but because it also provides the potential to standardize design techniques and to also lower the costs of launch, which is very important to reducing acquisition costs overall, and also of the potential 

of the program to bring in new players into the space business. 

Also, just by virtue of working on smaller programs that go faster, you are providing a lot of learning opportunities for people that 

do not have those opportunities on these longer kinds of efforts. It 

encourages just more learning and risk-taking in general. 

You have to be cautious in applying this concept across all of 

space because some of the requirements are very demanding and 

the solutions inherently have to be different at this point in time. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is 

good to be back with you, and I am glad that my colleague, Senator 

Vitter, is your ranking member. I am sure you can get a lot more 

productive work out of him than you were able to get out of me. 

He is committed to our country’s defense and has the brain power 

to understand the complexities that we deal with. [Laughter.] 

General Kehler, you point out in your testimony that Air Force 

Command provides land-based strategic deterrence through the 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fleet. Could you outline for 

38 

us, briefly, how you maintain the reliability of this force over time 

and what are the challenges in what you do? 

General KEHLER. Sir, first of all, we are about to complete a very 

substantial investment in the Minuteman ICBM force that will 

take it to 2020. We are looking at what it might take in additional 

investment to take it to 2030. 

Now, how do we do that? We do that through a variety of programs that sustain this force and analyze the force and where it 

may need investment and then take those investment steps. One 

of the key activities that we have is an aging and surveillance program. That aging and surveillance program looks very hard at the 

boosters themselves and the supporting equipment that goes with 

those to try to predict where failures might occur in the future. 

For example, three times a year—and we are looking at going to 

a fourth, but for right now three times a year—we operationally 

test fly a full-up Minuteman round, if you will, from one of the 

operational bases where it is disassembled, taken to Vandenberg 

Air Force Base, reassembled, shot down the western range. We also 

fire static test assets at various locations around the country. We 

also dissect some of these missiles. We do analysis on the chemical 

content of the fuels, and we constantly look at the electronics. The 

system, as it sits there deployed operationally in the field every 

day, is constantly going through a set of self-checks and self-analysis to tell us what its health is. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think you are to be commended for that. I 

think that has been an important part of the confidence we have 

in that system. 

So you are doing as many as three flights a year? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. I remember we cut the ICBM force from 500 

to 450. Part of the agreement to do that was that we needed those 

launches for testing. I believe that is right. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, Mr. Chairman, I do not know if we have 

lined up enough in our Ground-based Midcourse Defense program 

for testing. You have always felt we probably should have more rigorous testing, and then if we are going to keep this system in place 

for a while, we will need to make sure we have enough when we 

look at that number on testing. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We are going to bring General O’Reilly in 

here. 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay, very good. 

ORS is something I know that the chairman has been interested 

in and supportive of. You announced, Secretary Payton, a launch 

yesterday? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. Last night. 

Senator SESSIONS. So far, so good? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. It was a successful routine launch out of 

Wallops Island. The satellite separated from the last stage of the 

Minotaur launch vehicle. Solar rays unfurled, and they are going 

through on-orbit checkout right now. 

Senator SESSIONS. Just briefly, how do you feel about how the 

progress is going on this? I think you said that earlier, but would 

39 

you summarize that for me what your best judgment is? Are we on 

schedule? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. In addition to the TACSAT operational experiments, we have another program that is responding to an urgent need from Central Command, a project we call ORS satellite 

number 1, not very descriptive. It is intended to respond to an urgent need from Central Command. So we have selected an industry 

team to go out and build the spacecraft with very mature technology, piece part technology designs. Part of that is to even use 

the existing link from space to the ground, use the existing link 

that the U2 uses today, so that when this satellite flies over Central Command, they will be able to receive it as if it is a very high 

altitude U2. It fits right into their analytical work stations for Central Command. So it is a very fast-paced program that the ORS 

program is managing. 

Senator SESSIONS. Space News reported May 18 that the 2010 

funding request is insufficient to launch the ORS 1 satellite mission planned for 2010. Is that a disappointment? How did we let 

that slip? 

Mr. PAYTON. No, sir. We have a decision point in the program, 

again, part of our back-to-basics. If the program is still making 

good progress on its design evolution and its subcontracting and 

delivery of the piece parts for the spacecraft and the sensors, if 

that is going well in early July, we will make a conscious decision 

about how fast to continue that program. So the budget requests 

necessary to keep that program on a fast pace are in the process 

to come to Congress for approval. 

Senator SESSIONS. So you have an urgent request. The original 

plan, as I understood it, was to do it by 2010, but our warfighter 

now is not going to have it. 

Mr. PAYTON. No, sir. Again, we do not want to spend money to 

keep a program on a pace that technically it will not deliver. So 

the decision point this summer is what pace to deliver that spacecraft on. 

Senator SESSIONS. It is not a question of money but a technological capability? 

Mr. PAYTON. It is a question of can the industry prove that they 

can deliver on that 2010 pace. 

Senator SESSIONS. If they can, you will have the money to fund 

it? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. If not, our plan is to continue the program, 

but not on the rapid pace. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Kehler, you were mentioning 

other agencies. Of course, DOD has an imminent interest in knowing what the weather is. We have not had too good of an experience 

with a National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Sensing 

Satellite (NPOESS). General James, how important is it that these 

sensors get fielded? 

General JAMES. Sir, from the warfighting perspective, weather it 

is absolutely essential and maintaining our awareness of the 

weather in theater and out is extremely critical to planning and 

conducting operations. So it is certainly critical. 

40 

Looking to the ground weather perspective, there are many 

weather satellites that we rely on, of course, the current Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) constellation, which we 

will have three satellites to be launched. So that will carry us forward for some period of time. Then other National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) and civil weather satellites that we 

can utilize for weather forecasting. But it is absolutely critical to 

military operations and also space operations because there is 

space weather that our space satellites conduct and determine and 

monitor solar wind, solar flux, those sorts of things that are important for satellite operations that we also need to maintain the capabilities for from the warfighter and operational perspective. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The structure on NPOESS between the 

Air Force and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) and NASA has not worked. There is a committee or a task 

force report that is coming out in a week or so headed by a very 

respected person in these matters, Tom Young. That report is going 

to say that basically, since it is underfunded, it needs to be funded, 

but that between the DOD and NOAA and NASA, they have to get 

their act together. The recommendation is going to be that basically NASA design and operate the satellite for NOAA with the cooperation of DOD. Do you have any problem with that? 

General JAMES. Sir, I will just speak from the warfighter perspective. The warfighter has weather requirements. As long as the 

acquisition process meets those requirements, then no. But I would 

turn to the acquisition side to talk about the management of the 

program itself, but the requirements will still be the requirements 

and they need to be addressed in whatever form or program management structure exists. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Mr. Secretary and General Kehler? 

Mr. PAYTON. I would suggest that today NOAA operates not only 

the polar-orbiting satellite that they have sponsored, but also the 

DMSP military spacecraft. So from a shared operational perspective of constellation management and flying the spacecraft and 

tasking the spacecraft, NOAA does that for both the Air Force and 

the rest of the world right now. We rely on European sensors also 

from their program they have called MEDOP. So the operational 

relationship is already established. 

The difficulty with NPOESS has been a very complex and sophisticated suite of sensors that have been troublesome in their development, in their engineering, most notably a sensor called visible 

and infrared sensor. That is the shared difficulty that NASA and 

NOAA and the Air Force have right now, and the delivery and development of that sensor has been the cause of our frustrations 

with the NPOESS program. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I would suggest to you that another problem is its management by committee, and you have to have a lead. 

The Tom Young report is going to suggest that NASA be the lead. 

Mr. PAYTON. If we do march down that path, we will have to 

have very strong confidence and guarantees from NASA that they 

could satisfy the warfighters’ requirements. We would have to work 

out mechanisms to ensure that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Where does Ash Carter play into this? 

41 

Mr. PAYTON. Senator, I honestly do not know. He would be a critical decision-maker if we moved down that path. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What I would like you to do is maybe we 

will get him and you back up here after you have looked at this 

Tom Young report. But this thing is going to take another billion, 

billion and a half dollars, to complete. I think the management 

structure has in large part been the problem, as well as the technical challenges. So we will visit that one on another day. 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In the meantime, I think it would be well 

if you would get with Ash Carter and you all get Dr. Young’s report 

and see what conclusions and reach out to NOAA and to NASA. 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. His organization is already working with 

us to scrutinize to date his suggestions and to look at alternative 

implementations. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let us talk about protected communications. It appears there may be a gap in 2018. What is the likely 

potential for this gap? General Kehler and Mr. Secretary? 

General KEHLER. Sir, protected communications remains a critical warfighting requirement. That has not changed here recently, 

although some of the budget decisions with the fiscal year 2010 

budget have adjusted the demand date for increased protected communications. Some of it was tied to the Army’s future combat system and some other Service programs that have now been altered 

with other budget decisions. 

Nevertheless, the requirement for protected communications for 

the forward forces remains an especially growing requirement for 

communications on the move that are protected. We have two programs underway right now. One is not protected. That is the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system. We have put two of those satellites on orbit. The first one was turned over to Pacific Command 

almost a year ago and is functioning very well. The second one is 

on orbit and going through its checkout phase, and all indications 

are that that one will be very successful. We have four more of 

those to launch in the coming several years to put much more unprotected capability on orbit, which is important for the warfighters 

as well. 

Protected communications today is the Military Strategic and 

Tactical Relay satellite. That is the name of the satellite that does 

that. We are going to replace that with the Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency (AEHF) satellite. We expect to launch the first of 

the AEHF satellites within the next year or so, perhaps a little bit 

longer, the fall probably of 2010, and that will be the first of four 

AEHF satellites. Now with the budget decisions on TSAT, which 

was to be the follow-on, we are looking very hard at an architecture 

that will continue to put upgraded, if you will, AEHFs into the system beyond number 4. 

So sitting here today, I am not concerned about a gap, as we 

would think of no satellites on orbit. The question is how quickly 

can we bring additional capability into AEHF as the warfighters’ 

need goes up. I think we have a way forward to do that. I think 

it was Mr. Payton who used a great word a week or so ago in another appearance where he talked about ‘‘harvesting’’ the technology out of the TSAT program. We will need to go do that, find 

42 

out how quickly we can infuse some of that technology, both in 

WGS and in AEHF, and continue to rely on commercial as well and 

approach this in the sense of an architecture. 

So I am not overly concerned, sitting here today, about a gap, if 

you will, in 2018 or 2019. I think the challenge for us is to decide 

how do we go forward here with advanced EHF and what does that 

mean in terms of being able to pull new things into advanced EHF. 

Those decisions have to be made and brought back probably in the 

next budget, not this one. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, do you think there is a gap? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We have not done a formal gap analysis on this 

issue and would like to, but we are concerned about the potential 

gap in protected communications, as well as the ultra high frequency (UHF) communications, as well as missile warning capabilities, and of course, the GPS and the weather satellites. 

AEHF is still not out of the woods yet either in terms of technical 

problems, it is important to remember that. While you can add evolutionary over-time capabilities to AEHF, you have to also be 

aware that at some point you might be adding so much you need, 

again, a larger satellite bus and more redesign that might take 

more time than you think to answer. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to talk about TSAT. It was canceled, but after we spent $2 billion on it. Mr. Secretary, what plans 

are in place to preserve the work that was done for TSAT? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. The TSAT program had matured what I 

call piece part technologies to a very high technical readiness level. 

These are irradiation hardened processors, laser com, a multitude 

of technologies that the GAO identified several years ago and the 

Air Force agreed with, and we spent over $2 billion maturing those 

technologies before we would set the configuration of the spacecraft 

itself and before we would select a single particular industry to go 

build the spacecraft. 

Those are the technologies that I used the term ‘‘harvest’’ from 

the TSAT program so that we collect the intellectual property that 

the government has rights to, we collect the equipment that the 

government justly, rightfully owns, and we start laying in the 

plans and the designs on how to apply those harvested technologies 

to both AEHF and WGS. 

So that is in front of us over the next months, and again, we will 

turn to the warfighter to prioritize which new capabilities we add 

when out of that harvested collection of intellectual property and 

piece part technologies from the TSAT program. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Is AEHF next? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. The first launch is a little bit more than 

a year from now. The fiscal year 2010 budget request includes 

money for the fourth AEHF, and again, our intention is to look at 

continuing that constellation with the properly phased upgrades to 

satisfy the warfighter needs. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Kehler, what are the lessons 

learned from the cancellation of TSAT? 

General KEHLER. Sir, that is a really good question. We had 

begun the TSAT program, I think, doing a lot of things right. We 

were insisting on technology readiness that was high. We were 

dedicated to locking down requirements, et cetera. We thought that 

43 

if TSAT had continued, that we had started the program correctly 

and that we had addressed many of the concerns that GAO and 

others have raised about programs like this. 

I think the lesson learned is this is, in part, an issue, I believe, 

about synchronizing capability with need over the longer term. We 

were producing TSAT on a schedule that was going to have it 

ready to provide increased support for warfighting systems that are 

now perhaps taking a little bit different direction. So I think it is 

about synchronizing need. 

At some point, I think Ms. Chaplain is also correct here in that 

you can only add to advanced EHF to a certain point, and from 

there on, we will have to look at a follow-on system to advanced 

EHF. So we will see where this will have to go in the future, but 

certainly for the near term, continuing with advanced EHF through 

number 4 or perhaps beyond that, as we look at the next budgets, 

will be the right thing to do. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral, do you have heartburn as a result of TSAT being canceled? 

Admiral HARRIS. No, sir, we do not have heartburn that TSAT 

was canceled as long as AEHF proceeds on the course that Secretary Payton and General Kehler have outlined. Protected communication, obviously, is important to the Navy, as it is to all the 

Services; and we are confident, sir, that the Air Force will manage 

AEHF through to fruition. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you have heartburn that the Mobile 

User Objective System (MUOS) is 11 months late? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir, we do have heartburn with MUOS. 

The Air Force does not have a monopoly on delayed satellite systems. MUOS is suffering an 11-month delay right now. I believe 

that we will get through it. There are some technical challenges 

that the builder is experiencing with the critical path through the 

antenna di-plexer. After it goes through that, the next phase of 

MUOS testing will involve the thermal vac where a lot of problems 

could come up; but right now, the problem is in the antenna piece. 

It is mating the legacy UHF payload to the new antenna bus, and 

that is a very significant problem. 

The Air Force has offered to help us in that, and we are grateful 

for that offer of assistance. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 

Research, Development, and Acquisition has determined that he 

needs to put together a team of national experts to help industry 

to go through this problem that we are having with MUOS. We recognize the importance of the satellite to the warfighter for the UHF 

communications, and we are grateful for the assistance that the Air 

Force has offered in that regard. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Is the Air Force going to pay for it for 

you? 

Admiral HARRIS. No, sir. That is our program. 

Senator BILL NELSON. How much extra is it going to cost? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I do not have that information now; but as 

soon as I get it, I will get that back to you as soon as we know 

what it is. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

There is no additional Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) funding required in 

fiscal year 2010. The MUOS Program Manager is currently projecting Satellite #1 

44 

On-Orbit Capability in 2011. Satellite subsystem testing has uncovered technical 

problems that are being addressed by the prime contractor; not surprisingly, this 

is causing delivery date slippage. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 

Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A) has chartered a national team of space 

experts to assess the program and provide recommendations to reduce schedule and 

technical risks. Following the team’s report, ASN RD&A will work with OPNAV N6 

on a budget to meet MUOS requirements in support of PRESBUD 11. Since this 

assessment is ongoing the budget figures are not yet ready. Therefore, this is an 

interim response. Once the new cost is fully understood, I will forward the difference 

for fiscal year 2011 to you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. We need to know that. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The legacy UHF satellite is not lasting as 

long as it was supposed to. So now there appears to be the possibility of a UHF gap. Tell us about that. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. Sir, if MUOS suffers this 11-month 

delay, the first on-orbit capability will be in February 2011. The 

projected 70 percent line from which we would call a gap will happen in mid-2010. 

There is a bit of good news here and that is that we are using 

the legacy satellites and our fleet satellites. Every day that those 

satellites do not fall out of the sky or fail, that extends that gap 

point further to the right. I think it is a tribute to good satellite 

design and acquisition practices that those satellites, as old as they 

are, continue to remain in orbit and are continuing to produce for 

us. 

The Navy has also put in place several mitigation procedures, including using the digital part of UFO F11 in order to increase 

channel accesses. So that is good news. 

We are optimistic that we will be able to manage through this, 

and if there is a gap, below 70 percent, that will be minimized, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Have you thought about putting a UHF 

transponder on a commercial satellite? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir, we have. What we have determined is 

that the cost of doing that and the availability of a satellite to do 

that in terms of time—the earliest we could put one up would be 

in the 2012 timeframe, which is after the first MUOS should be on 

orbit. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Are there other contractors involved besides Boeing? 

Admiral HARRIS. For MUOS, the prime is Lockheed Martin. 

What we are trying to do with MUOS, sir, is put the legacy UFO, 

UHF payload onto the MUOS satellite, on the antenna bus. So the 

industry is trying to mate a Boeing legacy payload to a Lockheed 

Martin antenna bus, and that is where the first challenge, the critical path challenge, that we are facing is. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We are going to go in just a minute over 

to the Office of Senate Security. 

General James, we had an Iridium satellite collide with a Russian satellite. Joint Space Operations Center has the job to track 

and to warn of collisions. DOD submitted to us a legislative proposal that would enlarge and expand the program to assist commercial entities with additional support. Will this expanded program result in additional information being provided to the Joint 

Space Operations Center? 

45 

General JAMES. Sir, the commercial and foreign entity program 

is that to which you refer, and that is a program for us to provide 

data to various users who sign agreements, and that data would 

be the location of your satellite, the possible conjunction of your 

satellite with another object, and then anomaly supports if you 

have a problem with your spacecraft. 

The potential for data coming into the Joint Space Operations 

Center would be that, as a part of those agreements, we would look 

to possibly share data from the commercial providers of the world 

such as INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and SES Americom, where they 

have very accurate knowledge of their satellite location and they 

could then provide that into the Joint Space Operations Center 

freeing up our sensors to go look at other satellites from which we 

do not have very accurate information. So from an informationsharing perspective, we are looking at some agreements that we 

would like to foster with the commercial entities to gather some of 

that location information on their satellites. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Would the Air Force get reimbursed for 

the services you provide to nongovernmental entities in that Joint 

Space Operations Center? 

General JAMES. Sir, the law allows that. At this point, the Department has not elected to charge for those services. I believe that 

will be a policy decision that needs to be made at the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and above on how we implement that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In that operation center, do you not need 

upgrades? 

General JAMES. Yes, sir. As we look at expanding our conjunction 

assessment capability, we are looking at additional processing capability requirements, as well as additional analyst capability requirements in order to meet some of those needs. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In order to avoid these collisions, do you 

think anything else needs to be done? 

General JAMES. Sir, where we are today is that we are bringing 

on that additional processing capacity here in the near term. We 

are adding, through funding provided by Air Force Space Command, additional analyst capability, and we are planning to be able 

to do this conjunction assessment for roughly 800 satellites, those 

that can maneuver, by this fall. So that is our current plan that 

we are marching down. 

But in the broader sense, we certainly need to increase our capability for space situational awareness, increased sensor capability, 

increased radar capability, increased on-orbit sensor capability, because we do have shortfalls today in terms of how often we can 

track objects, how small of an object we can track, and how accurately we can track those objects. So broadly speaking, we need increased space situational awareness capacity. 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, may I add just a quick remark 

to this? Space is more crowded than ever. We catalog over 19,000 

objects that are on orbit today. There are most likely thousands 

more that we do not catalog because of their size, nuts, bolts, washers, that sort of debris, if you will, that is up there, fragments from 

things that have gone wrong, for example. We know that all of 

them are traveling at extreme speed, 17,000 miles an hour roughly, 

and this problem is growing for us. 

46 

We have now an investment road map for how we improve our 

space situational awareness. You will see some of that investment 

request in this budget that comes to you this year. That includes 

not only some improvements in sensors, but there is a piece of this 

investment that will go to General James so he can fuse the data 

that is out there better. To get better, faster, it is not about putting 

more sensors out, although we will do some of that. It is about 

using the sensors we have more effectively. We have plans in place 

to do that that will be included in this investment plan that you 

see from us this year. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you all for your public service. We 

are grateful. This is highly technical stuff that we are getting into. 

