## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

IP Plaza, LLC v. Bean , 2011 IL App (4th) 110244

Appellate Court Caption I P PLAZ A, L L C, an I llinois L imited L iability Company
, Plaint i ff

Appellee
, v. STEPHEN BEA N, in His Capac ity as Macon County Clerk; and MACON COUNTY, I L L I NOI S, Def

endants-A

ppellants, and MT. Z I ON COMMUNI TY UNI T SCHOOL DI STRI CT NO. 3, MACON CO UN T Y M O SQ U I T O A B A T E M EN T D I ST RI CT
, M A CON CO U N T Y HEAL TH DEPARTMENT, MACO N COUNTY MENTAL HEAL TH DEP ARTMENT, MACON COUNTY CONSERVATI ON DI STRI C T
, L ONG CREEK TOWNSHI P, M AC ON COUNTY UNIVERSI TY OF I L L I NOIS EXTENSI ON, L ONG CREEK FI RE PROTECTI ON D I ST RI CT
, D E CA T U R PA RK D I STRI CT
, RI CH L A N D CO M M U

N I T Y COL L EGE NO. 537, SANI TARY DI STRI CT OF DECATUR, CI TY OF D ECATUR, D E CA T U R PU B L I C L I B RA RY
, E A ST G A T E CO M M O N S TAX I NCREMENT FI

NANCI NG DI STRI CT, and S TEPHEN M. GRI MM, in His Capacity as Mac on County

Trea surer , Def

endants, a nd
STEPHEN BEA

N, in His Capac ity as Macon County C l erk; DAYSA MI L L ER, in Her Capac ity as Macon County Supervisor of Assessments; and MACON COUN TY, I L L I NOI S, Count erpla intiffs-Appellants, v.
THE CI TY OF DECATUR, I L L I NOI S; and I P PL AZ A, L L C, Counterdef

endants-A

ppellees.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-11-0244

Rule 23 Order

filed Rule 23 Order withdrawn Opinion Filed November 3, 2011

Dec ember

21, 2011 November

3, 2011Held

(Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no pa r t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by t he Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In an action seeking to compel defe ndant county cler k to cer tify the initial equalized assesse d valuation of cer tain rea l proper

ty under the TI F Ac t, the trial court pro p er l y g rante d the complaint for mandamus, denied defe ndants’ laches defe nses and dismiss ed defe ndan t county ’s
counter claim alleg ing that the TI F district was invalid, si n ce t he trial
court did not err in g ranting mandamus re lief, defe ndants failed to

es t ab lish any prejudice from the delay with respe ct to plaintiff’s mandamus action and a develope r had i n v est ed over $2.3 milli on in purcha sing and rede veloping the proper ty based on the passag e of the TI F ordinanc es.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circui t Court of Macon County
, No. 08-CH-110; the Hon. Thomas E. L ittle, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l J ack Ahola, State’s Attorney
, of Dec atur, and J ohn M. My ers (ar g ued), of Rabin & My ers, P.C., of Spring field, for appellant.

Christop h er M

. Ellis (ar g ued) and Timothy J

. Tig he, J r., both of Bole n Robinson & Ellis, L L P, o f Dec atur, and J ack B. Teplitz, of J ack B. Teplitz & Associates, and Br ian M. Nemenoff, both of Peoria, for appellee s.

Panel PRES I DI NG J USTI CE TURNER delivere d t h e j udg ment of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Steigma

nn and Kne cht conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In Marc h 2008, plaintiff, I P Plaza, L L C, filed a co m p l ai n t fo r ma n damus ag ainst defe ndant Stephen B ean, in his ca pacity as Macon County cler k, to compel B ean to c ertify the initial equalized assessed valuation (EAV) of ce rt ai n rea l proper ty under the Tax Incre ment Allocation Redeve lopment Act (TI F Act) (65 I L CS 5/11-74.4-1 through 11-74.4-

-2-11 (West 2006)) in the manne r set for th in releva

nt Cit y of De catur

(the City) ordinanc es. ¶ 2 In May 2008, Be an answe re d an d fi l ed a counterclaim ag ainst I P Plaza and the City
, alleg i n g t h e tax incre ment financ ing (TI F) district was invalid. In Dec ember 2008, Macon County (the County) filed a counter claim ag ainst I P Plaza and the City

