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45–514 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–146] 

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY AND 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERAGENCY 

PROCESS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 15, 2008 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, April 15, 2008, Building Partnership Capacity and Development 

of the Interagency Process ................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, April 15, 2008 .......................................................................................... 51 

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 2008 

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 

INTERAGENCY PROCESS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 4 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense ........................................................ 5 

Mullen, Adm. Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ....................... 11 

Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary of State ........................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gates, Hon. Robert M. ...................................................................................... 55 

Rice, Hon. Condoleezza .................................................................................... 60 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter to Mr. Marshall dated July 2, 2008, signed by the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs and the Assistant Secretary 

of State for Legislative Affairs ..................................................................... 77 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Marshall ..................................................................................................... 81 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 81 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 86 

Mrs. Gillibrand ................................................................................................. 88 

Mr. Marshall ..................................................................................................... 86 

Mr. Spratt ......................................................................................................... 85 

(1) 

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY AND 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 15, 2008. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to our hearing 

this morning. Two quick announcements. There is a hard stop on 

this hearing at 12:30. The witnesses turn to pumpkins at 12:30 and 

we have promised to let them leave at that time. So I urge the fiveminute rule be adhered to strictly. And we will also have a break 

for the witnesses at 11:00. And when that happens, I hope that the 

audience will stay in their seats for them to repair to the back 

room for the five-minute break. 

So let me officially say good morning and welcome our witnesses 

to the House Armed Services Committee on Building Partnership 

Capacity and Developments in the Interagency Process. This is a 

historic moment, historic because we have two distinguished guests 

with us. In the history of our country, this has not happened before—the Honorable Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, and the 

Honorable Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of the State testifying before a committee, and we appreciate your being with us on this 

very important topic. 

I understand also that Admiral Mullen, Michael Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs is on hand to help answer your questions, 

although as I understand it, will not be offering official testimony. 

Is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. I actually have a brief opening statement, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Thank you. Two years ago this month in 

April 2006, the House Armed Services Committee held two hearings, one on the interagency process and one the next week on 

building partnership capacity. Today we have combined both of 

those topics into one hearing and we will see if that represents 

progress. These are two very important topics for our committee to 

explore, and in many ways they are intertwined. Our country faces 

a more complex security environment today than that of the Cold 

War. We have seen a growing realization that the Nation’s challenges such as fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting 

terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
2 

tion (WMD) require holistic strategies that make use of all the capabilities of all of our government agencies. 

Instead, our national security structures remain essentially unchanged from the days of the Cold War. The mechanisms to integrate all of the United States governmental departments and agencies that should play a role in the development of our national security policy and in translating that policy into integrated action 

are weak if they exist at all. Where they do exist, they are usually 

the ad hoc efforts of those directly engaged in the challenge of the 

moment and not the result of a deliberative process designed to 

achieve a unity of effort that emerges as a natural product of governmental function. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are 

forcing solutions on those issues. Just as those conflicts will not be 

solved by military power, so too is the expertise we most need to 

make a difference there essentially diplomatic. 

Secretary Rice, I commend your efforts—in partnership with 

those like Secretary Gates—to advocate for adequate funding for 

the State Department in the President’s budget request and in 

transforming the Foreign Services culture to adapt to the needs of 

the post-9/11 world. Cultural change takes time and requires sufficient resources. But my view is that some of our problems in Iraq 

and Afghanistan would have been avoided at the beginning with 

the right civilian capabilities deployed in sufficient numbers. 

In its annual submission of legislative proposals for consideration 

in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Department of Defense (DOD) has asked the Congress to consider a 

set of broad-reaching authorities they call building partnership capacity. Most of these are not new. We have seen them, and in some 

cases, acted on them. But in many ways, this looks like one of the 

ad hoc efforts I have mentioned. They are proposed near-term solutions to deal with real problems, but without the discussion we 

want to see of how these authorities fit into the broader set of tools 

that have traditionally resided in the State Department. 

Last year, this committee set the Department of Defense, particularly the military services, on a course to reevaluate the roles 

and missions of the Department. The discussion today is also about 

roles and missions. What is and what should be the State Department’s (DOS) role in the training and equipping of foreign militaries and in mustering the resources to prevent conflict? What existing programs and institutions have to be reformed? How do we 

ensure that the roles and missions that should be resided with the 

State are funded through the President’s budget request? 

In some ways, the specific legislative requests seem to indicate 

that the current authorities and processes governing foreign military assistance today residing within the State Department’s jurisdiction are too inflexible to meet current security requirements. It 

seems to indicate recognition that the national security-related capabilities of civilian agencies, most notably, the State Department, 

must be strengthened. 

In the absence of a national framework for that to happen, the 

Defense Department is willing to use some of its resources toward 

that end. In many ways, therefore, these authorities represent the 

Department of Defense’s effort to jump start and take responsibility for resourcing an interagency process. In recent years, this 
3 

committee has considered these and similar authorities. While we 

have not approved them in their entirety, let me be clear, we are 

very supportive of the goals, the training and equipping of partners 

who will fight with us or for us and improving civilian capabilities 

to deal with tough theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan. 

We have admitted that there was some concern, though. Some of 

that concern has had to do with what appears to be the migration 

of State Department activities to the Defense Department. The 

State’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program has put in place 

a strong system of safeguards and controls through legislation and 

policy all overwatched by persons of considerable expertise. Why, 

then, we wonder, was the Department of Defense asking for similar 

authority. Why can’t the FMF program handle it? Some of the concerns revolve around funding issues. 

As I have mentioned, Secretary Rice has been challenged in finding additional funding through State’s budget. To provide funding 

from the Department of Defense generally means drawing on operation and maintenance funds. I don’t need to tell anyone that those 

funds are tight and need to go to the Department of Defense operations and maintenance costs. In the end, Congress has tried to 

provide sufficient authority for the most pressing needs of the Department of Defense while strongly encouraging the Administration 

to develop a more integrated, interagency approach to building 

partnership capacity. That you are both back here today in support 

of greater authority for the Defense Department would indicate 

that the Administration has not taken that hint. 

Do these requests for expanding Department of Defense authorities really represent the future of interagency thinking? I hope not. 

But where do we go? Whether the Congress acts on these issues, 

be they the trained equip authority known as ‘‘1206’’ or the authorization for the transfer of Department of Defense monies to the 

State Department, has been in limited scope and for a limited duration. It is now time to consider whether Congress will extend or 

expand these programs. 

But how? While Congress has acted on these issues as a temporary fix, what is the way forward from here? That is what we 

hope to hear today. Is the Department of Defense becoming the de 

facto lead agency in what used to be the State Department’s realm? 

If so, why? How do we see these programs evolving from the ad hoc 

efforts to fully institutionalized governmentwide solutions? Two 

years ago, as I said, we had a hearing on this very subject where 

both then Chairman Hunter and I as ranking member expressed 

our concerns about these issues. The concerns I venture to say 

have not changed over the intervening times. Secretary Gates, Secretary Rice you have the opportunity today. From you we hope to 

hear how the Administration has used those two years to mature 

its approach on those specific issues. And I will expect you will 

need to explain to us why or why it hasn’t. 

Before I conclude, let me take an additional minute to address 

the testimony this committee heard last week with General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Needless to say, they are 

among the finest we have in public service, but they are not responsible for taking the broader view that our two Secretaries must 

take on our national security. I continue to be deeply concerned 
4 

that the Iraqis are not taking advantage of the opportunities our 

troops have provided for them. Moreover, Secretary Gates, I know 

you also share my concern about the state of our military readiness 

if they are called upon to fight elsewhere, heaven forbid. I see a 

desperate need for increased resources in Afghanistan so we don’t 

lose that effort. When we know that the most likely source of attack upon our Nation is coming from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, I have a hard time understanding why Iraq is priority one instead of Afghanistan being priority number one. With that, I will 

now turn to my friend, the ranking member from California, Mr. 

Hunter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for holding 

this very timely hearing. And I would like to join you in welcoming 

our witnesses, Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice as well as Admiral Mullen, who I understand is here and available to answer questions for members. It seems to me that at first glance, today’s topics, building partners capacity and reforming the interagency system, are unrelated. However, I believe that the need for the Defense Department to train and equip foreign forces and to provide 

funding for stabilization program social security is emblematic for 

interagency reform. 

In recent years, the defense authorization laws have grown the 

ability of DOD to build the capacity of foreign forces or otherwise 

stabilize foreign nations through numerous programs. I hope today 

our witnesses will describe these initiatives, including the threeyear section 1206 pilot program that allows DOD to train and 

equip partner militaries for counterterrorism or stability operations 

and the three-year section 1207 transfer authority that allows 

State Department to redirect DOD funds to governance, train and 

equip other stabilization programs worldwide, and last, the longer 

term section 1208 program employed by our special operation 

forces. 

As you can see, Congress has recognized the need for the Defense 

Department to play in this foreign assistance arena. However, I 

note that Congress enacted many of these programs on a temporary basis. We have always been very conservative about putting 

these programs in place and we clearly outlined our legislative intent that they serve as stopgap measures. As mentioned during an 

April 2006 full committee hearing on building partner capacity, we 

wanted to give the Administration time to address the larger problem of how our ability to train and equip foreign forces and to provide stabilization aid is arranged under the State Department’s 

traditional foreign assistance programs. We wanted to avoid increasing reliance on our Nation’s military personnel who we all 

know have a can-do ethos and are willing to help in this area but 

who are actively engaged in combat operations and who need every 

single penny of operation and maintenance and other funding that 

we are providing them. 

For example, I note that with some concern that 10 million of 

DOD funding was recently used for government and infrastructure 
5 

in Nepal to hedge against the risk of communist domination. I am 

curious which DOD programs received 10 million less funding so 

that this stabilization project could occur. More broadly, I would 

like to hear about the U.S. foreign assistance strategy and the 

steps you have taken in the two years since this committee’s foreign assistance hearing to address shortfalls and challenges in the 

broader foreign assistance program. 

It seems to me that the need to train and equip foreign forces 

and to provide stabilization programs will remain necessary as we 

continue to fight the global war on terror (GWOT). That said, the 

long-term answer must reflect an integrated approach to foreign 

assistance and not simply just a shift in those types of missions to 

U.S. military forces and that is something this committee is traditionally pushed back against because of this potential for a fairly 

substantial draw on DOD funding, funding that could come from 

some other important missions. And I believe that a long-term integrated approach should emerge from an updated national security 

architecture that is adapted to the full range of 21st century challenges. 

Members of Congress have been actively discussing possible reforms in the national security architecture to make the interagency 

process and structures as efficient and effective as possible. In fact, 

this committee played an integral role in exploring this issue 

through both a legislatively required study and the work of our 

Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee. 

So today we are discussing foreign assistance, but reforming the 

interagency would also have a beneficial impact on a range of other 

important issues. For example, staffing provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRTs), deploying civilian personnel abroad, and involving 

other departments, such as Justice and Homeland Security and 

overseas endeavors. 

So this committee wants to be as supportive as possible in 

achieving the range of our Nation’s national security missions to 

develop the various elements within the foreign assistance toolbox 

without damaging the ability of our military to accomplish or assign missions. I think we have got to take a careful look at the role, 

missions, and relationships among our national security-related departments and agencies and hopefully, Mr. Chairman, this hearing 

today will help members of this committee to have this conversation. So Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I welcome our guests and I look forward to the testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly thank the gentleman. Secretary 

Gates, welcome. And we will proceed from here. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 

committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear with Secretary 

Rice and Admiral Mullen this morning. The subject being discussed 

and debated in this hearing goes to the heart of the challenge facing our national security apparatus. How can we improve and integrate America’s instruments of national power to reflect the new 

realities and requirements of this century? For years to come, 

America will be grappling with a range of challenges to the inter-
6 

national system and our own security from global terrorism to ethnic conflicts to rogue nations and rising powers. These challenges 

are, by their nature, long-term, requiring patience and persistence 

across multiple Administrations. Most will emerge from within 

countries with which we are not at war. They cannot be overcome 

by military means alone and they extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency or department. 

They will require our government to operate with unprecedented 

unity, agility, and creativity, and as I have said before, they will 

require devoting considerably more resources to nonmilitary instruments of national power, which need to be rebuilt, modernized and 

committed to the fight. Over the last 15 years, the U.S. Government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st 

century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the 

wake of a Second World War. 

Operating within this outdated bureaucratic superstructure, U.S. 

Government has sought to improve interagency planning and cooperation through a variety of means, new legislation, directive, offices, coordinators, czars, authorities, and initiatives, with varying 

degrees of success. The recent efforts at modernizing the current 

system have faced obstacles when it comes to funding and implementation. 

Some real progress has been made. One of the most important 

and promising developments of recent years is the main subject of 

today’s hearing: the U.S. Government’s ability to build the security 

capacity of partner nations. And in summary, the global train and 

equip program known as section 1206 provides commanders a 

means to fill long-standing gaps in the effort to help other nations 

build and sustain capable military forces. It allows Defense and 

State to act in months rather than in years. The program focuses 

on places where we are not at war, but where there are both 

emerging threats and opportunities. It decreases the likelihood that 

our troops will be used in the future. Combatant commanders consider this a vital tool on the war on terror beyond Afghanistan and 

Iraq. 

It has become a model of cooperation, of interagency cooperation 

between State and Defense, both in the field and here in Washington, as I hope will be on display here today. Some have asked 

why this requirement should not be funded and executed by the 

State Department or that the issue as a matter of State’s manning 

and funding to the point where it could take over this responsibility. 

In my view, building partner capacity is a vital and enduring 

military requirement, irrespective of the capacity of other departments, and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect 

that reality. The Department of Defense would no more outsource 

this substantial and costly security requirement to a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission. On the other 

hand, it must be implemented in close coordination and partnership with the Department of State. For a long time, programs like 

the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing were of minimal interest to the U.S. Armed Forces, that our military would one 

day need to build large amounts of partner capacity to fulfill its 

mission was not something that was anticipated when the FMF 
7 

program began. The attacks of 9/11 and the operations that have 

followed around the globe reinforced to military planners that the 

security of America’s partners is essential to America’s own security. 

In the past, there was a reasonable degree of certainty about 

where U.S. forces could be called to meet threats. What the last 25 

years have shown is that threats can emerge almost anywhere in 

the world. However, even with the plus up of the Army and the 

Marine Corps, our own forces and resources will remain finite. To 

fill this gap, we must help our allies and partners to confront extremists and other potential sources of global instability within 

their borders. This kind of work takes years. It needs to be begun 

before festering problems and threats become crises requiring U.S. 

military intervention at substantial financial, political, and human 

cost. 

As a result, the Department came to the Congress three years 

ago asking to create a DOD global train and equip authority. We 

knew that the military could not build partner capacity alone. We 

recognized this activity should be done jointly with State, which 

has the in-country expertise and understanding of broader U.S. foreign policy goals. For that reason, Defense asks the Congress to 

make State a co-equal decision maker in law, hence the dual turnkey mechanism. The primary benefits of global training and equip 

will accrue to the country over 10 to 15 years, but the 1206 program already has shown its value. A few examples. 

Providing urgently needed parts and ammunition to the Lebanese Army to defeat a serious al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist threat 

in a Palestine refugee camp, supplying helicopters, spare parts, 

night vision devices, and night flight training to enhance Pakistani 

special forces’ ability to help fight al Qaeda in the northwest territories and setting up cordons run by partner nations in waters surrounding Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines that over time 

will reduce the risk of terrorism and piracy in southeast Asia. 

But we need help from the Congress to sustain this program that 

military leaders from combatant commanders to brigade level say 

they need, as section 1206 is due to expire at the end of this fiscal 

year. So we would ask you to make 1206 permanent in recognition 

of an enduring Defense Department mission to build partner capacity, to increase its funding to $750 million, which reflects combatant commander requirements. And to expand section 1206’s coverage beyond military forces to include security forces that are essential to fighting terrorism and maintaining stability. I know 

members of the committee also have questions about section 1207, 

which currently allows defense to transfer up to $100 million to 

State to bring civilian expertise to bear alongside our military. 

We recently agreed with State to seek a five-year extension and 

an increase in the authority to $200 million. A touch tone for the 

Defense Department is that 1207 should be for civilian support to 

the military, either by bringing civilians to serve with our military 

forces or in lieu of them. I would close by noting that seeing these 

changes through, including the now central mission to build capacity of partner nations, will take uncommon vision, persistence, and 

cooperation between the military and civilian, the executive and 

the legislative, and among the different elements of the inter-
8 

agency. Though these kinds of activities and initiatives are crucial 

to protecting America’s security and vital interests, they don’t have 

the kind of bureaucratic or political constituency that one sees, for 

example, with weapons systems. 

So I applaud the Members of Congress who have stepped up to 

make these issues a priority. Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for 

the opportunity to testify today and for all this committee has done 

to support our Armed Forces. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. 

Secretary Rice, please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF 

STATE 

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. Thank you very much. I would very much like to 

thank this committee for the opportunity to testify on this extremely important issue and to do so with my colleague and friend, 

Secretary Bob Gates. I believe that you have correctly identified 

the degree to which the challenges of the 21st century require both 

change within individual departments of our national security apparatus and better and stronger means for interagency action and 

coordination. 

