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THE HUDSON RIVER AIRSPACE 

AND MANAGEMENT OF 

UNCONTROLLED AIRSPACE 

CORRIDORS 

(111–58) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2009 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

VACANCY 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii 

TESTIMONY 

Coyne, James K., President, National Air Transportation Association .............. 8 

Fuller, Craig, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association ....................... 8 

Hersman, Honorable Deborah A.P., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board ................................................................................................................ 8 

Kragh, Edward, Certified Professional Controller - Newark Tower, Adjunct 

to FAA New York VFR Airspace Task Force, National Air Traffic Controllers Association ..................................................................................................... 8 

Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization, Federal 

Aviation Administration ...................................................................................... 8 

Zuccaro, Matthew S., President, Helicopter Association International .............. 8 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 46 

Cohen, Hon. Steve, of Tennessee ............................................................................ 47 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 48 

Graves, Hon. Sam, of Missouri ............................................................................... 53 

Johnson. Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas .................................................................. 55 

Mica, Hon. John L., of Florida ................................................................................ 58 

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 64 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 65 

Petri, Hon. Thomas E., of Wisconsin ..................................................................... 70 

Richardson, Hon. Laura, of California ................................................................... 75 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Coyne, James K. ...................................................................................................... 81 

Fuller, Craig ............................................................................................................. 88 

Hersman, Honorable Deborah A.P. ........................................................................ 97 

Kragh, Edward ......................................................................................................... 109 

Krakowski, Hank ..................................................................................................... 129 

Zuccaro, Matthew S. ................................................................................................ 151 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hersman, Honorable Deborah A.P., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board: ...............................................................................................................

Animation ...................................................................................................... 10 

Response to question from Rep. Hall, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of New York ...................................................................... 105 

Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization, Federal 

Aviation Administration: .....................................................................................

Response to question from Rep. Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri .............................................................. 38 

Responses to questions from Rep. Costello, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois ................................................................. 136 

Response to question from Rep. Hall, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of New York ...................................................................... 146 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

National Business Aviation Association, Ed Bolen, President and CEO: ...........

Written testimony ......................................................................................... 155 

Letter to Administrator Blakey ................................................................... 160 

Page

VI 

New York City Council, Christine Quinn, Speaker, written testimony .............. 173 

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(1) 

THE HUDSON RIVER AIRSPACE AND MANAGEMENT OF UNCONTROLLED AIRSPACE CORRIDORS 

Wednesday, September 16, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jerry F. Costello [chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. The Chair 

will ask all Members, staff, and everyone to turn all electronic devices off or on vibrate. 

The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the 

Hudson River Airspace and Management of Uncontrolled Airspace 

Corridors. Although the gentlemen from New York, Mr. Nadler and 

Mr. Bishop, and the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires, are not 

Members of the Subcommittee on Aviation, they are Members of 

the Full Committee; and, therefore, I ask unanimous consent that 

they be allowed to participate in today’s hearing. They have a 

strong interest in this hearing due to the proximity of their districts to the Hudson River corridor. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I will give a very brief opening statement, then call on my Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for any remarks or opening statements that 

he may have, and then we will hear from other Members that may 

have an opening statement or remarks and go right to the witnesses. 

I want to welcome everyone to our Subcommittee hearing regarding the Hudson River Airspace and Management of Uncontrolled 

Airspace Corridors. The recent collision between a private airplane 

and a sightseeing helicopter over the Hudson River in which nine 

people died was a tragic accident. The Subcommittee offers our 

deepest sympathies to those who lost family members on August 

the 8th. While the National Transportation Safety Board has released preliminary findings on the incident, the investigation is ongoing; and no conclusion can be made at this time. 

The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from experts 

in aviation safety, flight operations, and air traffic control procedures that are knowledgeable about the Hudson River airspace 

known as a Class B airspace exclusion area and similar corridors 

around the country. The exclusion area is heavily used by heliVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:57 Nov 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52279 JASON
2 

copters and general aviation airplanes transiting through the area 

or sightseeing. 

Currently, there are voluntary procedures for pilots to follow 

when operating in the exclusion area; and, since 1971, millions of 

aircraft have flown in the Hudson River exclusion area without a 

collision occurring. However, there has been many near misses reported. According to the recent FAA estimates, there are oftentimes 

as many as 600 aircraft operations per day in this corridor. 

I commend the NTSB and the FAA for undertaking an immediate safety review of the procedures governing this airspace, including ATC handoff procedures. Similar corridors throughout the 

national airspace system warrant a review as well. 

On August 27th, the NTSB issued five independent recommendations to the FAA to improve the safety of the airspace. I look forward to hearing from the NTSB Chairman, Deborah Hersman, on 

these recommendations. 

I also commend FAA Chief Operating Officer Hank Krakowski 

for convening the New York Visual Flight Rules Airspace Task 

Force quickly after the accident to examine procedures for aircraft 

operations and identify ways to enhance safety in the Hudson 

River exclusion era. Shortly after the meeting, the task force issued 

eight recommendations to the FAA pertaining to airspace realignment, ATC and flight procedures, charts for pilots that depict the 

New York airspace and specific operating procedures within the exclusion area, and training and educational programs for pilots and 

controllers. 

One of the recommendation mandates that pilots follow standard 

operating practices, which are currently voluntary, within the Hudson River Class B exclusion area. I agree with the FAA’s decision 

to move forward with publishing mandatory operating procedures, 

and I am pleased that the FAA issued a notice to airmen that temporarily establishes these rules. However, we need to ensure that 

pilots and air traffic controllers are adequately trained on these 

new procedures. 

I am also interested in hearing how sightseeing helicopters making multiple takeoffs and landings per day will be separated from 

the path of airplanes transiting through the airspace. 

Several of the witnesses testifying today participated in the task 

force, and I look forward to hearing their recommendations in discussing any issues or concerns the Subcommittee should be aware 

of before the FAA acts on a rulemaking. 

Before I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his opening statement, I ask unanimous consent to allow 2 weeks for all 

Members to revise and extend their remarks and to permit the submission of additional statements and material by Members and 

witnesses. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. 

As I have indicated many times, aviation safety is our Subcommittee’s top priority; and I know it is the top priority of our 

Full Committee as well. It is vitally important that we understand 

3 

and fully explore any and all safety issues related to the operations 

in the national airspace system. 

Just over a month ago, a Piper airplane and a tourist helicopter 

collided over the Hudson River, killing all nine people aboard both 

aircraft. While the specific causes of this tragic accident are still 

under investigation, it is another reminder that, while we have a 

very safe system, we cannot let our guard down or become complacent. I look forward to working with the National Transportation 

Safety Board, the FAA, and industry stakeholders to address all 

the contributing causal factors in this accident. 

Hundreds of flights a day from JFK, La Guardia, Newark, and 

Teterboro operate in the New York City airspace, making it the 

busiest on our globe. Maintaining safety in this airspace requires 

a dedicated, focused effort by air traffic controllers, operators, and 

regulators alike. 

The National Transportation Safety Board has taken an important first step by releasing its recommendations for improving safety in the Hudson River airspace. These recommendations include 

revising air traffic control procedures as well as creating a special 

flight rule area in this airspace. I am pleased that Chairman 

Hersman could join us today and look forward to her testimony as 

she outlines these recommendations. 

The air traffic control challenges posed by this congested airspace 

should renew our focus on how accelerating air traffic control modernization can help address safety issues. With commercial and 

general aviation air traffic anticipated to continue to grow, modernizing our Nation’s air traffic control system should be a top priority. Ensuring that every aviation operator, general as well as 

commercial, has the opportunity to obtain satellite positioning technology could go a long way in making aircraft operation safer and 

more efficient. 

Imagine if the pilot of the Piper had access to the air traffic control information right in his own cockpit. He would have been alerted to the presence of other aircraft and could probably have avoided the collision. We simply cannot afford to operate an analog airspace system in a digital world. 

I am looking forward to the testimony and discussion of these 

safety issues; and I actually have, I think, some command and control issues as well, who is in charge. I thank our witnesses for their 

participation and contributions to this hearing and yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the Ranking Member and now recognize 

the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires, for any comments or 

opening statement that he may have. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing me 

to participate in today’s hearing. 

The recent tragedy between a small plane and a sightseeing helicopter over the Hudson River highlights the need for improved 

oversight of aircraft in this area. It is critical that this congested 

airspace be better regulated. 

I represent Hudson County in New Jersey, which borders the 

Hudson River directly across Manhattan. Ellis Island, Liberty Island, lies entirely within Hudson County waters. The scenic views 

from New York, New Jersey, as well as the Statue of Liberty, atVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:57 Nov 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52279 JASON
4 

tract large numbers of aircraft through the Hudson River corridor. 

On any given nice day, upwards of 600 aircraft can be seen passing 

over the Hudson River. While the vast majority of aircraft travels 

safely through the area, it does not alleviate our responsibility to 

address safety concerns. 

For years, the FAA insisted that it lacked statutory authority to 

regulate airspace below 1,100 feet. While I am encouraged to see 

that FAA has reversed its position, I am concerned whether the recent accommodations go far enough to prevent further tragedies— 

fromensuring better handling of aircraft between control towers to 

a comprehensive system for regulating flights over 1,000 feet, and 

improving safety standards for commercial sightseeing tour operations. 

In addition to safety concerns, I am also concerned about the 

noise associated with low-flying aircraft. I am sure you have received some of my letters regarding the concerns of the residents 

in our area regarding the noise. 

The task force included recommendations on helicopters over the 

Hudson River must fly below 1,000 feet. In the past, the number 

of sightseeing helicopters has exceeded 20,000 a year. Having that 

many aircraft flying at lower altitude creates a constant noise nuisance for those in New Jersey living along the Hudson River. From 

my perspective, the FAA’s recommendation for helicopters seems to 

simply trade one problem for another. 

Thank you, Chairman, for holding this important hearing and allowing me to participate. I look forward to the discussion on this 

issue. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from New Jersey and now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you; and I want to thank Mr. Costello for 

convening this hearing. 

I do want to start out first, before I comment on the topic at 

hand, to express my sincere condolences to the family of Bill 

DeCota. Bill DeCota was among hundreds of our Nation’s great 

aviation directors; and Bill was the New York Port Authority Director of all of the airports in New York City, including a recently acquired Stewart facility. 

I have known him for about a decade. I worked with him when 

I was Chairman of this Subcommittee. He passed away last Friday, 

September 11. The irony of that day and that passing is something 

that I just—I can’t believe. 

When I became Chairman in early 2001, Neil Levin, who Levin 

who had been the Legislative Director of Senator Al D’Amato when 

I was Chief of Staff for Senator Hawkins from Florida, a good 

friend, they invited me to come up to New York as the Chairman 

to look at the airspace and the congestion and problems they faced. 

The New York Port Authority controlled all of the airports. So Neil 

was the Director. The Director of the airports was Bill DeCota. 

And I went up about 7 weeks before. It was in August of 2001. 

I spent about a half a day at each airport. 

On the Monday after that weekend, we had about a dozen Members of Congress who came up to the New York Port Authority 

headquarters. We were in the World Trade Center. The Port AuVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:57 Nov 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\52279 JASON
5 

thority owned the World Trade Center. We conducted a hearing; 

and, afterwards, several of us were invited by Bill DeCota and Neil 

Levin to have lunch in a conference room which was adjacent to 

the Windows of the World restaurant that the Port Authority kept 

for meetings and their own purposes. 