We are going to get several layers deeper now. So the subcommittee will stand in recess and we will reconvene over in the 

Office of Senate Security area. Thank you. We are adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK UDALL

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

1. Senator UDALL. General Kehler, is there a need for a strategy to rapidly develop and deliver cyber capabilities for the Air Force missions? 

General KEHLER. Yes, there is such a need. The cyber domain is characterized by 

a rate of change that is orders of magnitude faster than the other domains of military operations. The cyberspace threats are constantly changing and require rapid 

response in order to blunt attacks and secure our ability to fight in air, space, and 

cyberspace. Every day, Air Force systems are threatened from a variety of sources. 

It is essential that we have effective capabilities to protect ourselves and respond. 

Our abilities in this area are limited at this time and enhancements are underway. 

We are developing a strategy, in conjunction with the acquisition community, to 

strengthen and improve our capabilities in the burgeoning cyber arena. 

2. Senator UDALL. General Kehler, what is Air Force Space Command’s plan for 

rapidly developing and delivering cyber capabilities? 

General KEHLER. Our plan is to quickly improve upon the capabilities and processes we currently have and define new ones where needed. We will do this by developing improved processes for rapid decisionmaking, making our capability delivery processes more responsive, better resourcing the real-time response capabilities 

we already have, and bringing in more cyber smart people and developing them as 

cyber warriors. We want to fully leverage the finest expertise of U.S. industry, academia, and national laboratories, as well as our sister Services and coalition partners. 

Air Force Space Command is taking on the cyber mission for the Air Force, and 

the ensuing standup of 24AF, will enable development of improved processes for 

rapid decisionmaking. The dispersed Air Force cyber community will be unified 

under a single major command, providing efficient command and control of cyber. 

We must be able to operate faster than our adversaries’ decision processes. 

We need to strengthen our teaming relationships with key organizations by closely integrating intelligence, operations, requirements, acquisition, and testing. We 

need to streamline processes to eliminate existing seams in the rapid prototyping 

development and test environment. 

Improved processes are not the total solution. The United States has some of the 

finest cyberspace minds in the world, and the Air Force has tremendously bright 

military personnel, civilians, and contractors executing the Air Force missions in 

cyberspace today. We intend to continue to recruit America’s best and brightest, and 

develop them into technically skilled cyber warriors. We will develop within them 

the operational arts necessary to ensure mission dominance in the cyber domain. 

Finally, we will provide them the world-class tools and networks necessary to successfully execute their missions. 

[Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(47) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2010 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Sessions, and 

Vitter. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Ryan Ferris, assistant 

to Senator Bill Nelson; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; 

Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Matthew R. 

Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; and Michael T. Wong, assistant to Senator Vitter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good afternoon. We’re going to welcome 

Tom D’Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and General Donald Alston, Air Force 

Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, 

General Floyd Carpenter, Commander of the 8th Air Force, and 

Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director of the Navy Strategic Systems Programs. It’s a pleasure to have you. 

My opening statement will be put in the record, and when Senator Vitter arrives, his will, as well, and we’ll ask him if he would 

like to make any comments. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

We welcome our witnesses this afternoon. Today we have with us Tom D’Agostino, 

the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; Major General 

Donald Alston Assistant Air Force Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 

Integration; Major General Floyd Carpenter, Commander, 8th Air Force; and Rear 

48 

Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director of Navy Strategic Systems Programs. It is a 

pleasure to have you all here. 

I note that this is the last subcommittee hearing prior the markup of the National 

Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010, which will occur the week of June 

22. 

We have a number of topics to cover including the actions taken by the Air Force 

to improve its management of nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons enterprise; 

long-range bomber and ballistic missile programs and the programs at the National 

Nuclear Security Administration. An overarching question and one that in many 

ways was a root cause of the problems that the Air Force had in the fall of 2007 

is the need to maintain rigor in the management of all things nuclear while reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy. We are no longer in 

the Cold War but the care with which nuclear weapons are managed and maintained can never be diminished. In many ways a smaller stockpile will be more difficult to maintain and ensure that it remains safe, secure, and reliable. 

[The prepared statement of Senator David Vitter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses. This 

is my first hearing as ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and 

I look forward to working with you on the many important issues under this subcommittee’s jurisdiction. 

The administration’s fiscal year 2010 budget provided a significant funding increase for Defense-wide, ‘‘white space’’ programs. This year’s request at about $11.1 

billion—$9.2 billion of which is for Air Force space programs represents a $412 million increase over fiscal year 2009 appropriated levels. I look forward to hearing 

from our witnesses today how this money will be spent wisely and what will be done 

to guarantee that the programs we fund in fiscal year 2010 break away from past 

practices of cost overruns and long delays. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which I am pleased is here today 

to testify, has for some time highlighted a number of systemic problems associated 

with our major space acquisition programs. GAO has found that because the Department of Defense (DOD) starts more weapon programs that it can afford—competition for dollars lead to low cost estimation and unrealistic scheduling. GAO 

notes that DOD tends to start many of its space programs before it has a sound 

understanding and the appropriate assurance that the technologies it seeks are 

achievable within available funding. As a result of this broken acquisition process, 

the Department all too frequently puts itself in a bind with respect to supporting 

the warfighters needs. Not only are we constantly underestimating cost, but according to GAO, delays in schedule are increasing the overall risk for capability gaps 

in areas such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and weather 

monitoring. 

Under the leadership of Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain, this committee broadly recognized those problems in developing the ‘‘Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.’’ That bill emphasizes starting major weapons systems 

off right by having them obtain reliable and independent cost estimates and subjecting them to rigorous developmental testing and systems engineering early in 

their acquisition cycle. In so doing, the bill (which will likely be signed into law by 

the President within the next few days) intends to ensure that programs not proceed 

from one stage of the acquisition cycle to the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the risk of cost growth and schedule slippage. I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses how they believe the bill will help manage technology 

and integration risk in DOD military space programs. 

I am encouraged by Secretary Gates’ recommendation to cancel the Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) program, an example of an overly ambitious project, lacking a meaningful technology, schedule, and funding path. I am 

also pleased to hear that the Department will not let the $3.3 billion already invested in TSAT go to waste. With the recommendation to eliminate TSAT and purchase two additional Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites, it is 

clear that the Department recognizes that smaller, more incremental steps forward, 

are far less risky ventures and are a significantly more responsible path forward 

with respect to the taxpayer’s money. I am encouraged that the Department does 

not plan to let our hefty investment in TSAT go to waste and does plan to harvest 

some of TSAT’s more successful research and development efforts. I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses more about the plan to address our satellite communications needs, how we will utilize TSAT technologies on the procurement of already 

49 

proven and technologically mature systems, and how TSAT can be a lesson moving 

forward for our future space acquisition endeavors. 

A recent Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) report charted by DOD to address 

congressional concerns with the leadership, management, and organization for National Security Space found that ‘‘significant improvements are imperative . . . in 

order to maintain U.S. space preeminence and advert the loss of the U.S. competitive national security advantage.’’ The report asserts that ‘‘no one’s in charge,’’ leadership is fragmented with respect to strategy, budgets, requirements, and acquisition and recommends that the President establish and lead the execution of a national space strategy. The report recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul and I look 

forward to hearing from the witnesses what steps are being taken to address the 

report’s recommendations. 

I recognize that space acquisitions are inherently risky and are like no other venture DOD undertakes. The challenges are many and the unknown and need for 

pushing the technology envelope is great. However, we must do a better job at managing the risk and spending the taxpayers’ money wisely. Nonetheless, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses what is being done to address the space acquisition shortcomings, if you believe the condition is getting better, and what more 

needs to happen within the Department. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Gentlemen, we will put all of your opening 

statements in the record, so the record will be complete, and we’ll 

get right into it. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

[The prepared statement of Mr. D’Agostino follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our vision for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). My remarks today focus on the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request. The budget requested today will allow the NNSA to continue 

to achieve the mission expected of it by the President, Congress, and the American 

people. 

In a recent trip to Prague, President Obama outlined his vision of a world without 

nuclear weapons. To this end, the United States will take concrete steps towards 

achieving such a world by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urging others to do the same. Until that ultimate goal is achieved, 

however, the United States will maintain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies. To support this vision, the NNSA 

will continue to: 

• Ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, 

even if that stockpile is reduced under a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(START) Follow-On Treaty. 

• Reduce the threat to the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and related nuclear materials and expertise. 

• Provide safe, reliable, militarily-effective propulsion systems to the U.S. 

Navy. 

By pursuing its mission to achieve these ends, and by providing our unique 

knowledge and support to our partners in national security, the NNSA will continue 

to meet its current statutory responsibilities while supporting the long-term goal of 

a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. 

While the President’s long-term objectives are clear, the role of the nuclear weapons stockpile and America’s deterrence policy are being reviewed as part of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Efforts are underway in the NPR to establish 

the size and composition of the future stockpile and the means for managing geopolitical or technical risk—NNSA is fully engaged in these activities. Its role is to 

provide the technical and scientific input to inform policy decisions, and then to enable the implementation of the decisions. 

NNSA is advancing our knowledge of the physical; chemical, and materials processes that govern nuclear weapons operation and is applying that knowledge in extending the life of existing weapons systems. We have recently completed construction of the National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National LaboraVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tory to explore weapons-critical regimes of high temperature and pressure and will 

begin our first ignition campaign to improve our scientific understanding of phenomena that could previously only be explored theoretically or in full-scale nuclear 

testing. The NNSA is also conducting warhead Life Extension Programs to ensure 

that our country remains secure without the production of new fissile materials, and 

without conducting underground nuclear tests. On the basis of the most recent assessment by the directors of our national nuclear weapon laboratories, today’s nuclear stockpile remains safe, reliable, and secure. At the same time, we are concerned about increasing challenges in maintaining, for the long term, the safety and 

reliability of the aging, finely-tuned warheads that were produced in the 1970s and 

1980s and are well past their original planned service life. 

I am committed to continuing to transform our national laboratories and production plants into a smaller and more cost-effective Nuclear Security Enterprise. However, I am mindful that our design laboratories and production facilities are national 

assets that support a large number of defense, security, and intelligence activities. 

As the role of nuclear weapons in our Nation’s defense evolves and the threats to 

national security continue to grow, the focus of this enterprise must also change and 

place its tremendous intellectual capacity and unique facilities in the service of addressing other challenges related to national defense. We are taking steps to move 

in this direction, including functioning as a national science, technology, and systems engineering resource to other agencies with national security responsibilities. 

The NNSA fiscal year 2010 congressional budget request will allow continued 

progress in obtaining the essential goals I have outlined. It will allow us to: 

• Continue transforming into a Nuclear Security Enterprise by: 

• Involving the next generation of our Nation’s scientific, engineering, and 

technical professionals in the broad sweep of technical challenges; 

• Operating the National Ignition Facility, allowing the use of innovative 

technology to provide answers to important scientific questions; 

• Shrinking the Cold War complex by preparing buildings for decommissioning and decontamination, and replacing these antiquated facilities with 

modern and efficient facilities; as well as disposing of excess real property 

through demolition, transfer and the preparation of process-contaminated 

facilities for transfer to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) for final disposition ; 

• Initiating a Site Stewardship program to ensure that NNSA increases the 

use of renewable and efficient energy, and reduces the number of locations 

with security Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials, including the removal of these materials from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

by the end of 2012, and 

• Reducing security, safety, and environmental risks by consolidating and 

disposing of excess nuclear materials wherever possible. 

• Support the development and implementation of arms control, nonproliferation, and civil nuclear energy agreements by: 

• Providing technical and policy support to U.S. delegations negotiating 

arms control, nonproliferation, and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation 

agreements; 

• Developing the technologies and approaches needed to verify compliance 

with negotiated treaties and agreements, and 

• Providing training and technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

• Support U.S. commitments through construction of the Mixed Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication Facility and Waste Solidification Building to provide a disposition 

pathway for excess U.S. fissile materials, and to help Russia implement its reciprocal commitments. 

• Continue our successful programs to secure and/or eliminate vulnerable nuclear and radioactive material in other countries, enhance nuclear/radiological 

material detection capabilities at borders, airports, and seaports, and strengthen nonproliferation practices and standards worldwide. 

• Embark on the design and development of an advanced reactor core and propulsion plant supporting the timely replacement of the Ohio class submarine. 

• Overhaul of the land-based prototype reactor plant used to test advanced materials and techniques in a realistic operating environment prior to their inclusion in propulsion plants. 

• Honor the commitments made to those who won the Cold War by ensuring 

their pensions are secure in times of financial uncertainty. 

51 

Today, I’d like to testify on our efforts in Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors. 

WEAPONS ACTIVITIES OVERVIEW

The NNSA will ensure that our nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure and effective to deter any adversary, and provide a defense umbrella to our allies. At the 

same time, NNSA will continue to pursue a modern more flexible Nuclear Security 

Enterprise that is significantly smaller than the Cold War complex, but is able to 

address a variety of stockpile scenarios. 

As I have committed to you previously, NNSA continues to retire and dismantle 

nuclear weapons. By 2012 our stockpile will be one-quarter of the size it was at the 

end of the Cold War. As the United States prepares for the 2010 Review Conference 

of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this fact alone should emphasize the commitment we make to both our Nation and to the world. 

As a full partner in the NPR, the NNSA is working with the Departments of Defense and State to establish the plans, policies, and programs that will govern the 

future posture of our nuclear forces and supporting infrastructure. The recently 

issued report of the Bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture 

of the United States will help guide these efforts. These reviews will assist the U.S. 

Congress and the administration in clearly defining our future direction. 

As the NPR proceeds, NNSA continues to carry out a number of activities in support of the stockpile including warhead surveillance, assessment, replacement of 

limited life components in existing weapon systems, and dismantlements. We are 

also continuing the W76 Life Extension Program and a feasibility study with the 

Air Force for a Life Extension Program for some models of the B61 gravity bomb. 

There are also activities planned in the six campaigns and the studies needed for 

Annual Assessment of the stockpile. 

The NNSA will also continue transforming the Nuclear Security Enterprise into 

a modern, smaller, and more flexible complex. The NNSA inherited a system of laboratories and production plants designed to produce large volumes of weapons and 

designs needed to counter Soviet aggression. We have initiated a major effort to 

right-size the enterprise to meet the new, anticipated requirements. The NNSA is 

consolidating Category I and II Special Nuclear Materials; removing these items 

from selected sites and providing safe, secure storage for this material. 

In fiscal year 2010, we will be reducing our infrastructure footprint through the 

deactivation and decommissioning of buildings such as buildings 9206 and 9201 at 

Y–12. We will also plan for the future infrastructure through continuing design of 

the Uranium Processing Facility at Y–12, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility at the Savannah River Site, and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and begin the process 

of planning for an orderly migration of missions to a smaller and more flexible facility at the Kansas City Plant. 

The NNSA has received assistance in our ability to alter our infrastructure in the 

form of an increase in the General Plant Projects limit. We are pleased with the 

decision to increase the ceiling on General Plant Projects from $5 million to $10 million. We believe that this aids in the maintenance and repair of the enduring enterprise. Following on this increase, the NNSA is submitting a legislative proposal to 

similarly increase the design cost limit for these construction projects from $600,000 

to $1,500,000. We seek your support for the proposal. 

But while NNSA is reducing its footprint, and while the total number of warheads 

in the stockpile continues to decline, there are capabilities that must be preserved. 

Not only are these capabilities needed to support the maintenance of any stockpile, 

but they are also needed to support the Nuclear Security Enterprise’s initiatives in 

nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear forensics, and nuclear incident 

response. It’s important to note that the enterprise does not scale linearly with the 

size of the stockpile; and the need for baseline functional capabilities is not eliminated with cessation of research into new designs and the cessation of any production of new weapons systems. These capabilities are needed whether we have a few 

warheads, or a few thousand. 

Although NNSA did not receive any funds directly from the American Recovery 

and Reinvestment Act, we are assisting other parts of the Department in implementing their plans for stimulus work at the NNSA sites and stand ready to do 

more. 

As NNSA prepares for the future, we must focus on the retention of our scientific, 

technical, and engineering personnel throughout the complex. Without experienced 

scientific, technical, and engineering personnel, NNSA cannot succeed at its mission. 

Throughout the cold war we were able to attract the Nation’s brightest scientists, 

52 

engineers, and technical professionals by providing challenges, facilities, and opportunities that were unique, were on the forefront of science, and that allowed them 

to put their talents to work to serve their country. Today we are transitioning our 

emphasis to a broader nuclear security mission, but our need to attract the best scientists, engineers and technical professionals remains. By developing new scientific 

tools such as the National Ignition Facility, new challenges such as the detection 

of smuggled uranium and plutonium, and the modernization of facilities such as the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility, we can continue to attract bright technical minds who wish to serve their country. We believe that our 

response to the spectrum of threats to national security is not only the right steps 

for us to take to make the Nation more secure, but also will provide a significant 

set of technical areas that will motivate young scientists to join us in our mission. 

The challenges are huge and meeting them calls upon both basic science and applied technology. Approximately 70 years ago, Hans Bethe advanced the state of 

science with his critical work explaining the physical processes governing the life 

cycles of stars. Today the National Ignition Facility (NIF) stands on the threshold 

of producing stellar conditions in the laboratory. By moving the enterprise forward 

in advancing the boundaries of science, we will continue to attract our Nation’s 

brightest minds to our scientific endeavors. In fiscal year 2009, two significant technological milestones were achieved; crossing the one mega joule threshold with NIF 

and the one petaflop threshold in the Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign. 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION OVERVIEW

As part of the President’s comprehensive strategy to address the international nuclear threat, the President also called for strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, accelerating our efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around 

the world, and increasing our work to detect, deter, and eliminate illicit trafficking 

of nuclear materials. The NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise is actively engaged in 

these and other nonproliferation missions and will provide the technical expertise 

to ensure they are successful. 

The movement of funding for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and the 

Waste Solidification Building into the Fissile Materials Disposition budget is the 

largest change in the fiscal year 2010 Congressional Budget for Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation program. These critical facilities provide the nonproliferation programs a disposition pathway for at least 34 metric tons of surplus U.S. weapons 

grade plutonium. I’m pleased to report that the U.S. and Russia have agreed on a 

revised Russian program to dispose of Russia’s 34 metric tons of their surplus weapons plutonium. These changes will be codified in a Protocol that will amend the 

2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, and we expect to sign the Protocol this summer. In light of President Obama’s recent statements in Prague and London, I am particularly pleased that the U.S. and Russian 

plutonium disposition programs are coming together at this time. As a result of 

these efforts, the U.S. and Russia will ultimately dispose of enough weapons plutonium for at least 17,000 nuclear weapons. 

I should note also that with this budget request, we are submitting our last request for funding to eliminate the production of weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia by December 2010, through the shutdown of Russia’s last weaponsgrade plutonium production reactor in Zheleznogorsk. 

The NNSA directly supports President Obama’s goal to accelerate efforts to secure 

all vulnerable nuclear material from around the world within 4 years, including the 

expansion and acceleration of our existing efforts. The NNSA is the key agency supporting the administration’s goal of minimizing the use of highly-enriched uranium 

(HEU) in the civil nuclear sector through our program to shutdown entirely or convert HEU fueled research reactors to the use of low-enriched uranium fuel. In fiscal 

year 2010, we will direct significant funding to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative mission to eliminate and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials 

located at civilian sites worldwide. 

In fiscal year 2010, we will also improve the physical security of nuclear material, 

as well as facilitate the development and implementation of material control and accountability procedures, and train personnel, to protect a total of 73 nuclear sites 

throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics. The NNSA will fulfill the administration’s goal of securing nuclear weapons-usable material by ensuring that 

the material possessed by the Russian Navy, the Russian Ministry of Defense, 

Rosatom and Russian civilian sites is secured. 

But improving the security of weapons-usable material at its source is only the 

start. We must also develop a Second Line of Defense in order to anticipate the posVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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sibility that nuclear weapons-usable material could be smuggled out and transported across international borders. In fact, we know that illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials continues, especially in Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. In response to the President’s charge to do more to 

combat nuclear trafficking, we will install additional radiation detection equipment 

at 42 foreign sites across Europe, Asia, and North America, and provide detection 

equipment in 15 additional ports where cargo is loaded for shipment to the U.S. 

