United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 21-2863

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Christa L. Peterson

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Experian Information Solutions

 Defendant - Appellee

Equifax Information Services

 Defendant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: May 10, 2022

Filed: August 16, 2022

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Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

Christa Peterson initiated this action against Experian Information Solutions 

(“Experian”), alleging a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 
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et seq. (“FCRA”). The district court1 found that Peterson failed to produce sufficient 

evidence to create a jury question on damages. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Peterson filed a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy on March 25, 2019. Her 

bankruptcy schedules listed a Southpoint Federal Credit Union credit card ending in 

*3776 as an unsecured nonpriority claim of $2,349. The bankruptcy court entered a 

discharge order a little over three months later.

 On August 30, 2019, Peterson obtained a credit report from Experian. Though 

the report correctly noted that Peterson had received a discharge, Experian still listed 

the *3776 account with an outstanding balance of $2,481. The report also indicated 

that the account was 90 days late and “[o]pen[] $214 past due as of Jul[y] 2019.” By 

October 2019, Experian had updated the account to accurately reflect as discharged

in bankruptcy with a zero balance.

In February 2020, Peterson sued Experian for purportedly violating 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681e(b) by neglecting to “maintain reasonable procedures to ensure debts that are 

derogatory prior to a consumer’s bankruptcy filing do not continue to report balances 

owing or past due amounts when those debts are almost certainly discharged in 

bankruptcy.” Peterson sought damages resulting from credit denials, a lower credit 

rating, and emotional distress. Experian moved for summary judgment, defending

its procedures as reasonable and asserting Peterson lacked proof of actual damages.

2

 

The district court granted the motion on the damages issue and dismissed the claim. 

1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District 

of Minnesota.

2

Another defendant, Equifax Information Services, settled with Peterson prior 

to summary judgment.
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II. DISCUSSION

Peterson contends that a genuine dispute of material fact exists on damages 

because she provided evidence of financial and emotional harm. To maintain a claim 

for negligent violation of the FCRA, a plaintiff must offer proof of “actual damages 

sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1).3

 We 

review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence 

and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Starkey v. 

Amber Enters., Inc., 987 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2021). We will affirm when “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A. Financial Harm

Peterson argues that she sustained financial injury based on the denial of her 

application for a Chase Bank credit card after a hard inquiry on her Experian report. 

Her deposition testimony refutes this claim. In her deposition, Peterson placed the 

entire fault for the credit denial on the bankruptcy itself, not the mistaken 

information in her credit report. Peterson later submitted a declaration in opposition 

to summary judgment in which she claimed Experian’s incorrect reporting of the 

*3776 account contributed to Chase’s denial decision. But the declaration “directly 

contradicted” her “previous deposition testimony,” making it “insufficient to create 

a genuine issue of material fact under Rule 56.” City of St. Joseph v. Sw. Bell Tel., 

439 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 2006). This is not a situation where the declaration 

simply cleared up confusion or vague statements made during a deposition. See id.

at 476. Peterson first testified that only the bankruptcy caused the denial, then made

a written statement blaming Experian’s erroneous report. We decline to credit the 

3

The statutory language defeats Peterson’s claim that the mere dissemination 

of inaccurate information to a third party in a credit report is enough to raise a triable 

damages question. See Losch v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 995 F.3d 937, 943-44 (11th 

Cir. 2021) (distinguishing between standing to sue under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) and 

evidence of damages on the merits). 
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contradictory declaration. See Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 

1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1983) (“If testimony under oath . . . can be abandoned many 

months later by the filing of an affidavit, probably no cases would be appropriate for 

summary judgment.”). 