On that day, on that Monday, we left Bill DeCota, we left Neil 

Levin, many who helped us. Unfortunately, on the morning of September 11, Neil Levin and many who helped us, with the exception 

of Bill DeCota, were all in that same room; and they were all killed 

in the attack. Bill DeCota, ironically, was in Montreal for an aviation conference; and he did not die on that day. But some 8 years 

later, the good Lord took him away from us. It just an incredible 

irony of fate. 

He was one of the finest human beings that I knew in the whole 

industry, dedicated day and night to his job and safety of operations and efficient operations in probably the most difficult setting 

of any aviation operations in the world. So we will miss him and, 

again, our condolences. 

Again, I appreciate a moment to speak about Bill and remember 

him in the record; and I am going to put a statement in the record 

today. 

This hearing is apropos. It is important oversight. That was a 

tragedy. We were very fortunate we did not have a tragedy earlier 

in the year with the U.S. Air flight that landed safely in the Hudson. 

As the Ranking Member has brought up, our Ranking Member 

and Mr. Costello, and you will hear also from Mr. Coyne and others, we need 21st century technology. Those who may have not 

functioned well—and this is still under investigation, so we don’t 

want to jump the gun—but if people did not operate properly or 

were inattentive to duty or complacent in their work, they need to 

be held accountable. The investigation will reveal that. 

My final concern is that New York airspace has been under redesign. I was up there 8 years ago to look at the congestion, the problems. The New York airspace accounts for about 80 percent of all 

our chronically delayed flights. The corridor that is in question 

here isn’t exactly part of that redesign, but it is affected by the redesign, and we should have good rules in place for operation in 

that corridor of small aircraft or charter aircraft. So we have got 

to get resolved problems that have emanated from the New York 

airspace and that corridor in the best interests of safety of the public and move forward. That is our chief responsibility in this Subcommittee and Committee, so I look forward to working with you. 

And, again, I appreciate the extra time to remember Bill DeCota 

at this hearing this morning. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now 

recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Chairman Costello and Ranking Member Petri, for holding this hearing and for allowing me to participate in today’s proceedings. 

As you know, the Hudson River corridor is partly in my district. 

I share it with Mr. Sires. So this is an issue that I have been working on for a very long time, and it is of great concern to me and 

to many New Yorkers. 

6 

After many years of pleading, I am pleased to see the FAA finally take action to regulate—begin to regulate this congested airspace, but I fear that the steps being taken are simply not enough. 

For at least 10 years, I have been demanding regulation of the helicopter industry in New York. 

In 1999, after receiving numerous complaints from constituents 

about helicopter traffic, I called on the FAA to regulate our airspace. The FAA responded they lacked the statutory authority to 

regulate airspace below 1,100 feet. Subsequently, we got a study 

authorized to analyze the impacts of helicopter traffic, but the 

events of 9/11 put the topic of helicopters temporarily on hold. 

Over the last 2 years, we have redoubled our efforts to get the 

FAA to regulate our increasingly crowded airspace. We in fact met 

with the FAA to discuss this issue as recently as July and then a 

follow-up meeting scheduled for late August, when it was scheduled 

well before the terrible crash. Throughout this entire time, including in July, the FAA insisted to us that it lacked the statutory authority to regulate the airspace in the New York City corridor 

below 1,100 feet. 

Obviously, this claim was not true, as we kept telling them it 

was not true. 

I am gratified that, after the crash, the FAA has finally reversed 

its position and now agrees that it has statutory authority to regulate this airspace. It is tragic and absolutely unacceptable that it 

took nine deaths to produce this belated concession on the matter 

of clear law. The midair collision has provided the impetus for action, but the congestion in New York airspace is a widespread problem beyond this one incident. 

I support the measures FAA has proposed to improve operating 

procedures for pilots in the area, but they are simply not enough. 

For example, the FAA will develop and make available training for 

pilots and controllers in the Hudson River exclusion area. But why 

is this training voluntary? We require training for pilots in the 

Washington, D.C., area. Why isn’t the FAA mandating training for 

anyone that flies in the New York area, especially given the density, security sensitivity and complexity of New York’s airspace? 

More importantly, why has the FAA not taken action to address 

the main problem of congestion? By the FAA’s own estimates, there 

are about 600 aircraft occupying this airspace on a typical good 

weather day. Why doesn’t the FAA limit the number of flights, at 

least until satellite-based technology is available to track and manage traffic? 

The FAA has proposed stratifying airspace, with local aircraft 

like air tours all flying below 1,000, essentially allowing the same 

number of flights but shrinking the space that they are allowed to 

fly in. I have referred to the Hudson River as the Wild West because of the appearance that this heavily used and the congested 

airspace is a free-for-all without any regulation or control whatsoever and too much uncontrolled traffic to be able to operate safely 

in the corridor. Under the FAA plan, it will would still be the Wild 

West, just in a more constrained geographic area. I fear this could 

actually make the situation worse, and it will certainly exacerbate 

noise and safety concerns. 

7 

If there is any good news in all of this, it is that there is technology out there which could allow better management of aircraft 

such as the ADS-B system, a component of NextGen that is a satellite-based GTS detection system. ADS B is not yet operational, 

but the FAA should give priority to congested areas and potentially 

use New York as a test area for earlier implementation than its 

proposed 2010 deadline. 

In the meantime, the FAA should consider limiting, if not banning, flights below 1,100 feet, certainly tourist flights, which serve 

no real function except for commercial profit. And, contrary to the 

Mayor, I do not believe that any substantial number of tourists are 

not going to come to New York and harm the tourism industry because of a lack of helicopter flights. But certainly there should be 

a limit or perhaps a ban on flights below 1,100 feet until these 

radar systems are available to track them. 

Thank you again for holding this hearing and for permitting me 

to participate. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and to 

working with all of you to improve the safety of New York’s overcongested airspace. 

I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from New York 

and now recognizes the other gentleman from New York, Mr. Hall. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Chairman Costello and Ranking Member 

Petri, and thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today 

to discuss this important topic. 

I also would like to offer my condolences to the families of those 

who died in the August 8th crash over the Hudson. 

My district spans the Hudson River north of where the accident 

took place, but many of my constituents work in New York and 

commute to New York, and some of them use air service in the 

process of doing so. 

I am pleased that the FAA responded quickly to the crash, convening a panel of stakeholders together with the NTSB to devise 

some changes to the management of the Hudson River corridor airspace to improve safety. I am still reviewing the proposals put forward by the task force, but I am optimistic that positive changes 

will result from this process. 

My foremost concern is why does it always seem to take a fatal 

accident to motivate the FAA to implement the NTSB recommendations? This Committee’s transcripts are filled with instances where an accident occurs, we hold a hearing and then determine what happened and how it could have been prevented, only 

to learn that the NTSB has already made recommendations, in 

some cases several years prior, that if implemented would have 

saved lives. 

I should note that this phenomenon is not limited to the FAA. 

This summer’s Metro crash here in D.C. showed that there is no 

monopoly in failure to heed NTSB’s warnings and recommendations. 

So, once again, thank you to the Chairman for holding this hearing. Thank you to all of our witnesses. I look forward to your testimony, to working together to make the skies of New York and the 

entire country safer. 

I yield back. 

8 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and would ask, 

any other Member wanting to make an opening statement or comments? 

If not, the Chair will recognize the panel of witnesses at this 

time: the Honorable Deborah Hersman, who is the Chairperson of 

the National Transportation Safety Board; Mr. Hank Krakowski, 

who is the Chief Operating Officer of ATO with the FAA; Mr. Craig 

Fuller, who is President of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association; Mr. Matthew Zuccaro, who is President of the Helicopter Association International; Mr. Edward Kragh, who is a Certified Professional Controller, Newark tower; and Mr. James Coyne, who is 

the President of the National Air Transportation Association. 

I would advise all witnesses that we would ask you to adhere as 

closely as possible to the 5-minute rule. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, 

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; 

HANK KRAKOWSKI, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; 

CRAIG FULLER, PRESIDENT, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION; MATTHEW S. ZUCCARO, PRESIDENT, 

HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; EDWARD 

KRAGH, CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL CONTROLLER - NEWARK 

TOWER, ADJUNCT TO FAA NEW YORK VFR AIRSPACE TASK 

FORCE, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION; AND JAMES K. COYNE, PRESIDENT NATIONAL AIR 

TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION 

Mr. COSTELLO. At this time, the Chair recognizes the Chairperson of the NTSB, the Honorable Deborah Hersman. 

Ms. HERSMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Petri, and Members of the Committee. On behalf of the NTSB, I 

would like to extend our condolences to all those who lost loved 

ones in this accident. 

And, Mr. Chairman, with your concurrence, I would like to show 

an animation today during my testimony. I will go over the 5- 

minute time limit, but I think the Committee will find it of interest. This animation shows the events leading up to the August 8th, 

2009, midair collision of a Piper Lance and Eurocopter AS350. 

The collision occurred in the Class B exclusion area over the 

Hudson River. There were three fatalities on the private aircraft 

and six fatalities on the helicopter. Neither aircraft was equipped 

with a cockpit voice recorder, a flight data recorder, nor were they 

required to be equipped. I would like to emphasize that this is still 

an ongoing investigation and that there is significant work to be 

done by our staff. 

My testimony today will be limited to the factual information 

that we found thus far. I will not provide any analysis, draw any 

conclusions, or establish the cause of this accident today. 

We have already identified some early issues of concern. They 

prompted us to issue a number of safety recommendations which 

you all have referenced, and I discuss those in more detail in my 

written presentation. 

9 

I would like to restate that we have not determined the cause of 

the accident, the role of any individuals, mechanisms, or organizations who might have been involved. 

The animation that I am about to show has been created by our 

staff using preliminary radar data and air traffic control tapes from 

the FAA. Our staff are represented today by Ms. Alice Park and 

Ms. Christy Spangler, and I would like to recognize them. 

This is a major effort for our team. They have worked the last 

few weekends to be able to complete this animation in time for today’s hearing. On the animation you are going to see some transmissions that are attributed to the pilot of the accident aircraft. 

The accident airplane, you will see that reflected as mike charlie, 

the Teterboro controller and the Newark controller. However, the 

audio track is only from the Teterboro Tower. 

A witness reported that the accident helicopter made position reports over the common traffic advisory frequency, but that frequency is not recorded. Also noted on the animation is a nonpertinent call that was made on a landline by the Teterboro controller 

to operations at Teterboro. 

The animation begins after the Piper takes off from Teterboro 

and appears on radar. The Teterboro Airport is going to be at the 

top left on the screen, and it will be highlighted by a white ring. 

Can you please start the animation? 

[Animation is shown.] 

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Insert offset folio 12 here 52279.012
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Insert offset folio 13 here 52279.013
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Insert offset folio 14 here 52279.014
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The exclusion area provides a passageway through the Class B 

airspace permitting aircraft to fly north and south along the Hudson River between approximately the George Washington Bridge to 

the north and the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge to the south without 

authorization from air traffic controllers. The exclusion area extends from the surface of the Hudson River up to 1,100 feet. 

As seen in the animation, the airplane flew southbound until the 

local controller instructed the pilot to turn left or southeast and 

join the Hudson River. 

In a moment, the Teterboro controller will instruct the Piper to 

change frequencies and contact the Newark controller. 

Our review of other tapes indicate the pilot read back an incorrect frequency and did not contact Newark before the accident. The 

accident helicopter departed from the West 30th Street heliport 

about 11:52 for a 12-minute tour. The first radar target for the accident helicopter was detected by the Newark radar when the helicopter was west of the heliport. 