. The City also filed

a counter claim ag ainst Be an and a third-par ty complaint for mandamus ag ainst Day sa Miller, the Macon County supervisor of assessments. In April 2009, the trial court dismiss ed the County ’s counter claim based on equitable estoppel and laches

. In Fe bruar y 2011, the court g rante d I P Plaza’s and the City ’s mo t i ons for summary judgme nt and enter ed an order of mandamus

. ¶ 3 On appea l, Be an, Miller, and Macon County argue the trial court err ed in g ranting t h e complaint for mandamus and in denying the County ’s an d Be an’s laches defe nses to the mandamus claims. We aff irm.

¶ 4 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 5 A. The TIF Prope rty ¶ 6 In 2003, Rural King
, a company of far m supply stores , i n q u i re d ab out purcha sing a n abandone d Kmart building in Dec atur. Nothing came of Rural King ’s inquiry
, and the Glad Tidings Assembly of God churc h eventua lly purcha sed the old Kmart proper ty in September 2004. The churc h reque sted a tax exemption for relig ious use. In May 2005, the I llinois Depa rtment of Revenue deter

mined the proper

ty was tax exempt as it was in use as a churc h and the e x emption applied for 29% of the 2004 a ssessment year

. ¶ 7 The equalized assessed value of the building was $446,642 for the 2004 assessment y ear

. There afte r, and until November 14, 2006, Supervisor of Assessments Day sa Miller showed the proper

ty as having an eq u al i z ed assessed valuation of $0. Miller stated this was done beca use “the State of I llinois require s assessors to show exempt property on their books as beingexempt and having a value of $0 so that our softwa re doe s not ge nerate a tax bill.” ¶ 8 In late 2005, the churc h b e g a n r e mo d e li n g the Kmart building. Construction howeve r wa s abandone d in J une 2006. On J une 20, 2006, the churc h and L ear Group, L L C, entere d into an exchang e agree ment for the purcha se of the Kmart building by L ear Group in exchang e for the c hurch’ s purcha se of the f ormer A mere nI P buildi ng in Decatur. ¶ 9 On J une 29, 2006, I P Plaza was s u b s tituted for L ear Group as the purcha ser under the exchang e ag ree ment with the churc h. On J uly 4, 2006, the churc h took cu s t o d y o f the Amere nI P buildi ng and beg an pra y er se rvice s and cle anup ac tiviti es. ¶ 10 On J uly 26, 2006, the City and I P Plaza enter ed int o a re d ev el o p m en t agre ement respe cting the Kmart/chur ch building pursuant to the terms of the TI F Act. There in, the City
ag ree d to establish a TI F district for the proper ty ’s commerc ial development by I P Plaza. The TI F district bec ame known a s the Eastg ate Commons TI F District. ¶ 11 As part of establishing t h e T I F d i s t ri ct an d p u rs u an t t o i ts obligations under the rede velopment agr eeme nt, the C ity convene d a joi nt revie w b o ar d o n August 24, 2006, as require d by section 11-74.4-5( b) of the TI F Act (65 I L CS 5/11-74.4-5(b) (West 2006)). Be th Ruhle, the TI F consultant, found the are a in question met 6 of the 13 criter ia to be desig nated

-3-as a TI F district. The county cler k moved for approva l and stated the rede velopment site met the cr iteria of the TI F Ac t. ¶ 12 On November 6, 2006, co n s is te nt with its commitments in the rede velopment agree ment, the City adopted three ordinanc es establishing the rede velopment plan and adopting the taxin c r e me nt financ ing pursuant to the TI F Act. Ordinanc e No. 2006-100 direc ted the City Cle r k
to “file a cer

tified copy of t his ordinanc e with the C ounty Clerk of Maco n C o u n t y ” and to “obtain a cer

tificate from such County Clerk as to the total initi al equa liz ed asse ssed value ‘EAV’ of all taxable proper ty in the R ed ev elopment Project Are a.” Dec atur Municipal Ordinanc e No. 2006-100, § 5 (adopte d Nov