In fact, I believe that the way that we have come to think with 

the world that we face, is that there are no longer neat categories 

between war and peace. More often, we are facing a continuum between war and peace, countries with which we are not at war, but 

which we must make capable of waging counterterrorism operations, countries that have emerged from war but are not yet in a 

position in which they are stable and in which we are still helping 

them to fight terrorists in their midsts or insurgencies in their 

midsts. And this is why the ability of the Department of State and 

the Department of Defense to work together in these environments 

is so crucial to our success. 

In many cases, we are engaging the fact that the threats to us 

come perhaps more from within states than between states. Indeed, 

we learned on September 11th that the most extreme threat to the 

United States came indeed from a failed State, Afghanistan. And 

that has changed significantly the security environment in which 

we act. As I said, this has required great changes in the way that 

we think about the departments and it requires different thinking 

about the relationship between our departments and the ability to 

coordinate them. 

Let me note that the Department of State and I thank you very 

much, Mr. Chairman, for your remarks about the efforts we are 

making in the Department of State, to transform our department. 

It has required us to think of ourselves as more expeditionary; it 

has required us to think of ourselves as a national security agency 

and President Bush has designated us as such. It requires us to 

work increasingly outside of capitals, whether in places in which 

there is growing population or more likely in places in which there 

are even ungoverned spaces and where the work will be quite dangerous. It has required us to redeploy some 300 officers out of Eu-
9 

rope into places of greater need, to change our assignment processes, to be able to take on higher priority tasks whether they be 

in Iraq or Afghanistan or in Pakistan. 

And we are requesting in this year’s 2009 budget from the President increases to both the Foreign Service and to the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), 1,100 new Foreign Service 

officers and 300 new USAID officers. And this reflects the fact that 

the effort to take the peace dividend in the 1990’s did not only cut 

into our military forces, but it, in fact, cut into our civilian capacity 

as well. There was a period in the 1990’s when we were not keeping pace, even close to keeping pace, with attrition. And so we have 

a Foreign Service with professional officers of just under 6,500. 

I think Bob Gates has said somewhere near the number of people—is it military bands or Pentagon lawyers, Bob? But it is indeed 

a very—— 

Secretary GATES. A lot more lawyers. 

Secretary RICE. A lot more lawyers than that. But it is indeed 

a very small professional force. USAID has dropped from highs in 

the 1980’s of nearly 5,000 officers to 1,100 officers currently. And 

so we have some significant rebuilding of our civilian professional 

corps to do. We have also changed the way that we train our Foreign Service officers for nontraditional roles. We have increased the 

number of political officers serving with military commands and we 

have pushed the pull-out, as they have called, down to ever lower 

levels of command to help provide civilian expertise to commanders. 

I might just mention three points that have been raised in the 

initial comments. The first is that we have, in the foreign assistance reform that we have undertaken, tried to better integrate the 

foreign assistance dollars that the United States of America is providing to countries by a more integrated foreign assistance process 

that is led by a new director of foreign assistance who is simultaneously the head of USAID. Roughly 80 percent of all foreign assistance is provided by those two agencies. 

But in the process that we have to construct the foreign assistance budget, we have included the Department of Defense in the 

construction of that budget from the very first meetings, all the 

way up to the management review of budget requests that I chair 

at the end of the process before the submission of the budget to the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and ultimately to the 

Congress. And so we have tried by including Defense Department 

and indeed joint staff representatives in our process to begin to 

take account of the needs of military commanders, of the need to 

build partner capacity in our overall foreign assistance approach. 

Two other major initiatives that we have undertaken is one to 

try and deal with the problems of stabilization. We faced this problem in the Balkans. We faced it again in Afghanistan. We faced it 

again in Iraq. And I think it is fair to say that in none of those 

cases did we have really the right answer in terms of the civilian 

component of stabilization. We simply didn’t have a civilian institution that could take on the task of providing stabilization in the 

wake of war or civil war. 

As a result, I would be the first to say that our military did take 

on more tasks than perhaps would have been preferred. And we 
10 

began some work when I was still national security advisor to 

think through how we might build a civilian institution that would 

be up to the task. We have, as a result, a civilian stabilization initiative. This initiative would create a rapid civilian response capacity for use in stabilization and reconstruction environments. It 

could be deployed alongside the military with international partners or on its own. 

The civilian stabilization initiative consists of three kinds of civilian responders: an active response corps of diplomats and interagency federal employees, who are selected and trained for this capability; a standby response corps of federal employees; and finally 

a civilian reserve corps of private sector, local government, and 

civil society experts with specialized skillsets. And I might especially underscore the importance of this last component because it 

is never going to be possible to keep within the environs of the 

State Department or really even government agencies the full 

range of expertise that one needs in state building, for instance city 

planners or justice experts, or police training experts and so this 

civilian component to be able to draw on the broader national community of experts, Americans who might wish to volunteer to go to 

a place like Afghanistan or Haiti or Liberia to help in at a time 

building we think is an important innovation, the President talked 

about this in his State of the Union one year ago and we are now 

ready to put that capacity into place. We have requested $248.6 million in the President’s foreign assistance budget for the construction of that corps. If I may, let me 

just mention two other elements of our efforts to meet these new 

challenges. Secretary Gates has talked about the 1206 authorities. 

We believe at State that this additional military assistance that 

has become available under section 1206 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) has proven invaluable. We fully support 

this and other complementary foreign assistance authorities within 

the jurisdiction of this committee, most notably, the extension and 

expansion of 1206 and 1207 authorities. In 1206, we have provided 

a ‘‘dual-key’’ approach of delivering resources for emergent shortterm military assistance needs and counterterrorism activities. 

Let me underscore that this is not a substitute for more robust 

funding for security assistance accounts, but we strongly advocate 

continuing these important contingency authorities and they are 

the additional tools that we need to meet emergent, exigent problems that very often emerge out of budget cycle. Secretary Gates 

mentioned the Lebanon situation. 

I think had the United States not been able to respond to the 

needs of the Lebanese armed forces for immediate military assistance in fighting the al Qaeda-linked terrorists in the Nahr ElBared refugee camp, we might have seen a very different outcome. 

In the case that we were able to respond, we saw a Lebanese Army 

and a Lebanese government, democratic government, able to respond to that exigency. We have created many of these tools as 

tools that came out of necessity. It is true that it would be very 

good to have some of these put into more permanent authorities. 

But let me just say that I am a firm believer that it is often out 

of exigent circumstances, out of efforts to respond to new contingencies, out of efforts of this kind that we build our best capacity 
11 

and that we build our best institutions. I am very much of the view 

that it is fine to think of trying to plan for the reconstruction of 

the interagency—the interagency process, but really we have gone 

a long way in creating new tools of interagency coordination. 

They may well have been born of necessity, they may well have 

been ad hoc in character at first, but whether it is 1206 authorities 

or the civilian response corps or the work that we have done together in PRTs, I think that history will look back on this time as 

a time in which necessity was indeed the mother of invention. It 

is often the case that that which is invented in response to new 

and real on-the-ground contingencies turn out to be the best institutions for the future. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Secretary Rice. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice can be found in the 

Appendix on page 60.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mullen. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral MULLEN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hunter, 

members of the committee. It is an honor to join Secretary Gates 

and Secretary Rice here and offer you my views on building partner capacity. As you know, I have long been committed to this effort, certainly from a philosophical perspective. It was at the core 

of what we were trying to do across southern Europe and northern 

Africa during my North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tour 

in Italy a few years ago. And it was the very rudder and keel of 

the 1,000 ship Navy concept that the Navy has pursued for the last 

few years. 

And it is becoming an increasingly critical component of joint operations during the war on terror in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn 

of Africa, and elsewhere around the world. At its core, building 

partner capacity is about helping solve problems before they become crisis. And helping contain crises before they become conflicts. 

It is about working with and through our international partners to 

appropriate security and self-reliance and preclude the sort of conditions that invite the spread of malign influences, ideology, and investments. 

Put simply, it is about lifting all boats at the very same time. I 

have been very public in stating my conviction that not only is the 

U.S. military incapable of winning this long war all by itself, military means in and of themselves are insufficient to the task as 

well. Ours must be a broader reach. We need partners on the 

ground, partners in the interagency, partners in the international 

community, and partners across the spectrum of nongovernmental 

organizations. By building partner capacity, we are, in fact, building global capacity to meet modern, complex challenges, which is 

why today’s hearing is to important. We must address now serious 

shortfalls in the U.S. Government’s ability to assist our partners by 

at the very least extending and expanding our global train and 

equip and reconstruction assistance authorities. 

The Congress can also help by enacting all the authorities contained in the Building Global Partners Act. Without these additional investments, in building partner capacity, I believe we place 
12 

at greater risk and imperil our own efforts to defense our own vital 

national interests. On that score, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of this committee and the House of Representatives 

for passing House Resolution 1084 for the establishment of a civilian response capability. It is a vital step forward in this direction 

and I both applaud and appreciate it. Thank you for your continued 

support to all of our men and women who serve and their families. 

I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Admiral. I will ask one 

question now and save my other questions until a bit later. But let 

me ask that the two Secretaries—what are you doing in your department, your respective departments, about bringing about the 

cultural change to improve interagency cooperation? We have seen 

in the Goldwater-Nichols effort there was a need for cultural 

change within each of the services, which has come about. And 

each of the two departments, by necessity and history, have had 

cultural differences. So what are you doing, if I may ask, within 

your respective departments to change or improve the culture 

which would fit into interagency cooperation better? Secretary 

Gates. 

Secretary GATES. I think that as Condi indicated, necessity is the 

mother of invention, and I think necessity has contributed to a cultural change in the Department of Defense since 2001 in terms of 

the need for greater interagency help, and I think the more that 

we have seen military personnel pressed into service to carry out 

tasks that they recognize are better performed by civilian experts, 

even though our folks do a good job of it, they would be the first 

to admit that when the real experts come in, it is a huge force multiplier. We hear this when we talk to PRT members, and we hear 

it when we talk to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan themselves. 

So I think what you have seen—what has been extraordinary in 

fact to me in returning to government at the end of 2006 is rather 

than what I saw for almost 35 years, 30, 40 years since I joined 

the government, instead of these agencies—instead of the Department of Defense building walls to keep the other agencies out and 

to guard turf, the military has been out begging practically for 

greater involvement by not just the State Department, by the Justice Department, Agriculture, Treasury, various other departments 

of government and has been one of the foremost advocates of 

strengthening interagency coordination and work in these areas 

that we are talking about. 

So I think that in most respects, the requirements of developments in Iraq and Afghanistan have to a considerable measure had 

a huge impact on the culture of the Department of Defense in 

terms of recognition of the need to seek help elsewhere that we 

have neither the personnel nor the expertise to be able to do all 

that is needed in these areas. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Secretary Rice. 

Secretary RICE. I would add—and I think I would say—much the 

same for the Department of State. In fact, if you look at where an 

awful lot of our officers are serving now, they are very often serving in places where they are in close contact with, if not actually 

embedded with, our military. So I could give you three different 
13 

kinds of examples. PRTs in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are 

obviously the closest collaboration that we have. And when those 

officers come back from the experience of serving in a PRT, they 

do have a different view and a different culture about what it is 

that we do as diplomats as civilian support to counter insurgency 

operations. But it is not just in the major efforts like Iraq and Afghanistan, but we have had a very successful collaboration in the 

Philippines. Just recently the ambassador from the Philippines, 

Kristie Kenny, was back to brief the President on the successful 

counterinsurgency efforts in Mindanao in the Philippines. This was 

a place, Mr. Chairman, when we came everybody had said was 

given over to the Abu Sayyaf group. But through coordination with 

the Pacific Command (PACOM), with the—with our embassy and 

really a very strong counterinsurgency effort, we have turned— 

helped the Filipinos turn—Mindanao around. 

And then finally I would say that we have tried to make sure 

that we are transferring these experiences through joint seminars 

and courses at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), at the National 

Defense University (NDU). I am going to sponsor an effort working 

with people at the National Defense University to do a lessonslearned, State Department’s equivalent of a counterinsurgency 

manual for how the civilian peace for counterinsurgency has to 

work. 

We are learning a lot on the ground, but we need to take those 

lessons, capture them, and leave them for future Departments of 

State. We have increased the number of political officers serving 

with combatant commanders or with commanders and pushed it 

down several levels, and finally the training that our people do together for efforts like the PRTs, I think, is having an effect on the 

culture. Department of State diplomats are beginning, I think, to 

realize more and more that our work is increasingly not reporting 

on the politics of another country or spending time with government officials, but it is being out in the field with people, helping 

them improve their lives, helping them improve their governance, 

and hopefully creating a network of well-governed democratic 

states that will not be sources of terrorism and security risks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Secretary Gates, you said that you understand on an increasing basis 

that DOD needs to seek help elsewhere. And you mentioned not 

only State, but Agriculture, Treasury, Justice, all of whom are supposed to be involved now in this major challenge of our time, manifested in the balance in which Iraq hangs. What kind of a grade, 

unvarnished grade, would you give right now from your perspective 

to Agriculture, Treasury, and Justice in terms of their participation 

in the Iraq operation? 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Hunter, first of all, I would say that a big 

part of the problem that we face here is not a lack of will, but a 

lack of capability. We have just sent a dozen or so—we, the U.S. 

Government—has just sent a dozen or so Treasury experts to 

Baghdad to help the ministries execute their budgets better. Various other departments are contributing, but it has been a long 

start-up time, and part of the reason is that other agencies do not 

have the deployable capability that they once—that were once con-
14 

tained in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

when at the height of the Vietnam war, USAID had 15/16,000 employees, and they covered all of these skills, and they were all 

deployable, and they all wanted to serve in developing countries 

and around the world. So I would give—frankly, give the Departments probably an A for will, but we would have to talk about their 

repeating the semester when it comes to performance. 

Secretary RICE. Mr. Hunter, may I make one comment on this? 

Mr. HUNTER. Certainly. 

Secretary RICE. I do think it is a matter of capability. And one 

reason that we need the civilian response corps is to be able to find 

that capability both inside the U.S. Government but also outside of 

it. There are going to be a lot of skillsets that we are never going 

to be able to keep inside the U.S. Government. 

The other thing we have done is we have made it possible, 

thanks to the U.S. Congress, for the State Department to reimburse. These used to be unreimbursable details. And if you are the 

Department of Agriculture with a committee that may not fully understand why the Department of Agriculture should be doing that, 

it does help to be able to reimburse, and we now have that capability. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, Madam Secretary, I saw what I thought were 

a couple of stark illustrations of a difference in attitude toward this 

challenge in Iraq manifested in the two departments. I looked at 

the re-up rates, re-enlistment rates of our combat soldiers, guys in 

the 101st, the 3rd Infantry Division, the first Marine division, and 

extraordinary re-enlistment rates by the people that are in combat 

in the theaters, and then I looked at the report that came from the 

so-called town meeting that State held in which it was difficult for 

you folks to come up with the last reading of an additional 40 or 

42 people to go to the Green Zone for the State Department. 

And I looked at the statements that they made in this town 

meeting where they thought that they would be in grave danger in 

the Green Zone, a place where our soldiers often consider to be a 

place where they take rest and relaxation (R&R). And there was 

a distinct difference in attitude, in culture in terms of engaging in 

this enormous challenge for our country. And I wonder what you— 

if you see that difference. And if so, if you have done anything to 

try to change that culture in State Department because I thought 

that was a sad commentary when you have tens of thousands of 

soldiers and Marines laying their lives on the line who are re-enlisting for that combat and you had State Department people 

standing up and saying they were not going to go to Iraq, that they 

wanted a different assignment, that they thought they would be in 

grave danger in the Green Zone. And really a total change from 

that—from that great spirit that we have seen in the past. And I 

have lived through the—in this congressional career through the 

Contra wars and through the Middle East operations in which 

State Department personnel performed extraordinarily. But I 

thought that that was a distinct change in the ethics, this ethic of 

engagement and participation in dangerous and inconvenient 

places that was manifested in this last couple of months. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. First of all, town halls 

are self-selecting and I think you will find that was a comment 
15 

from a person who said that he felt in danger in the Green Zone. 

The great majority of that town hall was not even about assignments to Iraq. The last couple of comments were about assignments to Iraq, and I will tell you the blogs were lit up in the Department of State by people who were offended. And I mean Foreign Service officers who were serving not just in Iraq and Afghanistan and Islamabad, but serving in the deep, dark jungles of Guatemala as well, who were absolutely—or the highlands of Guatemala who were absolutely offended by those comments. Foreign 

Service officers are still serving in dangerous posts. They are still 

serving in posts where they cannot be accompanied by family. And 

I had no trouble after saying that I was prepared to direct assignments to Iraq, no trouble in getting not just the right people, but 

in getting them very quickly for our assignments in Iraq. To be 

fair, we have had to change some policies in the way that we deal 

with people, and where their families can stay and so forth. But 

I am really proud of the response of Foreign Service officers, and 

if I may just give you one illustration of that. I have now, with Ambassador Crocker, four people who gave up ambassadorships to go 

and serve in Iraq alongside him. And that is the true spirit of the 

Foreign Service. And I was deeply offended myself and deeply sorry 

that these people who had self-selected into this town hall went out 

of their way to my view cast a very bad light on the Foreign Service. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. And just a last question, Mr. Chairman. We have had a battle over the years in this committee with 

respect to the funding. A lot of us have seen this—the train and 

equip programs as a funding shift from a legitimate State duty to 

the Department of Defense. Both agencies now participate in shaping these programs that we have discussed. But as I understand 

it, DOD is footing the bill. Is that right, Secretary Gates? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you see any justification for sharing that burden 

with State rather than DOD taking the entire burden? 