The following is an animation of the final flight path of the two 

aircraft based on radar data. The accident helicopter appears on 

the lower left side and is highlighted by a white circle. The helicopter continues climbing southbound until the collision occurred at 

about 1,100 feet. 

These images were taken by ground witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony, and I would be 

pleased to answer any questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you and the members of your 

staff for pulling this together. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Krakowski. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Petri. Thank you for inviting us to testify about what FAA has 

done since the accident on August 8. 

We would also like to say that we also grieve over the loss of the 

family members on that airplane and also of Bill DeCota as well, 

who was clearly someone we worked with at FAA quite a bit. 

I think the best way to describe my testimony is to also use some 

visual aids, and you have all been provided a packet of information. 

The first two pages are the eight specific recommendations that 

came out of the task force which was convened a week after the 

accident. Once we looked at the data, we saw are we saw a clear 

need to get the stakeholders involved, including the NATCA controllers, to help us sort out what improvements are appropriate for 

the airspace. 

So if we could go to Chart 1, which is the third document in your 

package. This is not quite as detailed a representation, but it 

shows you approximately where the accident occurred over the 

Hudson River, and this happened at 1,100 feet. 

So keeping that in mind, if we go to Chart 2, this is a side view, 

looking from the west side of the Hudson River looking east toward 

Manhattan. This is a side view of the airspace and how it is organized in its current configuration, a configuration that has basically 

been this way since 1971. The most important thing to know about 

is Class B airspace, which is positive controlled airspace, all aircraft in that airspace has to be under positive control of a controller and radar. The primary purpose of Class B airspace is to 

17 

protect airliners at the three large airliner airports. And that is 

what the purpose of Class B airspace always was. It was never set 

up to control general aviation traffic, other than keeping them 

properly separated from the airliners. 

A couple of things that you will notice about the Class B airspace 

is that it has different altitudes at different parts in the river. At 

some points, it is 1,100 feet; at other points, it is 1,500 feet. One 

of the things we found out is that for aircraft that transitions, in 

and out of the airspace, there is some frequency confusion: What 

frequency should I be on, talking to the controller? Or should I be 

talking to the other airplanes on the common frequency? So we saw 

that as an opportunity. 

This has been regulated airspace, by the way. Even though the 

term ′′uncontrolled′′ is used a lot, it is ‘‘uncontrolled’’ in terms of 

a controller actually controlling the airspace. It is regulated with 

procedures and regulations and has been regulated basically forever. But you do see a lot of mixing of traffic, helicopters doing 

their sightseeing tours or medical evacuation or police missions, 

aircraft flying through the area, changing altitudes, seaplanes even 

landing up and down the Hudson. 

And I think what is notable is that you will notice that the air 

speeds and ground speeds of the aircraft are significantly different. 

An airplane that is maneuvering will typically be going slower over 

the ground or a helicopter for sure would be going slower, with 

faster moving transient aircraft going up and down the river. So 

we found that interesting. 

So if we go to the next chart, which is an overhead view, again, 

of the current configuration, we also saw something interesting 

looking at the radar data: that aircraft coming off of Teterboro, airplanes flying south down the river, airplanes flying north up the 

river, all mixed with the helicopter, seaplane, and local traffic. And 

what was interesting when we looked at the radar data is many 

of the aircraft were at 1,100 feet, which is the highest they can go 

in the area. 

So we thought that that was an area of opportunity. Could we 

do something altitude-wise to separate the different operations better? 

So over a 2-week period the task force went to work. Three of the 

organizations that served on the task force are with us today; and 

the recommendations are as follows, if we could go to Chart 4. 

One of the things that we thought was important is to create 

consistency of the Class B airspace. If you recall, it was 1,100 feet 

or 1,500 feet. We flattened it out to 1,300 feet so aircraft will know 

which frequency to be on, when you are talking to a controller, 

when you are not talking to a controller, which results in a lot less 

handoff problems for the controllers, a lot less workload for the pilots. 

Of course, aircraft above 1,300 feet would be under positive control of the controllers. Aircraft under 1,300 feet would still be in 

visual flight rules, but we are also mandating a separation of overflight traffic, which is typically faster-moving traffic from local operations doing the tour business or photo shoots or police missions, 

whatever. So there was a general feeling that by segregating the 

18 

aircraft speed types of the different operations was the right approach. 

The other thing is all aircraft under 1,300 feet would be on one 

common frequency making position reports to each other at specified places along the river, which should increase situational 

awareness for all traffic. 

I would like to point out that many of these procedures are the 

very procedures we use at places like the Oshkosh Air Show, which 

has over 3,000 flights a day; and these are the same techniques we 

use to create a safe operation up there every year. 

And, finally, the last chart, Chart 5, is an overhead view of the 

changes we are recommending. 

First, you will note that aircraft traveling south on the river, we 

are going to ask them to favor the west side of the river. Aircraft 

traveling north favor the right side. And you will also notice that 

those airplanes overfly the local aircraft as well, lights on, talking 

to each other, good situational awareness. And we think that these 

regulated changes and the two regulatory changes that are necessary are the Class B airspace change and the pilot procedures, 

all scheduled to come together and be in effect on November 19. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you for allowing me to 

testify. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Krakowski, and now 

recognizes Mr. Fuller. 

Mr. FULLER. Mr. Chairman, good morning, and Ranking Member 

Petri and Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure for me to be 

here on behalf of AOPA and our 415,000 members. 

I privately expressed our concern to the families who were lost 

in this accident. We had one of our members who was lost. I publicly would do so again today. It is a tragedy that brings us together. 

But I also think it is important to recognize the good work of 

NTSB and particularly the FAA. We were pleased to be part of the 

process of immediately evaluating the circumstances in New York 

and the situation around this accident. We had one of our people 

sequestered for a couple of weeks to intensely look at this with others in the aviation community. 

And I think it is great that this oversight session is taking place, 

but I think we should recognize that the FAA really gave us all a 

forum to take a very hard look at the traffic in that area, how it 

is utilizing this airspace, and what we can do to enhance and improve safety. 

I am not going to repeat the remarks I submitted. I thought I 

would try to be responsive to some of the comments that have been 

made. 

We had an interesting session last night with our AOPA Air 

Safety Foundation which immediately, upon receiving the recommendation, structured a flight training program, if you will, and 

went to Newark where 350 pilots were at the session. Another 200 

people were online. I think it probably is a prelude to some of the 

comments we will hear. It was a very constructive dialogue. 

I don’t need to tell the members from the area that pilots in that 

area are passionate about flying in that airspace to see the incredible views, to transit the area; and they desperately want, as do I, 

19 

to keep that airspace open and available. I think the recommendations do that, and I think they do enhance the certainty of where 

you should be flying if you are in the airspace. 

I know the airspace is referred to as ′′uncontrolled.′′ That is kind 

of a technical term, and that was explained a little bit ago. 

Frankly, this airspace for pilots—and I have flown for 42 years— 

is one of the most heavily regulated sections of airspace in the U.S. 

The fact that we have Class Bravo airspace around the heavily 

used airports to ensure that instrument aircraft and commercial 

aircraft are separated from aircraft flying visual flight rules does 

not mean the aircraft flying visual flight rules are not regulated. 

They are flying safely through corridors, through passageways that 

keep them separated from other aircraft. 

Pilots train regularly. We have to get reviewed every 2 years. Pilots who fly in this area review this airspace. 

The improvements in the charts I think that have been referred 

to will make a big difference. I used to fly through and live under 

the corridor in Los Angeles, and I used it all the time quite safely. 

Honestly, when I fly in New York, I typically fly IFR, and that 

provides for separation. But I think the choices that many pilots 

make are the right choices for them to transit that area. 

I would also caution against the problem of the unintended consequence, the problem of saying, well, let’s close down this airspace 

because we don’t like the way it is being used because it will send 

hundreds of people around the Class Bravo airspace. It may not be 

a concern that it uses more fuel, but it will put other aircraft in 

areas where they are not now flying when in fact for decades this 

airspace has been used safely. 

Also, I want to say a word about the controllers. I do fly in the 

airspace a great deal. Probably the most challenging of the alternatives, if I was taking off from Teterboro tomorrow morning on instrument flight rules, I know I would have separation. If I took off 

intending to fly the corridor and the weather permitted it, because 

you have to have certain requirements before you can use that 

flyway or corridor, I would have a certain plan, and I would know 

what frequency to be on and when to talk. If I chose the alternative, which is a good alternative used hundreds of times, of taking off and hoping to get cleared through Class Bravo airspace, I 

would know the controllers would make every effort to accept me 

and give me an altitude and monitor my flight. 

But the plans can change. It is the one course of action where 

plans can change. Because you might be sent into the corridor. You 

might be cleared into the airspace. They might not be able to take 

you. 

And I just want to say that my experience flying in that area, 

I think we have some of the best-trained controllers and the most 

accommodating that we work with; and that is very helpful, too. 

We do stand ready to continue our efforts to enhance the training 

and to support these recommendations. 

I look forward to any questions you may have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Fuller, and now recognizes Mr. Zuccaro. 

Mr. ZUCCARO. Good morning, Chairman Costello and Mr. Petri, 

Ranking Member, and Chairman Oberstar. 

20 

I am here today in my capacity as President of the Helicopter Association International, whose 3,000 members, inclusive of 1,600 

member companies, fly 5,500 helicopters 2.5 million flight hours a 

year. 

On a more personal note, I am also here as a professional career 

pilot and flight instructor for both helicopters and airplanes who 

has spent almost 30 years flying and managing aircraft operations 

within the New York City airspace, to include tour operations, 

scheduled helicopter airline service, airborne law enforcement, and 

charter and corporate, as well as New York City heliport and airport management responsibilities. During this period, I also represented the local affiliated organization, Eastern Region Helicopter Council. 

Make no mistake about it. There was a tragic accident on Saturday, August 8, in which nine people lost their lives. Our heartfelt 

sorrow and deepest sympathy goes out to those involved. 

One of those aircraft, a helicopter, was operated by one of our 

members. On that day, a member of our family within the helicopter community, Captain Jeremy Clark, a professional, dedicated 

helicopter pilot, departed the Manhattan West 30th Street heliport 

just as he had done so many times before, with the intent, as always, to provide a safe, inspiring aerial tour and display the majesty of New York City to his passengers. 

On that same day, Steven Altman, a businessman, an aircraft 

owner, general aviation private pilot, had taken off from Teterboro 

Airport in his personal aircraft accompanied by family members for 

I am sure what he envisioned would be an enjoyable flight on a 

beautiful day to Ocean City, New Jersey. As you know, neither of 

these pilots completed their respective flight. A tragedy indeed. 

As I have testified before the Committee previously, my sincere 

belief is that one accident anywhere of any kind is one accident too 

many. And in the memory of those who died, we can and should 

strive to make operations in the Hudson River corridor even safer 

than they currently are. 

In an effort to accomplish this, I believe we must first look at the 

history associated with the environment. I would note that I served 

on a previous airspace task force group in 1983. The recommendations of that task force enhanced over the years formed the basis 

of the current practices and procedures that are utilized to this 

date in the corridor. We have provided a safe and operational efficient environment that accommodated millions of flights over that 

26-year period since that study. Accordingly, I believe we should be 

cautious of an overreaction and should respond with a reasoned, 

well-thought-out approach that will actually enhance the safety. I 

sincerely believe that the FAA recommendations are well-reasoned 

and sound in nature and will do that. 