This work started several years ago. Technology advances and foreign personnel 

turnover have occurred since NNSA first began securing sites and borders in foreign 

countries. Funds will be used not only to perform new installations and train personnel at new sites, but will also be used to upgrade older equipment at existing 

sites, and to provide refresher training to foreign security professionals. 

Additionally, in fiscal year 2010, NNSA will expand and accelerate its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), adding $15 million to revitalize the U.S. technical and human capital base necessary to strengthen the international safeguards 

system and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in line with President 

Obama’s charge in Prague. The NGSI complements related NNSA priorities to reduce proliferation risks associated with growing international interest in the use of 

nuclear power; to expand export control training and outreach; to develop and implement reliable fuel services as an alternative to the further spread of enrichment 

and reprocessing capabilities; and—consistent with the President’s call for progress 

towards a world without nuclear weapons—to provide technical support for negotiations of the START follow-on agreement, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 

and a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. 

NAVAL REACTORS OVERVIEW

The NNSA also contributes to national security through the Naval Reactors Program. This program ensures that the nuclear propulsion plants aboard our Navy’s 

warships remain safe and reliable for their complete service lives. Over 40 percent 

of the Navy’s major combatants are nuclear-powered. All of the Nation’s aircraft carriers, attack submarines, guided missile submarines, and ballistic missile submarines enjoy the significant operational advantage afforded by nuclear power, including speed, endurance, and enhanced combat payload. Through NNSAs efforts, 

nuclear-powered warships are on station where American interests are threatened, 

and ready to conduct sustained combat operations. 

For over 60 years, the Naval Reactors program has had complete responsibility 

for all aspects of Naval Nuclear Propulsion. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 

currently supports 82 active nuclear-powered warships and 103 operating reactors. 

This represents eight propulsion plant designs, in seven classes of ships, as well as 

a training platform. 

Naval Reactors funding supports safe and reliable operation of the Nation’s Nuclear Fleet. This includes providing rigorous oversight, analysis of plant performance and conditions, as well as addressing emergent operational issues and technology obsolescence for 71 submarines, 11 aircraft carriers, and 4 research and development and training platforms. This funding also supports new plant design 

projects (i.e., reactor plant for the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier and alternative lower-cost core for Virginia-class submarines), as well as ensuring proper 

storage of naval spent nuclear fuel, prudent recapitalization of aging facilities, and 

remediation of environmental liabilities. 

The Ohio-class SSBNs, which are the most survivable leg of the U.S. Strategic 

Forces, are approaching the end of their service lives. The Navy recently completed 

studies for a follow-on replacement to the Ohio-class and is funding the commencement of design work in fiscal year 2010. NNSA funding in fiscal year 2010 supports 

reactor core and propulsion plant design and development efforts to support this replacement. 

Since 1978, the land-based prototype reactor plant (S8G) has provided an essential capability to test required changes or improvements to components and systems 

prior to installation in operational ships. The prototype has also provided required, 

high-quality training for new sailors preparing to operate the Nation’s nuclear-powered vessels. This land-based prototype will run out of fuel and require a refueling 

overhaul starting in 2018. This overhaul and the resultant opportunity to test advanced materials and manufacturing techniques in a caustic operating environment 

will significantly mitigate risk in the Ohio Replacement reactor plant design. To 

support the refueling overhaul schedule, concept studies and systems design and development efforts will begin in 2010. 

The Expended Core Facility, located at the Naval Reactors Facility on the Idaho 

National Laboratory, is the central location for Naval spent nuclear fuel receipt, inVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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spection, dissection, packaging for dry storage, and temporary storage, as well as 

detailed examination of spent cores and irradiation specimens. Continuous, efficient 

operation of this facility is vital to ensure the United States can support fuel handling operations in our shipyards conducting construction, repair, and restoration of 

nuclear ships. The existing facility and related infrastructure is over 50 years old 

and requires recapitalization. The mission need for recapitalizing this capability has 

been approved and conceptual design efforts begin in 2010. 

The Program continues to explore and develop potentially advanced technologies 

that could deliver a compellingly better energy source for nuclear ships. For example, using a supercritical carbon dioxide energy conversion as a replacement for the 

traditional steam cycle is envisioned to be significantly smaller for the same power 

output, simpler, more automated, and more affordable. Leveraging existing university, industry, and Nuclear Security Enterprise scientific and engineering work in 

this technology, conceptual development and small-scale testing is underway to support eventual megawatt-scale testing and prototyping. 

Acquisition of a new surface combatant (i.e., cruiser) in support of new ballistic 

missile defense and anti-air warfare mission requirements are currently under evaluation by the Navy. Based on these mission requirements, this new ship will potentially require higher energy capacity and output than is currently available from 

traditional fossil fueled power plants. Further, the National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) for 2008 authorizes the Navy to construct all future major combatant 

vessels with integrated nuclear power systems unless this requirement is waived by 

the Secretary of Defense. The Navy is currently analyzing alternative shipboard systems that will determine final power plant requirements. Should the Navy decide 

to pursue a nuclear-powered cruiser in its current long-range shipbuilding plan, 

DOE-cognizant reactor core and propulsion plant design and development will be required. 

The value of nuclear power for naval propulsion is well recognized and the demand for its inherent capabilities remains strong. By taking every opportunity for 

economies in our work and business practices, we have made a concerted effort to 

meet the Navy’s demand for new propulsion plant designs while assuring the safe 

and reliable operation and maintenance of the existing fleet. However, the need to 

deal with a formidable collection of new challenges coupled with the Program’s 

aging infrastructure and environmental legacies requires a fortified level of resource 

commitment. 

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STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION 

[The prepared statement of Major General Alston follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force strategic programs. 


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In the Executive Summary of the Final Report of the Congressional Commission 

of the Strategic Posture of the United States, the commission stated: ‘‘In addressing 

the challenges of nuclear security for the decades ahead, the United States must 

pursue a comprehensive strategy. So long as nuclear dangers remain, it must have 

a strong deterrent that is effective in meeting its security needs and those of its allies.’’ 

The Air Force contributes to effective deterrence by operating, maintaining, securing, and sustaining intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), dual-role bombers 

and dual-capable fighter aircraft. Although the numbers of systems are dramatically 

smaller than at the height of the Cold War, the Air Force provides national leadership with the most responsive, flexible and visible nuclear deterrence capability. 

Strategic deterrence is in an airman’s DNA; we were born with this mission in 

1947. For the past 61 years, we have successfully provided our Nation and our allies 

diverse and effective nuclear deterrence capabilities. Today, the international security environment is more complex than during the Cold War, with more nations in 

possession of nuclear weapons and non-state actors in pursuit of weapons of mass 

destruction. 

Our continued ability to provide a safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence capability underpins our national defense, a sober responsibility that the 

Air Force, with responsibility for two legs of the traditional TRIAD, executes with 

skill and commitment on a consistent basis. 

The Air Force depends on a nuclear enterprise that involves thousands of professionals to include dedicated airmen operating, securing, maintaining and sustaining 

our operational forces; our partners in the industrial base; the exceptional capability 

at the national laboratories; and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. 

The airmen and civilians involved in the nuclear mission area are uniquely qualified to execute the significant responsibilities associated with nuclear weapons and 

are known for their discipline, rigor, precision and reliability. Thousands are certified under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) and many others have critical 

duties supporting PRP. All our nuclear units across five different major commands 

undergo rigorous and unforgiving Nuclear Surety Inspections with necessarily high 

standards that demand consistent precision and reliability. It’s a tough business, 

but the stakes are too high for it to be any other way 

Over this past year, the Air Force made a series of key decisions to address systemic weaknesses in its nuclear mission area. The US Air Force Posture Statement 

2009 states: ‘‘Through a back-to-basics approach, the Air Force is re-emphasizing accountability, compliance, and precision in the nuclear enterprise. We are reorganizing our nuclear forces in a manner that reduces fragmentation of authority and 

establishes clear chains of supervision for nuclear sustainment, surety, and operations. These changes include: (1) consolidating all nuclear sustainment matters 

under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center; (2) establishing a new Air Staff nuclear directorate responsible for policy oversight and integration of our nuclear enterprise activities; and (3) standing up Air Force Global Strike Command, which is 

already operating in a provisional status at an interim location. Global Strike Command will consolidate Air Force ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers under a single 

command, and is on track to activate later this year.’’ 

The basis for these three key organizational decisions, as well as additional institutional direction can be found in the nuclear roadmap published last fall, ‘‘Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.’’ The roadmap represents a comprehensive 

approach to address root causes of documented deficiencies to ensure we are aggressively working to reclaim our legacy of excellence in the nuclear mission area. The 

roadmap-related efforts well underway in the Air Force to reinvigorate the nuclear 

enterprise can be categorized into six broad strategic objectives: (1) Develop adequate nuclear-related expertise and properly man the enterprise: right experience, 

right job; (2) Implement a process for ensuring sustained advocacy, focus, and commitment; (3) Establish clear lines of authority; (4) Implement a disciplined, comprehensive enterprise system-of-systems methodology to ensure day-to-day 

sustainment excellence; (5) Implement processes to uncover, analyze, address, and 

review systemic weaknesses; and (6) Sufficiently invest in the nuclear deterrence 

mission area. By accomplishing these objectives, we will continue to build on the 

confidence that our Nation and allies have in our commitment to this critical mission. 

Our first strategic objective, to improve the professional development of our nuclear experts, is a multi-year effort involving education, training, and the assignment process. 

All professional military education courses, both officer and enlisted, have been 

reviewed and modifications are underway to ensure the appropriate level of content 

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regarding the nuclear mission area. Additionally, Air Force nuclear doctrine has 

been updated to include a greater focus on deterrence. 

It is vital to assign the best qualified people to key positions. We are aligning our 

training, education, and career force development with significant work completed 

by our personnel directorate on the Air Staff in conjunction with the Air Force Personnel Center in San Antonio, TX; truly an ongoing effort that must be continually 

re-evaluated with the ultimate goal is to ensure the right expertise is matched to 

the right job. Also, the Air Force has identified billets both inside the AF and across 

joint and interagency positions that require key nuclear expertise, and these authorizations will be given priority for filling. Additionally, nuclear experience identifiers 

are being added to personnel records to ensure we are able to track individual experience levels, which aides our efforts to properly develop our people to take on positions of greater responsibility in the future. 

We are achieving our second strategic objective—to implement a process for ensuring sustained advocacy, focus, and commitment for the nuclear enterprise—with 

a series of process changes. The internal AF resourcing process has been changed 

to now include a new Nuclear Operations Panel, whose role is to ensure a thorough 

assessment of nuclear funding requirements. The Air Force Strategic Plan, a key 

planning document to link future capabilities to the programming process, established reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise is the number 1 priority of the Air 

Force. Additionally, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of staff, at their 

initiative, established and co-chair the Nuclear Oversight Board, composed principally of the nuclear Major Command Commanders, to ensure proper focus and advocacy is maintained Air Force-wide. 

To effectively manage the nuclear enterprise, it is necessary to ensure our third 

objective is achieved, establishing clear lines of authority. Discussed earlier, these 

changes include: (1) consolidating all nuclear sustainment matters under the Air 

Force Nuclear Weapons Center; (2) establishing a new Air Staff nuclear directorate 

responsible for policy oversight and integration of our nuclear enterprise activities; 

and (3) standing up Air Force Global Strike Command. 

A significant force-wide challenge is encompassed in the fourth objective, implementing a disciplined, comprehensive system-of-systems methodology to ensure dayto-day sustainment excellence. A large component of this effort is being achieved by 

consolidating our nuclear sustainment activities under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. The Center is working in conjunction with our Air Staff maintenance 

and logistics experts on a comprehensive positive inventory control methodology and 

a fusion center for maintaining continuous oversight of nuclear weapons related material. 

Critical to our day-to-day excellence in the nuclear mission area is our fifth objective, implementing processes to uncover, analyze, address and review systemic 

weaknesses throughout the nuclear enterprise. Regardless of the size or structure 

of our nuclear force, every action by every airman must be executed with precision 

and reliability. The Air Force is rebuilding a nuclear culture with a robust self-assessment and inspection process in order to effectively uncover, analyze, and address systemic weaknesses within its nuclear enterprise. The Air Force has developed standardized training, qualification, and certification requirements for nuclear 

inspection team members. Where appropriate, common checklists will be used 

across all nuclear commands. When significant deficiencies are noted, common root 

cause analysis techniques are implemented to fix the problem and improve related 

processes. Today, every AF Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) is performed under the 

oversight of the Air Force Inspection Agency. Also, a core team of inspectors will 

be attached to each MAJCOM NSI team to ensure consistency across all MAJCOMs. 

In addition to the increased depth of inspections, ‘‘no-advanced-notice’’ inspections 

are now occurring across nuclear major commands. 

The Air Force has taken aggressive actions to achieve our sixth objective, sufficiently investing in the nuclear deterrence mission area, an area that numerous 

studies have identified as being significantly under-resourced. Ensuring continued 

reliability and credibility of our nuclear systems requires a sustained commitment 

to funding weapons and platforms while simultaneously investing in a credible deterrent capability for the future. We have already programmed resources to address 

many of the recommendations provided by the various assessments of the nuclear 

enterprise and continue to focus and prioritize future investments. 

Expanding upon our sixth objective, the fiscal year 2010 PB represents significant 

progress toward addressing many issues and recommendations made by numerous 

internal and external reviews and investigations. This includes funding and investment to bring all 76 B–52s in our inventory to a common configuration with updated 

communications and flight systems making all aircraft capable of nuclear and conventional missions. We are revitalizing our intercontinental ballistic missile force, 

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the Minuteman III, with additional resources for sustainment, aging and surveillance. We have funded improvements to the rural missile complex gravel roads to 

bring them up to standards which ensure safe transport of our critical systems to 

and from base, as well as our most precious asset, our airmen, who travel thousands 

of miles on these roads every day. Other initiatives include the Air Force study of 

the B61 Life Extension Program that will look at options to extend the service life 

of the oldest weapon in our inventory. Finally, we are introducing a program to replace our Vietnam-era helicopters for missile field complex security operations with 

an airframe that will provide required lift capacity, speed and range. 

Additionally, with your support, we requested and received permission to reprogram over $100 million to address immediate and achievable needs to the nuclear 

enterprise in fiscal year 2009. With these funds, we were able to accelerate procurement of armored security vehicles for the missile complexes and weapons storage 

areas, complete overdue electromagnetic pulse protection work on critical infrastructures, upgrade weapons security systems in Europe, and develop software that will 

enable our Nuclear Weapons Center to track all Nuclear Weapons Related Material 

from cradle to grave. 

CLOSING

According to the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear 

Weapons Management, ‘‘the strategic role of nuclear capability is to deter and dissuade current and emergent enemies from attacking the United States and its vital 

interests. To be successful in this critical national objective, the Nation’s nuclear 

forces must be demonstrative and credible, and be survivable against a preemptive 

attack. This combination of capability, credibility, and survivability presents high 

uncertainty to a potential adversary in attempting to anticipate the success of executing one or more courses of action.’’ 

Collectively, all of the actions described above are ultimately focused on deterrence. Strategic deterrence is vital to America’s security, and the Air Force is an 

essential provider of strategic deterrence. Our actions will ensure the Air Force continues to deliver the unique, effective strategic capabilities of stable, flexible and 

visible nuclear deterrence, thereby instilling confidence in the American people and 

national leadership; assuring allies; and dissuading and deterring potential adversaries. The Air Force is fully committed to the nuclear deterrence mission. 

Thank you for the committee’s continued support of the U.S. Air Force. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FLOYD L. CARPENTER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, 8TH AIR FORCE, AIR COMBAT COMMAND 

[The prepared statement of Major General Carpenter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. FLOYD L. CARPENTER, USAF 

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to represent the men and women of 

the Eighth Air Force and to answer your questions regarding the use of bomber aircraft in the United States Air Force. A key component in our Nation’s ability to conduct long-range strike missions is found within our Air Force bombers. This unique 

capability is not possessed by any other branch of our armed services or by any 

other nation. Globally, the distance of our potential adversaries and lack of basing 

options hampers our ability to perform in a variety of theaters and scenarios. Longrange strike aviation is one of the few hedges our Nation maintains to mitigate 

these fundamental challenges. Air Force strategic bombers are a critical element of 

our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, providing unique capabilities to fulfill combatant commanders’ mission objectives from shaping and deterring to large scale conventional operations and even nuclear scenarios. 

Despite the age of our Nation’s three bombers, the Air Force long-range bomber 

force is unmatched in its ability to provide conventional power for initial response 

to regional crises within hours. Additionally, our bombers can provide sustained operations in any region of the world employing either conventional or nuclear options. 

As we move away from forward overseas basing, the speed, range, and payload of 

today’s manned bombers allow for a U.S. presence anywhere on the globe within 24 

hours. 

The end of the Cold War brought about a false feeling of global security, especially 

surrounding the long feared use of nuclear weapons between the Cold War superpowers. Shortly after the end of the Cold War we saw the world in its new form— 

violent and unstable. Different from the last century, non-state actors, specifically 

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radical fundamentalists, moved to the forefront of the international stage. Our national security debates centered on not only how to counter this threat, but whether 

insurgent radical fundamentalism is the likely dominant form of warfare for the 

21st century. These are critically important questions when deciding the best national military force structure size and composition. But in an effort to ‘‘tailor’’ our 

force structure we would be remiss if we were to assume this type of warfare will 

totally dominate the global security horizon for the foreseeable future. For at least 

the first 25 years of the 21st century, instability, violence, proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction, and cultural/religious clashes will be center stage on the global 

arena. However, we must guard against absolute predictions of what forms of warfare may occur in the future. 

As we moved into the 21st century, the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review revealed 

that the Cold War’s Triad was limited in scope and in need of an update. Our deterrence foundation still relies on our strike capability composed of a formidable balance of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, 

and manned recallable and retargetable bombers. In today’s threat environment 

where non-state actors and counterinsurgency operations are center stage, the importance of our bomber force to deterrence is often overlooked and little understood. 

The strategic bomber is unique in its ability to assure allies, shape the environment, 

dissuade potential adversaries, complicate adversary strategy, provide the President 

and Secretary of Defense escalation control options, and ultimately offer alternatives 

to the insertion of precious ground forces on foreign soil. 

Unquestionably, there are a myriad of applications for the use of bombers. These 

include but are not limited to: (1) the demonstration of national resolve through 

force generation and arming with either conventional or nuclear weapons; (2) upon 

order, covert, or overt dispersal within the U.S. or deployment to forward locations; 

(3) strike operations from single-aircraft to multi-aircraft conventional and/or nuclear packages, which, most importantly, can be executed, retargeted, or recalled; 

and (4) employment of a vast array of weapons to include conventional unguided 

general purpose bombs, cluster munitions, precision-guided munitions, hard target 

penetrators, nuclear gravity weapons, and conventional or nuclear cruise missiles. 

Further, bombers have a unique ability to communicate de-escalation through visible downloading and removal from alert status and/or redeployment to home stations. Overall, and possibly most notable, bombers are differentiable from other 

strategic nuclear weapon systems—thereby not forcing an enemy into assuming a 

worst case nuclear scenario. 

In the new Strategic Triad, it is the bomber that provides the most flexibility to 

U.S. command authorities, with this flexibility being multifaceted and unique 

among the triad components. Air Force bombers are recallable, scalable, directional, 

and visible and provide our President and Secretary of Defense with both assurance 

and deterrence at the same time. This deterrence flows not only from the bombers’ 

nuclear strike capability but also from the robust demonstrated conventional capability that can hold any target on the planet at risk. Another unique feature of our 

bomber force is the ability to deter even while strike operations are being executed. 

Simply put, deterrence from bombers can continue despite shots being fired. Furthermore, by enabling the effectiveness of other U.S. and partner instruments of 

power, bomber conventional capability can provide alternatives for deterrence beyond the obvious threat of annihilation. The most illustrative example is U.S. bombers operating in conjunction with indigenous ground forces in Serbia, which ultimately helped facilitate enemy capitulation without large scale North Atlantic Treaty Organization ground force insertion. 