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, on 1206, the projects put forward in 1206 emanate entirely from our combatant commands. We 

coordinate them with State and with the ambassador in the country where they are going to be applied. But these are needs identified by combatant commanders in a military context and what I 

would call phase zero of our war planning and contingency planning, and that is before hostilities break out, what you do to try 

and empower those that are your friends to try and keep the problem under control. 

So I think that is entirely military, ought to be entirely within 

the framework of the Department of Defense. Similarly, with 1207, 

as I say, we see this as an asset because the civilians that are 

being deployed forward are being deployed forward to assist in a 

military situation. And so the amount of money that we have been 

talking about with 1207 is very modest and the projects themselves 

in both 1206 and 1207 are very small, and I might add notified to 

the Congress. 

So I think we are very comfortable with both of these programs 

being in the DOD budget in part because it gives us—in part be-
16 

cause of the origin of the requirement in both case, but second also 

because of the agility with which we can deploy the money. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Spratt, the gentleman from South Carolina. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your testimony. I understand the 

need for what you are proposing, but I am concerned that there 

may be as many risks as rewards in this whole process. Let’s start 

with the power of the purse which is the one power that we have 

that is the source of our authority. How do we as Congress give up 

the control of this money and give maximum use and discretion— 

maximum discretion on its use and still maintain some oversight 

on a timely basis as to how it is being used so we can intercede 

or at least hold accountable those who are being given these funds 

for use. How do we wire Congress into this without undercutting 

the purpose of the program? 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Spratt, I believe that principally, as I understand it, each of these projects is notified to the committees as 

they are approved. So you have transparency into the projects and 

into the money and the opportunity to evaluate how the money has 

been used. 

Mr. SPRATT. So you would have real-time approval—I mean, realtime notification following approval? 

Secretary GATES. That is my understanding of the existing practice. 

Mr. SPRATT. Now, how do you maintain an audit trail? For example, if you had to go out and audit and report on all of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds used, would 

you be able to do that since the beginning of the Iraq engagement? 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Spratt, I am not sure that we could do 

that to the level of detail that I think you are asking about. But 

there is a pretty—we have got controls on this in theater, and they 

have also been advanced over time in terms of their quality, particularly because of the amount of money that is involved. And because of the importance of the impact of CERP funds in theater 

particularly. 

General Petraeus now describes those funds as the ammunition 

directed toward success very specifically. So from the controls that 

we have both in our comptroller shop here in Washington to follow 

that very closely and then look at that in execution, I am comfortable with it that we are in good shape with respect to that, 

whether that all comes back to here or not, I just don’t know. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Spratt, I could just add that all of the 1206 

projects by law comply with foreign assistance, legal safeguards 

with respect to export controls, human rights, and so on, and there 

is a 14-day prior notice to the committee. 

Mr. SPRATT. What about—not just talking about how the money 

is doled out and spent, but auditing or reporting on results. How 

do you keep track of results, of what is working, what isn’t working, what should be stopped, and what should be started? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I would offer—and this is for me personally, anecdotal—but when I am on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and speak to commanders, the amounts we are talking about 

typically that young captains have are in the $50,000 or $100,000— 
17 

those kind of funds. The feedback they give me very directly and 

right up through their chain of command is very, very positive 

about the impact they have and the difference that it makes in 

terms of building capacities in towns and cities, restoring buildings, 

restoring schools, projects like that, beyond also just souring the 

members of the civilian Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), the Sons 

of Iraq. 

So, from that perspective, universal feedback, when I have been 

there, is the positive impact of these kinds of funds. 

Secretary GATES. I would just add, Mr. Spratt, that, particularly 

with 1206 monies, we are looking at train and equip of military 

forces. So we will see the results of the money we invest either by 

the equipment we give them or, in the case of Lebanon, whether 

the Lebanese army is successful in defeating the terrorists in one 

of these refugee camps. 

I think that there is pretty real-time feedback because, as I say, 

principally the 1206 funds are for short-term kind of activities and 

partner enablement. So we can observe the improvement of the 

quality of the partners as a result of either the equipment or the 

training we have been giving them. 

Mr. SPRATT. Just in closing, one concern is it seems to me a large 

part of what you will probably be doing involves recurring funding, 

but we have basically got ad hoc funding, a lot of ad hoc application 

of money. Once you get the thing started and running, they need 

recurring funding. Is that a problem? Do you see that as a problem 

if this is going to be effective across the board in various regions? 

Secretary GATES. I am not sure I understood the question, or 

heard the question. 

Mr. SPRATT. I will submit it for the record. Thank you very 

much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Everett. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, Secretary Rice, Admiral Mullen, thank you very 

much for your long service to this country and to the people who 

serve under you. 

Secretary Rice, I would like to comment on a particular honor 

you received yesterday down at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery. You got the first-ever honorary doctorate degree there. 

This is not a small thing. This honorary doctorate degree at Maxwell University has been in the planning stage for three years. It 

is a singular honor. 

The core mission of Maxwell is national security and international relations. They teach this to our military officers. So I was 

delighted that, in recognition of your work in national security and 

international relations, you received this first-ever honor. 

Of course, a secondary delight to me is a fact that you are a native of Alabama, and I appreciate it from that standpoint. 

Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates, you answered in part some 

questions that I had intended to ask, such as what combatant commands and others across DOD where the State Department officials operate with the other commands; and I guess my question, 

since you partially answered that, is if conflicts arise—and I am 

sure there must be—how are these conflicts resolved? 
18 

Secretary GATES. If they were to arise—because I am not aware 

of any that have so far—ultimately, they would be settled between 

Secretary Rice and myself. What has impressed me is, as these 

have gone along in the 16, 17 months I have been on the job, I 

can’t recall any of these issues, proposed projects with respect to 

either 1206 or 1207, being in such dispute that it ever rose to that 

level. 

Mr. EVERETT. Secretary Rice. 

Secretary RICE. Yes, we have not had it rise to that level. I think 

we should give credit, we have very effective deputy level coordination between Gordon England and John Negroponte, and they are 

very often able to work out any concerns. 

Secretary GATES. Also, our bureaucracies know we don’t like to 

fight with each other. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both. Admiral, good to see you. Thank you for being 

with us today. 

I hope that maybe you can elaborate on my question a little bit. 

But, recently, a memorandum of agreement (MOA) was agreed between the Department of Defense and the Department of State regarding civilian contractors on the battlefield. Can you discuss 

which of your agencies are the lead element, how the guidance is 

being implemented, and an update on overall execution of the 

agreement? 

I go back to your statement that you made, Mr. Secretary Gates, 

where you say that, on page two, ‘‘The Department of Defense 

would no more outsource these substantial and costly security requirements to a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission.’’ 

But going back to the contractors, I don’t think that the contractors—when we have 200,000 contractors in Iraq and 140,000 soldiers, and I think that they have left a bad taste in the mouth of 

many people. But maybe, going back, maybe you can elaborate as 

to the memorandum of agreement between both departments. 

Secretary GATES. Let me start. 

First of all, the memorandum was worked out principally by Gordon England and John Negroponte, our respective deputies, and it 

was worked out to the complete satisfaction I think certainly of 

General Petraeus and I believe also of Ambassador Crocker, and 

we fundamentally changed the way we do business with respect to 

security contractors in Iraq. 

The Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNFI) now has representatives 

in the operations center where the security details are deployed or 

where assignments are made for them to be deployed. We have full 

visibility into when the convoys are leaving, where they are going, 

and who they are carrying. General Petraeus and his people have 

the authority to stop one of those to deconflict it if there is something going on that they know about someplace else. 

So I would say that while State is still doing their own contracting in an operational sense, the lack of visibility that was part 

of the problem before the Blackwater incident, as far as General 
19 

Petraeus is concerned, that problem has been solved, and he is 

quite satisfied with the arrangement that exists today. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Madam Secretary. 

Secretary RICE. I would agree with the comments that Bob has 

just made. 

I would also say that we have some technical fixes as well so 

that we can monitor and have a record of what has gone on. For 

instance, in an incident, we have improved the capability of our 

own diplomatic security agents to be a part of the teams in these 

complex security operations. 

I think it is fair to say we could not do our work without security 

contractors. We would never be able to have enough diplomatic security agents, and I don’t think this is really something the military wants to take on, which would be guarding civilians going, 

diplomatic personnel going from place to place. 

But I do think we have come to a good modus vivendi for working through the problems, and, to my knowledge, at this point it 

is a system that is much better. I must say we are going to have 

to monitor and we are going to have to get a report back as to how 

it is working because there were significant problems with it. And 

I myself hope that the changes that we made have fully addressed 

those problems, but I await the first full reports after several 

months to be certain that that is the case. 

Secretary GATES. I would just add, Mr. Ortiz, that I in fact had 

asked General Petraeus to give me a report after 30 or 60 days, 

and I have that first report, and he was quite content with the way 

things were working. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Just another short question. You mentioned about the necessity 

of engaging some of the countries, surrounding countries. Have we 

started working on that, and what signals? You say that we need 

to do some engagements, but when do you begin to do these engagements? What signals are you waiting for us to go in there and 

engage these countries? 

Secretary RICE. I am sorry, do you mean in regards to Iraq? 

Mr. ORTIZ. We are talking about countries like Syria, Jordan. 

Secretary RICE. The neighbors, in effect. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Are we doing something now, and what signals are 

we expecting if another conflict arises before we get involved, before we enter negotiations or contact with those countries? 

Secretary RICE. We have, in fact, engaged and continue to engage 

Iraq’s neighbors through a Neighbors Conference. We believe it is 

best to do this in a multilateral setting where Iraq can represent 

itself. 

I will, in fact, go to one of these meetings next week that is being 

held in Kuwait. It has a plan of action in terms of borders, refugees, security concerns. It now has a small steering or secretariat 

that works on these concerns. 

So I think Iraq’s neighbors are engaged. But we thought it better 

to do it in a multilateral setting, rather than just bilaterally with 

the United States. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Bartlett from Maryland. 
20 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Rice, 2 years and 10 days ago, you testified before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and you made the following 

statement: ‘‘We do have to do something about the energy problem. 

I can tell you that nothing has really taken me aback more as Secretary of State than that the politics of energy is, I will use the 

word, warping diplomacy around the world. It has given extraordinary power to some states that are using that power in not very 

good ways for the international system—states that would otherwise have very little power. It is sending some states that are 

growing very rapidly in an all-out search for energy, states like 

China, states like India. That is really sending them to parts of the 

world where they have not been before, and challenging, I think, 

for our diplomacy.’’ 

A major headline in the New York Times this morning above the 

fold was that leaders of third-world nations are now complaining 

that our quest to relieve ourselves from some dependency on foreign oil in producing corn ethanol, which diverted land from wheat 

and soybeans to corn, doubled the price of corn, nearly doubled the 

price of soybeans and wheat, drove up the price of rice, a foreign 

major food of basic substances for poor people around the world. 

They were complaining that their people were starving because of 

our quest to relieve ourselves of some of the necessity for foreign 

oil by moving to corn ethanol. By the way, then oil was $61.27 a barrel. This morning, it was $112 a barrel, and going up. 

What would you say today about energy warping foreign policy, 

and what does this have to do with building partnership capacity 

and development of interagency process? 

Secretary RICE. Well, the interagency issue here is not really 

with the Defense Department, but with the work that we do with 

the Energy Department, the work that we do with the Agriculture 

Department. We clearly have twin problems. We have an energy 

problem, and we have a food problem. There are some relationships 

between them, Mr. Congressman. 

Obviously, we are looking hard at what element of this might be 

related to biofuels, in particular, ethanol. But we also think that 

a significant part of the food problem relates not from biofuels, but 

from simply the costs of energy in terms of fertilizer, in terms of 

transportation costs for food, and that that is in part maybe even 

a larger part of spiking the food crisis that we have. 

As you know, the President yesterday made available some emergency food assistance. I had people together yesterday to look at 

what we might be able to do in terms of the larger food problem 

that we face. 

Let me just say that one thing that would be very helpful, if you 

look at problems like transport, is that the President has asked for 

local purchase of food closer to the source. That would be enormously helpful. That bill is before the Congress, and we would very 

much like to see it passed. 

But as to energy, we are continuing to work on diversification. 

We are continuing to work on diversification both of supply and 

supply routes. The President is appointing a special envoy for energy to work with Europeans and Central Asians and others to see 
21 

if we can improve the capacity for both production and supply from 

various sources, not relying simply on one element of diversification, which is biofuels. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Do you believe that $110 oil is a temporary problem or is it an enduring problem? 

Secretary RICE. I would be well out of my depth to try and comment on the prospects for oil. I will just say that we know that we 

do have a growing supply problem as large economies like China 

and India come on line. But we say to suppliers all the time that 

the health of the international economy should also be of concern 

to them. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Financial Times today reported that one year 

ago Russia peaked in oil production. Do you think that is significant? 

Secretary RICE. That was a very interesting article, and it is significant. What we do know is that the lack of investment in Russian oil fields, many of which are aging, is causing a problem in 

the depression of production. That is something that I have been 

interested in, actually, for quite a long time, Congressman, even as 

an academic. 

Russia needs to attract investment into its oil fields and to its 

gas fields, and this is one reason that we have encouraged the Russian government to have a more market-oriented, less statist approach to the attraction of foreign investment into its oil fields. The 

more transparent Russia is, the more rule of law there is in governing contracts, the better they are going to do at getting the kind 

of investment that they need to keep those fields producing. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to call on the gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. I might also mention that he made the initial 

recommendation for this hearing. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

As you all know, there has been a lot of churning in this town 

for the last year or two on the whole issue of interagency stuff, 

both within your agencies, within the think tanks, within the Congress, within the war zones. There have been concerns about this. 

Our Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation for the last six 

or eight months has been looking at the PRTs, and we have a report coming out on Thursday that I hope you both will look and— 

all three of you will look at, Admiral Mullen—and let us know your 

thoughts. It is all in the spirit of how we might improve the kinds 

of on-the-ground activities that we all care about. 

As part of that, it really brought home to me the issue. I have 

a constituent who has served in Afghanistan, a veterinarian by 

training and is now I think winding down a year in Iraq. She emailed us some months ago, and I think her line was something 

like she sometimes thinks that there’s more division between the 

different agencies of the U.S. Government than there is between us 

and the Iraqis. 

I think that really brought home that issue of here is somebody 

trying to coordinate with all the different agencies in the U.S. Government and finds the division is so great, which is why, Secretary 
22 

Gates, I think you played such an important role in this discussion 

for some time. Nobody would have been surprised if Secretary Rice 

had been leading the charge on this, but to have the Secretary of 

Defense start talking about the need for dramatic increases in 

funding for USAID, dramatic increases in both numbers of funding 

for the State Department and Foreign Service Officers, is really important. 

I wanted to read a couple of sentences you had from your opening statement, talking about the challenges this country faces in 

national security: 

‘‘They,’’ referring to these challenges, ‘‘will require the Government to operate with unprecedented unity, agility, and creativity.’’ 

I think those are important concepts for us to think about because 

I don’t think we think about that. 

I think the agility part of it is very, very important. I think we 

have a long ways to go. It can’t be agile when we fumbled so long 

in getting the kind of mix of people we want in the PRTs and are 

still fumbling with that. You talk about the will is there, but not 

the capability. That is not the kind of agility we need. 

What I wanted to ask about is the unity. You all I think are trying very hard to pull in harness together. I think General Petraeus 

and Ambassador Crocker are trying very hard to pull in harness 

together. But that is, in some ways, a personality-driven cooperation that doesn’t include all the other agencies of the U.S. Government. 

My questions are two. First, do we need to have some kind of big 

Goldwater-Nichols-like reform come out of the Congress? Or is it 

the kind of thing that needs to be chipped away at by incremental 

stages of legislation? Do either one of you have any thoughts about 

that? 

Secretary GATES. I think in the short-term that we need to keep 

chipping away at it. 

There has been progress in a lot of areas. We talked earlier 

about cultural changes in our two departments and the perceived 

need to work together. But my fundamental premise in the Landon 

lecture that I gave at Kansas State last November is that we are 

operating under a structure that was created by the National Security Act of 1947 that helped us fight and win the Cold War, but 

it is not an appropriate structure for the 21st century. 

On a bipartisan basis and at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, 

people are going to have to think about how to restructure the national security apparatus of this government for the long-term in 

terms of new institutions and new capabilities, and not only new 

institutions, but figure out a way, frankly, to scrape away a lot of 

the barnacles that exist on existing legislation, such as Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) and various other things that make them just 

the opposite of agile. They are very difficult, take a lot of time to 

implement, and so on. So there is a requirement, I think, for fairly 

dramatic change. 