I am honored to have served on the airspace task force committee that was just established by the FAA. I am not going to repeat the details, because those will be covered by others and have 

been already. And I would say that they are sound and sensible 

and would enhance safety. 

I am also pleased to report that the resulting FAA recommendations are supported by HAI, other associations, and are very similar to the NTSB-issued recommendations. 

21 

In coordination with the FAA, the NTSB, and other associations, 

HAI stands ready to develop and promote an extensive educational 

training program relative to this airspace. It is crucial for the pilots 

to know not only the airspace options but what is expected of them 

when they are in that airspace. 

Admittedly, none of these recommendations on its own is a silver 

bullet. There are no silver bullets, and I wish there were. However, 

each of these recommendations is a sensible, rational, well-thoughtout element and, when considered in a package, they will make a 

real difference. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I can assure you I 

don’t consider myself a cowboy, and I don’t view that airspace as 

Wild west. I would not have spent the majority of my adult life flying and managing operations in that airspace if I thought for one 

second it was truly unsafe. Nor do I believe the thousands of other 

pilots that operate there would fly in it if they thought it was not 

safe. 

In closing, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the highpriority fast track initiative and excellent work by the FAA which 

will result in these new procedures being in place by November. 

We applaud and support their efforts. I anxiously await the investigative work and associated final recommendations to be delivered 

by the professional and dedicated staff of the NTSB. 

This is how the system is supposed to work, and we are honored 

and pleased to be part of this initiative. HAI and our affiliate, the 

Eastern Region Helicopter Council, look forward to working with 

the Subcommittee, the agencies, and other interested parties to ensure that the highest level of safety within this airspace is 

achieved. 

Thank you very much, and I am prepared to answer any questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you Mr. Zuccaro and now recognizes Mr. Kragh. 

Mr. KRAGH. Good morning, Chairman Costello, Ranking Member 

Petri, Chairman Oberstar, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. 

My name is Edward Kragh. I have been an air traffic controller 

for 22 years, and for the last 16 years I have been at Newark Liberty Airport. I would like to echo the sentiments of the Chairman 

and several others who have offered their condolences to the families of those departed on August 8 and also echo the sentiments of 

Congressman Mica on the passing of the much-beloved Mr. DeCota 

of the Port Authority. 

I am here today as NATCA’s representative on the FAA’s VFR 

flight rules task force. We were charged with examining the procedures in airspace surrounding Manhattan in order to recommend 

changes that would help make the airspace safer. My role in that 

task force was to serve as a subject matter expert on air traffic control procedures in airspace. 

The FAA invited NATCA to be a part of the task force and 

worked collaboratively with the union throughout. It is NATCA’s 

hope that the agency will continue to follow through with its commitment to include us in the completion of this project and in any 

future changes. 

22 

The August 8 incident occurred under visual flight rules outside 

of Class Bravo airspace in the Class B exclusion corridor, what we 

commonly refer to as the exclusion, during a handoff between air 

traffic control facilities. Aircraft in Class B airspace is permitted to 

use visual flight rules in clear weather, but separation in Class B 

airspace remains a controller’s responsibility. No aircraft is permitted to enter Class B without first receiving clearance from ATC; 

and, once inside, pilots are then required to closely follow ATC instructions. 

In the exclusion, VFR aircraft are permitted to fly without being 

required to communicate with air traffic control. The exclusion is 

Class G or uncontrolled air space. As such, air traffic controllers do 

not have jurisdiction over aircraft in this airspace. The burden of 

separation there is entirely upon the pilots using VFRC and avoid 

procedures. 

Pilots flying in Class G airspace are currently urged to monitor 

and broadcast their positions over the common frequency, and they 

are expected to do so in order to effectively coordinate the use of 

that airspace. 

Climbs from ATC is required to enter and operate within Class 

B airspace, and under the current procedures Teterboro controllers 

do not have the authority to climb VFR aircraft into Class B airspace. Therefore, that transition into Class B requires a handoff of 

control from Teterboro to Newark. 

When the Newark controller accepts that handoff, that controller 

climbs the VFR aircraft into Class B; and if he is unable to accept 

the handoff, the aircraft must remain outside Class B airspace 

until receiving air traffic control clearance. 

That—just to divert from the statement for a moment—is what 

we discovered in the task force, that that loophole, which is also 

echoed in the recommendations—preliminary recommendations 

from the NTSB turns out to be a flawed procedure, which I will address now. 

On August 8, the Teterboro controller did initiate a timely handoff, which the Newark controller accepted. The Newark controller 

was expecting radio contact from the Piper, which never came. Although controllers at both Teterboro and Newark attempted to reestablish radio communication with the pilot, they were unable to 

contact him; and at the time of the collision, the pilot was not in 

communication with air traffic control at either Teterboro or Newark. 

There was an unfortunate rush to judgment regarding the underlying causes of the August 8 tragedy which, as several Members 

have stated, is still under investigation. But the controllers on duty 

utilized the procedures that they had been trained to use and that 

they were required to use by FAA orders. The first day the task 

force met it was unanimously agreed upon and recognized that 

those current procedures were flawed and that under those flawed 

procedures the August 8 accident could not have been prevented. 

Since the incident, a number of elected official have advocated for 

full control for airspace around Manhattan, in other words, eliminate the Class B exclusion and require that all aircraft flying in 

this region be under the direction of ATC. NATCA and the task 

force both recognized that this drastic change would require signifiVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:57 Nov 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\52279 JASON
23 

cant new resources because present infrastructure is insufficient to 

handle those changes, and there simply aren’t enough air traffic 

controllers to handle the increased workload that would result. 

The geography of that area with densely packed skyscrapers prevents effective radar and radio coverage currently. You might recall 

that when my colleague Patrick Harten testified regarding U.S. Air 

flight 1549 he described having lost radio and radar contact with 

that aircraft as it lost altitude. Additional radar and radio sites 

would be a necessity to safely provide ATC services to that corridor 

or some other form of enhanced surveillance. 

The FAA’s task force recommended several changes to training 

procedures and airspace structure, and the union supports these 

recommendations. We agree that their implementation will make 

this historically safe corridor even safer. 

However, like the task force, we recognize that further analysis 

is required before the recommendations can be implemented. For 

instance, we agree with the recommendation that encourages pilots 

to transition the Hudson using Class B airspace above the exclusion so they are under ATC control. But an influx of VFR aircraft 

into Class B airspace may significantly increase controller workload and generate a need for increased staffing to meet those increased demands. 

Lastly, the FAA and controllers certainly work best when we 

work together. I implore the agency to continue to use this approach on behalf of the safety of the flying public. 

That concludes my testimony. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Kragh, and now recognizes Mr. Coyne. 

Mr. COYNE. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Petri, Chairman Oberstar, and other Members of the Committee. 

I would first like to echo the comments of Mr. Mica about our 

good friend, Bill DeCota. It has a special relevance here. Bill 

DeCota and I served as original members of what we called the 

Teterboro Task Force, which was a group put together to deal with 

the safety of aircraft operations in and around Teterboro Airport; 

and, of course, since Teterboro Airport was managed by the Port 

Authority of New York, it was an official responsibility of Chairman DeCota. 

And I wanted to echo the remarks of Mr. Mica. His sudden death 

is going to be a great blow to many of his friends in aviation, and 

we look forward to making further comments reflecting upon his 

career. 

I would also like to join all the rest in extending our sympathies 

to the victims of this accident. The small Piper Lance departed 

from Teterboro Airport just a few minutes before the accident. Its 

last location was at one of our members, Meridian Aviation at 

Teterboro Airport. Our members were the last people to see that 

pilot and his passengers, and it is always a great personal tragedy 

for us when situations like this happen. 

I, of course, serve as the President of the National Air Transportation Association; and we represent the businesses like the charter 

operators and FBOs and others who support aviation services 

24 

around the country. And I am also on the board of the Flight Safety Foundation and the President and founder of the Air Charter 

Safety Foundation. So I have a real commitment to air charter 

safety and aviation safety. 

This accident provides us with an opportunity not only to address 

the specific concerns of this accident in the Hudson corridor and 

how to change, as has already been said, the procedures that need 

to be changed there—and I should point out that NATA strongly 

supports the recommendations of the FAA Task Force and the 

NTSB as the preliminary recommendations we have already seen. 

But I think in a situation like this there is also an opportunity 

for us to look at the bigger picture, the national picture. What can 

the entire country and all pilots and all the people involved in safety and regulation learn from this accident? What can we do to 

make the skies better for everyone? These are what I call the bigger lessons from this accident. 

The first one that comes to me is clear to those of us who were 

listening to the reenactment of this accident, and that is the communication challenges faced by controllers and by pilots alike in 

circumstances like this. You can’t help but listen to that reenactment to conclude that there is something wrong with our communications procedures, especially in densely controlled airspace. 

We have, of course, the best air communication system the world 

could put together in 1959. We can do better in 2009. It doesn’t 

take—everyone has the experience of driving in their car and talking on a cell phone perhaps and seeing how seamlessly we move 

from one control tower, if you will, to another and our communications is entirely uninterrupted. We can get digital information, 

texting anywhere in the country without any hesitation, regardless 

of where we are and where we are moving; and yet we have a communication device in aircraft which is, in fact, archaic. 

NextGen and the technologies embraced by it, we have been talking about for a long time. In fact, it was almost exactly 15 years 

ago today that I was in this room. I think Chairman Oberstar was 

at that same hearing. It was called by Collin Peterson, and it was 

the first hearing of this Committee to talk about modernization of 

air traffic to take advantage of GPS and digital communication and 

data link. And we said in 1994 we have got to do this. We have 

got to move in this direction. 

And here we are 15 years later. And although we are closer and 

I know millions of dollars and a lot of man hours have been put 

to move us in this direction, it is really time for us to modernize 

our air traffic control, especially the communications. 

The clear indication from this accident is that information that 

is not at the right place at the right time is worthless information. 

And the information that was needed by those two pilots was not 

in their cockpits because of the lack of NextGen capability of ADSB and data link digital communication. So I hope that this Committee takes from this tragedy a renewed commitment to modernize our air traffic control system so that in the next few years 

we can say to any pilot and any citizen that this accident will never 

happen again. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Coyne. 

25 

And now the Chair recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the 

Full Committee, Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to express my appreciation to you for your continued vigilance over aviation safety and Mr. Petri for participating in and establishing this very, very important hearing and all the witnesses 

contributing their respective and special expertise. 

I join, as all of the witnesses have done, in expressing our condolences to the families of the victims and our sadness over loss in 

aviation. It is always dramatic. It is always painful. It hits us very 

hard, those of us who care so deeply about aviation. 

But I wanted to, at the outset of this hearing, to express my personal sense of loss at another, and some of the witnesses have mentioned that Mr. Mica apparently was here earlier and did as well, 

about the loss of Bill DeCota. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. For me it is particularly painful. I was with him 

just 2 weeks before he died, and our colleague, Mr. Crowley, who 

represents the district which encompasses LaGuardia Airport—we 

were doing a tour of the land side and the terminal facilities on the 

air side, followed with a meeting with neighbors of LaGuardia concerned about noise. 

Bill DeCota was an encyclopedia of information about aviation in 

general, but also about the three airports for which he was aviation 

director for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. He 

lived, breathed, slept aviation. He was there from early in the 

morning to late at night. He did not marry, did not have a personal 

family of his own, but his family, his love, his life was aviation. 