To be sure, all components of the Strategic Triad are critical to our National Security Strategy but the bomber force has and will continue to be unique in its ability 

to assure allies, shape environment, dissuade potential adversaries, complicate adversary planning, provide escalation control, and offer alternatives to our combatant 

commanders and the President and Secretary of Defense. Bombers are the only platform in the Strategic Triad which can be employed in either conventional or nuclear 

roles. As our forces continue to redeploy from forward bases around the world, longrange strike aviation will remain one of our Nation’s key power projection capabilities in the foreseeable future. This long-range strike capability provides the Nation 

the most powerful means to rapidly respond or attack around the globe and offers 

our Nation’s leaders freedom of choices and freedom of action in the new world environment. Our national security will increasingly depend on strategic bombers to 

meet the demands of responding rapidly and decisively to security threats. Thank 

you for this opportunity. I look forward to your questions. 

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STATEMENT OF RADM STEPHEN E. JOHNSON, USN, DIRECTOR, 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS 

[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM STEPHEN JOHNSON, USN 

Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, distinguished members of the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss our 

Navy’s nuclear enterprise, today’s force and the efforts to ensure the continued reliability of our submarine strategic forces, and the Ohio class replacement to maintain continuous strategic deterrence. 

NAVY NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

The Navy remains vigilant in executing our nuclear strategic deterrent mission. 

The Department of Defense nuclear enterprise has gone through several important 

events over the last year. Through numerous reviews, both internal and external, 

the Navy has been found satisfactory in executing our responsibilities although 

there are areas where improvement is required. These efforts included an in-depth 

review of nuclear weapon custody and accountability procedures, weapons handling 

procedures, training, and flight test non-nuclear verification requirements. These reviews have confirmed the Navy has maintained a safe and secure environment for 

our strategic assets As a result of these reviews, the Navy has established two new 

three Star level councils chaired by the Director Navy Staff to provide central coordination to focus and address policy, operational and acquisition issues associated 

with our nuclear weapons enterprise, and ensure the Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO) receives comprehensive recommendations for nuclear weapons governance. 

The first council involves the three Star Admirals on the CNO’s direct staff and is 

called the Operational Navy Nuclear Weapons Council. The second brings together 

the Operational Navy leadership, the Fleet leadership, and acquisition leadership 

and is called the Navy Nuclear Weapons Senior Leadership Oversight Council. 

These new councils demonstrate the Navy leadership’s continued focus and commitment to this mission area. 

I have focused Strategic Systems Programs on six major areas to continue to sustain high standards which include: (1) rigor; (2) field activity oversight; (3) self-assessment; (4) corrective action; (5) material management; and (6) personnel. These 

six areas of focus form the guiding principles by which we will manage our day to 

day operations and set the culture to sustain this mission for the long term. The 

men and women of Strategic Systems Programs and our industry partners remain 

dedicated to implement these guiding principles to meet the mission of our sailors 

on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines and sailors who are standing the 

watch to ensure the security of the weapons we are entrusted with by this Nation. 

TODAY’S FORCE

Our 14 Trident Submarines, eight of which are homeported in the Pacific and 6 

in the Atlantic fleet, continue to provide a credible, survivable, and reliable seabased strategic deterrent for our national leadership. Two of our submarines, USS 

Nevada (SSBN 733) and USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) are undergoing Engineering 

Refueling Overhauls which will maintain the viability of these platforms through 

the end of the class. USS Alaska (SSBN 732) has recently completed her overhaul 

and post availability testing and is preparing for her Demonstration and Shakedown 

Operation with a Replacement strategic outload and return to the operational cycle 

next spring. 

The men and women of Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) are committed to maintaining the high reliability of our 14 Ohio class SSBNs with their Trident II D5 Missiles, as well as the four Ohio class SSGNs that have been converted to carry Tomahawk missiles and support Special Operating Forces (SOF) missions as directed by 

our combatant commanders. In February the USS Alabama (SSBN 731) conducted 

the 126th consecutive successful flight test of the Trident D5 missile as part of her 

Demonstration and Shakedown Operation. This record of successful flight tests is 

unmatched by any previous missile launch system. Therefore, I am pleased to report 

to you that the Trident Strategic Weapons Systems continues to meet the operational requirements established for the system almost 30 years ago. However, it 

is my military opinion that the overall health of the D5 weapons systems is not 

without cause for pause, as the weapon system is nearing its 20th year of deployment and now enters an era of its lifecycle where age-related issues may impact its 

reliability. With D5 planned for operational deployment to match the Ohio class hull 

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life extension, D5 hardware will age beyond our previous experience base and will 

be operational almost twice as long as any previous sea-based strategic deterrent. 

Age related concerns have been validated by several technical issues that have arisen over the past year that remind us that the Trident weapons system requires increased vigilance to maintain the demonstrated high reliability of the system. I am 

confident that the dedicated SSP team is up to this challenge. 

D5 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

Our efforts to extend the life of the Trident II D5 missile continue. We are procuring additional missiles, due to the Ohio class hull life extension, to ensure that 

our Ohio class submarines are fully out loaded throughout their service life. This 

is being accomplished through continuous production of critical components such as 

rocket motors, major requalification efforts when necessary, and an update to missile electronics and guidance packages to address obsolescence. However, even with 

continuous production of solid rocket motors, we are experiencing cost challenges 

today as both NASA and Air Force demand declines and will continue to experience 

those cost increases as demand continues to shrink in future years. We are approaching the Critical Design Review for our missile electronics update and are 

evaluating various options to determine the most cost effective implementation into 

the fleet. These updated electronic packages form a large part of the life extension 

strategy which supports the deployment of the Trident II D5 weapons systems on 

the Ohio class submarine and its impending replacement program. 

Key to the success of the Trident II, D5 Life Extension is the life extension of the 

W76, Mk4 warhead refurbishment known as the W76–1 which we are executing in 

partnership with the Department of Energy. This program is on track to provide the 

Navy with the weapons we need to meet operational requirements throughout the 

Ohio class deployment and the planned follow-on platform. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY

As technical program manager responsible for the Navy’s Nuclear Weapons Security, SSP has actively pursued technologies which will provide credible, cost effective 

security for the nuclear assets entrusted to our watch. Our Marines and Navy Master-at-Arms are providing an effective and integrated elite security force at both of 

our strategic weapons facilities. We have begun construction of our Limited Area 

Production and Support Complex at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Bangor, WA. 

When complete, this facility will provide a higher degree of security for our ashore 

operations. 

The United States Coast Guard, Maritime Protection Force Units have been commissioned at Kings Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. These Coast Guardsmen and the 

Navy vessels they man provide a security umbrella for our Ohio class submarines 

as they deploy and return from their deterrent patrols. They form the basis of our 

Trident Transit Protection System. 

OHIO CLASS REPLACEMENT

In 2027, the Navy will retire the oldest of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs when it 

reaches the end of its service life. Over the subsequent 13 years the Navy will retire 

the remaining Ohio-class SSBNs at a rate of approximately one per year. The Ohio 

class replacement is the replacement capability for the Ohio class ballistic missile 

submarine. It will be a strategic national asset whose endurance and stealth will 

enable the Navy to provide continuous uninterrupted survivable sea-based strategic 

deterrence. Appropriate investment in the Ohio class replacement research and development and concept development is essential to a reliable, survivable and adaptable sea-based strategic deterrent prepared to face an uncertain future. The Analysis of Alternatives study commenced on 13 Aug 2008 and will complete this summer. The Navy’s fiscal year 2010 budget provides the required RDT&E investment 

to support the lead ship construction. 

The U.S. will maintain its strong strategic relationship with the U.K. for followon platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement of 1963 and recently reinforced by the Presidential, Prime Minster and Secretary of Defense exchange of letters. The U.K. has provided funding in 2008 and 2009 to support the design and 

development of a Common Missile Compartment that supports both the Ohio class 

replacement and the successor to the U.K. Vanguard class. 

SSGN

Although SSGN is not a strategic asset, the program synergizes off of the Trident 

system. This highly successful program, authorized by Congress as a method to 

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maintain the viability of four Ohio class submarines and bring a major advance in 

tactical submarine overseas presence is almost complete. All four of these submarines have completed their conversion to SSGN Attack and SOF Platforms. USS 

Ohio (SSGN 726) completed a highly successful 14 month forward deployed period, 

USS Florida (SSGN 728) just returned from her deployment in 5th Fleet, USS 

Michigan (SSGN 727) is forward deployed in 7th Fleet, and USS Georgia (SSGN 

729) will depart on her maiden deployment later this year. By any measure, these 

platforms have delivered on the promise to provide high volume strike and high capacity SOFs capability to our combatant commanders. I am in the process of turning 

over the day-to-day maintenance operations and future spiral development efforts 

of these fine ships to the Naval Sea System Command In-Service Submarine Organization as these platforms are no longer considered part of the Nation’s Strategic 

Forces. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate your continued support of the Navy’s nuclear enterprise. Your efforts will 

ensure the continued credibility and reliability of our Trident II Weapons System 

and its remarkable Trident II D5 Missile, maintaining an unmatched record of success by any missile system. The men and women of Strategic Systems Programs are 

committed to the highest standards of safety, surety, and reliability of this remarkable system. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and 

am prepared to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, there’s an article in the 

New York Times and in a bunch of other papers about the publication of the Government Printing Office (GPO) Web site of a report 

that, according to the article, ‘‘gives detailed information about 

hundreds of the Nation’s civilian nuclear sites and programs, including maps showing the precise location of stockpiles of fuel for 

nuclear weapons.’’ I understand that they’ve taken this report 

down from the Web site. 

Tell us about this, and tell us your assessment of any vulnerability that was disclosed in the report. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, I’d be glad to. 

First of all, the report that you mentioned is the United States 

declaration associated with the additional protocol, which is a more 

rigorous inspection regime set up to assist in our nonproliferation 

efforts around the world. In fact, it’s not a report about our nuclear 

weapons activities or sites, specific locations of nuclear weapons or 

nuclear security; it’s civil nuclear materials that exist around the 

United States. It is a sensitive, but unclassified, report. Ultimately, 

it would have gone after 60 days here in Congress, it would go over 

to the International Atomic Energy Agency. We think the report’s 

a great demonstration of U.S. leadership and wanting to be upfront, wanting to be the first one to get on to these more rigorous 

inspections. We’re certainly dismayed that the sensitive information was displayed publicly, but I can assure you, sir, I’ve looked 

at the actual report—in fact, this morning again—to make sure 

that I was very clear, particularly at sites that are the responsibility of my organization, to make sure that the information there 

is all unclassified. It went through a detailed interagency review. 

So, while I’m dismayed that it’s out, I can assure you, sir, that it 

doesn’t release weapons information. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, it’s just an easy locator for where nuclear weapons complexes are. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It’s an easy locator for the civil side of what I 

would say the research and development that the Nuclear Energy 

Program does in the Department of Energy (DOE); some of that 

work is done at the NNSA site, some of it is done at the laboratories. There is some commercial power plant information that’s 

107 

out there. But, it does not reveal any classified information. Unfortunately, it’s a nice compilation of information dealing with civil 

nuclear, and we are always very sensitive—and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is, as well, very sensitive—to how much information gets out there that doesn’t necessarily need to be out there. 

Unfortunately, this is one of those cases. 

The real concern, I think, has to do with, how did this information get out onto the GPO Web site, and that’s something I’m sure 

we’ll be working very closely with Congress on, trying to figure that 

out. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you have any idea how this would have 

appeared in the paper? Did they just cobble together a bunch of unclassified information? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think what probably happened is, this sensitive, but unclassified, report that was sent was inadvertently 

placed on the GPO Web site. Another group—I believe it was the 

Federation of American Scientists—picked that up and placed it on 

their Web site, and from there it spilled into the media. It has 

since, as I understand it, been taken off of the GPO Web site. It’s 

all unclassified information, but it’s sensitive. It details where the 

country is doing some of its civilian research in nuclear areas, so 

it has information about materials and things like that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do we have to worry about any enhanced 

security, or do you feel like the security is adequate? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’m very comfortable with the security at our 

NNSA sites. Those are the ones I know about the most. We design 

our security posture fairly rigorously against—the details, of 

course, are classified—a pretty broad set of threats. It would certainly cover the potential threats that might be here. 

We don’t want to make things easier for people. I think, unfortunately, something like this does make some things easier. It just 

means that we have to maintain our security posture and keep it 

strong and continue to check on how we’re doing, per our own 

standards. 

So, I’m very comfortable with the security of our NNSA sites, 

even with this report out, because I’ve looked at the ‘‘maps,’’ if you 

will, and there’s—on all of our sites—really nothing there, quite 

frankly. It just shows a corridor, for example, in a building, nothing 

else around it, so you have no idea of those kinds of details. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is underway, and each of you have a role in the process. So, why don’t 

we start with you, Admiral, and you all just go right down the line 

and tell us about your role in the process. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. The Navy assigns a flag officer to 

each of the working groups for the NPR. I am assigned, appropriately, to the Stockpile and Infrastructure Working Group, and I 

support Mr. Henry and Dr. Harvey, who are the chairmen of that 

group. Then, the Strategic Systems Programs has key individuals 

supporting all parts of the NPR. We meet weekly. In my opinion, 

it’s good communication, it’s a good, healthy process, and I expect 

a good outcome. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Now, you said you’re assigned and 

that you meet weekly. What’s your role in the process? 

108 

Admiral JOHNSON. I provide the answers to postulated scenarios 

provided by the other groups primarily who are the force structure 

groups. In the case of change in weapons loading, we would analyze: where would we store weapons; how many would have to be 

moved; how long would it take; what would it cost; et cetera. Those 

sort of practical answers. In the group that I’m in, we also help illuminate the investments necessary within the infrastructure for 

the Stockpile Stewardship Program and for it to carry on into the 

future. 

General CARPENTER. Sir, like the Admiral, I have no real direct 

role, other than as a technical advisor, if you will, or a subject matter expert on the bomber side, since 8th Air Force is the nuclear 

bomber leg, which we consider a critical part of the triad. I act as 

an advisor when there are questions about that particular part of 

the triad, and how many weapons would be appropriate for that 

part of the triad. So, I’m removed, at Barksdale Air Force Base, 

from the NPR process itself, but very much engaged, through 

STRATCOM and through the air staff, with General Alston. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you get involved in the design of the 

new bomber? 

General CARPENTER. No, sir, I have not. 

Senator BILL NELSON. How about you, Admiral? With regard to 

the new submarine? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You get involved in the design? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I have been responsible, on the Navy 

side, for all the pre-milestone work, the system-engineering work 

that preceded the start of the analysis of alternatives, and I will 

be responsible for the design and the operation of the missile compartment. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General? 

General ALSTON. Mr. Chairman, I am responsible for the Air 

Force support to the NPR process, so I ensure that we have proper 

representation on all of the working groups that are working the 

NPR. Admiral Johnson and I have found ourselves, in my 21 

months, together very often, because of our somewhat common responsibilities, and we also share seats in some of the NPR forums. 

But, my responsibility would be not only to ensure that we have 

active engagement at every level within the NPR, but that I ensure 

that, as discussions and propositions and excursions would develop, 

that whatever would be asked of the Air Force, in terms of replies, 

that I would help manage those replies to that process. 

I, too, agree that this has been a very collaborative process. I 

think it’s been a very transparent process. It is bona fide that the 

Services have been invited to participate fully. I’m very encouraged 

that, with this level of collaboration and a focus on strategy and 

policy-leading force structure, that I, too, am confident that we will 

get a very competent outcome for the Nation. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I’m a member of the Senior 

Integration Steering Group (SISG). We meet weekly. Essentially, 

there are a series of working groups—the Stockpile and Infrastructure Working Group, as you heard Admiral Johnson describe, Policy Working Group, Force Structure Working Group, an InterVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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national Working Group. We have this organization above that 

worries about the interagency coordination between these detailed 

working groups. So, I sit on that group. We do tradeoffs. We make 

sure that the strategy force structure feeds the number of warheads, types of warheads, and then do the iteration back and forth 

and make sure all these pieces tie together. Then, occasionally I’ve 

sat in as acting for the Deputy Secretary in deputies’ committee 

meetings at the National Security Council (NSC) to be on the receiving side of some of this. I would agree with General Alston, I’ve 

seen a tremendous level of collaboration, not only between the 

Services and OSD policy, acquisition technology, and logistics, but 

State Department and international partners, as well. So, it’s been 

a great process. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Jeff, do you want to ask any questions at 

this point? 

Senator SESSIONS. You can go ahead. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Mr. D’Agostino, you know that 

there is a reasonable chance that we’re going to reduce the nuclear 

stockpile. That’s going to increase the size of the backlog of the nuclear weapons waiting to be dismantled. How would NNSA handle 

that increased number of dismantlements? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely right, sir, we do expect some increase in our dismantlement queue. As I’ve mentioned publicly before, we have a pretty sizable dismantlement queue. The actual 

number is classified, but at the pace that we’re on, we’ll take apart 

our last warhead in that dismantlement queue in 2022. That actually is a fairly accelerated rate from where we were about 4 years 

ago, on the pace that we were on. Our plan—we submitted a report 

last year with the classified details to Congress, and every 2 years 

we’ll re-up that report. The way we would handle the increased 

rate is to continue to use what we call a special tool set. It’s what 

we call ‘‘Seamless Safety for the 21st Century.’’ It’s a series of special tools that assist us in working on our warheads, where we 

don’t have to move the warhead around so much, but it sits in a 

special toolcase where it allows us to take it apart fairly rapidly. 

But, most importantly, more important than speed, is the safety 

piece of this. Many of these warheads, particularly these old warheads, were built 40-plus years ago of fairly exotic materials, and 

have been in very hot silos and up in cold airplanes and back and 

forth. It’s a very complicated job. So, my primary concern is not if 

I can take them apart faster every single year, but can I continue 

on the safety record that we’ve held essentially since the program 

started, because we’re dealing with conventional high explosives 

that don’t have the safety—on old systems that don’t have the safety features of our more modern systems. 

So, I can assure you, safety is number one, not how fast I can 

do them. Clearly it’s going to require us to maintain a good set of 

production technicians who are trained in this area. I think we 

have that crew in place right now. 

What I don’t want to do is hire up essentially 300 people, because it’s going to take me a few years to get them trained up— 

have them work really hard for 6 years to take everything apart, 

and then have to lay them off, because it doesn’t make sense economically. 

110 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you have enough pit storage at 

Pantex? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, right now, our expectation is that we 

will be able to handle our expected future pit capacity not only 

today on our current plans, but the expectations of the NPR. I don’t 

want to be predisposed that I know the answer before the review 

is done, and I don’t. But, we’re going to reevaluate all of these 

questions on storage facility locations as soon as we get the exact 

numbers. So, I’m anxiously waiting, frankly, to get this review 

done, get the details out, because that assists me greatly in my 5- 

year planning. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Why did you move the responsibility for 

the construction of the pit disassembly facility from one office to 

another? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In many cases, the pit disassembly and conversion facility move was directed by Congress, so we had a shift. I’m 

never a big fan of moving large projects from one to the other, because what you do is, you disrupt teams. These are very complicated facilities. They require a certain set of consistency over 

years of time. Both of those organizations are in the NNSA, so I 

am ultimately responsible for it and ultimately that’s going to be 

my objective. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In disassembling the nuclear weapons, do 

you want to do some of that in Nevada or do you want to do all 

that at Pantex? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I want to do that at Pantex, because first of all, 

my production technicians are at Pantex. Next, the facilities that 

I have at Pantex are actually certified by ourselves and checked by 

the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board to be able to do what I 

would call the highest level of nuclear safety work, because safety 

is primarily number one. If we’re ever in a situation where we 

have, I would say, a problem disassembling a particular warhead, 

for example, because it’s just been together for so long and we are 

in a situation where we need to get it out of the system because 

it’s stopping a lot of other disassembly work from happening, we 

do have the option, and it will be on a case-by-case basis, to say, 

‘‘Let’s use our device assembly facility at the Nevada Test Site, fly 

some technicians out there, do this specialty work on this particular warhead while we continue to work away this larger bucket 

of dismantlement work.’’ 

So, Nevada is always a nice contingency plan for us. I don’t see 

anything in the near future that would cause us to use it right 

now. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Mr. D’Agostino, when we talk about nuclear stockpile reductions, 

which will be part of the President’s talks with the Russians—have 

they already begun? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Assistant Secretary, Rose Gottemoeller, 

from the State Department, has started working with the Russians. Yes, sir, she has. 