The record bolsters the conclusion that the bankruptcy drove Chase’s decision 

to deny Peterson’s credit card application. A second Experian credit report retrieved 

in March 2020 evinces that Peterson applied for another credit card from Chase after 

the inaccurate information had been removed. Once again, Chase declined her 

application. Cf. Hauser v. Equifax, Inc., 602 F.2d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding 

no evidence of damages where an insurer refused to continue plaintiff’s disability 

payments even after receiving information correcting a credit report error). To the 

extent Peterson alleges injury solely from diminution in her credit score, that type of 

abstract harm does not support actual damages. See Smith v. Santander Consumer 

USA, Inc., 703 F.3d 316, 317 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (observing that any “real 

damage from an erroneously reduced credit rating . . . occurs if the consumer’s cost 

of actual borrowing increases or if he is refused credit altogether”). Peterson’s 

assertion of financial harm is insufficient to create a jury question on damages. 

 

B. Emotional Distress

Peterson also insists that Experian’s inaccurate reporting caused her emotional 

distress by worsening her anxiety, depression, stress, and sleeplessness. For FCRA 

claims, “[m]ental pain and anxiety can constitute actual damages.” Taylor v. Tenant 

Tracker, Inc., 710 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2013); see Millstone v. O’Hanlon Reps., 

Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 834-35 (8th Cir. 1976). “[E]motional distress damages must be 

supported by competent evidence of ‘genuine injury,’ which ‘may be evidenced by 

one’s conduct and observed by others.’” Taylor, 710 F.3d at 828 (quoting Carey v. 

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n.20 (1978)). A plaintiff may establish emotional distress 

damages through her own testimony. Id. at 829. 
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As a preliminary matter, we cannot consider Peterson’stestimony that she met 

with a counselor to discuss the incident with Experian and was prescribed increased

doses of anxiety and depression medication. Peterson conceded when responding to 

requests for admission that she had “not met with, or been examined by, any medical 

professional to treat or diagnose any condition caused by the events that form the 

basis of this litigation.” The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require an admission 

to be regarded as “conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the 

admission to be withdrawn or amended.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). And where, as here, 

“a party has made no filing that could be construed as a motion to withdraw or amend 

an admission,” we must “give the admission conclusive effect.” Stine Seed Co. v. 

A & W Agribusiness, LLC, 862 F.3d 1094, 1102 (8th Cir. 2017).

What evidence is left over fails to raise “the kind of severe emotional distress 

that warrant[s]” damages. Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527, 531 (8th 

Cir. 1999). In Taylor, for instance, we held that a plaintiff failed to present adequate 

evidence of emotional distress by stating she “was very upset” and “extremely upset 

and embarrassed” after a housing authority briefly reviewed inaccurate information 

in her credit report but took no adverse action against her. 710 F.3d at 829. Similarly 

here, Peterson received a credit report with a single inaccurate account in late August 

2019. Experian corrected the error by early October 2019. A credit card company, 

Chase, looked at the erroneous report but—as Peterson herself admitted—denied her

application because of bankruptcy. In the days between Peterson viewing the report 

and Experian mending the error, she did nothing to dispute the outstanding balance.

Like in other decisions where we have denied damages for emotional distress, 

the record reveals that Peterson “suffered no physical injury, she was not medically 

treated for any psychological or emotional injury, and no other witness corroborated 

any outward manifestation of emotional distress.” Forshee, 178 F.3d at 531; Taylor, 

710 F.3d at 829. Peterson’s declaration and interrogatory responses, which variously 

characterize her exacerbated mental health problems as “extreme,” “incredible,” and 

“immense,” amount to self-serving and conclusory statements incapable ofsurviving

summary judgment. See Keiran v. Home Cap., Inc., 858 F.3d 1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 
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2017); McKenny v. United States, 973 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that 

“a sworn interrogatory response is treated like an affidavit on summary judgment”). 

Peterson fleetingly testified that her Experian report was a “major part of my—my 

anxiety went through the roof. . . . And I just became super depressed.” Still, when 

asked whether those conditions were “related to your credit report or is it just related 

to . . . making good financial choices,” Peterson responded, “It’s—it’s all of it.” To

avoid summary judgment, “a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must 

be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In these circumstances, a reasonable 

jury would not award emotional distress damages.

III. CONCLUSION

Because Peterson failed to create a genuine fact dispute on damages, Experian 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We affirm the district court’s judgment. 

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