We discussed the various changes that needed to be made in the 

terminal of things that were in progress, actions that were in 

progress on the land side at LaGuardia. We walked through the 

terminal. He showed how these things hadn’t been changed since 

Fiorello LaGuardia in 1939. And with great excitement he pointed 

out the changes that would be made inside to accommodate passengers, showed me where people are sitting in the corridors—that 

is not acceptable, we can’t have this—you know, with great energy 

and enthusiasm. 

Then, on the air side where aircraft were parked there just 

wasn’t enough room. If we make these changes, which he discussed, some consolidation of services, we will have fewer aircraft, 

more passengers, fewer arrivals and departures, less impact on airport neighbors. 

And we went through this whole morning of Bill being really enthused and excited. I just couldn’t imagine a person more alive and 

more excited about his work dying so suddenly, just like the victims of this crash. 

So I offer to all his friends, associates, his colleagues and the 

neighbors of airports that he served so enthusiastically and with 

such vision and direction, and sense of direction that the airport 

authority needed to move, my heartfelt condolence, which is an inadequate word for the deep sense of loss that I feel personally 

about Bill DeCota. Aviation has lost a great advocate and enthusiastic friend, one who had the best interest of the traveling public, 

the airlines, the personnel who worked at that airport, and the airport neighbors as well. 

26 

The subject of this hearing, to me is reminiscent of the tragedy 

over Cerritos, California. For several years I had held hearings. 

And, Mr. Coyne, you may have been in Congress at the time that 

we conducted these hearings; I know that Mr. Costello was. Great 

resistance over installing on or requiring installation on aircraft of 

Mode C transponders and TCAS. 

The FAA said, Oh, technology isn’t ready yet, TCAS-I, there is 

something else in the works; there will be TCAS-II, there will be 

something better than that. We kept saying the perfect is becoming 

the enemy of the good. 

And then that tragedy occurred over Cerritos. And it was Mr. 

Packard on the Republican side who represented that district— 

himself, I think, a pilot and enthusiast for aviation—who said, We 

have to require TCAS onboard aircraft by act of Congress. 

I said, Ron, you introduce the bill; I will join you as cosponsor. 

He did and we did. We had the hearing, reported the bill and 

moved it through the House and the Senate; and it became law. 

And then suddenly all the opposition of the airlines melted away. 

But do we have to have fatalities? Do we have to have tragedy 

in the air before we act? Again and again and again, is that what 

it takes to mobilize? Doesn’t the wisdom of the NTSB, the wisdom 

of the air traffic controllers, the wisdom of the FAA suffice to say, 

This is what we need to do; look ahead and do it now before there 

are fatalities? 

I question the classification of airspace in the way it has been 

structured in this busiest of all air traffic facilities in the world. 

The New York TRACON handles as much air traffic as all of Europe combined, responsible for 16 airports, 1,200,000 operations 

last year. Charles de Gaulle, London Heathrow, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Madrid, all together handle 1 million—2,100,000 operations a 

year. 

This is New York-New Jersey Port Authority. Why don’t we have 

at least Mode C transponders on aircraft? That is not going to 

break the bank. A TCAS-II is in the range of $200,000. That could 

be very expensive for a small aircraft. And from the standpoint of 

air traffic controllers that may be too much traffic, too much signalization in that airspace, too much ′′clutter,′′ as you call it. But 

somehow if you are going to operate in this busy airspace then you 

ought to have on board the aircraft the equipment you need to let 

others know when ′′see and avoid′′ fails. That has been my position 

for years. I think that is where we need to go. 

I will stop at that point. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, and now recognizes the 

Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony. And I appreciate the investigations ongoing. But I just would be curious to know, it seems listening to this and reading some of the transcripts and one thing and 

another that one of the key contributing factors to this accident 

was the loss of contact between the airplane and, I guess, it was 

Newark following what was supposed to be a handoff, and suddenly 

the person has disappeared. And that was due to a 

miscommunication of—the controller gave the correct frequency for 

Newark, the person repeated a slightly different frequency and 

27 

suddenly logged on to a station in Connecticut or somewhere, and 

they were out of contact. 

If that is true—I mean, my daughter, everyone else, has BlackBerrys; they are texting, they are very good at it. Can’t you just 

figure out—there is voice recognition equipment these days in cars 

where people—you say the number, and it prints it out. This 

doesn’t seem to me to be rocket science in this day and age. For 

a couple hundred bucks you could not just say it, you could print 

it out on any little device, BlackBerry, in a cockpit or something. 

Am I missing something? I mean, all the redesign and talk about 

the space, it seems to be a communication problem. It is human 

error. We are never going to eliminate that. But we need to have 

backup systems and give people opportunities to verify quickly in 

real time how they are communicating. Would any of you comment 

on that? 

And the second question, I didn’t understand really very well: 

Mr. Fuller was talking about the one area of variable, when you 

are entering into it, you hit various precertified or predictable possibilities, and there was one where people had to make real-time 

choices, and if that was this and the communication contributed to 

that, or how that all worked. 

Mr. FULLER. Well, let me just start with the first point you 

make. And I am not trying to avoid the question, and I will respond to it; but we obviously don’t know exactly, or I sure don’t 

know exactly, what happened in that aircraft. 

I think that while technology can solve a lot of things, there is 

always going to be some human error. One of the procedures that 

we follow when we fly aircraft is—all aircraft, whether it is by single-engine Bonanza or a jet aircraft—when a controller gives us an 

assigned frequency, we read that frequency back with our aircraft 

identification number. It is the single best way to assure the controller, as well as the pilot, that you are going to enter the frequency that you were assigned. 

I don’t know why, if the frequency was read back and either not 

understood or was read back incorrectly, it wasn’t corrected. It happens to us who fly, not often, 125.52 sometimes sounds like 125.25. 

In the amount of time—that happens to be a Potomac clearance 

frequency, approach frequency—in the time it takes to read it back, 

you don’t switch over, so you wait to make sure that if there is any 

question, the communication between the controller and the pilot 

straightens that out. 

I think that is a procedure that works well for us. I don’t know 

how foolproof the technology is for voice recognition with the many 

voices we have and the many kinds of equipment we have, and I 

would be a little hesitant to think that would be a solution. 

That is about all I can say on the question of the communication 

and how we verify the correct frequencies, because as I said, I don’t 

know what happens. 

I will say one other thing. One of the—and I have flown for 42 

years. I have seldom seen an accident where there was one clearcut reason why the accident occurred. Every aircraft has strengths 

and weaknesses, every aircraft has blind spots and good visibility. 

I fly a low-wing Bonanza aircraft. One of my blind spots is obviously under those two wings on either side of the plane. One of the 

28 

realities is, our radio is in the center of the console, so by definition, if you are working on your radio, you are looking to the right. 

And obviously the helicopter was coming up on the left in a blind 

spot. I think that had to be part of the—one of the things that was 

going on. 

To the point I was making about Teterboro today, or even 

Teterboro with the new regulations, as an instrument-rated pilot, 

I could file an instrument flight plan from Teterboro to Atlantic 

City, let’s say. I would not be released from Teterboro until I could 

enter the air space. I would be under positive control, talking to the 

controller. That is one alternative. 

I could also decide to leave Teterboro knowing that I was intending to fly on a clear day, if the rules were appropriate, fly that 

flyway. And I would know exactly what altitude I had to be at, and 

I would be looking for traffic, monitoring the frequency. 

The point I was making was—the third alternative is to take off 

from Teterboro VFR and able to fly visual flight rules and expect 

that handoff, request clearance into the Class Bravo airspace for 

positive control. Those clearances, those requests are accepted hundreds of times a day, maybe even more, but hundreds of times a 

day, but it is not certain I would get it. 

So of the three alternatives available—the taking off VFR, requesting a clearance request Bravo airspace is the one alternative 

that leaves a degree of uncertainty as to whether I am going to get 

cleared into positive controller space or to actually be steered into 

the corridor until they can take me. Personally, this is personally 

speaking, that is the most complicated, because I now have alternatives I am not certain about, and I would rather have a plan and 

execute the plan. 

Flying in New York air controlled airspace always means there 

is some uncertainty. You are always given different clearances. But 

it further complicates the workload on a pilot who may have 

thought he was going to get to 3,500 feet talking to controllers, but 

actually was sent to 1,100 feet until he could get their clearance. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now 

recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I listen to some of the comments that were with your testimony, I think this could have been avoided. Mr. Krakowski, you 

make a comment regarding how some of the regulations will implement to someplace else in an air show. What was that air show you 

talked about? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Oshkosh. 

Mr. SIRES. Oshkosh, 3,000 hours or whatever it was. Now we are 

going to use it here. 

The controller said, right from the beginning that they realized 

that that could have been avoided. 

I just don’t know what it takes. Sometimes we implement these 

things before it happens. These regulations, I assume that you 

think this is going to work to make it more safe. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We absolutely are confident they are going to 

work, because they are techniques that are used in high-volume 

airspaces like the Oshkosh Air Show. 

29 

The difference is, these were recommended procedures over the 

Hudson for many, many years. They weren’t charted very clearly. 

We talked about the frequency confusion issue, and even the handoff confusion issue from the Teterboro tower to aircraft 

transitioning out of there. All of these are accounted for in our recommendations. 

Mr. SIRES. Are there any new recommendations for flights underneath 1,000 feet? Do you have new guidelines for regulating? Because 1,000 feet is not very high, especially where I live, and especially where Congressman Nadler lives. 

And how far in are these corridors? I mean, I stand on my balcony and it looks like Ming City in Flash Gordon, with all these 

planes flying in and out. I mean, I just think that something has 

to be done, especially those flights that are low. Sometimes I wave 

to them on my balcony. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I am going to ask Mr. Zuccaro to help me out 

because he has flown in that airspace quite a bit. There has always 

been traffic at different altitudes in that airspace, low altitudes, 

doing their missions, and the high altitudes as well. 

What the new regulations are intended to do is to better separate 

faster-moving traffic from maneuvering around slower-moving traffic, and you do that by altitude, by keeping the slower aircraft low. 

A typical technique you use at air shows and military training 

fields, we use this technique; it was one of the strong recommendations that I think Mr. Kragh was pretty fervent on during the—— 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Krakowski, with all due respect, in air shows they 

don’t have millions of people underneath them, and they don’t have 

high-rises that you look from the balcony and you see almost at eye 

level. I mean, we have to—there is also the fact that people live 

underneath where these people are going by. And the noise factor 

and the safety factor. 

I mean, we were very fortunate that these two planes fell in the 

river. Had they deviated somewhat they could have hit another 

high-rise in New York City or in my district. 

Have you ever considered limiting? I mean, sooner or later it is 

going to reach a saturation point where you cannot have so many 

flights over this area. Is there any consideration for that? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. The task force was not considering any limitations. In fact, if you look at the task force recommendations, we 

didn’t think it was appropriate. 

We thought the first step was to take the traffic that exists and 

put a little more order into it, which is exactly what the regulations 

do. We believe access to the national airspace is a public right for 

those who want to use it. 

Mr. SIRES. But sooner or later public right infringes on the public 

safety, and a decision has to be made. I mean, this is not a very 

large corridor for the amount of flights that are going through 

there. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We are making decisions to put more order in 

it. Very similar to the Los Angeles flyway that was referred to earlier, those techniques have been used for many, many years. We 

think they are appropriate here. And we think the safety equation 

is increased by putting these into effect on November 19th. 