. 6, 2006). In providing the cer tification, the ordinanc e stated “the County Clerk shall use the levy y ear 2005 in deter mining such total initial EAV.” (Emphasis in orig inal.) Dec atur Municipal Ordi n an ce No

. 2006-100, § 5 (adopte d Nov. 6, 2006). ¶ 13 On November 14, 2006, the city cler k filed a c opy

of ordinanc e No. 2006-100 with the county cler

k. That same day
, Supervisor of Assessments Miller revoke d the relig ious exemption on the Kmart/chur ch proper ty

. On November 21, 2006, the churc h conveyed the
proper ty to Main Street Ba

nk and Trust as trustee. In Fe bruar y 2007, the bank conveyed the
proper ty to I P Plaza. The proper

ty was then remode led as a Rural King store. The 2006 rea lestate tax bill from Macon County listed the fair marke t value of the proper ty to be $883,968 and the equalized assessed v al u ation to be $294,656. A tax of $25,737.12 was assessed
ag ainst the proper

ty and paid by

I P Pl aza. ¶ 14 In Marc h 2007, in connec ti o n wi t h t he prepa ration of the tax bills for the 2006 taxes
pay able in 2007, County Clerk B ean c ertified the initial EAV of the prope rty as $446,642. After consultation with Assistant State’s Att orney Ken B oles, Be an conc luded the amount

was proper as it was the EAV the proper ty had prior to its obtaining relig ious-use exemption
status.

¶ 15 B. Court Proce eding s ¶ 16 In November 2007, I P Plaza filed a tax-objection c omplaint pur suant to se ctions 23-10 and 23-25 of the Property Tax Code (35 I L CS 200/23-10, 23-25 (W es t 2 0 0 6 )). I P Plaza claimed the supervisor of assessments incorre ctly revoke d the proper ty ’s exempt status, and made it retroa ctive to J une 1, 2006, based on her belief the proper ty was no longe r being used for relig ious purposes. I P Plaza argued the supervisor’ s belief of nonexempt use was fac tually incorre ct and asked the trial court, inter alia
, to find the proper ty was exempt from taxation for the 2006 tax y ear and reduc e the proper ty ’s TI F base value from $446,642 to $0. ¶ 17 In Marc h 2008, I P Pl aza filed a complaint for mandamus , naming the county cler k and multipl e taxi ng bodies as defe ndants. I P Plaza alleg ed the most rec ently asce rtained EAV of the churc h proper

ty at the time ordinanc e No. 2006-100 was adopted on November 6, 2006,

was zero. I P Plaza claimed Be an did not use the 2005 levy y ear in deter mining and cer

tifying the initial EAV for the proper ty but instead used the later- deter mined EAV afte r the proper ty had its exempt status revoke d. I P Plaza argued the direc tive in ordinanc e No. 2006-100 that “the Count y Clerk s hall use t he levy y ear 2005 in deter mining such total EAV” (empha sis in or igina l) (De catur Municipal Ordinanc e No. 2006-100, § 5 (adopte d Nov. 6, 2006)) was

-4-mandatory and not discretionar y

. I P Plaza sought an or der of mandamus direc ting Bea n to

cer tify the initial EAV using the 2005 levy y ear

. ¶ 18 In May 2008, the county cler k filed his a

nswer with a ffirmative defe nses. Be an alleg ed I P Plaza lacke d standing to bringan ac tion for mandamus . Be an also claimed the Eastgate Commons TI F ordinanc es wer e invalid beca use the are a in the TI F district did not qualify as

a “blig hted are a,” and thus Be an had no responsibilities with respe ct to I P Plaza’s supposed rig hts unde r an invalid or dinance and ag ree ment. Be an also filed a counter claim ag ainst I P Plaza and the City , seekingdecla ration that the TI F district wa s invalid. ¶ 19 In J une 2008, I P Plaza filed a combined motion to dismiss Be an’s counter claim pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2008)). Under section 2-619 (735 I L CS 5/2-619 (West 2008)), I P Plaza argued Be an’s counter claim should be dismiss ed beca

use it wa s barr ed by the doctrine of laches . I P Plaza claimed Be an sat on the joint revie w board, which asce rtained whether the Eastg ate Commons proper ty was elig ible for tax-increment financ ing, and he moved the board to qualify the proper ty for TI F
treatment. I P P l az a also included the aff idavit of Antonio Romano, a member of the
company , who stated I P Plaza invested approximatel y $ 2