Now the problem is there is often the desire, and we went 

through this when the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was 

created, to use Goldwater-Nichols as a model. The problem is Goldwater-Nichols only works in the Defense Department because at 
23 

the end of the day there is one person in charge who can make decisions. 

Dr. SNYDER. That leads to my second question. Who is going to 

be that person in charge when you have multiple civilian agencies? 

I agree with you, by the way. I agree it should be incremental. 

There has been some thought that it should be in the National Security Council (NSC). The problem is we don’t know what happens 

in the National Security Council. Who do you foresee would be the 

overriding person to head up some kind of interagency approach to 

national security? 

Secretary GATES. One of the things that President Nixon experimented with was super departments, where two or three departments basically were grouped under a single secretary. They still 

had their own secretary, but one had a lead. I am not sure it ever 

really worked. 

But the point is we have to think freshly and, like I say, I think 

short-term incremental change, but, long term, there needs to be 

some fundamental changes in the way business gets done. Frankly, 

we have led a contract for people to look at that on the outside and 

begin thinking about it. But the same kind of thought and analysis 

that went into the National Security Act in 1947 and into the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, I think, needs to go into how do we deal 

with this world of persistent conflict, failed and failing states, and 

so on and so forth for decades to come. 

Secretary RICE. I would draw a distinction between Washington 

and the field here. We have to remember that when the United 

States Government confronts a country, it confronts it, first and 

foremost, on the territory of that country. That is why you have a 

chief of mission. In effect, what has happened to our chiefs of missions is they have found themselves with extremely large interagency teams on the ground, and they are now having to find ways 

to coordinate those interagency teams on the ground because whatever we do back here in Washington, if it doesn’t translate onto the 

ground, if the decisions aren’t made on a timely basis on the 

ground, things are not going to flow properly. 

So I think one of the challenges is that the chiefs of mission, who 

are the face of the U.S. Government to foreign governments, are 

going to perhaps have to be given greater authority to coordinate 

and indeed to direct the various agencies that are under them in 

the field. They have that authority in theory. Sometimes they don’t 

actually have it in practice. 

I think we do have to look at the chief of mission. It has become 

in some places an almost impossible task of coordinating massive 

numbers of agencies on the ground. And not just having the military there and having Justice there or Treasury there, but we are 

talking about the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), for instance. 

Now we have some very successful examples. Colombia has been 

a very successful example of being able to put all of those interagency teams together to run counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 

counter drugs, all while helping Colombia to build, obviously, a 

budding democracy and a strong, as President Uribe has called it, 

democratic security plan for Colombia. 
24 

So there are examples where this has worked. I mentioned 

Mindanao, where it has worked. But our chiefs of mission are challenged by the huge numbers of agencies that they are now overseeing. 

When it comes to Washington, I actually think you are probably 

going to have to look at the Department of State as that lead agency. I don’t see how else—and it may be that it has to look more 

like some kind of super agencies Bob has talked about, but I don’t 

see how you keep the coherence of foreign policy, which is more 

than simply building partner capacity. It is building partner capacity not only with military forces, but, for instance, building partner 

capacity to deliver health care and to deliver the AIDS programs 

that we have, to deliver education to the population. Because if a 

democratic government doesn’t deliver that, pretty soon it is going 

to be out of power. So looking at the totality of what the U.S. Government delivers for a country is going to be important as we think 

about this national security perspective. 

If I may just go to the question of chipping away. I am actually 

a big fan of chipping away, because I will just repeat, I think we 

have gotten some real innovations out of this last period. PRTs are 

one. 1206 authority is another. The civilian stabilization initiative 

is another. 

I might just note that while we now look back in retrospect at 

the National Security Act of 1947 as having been created out of 

whole cloth, it was actually created out of pieces that came out of 

World War II necessities. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The National Security 

Council came out of Roosevelt’s War Council. 

And so, in fact, that was also an evolutionary process, not a radical revolutionary process, when the 1947 Act was created. Institutions most often come into being that way. People look at a cause 

or a problem, they experiment with forms, and, if those forms are 

successful, they grow legs, and they become institutionalized. 

I think we might want to look, if you do go to this—and I would 

very much encourage both ends of Pennsylvania to do it—but you 

might want to look at how the National Security Act of 1947 actually came into being. It didn’t come into being out of whole cloth. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you both. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the United States Air Force came out as a 

result of the Army Air Corps. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Madam Secretary, thank you very much. Secretary 

Gates, Admiral, thank you all for being here. 

Madam Secretary, I think I have listened to the questions, I have 

listened to comments about the interagencies and what we need to 

do, and programs, and everything that we want to do comes back 

to money. There is no question. 

I look at the fact that the debt of this Nation is growing at about 

$1.67 billion a day. I just started reading the book: The Three Trillion Dollar War. I have seen the projections of taking care of our 

injured and wounded for the next 30–35 years. The amount of 

money is astronomical. 

Then I come back home to eastern North Carolina, the Third 

District. I am pumping gas. People around me are buying gas. In 
25 

the year 2001, the gas was $1.42 for 87 octane. It is now $3.36, 

even higher in some places for the same 87 octane. 

This brings me to my point and my question. I was truly outraged by reading an article in USA Today, February 6 of 2008. It 

says, ‘‘Allies fall short on our aid pledges.’’ I will read very briefly. ‘‘Foreign countries have spent about $2.5 billion of the more than $15.8 billion they pledged during and after the October, 2003, conference in Madrid, according to a news report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq reconstruction. The biggest shortfall in 

pledges by 41 donor countries are from Iraq oil-rich neighbors and 

U.S. allies. The United States so far has spent $29 billion to help 

build Iraq, and the Inspector General report says Congress has approved an additional $16.5 billion.’’ 

I wrote you on February 8, and I did get a response from Mr. 

Jeffrey Bergner, three pages, very nice. I appreciated the response. 

But you said through him that you also are concerned. You also indicated that senior U.S. officials continue to urge governments to 

follow through on these pledges. 

My question to you and a concern that I have I think on behalf 

of the people of this great Nation is that these countries are making a profit on that $3.37 per gallon cost of 87 octane while our 

men and women are losing their legs and their arms. It is our responsibility as a government to take care of them for the next 30 

years. 

I will never forget—and I am going to let you answer the question. I will never forget two years ago when Gene Taylor and I 

went to Walter Reed Hospital, and we happened to see a young 

man from Maine sitting in a wheelchair, and we chatted with him. 

Then his mom came in, and she looked at Gene and I, and she had 

one question. She said, I only have one question for you, Congressman. Is this government going to take care of my son 30 years from 

now? One of us said, ‘‘This government should take care of your 

son.’’ 

But when I look at this growing debt and spending roughly $12 

billion a month in Iraq, why can’t we make the Middle East, the 

rich countries, pay their bills to this country? What are you doing 

and what can you do? 

Secretary RICE. Well, I am spending a lot of time making that 

argument, Congressman, to the countries that are Iraq’s neighbors 

in particular. I might just say that the European Union has generally paid its pledges. I think we have to say that for allies who 

have done so. 

The problem, very often, and let me tell you what they say in response. Since a lot of this is project funding, they say that, in fact, 

the security environment has made it difficult for them to carry out 

the actual projects that they had pledged. 

We had a problem, for instance, in Afghanistan, where there was 

a Japanese pledge that they said could not be carried out. What we 

did was to take that money then and have the Army Corps of Engineers carry it out. 

So we are trying different means. But now that we are seeing an 

improved security situation in Iraq, I am going to redouble my efforts and we are all going to redouble efforts to make sure they are 

making good on those program pledges. I will go to a Neighbors 
26 

Meeting on the 22nd of this month, and I will make the argument, 

and I will make it on your behalf as well as on behalf of the American people. 

I think it is absolutely right. They need to pay their way, and 

they need to support Iraq. Not only should they support Iraq, but 

it is in their interest to do so. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We will have a five-minute break. I would ask the audience to 

allow those at the witness table to repair to the anteroom. We will 

take up in five minutes. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Before I call on Mr. Smith, Secretary Gates, in a matter not directly related to this hearing but I want to raise with you today, 

to be followed with a letter, but I just thought I would mention it 

to you. 

At the February 6 budget hearing the committee held with you 

and Admiral Mullen, Mr. McHugh asked how are you going to approach stopping the military-to-civilian conversions. Ms. Jonas, 

your comptroller, responded that we will clearly work with the 

Congress to address those. But five days ago, on April 10, our committee received the Administration’s proposal to repeal the same 

military-to-civilian conversions. 

I will send you a letter on it, but I wanted to give you a headsup and not ask you about it, because that doesn’t relate to this 

hearing. 

Mr. Smith, please. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up on what Dr. Snyder was talking about on coordination, how we sort of bring all of this together, because we are 

dealing with a big, comprehensive, ideological struggle that has 

many components and involves many different countries. To some 

degree, it is like a counterinsurgency in several dozen different 

countries. 

I visited in the southern Philippines to see what they were doing 

down there. So there is a huge development piece, certainly a military piece, and the challenge is how do we bring all of that together 

in a coordinated fashion. I think this hearing is very appropriate. 

The one idea I wanted to sort of float by and see what both of 

you thought is we have sort of coordinated our efforts on the tracking of high-value targets, and so did the direct-action piece of this 

big comprehensive struggle, I think in a very good way. And there 

is many different pieces to that as well. 

But we have used the National Counterterrorism Center. To 

some extent, we have used other pieces that we won’t get into. 

Some of it is top secret. 

Secretary Gates, you know how they coordinate that. They really 

did a good job by picking out some people to coordinate it and then 

getting all the key players to buy in and participate. In that instance, it is dozen of different agencies as well. Granted, this one 

pulls in even more. I think of that as a model. On a daily basis, 

all of those different players get briefed and sort of know what is 

going on in the high-value-target world. 
27 

What I have always thought is that we need the same thing for 

the broader strategy, for strategic communications, for development, to sort of have a picture every day of the several dozen different countries that this struggle is playing out in and what is 

happening and who is involved in what and how those resources 

are divided up. We just need somebody to coordinate that. 

I am curious again to follow up on how you think that would play 

out, because I think I kind of agree with Secretary Rice that logically that fits in the State Department. When you are talking 

about foreign aid development, diplomacy, all of the different pieces 

there, it seems to have more pieces that are in their area and then 

some that cross over. 

The problem is, to be blunt about it, Secretary Gates has the 

money. You mentioned the 1990’s and how we sort of did our peace 

dividend. After 9/11, we clearly responded militarily. You can look 

at the Defense Department budget from September 12, 2001, forward, and you can see we got the threat and responded. It has not 

happened in the State Department on a development of diplomacy 

level. 

I guess the two questions are, one, what level of funds do we 

need to do? Is it realistic to say now we are going to make that 

commitment on these other pieces, in addition to the military 

piece? In factoring that in, how do you see who you would pick to 

coordinate? I guess I would be curious if Secretary Gates thinks my 

analogy to what we are doing on the direct-action piece works at 

all in terms of a coordination model. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

First of all, on budget resources, obviously, I would love to have 

the Defense Department budget. It is not going to happen. We recognize that. 

Mr. SMITH. Even 10 percent of it, maybe. 

Secretary RICE. I think I don’t even have 10 percent of it. That 

is right. 

But we have had a significant increase in foreign assistance. The 

President has tripled it worldwide, quadrupled it in Africa, doubled 

it in Latin America. And recipients, obviously, like Afghanistan 

have been significant—and Iraq, for that matter—significant recipients of counterinsurgency foreign assistance, where we are going 

into an area and building after an area has been cleared of terrorists. So we have increased it. 

What we have not kept pace with, frankly, is the platform for the 

State Department in terms of people. We have spent a lot of money 

on buildings, but we really have allowed the numbers—now Secretary Powell had a diplomatic readiness initiative, which added a 

significant number of officers. They were almost immediately swallowed up by the big efforts that we have in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Mr. SMITH. If I may, I think that is why a lot of this stuff has 

fallen to DOD. My subcommittee has jurisdiction over the Special 

Operations Command, and a lot of those soldiers got involved in 

some of this stuff we are talking about because, again, they had the 

people. 

Secretary RICE. I think that is exactly right. It is why I think one 

of the answers, again, is to go to a kind of civilian response corps, 

which would be, in effect, a kind of equivalent of the Reservists or 
28 

National Guard, that you could call people up as you need them, 

rather than trying to keep them on the payroll. But we also have 

to increase the pure numbers of serving Foreign Service Officers, 

serving USAID officers. 

I think it is an interesting question. I was in the NSC when we 

created the National Counterterrorism Center, and it is an important innovation. I think the problem in kind of taking it as a 

model, for instance, for how we might engage, let’s say, the country 

of Pakistan or the country of the Philippines is it is such a complex 

set of calculations. It is not just the counterinsurgency piece. It has 

to build out to building government capacity, for instance, to deal 

with the problems that are causing the rise of the counterinsurgency, whether those are governance issues or justice issues or poverty issues. 

So I suspect that what you are going to find is that that does 

have to be done by the chief of mission and by the Department of 

State. I have found that the National Security Council can play 

that role at the strategic level of policy guidance in an effective 

way. The minute it tries to get down into a more operational level, 

it gets into trouble. 

I have been National Security Advisor. Bob has been Deputy National Security Advisor. You must, I think, keep the authority and 

responsibility in the same place, and because the National Security 

Advisor is not a confirmed officer, does not have the authority, and 

therefore does not have the accountability for those programs, I 

think it would be a mistake to have more than a kind of policy coordinating role in the NSC. But I would suggest that is where that 

policy coordination really ought to be. 

Mr. SPRATT [presiding]. Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you for 

being with us today. We all appreciate it very much. 

This is a complex issue, as we all know, particularly given the 

lay-down of our bureaucracy, if you will. 

When General Caldwell, Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, was here last month, he mentioned that 

he was having some difficulty in getting civilians from the interagency community to take part in the command and staff college 

training opportunities that existed. He offered to pay all expenses, 

and still he couldn’t sway the civilians or the organizations that 

they work for to train with future leaders of the Armed Forces. 

Assuming that that would be good, I assume it would be good, 

if one feature is to reform how agencies educate, train, assign, and 

promote their personnel, then what incentives can departments 

and agencies offer career professionals to pursue interagency education, training, and interagency experience? 

Secretary RICE. First of all, I am a big supporter of these kinds 

of opportunities. What we have lacked, at least in the Department 

of State, is a people for training float, if you will. We run people 

through so fast just to get them back out to the field so that we 

can fill the positions that we have got, that we really don’t have 

the time to spare them for training. No good organization lives 

with the fact that you really can’t have people on a training cycle 
29 

of the kind that gives them interagency training or proper language training. 

A significant portion of the new positions that the President is 

requesting is so we can create a training float so that people can 

actually spend the time training. Right now, I don’t even have 

enough people to fill the positions. I am at some 10 percent freeze 

on positions, 10 percent unfilled positions frozen out in the field. 

That is after having pulled every single diplomat I can out of Europe to go someplace else. 

I think this is, again, evidence of a too-small civilian capacity to 

really engage in the interagency piece, the language training, the 

proper training that is necessary. I know that it is something that 

is very much valued by our officers. They love to go and do this 

kind of training. We just need to be able to provide them the opportunities. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I am sure that what 

you say is very true, and I guess there are many of us here who 

think not only does State have too few people that give us too few 

capabilities, but, as you know, we are building additional capacity 

in the armed services as well. So it is a new world, a new era, and 

we need to make changes to accommodate our capabilities to those 

new demands. So thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SPRATT. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being before us today. 

Secretary Gates, in your written testimony you cite two commands as examples of positive changes toward effective interagency 

cooperation: U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Southern 

Command (SOUTHCOM). I think that it is great that we are trying to do that. My question is, clearly, that SOUTHCOM and 

AFRICOM are areas of responsibility that aren’t facing the type of 

conflict that we have in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Are 

there plans in place to implement this interagency structure in 

CENTCOM? And, if so, what sort of timeframe do you have for that 

and what challenges do you think you will see when you are trying 

to put them in a command that has a war in it? And what do we 

need to do in order to make sure that we have this in a place like 

CENTCOM, and are there other commands where you want to 

place that type of interagency team in place? 

Secretary GATES. Let me say a word and then ask Admiral 

Mullen to join. 

Part of the problem that we face ties right in with the last question that Secretary Rice answered, and that is we have a significant need for civilian representation, interagency representation in 

AFRICOM above all, but also in SOUTHCOM. Part of the challenge that we are facing is that the other agencies just don’t have 

the spare people to give us. 

Now the deputy—one of the two deputy commanders of 

AFRICOM will be a State Department ambassador. This is a new 

model. So I would say the need first is to try and fill the positions 

in AFRICOM. 

Southern Command has, over a period of years, developed a large 

interagency presence, but there is a real squeeze in terms of the 
30 

availability of people. All of our commands are becoming more 

interagency. But I would tell you that our priority right now is on 

AFRICOM and then on SOUTHCOM. 

But let me ask Admiral Mullen. 