30 

Mr. SIRES. How about flights from 1,000 or 1,100 feet, any regulations? How low can they go, some of these flights? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Well, seaplanes can go to the surface. 

Mr. SIRES. What does that mean? I am not a pilot. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Seaplanes land on the surface, and there is 

some of that. 

Matt, would you like to try to help out? 

Mr. ZUCCARO. Maybe I can try to give an overview. 

But basically the traffic right now, as a point of information, is 

actually less than it has been in previous years. There have been 

higher levels of traffic when the activity and the economy was better. 

In 9/11/2001 the traffic dropped off, obviously, to almost a stop 

immediately following the event; and it took several years to build 

back up. It did not really achieve the level that we had in the late 

1980s and in the 1990s. And now, with the economic downturn, the 

traffic level actually has gone down. 

In terms of the ability to operate within the corridor, I have to 

remind people that nobody is more motivated for safety than the 

pilots and the operators. We are in the helicopters, we are in the 

airplanes. It is our lives at stake, so we are motivated to do everything we can to make it as safe as possible. 

I don’t think we can ignore the fact that that area has operated 

for over 25 years without an incident like this. But I will repeat 

my statement; one accident is too many; and we have to do everything possible to enhance safety. The difference that you will see 

is that the procedures that were previously voluntary, which in fact 

created that environment that gave us a safe, efficient operating 

place, are now transitioning from voluntary to mandatory. It is not 

an option for a pilot anymore to comply with the recommended procedures and things on the charts and in the literature that is put 

out. You have to do it now under these new recommendations. 

That is going to enhance greatly the aircraft stratification, by 

mission; and what we mean by that is, the pilots that are 

transitioning the area—and that is all they are doing is going from 

A to B; a case in point would be going from the George Washington 

Bridge to the Verrazano Bridge, and you have no intention of landing in a heliport, you have no local mission that you have to perform—that traffic will remain in that higher-altitude corridor and 

just go through rather than having an option of ′′Which altitude do 

I go through at?′′ 

The helicopters predominantly will be in the lower altitudes just 

by the sheer mission of the fact that they are coming and going 

from heliports and have a need to reach that facility. So they will 

be at the lower altitudes to get to and from that facility. When they 

are operating and transitioning in and out of the area, they too will 

be up. And helicopters actually operate within the controlled airspace on a fair amount of the flights that they conduct, even the 

tour operations. Only a portion of the tour is done in the uncontrolled airspace below the 1,100 feet that currently exists. They go 

up into the controlled airspace for a part of that tour. 

And helicopters that don’t do tours—corporations, on-demand 

charter, police, electronic news gathering; on many flights they 

have no need to go in the corridor—they will be at the higher altiVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:57 Nov 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\52279 JASON
31 

tude. So we are very conscious of safety. We are the most motivated people to be safe. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from New Jersey and now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fuller responded to Mr. Petri’s question. Mr. Krakowski, let 

me extend that line of questioning with you. 

Based on the transcripts and the air traffic control tapes, it appears that air traffic control may have lost contact with the pilot 

due to an alleged failed handoff. How did the working group address the alleged deficiency of the verbal handoff that seems to 

have played a pivotal role in the accident? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. That is an excellent question, sir. 

One of the things that the task force did is—and I think Mr. 

Kragh would be probably useful to respond as well—the handoff 

procedure, we don’t think, was as good and robust as it could be, 

particularly when you are transitioning aircraft out of Teterboro to 

Newark where there is an uncertainty whether Newark is going to 

take the handoff; there is a frequency ambiguity because of the 

way the airspace is parceled out. 

And the task force recognized this and are recommending procedures for Newark to actually authorize that prior to the takeoff in 

Teterboro, plus other handoff procedures in the area, which will assure a more positive control of what frequency should airplanes be 

on during these operations. 

I don’t know if Mr. Kragh would like to speak to that. 

Mr. KRAGH. Thank you, yes. 

Congressman Coble, this could answer the question that Ranking 

Member Petri posed and some of the concerns that Congressman 

Sires also expressed. 

The task force recognized almost immediately, and I have to say 

as a matter of personal frustration for me, to have brought forth 

so many other safety issues, not to have seen this loophole coming, 

it is agonizing to have lost these lives and not been able to have 

the foresight to correct this flawed procedure. 

But there aren’t a whole lot of flights that do what one mike 

charlie did that day, and come out of Teterboro and get a handoff 

to Newark. So we were able to recognize the flawed procedures and 

correct them by taking a whole bunch of steps in the recommendations. 

First of all, going back to Mr. Fuller’s remarks, a pilot shouldn’t 

be given a whole bunch of options while he is flying or while he 

is taxiing. There should be a definite plan, what action am I going 

to take to exit this busy airspace; and that plan should happen 

probably before that pilot starts moving that aircraft even away 

from the ramp. 

Unfortunately, controllers are trained in a very linear fashion, 

and the first controller that that pilot spoke with that day is only 

checked out or certified to work that clearance delivery position. 

They don’t really know yet what a pilot’s options are. They might 

not even be familiar with all the procedures that the other conVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:57 Nov 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\52279 JASON
32 

troller in the tower is going to use because they haven’t yet been 

trained on that. 

So recognizing that, recognizing that there were so many options 

to get out of that airspace, the recommendations that we came up 

with were, one, require the Teterboro controllers to contact Newark 

prior to that aircraft ever departing and request approval to allow 

it to depart. That way the controller in Newark can say yea or nay, 

and they can hold that aircraft on the ground. I think, as Mr. 

Fuller described, it happened to him in the past. 

And then there is a training element for less experienced controllers, those who have just certified on those first positions may have 

only months, literally, of experience talking to airplanes. And it 

may not be private pilots either, which is also—you know, just 

doesn’t give them the foresight to make a plan, to help a pilot make 

a good plan as he is leaving that busy airspace. 

A more experienced controller, in fact, hearing a pilot make that 

initial request—I would like to depart, and go—I think this gentleman requested to depart to Ocean City at 3,500 feet. That, to an 

experienced controller like myself, is a very vague request. I would 

have the experience and knowledge to offer him all the options 

available and nail that down before he ever gets that plane moving. 

Unfortunately, that younger controller hasn’t had that experience 

and may not yet be trained on those elements of the system. 

So we are going to develop in conjunction with the agency—and 

I hope I get to participate in the development of that—we are going 

to develop a training module for controllers. There is also another 

recommendation to develop training for pilots, so that we can all 

be singing from the same page, so to speak, before he ever gets the 

aircraft moving. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that. 

I have one more question, if I may. I think on balance, Mr. 

Chairman, the controllers and the entire aviation industry has 

done an excellent job in promoting and nurturing safety; but as one 

of you pointed out, one accident is one too many. If I may, Mr. 

Chairman, one more question. 

Mr. Krakowski, what is the FAA’s policy regarding personal 

phone calls while on duty, A? And B, is there anything in the manual, FAA orders, that specifically lays out this policy? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes, indeed, when you are on duty and position, 

those types of calls are not permitted. And one of the things we did 

immediately after the accident is mandate all of our facility managers reinforce that to every operating controller across the country 

by no later than September 15th and sign off that they had that 

conversation to remind them of that responsibility. 

Controllers get breaks just like everybody does during work, and 

those types of calls are appropriate during those break periods. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you all for being with us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, and now recognizes the 

gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fuller said that the corridor is a very safe corridor. And yet 

in Ms. Hersman’s testimony, she stated that the Near Midair Collision database and the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System 

33 

database revealed 11 reports of near midair collisions between aircraft in the exclusion area since 1990. So that says to me that we 

have been lucky and that it isn’t quite as safe as we may suspect. 

Now, due to the current limitations of each of the various technologies—— 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman—would the gentleman yield? 

We have to get the gentleman’s microphone corrected here. What 

the gentleman is saying is very important and the static from that 

microphone may obliterate his comments. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Due to the current limitations of each of the various technologies, 

the FAA seems to have determined that the best approach to improving safety in the corridor in the exclusion area is to change operating procedures, enhance training and improve communications. 

But given that this is such a congested area—by the FAA’s estimates, about 600 aircraft in the exclusion area on a typical goodweather day—why hasn’t the FAA given any consideration to limiting the number of flights at least until satellite-based technology 

is available to track and manage traffic? 

And I was disturbed to hear a moment ago Mr. Krakowski’s offhand remark that unlimited access is a right. I don’t think unlimited access is a right. It may be consonant with safety, it may not 

be. But that attitude, frankly, is a very disturbing one. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Well, again, Congressman, what reinforces my 

belief that these procedures—— 

Mr. NADLER. I can’t hear you. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. There we go. 

What reinforces both my and the task force’s belief that these 

procedures and these changes will take the existing flights in the 

area and continue to make them safe are the experiences that we 

have across other parts of the country. 

And I keep referring back to Oshkosh because it is important. 

We don’t have controllers looking at radarscopes separating 3,000 

airplanes per day during an almost 9-day period every year. We 

use these very types of procedures to take a many-times-greater 

even saturation of traffic and manage it correctly going in and out 

of that huge general aviation air show, with a mix of traffic, by the 

way, that we don’t even have in this corridor—military aircraft, 

gyrocopters, hot air balloons, I think, at one time. But it is probably the most dynamic mix of aircraft you ever saw. 

So the pilots, who know what frequencies to be on, know what 

route to fly, where to check in and tell each other where you are 

at, I think these have been well demonstrated as good safety practices, which we mandate for some of the high-volume areas. So we 

think it is the right step here. 

Mr. NADLER. I am not sure I understand what you are saying. 

You are saying that mandating these, which presumably should 

have been mandated a long time ago in New York, is safe enough 

that you don’t have to consider limiting the volume? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We believe these procedures will. You are going 

to vertically separate different airplanes, horizontally separate 

them as well, make sure the airplanes are more visible to each 

other—— 

34 

Mr. NADLER. And that is sufficient, even given the level of traffic? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We believe so. 

Mr. NADLER. At what level of traffic would it not be sufficient? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I have no opinion on that. 

Mr. NADLER. An infinite amount of traffic would be okay under 

this? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I am sorry. 

Mr. NADLER. An infinite amount of traffic what be okay under 

this? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I have no opinion. 

Mr. NADLER. You have no opinion on an infinite amount of traffic. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I don’t know what that means, really. 

Mr. NADLER. Forty thousand flights. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Obviously, that would be a problem. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. So where would you— where might you draw 

a line? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. It would take some analysis for me to come to 

a conclusion like that. 

Mr. NADLER. But without doing that analysis, 600 is fine? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Well, it is actually more like 200 in the corridor. 

I think the 600 number is in the New York area overall. Our analysis, the FAA analysis, is that in that corridor it is about 200 operations per day. 

Mr. NADLER. We keep hearing from the FAA that it is 600 in 

that corridor. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. No, it is not 600 in the corridor. 

Mr. ZUCCARO. I think some of the confusion coming is the way 

that the heliports report operations. They report a landing and a 

takeoff. It is really the same helicopter. It is one operation. 

So you would have that. It is one aircraft coming in and going 

back. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. My time is running out. 

Has the FAA given any consideration to the fact that under the 

proposed plan to stratify the airspace, you will have the same number of flights with pilots operating under visual flight rules, but 

condensed into an even smaller geographic area? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. The geographic area is not changed at all. What 

we are doing is putting more order into it by having the altitude 

separation and the horizontal separation along with the visibility 

rules and reporting rules. 