Senator SESSIONS. It’s on a fast track. I would just note that 

there’s no reason that that has to be done this year. It’s a self-imposed goal. We can extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

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(START) for up to 5 years with little problem. But, at any rate, the 

President seemed to be determined to move forward with that, and 

announced some reductions. But, the question I think we’re hearing from various experts in the field, that any reduction done by 

current stockpile should be tied to some sort of modernization plan 

of our existing nuclear weapons. Do you share that view? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think that’s a discussion that I’m currently 

having right now. One statement I would make is, I feel very 

strongly that we are in a fragile position, if you will, from an infrastructure and people standpoint. There’s a Perry-Schlesinger report 

that has come out recently that has a fairly accurate portrayal of 

the infrastructure and people concerns that they have. One thing 

to do is make—we have great people in our outfit. The people want 

to know that they’re doing work that the country cares about and 

that they’re doing work that exercises their skills. So, an element 

of that is extending the life of the warhead. The way that PerrySchlesinger Commission report describes life extension is a continuum of activities, from refurbishment to replacement. I think 

working in that continuum is where we’re going to end up and 

what the NPR is going to end up showing us. 

So, all of these pieces are tied together. In my view, you can’t 

just talk about one piece, just talk about size only, and not address, 

frankly, the whole integrated situation, not only on the NNSA side, 

but my colleagues in DOD who also have concerns with critical 

skills. 

Senator SESSIONS. Former Secretary Perry, on May 28—who’s 

been, frankly, very aggressive, more than I would suggest, is required to draw our weapons systems down—said this in his article: 

‘‘The U.S. should maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for itself and its allies, and that this deterrent should be 

adequately funded and staffed with topnotch managers, scientists, 

and engineers.’’ I know that you are challenged with making sure 

that there’s no waste, every dollar is spent wisely. But, is the budget before us today that’s been proposed, is that sufficient to meet 

the standards that Secretary Perry made? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The budget we have before us today meets the 

standard for today, for the year that we’re talking about, 2010. I 

would like to note, though, that particularly when one looks at the 

out-year plan—typically we submit a 5-year series of numbers to 

show direction, if you will, on our programs. This program, you’ll 

note that our out-year numbers are exactly, in some cases, in 

science and technology, fairly identical with the 2010 number. That 

is done because I recognize that changes are going to have to be 

made in the out-years in order to make Mr. Perry’s statement a 

sustainable and true statement out in the out-years. 

So, the way I would describe this is as a 1-year budget submittal 

to Congress, that once the NPR comes out, my plan, Tom 

D’Agostino’s plan, is to make sure that the challenges of securing 

nuclear materials in 4 years, the challenges associated, as the 

Perry-Schlesinger report puts out, on doing life extensions on our 

warhead and exercising our people, are duly reflected in the science 

element of my program, the infrastructure element of my program—not ‘‘my program,’’ but the program that the country has enVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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trusted me with for now, as well as the direct stockpile work piece, 

the life-extension piece. 

Senator SESSIONS. Is there money in it sufficient to do those 

things in the out-years? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Not in the out-years, but in 2010, yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary of Defense Gates, just last October, 

said, ‘‘The U.S. is experiencing serious brain drain in the loss of 

veteran nuclear weapons designers and technicians.’’ He went on to 

say, ‘‘To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a 

credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a 

modernization program.’’ Do you agree with that? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I largely agree with that statement. There’s details below some of those statements. A modernization effort, in my 

view, encompasses a wide variety of activities, from reuse of components that we’ve previously made, exercising our scientists, to making sure that when we do a life extension on our program, we modernize the safety and security elements of our warheads. That’s absolutely important. The last thing I think is—as we maintain our 

deterrent, put warheads into our stockpile that are based on 1970sor 1980s-era safety and security efforts, because we know that 

things have changed in the last 30 years. 

Senator SESSIONS. A modernization program should result into 

weapons being more reliable and significantly more safe, should 

they not? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely, Senator. I agree 100 percent with 

that statement. 

Senator SESSIONS. What objections are you getting to modernizing, even as we draw down some of the numbers? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think making sure that it’s put in the context 

of the President’s overall strategic direction, making sure that it 

fits in. We have an integrated framework to talk about nuclear security. 

Senator SESSIONS. Yet, you don’t have a commitment for funding 

that would allow you to do that. Is that what you’re saying? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The program I have right now puts us in a position to be able to respond to the NPR. I’m very confident—and 

that’s why I’m very excited about being able to get a NPR out, because we want that detail and that information in there. That’s 

why Dr. Harvey, who is co-leading the stockpile and infrastructure 

group, understands this program, has my views—is working that 

in the NPR process, because I have these views that I want to be 

reflected in, ultimately, the administration’s position for the future. 

So, I have no objection to modernization. I think it’s important. 

We need to put safety and security into our stockpile. We have 

some in already. We want to make sure that, if we’re going to extend the lives and maintain our deterrent, that continues out into 

the future. 

Senator SESSIONS. You also would acknowledge that we’re the 

only nuclear weapons country in the world that doesn’t have a 

modernization ongoing program. Is that right? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That’s correct, but we do have a life extension 

program. I want to make sure that that’s clear. Some of this is not 

semantics—there are some details behind the difference between a 

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pure refurbishment life extension and a reuse life extension or a 

replacement life extension activity. So, it’s absolutely correct, if 

we’re talking about what I would call advancing the ball dramatically on safety, security, and reliability. But, we do have a life extension program underway; in fact, we’re supporting the Navy, Admiral Johnson’s requirements, for the W–76 warhead, in that respect. 

Senator SESSIONS. We just need to do what is necessary to move 

forward with these programs. I just am not seeing a firm commitment from the administration that that’s what’s going to happen. 

We hear some positive talk. I think you guys hope that the NPR 

will help move us in that direction, but I haven’t seen it yet, and 

it makes me somewhat nervous. 

Admiral Johnson, tell us briefly about missile defense, about 

your requirements to test submarine-launched missiles, how often 

do you launch those, how many you do, and why you think that’s 

necessary to guarantee the reliability of those systems. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. The Navy tests four missiles per year 

in a program we call a Follow-on Commander’s Evaluation Test. 

The submarines are on patrol. They are notified. They’re selected 

at random. They’re notified by message. They return to port. Two 

missiles are selected—again, randomly. Those missiles are then— 

the warheads are removed, and the appropriate test instrumentation, telemetry, and destruct capability are installed. It takes a couple of days, a matter of days, and the ship proceeds to the range 

area and conducts normally two missiles from that submarine. We 

do that twice a year, a total of four. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Tell us where that range is, Admiral. 

Admiral JOHNSON. There are two ranges. The one we used yesterday is off the coast of Florida. It’s the same operation center the 

Air Force runs for a variety of tests. They share that facility with 

us at the 45th Space Wing, and it’s the eastern range. We fired, 

in this case, from Her Majesty’s ship, Victorious, a Royal Navy submarine fired off the coast of Florida for a 5,000-mile test splashing 

down off the coast of Africa. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I think, one thing we will need 

to look at is that the national missile defense—they reduced the 

number to 30. If that goes forward, which I’m not comfortable with, 

I think it puts an even greater requirement that we have enough 

missiles that we have tested over the years, because all of our 

other areas test. You’ve been a critic, I know, for some time, and 

then—that we haven’t probably tested that system enough. So, 

however we come out with national missile defense, I think we’re 

going to have to produce those things while the assembly line is hot 

so they can be used for testing. 

Thank you. I appreciate your leadership. You are exceedingly 

knowledgeable on all these issues, and I’m pleased that you’re 

chairing our committee. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Just for you students, here, this is the famous Senator whose picture is on the front page of the Washington 

Post this morning. [Laughter.] 

Mr. D’Agostino, we’re not only reducing the number of nuclear 

warheads, but we’re going to reduce the actual types of nuclear 

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warheads. So, how do you go about reducing the weapons types and 

reducing redundant warheads? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. What I would say now is, there is discussion 

about reducing types, but that will be left for the NPR ultimately 

to come out. But, I would offer the following, if I could. Ultimately, 

it gets driven by DOD’s requirements, the types of targets that are 

part of the algorithm that determines the size of the stockpile, 

whether or not certain targets can be covered by multiple warheads, are there backups needed. From my standpoint, reducing 

the numbers of types makes the maintenance element a lot easier. 

I don’t have to make X number of different types of neutron generators or thermal batteries or other particular components that we 

have to replace on a periodic basis. So, the maintenance piece becomes easier. There’s a downside, of course, to reducing the types, 

and that is, you become more and more dependent on the types you 

have remaining. Therefore, that drives you to want to make doubly 

sure or triply sure that you know exactly what’s going on with 

those particular warheads you’ve decided you’re going to retain in 

your arsenal, both in numbers and types. So, I’ve always emphasized the point that as—if our stockpile gets smaller, and if the 

numbers of types go down, that more and more reinforces the need 

to have this discussion on having a very sustainable workforce and 

infrastructure that does that. Right now, we don’t have that in the 

out-years, in my opinion, but that’s what we have to get to. 

General Chilton ultimately can provide a more fullsome answer, 

sir, to your question on reducing the types. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. We’ll take that up with him. 

Historically, each lab has been responsible for the weapons that 

it designed. What do you think of the idea of having all the data 

on all of the weapons available to each of the laboratories and having each lab do an independent review of each weapon? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I like that idea, sir. I think it’s a great idea. We 

discussed, last year, on how we make our annual assessment process stronger as our stockpile size changes. We believe we’ve 

reached that point where our stockpile size is small enough that we 

need two independent checks, full sets of experiments run independently by both labs, keeping the responsibility, of course, for the 

design with one laboratory, because we always want one organization responsible. But, having another institution do that—Secretary 

Chu has looked at this idea. In his first month or so as the Secretary, I talked to him about that. He was convinced enough that 

he signed out, essentially, a piece of paper that directed us to go 

off and establish the system where we work that in. It means a little bit more science work, it means a few more experiments, it 

means a bit more analysis, and it means a bit more back and forth 

between our two laboratories, but that’s a good thing. I think the 

country will be better off because of that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Just briefly. The Wall Street Journal, on June 

2, has an article that the U.S. and Russia talks appear headed for 

a framework agreement by July 6, and a final treaty by December. 

That’s moving right along. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I would agree with that, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Have you been involved in that? 

115 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, at what we call the interagency meetings we have at the NSC and advising the Assistant Secretary of 

State—that is the prime negotiator for the administration. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of 

the Arms Control Association here in Washington, which is a private group, I think, that apparently knows a lot about it, described 

the atmosphere at these meetings, usually tedious, as ‘‘electric.’’ 

White House officials wouldn’t say what their targets are on a treaty with Russia, but Mr. Kimball said the deployed nuclear weapons 

in each country could be reduced by 30 percent to 40 percent from 

their current limit of 2,200 warhead delivery systems, Admiral 

Johnson, would be cut by half. General Alston and team, let me 

ask the military witnesses whether they’ve conducted any analysis 

on the implications of these reductions for their leg of the triad. 

Who wants to start? 

General ALSTON. Senator, I’d be happy to start. 

The process so far with regard to the NPR has been looking at 

the existing treaty limits with regard to Moscow and the combatant 

commander has been involved in his assessment as to force levels, 

but the discussions have not gotten so specific yet as to identify 

specific force levels. It has been a priority, certainly of the Air 

Force, and I will let Admiral Johnson speak for his service, but 

that we are ensuring that our responsibilities to maintain nuclear 

surety at lower levels is a very important matter to us. You would 

have, in your workforce, their ability to perform their roles and responsibilities. It’s a sensitivity that we have. As we get deeper into 

this discussion and deeper into the NPR, I know we’re going to 

reach a point where we’re going to have to be able to make the assessments that you indicate we will need to make. 

Senator SESSIONS. But, you haven’t been asked to, and have not 

completed an assessment to reduce your delivery systems by onehalf? 

General ALSTON. No, sir, we have not. There have been some excursions to see what would be the art of the possible, but I really 

would not qualify those as reaching the point where they would be 

sufficiently mature for force-structure recommendations. But, for 

half of the force, no, sir, there hasn’t been that level of detailed discussion involved in the Air Force. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Carpenter? 

General CARPENTER. I agree with everything General Alston 

said. Our position basically has been that we have been promoting 

a balanced triad, whatever the numbers are, that the end result 

should end with a triad, as we have today, that is a balanced triad, 

so that every leg has a sufficient number of weapons to make it 

sustainable. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Johnson? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir, I agree with the same position. I do 

make the observation that, in the case of the missile tube numbers, 

the current numbers are set higher than the number of missile 

tubes that we have today, and that may provide some insight into 

the way—I haven’t read the article, so I can’t exactly respond to 

it. 

Senator SESSIONS. They just speculated. They talked about delivery systems being reduced by half. Let me ask you—you’re aware— 

116 

and I know when you’ve been promoted and had hearings, you’ve 

been asked whether or not you would give your honest assessment, 

regardless of what the politicians tell you, so I’m going to ask each 

one of you three uniformed personnel, will you, if asked about 

whether or not you can accept a 50 percent reduction in the delivery systems of our triad, will you give your best military judgment? 

General ALSTON. Yes, sir. 

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. All three of you said ‘‘Yes.’’ I appreciate that. 

Also, Secretary D’Agostino, on the question of nuclear weapons, 

the numbers slip my mind right now; perhaps you can recall how 

many tactical nuclear weapons the Russians have and how many 

we have. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The actual numbers are classified, but I will 

say there’s a 10-to-1 ratio, roughly, give or take. It’s a big difference between the two. 

Senator SESSIONS. If the START goes forward, we’re talking 

about the strategic nuclear weapons primarily being reduced, and 

there’s no plan to narrow the gap in the tactical nuclear weapons, 

is there? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The administration is focused—you described 

the timeframe earlier, which is correct, sir. Addressing the tacticals 

would be very difficult to do in the time period. There’s other implications. Russia’s been very coy about the role of their tactical nuclear weapons, vis-a-vis their overall national defense. It’s a different approach than what we have. 

Senator SESSIONS. Oh, I see. The Russians don’t want to talk 

about it? That’s right, the Russians don’t want to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. That’s off the table. They’re willing to talk 

about strategic nuclear weapons, and that’s the fact of the matter. 

The administration is determined to reach this treaty, for reasons 

that baffle me. Hopefully we can go in that direction and move forward in that direction. I’m supportive of that. But, we’re not under 

any pressure to do this. This is a self-imposed pressure that worries me. So, these are important issues. I know you will work on 

them, and give your best judgment. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Originally, under START II, there was a general understanding 

that once we got to START III, they would take up the tactical nuclear weapons, but we never got around to ratifying START II. So, 

this is something you have brought up in a most timely fashion, 

and I thank you for bringing it up. We need to keep it out there 

on the table and ultimately get to that issue. 

The idea was to address the strategic weapons first and then get 

to the tactical. Well, we never got there. So, thank you, Senator 

Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Vitter? 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, to all of you. In particular, General Carpenter, welcome 

to you, and thanks for your new leadership of the Mighty 8th in 

Louisiana. We’re very proud of that. 

117 

My first question goes to something focused there, which is of the 

Air Force’s movement on Global Strike Command, which is slated 

for Barksdale and obviously we hope that moves along and continues, in terms of the new major command that is clearly a significant high national priority, and it’s a national priority to stand it 

up in a timely way. Can you give us a view—and/or, General Alston—an update on how that’s progressing? 

General CARPENTER. I can give you a timeline, and General Alston can fill in any gaps I missed. 

June 27 is the end of the environmental assessment period. Assuming that all comes out as we hope, then it will be announced 

as the final location. Once that happens, then you will start seeing 

people and resources being moved there. General Kowalski, who’s 

the vice commander now of Global Strike Command, I believe is 

scheduled to arrive the first week and a half of July, followed by 

General Klotz, the new commander, and he is to arrive by early 

August. We’re going to have a standup of the command, an activation of the command, and I believe August 7 is the planned date 

right now, tentatively at least. I think you know that the initial operating capability is scheduled for September. Come December of 

this year, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) wings move 

over to Global Strike Command out of Space Command, and then 

followed, in February 2010, the bomber units will be moved from 

Air Combat Command into Global Strike Command, with, finally, 

full operating capability in September 2010. So, that’s the schedule 

as I know it today. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, and thanks for your leadership in that important transition. Again, thanks for your leadership of the Mighty 8th and your being part of our military community in Louisiana. We’re very proud to have you. 

General CARPENTER. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Gentlemen, I share many of Senator Sessions’ 

concerns about some of this work toward treaties with regard to 

START. I can support the concept, and I can support the goal, I 

just want to make sure we do it right and don’t set deadlines or 

timetables or goals with PR in mind, versus substance, and basically put politics and PR ahead of substance. 

With respect to that, I’m concerned about this schedule of trying 

to get to a new START in December, when the current NPR isn’t 

slated to be done yet. It isn’t slated to be completed until early next 

year. Isn’t that potentially putting the cart before the horse? 

Shouldn’t we have the new NPR finalized to understand the landscape with regard to what we should agree to, in terms of a new 

START? 

General ALSTON. Senator, I’ll be glad to take a first answer 

there. Sir, I think the process that we have, that we are participating in with the NPR, has been a very collaborative process. It 

has been a very transparent process. Personally, I see very talented 

people that are trying to work these issues very much in earnest, 

very much in the open, and the Services have been a part of this 

process from the beginning. So, the dynamic that is helping work 

through these issues, I think, is a very positive dynamic, so I can’t 

comment on assessing the pace. But, for the efforts that are underway, there’s been very good, deliberate effort, and I think the work 

118 

is moving towards a productive outcome from DOD for the participation that the Air Force is having in this process right now. 

Senator VITTER. I appreciate that. My question is about timing. 

Is it correct that that process is slated to be finalized early next 

year? 

General ALSTON. Sir, I think the NPR is supposed to be complete 

by the end of this year, but clearly there’s a relationship between 

the analysis that is underway with the NPR and the START activities. It’s just the way the process is working right now. 

Senator VITTER. I’m not sure I understand what that means. Let 

me ask it a different way. Does it make any sense to agree to a 

new START product before the NPR is completed and digested and 

understood, including by the START negotiators? 

General ALSTON. Sir, I can’t speak to that, I can only speak to 

the Air Force role contributing to that process. The Department 

would be ultimately responsible for the quality of the NPR product. 

Senator VITTER. Mr. D’Agostino, maybe that’s more appropriate 

for you to comment on that. It seems pretty logical that you want 

to complete and digest and understand the NPR before you agree 

to a new START. What’s the matter with that assumption? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think there clearly are two activities happening. In fact, one does inform the other activity. But, there’s 

overlap. I think it is not unreasonable to say—there’s a lot of detail 

that would have to happen in the NPR that doesn’t have anything 

necessarily to do with START. If I can give an example or two, it 

might help, examples associated with maintenance of how we recapitalize our infrastructure, on what pace we would recapitalize 

our infrastructure, the actual different types of warheads themselves, where it depends on if the focus on the START number— 

the situation is a number and an agreement in a general direction. 

We can get the President, who’s already said publicly that he is 

looking at a lower number than what the Moscow Treaty was and 

that he’s interested in certain verification measures, as well. That 

framework is already established, in essence, and that provides a 

framework, so you don’t have to wait until the NPR is exactly done, 

until the books are closed on it, because my expectation, frankly, 

what we want to do in the NPR process is, in fact, fairly accelerated. 

The DOE, the NNSA, need elements of that NPR understood before we develop our budget for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, our 

5-year budget. That is a program and budget that we’re working 

on to get done by September of this year, so it’s an element of the 

NPR process that’s accelerated to get to that answer sooner so we 

can develop an actual program. In fact, that’s exactly what we’re 

going to do, and that’s why General Alston described the NPR 

largely being completed by the beginning of the fiscal year later on 

this fall, if you will, because that’s going to inform us as we develop, with DOD, our joint programs. 

So, there’s certainly some parallelism going on. I can’t deny that, 

and I don’t want to deny that. I don’t want to send that signal. But, 

at the same time, because we have such very good collaborative 

process, frankly, and we’ve gone through, already, a couple of 

iterations of how policy drives the force structure and how the force 

structure drives the warheads, numbers, and types, we’ve gone 

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through an iteration that way. We have some sense of where things 

may end up. We don’t want to give an answer right now. 