. 3 m illion in purcha sing and rede veloping the Eastg ate Commons TI F proper ty

. Romano stated I P Plaza would not have purcha sed or de veloped the pr operty but for the pa ssag e of the TI F or dinance s. ¶ 20 In J une 2008, the City filed a motion to dismiss Be an’s counter claim. In October 2008,
to ensure the litigation proce eded eff icient l y , the parties enter ed into a joint stipulation wher eby
, inter alia
, Bean would withdraw his counter claim with leave to file additional aff irmative defe nses, the City and the County wer e g iven leave to file counter claims, and the mandamus case was c onsolidated with the tax-objection case

. ¶ 21 In November 2008, Macon C o u n t y fi led an answe r and both the County and Be an set forth the aff

irmative defe nse that mandamus relief was ba rre d by the doctrine of laches

. In Dec ember 2008, the County fi l ed a counter claim, alleg ing the invalidity of the Eastg ate Commons TI F district and ordinanc es. The County contende d the TI F district did not qualify

as “blig hted” and the ordinanc es wer e invalid beca use there was no rea son to suppose the rede velopment projec t are a wa s not subject to gr owth throug h private inve stment. ¶ 22 In April 2009, the City later filed a counter claim ag ainst Be an and a third-par ty complaint for ma n d a mu s ag ainst Supervisor of Assessments Miller. The City soug ht an order of mandamus direc ting Be an to cer tify the total initial EAV as zer o and an order direc ting Miller to amend her

rec ords to ref

lect the c orre ct valuation. ¶ 23 In April 2009, the trial court enter ed an order dism is s in g the County ’s counter claim base d

on the doctrines of equitable es t o p pel and laches

. The court found I P Plaza and the City “have incurre d substantial contra ctual obligations and have spent signific ant sums of money

over the two-y ear period from the date of the adoption of the TI F Or dinance (Nove mber 6, 2006) to the date of filing th e C o u n t er cl aim (De cembe r 1, 2008).” The court stated these commitments wer e made in relianc e on the revie w board’ s rec ommendation to approve the proposal and “it would be inequitable and unjust to permit the County to now challeng e the validity of the TIF District.” ¶ 24 I n M ar ch 2010, I P Plaza filed a motion for summ ary judgme nt. In J une 2010, the C i t y

-5-filed its motion for summary judgme nt. Both par

ties argued the initial EAV for the chur ch
proper ty should be zero. In Dec ember 2010, the trial court held a hear ing on the motions for
summary judgme nt. ¶ 25 I n Februar

y 2011, the trial court issued its written order and g rante d the motions. The
court found the undisputed fac ts demonstrated the most rec ently asce rtained EAV for the churc h proper

ty for the 2005 levy y ear was zero. Moreove r, the court found the TI F Act did
not permit the county cler

k to exercise discretion in deter mining the initial EAV but require d him to perform the ministerial task of cer tifying the initial EAV for the 2005 tax y ear . The
court direc ted Be an to utiliz e zero as the EAV for the churc h propert y

. T h e co u rt also direc ted Miller to amend the assessment rec ords to proper ly ref lect the assessed valuation of the prope rty . This appea l followed.

¶ 26 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 27 A. Standard of Review ¶ 28 “Summary judgme nt is appropr iate wher e ‘the pleading s, depositions, and admi s s i o ns

o n file, toge ther with the aff idavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine i s s u e as t o an y materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.’ ” Ioerge r v. Halve rson Constr uction Co. , 232 I ll. 2d 196, 201, 902 N.E.2d 645, 648 (2008) (quoting 735 I L CS 5/ 2 -1005(c ) (West 2000)). On appea l from a trial court’s decision g ranting a motion for summary

judgme nt, our revie w is de novo

. Bagent v. Ble ssing Care Corp. , 224 I ll. 2d 154, 163, 862 N.E.2d 985, 991 (2007).