Mr. NADLER. And have you given any consideration to accelerating implementation of NexGen in New York? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Absolutely. ADS-B, which is probably the best 

technology to address the New York issue long term, the actual 

ground infrastructure network, will be in place in that area by the 

end of next year. 

Mr. NADLER. And finally, because my time is running out, the 

FAA requires certain training measures for pilots who fly in the 

Washington, D.C., area. Why are you not recommending making 

that training mandatory for pilots that fly in the New York area? 

Why only recommend it? 

35 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. It actually is mandatory, because every pilot is 

mandated by law to be familiar with the flight rules, have the 

charts available and fly the procedures as specified. Every pilot, before they take off, is mandated under law to do something called 

preflight action, which means that the review of the operating procedures in that area—— 

Mr. NADLER. But in Washington you mandate, I am told, that 

these pilots take certain classes; and you are not mandating that 

in New York. Why is that? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Because the rules around Washington are 

hypersensitive because of security requirements in the area. And 

that is what drove this entire zone around Washington, DC. 

We don’t have those same security considerations up there. 

Mr. NADLER. You mean they are more complicated in Washington? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. No. I think it is a higher security concern. The 

issues around the Washington airspace are more around security 

versus aircraft diversion. 

Mr. NADLER. They are not more complicated, they are simply 

more important? That is what you are saying, in effect. 

Because of security related they are more important because they 

are safety related in New York? That is the implication of what you 

are saying. 

Mr. ZUCCARO. If you would allow me, can I just enlighten on 

which is the majority of the operations in terms of pilot population, 

the tour operators? 

They are actually regulated by three sets of regulations. Their 

training is mandatory. All of the pilots that fly tours have to comply with Part 95, FAR Part 135 and FAR Part 136. 135 and 136 

actually mandate training that they have to take. 

Mr. NADLER. So your testimony is that they are mandated to 

take equal training to that mandated in Washington, including 

those classes? 

Mr. ZUCCARO. It is way above that training. 

Mr. NADLER. Way above that training? 

Mr. ZUCCARO. Way above that training. They have to get local 

area orientation, they have to get aircraft qualification. If they 

change type aircraft they are trained. If they even fly the same 

model of aircraft, and it has a different button in a different place, 

they have to take differences training. And they do this as a minimum every year and some 6 months. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from New York, 

and now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Dr. Ehlers. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have fewer questions than comments at this point because a lot 

of the good questions have already been asked and answered. But 

I commend the FAA and their response to this particular incident. 

And the new plan you have laid out, I believe, is considerably better than what you have had, and I think you will be successful in 

maintaining the safety record that you like. 

My question, Mr. Krakowski, is do you regularly review all the 

different areas in the United States and try to find problem areas 

like this. I mean, I suspect if you had really carefully personally 

36 

examined the procedures in Teterboro a year ago, you would have 

said, Hey, you’ve got some holes here that we ought to plug. 

Do you routinely do that across the United States at all these 

particular locations, and not you personally, but instruct the staff 

there, try to find out what could possibly go wrong and see what 

you can do to correct it? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. It is a good question, and we typically have not 

been in a mode of looking at visual flight rule traffic areas. Most 

of our concentration of our risk in the system is around airliners 

and business jets and everything that we are actually positively 

controlling. And it is a combination of not just air traffic, but Flight 

Standards and the Safety Division of the FAA to collectively look 

at this larger picture that you are suggesting. 

One of the follow-on actions that is going to happen from this effort that we are doing is, after the task force recommendations 

have been adopted, we actually put them in place in New York, we 

want to see how they operate, we want to evaluate if they are effective or not. But the other thing we are going to do with Flight 

Standards and Safety, like we did after the Comair accident in Lexington, where the jet took off on the wrong runway, is look for similar-type risks in other areas. We have an idea of where those may 

be. 

We want to put the same high-performing team on looking at 

some of these other areas in the country. And we will be doing that 

going into next year, but we want to make sure that they stay focused on making the New York situation better. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you. And I would encourage you to continue 

doing that as much as you can. 

But a comment also. I just want to make it clear to the public 

and the media who are here, I am a would-be pilot, and I am a 

member of AOPA. Mr. Fuller is the president of that, and I have 

been a member off and on for more than 50 years now. 

I am struck every time I read that magazine, plus the other five 

aviation magazines I get and try to read—while I am flying, by the 

way, not while I am piloting; but every magazine, there is just so 

much emphasis on safety in all the aviation magazines. And it is 

there for a reason, because we want a safe air transportation system. 

But also they are being read because every pilot wants to be a 

safe pilot—and not just as a matter of preserving their own lives, 

but this is a great sin if you cause an accident, and particularly if 

you cause a death. Pilots really, really take safety seriously, and 

I think we should recognize that and commend them for it. 

I also want to give my annual diatribe against public attitudes 

on flying, and some of you have heard this before in various other 

accidents. But this was a terrible accident and no one wants to 

have something like that happen. On that same day, I would guess 

that at least 100 more people were killed in the State of New York 

and hundreds more were killed across the Nation than were killed 

in that particular accident. None of them made national news; 

some made local news and that is it. 

This preoccupation with aviation as somehow being dangerous or 

not operating appropriately is just dead wrong. There is a great 

deal of concern about safety among pilots, among passengers, evVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:57 Nov 30, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\52279 JASON
37 

eryone in aviation, and it has been very successful. When you look 

at Jim Coyne’s outfit, the flight records, they are just astounding 

on a passenger-mile basis, just absolutely astounding, and much, 

much safer than getting into an automobile and driving that same 

distance—also much safer than most other countries’ aviation systems. 

So I think instead of—you know, it is good to have these reviews 

and find out what went wrong and correct it. But let’s always keep 

this in mind: 45,000 people every year die in automobile accidents. 

The aviation accidents don’t even get into the hundreds, generally 

less than 100 per year, with a lot of miles flown—not quite as 

many as the automobile; it has been a lot. 

So I think it is important for us on this Committee, it is important for the public, it is important for the media to recognize that. 

The very fact that this is national news is because it occurs so rarely. And always keep that in mind and commend the pilots for their 

care and thoughtfulness in their flying. It is just absolutely remarkable. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The gentleman makes an excellent point. 

And now the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking 

Member for putting this hearing together, all of you on the panel 

for being a part of addressing these safety issues and add my voice 

and condolence to the people who were lost and their families. 

The question I had had to do with the type of aircraft involved 

in this August 8th crash being an on-demand aircraft. According to 

a report issued by the DOT inspector general in July, on-demand 

aircraft receive less FAA oversight and have more fatalities than 

commercial aircraft. The FAA’s rule for on-demand aircraft has not 

been updated for more than 30 years. 

What steps do you think need to be taken to improve FAA’s oversight of on-demand aircraft? And I wanted to start with Mr. 

Krakowski. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Congressman, I run the air traffic organization, 

so I don’t have the oversight of the Aviation Safety Organization 

as part of my portfolio so I am really ill-equipped to speak to your 

question. 

I would be happy to make sure that the Office of Aviation Safety 

would get with you and answer your questions. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I would ask that you do that, and ask any other 

of the panelists to take a shot at that. 

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39 

Mr. Zuccaro. 

Mr. ZUCCARO. I would like to take it, speaking specifically about 

the helicopter industry in New York. There is a large population 

of 135 on-demand aircraft there. 

A number of years ago the city of New York’s Economic Development Corporation published a heliport master plan, and as part of 

that plan, they analyzed the operations within the New York City 

heliport structure. The helicopters, including the on-demand traffic 

that operated at those heliports was found to be six times safer 

than the national average operating in and out of there. One of the 

reasons that contributed to that is because of the fact they were ondemand, and they had higher training, higher equipment in the 

aircraft and a more formalized methodology of operating the aircraft in the New York metro area. 

So I would solicit that, in fact, the on-demand environment 

where there is a high surveillance oversight of the helicopter industry, certainly in New York, actually contributed to an enhanced environment operating at those heliports. 

Is it possible—I would just like to carry on a little quick comment about Congressman Ehlers about the—and I think it is an 

important one because it is a personal one. 

You spoke in terms of the attention put on aviation accidents and 

how people have a perception that aviation is a much less safe environment than other modes of transportation or activities in life. 

From a personal standpoint, there was a very good friend of mine 

who was a highly motivated safety, I want to say, mentor in the 

industry. 

This gentleman’s name was Paul Smith, and he flew helicopters 

in Vietnam, like I did, and came to the New York area in the early 

1970s and spent pretty much his career like mine, different operations. And he flew there for over 25 years. 

As part of his last job, he was the pilot for the ABC Eyewitness 

News helicopter, and in that position he assisted the citizens in reporting traffic or to assist the fire department, and he would—you 

know, in fire oversight by providing the pictures. And it was a very 

ironic situation, because I used to go into the neighborhoods and 

work with the communities, and Paul would accompany me; and 

people would say, you know, We think the helicopter is unsafe. 

Paul made the comment on a repeated basis that he was more 

worried about driving to work and walking the city of Manhattan 

than he was flying that helicopter over the city of New York for 25 

years. 

There is a very sad end to this story. Paul basically got killed on 

the city of New York streets coming out of a restaurant, hit by an 

out-of-control cab; and his wife was critically injured. 

That man spent 25 years over the city, safe, never had anything 

happen to him, the airspace treated him safely; but he was killed 

on a Manhattan street by a cab. 

I would purport that we act accordingly when these events occur. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, and now recognizes the 

other gentleman from Missouri. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Sure. Go ahead. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Coyne. 

40 

Mr. COYNE. Well, just very briefly. I want to mention, as the 

president of the Air Charter Safety Foundation, we strongly support a wide range of safety initiatives in the air charter and ondemand community. 

But perhaps the most important thing that has been done in the 

last 5 years is the rule-making committee, the ARC, which was established for 135 safety, which submitted to the FAA a broad range 

of recommendations on Part 135 safety, which we have strongly 

supported. Those recommendations are, I think, very close to being 

converted into new rules at the FAA; and if someone from the safety part of the FAA had been here, I am sure they could have given 

you an update on that. 

But it is our hope that those ARC rule-making recommendations, 

which are at the FAA being evaluated, will be turned into new recommendations rules in the near future. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and recognizes 

the other gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess more of a comment than anything else, and to kind of 

build on what Mr. Ehlers has said, and even a little bit on what 

Mr. Zuccaro has said. You know, this was a tragedy, it was an absolute tragedy. But don’t lose sight of the fact that these two pilots 

involved in this were the two people that had more at stake than 

anything else, and they wanted to be just as safe as they possibly 

could. They wanted to go home that night after work, whatever the 

case may be. And there was a mistake. And it doesn’t matter if we 

ever had more technology in the aircraft or if we had had more 

safety inspections on the aircraft, there was still a breakdown and 

a mistake. 

There was a handoff procedure that was missed. And they came 

up on a frequency that obviously wasn’t the frequency to come up 

on. And the bottom line is, it comes down to still visual separation. 

A pilot is responsible for visual separation from himself and any 

other aircraft in the air. Period. 

And it is a terrible thing that happened, an absolute terrible 

thing that happened. But let’s use a little bit of common sense. 

We have—and I am glad we are taking a look at some of these 

things. Whether it is what Mr. Nadler pointed out, and some of the 

very busy airspace. I have been in that airspace before. I am a commercial pilot. I don’t point that out because I am trying to brag 

about experience, but I also know what visual separation is. 

And flying into Oshkosh is a perfect example, and I have done 

it before, and I have done it when I have got airplanes on three 

sides of me that I am trying to maintain a visual separation from 

with very limited radio contact. You still have to separate yourself 

from anybody else that is in the air. 