Admiral MULLEN. Ma’am, the two commands you specifically 

spoke of, how we would do this in Central Command and, in fact, 

in both Iraq and Afghanistan we have put an awful lot of people 

from other agencies out there, not the capacity we would like, and 

that really is in phase four of what we call sort of the various 

phases we go through in our operations, by and large, stabilization. 

So it is implemented there, but not to the degree that we are restructuring or standing up AFRICOM and in fact changing Southern Command, with a lot of the same kinds of activities except it 

is preventive. It is the phase zero kinds of things, and they are not 

exactly the same kinds of things that we do. But, clearly, that is 

the kind of sea change that is going on right now that we think 

is going to be very representative of the future. 

The other command that we have done an awful lot of interagency work and stood up is in Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 

in Colorado Springs, where that is inherently interagent, almost 

immediately as we stood up, because of its mission. I think it is 

representative of where we need to be now and also where we need 

to go in the future. 

There was a question on career paths earlier. How do you provide the education? Leaders have to incentivize this for people to 

not just come and do it but also succeed. All that I think speaks 

to the kinds of changes that have to occur across many areas, including how we attract and retain our people across the entirety 

of government. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Admiral. 

Just in the last few minutes that I have, I sent you a letter, Secretary Gates, about the incidents with female contractors who are 

sexually assaulted in Iraq. You sent me back a letter; and in it you 

said you are in the process of working with our commanders to improve the necessary implementation procedures for the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) application, et cetera. You said 

there were still some significant gaps and inconsistencies. 

Can you tell me what are the inconsistencies and significant gaps 

and how do you plan to correct them? Or do we as a Congress have 

to help in order to make sure that we have some accountability to 

our women contractors in Iraq who are being raped by contractors, 

such as where we had the KBR contractors do it to Jamie Leigh 

Jones? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know the date of the letter that I sent. 

I have subsequently sent out to the commanders around the world, 

including to General Petraeus, a memorandum telling them how to 

proceed with the use of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 

against civilian contractors working for the United States Government and that they have the authority under the law that you all 

gave us a couple of years ago to carry out a criminal investigation 

against a civilian and to bring charges against a civilian contractor. 

And, in fact, I think there has been one such arrest just in the last 

two or three weeks. 
31 

What we don’t know is how the courts are going to look at bringing a civilian in under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and 

so the gap that exists is on the other law that is more apt. And 

I should say we also give the Justice Department the opportunity 

to intervene on one of these cases and take it away from the commander if they choose to prosecute. 

The concerns I think that we have is the McGee law has some 

gaps in it. It is the one where there probably needs to be a further 

examination by the Congress to see if there are gaps where it can 

be applied more easily to contractors. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Maybe we can work together. We want to make sure we have this cover for when this 

type of situation happens. 

I thank the chairman for indulging the extra minutes. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me, first of all, thank all three of you for the jobs that you 

do. We know you have very difficult jobs, and you do they them 

very, very well. 

There is a legitimate argument to be made that in Congress we 

sometimes do not have the capacity, maybe the will to focus in and 

laser on priorities as quickly as we need to do and maybe get the 

funding there where it ought to be. A good example, we talk about 

readiness, and we still bottle up a supplemental and delay the passage of that. 

With all of its blemishes and all of its warts, the processes that 

we go through does at least end up with a situation where we are 

voting on funding and we have a degree of openness about where 

that funding is. Oftentimes, we worry about shifting within agencies from one program to the other, which might be different than 

what we establish. 

So when we look at interagency reform and we look at things 

that we want to do, most of us support very strongly information 

on planning coordination. But when we start shifting the funding, 

it at least raises some questions, and the three questions that I 

have to throw out to any of you this morning is this: 

Should there be any limit on the amount of funding that we can 

switch from DOD to the Department of State? If so, what is that 

monetary limit and why should we have the limit, one. 

Number two, we consistently hear testimony that it is not just 

State and DOD, but other agencies that we need to be involved as 

well in what we do, and should we be able to shift that funding 

on an equal basis between all of those agencies? 

Then the third thing is, we mentioned the fact that our combatant commanders are the ones that are basically going to make 

these calls. We know that they are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate. But the question is, historically, when they 

have come in to us with requirements and the requirements that 

they have talked about, they have been military requirements. 

How do they get their hands around the requirements that they 

are going to be recommending now? What definition do we give 

them to help structure the requests that they are making when 

they are talking about requirement needs now? 
32 

Secretary GATES. Let me tackle the first couple and ask Admiral 

Mullen to take on the third. 

First of all, it certainly is my impression that there are very clear 

limits on the resources that can be transferred from the Defense 

Department to the State Department. As an example, under 1206, 

as I indicated earlier, any of those transfers and those specific 

projects have to be notified 14 days in advance to the Congress so 

you all have complete visibility into the transfer that is being made 

and the amount of money that is being made and why it is being 

made. 

Mr. FORBES. Just because that notice comes here doesn’t give us 

the same play over it that we would have in a particular authorization bill or something that would be coming. 

Secretary GATES. But it does give the Members and the staff, 

above all, complete visibility into the process in terms of accountability and an ability to raise questions about those things if they 

have those questions. We get those questions all the time. 

So I think that there are limits. I think we can’t transfer—I am 

no expert in this, but I don’t think we can transfer money to any 

other department without notification to the Congress and going 

through a significant process up here. So I think that is really— 

just as we are coming up here for a request in 1207 for the authority to be able to transfer up to $200 million to the State Department for 1207 and for $750 million authority for 1206, those are 

specific caps, and you would know under those caps what those 

transfers were being made for. 

So it seems to me that, in terms of your responsibility, you have 

the information to hold us accountable. 

Admiral. 

Admiral MULLEN. As far as the requirements themselves are concerned, what the combatant commanders have seen is the value of 

this kind of 1206 building partnership capacity, military training 

and equipping; and it has spanned the very different kinds of capabilities: tactical communications, maritime security, night vision 

kind of flying opportunities. The Secretary mentioned that in Pakistan. The full spectrum. 

They see also the agility with this funding, to be able to make 

it happen very quickly, and that is, I think, very encouraging to 

those that they are engaged with routinely. Combatant commanders have historically come in for a vast array of requirements. 

Typically, they never get the full list, even as they see it. That is 

the case even now in 1206. As it has been asked to be expanded 

from I think $500 million to $750 million, the combatant commanders could actually come in and see other areas of application 

to spend more money. 

So I think to a certain degree we are in a growth timeframe because they see the value of it. I trust their judgment in this because they are in the field, they are engaged with these countries 

routinely, and they see where those needs are. It is in that building 

and the speed with which they can do it where this kind of money 

is so valuable. 

So I am comfortable with the requirements process. It is still 

early. We will go through that. They do that fairly rigorously. It depends on what part of the world we are talking about. But I am 
33 

comfortable with what they do in the country, as well as with their 

staffs, as far as validating these requirements. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Tauscher. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you very 

much for being here. And thank you to the men and women that 

you serve with all around the world. 

I guess the biggest surprise for me after September 11, looking 

at a new, unconventional world of where asymmetrical threats and 

places of chaos are such a threat to us, is how labor-intensive it 

is. We came out of the 20th century believing that we had invested 

in smart systems and smart platforms and lots of things, and the 

truth is it is about people. And I think that what we are finding 

is that we don’t have enough people across the board. 

We clearly have a readiness issue in our military. We need to 

have more people. Madam Secretary, you don’t have enough people, 

certainly, to represent us both diplomatically and with programs. 

And then, across the board, we look like we don’t have enough people. 

I will never forget co-chairing with my colleague from Ohio the 

Congressional Defense Review (CDR) that was mirroring the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) a couple of years ago, and combatant commander after combatant commander would come in and 

say, ‘‘I have done everything I am meant to do.’’ We have done a 

very good job in the military, but where are the civilians? Where 

are the people from the Agriculture Department that are meant to 

come and talk to the Afghanis and tell them, ‘‘Not poppies; winter 

wheat’’? 

So I guess my question is this: People are expensive. They are 

very expensive. What are we doing to attract and retain the right 

kind of people? 

What are we doing to make sure that they understand that, very 

much like in the old joint world, Admiral Mullen, before the joint 

world became certified as the way to be promoted, what are we 

doing to tell the newer people that we are hiring and middle-management people that the way to go is to make this interagency 

process work, that this is the way to get promoted, this is the way 

to be a leader, this is the way to be a Secretary? 

And how are we building the training programs and allowing 

people to go into those systems in a way that gives them the kind 

of robust training and the tools that they need to go forward in this 

very labor-intensive environment? 

Secretary GATES. I will begin, and then Secretary Rice can pick 

up. 

I was smiling because when I first got an interagency detail from 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the National Security Council 

(NSC) in 1974, I was told there probably wouldn’t be a job for me 

in CIA when I came back. It turned out there was, but just barely. 

And the reality is, until the real joint world came along in the 

military—or I would say the rest of the government, to a large extent, has been like the military before Goldwater-Nichols, in terms 

of the attitude toward joint duty. If you are not here in the trench, 

you are not working. If you are over there working for somebody 
34 

else’s agency, you are off our payroll, we are not interested, and 

you are not going to get promoted besides. 

One of the things that I did when I was Director of CIA—well, 

when I headed the analytical side, I said, if you don’t have a rotation in a policy agency, you can’t be promoted to a GS–15, because 

you are over here doing intelligence and you don’t have a clue how 

it is used in the interagency process. And I tried to put that in 

place for the clandestine service when I was Director. That lasted 

until the day after I left office—actually, maybe the hour. 

But the point is I think there really has been a sea change in 

the last 15 years. And I think that most people understand that 

their futures—they look at the military, and they look at the number of positions—for example, that State Department officers are 

serving in the combatant commands (COCOMs) and places like 

that—and I think at least in these two Departments, there is a real 

understanding of that and the culture has changed. I would be surprised if it has changed anything like that in the other Departments—in most of the other Departments of Government. 

Secretary RICE. I would agree with that. 

I think that at State there is an additional reason for people to 

want to have some kind of interagency experience. It has always 

been the case with the National Security Council, increasingly with 

the Defense Department. But if you are going to be a deputy chief 

of mission (DCM) or an ambassador, you better understand the 

interagency. Because, as I said, most of our embassies now, when 

I go out to do an embassy meet-and-greet, as we call it, and I look 

around, some significant portion of those people in the audience are 

actually in uniform or they are DEA agents or perhaps Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents or perhaps from the Justice Department. And so learning to manage an interagency process really 

means understanding the perspective of having been outside of 

your own department. 

What we really have to work on is really two elements. One, better training for people. For instance, the PRTs now train together 

for six weeks or so. That is really good. And people who come back 

from those experiences have a different view of interagency work. 

The other piece, though, is that we need people from different 

perspectives and different backgrounds. And so the State Department is going to need to look at mid-career, entry-level people. It 

is great to get the Foreign Service officers (FSOs), 25, just out. But 

people who have had experiences in business, people who have had 

experiences in the military, people who have had experiences in 

nongovernmental organizations, we are trying to recruit some of 

those mid-career people into the Foreign Service. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mullen. 

Admiral MULLEN. Just one brief comment, Mr. Chairman, on 

this. 

I really think that the people issue is the biggest issue we have 

in DOD long-term—how are we going to recruit them, how are we 

going to retain them? They are the most important resource, and 

they are becoming more and more expensive. And we can have the 

greatest missions in the world and the greatest stuff in the world, 

and it is not going to work without them. And that is one we have 
35 

to tackle and, I think, be predictive about, as opposed to reactive 

about, which we aren’t very good at. 

And I was sitting, actually, down in Key West not too long ago 

with a young lady from an agency who has been down there assigned to the task force down there, and she had come from one 

of the headquarters here. And she looked at me at the end—she 

had been there about a year—and she said, ‘‘We should have done 

this 10 years ago.’’ And she was in an agency that she knows, 10 

years ago, wasn’t talking to anybody. And that was a real message 

for me and, I think, indicative of what we have to do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before I call on Mr. Wilson, let me ask a very quick question. 

And Admiral Mullen, I know, will recall the beginnings of Goldwater-Nichols, how, number one, it was fought by those with four 

stars on their shoulders within the Pentagon and then how some 

services dragged their feet as best they could, but it is finally the 

culture within the military. But it was forced upon the military by 

the Congress of the United States. And, to the credit of the military, it is working and working very, very well, but it took a while 

to do. 

So let me translate that into, should we come up with, at the end 

of the day, whether it be piece by piece or as a solid piece of legislation that does basically the same thing, that says, ‘‘Thou shalt do 

interagency work’’? How will the cultures—plural—accept this? 

Would this be a replay of the various services as a respondent to 

Goldwater-Nichols, or is there a difference? 

Either one or both of you. 

Secretary RICE. Mr. Chairman, I believe that interagency work 

is essential, and I think it is beginning to permeate our culture, at 

least at State, that it is essential. 

And as I said to Representative Tauscher, if you are out in an 

embassy—I think we tend to think of Washington, but our people 

mostly serve abroad. And if you are out in an embassy, you are in 

an interagency environment. If you are a Deputy Chief of Mission, 

you are in an interagency environment. And so I think what we 

have to do is to capture that experience. 

But if we are going to have people here in Washington who can 

go to the Command and General Staff College and to other places, 

we are going to have to be able to provide us with the training float 

to spare those people to go for that training. 

But I do believe that a sense of the importance of the interagency 

is there in our culture. You may not get it in some of the other 

agencies; that may take more time. But I sense it, and I believe 

it is there in State. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Thank you. 

Secretary Gates, do you have any comments? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I am torn between incentives and disincentives. In other words, frankly, when I was at CIA, the leverage that I used to cause people to get interagency experience was 

basically to tell them that they wouldn’t be promoted beyond a certain level if they didn’t have it. It is not unlike the promotion process in the military where, if you don’t have joint experience, there 

is only so far you can go, where it is a prerequisite for obtaining 

certain ranks and positions. So that is one aspect. 
36 

The other is to try to figure out, which I think—I think the incentive part of it is in some ways more complicated, in terms of 

how you cause people to see it in their own advantage to look for 

these opportunities, and so you build a culture where people are 

looking for the joint experience or the interagency experience. 

But I think for the Congress even to weigh in almost philosophically about the importance of interagency experience could have a 

salutary effect. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Madam Secretary and Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you 

very much for being here today. 

I believe that we are in a global war on terrorism, as you all 

have identified, a global counterinsurgency. To protect American 

families, it is just crucial that we deny the terrorists the abilities 

to create breeding grounds for terrorism or safe havens. And, working together, I believe you are making quite a difference. 

And, Madam Secretary, in particular, I want you to know how 

grateful I am for the work of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). I never cease to be amazed. Their 

annual report—I wish the American people could see, in dozens of 

countries all over the world, where there is a natural disaster, 

USAID is there right away, providing aid, helping countries provide infrastructure, working as we see at the country briefs. The 

dedicated people you have in State Department, it would warm 

your heart how much they care about the people that they are 

serving, in working with the Peace Corps. 

I have seen it firsthand. In 2005, I was in Muzaffarabad. And, 

Mr. Secretary, it was extraordinary. I ran into a constituent of 

mine, a young Pakistani-American corporal in the Marine Corps, 

and they were up there providing care for persons who had been 

in the earthquake in northern Pakistan. And with his perfect Urdu, 

he was able to truly project America as we know it, a country that 

cares about people around the world. 

And then I was able to visit in Darfur, in Sudan, in the USAID 

tents, the food being provided. Additionally I have seen the PRTs 

working together in Jalalabad and also at Khost. And I was most 

recently at Asadabad and with a young Navy lieutenant. He was 

talking about building a bridge for the people of Asadabad. You 

would think he was talking about the birth of his own child, he was 

so excited and so proud to show us what they were doing. 

And I have seen also, in Iraq, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) activities in Mosul. One of my sons served 

for a year in Iraq, and his greatest pride, indeed, was to provide 

water tanks to the villages, to help in a small way to work with 

the project to distribute 2 million bookbags to the children of Iraq, 

additionally with medical clinics. 

So I see progress all around. 

But I do share the concern of Congressman Jones that we have 

countries in the neighborhood of Iraq, many of them very, very 

wealthy, and it is in their interest, Madam Secretary, as you indicated, that they truly deliver on the commitments they have made 

but even more so. 
37 

So, again, how is this going to be brought to their attention? 

Secretary RICE. Well, it is going to be brought to their attention 

by continuously bringing it to their attention, Congressman. This 

is actually a subject for discussion every time I am with those 

countries. 

And as the security environment improves, there will not be, perhaps, the concern that they cannot carry out the projects that they 

need to carry out. 

Frankly, the Iraqis are quite capable of funding a lot of their own 

activities, and I think the reconstruction assistance now is about 

10 to 1, them to us. But it doesn’t mean, for instance, they wouldn’t 

be helped tremendously by debt relief by some of these countries. 

All of the Paris Club countries—the United States, France, Britain, 

now Russia—are in a position of discounting that debt. But we 

haven’t gotten the same response from some of the countries in the 

region. 

So those are the kinds of things that we go after them about all 

the time. It is most in their interest. That is why we have a neighbors conference, and I will be delivering the message again. And 

thank you; I can deliver the message directly from the Congress of 

the United States when I go to Kuwait. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, it is good business and good security for them. 