Ultimately there’s a negotiation piece with Russia; that’s important. So, I’m very confident, because of the transparency and because of our desire to get that NPR largely done later this year, 

so we can finish our budget preparations, because we submit that 

to you, sir, in January, that we are on a very tight path, but doable, is how I would describe it. It’s not just one finishes and then 

the other starts, sir. 

Senator VITTER. I’m not suggesting it should be one finishes and 

then the other starts. I’m suggesting it should not be that the treaty finishes before the NPR finishes. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, I understand. 

Senator VITTER. Do you understand the difference? I’m not saying the NPR has to finish before treaty discussions start, but it 

does seem a little odd for the detailed treaty negotiations potentially to finish before the NPR is finished. What am I missing? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me interject, here. I think there’s an 

element of this that the NPR discussions will inform the START 

negotiations, and the box that they find themselves in, that neither 

the Russians nor the Americans want this START extended. Under 

the terms of the treaty, it can only be extended for 5 years. Five 

years only. It can’t be extended 1 year, it can’t be extended 10 

years. It can only be extended 5 years. So, the expectation may well 

be, according to the implication of your question, which I think is 

right on the money, is that these negotiations own what may end 

up being several treaties will be informed by the NPR discussions. 

Is that in the ballpark, Mr. D’Agostino? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That’s my understanding, sir. I’m not an expert 

on the extension parts of the treaties, frankly, but that is, in essence—we can be informed enough by the work we’ve actually done 

to date on the NPR to start on the treaty discussions. Details do 

matter. 

Senator VITTER. Start. But my question is about the finishing of 

the treaty discussions before you finish the NPR. Mr. Chairman, I 

appreciate your comment, and you make some very good points. 

But, forgive me, as a recovering lawyer, the first thing I would say 

is, I don’t care what the current START says. You can sign a new 

treaty that’s the same as the old one, with one comma missing, and 

it can last 6 months if you want to, if that’s the smart thing to do, 

and it can be a new treaty that can just bridge to the next treaty, 

if that is the right thing to do, substantively. My only suggestion 

is, let’s put substance first, whatever that is. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Senator VITTER. I have a similar question about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Now, I have to say, right off, my impulse about that is a lot different from START, which is—I questioned the whole premise of the soundness of the CTBT. But, Secretary Gates has said that, without testing, it will, ‘‘become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal.’’ Given that, do you 

think any consideration—ratification of a CTBT should be preceded 

by plans for a new redesigned and more reliable warhead? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Sir, I would look at the question. I’m going to 

answer your question, but I would say, for the last 13-plus years— 

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or longer than that, frankly, 16 years—we have been operating, in 

effect, without underground testing, as a matter of policy. So, we 

have a program, a Stockpile Stewardship Program, designed to 

take a deep look inside our warheads, do an annual assessment. 

In an earlier question, Chairman Nelson asked about beefing up 

our peer-review process to make sure that we can do that. I am 

comfortable that, with what I could call a sustainable effort on 

science, a sustainable effort on the facilities that are required that 

the country is going to need, and a sustainable effort on modernization activity for our stockpile, that we can maintain the stockpile 

well on out into the future, without underground testing. I would 

add that that’s one element of the CTBT discussion, sir, that the 

Senate will be looking at, I’m sure. Another element, of course, is 

the verification questions, which are fairly complicated, deal with 

seismic issues and being able to find out what the rest of the world 

is doing. 

The one comment I would like to make on that is, the same people that maintain our current stockpile and that we need to beef 

up, if you will, over the next few years, are the exact same people 

that do the intelligence analysis, the seismic analysis, as well. So, 

having a NNSA infrastructure that is taken care of out into the future is going to be an important part of a CTBT. That’s the piece 

I’m going to make sure I communicate very clearly in this administration. That is my job, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. I take it from what you said that you just 

disagree with Secretary Gates that it will ‘‘become impossible to 

keep extending the life of our arsenal,’’ without testing. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That’s if we just leave the arsenal the way it 

is. In other words, to just do the day-to-day maintenance, I would 

agree with the Secretary, if we do what I would call the life-extension approach, which is a reuse or replacement approach—and I 

think this is where Secretary Gates was going, in effect, was modernizing, driving more reliable performance margins in there so 

we’re sure we don’t have to test—then my view is that we can do 

that in a nontesting future. 

Senator VITTER. I just want to make clear, his comment was not 

about that, it was about testing. He said, ‘‘Without testing, we 

won’t have this.’’ You’re disagreeing with that, correct? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I don’t know the context of Mr. Gates’s statement, so I think we are actually agreeing that if I can’t modernize 

the stockpile, we’re going to find ourselves where every year we’re 

getting closer and closer to the point where the scientists and engineers in my organization—they’re going to get to a point that say, 

Mr. President or Mr. Secretary, first, and then we tell the President, we’re facing a moment of truth here with respect to testing, 

but we believe, in DOE or in the NNSA, that an integrated program of fixing the infrastructure, of working on the stockpile, and 

modernizing pieces of it, together with a science program to back 

it up, can take care of our nuclear deterrent out into the future indefinitely without testing. 

Senator VITTER. I will try to get that full context to you. But, my 

understanding is, he wasn’t talking about this, he was talking 

about testing. Without testing, we can’t do this. But, I will get that. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I would love to come back on that. 

121 

Senator BILL NELSON. I would be surprised, Senator Vitter, if it 

were said in that isolated context, because I’ve had lengthy discussions with General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs, on this very issue, and I think he has every confidence to 

feel that, with the appropriate modernization program, that we can 

have the reliability we have to have. That’s my impression. 

Senator VITTER. I will get that context to you and follow up on 

the discussion. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I would love to do that. 

Senator, I’d appreciate that. 

Senator VITTER. Admiral, if I can ask you—and thank you for 

your visit yesterday; I enjoyed that very much—the fiscal year 

2010 budget continues funding for the next-generation follow-on to 

the Ohio-class SSBN. Can you discuss the Navy’s current plans for 

that next generation, and steps, in particular, that have been taken 

early on to try to ensure we don’t experience cost overruns or 

scheduling delays? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. This budget includes a request for $495 million to begin the work for the replacement of the Ohio 

class. The Ohio class is tremendously capable submarine today. It 

has no particular shortcomings. This request is based on the end 

of service life of that ship, which has been extended to 40 operational years. This is an on-time—it’s not early, it’s not late—it’s 

an on-time start for the engineering and the research and development work to support and start construction in 2019. It’s also on 

time with respect to the industrial base, and it’s timed well to support our ally the United Kingdom. The work that we’re doing early 

is concept work and missile launcher development prototype work, 

and it can be guided by the decisions of the NPR and the other 

events we talk about. I think it is well-timed to accommodate all 

the work that is going forward. It includes the early propulsion 

work for a ship of that size. 

Senator VITTER. Great. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that’s all I have. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to take your previous question and 

now ask that of the Admiral. How can you start the design of the 

new submarine if you don’t know the outcome of the NPR? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. The very early work is concept work, 

layout, and qualification of vendors. In the case of the Ohio class, 

the youngest of the Ohio class is the Louisiana, delivered in 1996, 

so we have been out of production of large, heavy missile tubes and 

the launching equipment for about 25 years. So, this early work is 

a combination of laying out how we will make that part of the submarine acoustically quiet, and other characteristics because, of 

course, we have very quiet attack submarines, but they do not have 

a missile compartment. It will be assessing how to do design and 

build that part of the ship, the missile compartment, with the same 

labor-saving techniques that we used on the attack submarines, in 

that section of the ship that we have not looked at in our Navy for 

almost 40 years. 

So, the exact number of tubes, the exact number or dimensions 

of those tubes, the exact speeds, none of those things need to be 

known in the first year of concept and research and development. 

Instead, we do things like we find a vendor capable of doing a misVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
122 

sile hatch of that size out of the type of materials that we need to 

do—a core test article, which is representative, but not identical— 

and then destructively test it to make sure that vendor can give us 

a device or a hatch without flaw. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Alston, the same question. How 

can you design a future airplane without knowing the results of the 

NPR? 

General ALSTON. Sir, we won’t do that. The follow-on bomber requirements—we heard the Secretary of Defense loud and clear, in 

terms of our requirement to improve and take a harder look at the 

requirements that we had already posited, as well as the technology that would be available at the time that we need this penetrating platform to be available. This platform would be informed 

by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), probably even more so 

than the NPR, but we do see linkages between both of those examinations, and we think that we will be better informed as the QDR 

and the NPR analysis continues. So, we think there’s a strong relationship between the two studies, and the outcome of that, with a 

better set of requirements for that platform in the future. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Is the B–1 bomber going to be part of the 

Global Strike Command? 

General ALSTON. No, sir, it’s not. It’s a conventional-only platform, and that will remain in the Air Combat Command. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Did you have a question, Senator Vitter? 

Senator VITTER. I just have one followup. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Go ahead. 

Senator VITTER. I just wanted to follow up on the Senator’s line. 

Admiral, I take it from what you’re saying, you would never, for 

instance, finish design of a submarine before the NPR was finished. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. General, similarly, you would never finish design of a new aircraft before this NPR is finished. 

General ALSTON. No, sir. 

Senator VITTER. I was just suggesting, earlier, that logically it 

seems pretty clear to me we shouldn’t finish a new START before 

the NPR is finished. That was my earlier point. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Carpenter, from an operational 

perspective of the 8th Air Force, what are your plans to balance the 

conventional and nuclear excellence of the bomber force? 

General CARPENTER. Sir, we’ve been doing that for a long time, 

ever since we took on the conventional mission in full force, starting around the Operation Desert Storm timeframe, but with the recent issues with the nuclear mission, obviously we’ve put a lot 

more focus on the nuclear side, and we designed the global deterrent force to address that issue. But, we’ve put a wing in the bucket, if you will, for the nuclear mission, and they stayed there for 

a whole year. So, while Minot Air Force Base is in North Dakota, 

the 2nd Bomber Wing at Barksdale is focused on the nuclear mission. So, we have that balance now. 

The 4th Squadron becomes a big issue now. When we stand up 

the 4th Squadron at Minot, it fills out that force, so we have 

enough force structure to separate that mission as we can. 

So, while neither are always exclusively focused, we always have 

to keep the nuclear certification, the crews ready to go, and the nuVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Dec 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\52626.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
123 

clear and on the conventional side, both, but the focus shifts from 

day-to-day, or from year-to-year, if you will. So, while the Global 

Deterrent Force, 2nd Bomber Wing right now—or, I’m sorry—and 

I got that backwards—2nd Bomber Wing is in Guam today, and 

Minot is in the Global Deterrent Force, kind of really focused on 

the nuclear mission, and that swaps back and forth. The B–2s don’t 

have the luxury of having two separate wings, but they have two 

separate squadrons. So, those two squadrons rotate back and forth, 

as well, where one is always assigned the Global Deterrent Force 

mission, and they focus, primarily at least, on the nuclear mission. 

When they do the training, they really go out and focus on the nuclear side. Then, the other squadron is the conventional role. So, 

we’re able to do that with the force structure we have today. 

General ALSTON. Sir, I just might add that, to the credit of 8th 

Air Force and General Elder and now General Carpenter, all three 

of our bomber wings have undergone no-notice nuclear surety inspections and have all passed those inspections. Those are exceptionally rigorous tests of nuclear requirements, and so, we are 

showing some positive results in that regard. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Now, we’re expecting B–52s and 

B–2s to take us all the way through 2030. Are we going to be able 

to sustain their viability? 

General ALSTON. Yes, sir, we will. I would ask General Carpenter to comment on this, as well, but first let me just say that 

the B–52 has a lot of life left in it, and we have plans in place to 

ensure its vitality in both the nuclear and conventional roles into 

the out-years. The B–2 ultimately will be facing threats that will 

exceed its capability as a penetrating platform; hence, the reason 

that we believe we need a penetrating platform to take on that responsibility when the B–2 may no longer be as effective at that role 

as we believe it is today. 

General CARPENTER. I would agree, sir. The great programs we 

have in place now, with the radar programs and all three bomber 

platforms—the B–2 specifically, and the B–52 on the books, and 

the B–1, as well, and the communications upgrades we have 

planned for all those platforms—it will take them well into the 

2040 timeframe. So, yes, sir, we can sustain those weapon systems. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Alston, you’ve had to work overtime to straighten out the loose nukes and all of that. Have you 

got it under control? 

General ALSTON. Sir, we absolutely have it under control. As you 

may know, I came into my Pentagon tour about 21 months ago, 

which happened to coincide within days of the challenge that we 

had with the unauthorized munitions transfer. So, I’ve been personally focused on this through this entire assignment. 

My responsibilities have shifted, and right now, as a consequence 

of Secretary Donley’s and the Chief of Staff, General Schwartz’s, 

decision last fall, I work directly for the Chief of Staff now in my 

responsibilities, on their behalf. Their personal leadership drove us 

to prepare a roadmap that we published last fall to set the course, 

with six principal strategic objectives to help the institution focus 

better and achieve the outcomes that we are starting to achieve at 

this time. 

124 

General Carpenter’s folks and our other deployed commanders, 

with a lot of very aggressive personal leadership, are ensuring the 

success that we have today. But, we need to move forward with the 

personnel development changes that we have underway. We’re 

bringing an additional 2,500 people into the nuclear mission over 

the course of this next year. 

General Chilton has pointed out in previous Defense Science 

Board studies, there has been an erosion of nuclear deterrence 

skills. So, the people component of our effort will continue to require the kind of vigilance and focus that we have in motion right 

now, and I believe it will take several more years before we feel 

that we have completely overcome some of the skill challenges we 

have. 

But, we have aggressive inspection programs, we have 100 percent oversight of all of our inspections. We’ve changed the Air 

Force corporate structure to have a dedicated nuclear operations 

panel. This is going to ensure a very thorough vetting of nuclearrelated requirements so that they compete well for Air Force resources. Air Force leadership intervention has ensured very good 

resourcing of the nuclear mission at this time. So that’s a thumbnail of the number of programs that we have underway that is fulfilling the Chief and Secretary’s establishment of reinvigorating the 

nuclear enterprise as the Air Force’s number-one priority in the 

strategic plan. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Part of our labs need to help out the intelligence community to support the analysis of foreign nuclear capabilities. There’s no funding in your budget for 2010 in the NNSA 

fiscal year 2010 budget request. Are you going to be needing funding for this, coming up in the future? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. For intelligence analysis, sir? 

Senator BILL NELSON. For analysis of foreign nuclear capabilities 

and the proliferation challenges. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In a way, the intelligence funding request 

comes through another part of the Department, not through the 

NNSA. But, what I would say, with respect to your question, the 

funding that we do—the same people that do this intelligence analysis are the same people that are either experienced weapons designers, people that understand the physics behind how to understand timers, special detonator devices—these are the same people 

that we start off with in the NNSA. Ultimately, as they go through 

our program, they can shift to other divisions in the laboratory. So, 

Z Division, for example, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, funded through the intelligence program, essentially contained people that started off in my program in the NNSA. 

So, the funding that I have ultimately supports intelligence, but 

in an indirect way, by exercising the capabilities, by getting these 

folks exercised, not only experiments, but having this design experiment. 

That essentially goes to the previous questions we talked about, 

is, are we sustainable, in the long term? That is why I want to get 

the science and the infrastructure pieces essentially on the right 

track. 

We’ve turned it around in this budget. We’ve shifted $130 million 

back into the science area, for this very reason. My view is, in the 

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out-years we’ll ultimately need more, and that will be, ultimately, 

my job within the administration, to work this problem in the outyears. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You’re going out to outside financing for 

a number of the buildings that you need. Why wouldn’t you ask for 

a government line item? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’ll go. For an example, one of the facilities you 

probably allude to, sir, is our Kansas City project. That is a General Services Administration project. There are a couple of reasons, 

but let me focus on one that is particularly attractive to me as we 

look at transforming ourselves from a kind of a Cold War nuclear 

weapons complex into a 21st-century nuclear security enterprise, 

and that is, I don’t know what the future brings with respect to unclassified parts that the Kansas City plan may need to make. We 

may find, as a result of our modernization efforts, that we can reduce the number or the complexity of these non-nuclear parts and 

find ourselves much more efficient, 20 years from now, if you will, 

from being able to make those parts at our laboratories. 

There’s a certain attractiveness that I find in driving efficiency 

in the program if I have a 20-year lease that is approved, of course, 

appropriately—there’s a financial payback, in this case, of $100 

million a year that has been audited, we believe—but being able 

to say, 20 years from now, I’m not building a facility that the Nation does not need way out into the future. So, from my standpoint, 

there’s a certain attractiveness in being able to say, 20 years from 

now, turning that manufacturing facility back over to the developer, and not having to worry about maintaining the structure out 

on the taxpayers’ burdens. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let’s talk about Los Alamos and Y–12. 

That’s where the problems are. Tell us about that. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Los Alamos has a proposal that I have not approved yet. It’s a proposal, right now, for a science complex. It’s a 

proposal that we agree that we need to get people out of trailers 

at the laboratory. These are our world-class scientists, and yet, we 

have them in facilities, frankly, that I’d be embarrassed to have 

any of these folks go into. So the laboratory is looking at—and we 

agree that there’s a need, but now we’re in the process of examining—should it be a third-party-financed facility, should it be a 

line-item facility, do the numbers work, does the analysis come 

through? General Harencak, who’s with me, who’s running defense 

programs—I talked to him this morning, frankly, about, where are 

we on our third-party-financed projects? He’s looking at this—DOD 

calls it an alternative analysis. What are our options with respect 

to acquisition? Doing what we need for our scientists. 

One thing that’s clear to me, though, is, for facilities that are— 

we have to be very careful about employing this technique. For one 

thing, it has to be done judiciously. Obviously, it has to make a lot 

of sense, financially, for the taxpayers. Obviously, it can’t put us 

in the position where we have to be moving large fences around 

and having pockets of uncleared spaces, because, ultimately, if the 

country decides it doesn’t need it anymore, then we turn it back 

over to the developer, and then we have an issue of fencelines and 

the like. 

126 

Senator BILL NELSON. The lease would probably provide that, if 

you can’t fill it up with the government activities, that they could 

lease it on their own. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. If the government walks away from the lease, 

and each arrangement is, in effect, different. Certainly—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. But, let me just cut to the chase. 

Theoretically you wouldn’t have the space leased; they could 

lease the space. You’d be inside the fence. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Theoretically, if we ended up that way, yes, sir. 

Theoretically, yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. You have to watch that. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We had some very serious problems at Air 

Force bases, on Air Force housing, with the result that, inside the 

fence, at the Air Force base, you could have private housing, because the housing could be rented to non-Air Force personnel. Now, 

there’s a pecking order that they would have to go through, but, 

theoretically, at the bottom of the pecking order, you could have 

somebody just off the street renting a house inside an Air Force 

base. That’s what our present condition is. So, we don’t want that, 

especially when you start fooling around with facilities in your line 

of work. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, 

an accelerator facility that produces protons for a variety of scientific and weapons research, was supposed to have an upgrade beginning in fiscal year 2010, but the upgrade was not funded. Is this 

upgrade necessary to maintain nuclear weapons? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Sir, the facility is definitely necessary to maintain our stockpile. The upgrade reduces the risk that the facility 

will not—reduces the risk. We want the facility, of course, online 

to support our deterrent out into the future. So, the upgrades approach was to take away a fair amount of risk associated with the 

facility going down. You’re right, sir, first of all, we continue to operate that facility. Second of all, you’re absolutely right, we need 

it for neutron cross-section measurement for doing material 

science, nuclear science. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. So, you’re saying you need it. So, 

what happens to the facility without the upgrade? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. What happens without the upgrade is increased 

risk associated with operations. It’s a fairly old facility. It’s something that I believe is an important part of maintaining a deterrent 

and maintaining a laboratory, quite frankly, that can attract scientists that want to work in material science and in nuclear 

science. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. How much will the full upgrade 

cost, and how long will it take? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’ll give you a sense, sir, but I would like to 

take that for the record, if I could. 