And I don’t know—we don’t know what the distraction was. The 

pilot may have been messing with his radio trying to figure out 

why he couldn’t bring up Newark, what was going on, and lost contact. The helicopter pilot—you know, the same way, we don’t know 

what it was. But the unfortunate thing was there was an accident. 

The same thing can happen to the person that dozes off going 

down the interstate and crosses the median, the same thing that 

41 

can happen in any other transportation accident that takes place. 

The unfortunate part is, it is aviation that seems to get all of the 

attention on this; and it is a very, very safe industry. And don’t forget the fact that these pilots are the safest people. They want to 

be safe. It is in their best interest to be safe in the air. But accidents do happen. 

I am not trying to diminish it any, I am not trying to downplay 

it any, but accidents do happen. And it wouldn’t have made any 

difference, as I stated before, if we had had better technology, more 

technology, more safety, inspections, whatever the case may be. 

There was still a breakdown when that pilot got the transfer order 

and didn’t make that jump. He didn’t make that jump. And those 

of us who are pilots have been in that situation before, and then 

you’ve got to backtrack. But, regardless, there was a mistake. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to say something, but I do get a little bit frustrated. I just want us to use a 

little bit of common sense when we are looking into these things. 

And please remember, too, that mistakes happen, unfortunately. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahon. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this important hearing—to us from New York, of course, 

and to our Nation as a whole. I want you to understand that I am 

a fan like everyone else of the aviation industry, and the men and 

women who work in it, and I think it is a very safe industry. 

Mr. Zuccaro, it is nice to see you again. I hope you remember me 

from the New York City Council, because I was one of those community—but I have a problem and I want to talk to you about it, 

and I want you to address it for me if you can. 

Mr. ZUCCARO. I will be more than happy to help you. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I appreciate that. But the problem is, I have 

been talking to you about it for about 12 years. 

Mr. ZUCCARO. Which? 

Mr. MCMAHON. The irony—the north shore of Staten Island. The 

irony—you all should know that the reason I am sitting here now 

is because of helicopters flying over Staten Island, New York, because I started as a community activist trying to get them not to 

fly over residential neighborhoods. 

They are still flying over residential neighborhoods, and it is a 

quality-of-life issue; that is how it got kind of started, because you 

are sitting in your house and helicopters are buzzing overhead all 

day long, flying back and forth from Linden or Teterboro or Newark over Staten Island where 500,000 people live. 

And I think you will all agree with me that this tragedy—I also 

agree with my colleagues, it is a terrible tragedy, and we mourn 

those who were lost. It was human error, and accidents happen, 

and we are sorry for that; but if that helicopter or that plane had 

been over land and landed on homes or schools or hospitals, it 

would have been much worse. 

And what people continue to do in New York that drives us crazy 

is, when you have the option to fly over water, you fly over land. 

Now, thank God, this accident happened over water; thank God, 

the 1549 was able to land in water. But I think you all will agree— 

42 

if you can just shake your heads—if it happened over land, it would 

have been much worse, right? You all agree with that? 

So in all these plans and all this talk about lowering the airspace, what are you doing in places like New York where you have 

millions of people living or residential areas, concentrations like 

Staten Island and Brooklyn, New York, what are you doing to try 

to make sure that if, God forbid, that accident does happen, people 

on the ground don’t suffer injuries as well? Because right now you 

are not doing it. 

Mr. Zuccaro, why don’t you start? 

Mr. ZUCCARO. I would like to, Congressman. 

The reference to Staten Island routing: Obviously, you are familiar with the fact that the route used to go right across the middle 

of Staten Island. And I know, I personally came down there, met 

with you and the industry, voluntarily changed the route and established a route along the shore of the Staten Island, around the 

water; and that is actually what is printed on the chart. 

I am respectful of the fact, if you have an issue now where you 

are still having helicopter activity—I am serious—we will get reengaged. 

The other issue of the water routes: The reason that the helicopter was where it was on the tour is because several years ago 

the tour industry and the helicopter community got together and 

established that the routes would go along that shoreline up and 

down the river. And that is where the helicopter is going to be if 

it is on those tours. It will be over the water, it won’t be over the 

land. And that is why the routes run up and down on the chart 

along the river over the water on each shore. 

We are very respectful and agree with you completely that we 

want to minimize flights over land, and we try to use the water to 

the maximum capability that we can. And if you look at the chart, 

all of the routes basically take advantage of the rivers and the waterways around New York City, and that is how we fly, over the 

water. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I know. And you and I worked on that. But unfortunately, the industry is not following it. So every day—do you 

know why I know? Because I live right there where they fly over 

every day. 

Mr. ZUCCARO. I am not going to kid you. I am upset to hear this. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I have met with your successor, I have been to 

the airports, and I have met with the pilots of the small airplanes 

and the helicopters, and we have asked them to respect that, but 

it is not happening. 

So I am asking the FAA if there is a way that we can put in the 

rules to mandate where there are—to mandate when there are options to use water, or land where there are not a lot of people, to 

use it. 

And the other thing is, if you are going to bring these flights 

down to a lower altitude, what about the people on the ground who, 

from a quality of life, first and foremost—or not first and foremost, 

but it is important that if you are in your house and there are 20 

flights of helicopters per hour going over your house, it is a qualityof-life issue—I think you will grant that—when they are at 500 

feet, and also for safety. 

43 

Can we mandate in an area like New York that when there are 

options to stay away from people, that we do it? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. The task force recommendations are very specific to operations over the river. And a couple of reasons here. 

As Mr. Zuccaro pointed out, the accident did occur over the river. 

And one of the things we saw was a mixing of traffic in a concentrated area. We took the airspace, provided the mandatory 

change to separate altitudes between faster-moving, slower-moving 

aircraft, as well as horizontal, and kept that over the river. 

It is unusual for light airplanes to fly over the populated areas. 

We don’t see that typically in our radar tracking data unless the 

aircraft are actually coming out and back to Teterboro for the purpose of landing. 

It is inherent in a single-engine airplane pilot to not want to fly 

over congested areas, because if your engine fails, you don’t have 

any options. So it is a normal practice for light airplane pilots with 

a single engine to not fly over the congested areas. And we actually 

see that in the radar area in New York, unless you are going in 

and out of Teterboro. 

Mr. MCMAHON. And what about Linden, Linden Airport? 

And I want to be clear, Mr. Zuccaro—I know I am a little passionate about this—I want to thank you publicly, because when you 

were at the head of Eastern Regional you were very responsive and 

you did help change the charts. 

Unfortunately, they are not being followed. You were great about 

it. 

Mr. ZUCCARO. Can I offer this? I will personally get reengaged 

and come up and meet with you and ensure that the operators will 

be there, and we can address this again. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I appreciate that. And I know your word is good 

because you have done it in the past. 

But my question then to the FAA is, why can’t you mandate that 

for helicopters as well when there are options, to mandate to not 

fly over land when you have an option not to, and not to fly over 

residential areas when you have an option not to, not to fly over 

schools when you have an option not to, not to fly over hospitals 

when you have an option not to. Why can’t we do that? 

And are you taking into account, when you are bringing these 

aircraft and these helicopters lower, what impact it will have on 

the residential communities? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Again, the lowering of the traffic, particularly 

the local traffic, is designed to be out over the river; it is not designed to be lowering it over congested areas. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I am looking for the word ′′mandated′′ to be when 

there is that option. Can you not tell the helicopters to stop flying 

and the planes not to fly over residential areas, unless it is like an 

emergency? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I mean rule-making—— 

Mr. MCMAHON. Because, am I correct, in New York I can just get 

in my helicopter really and just fly wherever I want to, right? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Right. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Do you think it is safe that if I am, you know, 

flying somebody to Atlantic City so they can go gambling that I 

should fly over residential areas when I have an option? 

44 

You are not hearing me about what a safety concern this is, and 

I want to know what you are going to do. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I think working with the local community, as 

Mr. Zuccaro was offering, is the right approach. 

I am also aware that some of those operations are lifesaving operations with medical helicopters and things like that. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Listen, I am on the ground, I see everyone, I can 

read their numbers. I know what they are doing. They are taking 

commuters back and forth and they are not lifesaving. 

I know the difference between a Coast Guard or a New York City 

police helicopter or an ABC News helicopter going back to its airport or back to its hangar. I know the difference. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I know the difference. 

Mr. KRAGH. Congressman, may I address you, sir? 

Thank you. 

I am certain that Mr. Zuccaro or perhaps Mr. Krakowski might 

not be aware of what you are talking about, but in Newark tower 

I witness it every day. I believe what you are talking about has become an unintended consequence of the airspace redesign off of 

Newark. 

Because when we use those departure headings, helicopters can 

no longer take what is on the charts as the Linden route where 

they fly up the train tracks west of Newark Airport and then go 

over Newark Airport generally at 1,400 feet or above. When we are 

doing that, they can’t be there, because they will be in conflict with 

planes. So the helicopters have reverted to sort of an old version 

of the Staten Island route. 

I was there when the route was there years ago and when it was 

removed. But they reverted to using that pattern because they 

need to get to and from Linden Airport. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I appreciate that. I appreciate what you do every 

day. But they could go over—even within that extended Newark 

buffer zone, if you will, they could go over the Arthur Kill. They 

would not be interfering with the Newark airspace, yet they choose 

in my opinion to go over the land, and that is a terribly unsafe situation. 

Mr. KRAGH. Yes, I have family in Staten Island, and they often 

complain to me, and they live all the way down by the outer bridge. 

But we do need to come up with some sort of agreement. Because, actually, if they came out of Linden and went up the Kill, 

they would get all the way to the Goethals Bridge, which is real 

close to the Newark Airport; and we would have a lot of conflicts 

between departing aircraft and landing aircraft, depending on the 

configuration in those aircraft. So perhaps altitude is part of the 

situation, getting them higher sooner off of Linden whenever we 

can. 

Mr. MCMAHON. They can also go south of your relatives, 

Verrazano and over the Verrazano Bridge, safe over water the 

whole time. 

Mr. KRAGH. And as a controller in the area I will take them 

whatever way they ask to go. I don’t have the power to restrict 

them. That is for the rulemakers to decide, and then I do what I 

am told to do. But I can definitely vouch for what you are saying. 

45 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you both. It goes back to my point that 

the FAA should be looking to make rules that mandates the safer 

route when there isan option. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. What I would like to offer, sir, is to get together, 

get the FAA people who would be appropriate along with Mr. 

Zuccaro’s people, Mr. Kragh, and the NATCA controllers to talk 

this over with you. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you very much and thank you for the allowance of extra time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. That is exactly what I was going to suggest, Mr. 

Krakowski, that you convene a meeting with Mr. Zuccaro and the 

controllers and others to try and do exactly what Congressman 

McMahon is trying to address here. 

Any Members have any final questions before we conclude the 

hearing? 

If not, let me thank all of the witnesses for appearing here today. 

Again, I think many of the Members on the Subcommittee have 

commended the FAA for acting quickly. It is not something that 

they have always done in the past. But we commend you, Mr. 

Krakowski, and the agency for acting quickly. 

Also, for the task force, we hope that you, in fact, will get the 

rulemaking done by the aggressive schedule that you have set out 

by the middle of November; and we look forward to you looking at 

other corridors throughout the country as you committed to do and 

not only the FAA but the task force as well. 

So, again, we thank you all for appearing here today, for offering 

your testimony, and the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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Æ 


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