And, Mr. Secretary, the foreign military financing (FMF) programs, to me, can be so helpful. I was in Ghana and so impressed 

by the developing military there and our association. 

Are there other examples of progress in Africa? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think FMF is a good example of a 

longer-term solution to the kinds of issues that we are talking 

about with 1206 and being able to do it in the short-term. And we 

have had some experience using 1206 in Africa and providing some 

training and so on, and I think it is a great short-term, initial way 

to get into the programs with some of these folks. 

Mr. WILSON. And is it helping them also with the latest equipment, so that it can be interrelated with other—— 

Secretary GATES. Generally, the kinds of things that we provide 

are pretty—you know, are small boats, are radios, some trucks and 

things like that. It is pretty simple stuff that they need—and training and professionalizing them. Those are really the needs that 

most of these countries have. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Secretary GATES. Even though they would all like to have F–22s. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. 

Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for your 

service. Thank you for your time this morning. 

Two states that pose significant issues for our country today for 

different reasons have a common problem in their recent history 

with our country, and that is Iran and Pakistan. 

Frankly, the standing of the American people and the American 

image in both countries is very different, but to the extent that 

there is disfavor toward the United States in each country, one of 

the reasons is our association with unpopular oppressive rulers. 

There are Pakistanis who have negative opinions of the United 
38 

States because of the real and perceived actions by General 

Musharraf. And although I understand our standing within Iran is 

rather good, there are still some Iranians who are bitter toward the 

United States because of our support for the Shah over the decades. 

In that context, Mr. Secretary Gates, I want to ask about your 

recommendation of expanding section 1206 coverage beyond military forces to include security forces. 

Now, I read this as saying your intent is to be sure that we bring 

peace and stability to troubled places. I don’t read a word in there 

that would talk about anything offensive or oppressive to the citizens of those countries. 

But what kind of criteria or safeguards do you think we should 

consider putting in to limit the use of section 1206 coverage for 

something other than military forces? In other words, aren’t we setting up the possibility that we will create in other places the kind 

of ill will we have created toward ourselves in the two states I 

mentioned, because we are seen as subsidizing and encouraging oppressive behavior toward people of those countries? 

Secretary GATES. I think that the reason for broadening it beyond military to security services is simply because many of the 

countries that we work with and that we potentially will work with 

organize themselves differently. So that in Liberia, for example, the 

Coast Guard that is helping us with maritime surveillance and so 

on is not a part of their military. In Pakistan, the Frontier Corps 

is not a part of the military. So it is really those kinds of institutions that we are talking about. 

And, as I say, there is a notification process in terms of accountability where you all can see who we are giving this money to and 

what we are doing. And they also have to meet the human rights 

requirement. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I appreciate that, although let’s posit this circumstance. Let’s posit an emerging growing state that has an orthodox military structure and an interior ministry. And let’s say 

that the interior ministry is dominated by a minority, religious or 

sectarian group and has some problems with the majority group. 

Should there be substantive criteria, not simply notification but 

substantive criteria, before we would use 1206 coverage for that interior ministry? 

Secretary RICE. Well, I think, Congressman, we have tried—first 

of all, do have the human rights vetting provisions that we use to 

make certain or to attempt to make certain that the equipment and 

training that the United States does would not be used for internal 

repression in one way or another. And we have not always been 

able to assure it. Certainly there have been some cases. But we 

have not been shy about cutting off assistance if those human 

rights abuses are found, even down to a unit level, in some cases. 

We are not talking about standard police forces here. I think we 

are talking more about forces, paramilitary forces in some cases, 

that may come into being in terms of counterterrorism operations. 

But I wouldn’t know how to establish criteria that are universal. 

I think this is really going to be more of a case of—— 
39 

Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Secretary, I don’t know that they need to 

be universal. And, frankly, my question is more of an institutional 

separation-of-powers question than it is about any particular case. 

We are, I think justifiably, reluctant to say that the Congress can 

be notified that these funds are going to be used for interior ministries but not have some substantive criteria to understand whether that human rights vetting process you talked about is in fact 

happening, how thorough it is, how credible it is. 

I don’t envy the job of anyone who had to deal with Iran in the 

1960’s and the 1970’s or Pakistan in these times. It is difficult. But 

I do understand that there is a record here that shows that our position and therefore our security is sometimes weakened and jeopardized because of the use of oppression by people that we have associated with or funded. 

It is a difficult problem, but I do think it is one the Congress 

needs to play a substantive role and not simply an advisory one. 

I see my time has expired. I thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here, and especially the folks that 

go out and put themselves on the line for our freedom. I always 

want to express gratitude for that. 

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the meeting called here was to 

hear testimony on efforts to build the security capacity of partner 

nations in the ongoing development of the interagency process. And 

I think the fact that the divergency that is represented on the dais 

of the panel here is an indication that development of the interagency process is occurring. 

So I have just one question that I hope all three of you can address, related to the security capacity of partner nations. 

Secretary Rice, you stated on page 12 of your testimony that, 

quote, ‘‘We are working closely with the Department of Defense on 

a number of strategic policy issues. The Gulf Security Dialogue integrates foreign policy and military dimensions with our allies and 

partners in the Gulf.’’ 

And, Madam Secretary, I wanted to specifically talk about Saudi 

Arabia. And I want you to know, this is not a catch-you question. 

I believe there is an answer—some answers to it, but it is a paradox to me, and that is our relationship with Saudi Arabia. 

First of all, the government of Saudi Arabia is failing in some 

areas related to the prevention of terrorist financing. They are one 

of the largest financiers of terrorism in the world. And they continue to indoctrinate their students with anti-Western and antiIsraeli beliefs in their textbooks throughout the education system. 

They remain intolerant to religions other than Sunni Islam, and 

they forbid political dissent. And moreover, their borders, sharing 

500 miles of border with Iran, are a particular problem, given that 

they are not doing well in securing their border enough to do anything to help in the effort of stabilizing Iran. 

And, of course, we have just sold Saudi Arabia some significant 

equipment, ostensibly to help them counter Iran, but in their statements, they don’t suggest that that is their intent with the equipment. And I don’t want to question any one of these things in par-
40 

ticular, but, all together, there seems to be a general indication 

that Saudi Arabia has not demonstrated to the United States their 

desire to propagate freedom and tolerance like we are hoping they 

will do. 

And in the long-run, I guess the question really is this: How is 

our partnership with a government like Saudi Arabia advancing 

our national security objectives? 

And, Madam Secretary, if you would go first, and I hope we can 

get the other two perspectives in too. 

Secretary RICE. I think it is absolutely the case that, prior to 

2000 and before 9/11 and really, frankly, before the bombings in Riyadh in May of 2002, I think that it could be said that Saudi Arabia was not as effective—or was not very effective in fighting terrorism. I think there has really been a change in Saudi Arabia on 

this fact. The government has been very aggressive. They have, in 

fact, killed a lot of al Qaeda operatives in Saudi Arabia. They have 

arrested scores more. I think our people would tell you we have 

very good counterterrorism cooperation. 

Now, on financing, yes, it is a more complicated picture, and I 

think there it is not so much the government as the inability to 

control certain elements that are funding through private sources. 

And we have been very—pressing them a lot on some of these foundations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that we believe continue to pass terrorists funding. 

But I believe that you are getting a major effort from Saudi Arabia. As to the regional dimension to that, though, I am absolutely 

certain that without strong defense capabilities for our Gulf allies, 

they will not be able to resist Iranian penetration, aggression, and 

the considerable spread of Iranian activities into the Gulf region. 

It is something that really does frighten them. And they see their 

own national interest as being linked to ours in resisting that, even 

if sometimes it is not in the rhetoric. 

But as to matters of democratization in Saudi Arabia, you are 

right, that is going to be a long course. We continue to hope for better. Some small things have changed, but the larger course of 

Saudi Arabia, I think, on this score is still to be determined. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Admiral Mullen, would you like to take a shot at it, I mean, from 

the military perspective? 

Admiral MULLEN. The military-to-military engagement has been 

strong and continues strong, and it is a key part of this whole Gulf 

Security Dialogue. And I have watched the members of this evolve 

tremendously in recent years. Obviously there is great concern now 

because of the tension created by Iran. And that balance, I think, 

is needed not just in the near-term but in the long-term. And Saudi 

Arabia has an awful lot to do with achieving and sustaining that 

balance. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, would Secretary Gates be allowed to 

answer the question? 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. 

Secretary GATES. I would just add one sentence to what has already been said, and that is you look for small signs. And one of 

the things that I found interesting recently was a call by the king 

for an interfaith dialogue, inviting representatives of all of the reli-
41 

gious faiths to get together and talk. And I think there is a concern 

on his part at the way Islam is being portrayed around the world 

and a desire to—he has had a dialogue with the Pope on these 

issues. And I think, you know, you take signs of progress where 

you can find them. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of you for being here and for your service. 

I wanted to follow up on both the organizational ends. And, Secretary Rice, you talked about both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, 

and I think there is a responsibility on both ends. 

And I wonder if you could address the organization of the executive branch. You talked about National Security Council, an advisor. Perhaps that is not the best umbrella, coordinating umbrella, 

because of a number of factors, including accountability and a host 

of others. 

How do you feel that the executive branch can be best organized 

in order for the Congress to be able to reflect that organization? 

We talk a lot about having a committee of cross-jurisdictions. I 

think the frustration may be that we haven’t had an executive 

branch organized in a way to actually have that interaction, to 

have that kind of engagement. 

And, you know, if you could—I know that perhaps you don’t like 

to tell Congress how to do its job—but how do you see a Congress 

organized in the way that could be more reflective and responsive 

to what you think an executive branch should be doing in this 

area? 

Secretary GATES. I am going to take the lead on this one, because 

I may say some things that Condi wouldn’t say. And I don’t want 

her to get into trouble with her committees. 

First of all, I served on the NSC staff under four Presidents. And 

often the temptation, when there was an interagency issue, was, let 

the NSC do it. So the powers and role of the NSC has waxed and 

waned over the years. And generally when it has waxed and they 

have gotten into operational difficulties, they have ended up getting the President into difficulty. I can remember two, in particular, President Carter and President Reagan. 

And my view is that, just as the Chief of Mission represents the 

United States in a foreign capital, and although CIA would bridle 

at that at times, I think the relationship actually has worked very 

well. 

I think that the State Department is the proper place to oversee 

all of the elements of American foreign policy, and where there is 

accountability and where there is operational authority and the 

ability to persuade or work, coordinate others. 

The NSC clearly has a role in policy formulation and coordination and so on and so on. But part of the problem that the State 

Department has is that it can never be empowered—let me phrase 

it is a different way. The State Department does not have the authority, the resources, or the power to be able to play the role as 

the lead agency in American foreign policy. And the Congress has 

not been willing, decade-in and decade-out, to give the State De-
42 

partment the kind of resources, people, and authority that it needs 

to play its proper role in American foreign policy. 

Now, that is a strange thing for a former Director of CIA and the 

Secretary of Defense to say, but I think that is the reality. And so 

I think that—I mean, the Secretary and the President have some 

proposals up here that would significantly strengthen the Foreign 

Service, strengthen the Department of Defense. As far as I am concerned, it is a start. They don’t have the extra field planning, the 

way the military does, any more than they have a training float of 

people. 

So these issues need to be addressed if you think that the institutional solution is for the State Department to have the lead in 

the way American foreign policy is implemented. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. And 

I agree wholeheartedly on the float issue, the need to have rehearsal time in working together, which, obviously, we haven’t had 

those people. 

But I also would think, I mean, the pressure has been to fund 

the military because we have two wars going. So I think that the 

desire to do that, perhaps historically you haven’t seen that. I 

think now there is an interest in doing that, but there is also the 

question of where that funding comes from. 

And I would think that, you know, there are continual questions 

that are being asked. The Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS) asked, you know, in their report—that I think is a 

good one, and I hope you have had a chance to see that—you know, 

how realistic is it to expect that robust civilian capacity will emerge 

and be funded? 

Secretary GATES. I would just say, ma’am, that, first of all, compared to the resources of the Department of Defense, the dollars required to accomplish these objectives in the Department of State 

are pretty small by comparison. The Department of State, essentially—I may be off on the numbers somewhat, but the State Department budget is about $34 billion. That is less than the Defense 

Department spends on health care. And so, if you gave State Department an across-the-board 10-percent increase in resources, you 

are still talking about a relatively modest amount of money. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. A follow-up question about the interagency too, I mean, Commerce, Agriculture. So do you see that that 

would also help that? 

I will leave it there. 

Secretary RICE. If I may just add, I think that the—we have had 

requests before the Congress for the last three years for an increase in the Foreign Service. And I am hoping that this time—because we have made the request bigger. It was 230 and 230, and 

it apparently didn’t get people’s attention. I am hoping that the 

1,100 will be funded and the 300 for USAID. 

We are never going to have a Department that is big enough to 

do the kind of thing that we have done in Iraq or that we are doing 

in Afghanistan. That is why, again, I hope that the civilian response will also be funded because there you can draw on people 

in waiting, if you will. When we did the reconstruction in the Balkans, it was a sort of United Nations mission, and, frankly, it 

didn’t work very well in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then 
43 

we did Afghanistan, and we did a kind of ‘‘adopt a ministry.’’ The 

Germans did one thing, the Italians another. We are paying for 

that with incoherence today in the civilian effort in Afghanistan. 

In Iraq, it was transferred to the Defense Department because 

they had the people and you wanted unity of command. I think we 

saw some shortcomings then in reconstruction in Iraq. 

What we need is a civilian agency that is sized for immediate 

contingencies, like a Liberia or a Haiti, but can be expanded accordion-like by pulling on expertise in the population at large. And I 

think this is a really good innovation, if we can get it funded and 

fully authorized. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for joining 

us today. We appreciate all of your hard work. 

I notice, in your efforts to build partnership capacity here, that 

recently there is a developing collaborative effort between State Department and the U.S. Joint Forces Command in developing some 

online courseware in supporting integrated operations. 

And I would be interested if you would elaborate a little bit on 

that and talk about what may be the goals of this effort. And then, 

collectively, how would the respective Departments measure its effectiveness as going forward and building this capacity? 

Secretary RICE. Yes, we are trying to do this, both in online 

courses and also the Foreign Service Institute has been looking at 

its curriculum. 

I was at Joint Forces Command about two years ago or so, and 

they had at that time a serving political advisor (POLAD), as we 

call them, who was very interested in trying to capture some of the 

lessons we were learning from these joint operations. People tend 

to think of the PRTs, but you also have to think about what we 

have done in Colombia, what we have done in Mindanao, what we 

have done in places that are not always on the radar screen. And 

I think that the development of these courses will be very important. 

Now, I would suggest that we will evaluate them the way I 

would evaluate a course if I were at Stanford: Are people actually 

learning from them? There will be student evaluations. I think at 

some point we are going to have to look back at this entire effort 

and have outside evaluation of these courses. 

But I believe this is really a significant improvement in our ability to work with the military. Yesterday, when I was at Maxwell 

for the very nice honor that they bestowed on me, I said that this 

is a test of the Department of State learning to work better with 

the military and vice versa. And we are getting enough experience 

now that we are going to have to do a formal evaluation of lessons 

learned and a formal evaluation of how well we have done. And 

here we are light-years behind the military in doing that kind of 

work, and we are going to have to make it happen. 

Admiral MULLEN. I am very encouraged by it. It is still relatively 

new. Just my own experience, in command in Naples as a North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander at the four-star 

level, I had a political advisor. Literally, I could not have func-
44 

tioned as a commander. It would have done me no good to go to 

work on any day had I not had that kind of advice. But I didn’t 

grow up that way, and we haven’t grown up that way. So now embedding it further, there are State Department employees now participating in exercises. All of that is headed in the right direction. 

I also just spent some time with an ambassador designee who 

just left as a political advisor to one of our combatant commanders, 

and his experience there as a POLAD was extraordinary. And he 

said it will impact his view of how he becomes an ambassador, 

should he be confirmed, in ways that he hadn’t even imagined. And 

it is planning and it is the kind of integration and the kind of collaboration that he learned in this job as well. So it goes both ways. 

We have, I think, 50 or 55 military members assigned to the 

State Department. We need to make sure we reach in and assign 

them well in the future and take advantage of that. 

So all of that is working, but we are still, I think, in the relatively early stages of where we need to go, long term. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of 

my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all of you for being here today and for your leadership. 

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, it is particularly refreshing to 

hear how strongly you feel we should increase the capacity of State. 

As you have noted, Mr. Secretary, it is kind of odd to have a Secretary of Defense saying exactly that, but I think it is terribly important given the kind of threats that we face now and will face 

in the future. 

I would like to talk a little bit about Iraq and Afghanistan specifically, particularly Iraq. Countries that have an awful lot of their 

wealth based on oil struggle to have a democratic or representative 

government. It doesn’t happen very often. So that presents quite a 

challenge for us, just given their circumstances to start out with, 

if what we are seeking for them and for us and for the world is 

a representative government in Iraq. 