There’s rough numbers of $150 to $200 million or so, as 

preconceptual design activities, but I don’t have the particulars. If 

I could take that for the record, I will provide the answer. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

127 

The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center refurbishment project would replace 

major components of the accelerator and accelerator control system that are required to maintain reliable operations and extend the life, but would not alter the 

design capability or capacity. The cost is currently estimated at $149 million, and 

the project could be completed within a few years of receiving full funding. This estimated cost places the project within the oversight guidelines of the Department of 

Energy order for project management. This order requires the cost for a project of 

this size to be validated; therefore, it is possible this estimate could fluctuate. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you have a guess on how long? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Multiple years. It’s not a 2-year activity. It’s 

probably 3 to 5 years, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask each of you, were your top five 

unfunded priorities—if funds were available, what would your top 

five be? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Sir, I would like to take that question for the 

record, if I may. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. So, you have to counsel up the 

chain of command? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. 

General ALSTON. Sir, the Air Force would have to do the same. 

We would like to take that for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Admiral JOHNSON. The President’s budget represents the best balance of resources to requirements. The Chief of Naval Operations’ top unfunded priorities includes SSP’s considerations and represents the top priorities of the Navy if additional funding should become available. 

General ALSTON. Currently we have identified only one unfunded strategic deterrence-related requirement for fiscal year 2010, the B–52 1760 Data Bus Internal 

Weapons Bay programs, which is on the unfunded requirements list submitted by 

the Chief of Staff on 18 May 09. The B–52 1760 Weapons Bay unfunded requirement totals $30.6 million which funds modification of the bay to add internal carriage capability for smart weapons and overall bomb-load capacity on the B–52. We 

will continue to identify areas requiring additional funding, and develop strategies 

to meet all combatant commanders’ requirements. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you want to take a stab at it? [Laughter.] 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’d like to provide the details for the record, but 

what I would like to iterate—and I can give you my—three broad 

priorities, are—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. Modernization? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. Modernization. It’s the science and the 

infrastructure that need to do that. But, we’ll take the question for 

the record, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Our top five unfunded priorities, if funds were available, would be to: (1) fully satisfy our Directed Stockpile Work program of work, including targeted life extensions 

for the weapon systems which support the Navy and Strategic Command needs and 

meet our extended deterrent obligations to our allies; (2) protect, replenish, and sustain the science, technology, and engineering capabilities required to leverage the 

Nation’s significant investment in science-based tools to assess the state of the 

stockpile and certify it’s safety, security, and reliability; (3) recapitalize our Cold 

War infrastructure so that our special nuclear materials (plutonium and uranium) 

processing capability is assured for the unknown future, including actions that will 

greatly reduce the size of the complex and reduce our security costs; (4) begin work 

on specific projects in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative that will help achieve 

some of the goals in the President’s speech in Prague; and, (5) support International 

Materials Protection and Cooperation activities to reduce special nuclear material 

128 

inventories through down-blending, and initiate activities to upgrade security in 

countries outside of the Former Soviet Union. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. 

Thank you all very much. The record will be kept open for 3 

days. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

1. Senator BILL NELSON. General Alston, are there any authorities that you need 

or that your successor will need to fully manage, oversee, and coordinate the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise? 

General ALSTON. I am confident we have the requisite authorities and structure 

in place to ensure enduring stewardship, manage, oversee, and coordinate the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise. The establishment of AF/A10 sends a clear and visible signal that the Air Force is committed to resolving the fragmented lines of authority 

across all levels of the nuclear enterprise and provides a headquarters Assistant 

Chief of Staff that reports directly to the Chief of Staff with authority to drive nuclear enterprise policy, guidance, requirements, and advocacy across the Air Staff. 

I am the single Air Staff authority for all nuclear-related issues and have lead responsibility for nuclear operations, plans, policy, and requirements. 

INSPECTIONS

2. Senator BILL NELSON. General Alston and Admiral Johnson, the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) also has a role in conducting inspections at nuclear facilities. How are the DTRA inspections coordinated with the service inspections, what do the DTRA inspections cover that the service inspections do not, and 

what is the benefit from each type? 

General ALSTON. DTRA inspects Air Force nuclear certified units in accordance 

with T.O. 11N–25–1, Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System. These inspections are coordinated with the Air Force Inspection 

Agency (AFIA) and the appropriate nuclear major command. DTRA inspections encompass those criteria established in T.O. 11N–25–1. The Air Force inspects using 

the same guidance, as well as that contained in AFI 90–201, Inspector General Activities, and major command specific supplemental guidance. Additionally, AFIA 

conducts independent oversight of Air Force nuclear surety inspections. DTRA inspections allow for an independent assessment, validation, and/or oversight of DOD 

nuclear weapon surety for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Air Force inspections, in line with their supplemental guidance, validate mission readiness as well 

as nuclear weapon surety for the major command commander and the Secretary of 

the Air Force. 

Admiral JOHNSON. There are two types of DTRA inspections associated with Navy 

nuclear weapons certified units. A Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI) is conducted on a not-to-exceed 5-year basis for each certified unit. DTRA is also tasked 

to conduct Surveillance Inspections (SI) that involve DTRA inspection team members providing an over-the-shoulder assessment of the Navy’s inspection team performance during a scheduled service Navy Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI). 

DTRA inspections of Navy nuclear weapons units are coordinated annually 

through direct liaison with the organizations responsible for Navy inspections. 

DTRA coordinates inspection scheduling of Navy afloat units with the type commanders for submarine inspections and with SSP for Strategic Weapons Facility inspections. 

DTRA inspections evaluate the 10 areas directed by the Joint Staff (JS) approved 

Special Weapons Ordnance Publication 25–1 which includes Management and Administration; Technical Operations; Tool, Test, Tiedown, and Handling Equipment; 

Condition of Stockpile; Storage and Maintenance Facilities; Security, Safety, Supply 

Support; Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program; and Logistics Movement. 

A NTPI covers an additional four areas which include Nuclear Weapons Radiological 

Controls; Radiation Health; Command and Control; and Nuclear Weapons Accident/ 

Incident procedures. 

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The benefit of DNSI is subjective and has been called into question by recent 

DOD level reports: Defense Science Board Report of Nuclear Surety Inspections, 

Schlesinger Commission Report, and others. 

3. Senator BILL NELSON. General Alston and Admiral Johnson, do you see any 

use in joint Air Force-Navy inspections? Would joint inspections address, among 

things, the shortage of skilled inspectors? 

General ALSTON. The Air Force fully supports the current joint inspection process 

performed by DTRA. Any new joint inspection requirement for Air Force personnel 

would have limited applicability due to Service-specific mission requirements and 

weapon systems. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Joint inspections occur today in the form of DTAR DNSI. 

Variations exist in technical operations and weapons system facility design between Air Force and Navy. A more consistent Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)/ 

Navy/Air Force criteria for inspection will better support a more streamlined DNSI 

process in the future. 

BOMBERS AND GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

4. Senator BILL NELSON. General Alston and General Carpenter, the new Global 

Strike Command, which will stand up at the end of the year, will eventually have 

responsibility for the B–52 and B–2 aircraft. It will not have responsibility for the 

B–1 aircraft. While I understand that the B–1 is no longer nuclear capable, on many 

occasions we have been told that the new Global Strike Command is not a reincarnation of the old Strategic Air Command and is not ‘‘nuclear command’’. In any 

event, the majority of the B–1, B–2, and B–52 sorties is, and will continue to be, 

conventional. I would like to get your personal and professional views on whether 

the B–1 should or should not be part of the new command and why? 

General ALSTON and General CARPENTER. The Air Force is reversing the trend of 

declining nuclear mission focus and erosion of nuclear expertise. One of the root 

causes of this trend was fragmented lines of authority and responsibility of our nuclear forces. Global Strike Command was created to align all nuclear forces under 

a single command and demonstrate full commitment to the global strike mission. 

While our primary focus is on reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise, we do realize 

there is a vital conventional mission for our B–52s and B–2s that must not be compromised. The B–1 is currently being used as a combat support aircraft in today’s 

operations, and related organize, train, and equip responsibilities will be retained 

by Air Combat Command. Additionally, Global Strike Command will provide the 

necessary leadership and focus to effectively balance the nuclear and conventional 

missions of the B–2s and B–52s to ensure they are ready to support the warfighter 

when called upon by combatant commanders. 

LOS ALAMOS NEUTRON SCIENCE CENTER

5. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center 

(LANSCE), an accelerator facility that produces protons for a variety of scientific 

and weapons research, was supposed to have an upgrade beginning in fiscal year 

2010, but the upgrade was not funded. Is the LANSCE upgrade necessary to maintain nuclear weapons? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The LANSCE facility is currently used to conduct experiments 

to answer specific stockpile-relevant questions, the answers to which are required 

to improve the science-based tools which allow certification of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile without resorting to underground nuclear testing. Those experiments include precision measurements of nuclear data on special materials important to nuclear weapons performance, classified experiments, and experiments utilizing high 

explosives and proton radiography. The weapons program requires data from 

LANSCE. The loss of the data from LANSCE would seriously affect our ability to 

improve our stockpile stewardship tools and therefore our capability to maintain the 

stockpile without testing. Unfortunately, the LANSCE accelerator facility has not 

received adequate preventive maintenance for years. Many of its components are 

long past their expected lifetimes and spares are in short supply. In the opinion of 

experts, the accelerator is ‘‘running to failure.’’ The failure of any one of the major 

components could result in a loss of continued operation of the facility for an extended period. The probability of a failure grows each year without refurbishment; 

yet other funding priorities within funding constraints have required that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) continues to absorb this risk. It was 

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cause we acknowledged that cheaper approaches to ameliorate these problems were 

available. These are now under consideration. 

6. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, what happens to the LANSCE facility 

without the upgrade? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It isn’t really possible to know how long the accelerator will be 

able to operate without refurbishment. All of the individual components are in principle repairable indefinitely, but in practice, we expect that the reliability of the facility will continue to decay without further investment. Without the refurbishment, 

we are accepting increased risk of major component failures affecting continued operations and increasingly large downtime. 

7. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, how much would the full upgrade cost 

and how long would it take to complete? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The LANSCE refurbishment project would replace major components of the accelerator and accelerator control system that are required to maintain 

reliabe operations and extend the life, but would not alter the design capability or 

capacity. The cost is currently estimated at about $150 million, and the project could 

be completed within a few years of receiving full funding. This estimated cost places 

the project within the oversight guidelines of the Department of Energy order for 

project management. This order requires the cost for a project of this size to be validated; therefore, it is possible this estimate could fluctuate. 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REORGANIZATION

8. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, the Strategic Posture Commission made 

several recommendations with respect to the organization of the NNSA. One in particular was focused on the regulatory environment. It appears that there might have 

been some confusion on the part of the Commission with respect to the role of the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), which is not a regulatory body, 

when they suggested that the nuclear weapons complex be regulated by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) rather than the DNFSB. Have you looked at the cost 

and the impact of having the nuclear weapons complex regulated by the NRC in 

lieu of the self-regulation that is in place today? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA has considered the impact of having the weapons 

complex regulated by the NRC in lieu of self regulation. We have not evaluated the 

cost impact of NRC regulation as opposed to self-regulation; however, there are several reasons that continued self-regulation is advisable. 

The first is that self-regulation has demonstrated an enviable nuclear safety 

record. Although the Commission was critical of our treatment of requirements, it 

did not question the safety of our operations. 

The second is that self-regulation permits the operational flexibility we need with 

respect to nuclear safety requirements to ensure we meet our mission. Following 

recommendations from the Colombia Accident Investigation and those of the 

DNFSB, we have established a Central Technical Authority and associated safety 

infrastructure to evaluate and concur on requests for relief from nuclear safety requirements where appropriate. Since September 2005, we have received and evaluated 20 requests for related exemptions. Only two were ultimately denied. Our 

streamlined evaluation process allows a quick turnaround where warranted, and exemptions have been concurred on in less than a day from receipt. Such responsiveness would not be possible with external regulation. Our demonstrated ability to 

grant relief where warranted provides effective control over the requirements under 

which we operate. 

Finally, external regulation would not relieve NNSA from the need to oversee nuclear safety. Most of our nuclear facilities are unique and provide products and services that are vital to our mission and that cannot be obtained elsewhere. In addition 

to possible damage to personnel, public, and the environment, a serious accident in 

one of our facilities would result in a loss of capability that would jeopardize our 

mission. If a public power utility has an accident, power can be obtained at a higher 

cost from other utilities. The same is not true for our operations. If our plutonium 

facility (for example) shuts down there is no replacement for the lost services and 

our mission is crippled. The same is true of most of our facilities. Thus, from a business perspective, our mission responsibilities require us to ensure that our nuclear 

facilities are operated safely. External regulation would result in more oversight, 

not less. These and similar considerations have led us to conclude that it is best 

if NNSA continues to self-regulate. 

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TRIDENT D–5 MISSILES

9. Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral Johnson, the Navy is moving towards more 

fixed-price type contracts to purchase the D–5 ballistic missile, which is used on the 

Trident ballistic missile submarine. In making this transition what are the issues 

that concern you most? 

Admiral JOHNSON. SSP recognizes the potential value of using fixed-price type 

contracts for mature production efforts and has committed to transition to the use 

of such contracts beginning in fiscal year 2011, where appropriate. As we make this 

transition there are several issues that concern us. 

First, there is a concern that the contractor may be motivated to make cost, performance, and safety tradeoffs that might not be in the best interest of the program 

or the Nation. Through the years, SSP has developed and implemented an acquisition strategy that maintains a primary focus on safety and reliability, while managing cost risk at or below budget. Because of the strategic importance of the system, any deviation from this successful acquisition strategy could engender unintended consequences that could impact the safety and reliability of the weapon. SSP 

will closely monitor contractor performance to ensure we maintain the optimal balance between contractor assumption of significant cost risk and managing an acceptable level of technical risk. 

Our second concern is maintaining the affordability of the system. While Trident 

II (D5) is a mature production program, the nature of the technical requirements 

leads to a program that still contains significant risk. The technical requirements 

of the D5 missile are unique in many respects. The volume limitation of the launch 

tubes combined with the stringent range performance requirements dictate the need 

for high energy class 1.1 propellants in the rocket motors. This technology is unique 

to the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) systems, and is not otherwise 

supported by other DOD or commercial (space) applications. A similar situation exists for the Trident Post Boost Control System components. Driven by the requirement for a Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle capability and the 

submarine safety requirements of using solid propellants, the designs, materials, 

and processes are unique to the SLBM system and are not supported by other government or commercial applications. Additionally, the electronics designs are driven 

by the need for radiation hardened components capable of performing in hostile environments. These unique requirements combined with very low production rates 

driven by budget constraints result in an increasingly fragile supplier base which 

requires constant management and oversight by the prime contractors to ensure a 

continuous supply of safe, reliable components. The ever present potential for complex, expensive efforts to requalify substitutes for legacy technologies and loss of 

suppliers represents significant cost risk along with the attendant technical risk 

which, in a fixed-price environment, would inevitably result in higher prime contractor cost proposals. 

Finally, we are concerned about the potential degradation of the open communication between SSP and its prime contractors. The success of the Trident program is 

due in no small measure to the cooperative government/contractor partnership developed over the past 50 years. When potential problems are identified they are discussed openly and solutions are developed through a collaborative effort. In a fixedprice environment, our contractors may be more motivated to unilaterally increase 

technical risk in an effort to save costs. This incremental increase in program risk 

may not be immediately apparent, but could lead to a cumulative unacceptable level 

of risk in the program. 

HELICOPTERS FOR THE ICBM FIELDS

10. Senator BILL NELSON. General Alston, for years the Air Force has been 

searching for replacement helicopters for use in the ICBM fields. In your prepared 

statement you are introducing a program to replace the old, Vietnam-era helicopters. What is the new program and what is the fiscal year 2010 funding? 

General ALSTON. The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) program 

will replace the existing 39 year old UH–1N helicopter fleet. CVLSP will provide 

vertical lift support for a number of missions including: Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missile (ICBM) nuclear weapon convoy escort, ICBM emergency security response, 

and National Capitol Region emergency response support. The UH–1N has deficiencies in carrying capacity, speed, range, endurance, and survivability for meeting 

mission requirements. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget requests $9.5 million of RDT&E for the CVLSP program. This funding supports development of statutory and regulatory acquisition 

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documentation along with activities to support a request for proposal and source selection. 

MISSILE AND COMPONENT TESTING

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, General Alston, and Admiral Johnson, 

the Services and NNSA work together to establish and conduct a minimum number 

of missile and component tests to ensure reliability. Most years there are not 

enough tests to meet the minimum standards. What is the minimum number of 

tests, including the number of joint test assemblies (JTAs), that are needed in fiscal 

year 2010 and are all of these tests funded? If not, why not? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Each weapon system has a testing plan that will feed the reliability model so a proper reliability assessment can be made. The number and type 

of tests for each weapon system varies every year based upon trends that are discovered and data gaps from previous years. NNSA accomplishes system, component, 

material, margin, aging, and flight tests as well as performing modeling and simulation programs. Joint flight testing with the DOD has the highest priority within the 

surveillance and assessment program. There are currently 19 joint flight tests 

planned for fiscal year 2010. All are fully funded. While additional laboratory tests 

would certainly enhance our confidence in the stockpile, NNSA must also prioritize 

this testing and assessment work against all of the other NNSA workload to maximize the benefit of the budget allocation. 

General ALSTON. Reliability testing involves both the delivery system and the 

warhead or bomb. DOD’s portion of weapon system reliability is computed using the 

delivery system reliability combined with the weapon’s or bomb’s reliability. Warhead and bomb reliability testing requirements are NNSA’s responsibility, with the 

number of associated JTAs determined in consultation with the Services. 

A minimum of four ICBM tests, all using JTAs, are required to determine weapon 

system reliability. The Air Force conducts approximately one test every 4 months, 

resulting in a 16-month cycle to determine weapon system reliability. This frequency meets the minimum requirement for nuclear weapons planning activities. 

A minimum of eight gravity weapon tests per year (five strategic and three nonstrategic), all using JTAs, are required to determine reliability. 

A minimum of eight Air Launched Cruise Missile tests per year, three using 

JTAs, are required to determine reliability. 

In total, the Air Force has 19 fully funded reliability tests scheduled in fiscal year 

2010, 14 of which will also contribute to warhead reliability testing, requiring NNSA 

support with JTAs. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Reliability is determined by a combination of flight test and 

ground test activities. The Navy performs four Trident II Follow-on Commander 

Evaluation Tests to validate that the weapons system continues its demonstrated 

performance in terms of reliability and accuracy as required by U.S. Strategic Command Instruction 526–1. Within the Navy flight test program, we fly four test heads 

(three NNSA JTAs and one Navy Enhanced Navy Test Bed) per weapon type to 

maintain reliability of Navy/NNSA components. These flight tests and hardware are 

funded in the President’s budget request. The Navy requirement for ground test 

evaluation is 11 warheads per year to be disassembled, tested, and 10 reassembled 

into war reserve units. The Navy portion of the cost of this testing is in the President’s budget, the NNSA portion should be in the NNSA budget. 

B–2

12. Senator BILL NELSON. General Carpenter, the B–2 budget request for fiscal 

year 2010 includes $16.8 million to integrate the Massive Ordnance Penetrator 

(MOP) on the B–2. Has DTRA completed the MOP development program? 

General CARPENTER. No, the DTRA technology demonstration is scheduled to complete in calendar year 2009. The MOP is being developed in three phases. Phase 

I (Concept Refinement) and Phase II (Design and Preliminary Testing) have been 

successfully completed. Phase III, Weapon Performance Demonstration, is underway 

and will culminate with MOP research and development flight tests from a B–52 

aircraft. 

B–2 integration efforts are occurring concurrently with the DTRA effort and will 

culminate with final hardware buildup and testing during the Air Force program. 

13. Senator BILL NELSON. General Carpenter, what is the capability and purpose 

of the MOP and why is it being integrated on the B–2? 

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General CARPENTER. MOP will provide the B–2 with a capability to defeat very 

hard and deeply buried targets such as deep bunkers and tunnel facilities. MOP is 

designed to improve weapon survivability, lethality, and penetration compared to 

existing Air Force penetrator weapons. 

The purpose of MOP technology demonstration program is to demonstrate the survivability, lethality, and penetration of a 30,000-lb. class penetrator weapon. The 

purpose of the MOP Quick Reaction Program is to deliver an improved Hard and 

Deeply Buried Target (HDBT) defeat capability beyond the Air Force’s current 

(2,000-lb. and 5,000-lb. class) penetrator weapons. 