¶ 29 B. Mandamus ¶ 30 “

Mandamus is an extraordinary reme dy traditionally used to compel a public officia l to perf orm a minist eria l duty .” People ex r el. Madigan v. Snyder
, 208 I ll. 2d 457, 464, 804 N.E. 2 d 5 4 6, 552 (2004). A petition for mandamus will be g rante d “ ‘only if a plaintiff establishes a clea

r, aff irmative rig ht to relief

, a clea r duty of the public officia l to a ct, and a clea r authority in the public officia l t o comply with the writ.’ ” Hadley v. Montes
, 379 I ll. App. 3d 405, 407, 883 N.E.2d 703, 705 (2008) (quoting People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe
, 201 I ll. 2d 552, 555, 778 N.E.2d 701, 703 (2002))

. The plaintiff bear s the burden of demonstrating

a clea r, leg al rig ht to the reque sted relief and must set forth ever y materia l fac t nece ssary to prove he is e ntitled to a writ of mandamus

. Lucas v. Taylor
, 349 I ll. App. 3d 995, 998, 812 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2 0 0 4 ) (c i ting Chicago Ass’n of Commerce & Industry v. Regional Transport ation Authorit

y , 86 I ll. 2d 179, 185, 427 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1981)).

¶ 31 C. The TI F Ac t ¶ 32 T h e TI F Act beca me eff ective in J anuar

y 1977. See People ex rel. City of Ca n t o n v. Crouch
, 79 I ll. 2d 356, 360, 403 N.E.2d 242, 244 (1980). In passing the TI F Act, the Gene ral Assembly soug ht “to provide municipalities with the means to era dicate blighted conditions by developing or rede veloping are as so as to preve nt the further deter ioration of the tax bases of these are as and to remove the threat to the health, safe ty , morals, and welfa re of the public

-6-that blighted conditions prese nt.” Board of Education, Pleasantdale School District No. 107

v. Village of

Burr Ridge
, 341 I ll. App. 3d 1004, 1010, 793 N.E.2d 856, 860 (2003). “The TI F Act enables a m u n icipality to eliminate bl ighte d conditions by collecting rea l proper ty tax incre ment reve n u es fr om local taxi ng districts within the TI F District and diverting the

reve nues to fund TI F District development projec ts.” Malec v. City of Bellev ille
, 407 I ll. App. 3d 610, 631, 943 N.E.2d 243, 262 (2011)

. “Ea ch y ear afte r the adoption of the ordinanc e, until rede velopment costs are paid, those

rea l proper

ty taxes which are attributable to the initial equalized assessed value shall be paid by the taxpay ers to the various taxi ng districts in the manner require d by law in the absenc e of the adoption of t ax incre ment alloca t i o n financ ing. [ Citation.] That portion of taxes which is attributable to the current equalized assessed value over and above the initia l eq u al ized assessed value of all taxable proper ty in the projec t are a shall be allocate d to and, when c ollected, sha ll be paid by the county

collector to the municipal
trea surer , who shall deposit the taxes into a specia l fund called the specia l tax allocation fund of the municipality for the purpose of pay ing rede velo p m en t projec t costs and obligations incurre d in the pay ment there of.” (Emphase s in orig inal.) Crouch
, 79 I ll. 2d at 362, 403 N.E.2d at 245. ¶ 33 Section 11-74.4-5 of the TI F Act sets forth the proce dure in the rede velopment proc ess, including the require ment that public hear ings be held, pl ans be made availab l e for public inspection, and a joint revie w board be conve n ed to approve or disapprove of the rede velopment plan. 65 I L CS 5/11-74.4-5 (West 2006). Once approve d, the municipality must adopt the appropr iate ordina nces. 65 I L CS 5/ 11-74.4-4( a) ( West 2006). ¶ 34 Section 11-74.4-4( a) pr ovides, in part, as f ollows: “Upon adoption of the ordinanc es, the municipality shall forthwith transmit to the county cler k of t he county or coun t i es wi t h i n which the rede velopment project are a is located

