J-A26036-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TIRRELL WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 2145 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of September 16, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-41-CR-0000590-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2015

Tirrell Williams appeals the September 16, 2014 judgment of 

sentence, which was imposed after he was convicted by a jury of two counts 

of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”).1 

Herein, Williams contends that the trial court erroneously denied his pre-trial 

motion in limine. We affirm. 

The trial court has summarized the factual and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

On November 12, 2013, police stopped a vehicle being driven by 

[Williams] because they had a warrant for his arrest. The police 

removed [Williams] from the vehicle, searched him incident to 

arrest, and found $111 and a cell phone. The police handcuffed 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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[Williams] and placed him in the back of Officer Justin Snyder’s 

cruiser.

There were four other occupants in the vehicle. The other 

occupants also were removed from the vehicle and patted down. 

Two of the occupants possessed controlled substances. The 

front seat passenger possessed heroin and [crack] cocaine, and 

another occupant possessed marijuana and cocaine. [The heroin 

found on the front seat passenger was stamped “American Idol.” 

The bags were packaged with rice in a plastic baggie. The crack 

cocaine was packaged in knotted plastic sandwich baggies.]

[Officer Snyder requested another officer to remove Williams 

from the cruiser, and search him a second time. The officer did 

so, but again did not find any weapons or contraband.] Officer 

Snyder transported [Williams] back to police headquarters. 

When Officer Snyder removed [Williams] from the vehicle, he 

discovered a clear plastic sandwich bag (sometimes referred to 

as a distribution bag) on the floor board of the cruiser in the 

area where [Williams] had just been sitting. The distribution bag 

contained a knotted sandwich bag with rice and twenty-one blue 

waxen bags of heroin stamped “American Idol” and another 

knotted sandwich bag with twenty baggies of crack cocaine. No 

controlled substances were in the cruiser when Officer Snyder 

began his shift, and [Williams] was the first person to be placed 

in the back of Officer Snyder’s cruiser. 

The police also did not discover any paraphernalia to ingest the 

controlled substances on [Williams’] person, in [Williams’] 

vehicle, or in Officer Snyder’s police cruiser. 

Officer Snyder charged [Williams] with [two counts of PWID.]

On August 29, 2014, [Williams] filed a motion in limine in which 

he sought to preclude the Commonwealth from introducing 

evidence that other occupants of the vehicle were found in 

possession of drugs with similar packaging as the drugs allegedly 

possessed by [Williams]. He asserted that the relevancy of the 

similar packaging was outweighed by its prejudicial nature and 

the confusion it would cause. The court held an argument on 

[Williams’] motion and denied it on September 15, 2014 on the 

basis that the evidence was circumstantial evidence of intent to 

distribute.

A jury trial was held on September 16, 2014. The jury convicted 

[Williams] of both charges. [Williams] requested immediate 
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sentencing, and the court sentenced him to incarceration in a 

state correctional institution for one and one-half to three years.

[Williams] filed a post-sentence motion in which he requested a 

new trial, because the court erred in denying his motion in 

limine. The court denied [Williams’] post-sentence motion on 

December 16, 2014. Two days later, [Williams] filed [a] notice 

of appeal.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 4/29/2015, at 1-3 (minor modifications made 

for clarity and consistency). 

On January 6, 2015, the trial court directed Williams to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

On January 26, 2015, Williams timely filed a concise statement. On April 29, 

2015, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Williams raises the following question for our review:

Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in 

denying [Williams’] motion to preclude the Commonwealth from 

admitting evidence of drugs found in the groin area of other 

occupants of the vehicle that [Williams] was driving in order to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Williams] possessed 

drugs found on the floor of a police cruiser?

Brief for Williams at 7. 

We begin with the legal standards and principles that govern our 

review of this case.

When reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, we apply an 

evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. See 

Commonwealth v. Zugay, 745 A.2d 639 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(explaining that because a motion in limine is a procedure for 

obtaining a ruling on the admissibility of evidence prior to trial, 

which is similar to a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, our 

standard of review of a motion in limine is the same as that of a 

motion to suppress). The admission of evidence is committed to 
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the sound discretion of the trial court and our review is for an 

abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 

A.2d 693, 704 (Pa. 1999).

Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa. Super. 2007).

The threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether the 

evidence is relevant. “Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to 

establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at 

issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference 

or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact.” 

Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696, 699 (Pa. 1992). 

In addition, evidence is only admissible where the probative 

value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. 

Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155 (Pa. 1978). However, 

where the evidence is not relevant there is no need to determine 

whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 

prejudicial impact. Id. Instead, once it is determined that the 

trial court erred in admitting the evidence, the inquiry becomes 

whether the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable 

doubt that such error was harmless. Id. Harmless error exists 

where: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the 

prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence 

was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was 

substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) 

the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was 

so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so 

insignificant by comparison that the error could not have 

contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 

A.2d 621 (Pa. 1995) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 573 

A.2d 536 (Pa. 1990)).

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 350 (Pa. 1998) (citations 

modified). 

Williams argues that evidence of the drugs that were found in the 

groin area of the front seat passenger was irrelevant to his case, primarily 

because Williams “cannot be connected to the drugs other than his proximity 

to the other occupant and his later proximity to drugs found in the police 
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cruiser.” Brief for Williams at 11. “The absence of connection between the 

passenger’s possession of drugs and the drugs found in the police cruiser 

make this evidence irrelevant.” Id. We disagree.

Despite Williams’ contention to the contrary, there is a very clear link 

between the drugs found on the floor of the police cruiser and the drugs 

found in the groin area of the front passenger: the “American Idol” stamp 

on the heroin. The Commonwealth was required at trial to prove that 

Williams possessed the drugs that were found on the floor of the police 

cruiser. Williams was the first person arrested and placed in the cruiser on 

the day in question. The drugs were not on the floor before Williams was 

placed in the car. However, he vehemently denied possession of the drugs 

at trial, in particular because he was searched twice before being placed in 

the back seat of the car. The evidence at issue unquestionably was relevant 

not only as circumstantial evidence of possession, but also to refute 

Williams’ assertion that he was not the person who dropped the drugs on the 

floor of the vehicle. 

As noted, the evidence was relevant as circumstantial evidence of 

possession. The Commonwealth had to prove the identity of the person who 

placed the drugs in the police cruiser. Williams, only minutes before, was in 

a vehicle with another person who had a quantity of drugs that was marked 

and packaged identically to those found at Williams’ feet in the police car. In 

proving that Williams was the person who secreted the drugs on the floor of 

the cruiser, the Commonwealth demonstrated that Williams was the only 
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person in the cruiser, that no drugs were in the cruiser before he was placed 

in the car, and the drugs were marked exactly as those found on a person in 

the vehicle that Williams was driving immediately before being arrested. 

The drugs on the front passenger were a relevant, and arguably necessary, 

piece of the Commonwealth’s proof of possession. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in holding the evidence to be relevant.

Williams next argues that, if the evidence was relevant, the prejudicial 

effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. For this argument, 

Williams maintains that the evidence amounted to a prior bad act that was 

used for the sole purpose of proving another bad act, which is strictly 

proscribed by Pa.R.E. 404. This argument fails before it starts, because the 

very language of the rule that Williams relies upon precludes its applicability 

to Williams in this situation. Pursuant to Rule 404, “[e]vidence of a person’s 

character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular 

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” In 

other words, per its own terms, Rule 404’s proscription applies only when 

the bad act being introduced was committed by the person against whom 

the act is being offered. In this case, that would mean that Rule 404 only 

applies if one of Williams’ prior bad acts is being used to show that Williams 

is acting in conformity with his own prior bad act. Here, it was the front 

passenger’s bad act that was proffered against Williams. Rule 404 has no 

applicability here. 
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The evidence in this case undoubtedly was prejudicial. Most, if not all, 

relevant evidence introduced against a criminal defendant is prejudicial. 

However, as detailed above, the evidence was highly probative to prove that 

Williams was the person who possessed, and then abandoned, the drugs in 

the police cruiser. We discern nothing in the record to indicate that the 

prejudicial value outweighed the highly probative nature of the contested 

evidence. Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion either in ruling 

the evidence to be relevant or in determining that the probative value of the 

evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/2/2015