And then you combine with that our history, which, as I understand it, has not been one of great success with regard to these efforts to build nations that are representative governments. If you 

look at the past pattern by the United States, we are excellent at 

building security forces, militaries, et cetera. We pale on the political end of it. We are not able to create quickly enough a class at 

will or a political aside to which the security forces remain. A charismatic civilian leader who works closely with the military ultimately winds up taking over. 

And I am concerned that the same thing might happen to us 

where Iraq is concerned. It has the embarrassment of riches where 

oil goes, and individuals fight like heck to get control of those kinds 

of riches in countries like Iraq. Afghanistan, on the other hand, is 

quite poor and has challenges caused by the fact that it is quite 

poor and resource-poor. 

It seems to me that we ought to be educating—and this is just 

sort of my view—that we ought to be educating Iraqis, particularly 

the politicians, those who would like to see a representative gov-
45 

ernment, the religious leaders, about these challenges and asking 

them to think about how Iraq can avoid having another Hussein 

or a Musharraf or a Putin as its leadership in 5 years or 10 years. 

Certainly it is in our interest to educate them along these lines and 

to help them think through how they avoid that happening. 

I have thought also that it was probably wise for us to think 

about having our military intertwined with the Iraqi military or 

Iraqi security forces generally for the foreseeable future, in ways 

that make it less likely that the military will take over, that the 

security forces will take over. 

And my question is this, and I am going to ask that it be answered for the record. I don’t think that this is a Crocker-Petraeus 

kind of thing. I think they are too buried in day-to-day, month-tomonth challenges that make it difficult for them to step back, look 

at our history, look at the uniqueness associated with efforts to 

build nations in circumstances like this, and come up with a strategy. I think this has to be at the Secretary level. I think this has 

to be done here. 

And what I would like—and I talked with Mr. Skelton just a 

minute ago about what would be the appropriate timing for a report to us, getting back to us in writing—what are we doing about 

this? What are the two Departments that—obviously State and Defense are the two Departments to work on this. Is there a team 

thinking through these issues, looking at our history, looking at efforts like this and identifying this—if it is not a problem, let us 

know that it is not a problem; we don’t have to worry about it. If 

it is a problem, then what are we doing to make it less likely that 

we wind up with some autocracy or oligarchy or whatever it is that 

typically winds up plaguing these kinds of countries and certainly 

has plagued in the past our efforts to do these sorts of things? It 

would be exactly the opposite of the result that we would like to 

see and that Iraqis generally would like to see. 

It seems to me that we have to have a strategy in place and todo lists and specific things to be done. To me, at the very least, 

educating Iraqis, probably thinking about being intertwined. And, 

frankly, thinking that in our Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 

or what have you, they would be interested in having exactly that 

happen—would be things that should be considered. 

But I am not the person that should be thinking through this; 

I think you all should. So two weeks, get back with what we are 

doing and what is the to-do list, who is doing it, et cetera? 

Secretary RICE. We will certainly get back to you about the significant institution-building efforts, but, absolutely, we will get 

back to you. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Okay. Thanks. I didn’t want to take any more 

than my five minutes. I was going to give my little spiel here in 

hopes that I am clear and in hopes that this can lead to a great 

report. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

And if you would get back for the record, we would certainly appreciate it, within two weeks, the gentleman suggests. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 81.] 
46 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gingrey, also from Georgia. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chief Mullen, Secretary Gates, Secretary Rice, we thank you 

very much for the time you have spent with us this morning. 

My colleague from Georgia, Mr. Marshall, gives me kind of an 

excellent segue into my question that I am going to direct to you, 

Madam Secretary. I don’t disagree with what he is saying at all in 

regard to what we end up with, and we want to make sure that 

it is the best that we can get. 

And in your testimony, Secretary Rice, you discuss challenges in 

assisting states in not only ending conflict but certainly establishing stable, civil societies and developing the means to care for 

those citizens and participate in the community of nations. And 

then you went on and you compared Colombia, where they were 10 

years ago and where they are today. And I think it is right remarkable, the fact that President Uribe has done what he has done in 

the face of so much hostility in that region. 

I would like for you to elaborate on that distinction, because I do 

think this sort of relates to what Mr. Marshall had to say almost 

in reverse, and then also why it is so important that Congress go 

ahead and pass the Colombia Free Trade Agreement as soon as 

possible. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

Well, Colombia is a success story, and it is a story of a state that 

was pretty close to a failed state in 2000. It is a story of the partnership that the United States has engaged with the Colombian 

people and the leadership. And it is a bipartisan story, starting 

with Plan Colombia, which helped them to build them the capacity 

to help defeat the terrorists. It is the story of not just military and 

police assistance, but also economic assistance to start to put the 

country on a more prosperous footing. And then it is the story of 

a political leader who is a strong, strong ally of the United States, 

who came to power determined to give his people, as he calls it, 

democratic security. 

And if my counterpart from Colombia was sitting here, the foreign minister of Colombia, you would be sitting with somebody who 

was held in captivity by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for six years and is now the foreign minister of Colombia. And that shows something about how far that country has 

come. I was in Medellin. It used to be synonymous with trouble 

and Pablo Escobar, and now it is a prospering, safer city. 

Now, we have to do the last step. When you help bring a country 

that far, you can’t then abandon them and say, ‘‘But we don’t actually want you to have economic prosperity that comes from free 

trade.’’ And if we turn our back on the Colombians, who have gone 

so far and done so much and are strong allies—in a part of the 

world, by the way, where I am always told, ‘‘What is wrong with 

the American image in Latin America? Why can somebody like the 

Venezuela President make headway with countries that should be 

friends of America?’’ Well, I can assure you we will do no greater 

harm to our ability to have an image of being a friend of the people 

of Colombia and a friend of Latin America than to fail to pass that 

free-trade agreement. That would do more harm than we could 

ever do in cutting off assistance or anything else, because the 
47 

whole region is watching to see whether or not being a friend of 

America matters. 

Dr. GINGREY. Madam Secretary, I could not agree more. And, as 

I say to my colleague, in regard to getting it right in Iraq and how 

important that is, no question about it. We have gotten it right in 

Colombia, and now we are on the verge of pulling the rug out from 

under that great effort. 

So I appreciate your work there. And maybe my colleagues will 

see the light of day and understand that that is so important. It 

is not just a matter of balance of trade and removing those 35, 45 

percent tariffs that we are paying to export our goods to Colombia 

and their goods coming into this country tariff-free; it is the security of this country and the security of the hemisphere. 

So I really appreciate your great work there. And, again, I hope 

and pray that this Congress will see the light of day in regard to 

that sooner rather than later. 

And I thank you for your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak. 

And, sadly, 12:30 will arrive very, very shortly, and we will have 

at least two members who will be unable to ask questions. But if 

you have questions for the record, feel free to give them to us. 

Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, to some degree, I have kind of watched the Department of Defense move toward more functional lines for unity 

of command: 1958, with the establishment of the unified commanders; more recently with the establishment of Special Forces 

Command. And those organizations—but they, kind of, tend to 

have a function. 

And as we have you come to Congress—and, as you point out, 

Secretary Rice has to go from here to talk about something, from 

here to another committee—what is your recommendation for how 

Congress should be better organized in order to address this issue 

and even to provide adequate oversight of any future change in the 

interagency process? 

And I didn’t know if functions was an important issue or not of 

oversight of an organization. 

Secretary GATES. It is a really good question, and it is one that 

I have actually thought about a fair amount. And I had some recommendations when I retired as Director of Central Intelligence for 

how congressional oversight of intelligence could be improved. 

My worry is that Congress has no way to holistically look at the 

different pieces of national security. And we have been talking here 

today about how does the executive branch coordinate better, integrate better, exchange people, become more holistic in its own approach in how we deal with national security issues. 

And the problem is that Secretary Rice has the Foreign Affairs 

Committees, Admiral Mullen and I have the Armed Services Committees, Homeland Security has someplace else, the Intelligence 

Committees are someplace else. These are all integral parts of the 

interagency we have just been talking about. 

And while there may not be any way that is politically possible 

to change the committee structure itself in any fundamental way, 

perhaps there is a way to create some kind of an overarching joint 
48 

committee where there are representatives from each of these committees, each of these authorizing committees, so that a certain 

body of senior Members of the Congress have the overview of what 

is going on in State Department and intelligence and in the military, in particular those three, so that the leadership of the Congress can look to whatever that number of people is for an integrated look at the balance of resources going one place or the other. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. I do think it is important we try to at 

least mirror what we are asking of you. 

My second question had to do—when the Commander in Chief 

back in the 1990’s said there is really no more foreign policies and 

domestic policies; there is really only one national security policy. 

And as I watch as the authority request came across, Ms. Secretary, that, as you go into 1206, you have to give concurrence to 

the authority. Again, I will come back to the issue of unity of command, even if it is a more functional approach. But you have coordination authority in 1207. And 1207 gives Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal (EOD) efforts to Lebanon, Haiti, Somalia, Trans-Sahara, 

Nepal. 

Should you have—is the example of authority approval—since 

there is really just one national security policy. You kind of established the first-line-of-offense, so to speak, diplomacy. Should the 

model of concurrence by you be the model that we should have also 

for 1207 and all the other attendant authorities that have come 

across? Because there is a score of them, as you know. 

Secretary RICE. Well, in practice, it has not been a problem, in 

practice. 

Mr. SESTAK. If I may, Mr. Gates made a very insightful comment. Your bureaucracies know you get along. It might not always 

be Mr. Gates, and it hasn’t always been Mr. Gates. So it hasn’t 

been a problem, but as you look down the road—— 

Secretary RICE. Well, it is something to keep an eye on. But we 

have thought of 1207 as a civilian support to essentially militarily 

essential missions. So I think that is why the authority has worked 

the way that it has. Whereas 1206 spoke to what had been more 

traditionally a State Department function, which is the train and 

equip, because obviously you want it to be a part of a broader foreign policy effort toward a particular state. And it has all of the 

ramifications. 

But it is something we should look at. I think, at this point, because we consider it to be civilian support to military operations, 

we have been comfortable with the authority. 

Mr. SESTAK. If I could follow up, the only reason I brought it up 

is, like, in Somalia, it has to do with justice reform. 

Was that the bell? 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Please answer the question. 

Secretary RICE. I am sorry. You were—— 

Mr. SESTAK. That is all right. I was just going to follow up. Since 

I saw something having to do with justice reform or police reform, 

I did not know if the final authority should be DOD, particularly 

when you are getting into places. But I think you have answered 

it for right now. It is something to look at. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
49 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Secretary Gates, on a related subject, the Guard Empowerment 

Act calls for a four-star chief of the National Guard Bureau. Would 

you, for the record, furnish us with the status of that effort which 

was in our last bill? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. I will just tell you very—we will give 

you an answer for the record. Just in one sentence, we are in the 

process, in accordance with the statute, of going out and seeking 

the input of each of the Governors. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 81.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly appreciate that. 

There is no way to thank you enough. This has been a historic 

hearing with excellent testimony. 

And, Admiral, thank you for being with us. 

And, Secretary Gates, Secretary Rice, thank you for your service 

and your testimony. 

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Hunter will say good evening formally. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, thanks for having this hearing, I think excellent 

exercise. 

I would just say that I think, Secretary Rice, you made a very 

accurate statement when you said that, out of these ongoing contingencies and operations, reforms will come about that will have 

a salutary effect on both services. 

You have two major operations going on right now, Iraq and Afghanistan. And I think in many areas we see the need for reform, 

for change, for seeing what works and moving ahead with it quickly. And especially Afghanistan, Mr. Secretary, the command and 

control situation, rules of engagement, other areas, at this point 

need a review, need a good scrubbing. I hope we can work with you 

in the coming weeks to effect some changes there. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Excellent hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

History is made by testimony such as yours. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 15, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 15, 2008 

(55) 
56 
57 
58 
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62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
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68 
69 
70 
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 15, 2008 

(77) 
78 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 15, 2008 

(81) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON 

Secretary GATES. As required by statute, the Department has requested nominations from the Governors, and those nominations are due to the Department by May 

31, 2008. After reviewing these nominations and considering the Military Department Secretaries’ recommendations, I will make a recommendation to the President. 

[See page 49.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL 

Secretary RICE. Please see the following response sent to Congressman Marshall 

and Chairman Skelton in a letter signed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Robert Wilkie and Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Jeffrey Bergner on July 2, 2008. [The letter can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77. Attachments referred to in the letter were not available at the time of 

printing.] [See page 45.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 15, 2008 

(85) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT 

Mr. SPRATT. Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary Rice, on the basis of your testimony, it appears that much of the funding that would be derived from Sections 

1206, 1207 and 1208 would be channeled into international commitments that are 

open-ended and typically addressed in an ad hoc manner. A prevalence of unknown 

variables would support the presumption that many of these commitments will require persistent national attention and recurrent funding in order to be satisfied. 

Do our open ended partnership capacity building, train and equip, and stabilization 

and reconstniction commitments compromise our strategic or diplomatic flexibility 

in any way? Would more focused or discrete applications of these funding lines enable us to address a broader range of achievable and affordable international objectives? 

Secretary GATES. The authorities in Section 1206, 1207, and 1208 each meet fundamentally different objectives. None of them, however, compromise US strategic or 

diplomatic flexibility. Quite the contrary, they increase this flexibility by providing 

more resources for the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to meet needs 

in critical areas where traditional diplomatic or military authorities have been insufficient. 

Far from being open-ended commitments unduly influenced by diplomatic engagements and expectations, each of these programs is based on strategic priorities to 

meet US-identified capability gaps. Our intent is to apply resources strategically to 

achieve discrete national security objectives. Since these programs are not guaranteed to any one country—and are instead distributed based on the merits of the 

projects for any given year—they discourage partners from assuming such assistance is entitled. We coordinate our programs closely with State to ensure appropriate de-confliction with traditional State Department programs, like FMF and 

IMET, which require multi-year funding commitments and meet broader foreign policy objectives. When coupled with the Secretary of State’s foreign policy toolkit and 

applied strictly to military capability gaps, we can positively affect capacity building 

efforts. 

Investments from all three programs provide a low-cost, high return instrument 

for early action that can save the United States substantial money over time. As 

partners take on more of their own security burdens, or deploy effectively alongside 

U.S. forces, we reduce near-term stress on our own military and the potential for 

future U.S. military interventions. Similarly additional civilian assistance in establishing the promise of increased stability means fewer requirements for U.S. forces 

for missions best conducted by civilian agencies. Such assistance allows us to address an unstable situation before it becomes a crisis. 

Mr. SPRATT. On the basis of your testimony, it appears that much of the funding 

that would be derived from Sections 1206, 1207 and 1208 would be channeled into 

international commitments that are open-ended and typically addressed in an ad 

hoc manner. A prevalence of unknown variables would support the presumption 

that many of these commitments will require persistent national attention and recurrent funding in order to be satisfied. Do our open ended partnership capacity 

building, train and equip, and stabilization and reconstruction commitments compromise our strategic or diplomatic flexibility in any way? Would more focused or 

discrete applications of these funding lines enable us to address a broader range of 

achievable and affordable international objectives? 

Secretary RICE. Sections 1206 and 1207, coordinated between DOD and State, are 

available to address urgent crises or opportunities that could not have been foreseen 

in the regular foreign assistance planning process. They generally fund discrete 

projects intended to build partner capacity, rather than open-ended commitments. 

Where additional funding may be required, the regular foreign assistance budget 

planning process takes this into consideration. These mechanisms do not hinder our 

strategic or diplomatic flexibility; rather, they enhance our flexibility to respond to 

crises or opportunities in ways that our normal processes cannot sufficiently address. 
86 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL 

Mr. MARSHALL. Secretary, General Petraeus recently came before the House 

Armed Services Committee to brief us on the progress of President Bush’s troop escalation in Iraq. As Commander of Multinational Forces in Iraq, it’s General 

Petraeus’ job to focus on Iraq. Secretary Gates, it is your responsibility to see the 

big picture. Media accounts have suggested that there is a great deal of disagreement within the Department of Defense about General Petraeus’ conclusions. One 

report from about six months ago stated that an internal Pentagon working group 

was putting together a report that would recommend a very rapid reduction in 

American forces—as much as two-thirds of the existing force very quickly—while 

keeping the remainder there. An unnamed DOD official was quoted as saying, 

‘‘There is interest at senior levels [of the Pentagon] in getting alternative views [to 

Petraeus].’’ I think there’s an interest in Congress in getting both sides of the story 

from the Pentagon as well. My question to you Secretary Gates is when will Congress see this report and can you tell us anything about it? Specifically: Who ordered it to be written and who was involved in writing it? Has it been completed, 

and if not when do you expect it to be completed? What are its exact recommendations? If DOD will not provide the report to Congress, what are the department’s 

reasons for withholding such information? Has the report been presented to General 

Petraeus, you, or the President? 

Secretary GATES. Contingency planning is a routine part of overall military strategic planning processes. With reference to your specific question, the Joint Staff Director of Plans and Policy was tasked by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to develop multiple force-planning options regarding troop levels in Iraq, which were 

then briefed to General Petraeus. The Director’s input was one of many used by the 

Chairman to provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense. 