a cer tified copy of the ordinanc es, a leg al descr iption of the rede velopment projec t are a,

a map of the rede velopment projec t are a, identification of the year that the county clerk shall use for determining the total initial equalized assessed value of the redev elopment project area consistent with subsection (a) of Section 11-74.4-9, and a list of the parc el

or tax identification number of eac h parc el of proper ty included in the redev el o p m ent projec t are a.” ( Emphasis added.) 65 I L CS 5/ 11-74.4-4( a) ( West 2006). ¶ 35 Section 11-74.4-9( a) pr ovides, in part, as f ollows:
“I f a municipality by ordinanc e provides for tax incre ment allocation financ ing pursuant to Section 11-74.4-8
, th e c o unty cler k immediately there afte r shall deter mine (1) the most

rece ntly ascertained equ a l i zed ass essed value of each lot
, block, t rac t or parcel of rea l
proper ty within s u ch re d evelopment projec t are a from which shall be deducte d the homestead exemptions provided by Sections 15-170, 15-175, and 15-176 of the Property Tax Code, which value shall be the ‘initial equalized assessed value’ of eac h such piece of proper ty , and (2) the total equalized assessed value of all taxable rea l proper ty within such rede v el opment projec t are a by adding toge ther the most rec ently asce rtained equalized assessed value of eac h taxable lot, block, trac t, or parc el of rea l proper ty within such projec t are a, from which shall be deducte d the homestead exemptions provided by

-7-Sections 15-170, 15-175, and 15-176 of the Property Tax Code, and s h al l cer tify such
amount as the ‘total initial equalized assessed value’ of the taxable rea l proper ty within such projec t are a.” ( Emphasis added.) 65 I L CS 5/ 11-74.4-9( a) ( West 2006). ¶ 36 In the case sub judice
, the City enac ted a series o f o rd i n an ce s i n No v em b er 2 0 0 6 perta ining to the Eastg ate Commons TI F district. Section 5 of ordinanc e No. 2 0 0 6 -1 00 provided a s follows: “The City Clerk s hall filed a cer tified copy of t his ordinanc e with t h e C o u n t y Clerk of Macon County
, I llinois
, and under the TI F Act shall obtain a cer tificate from such County Clerk as to the total initial equalized assessed value ‘EAV’ of all taxable proper ty in the Redeve lopment Project Are a. In providing this cer tificati o n , the County Clerk shall

use the levy y ear 2005 in deter mining such total i n i t i al EAV.” (Emphasis in orig inal.) Dec atur Municipal Or dinance No. 2006-100, § 5 (a dopted Nov. 6, 2006). The initial EAV for the 2005 levy year was $0 in light of the churc h’s prior exemption. The county cler

k, howeve r, did not use $0 but instead cer tified the initial EAV as $446,642, which was the local assessed value the proper ty had during the 2004 assessment y ear

. Since the “most rec ently asce rtained” EAV, require d by the TI F Act and based on the EAV for the 2005 levy y ear as require d by the C i t y ’s ordinanc e, was $0 at the time the ordinanc e was passed, B ean use d the wrong number. ¶ 37 The question then become s whether Be an was obligated to use $0 or whether he had the discretion to use any number he saw fit. The statute and the ordinan ce at i ssue i n this case

use the phrase s “shall deter mine” (65 I L CS 5/11-74.4-9(a ) (West 2006)) and “shall use” (De catur Municipal Ordinanc e No. 2006-10 0
, § 5 (adopte d Nov. 6, 2006)) respe ctively in
reg ard to the County

Clerk’s duty

in asce rtainingand ce rtifying the rele vant initial EAV. ¶ 38 “When used in a statute, the word ‘shall’ is g ener ally interpre ted to mean that something is mandatory .” Citi

zens Organizing Project v. Departme nt of Natural Resource

s , 189 I ll. 2d 593, 598, 727 N.E.2d 195, 198 (2000). “The rule is n o t , h oweve r, an inflexi ble one; the
statute may be int erpr eted as permissive, depending upon the co n t ex t of t he provision and the i n t en t o f t he draf

ters.” People v. W

oodard
, 175 I ll. 2d 435, 445, 677 N.E.2d 935, 940 (1997). “Where a statute repose s discretion, it is directory and not mandator

y .” Hightower v. Duffy , 192 I ll. App. 3d 65, 74-75, 548 N.E.2d 495, 502 (1989)