MOP is being integrated on the B–2 to provide a capability to defeat high value 

assets in HDBTs in a high threat environment. 

14. Senator BILL NELSON. General Carpenter, what is the requirement that the 

MOP is satisfying? 

General CARPENTER. MOP requirement is captured in the following Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated documents: HDBT-Defeat Mission Area Initial 

Capabilities Document (ICD) dated January 20, 2005; and in HDBT Characterize, 

Engage and Assess ICD dated September 19, 2005. Those documents specify a requirement for improved HDBT defeat capability beyond the Air Force’s current 

(2,000-lb. and 5,000-lb. class) penetrator weapons. Additionally, the 2006 HDBT 

Analysis of Alternatives Weapons Effectiveness Study found that MOP provides 

greatly improved HDBT defeat capability and the 2007 Air Force Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment highlighted the need for HDBT defeat capability. Most 

recently, the Air Force received an Urgent Operational Need (UON) request for a 

HDBT capability. The UON has been endorsed by multiple COCOMs. 

FUTURE CONCEPTS

15. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, General Alston, and Admiral Johnson, 

in thinking about the future of the life extension programs for nuclear weapons in 

a smaller stockpile without testing, there may be opportunities to fundamentally improve the safety, security, and reliability of the weapons. This could include having 

a complete inventory of weapons with fire-resistant pits, insensitive high explosives, 

and other safety and security features. To do this could require replacing or rebuilding the pit or the secondary and other components of a weapon or slightly reducing 

the yield of the weapon. Have there been discussions about this type of approach 

for the future? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, NNSA is working closely with DOD to study opportunities 

for life extension programs (LEPs) that would increase surety (safety, security, antiuse control) and reliability in the nuclear weapons stockpile. Within the context of 

the joint NNSA–DOD Phase 6.x acquisition process, NNSA iterates the military requirements with the DOD and conducts design and trade studies. These studies examine trade-offs between improvements in surety and potential reductions in performance (yield), as well as other impacts to both DOD and NNSA. The amount of 

rework required to improve weapon surety varies between weapon system and detailed assessments already required to understand the trade space. The optimal 

technical approach for the future involves modernizing the stockpile by selecting 

from among the spectrum of options described in the Perry/Schlesinger Congressional Posture Review Report. Success in improving the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapon stockpile will require all of the tools developed in the 

stockpile stewardship program and support for the Nation’s nuclear weapons enterprise. The affordability of making such improvements in safety and surety must ultimately be considered in relation to other priorities. Such investment decisions 

should be made on the best available analysis as derived from the planned studies. 

For example, the current B61 LEP Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and Option DownSelect) was initiated by the Nuclear Weapons Council in September 2008, and is 

conducting an assessment to determine requirements and options for improving 

safety, security, use control, and reliability. This study is examining the amount of 

pit and secondary work that would accompany certain proposed surety enhancements. Although the B61 is an insensitive high explosive (IHE) weapon, and contains some of the most advanced surety features in the stockpile, additional features 

are being considered to address current and postulated future threats. Other weapons could require even more extensive nuclear explosive package (NEP) modifications to update their surety features, to include, for instance, replacing conventional 

high explosive with IHE. LEPs would require more extensive NEP rework, which 

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nary discussions on such improvements to the W78 ICBM warhead are already underway with the Air Force, prior to entering its LEP study phase. 

Accomplishing these improvements to the safety, security, and reliability of the 

stockpile without nuclear testing is understandably challenging and will integrate 

all of the tools developed under the stockpile stewardship to ensure success. In addition, understanding the overall enterprise capacity for design and production drives 

the time to achieve a stockpile with modern safety and security features. Optimizing 

the order and priority of weapons is an ongoing conversation between the NNSA 

and DOD communities and requires all participants for success. However, a modernized stockpile with improved safety, security, and reliability is achievable and 

should be actively pursued. 

General ALSTON. Yes. The Air Force has established long-term goals with NNSA 

to incorporate enhanced surety features (safety, security, and use-control features) 

and reliability in life extension programs. Additional considerations include reduced 

maintenance workload, complexity, and cost. The use of alternative pits and major 

components, along with the possibility of reduced yield (which may be offset by increased accuracy) or other performance trade-offs would also be factors in planning 

for the long-term viability and reliability of the future nuclear deterrent stockpile, 

consistent with congressional direction and support. 

Admiral JOHNSON. The Navy, in coordination with NNSA through the Project Officers Group, is evaluating options for maintaining the Navy’s nuclear deterrent that 

include improving weapon safety, security, and reliability. For example, in coordination with the NNSA, the Navy, Air Force, and United Kingdom are working on a 

joint fuze effort to leverage technologies across Services. In addition, the Navy is 

coordinating with NNSA to look at safety and security technology applications in 

the planning and development of current and future Submarine Launched Ballistic 

Missile (SLBM) weapons. 

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

16. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, the United States has maintained nuclear weapons for 17 years without explosive nuclear weapons testing. As one lab 

director recently said, ‘‘we know how to do this.’’ On the other hand, there are many 

experimental and computational tools, and skilled people needed to do this task. 

What is needed in the way of tools, people, and funding to continue to maintain the 

stockpile over the next 5 to 10 years without nuclear testing, and does the fiscal 

year 2010 budget support this? If not, why not, and what is missing or not funded? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Stockpile Stewardship program has invested in improved 

experimental and simulation capabilities—e.g., Dual-axis Hydrodynamic Radiographic Test (DAHRT) facility, National Ignition Facility (NIF), and Advanced 

Simulatilon and Computing (ASC) tools—as key elements of a comprehensive 

science-based approach to the nuclear mission. Employing these capabilities is essential to deliver the robust, scientific underpinning needed to maintain the legacy 

stockpile over the coming decade. Additional resources would enable us to recapitalize major production facilities and enhance the science and engineering and Directed Stockpile Work needed to transform the stockpile to a smaller, more reliable 

deterrent without Underground Tests (UGTs). We incur more risk each year as the 

stockpile ages, critical skills erode, and historic UGT data becomes less relevant. 

The recent Perry Schlesinger Report indicates that in order to keep a vital skills 

base we will need to evolve the legacy stockpile by demonstrating capability to field 

modern warheads that have no new military capabilities. We have not fielded a 

modern warhead in two decades, and critical skills are deteriorating. Activities are 

needed now to ensure experienced designers and engineers can mentor a new generation. Additionally, the growing dependence on scientific understanding for the future stockpile will require additional experts in theory, experiments, and simulation. 

Each year the NNSA evaluates its ability to accomplish its mission and prioritizes 

its work scope within available resources across a 5-year horizon. Our fiscal year 

2010 request is sufficient to assure the safety and reliability of the current stockpile 

and sustain critical skills as we wait for the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to conclude and the national level direction to be provided for the future stockpile. 

We anticipate that identified funding levels for the out-years may not be sufficient 

to meet the post-NPR stockpile requirements—including directed stockpile work, 

science-based stewardship, and recapitalization of NNSA’s aging plutonium and 

highly-enriched uranium facilities—along with the requisite skills to be successful. 

135 

MAINTAINING CRITICAL SKILLS AT NNSA

17. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, maintaining critical skills throughout 

the NNSA complex is necessary to maintain a smaller stockpile in absence of nuclear weapons testing. This is not a new revelation but the Strategic Posture Commission (the Perry-Schlesinger Commission) has raised this issue again as one of 

their highest priority issues. What specifically is the NNSA plan to maintain these 

skills and transfer them to a next generation? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I am committed that the talents and facilities of the NNSA can 

and should be brought to bear on science and technology for the full complement 

of national security challenges. I am working to broaden the NNSA mission to become a science and technology arm for national security issues, a resource to which 

other agencies with national security responsibilities turn. By taking on the additional challenge of national security science and technology, we can provide the next 

generation of graduate students in science and engineering with exciting and relevant scientific challenges at premier research facilities such as Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories, so that they may contribute 

to the security of our Nation. 

In the absence of nuclear testing, the mission of the Defense Programs laboratories is focused on Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship. The success depends on 

the ability to show that simulations can credibly be used to replace nuclear testing 

as a means of ensuring stockpile confidence. Universities recognize the challenge in 

developing new kinds of simulation tools across a number of related disciplines to 

accomplish this mission. 

Multitude of university collaboration programs are being conducted by NNSA that 

include establishing focused center of excellence at universities performing leadingedge research to graduate and undergraduate internships and summer institutes in 

various disciplines at the laboratories. In addition, NNSA funds fellowships, Research Centers of Excellence, Minority Serving Institution partnerships, post-doctoral appointments, and critical skills development programs. These activities not 

only engage academic communities in advanced research in areas of critical importance to NNSA but also maintain hiring pipelines from university graduates to the 

national laboratories. NNSA’s investment in key critical skills pipeline programs exceeds $74 million annually. 

NNSA also offers unique capabilities and facilities such as the Roadrunner, the 

world’s fastest computer; National Ignition Facility, the most powerful laser in the 

world; the Microsystems Engineering Science Applications facility, a premier microelectronics facility; and the LANSCE, doing research that helps maintain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent, counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and lay 

the foundation for many of the products we use in our daily lives by supporting materials, sciences, and technology. These are but a few of the capabilities and facilities that attract university researchers and in turn, universities develop cuttingedge simulation tools, experimental methods, et cetera that are critical to NNSA’s 

mission. Specific examples of collaboration include the Advanced Simulation and 

Computing (ASC) Program’s 10-year $220 million Academic Strategic Alliance Program (ASAP) (1997–2007) and the followup, 5-year $87 million Predictive Science 

Academic Alliance Program (PSAAP) (2008–2013); and the Science Campaign’s 

Stockpile Stewardship Academic Alliances Program (SSAA). These programs engage 

multiple universities in the country and research conducted through these partnerships contributes to the knowledge base required to demonstrate the capabilities of 

predictive modeling and simulation across a broad spectrum of science and engineering applications using some of the most powerful computers in the world. The 

ASAP, PSAAP, and SSAA encourage collaboration between the national laboratories 

and universities in the advancement of multi-disciplinary predictive modeling and 

simulation technologies, and educating and recruiting individuals with skills critical 

to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS-STOCKPILE MIX

18. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, with the possibility of a smaller stockpile there is the possibility that there will be fewer types of nuclear weapons in the 

future. In preparation for the NPR, is NNSA looking at the technical feasibility of 

reducing the total number of weapons types and how technically feasible it is to reduce the number of redundant warheads? For example would it be possible to have 

an ICBM warhead serve as a backup for an SLBM warhead? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA’s Defense Programs is a force provider to the DOD and 

does not establish the mix of weapons or the stockpile quantities needed to support 

the mission. As an active participant in the DOD-led NPR, NNSA is assisting DOD 

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in assessing the nuclear weapons stockpile needs of the future. NNSA will be supporting DOD in the process to define options for force size and mix of weapons in 

the future stockpile. Currently, the operational environments of ICBMs and SLBMs 

differ significantly and no current warhead meets the requirements of both. The 

DOD would be the appropriate agency to determine if warfighting needs for such 

things as military targeting, weapon effects against targets, and military characteristics such as reliability and survivability could be met by having an ICBM warhead 

serve as a backup for an SLBM warhead. 

19. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, would the overall stockpile be easier 

to maintain if there were fewer types of nuclear weapons, and if so, why? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. While ‘‘easier’’ is subjective, there are sustainment advantages 

to having fewer types of nuclear weapons. Fewer warhead types would reduce the 

variety of surveillance and maintenance activities. Furthermore, it would reduce the 

number of life extension programs. Over the long-term, it would also reduce the diversity of weapons capabilities and expertise needed across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Once the entire inventory of a particular weapon type is retired, NNSA 

could eliminate recurring activities and funding needed to support such efforts as 

maintenance, core surveillance, assessment, and other design and production support; however, NNSA will need continued funding for associated weapons experts, 

safety, surveillance, and dismantlement and disposition of weapon components until 

all activities associated with the retired weapon type are complete. 

There are counterpoints to these advantages. Fewer weapons types will reduce the 

capabilities provided to the DOD. The DOD would have to respond regarding the 

impact this reduction of capability would have on mission effectiveness. For the 

NNSA, even though there are potential cost avoidances by reducing nuclear weapon 

types in the stockpile, there are also potential investments needed. For example, 

having multiple nuclear weapon types available for each weapon system in the triad 

does provide confidence that one technical failure will not completely negate one leg 

of the triad. By eliminating redundancy, the confidence in the reliability of each remaining system will be much more critical. Modernization of the stockpile and an 

even greater reliance on surveillance and the tools of Stockpile Stewardship will be 

essential to provide credibility of deterrence. 

COMPUTATIONAL CAPABILITIES

20. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, the computational capabilities of all the 

labs have proved to be the real game changer for maintaining nuclear weapons in 

the absence of nuclear testing. As you move from two-dimensional modeling to 

three-dimensional modeling, is NNSA able to fund fully the code development and 

hardware needs of the stockpile stewardship program? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program 

and DOE Office of Science’s Advanced Scientific Computing Research have recently 

established a long-term collaboration and have charged a steering committee of laboratory technical experts to identify the impediments to exascale and strategies for 

overcoming them. Once the steering committee’s analysis is properly vetted, we will 

understand the schedule and resources required to achieve exascale computing and 

move our trusted codes to this next generation of computing. 

One of the greatest successes of the ASC program has been the successful addition of three-dimensional capability in the codes and the corresponding computer 

power to run highly resolved, three-dimensional calculations. So while many of the 

day-to-day calculations run in two dimensions for practical computing purposes, 

three-dimensional capability also exists to explore detailed weapons characteristics 

and explore scientific phenomena. Because of the grand challenge nature of the 

modeling and simulation in ASC, this will continue to be a balancing act for code 

development and hardware—as well as other aspects of the program. 

For the near future, the ASC program is working to maintain expertise, utilize 

peer-review, and sustain healthy code teams to improve the scientific underpinnings 

of the codes and meet the simulation needs of the SSP for key applications. This 

will be supported by the Roadrunner, Zia, and Sequoia platforms slated to run these 

simulations. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

NEXT GENERATION BOMBER

21. Senator VITTER. General Alston, 20 B–2s are the only long-range strike assets 

in the Air Force inventory that can access high threat environments and survive. 

These aircrafts have not been in production since 1997 and so there are no viable 

replacements to backfill losses. When a B–2 crashed in Guam in 2007, the Air Force 

lost 5 percent of its stealthy long-range strike fleet. The B–52 and B–1 have been 

upgraded numerous times to take advantage of new technology such as precision 

strike, global positioning systems, and targeting pods. However, stealth can never 

be incorporated into these aircrafts and they could remain vulnerable to attacks by 

surface-to-air missiles and fighters. 

It is important to remember that in the final days of Vietnam, the Air Force lost 

15 B–52s in 12 days during Operation Linebacker II. Air defenses have advanced 

markedly since then, but 47 percent of the long-range strike fleet is comprised of 

these same B–52s. While aircrafts such as the F–22 are certainly useful in certain 

scenarios, tactical strike assets require access to regional bases and forward deployed logistical support. 

As recent events at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and K2 in Uzbekistan have 

illustrated, access to regional operating bases is becoming increasingly tenuous. Furthermore, potential adversaries have anti-access and area denial capabilities that 

could severely curtail operations at these forward bases. Taking all of this into consideration, what were the original Air Force recommendations in the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP) for the Next Generation Bomber? 

General ALSTON. The Air Force manages Long Range Strike (LRS) capability 

through execution of its three-phase strategy: sustain and modernize the legacy 

bomber fleet, develop a mid-term LRS capability survivable in a high threat environment, and create a long-term solution using advanced technologies to generate 

revolutionary LRS capabilities. The existing bomber fleet, while aging, uses focused 

sustainment and modernization programs to maintain mission relevance, addressing 

issues with communications, navigation, electronic attack, and weapons delivery 

systems, as well as for integrating new weapons onto the B–52. While these aircraft 

do face survivability concerns against advanced air defenses, this can be mitigated 

by using complementary capabilities, such as standoff weapons. To address this, the 

Air Force has funded in fiscal year 2010 an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for a 

Long Range Standoff follow-on capability that will mitigate the high threat scenarios. America’s bombers retain superior direct attack capability in lower threat 

environments. These continuing Air Force efforts ensure the bomber fleet continues 

to be a responsive, flexible, adaptive, and lethal platform able to support the Nation’s LRS requirements. 

Concerning the Next Generation Bomber (NGB), as part of its second phase, the 

Air Force was actively pursuing LRS capability to meet emerging operational requirements. One specific initiative within this effort, completed in 2007, was an 

AOA that identified the most promising of many possible aircraft designs. In April 

2009, OSD cancelled the NGB program with Secretary Gates citing the need to better define the need, requirement, and technology required for this complex program. 

As a next step, the Air Force is fully committed to supporting and participating in 

the ongoing 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and accompanying NPR. After 

completion of the reviews, the Air Force will reevaluate its LRS strategy based on 

direction and findings from the reviews. 

22. Senator VITTER. General Alston, what threat-based analysis changed this requirement? 

General ALSTON. The decision to cancel the Next Generation Bomber was directed 

by the Secretary of Defense in the fiscal year 2010 budget submission until we have 

a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology. The Air 

Force supports the QDR and NPR to assess future strategic requirements. 

23. Senator VITTER. General Alston, stand-off weapons are key enablers for legacy 

bombers that are increasingly less survivable in defended air space. Conventional 

air launched cruise missiles (CALCM) comprise the majority of the Air Force’s 

stand-off weaponry inventory, but recent comments by Air Force leaders suggest 

that these systems will not be viable over the long-run. This year’s budget paused 

joint air to surface standoff missile (JASSM) acquisition, the replacement for 

CALCM. Why did this pause occur? 

General ALSTON. JASSM went through Nunn-McCurdy certification in fiscal years 

2007–2008 based on unit cost increases. Defense Acquisition Executive direction out 

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of Nunn-McCurdy was to test Lot 5 missiles prior to awarding the fiscal year 2009 

contract. This test resulted in 6 successes out of 10 shots. Based on the test results, 

the program was paused to incorporate fixes identified during the Nunn-McCurdy 

certification, determine root causes of the failures on Lot 5, and incorporate necessary fixes on Lot 5, Lot 6, and Lot 7 missiles. With the delay of the Lot 8 award, 

fiscal year 2010 production money was removed. 

24. Senator VITTER. General Alston, will the Air Force continue to invest in 

JASSM? 

General ALSTON. Yes, the Air Force is committed to the JASSM program as it is 

the Nation’s only stealthy, conventional, precision, launch-and-leave, standoff missile capable of being launched from fighter and bomber aircraft. As part of the 

Nunn-McCurdy certification, OSD certified the JASSM program’s importance to 

Congress and stated that there are no alternatives to the JASSM program which 

will provide equal or greater military capability at less cost. 

25. Senator VITTER. General Alston, is the Air Force investigating new technologies that enhance or supersede JASSM? 

General ALSTON. Yes, the Air Force is investigating both enhancements to JASSM 

and technologies to supersede JASSM. 

The Air Force is committed to the JASSM program as it is the Nation’s only 

stealthy, conventional, precision, launch-and-leave, standoff missile capable of being 

launched from fighter and bomber aircraft. As part of the Nunn-McCurdy Certification effort, OSD certified the JASSM program’s importance to Congress and stated that there are no alternatives to the JASSM program which will provide equal 

or greater military capability at less cost. Near-term enhancements to the baseline 

JASSM missile include extended range (ER) and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) 

variants. Currently in development, JASSM–ER uses a different engine and larger 

fuel tanks to significantly increase standoff capability. In addition, the Air Force is 

investigating a JASSM/ASuW variant that would integrate a datalink onto the 

weapon and update JASSM software to enable attacking moving surface ships. 

The Air Force, in conjunction with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and 

other national laboratories, is constantly looking at the next level of technologies. 

The Air Force is researching technologies for higher survivability weapons, high 

speed (up to hypersonic) weapons, and directed energy but none are planned to be 

operational within the Future Years Defense Plan. One example is an Air Combat 

Command (ACC) coordinated effort working with AFRL on a Technologies for Responsive Precision Air Strike (TRESPAS)/Technologies for Responsive Precision AirLand-Surface Strike (TRESPAL2) concept which will examine future technologies 

that can be developed to strike fixed and mobile targets with varying degrees of 

weapon effects. 

[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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