The Department has a long-standing practice and policy that operational plans, 

including contingency plans, are not releasable or routinely shared with Congress 

or with other parts of the Executive Branch. A number of time-proven reasons for 

this policy exist, including operational security, the requirement for continuous update and modification of plans to account for changing security conditions, and the 

need to protect an operational commander’s ability to modify operational plans 

based on the changing operational environment. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. How much training would be involved in standing up the Civilian 

Response Corps? How is their ability to deploy quickly going to be maintained? 

Who’s going to manage this effort? When activated/deployed will they maintain a 

status as a contractor or government employee? 

Secretary GATES. The Department remains committed to supporting the establishment of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) and encourages congressional funding 

to ensure the program achieves its full potential. The responsibility for establishing 

the CRC is assigned to the Department of State. Composition of the CRC does not 

include employees or contractors of the Department of Defense. As a result, DoD’s 

role is that of supporting the State Department, primarily by sharing our extensive 

knowledge and expertise of training, deployment, sustainability, and management 

issues, achieved through decades of experience for this type of capability. To date, 

DoD has assisted the State Department across a range of CRC issues. These include 

the development of a training strategy which leverages the many DoD educational 

and training institutions’ current curricula and knowledge base. DoD is also assisting in highlighting logistical considerations as well as resource requirements for 

maintaining a CRC deployment capability in the out years. This includes identification of a training and deployment facility, of which several existing DOD locations 

are under consideration. 

I defer to the Department of State for further details on the CRC. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How much input has DOD had in the FMF process historically and 

how much today? Is DOD providing enough perspective/insight to make this effective? Please explain. 

Secretary GATES. Historically, DOD has had a reasonable amount of input to the 

FMF process, working closely with State to determine recommended budget allocations. Initially, the institution of the ‘‘F’’ Process at the State Department limited 

DOD’s involvement in the formulation of the FMF budget. There has recently been 

a marked improvement in DOD’s access to the ‘‘F’’ Process, and we expect that such 

collaboration will continue to improve. 

Each year DOD goes through a rigorous requirements gathering process for FMF. 

FMF requests are formulated by Security Assistance Officers in the field, and are 
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then reviewed by the Joint Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and 

OSD. These submissions are the basis for our input to State on the military requirements for Security Assistance. DOD is continually improving the processes by which 

we identify and compile FMF requirements in order to ensure that we provide the 

necessary perspective/insight to State. We are hopeful that increased collaboration 

and improved processes will lead to more robust and even more effective FMF and 

IMET budgets in the future. 

Congressional earmarks on FMF can often render a carefully constructed budget 

less effective from a strategic standpoint. Fiscal Year 2008 is a perfect example of 

this phenomenon. Out of a total FMF budget of $4.5 billion, only approximately $80 

million was fully discretionary. With such a small amount of FMF funding completely free of earmarks, in either the appropriation itself or the accompanying committee report, we are hard pressed to meet worldwide requirements for long-term 

capacity building. We are strongly supportive of the Administration’s request for an 

increased FMF budget for Fiscal Year 2009. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How much training would be involved in standing up the Civilian 

Response Corps? How is their ability to deploy quickly going to be maintained? 

Who’s going to manage this effort? When activated/deployed will they maintain a 

status of contractor or government employee? 

Secretary RICE. All members of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) will be U.S. 

Government employees. The Corps will be comprised of personnel representing eight 

different USG departments or agencies. 

The Corps will be managed by the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator 

for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS collaborates and works closely 

with the eight participating agencies through the Reconstruction and Stabilization 

Policy Coordinating Committee. 

The interagency reconstruction and stabilization training strategy for the Civilian 

Response Corps incorporates five training phases. 

1. Orientation Training—all Corps members will undergo a 2-3 week program 

that will establish baseline knowledge and skills required to operate effectively in a reconstruction and stabilization environment. 

2. Annual Specialized Training—Active Component members will receive up to 

eight weeks of Annual Specialized Training. Standby Component members 

will receive up to two weeks of Annual Specialized Training. Prior to deployment, Corps members with specific positions (e.g. Police Advisors, Lead 

Interagency Planners, etc.) will receive mandatory Annual Specialized Training to effectively perform their jobs. 

3. Pre-deployment Training—all Corps members are required to take Pre-deployment Training that includes health, safety, first-aid, security, and mission-specific curriculum prior to consideration for mission deployment. Active 

Component members will undergo Pre-deployment Training immediately following Orientation Training to maintain constant operational readiness for 

quick reaction deployments. 

4. In-theater Continuity Training—to provide any additional training needed to 

maintain continuity of operations, Corps members will receive In-theatre 

Training, as appropriate and feasible, with their assigned organization, and/ 

or those people with whom they are likely to work. 

5. Re-integration Training—all Corps members returning from deployments are 

required to undergo Re-integration Training to ensure adequate support and 

facilitate their readjustment to life back in the United States. 

Although not yet fully developed, the Reserve Component would undergo similar 

training to that provided for the Active and Standby components. 

To quickly deploy Corps members, S/CRS, in collaboration with USAID, will maintain a master database of all members which will track medical and security clearances, completed training, immunizations, and other relevant information. S/CRS 

will work with partner department and agency Response Corps Coordinators to ensure that all Active Component members are deployable upon 48 hours notice, and 

that all Standby Component members are deployable on 30 days notice. To maintain 

operational readiness, S/CRS and USAID will purchase and supply equipment, including fully armored vehicles, for rapid deployment. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How much input has DOD had in the FMF process historically and 

how much today? Is DOD providing enough perspective/insight to make this effective? Please explain. 

Secretary RICE. DOD is actively involved in all aspects of the security assistance 

process, especially for FMF. In fact, the depth and breadth of DOD interaction in 
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the State Department’s foreign assistance budget process for the past 2 years has 

been unprecedented. 

The State Department conducts interagency regional ‘‘roundtable’’ discussions to 

address security assistance objectives and priorities on an annual basis. Participation from DOD typically includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Joint Staff, and the combatant commands. These discussions serve as the framework for developing the security assistance budget requests 

which ultimately must be weighed against other assistance priorities. 

The State Department, after receiving DOD’s input at the beginning of each budget cycle, determines where the needs and requirements are and what USG priorities 

should be. Once security assistance funds are appropriated, DOD plays an active 

role in recommending allocations and implementing security assistance programs. 

In consultation with the State Department, DOD continues to refine its input to the 

process in order to ensure that validated, prioritized needs for military assistance 

are effectively conveyed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. GILLIBRAND 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Secretary Gates, can you begin to use the Reserve Components 

more for reconstruction efforts because of their civilian experiences versus their 

military training? For example, we are sending Guard members to Afghanistan who 

have agricultural experience. Can we begin to expand their training to complement 

the Civilian Response Corps? 

Secretary GATES. Using the Iraqi Provisional Reconstruction Team model that we 

successfully employed, we will continue to ask for volunteers from our Reserve and 

National Guard Components, including our retired Reserve members, to use their 

civilian expertise and experience in support of the various reconstruction requirements that would complement the Civilian Reserve Corps activities in Afghanistan. 

Because of the very limited training time available for Reserve Component members, we must continue to focus on preparing them to perform in their designated 

military skill and meet their readiness requirements. However, that does not preclude the Department from preparing a reservist who has volunteered for a particular assignment based on his or her civilian skill or experience so he or she can 

safely and effectively carry out that assignment. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. What does ‘‘victory’’ in Afghanistan look like? Does it not require greater troop levels from the US and NATO allies? How can we more effectively combat corruption there? We need an Inspector General at a minimum there 

do we not’? How do we use our leverage more effectively to inspire a greater commitment from our NATO allies’? 

Secretary RICE. As you know, our commanders have requested additional troops 

for Afghanistan, and meeting this need is a priority for this administration. President Bush has ordered two deployments—next month a Marine battalion that was 

to be deployed to Iraq, and early next year an Army brigade—which combined will 

add 8,000 new troops to our forces in Afghanistan. In all, the number of American 

troops in the country has increased from less than 21,000 two years ago to nearly 

31,000 today. But we are not alone. During the past year, the United Kingdom, 

France, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Australia, Germany, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and others have sent additional forces to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Over the past two years, the number of non-U.S. Coalition troops—including NATO troops—increased from about 20,000 to about 31,000. We continue to 

appeal to our 26 Allies and 14 partners and last week at the NATO Defense Ministerial in Budapest, Secretary Gates urged Ministers of Defense to do even more. 

In addition to more troops, we need to give Allied commanders on the ground 

more flexibility so they can use their forces most effectively. We understand the political constraints under which our Allies operate, but less flexibility requires more 

troops and prolongs the mission. We continue to appeal to them to lift these caveats. 

Also, last week in Budapest the Defense Ministers directed ISAF troops to conduct 

counter-narcotics interdiction operations for the first time. Afghanistan produces 

most of the worlds opium that is used to make heroin and it is estimated that the 

Taliban receives $100 million annually from the illegal drugs trade. 

ISAF is also working closely with the Afghans to build up their defense forces. 

Recently, the Afghan government requested and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approved an increase in the Afghan National Army from 80,000 to 

122,000 soldiers. With our support, the Afghan National Army has made great 

progress in the past several years and is seen as the most competent, professional 

and trusted institution in Afghanistan. It is increasingly capable of independently 

planning and carrying out missions—from July to August the ANA has taken the 
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lead in 62% of all operations. We are currently engaging nations around the world, 

not only those who have troops in Afghanistan, to contribute to the sustainment 

costs of the ANA. The stability of Afghanistan is in the world’s interest, and we are 

asking capitals for their support of the ANA. On the Afghan National Police (ANP), 

the Focused District Development (FDD) is off to a great start and is succeeding 

in improving police professionalism. FDD utilizes successful techniques from our 

training missions with the Afghan Army, and we continue to expand the program. 

Since the beginning of 2008, over 11,000 of the roughly 78,000 police have graduated from training programs. 

Although we are committed to ensuring a robust fighting force in Afghanistan, the 

military angle is only one part of the solution in Afghanistan. Since the fall of the 

Taliban much has been accomplished. Afghanistan has a democratically-elected 

President and parliament, and next year they will hold the second round of national 

elections. Countless development projects have been undertaken; roads, hospitals 

and schools have been built. More Afghans have access to basic medical attention 

and education than ever before. This progress is impressive, but the Afghan government needs to be even more responsive to the needs of its people in order to turn 

the tide. And, the Afghan people need to believe they have a stake in their country’s 

future. Good governance and security are required components for economic growth, 

and our assistance is necessary to help the Government of Afghanistan expand out 

to the provinces and the districts the progress made in at the national level in 

Kabul. 

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been very successful, and we 

are looking at how we can expand and improve upon them. We are also considering 

increasing our support for provincial governors, to give them more ability to identify 

and direct assistance dollars in a way most relevant for their communities. In all 

these ways, we and our Allies and partners are working to ensure that military 

progress is accompanied by the political and economic gains that are critical to success in Afghanistan. 

Regarding corruption, it is endemic in Afghanistan and exists in all aspects of society. Large influxes of cash from the drug trade, international investment, U.S. and 

international assistance programs, and a lack of accountability at the ground level 

are all contributing factors to the prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan. A Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has been appointed to 

ensure accountability during the period of U.S. involvement in the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan. SIGAR has a highly specialized mission, and reports to both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State on its independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction. It is focused on promoting economy, efficiency 

and effectiveness, as well as preventing and detecting waste, fraud and abuse in reconstruction programs and operations supported by the Afghanistan reconstruction 

funds. The Special Inspector General, Arnold Fields (Maj. General Retired), was 

sworn in 22 July 2008. Partial funding for the SIGAR was allocated in September 

and October 1, 2008. Its first quarterly report to Congress is due on October 30, 

2008. 

Additionally, the U.S. is working to develop a more coherent response to corruption with three areas of focus (elaborated below): 

1) Improved internal accountability to ensure that USG funds are spent on assistance programs and not diverted to enrich warlords or corrupt politicians. 

2) Assistance to the Afghan Government to improve their ability to investigate 

corruption charges, prosecute corrupt officials, and reduce and eliminate 

street level corruption among police, judges and low level government officials. 

3) Coordinate with our NATO allies, military and civilian contractors and other 

major players in Afghanistan to ensure that they are implementing similar 

controls against corruption. 

Improved Internal Accountability: In order to improve internal accountability, 

the Department of State established the Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan Support Group 

(AIJS) to assist with all Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

(INL) contracts issued in Afghanistan, Iraq and Jordan. AIJS has improved contract 

management and the dispersion of funds on these critical contracts, and also has 

been able to more accurately track the funds expended by Department of State contractors in the region to ensure that all funds are being used for their intended purpose. In addition, INL’s justice assistance reform projects are carefully designed to 

target gaps in the Afghan criminal justice system, with a mixture of training, mentoring, administrative reform, and direct assistance to ensure that funds are being 

spent in the most appropriate and effective way. 
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Assistance to the Afghan Government: INL, through their Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) have worked 

directly with the Afghan government to implement policy, programmatic, personnel, 

and administrative reforms intended to reduce and eliminate corruption in key 

areas of the Ministry of Justice (including the Central Prisons Directorate) and Attorney General’s Office. This includes Priority Reform and Reorganization (PAR), a 

comprehensive personnel reorganization that ensures all positions are appropriately 

planned and filled, through a competitive process, by the most qualified candidate. 

This is a foundational reform to help ensure that all justice practitioners nationwide 

are competent, trained, and that they receive a living wage (an incentive to stay 

away from petty corruption). Also, INL is working with the Attorney General’s Office to establish ACE, the Anti-Corruption Enforcement Unit made up of specially 

vetted prosecutors who are trained to investigate and prosecute corruption and financial crimes cases. 

INL’s on the ground programs have also established a case tracking and management system to promote a transparent, fair, efficient, and secure process for criminal investigations, prosecutions, trials, and incarceration. This review effort is being 

implemented right now to review all prisoner cases, augment sparse records, and 

immediately release prisoners who are being held after their sentences have been 

completed. This new system will reduce opportunities for government officials to extort money from defendants, potentially at every step of the criminal justice process. 

The Supreme Court recently released a review of all corruption-related efforts in 

Afghanistan, and the newly-appointed Attorney General appears to be committed to 

efforts to reduce corruption nationwide. President Karzai has recently established 

a ‘‘High Office of Oversight’’ to combat corruption within the Afghan government, 

although the details of implementation of this decree have yet to he worked out. 

INL and Department of Justice support the Criminal Justice Task Force, which has 

prosecuted a large number of low and mid-level defendants charged with drug trafficking and narcotics-related corruption. However, the Afghan government still has 

a long way to go, and has not, as of yet, demonstrated the political will to slow down 

corruption at the highest levels or go after any corrupt officials in politically sensitive positions. 

Coordinate with the International Community: 

The U.S is working closely with NATO allies, particularly the U.K. and Norway, 

to develop anti-corruption measures. (In particular, we are partnered with the U.K. 

and UN on the ACE project, and the U.K. and Norway on the CJTF project). Anticorruption was a focus of documents adopted by the international community and 

Afghan government at the Rome Conference focused on justice reform in July 2007. 

Anti-corruption is also a main focus of the National Justice Sector Strategy, which 

outlines reform needs and commitments over the next five years. We encourage 

NATO and other allies to continue and increase funding for the entire justice sector, 

including anti-corruption. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. How can we get better oversight and accountability over US 

funds provided to Pakistan? Should we have an Inspector General? 

Secretary RICE. The U.S. Government provides assistance to Pakistan through the 

U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of State, and Defense Department programs, all of which are subject to longstanding oversight and accountability mechanisms, through their respective Inspector Generals. These Inspectors 

General coordinate closely regarding oversight projects in Pakistan and have published a comprehensive joint audit plan for South West Asia. Additionally, the State 

Inspector General’s office already has an office dedicated to the Middle East and 

South and Central Asia to focus on high-cost, high-risk programs. Creating a new 

Inspector General position specifically for Pakistan is not necessary. 

With regard to the Coalition Support Fund program, in April 2008, the Department of Defense Inspector General completed an investigation of Department of Defense oversight and administration of the Program. This report is currently being 

finalized and readied for publication. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Should we be able to direct funding to reconstruction and civilian investments such as healthcare, education and economic development? 

Secretary RICE. In late 2007, the U.S. Government shifted much of its Economic 

Support Fund (ESE) assistance for Pakistan from direct budget support to projectspecific funding for healthcare, education, and economic development. During fiscal 

years 2005-2007, the U.S. Government provided $200 million per year in direct 

budget support to help the Pakistani Government implement economic reform measures and increase its spending on education and health. In fiscal years 2008 and 

2009, however, assistance will be provided to support specific education and health 

projects, instead of direct budget support. 
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Our assistance priorities in Pakistan will continue to be promotion of democracy, 

economic development and growth, and security. We view these activities as a longterm partnership with the Government of Pakistan, its people and institutions. 

As part of this goal, we look forward to working with Congress and the new Pakistani government on expanding U.S. assistance for Pakistan’s continued democratic, 

economic, and social development. We believe the restoration of democracy in Pakistan provides an important opportunity to demonstrate our long-term commitment, 

expand U.S. programs, and help the Pakistani people and new civilian government 

meet the challenge of transforming Pakistan into a prosperous, democratic, and stable international partner committed to delivering good governance and combating 

violent extremism within its borders. 

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