. ¶ 39 He re , we fi nd the use of the word “shall” was mandatory

. Be an had no discretion t o utiliz e a differ ent y ear or number. His job was purely minist eria l in nature , i.e.
, to deter mine the initial EAV using the 2005 levy y ear and cer tify it. C o n cl uding the word “shall” was any thing other than m andator y would allow t he county cler k to use any

number he wished and there b y t h wa rt the intent of the parties who may have made an ag ree ment with a particula r levy y ear in mind. ¶ 40 The county cl er k
, h o we v er , s o u gh t to justify his actions by rely ing on the so-ca lled “rollbac k” case s, espec ially City of W arrenville v. Novak
, 355 I ll. App. 3d 714, 824 N.E.2d 327 (2005). In his filed affidavit, Be an st ated he consulted with Assistant State’s Attorney Ken Bole s and, based on counsel’s advice and the “rollbac k” case s, Be an conclude d the most

rec ently asce rtained EAV was the value the proper ty had prior to its rel i gi o u s exemption, which he stated was $446,642 f or the 2004 a ssessment y ear

.

-8-¶ 41 We find Novak does n o t ap p l y

. I n t h at case , the issues cente red on the valuation and

taxation of open-spa c e p a

r c e ls a nd whether the municipality or taxi ng districts should rec eive rollback tax es. Novak

, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 716, 824 N.E.2d at 329. Under the Property Tax Code, when land former ly assessed as open space for tax purposes is no longe r used for open

s pace , “the person liable for taxes on the land ‘shall pay to the county trea surer *** t h e differ ence betwee n the taxes pa id in the 3 prec eding year s as based on a valuation [as ope n space ] and what the taxes for those y ear s would have be en whe n based on the valuation as otherwise permitted by law, toge ther with 5% interest.’ ” Novak
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 716, 824 N.E.2d at 329 (quoting 35 I L CS 200/10-165 (West 2002)). The three -y ear back pay ment is ref err ed to as a “rollbac k.” In situations involving open-spa ce land, the cou n t y cl er k is require d to place t h e v al ue of the open-spa ce land in a column separ ate from the assessed value in case a rollback amount is to be calc ulated in the future. 35 I L CS 200/10-160 (West 2006). The Second District found the TI F Act did not apply to the rollback taxes. Novak
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 719, 824 N.E.2d at 331. ¶ 42 The c ase before us does not involve the valuation and tax ation of open-space land and the calc ulation of rol l back taxes. Moreove r, in contra st to the open-spa ce valuation in the Property Tax Code, th e T I F Act contains no corr esponding provision that would require
separ ate listi ng s of the assessed value of proper ty and any applicable exemption amount. We find the rollbac k case s distinguishable. Thus, we find the t rial court did not err in g ranting mandamus relief

in this case.

¶ 43 D. Laches ¶ 44 Be an and the County claim on appea l that I P Plaza and the City wer e g uilty o f l a ch es with r espec t to their mandamus actions. The defe nse of laches may apply in a case wher e a party is seeking mandamus relief

. Ashley v. Pierson
, 339 I ll. App. 3d 733, 739, 791 N.E.2d 666, 671 (20 03). The laches defe nse “bar s claims by those who neg lect their rig hts to the detriment of others.” People v. W ells
, 182 I ll. 2d 471, 490, 696 N.E.2d 303, 312 (1998). “A complaint for mandamus must be b ro u ght within six months unless there is a rea sonable explanation for delay .” Caruth v. Qu i n l ey , 333 I ll. App. 3d 94, 99, 775 N.E.2d 224, 228 (2002). ¶ 45 Gene rally
, a party asser ting the defe nse of laches must prove (1) the lack of due dilige nce by the party asser

ting the claim, and (2) prejudice to the party asser ting the defe nse. Ashley
, 339 I ll. App. 3d at 739, 791 N.E.2d at 671. A plaintiff’s lack of due diligenc e is established by a showing of a lapse of more than six months from the acc rual of the cause of action and the filing of the man d

a mu s p etition, unless the plaintiff offe rs a rea sonable excuse for the delay

. Ashley
, 339 I ll. App. 3d at 739, 791 N.E.2d at 671. As to the prejudice prong , “in case s ‘whe re a detriment or inconvenienc e to the public will result,’ prejudice is inhere nt.” Ashley
, 339 I ll. App. 3d at 739, 791 N.E.2d at 671 (quoting City of Chicago v. Condell
, 224 I ll. 595, 598-99, 79 N.E. 954, 956 ( 1906)). ¶ 46 I P Plaza claimed it first lear ned Be an had cer

tified the wrong initial EAV for the subject
parc el in October 2 0 0 7
, when the City indicated I P Plaza was not g oing to be reimburse d from proper

ty taxes paid on the parc el beca use the County claimed the initial EAV was not

zero. Over the nex t few months, counse l unsucce ssfully neg otiated wit h the C ounty trying

-9-to resolve the problem. When n ego t i ati ons failed, I P Plaza filed the mandamus action in

Marc h 2008. ¶ 47 We find the trial court did not abuse its discr etion in f inding the laches defe nse did not apply in the mandamus action. Even if I P Plaza knew about the issue in J une 2007 when the
tax bills wer e alleg edly mailed, I P Plaza offe red a re asonable excuse, stating it was attempting to resolve the matter without litigation. Moreove r, Be an and the County failed to establish prejudice from any delay

. ¶ 48 Be an and the County also argue the trial court abused its discretion in dismiss i n g t h e County ’s counter claims and B ean’ s aff irmative def

enses ba sed on laches . We disag ree

.

“ Laches is a doctrine which bars a plaintiff relief wher e, beca use of the plaintiff’s delay in asser ting a rig ht, the defe ndant has been misled or prejudice d. [C it at i o n

. ] Whil e a delay in asser

ting a rig ht alone does not constitute laches
, it is inequitable and unjust to g rant re lief to the plaintiff if the de fenda nt has relied on the circ umstances c omplained of to his detriment and the delay has been unrea sonable. [C itation.] Although the doctrine of laches is ordinarily not applied to the State [citation]
, it may be appropr iate in extraordinary circ ums t an ce s [citation] .” County of Du Page v. K-Five Construction Corp. , 267 I ll. App. 3d 266, 275, 642 N.E.2d 164, 170 (1994). ¶ 49 In this case , Be an sat on the joint revie w board, which asce rtained whether the Eastg ate Commons projec t was eligible for tax-increment financing

. Be an provided the assessment numbers to I P Pl az a an d t h e City that wer e used and relied upon to consummate the deal. After hear ing the opinions of the TI F expert hired to evaluate the proposal, Be an moved the board to qualify the proper ty for TI F treatment. Be an specific ally stated the proposed site met the criteria outlined in the TI F Act, provided that a parc el not at issue be included at full
assessment. Ba sed on the numbers provided and the promise of tax-increment financ ing, the develope r i nvested over $2.3 milli on in purcha sing and rede veloping the property

. But for the passag e of the TI F ordinanc es, Romano stated he would not have develope d the proper ty

. ¶ 50 Under these fac ts, it would have been unjust to allow the County to move forwa rd with i t s co u n terc laim. Doing so would have subjected the develope r and the City to econo m i c harm. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in enter ing judgme nt ag ainst defe ndants on the counte rcla ims. ¶ 51 In closing
, we commend the trial court for the t h o u gh tful consideration it took in this

case

. The court’s order demonstrated a clea r understanding of the fac ts and the appli cable law, and w e found it helpful in the r esolution of this disput e.

¶ 52 I I I . CONCL USI ON ¶ 53 For

the re asons stated, we aff irm the trial cour

t’s judgme nt.

¶ 54 Affir

med.

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