J-A02040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF JULIANNA M. 

GENNARO, DECEASED

APPEAL OF: JOSEPH GENNARO

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 758 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 02-20-03721

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: February 9, 2023

Joseph Gennaro (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his request 

to serve as administrator of the estate of his daughter, Julianna, and granting 

letters of administration to Heidi Charles, who is Julianna’s mother (Mother). 

We affirm.

The orphans’ court summarized the factual and procedural case history 

as follows:

Julianna M. Gennaro died, intestate, on June 24, 2020, at 

the age of fifteen (15). The parents of Julianna had never married 

and had long resided, separately, [M]other, residing in Allegheny 

County and the father, [Appellant], residing in adjacent Beaver 

County. It is not disputed that at all times pertinent to this matter, 

[M]other had been the primary custodial parent of Julianna and 

Julianna had resided with [M]other. Nor is it disputed that 

Julianna was, at all times, a resident of Allegheny County.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Julianna’s death occurred ... when she was struck by a train 

near her home in Allegheny County. The death certificate 

identified Julianna’s residence as the residence of [M]other on 

Morgan Hollow Road, South Fayette Township, Allegheny County.

Thereafter, on August 10, 2020, [M]other caused a caveat to be 

filed with the Allegheny County Department of Court Records, 

Orphans’ Court Division, requesting that no letters testamentary 

or letters of administration be issued without notice having first 

been provided either directly to [M]other or to her counsel. On

August 13, 2020, Julianna’s father, [Appellant], caused a petition 

to be filed with the Register of Wills Office in Beaver County, 

Pennsylvania, entitled “Petition to Show Cause Why [Appellant]

Should Not Be Named Sole Administrator of the Estate of Julianna 

Gennaro.” In that petition, [Appellant] averred that, at the time 

of her death, Julianna had been a resident of Beaver County.

Approximately nine months later, on May 4, 2021, upon 

consideration of preliminary objections having been filed in 

response to [Appellant’s] Petition to Show Cause, the Beaver 

County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court directed that the 

proceedings be transferred to Allegheny County. On that same 

date, the Petition to Show Cause was filed with the Orphans’ Court

Division of Allegheny County on behalf of [Appellant], recaptioned, 

however, as an Amended Petition for Citation. Apart from a 

corrected averment that Julianna had been a resident of Allegheny 

County, rather than Beaver County, at the time of her death, the 

allegations set forth in the amended petition filed in Allegheny 

County were substantially unaltered from those contained in the

petition that had been filed in Beaver County. In the amended 

petition, the term “Beaver” had been scratched out of the original 

petition and “Allegheny” had been handwritten above that scratch 

out.

Subsequently, following presentation and argument before 

Hearing Officer Timothy Finnerty at the Allegheny County Register 

of Wills, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued 

regarding the Petition to Show Cause. Among the findings of fact 

set forth by Hearing Officer Finnerty was that, although Julianna’s 

death certificate stated that she had been a resident of Allegheny 

County at the time of her death, [Appellant] had alleged otherwise 

in the petition which he had earlier caused to be filed with the 

Register of Wills Office in Beaver County, asserting in that petition 

that Julianna was a resident of Beaver County.
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Among the further findings made by Hearing Officer Finnerty 

was that [Appellant] had not seen Julianna regularly and that 

[Appellant’s] actions of filing in Beaver County for his Citation to 

Show Cause, signing a verification to that false pleading and 

falsely portraying the amount of time he had, in fact, spent in 

person with Julianna negatively affected the ability [of Appellant] 

to administer the Estate. Accordingly, on April 19, 2022, Hearing 

Officer Finnerty entered an order issuing [a] letter of 

administration solely to [M]other. Objections to the hearing 

officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and order and a 

request for a de novo hearing before an Orphans’ Court judge 

followed.

A conference went forward before the [orphans’ court] on 

June 22, 2022. At that conference, counsel for [Appellant]

asserted that there was no basis on the existing record upon which 

to exclude [Appellant] from an appointment as, at least, a coadministrator of his daughter’s estate. More specifically, counsel 

urged that there are four factors to be considered when 

determining the fitness of an individual for appointment as an 

administrator and those factors are whether the individual (1) is 

a resident of Pennsylvania; (2) is insolvent; (3) has been 

convicted of a crime; or (4) has a hostile interest in the matter. 

That list of factors is derived from the decision in Fleming's 

Estate 32 Pa. D & C 245, 252 (1938). As noted in the decision 

rendered on appeal in that case, however, the bases for excluding 

or removing a fiduciary are anchored in statute and may be 

expressed more broadly than had been set forth in the common 

pleas court opinion. [See In re Fleming's Estate, 135 Pa. 

Super. 423, 427, 5 A.2d 599, 600 (1939).] ...

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 1-4 (footnotes omitted).

On June 23, 2022, the orphans’ court entered an order denying

Appellant’s request for a de novo hearing on the order granting letters of 

administration to Mother.

1 The next day, the orphans’ court entered an order 

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1 The orphans’ court used a pen to cross through the language in the proposed 

order drafted by Appellant’s counsel and handwrote “DENIED.” See Order, 

6/23/22.
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denying Appellant’s petition for citation to show cause why the Register’s April 

19, 2022, order should not be reversed. Order, 6/24/22. The orphans’ court 

explained:

An uncontested fact in this case is that [] Appellant, Joseph, 

opened an estate in a county that was not the last family or 

principal residence of his daughter. [Appellant]’s action was, if 

not deliberately contrary to law, then certainly an inexplicable 

disregard of the death certificate and in gross error. For that 

reason, [Appellant]’s request to be appointed administrator either 

in lieu of or jointly with [M]other was denied. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 5-6.

Appellant timely filed a single notice of appeal to both orders on June 

29, 2022, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement on July

14, 2022.

On August 1, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause for Appellant 

to address the appeal’s timeliness. We stated:

the orders do not appear to be final or otherwise appealable under 

Pa.R.A.P. 342 (governing appealability of orphans’ court orders 

and permitting appeal from enumerated orders). See, e.g., 

McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 349 (Pa. 

2002) (stating that appeal properly lies only from final order 

unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

341(b)(1) (defining final order as one that disposes of all claims 

in and parties to action); see also In re: Estate of Cherwinski, 

856 A.2d 165, 166-67 (Pa. Super. 2004) ... (providing that in 

estate case, generally, confirmation of final account represents 

final order, subject to filing and disposition of any exceptions).

Order, 8/1/22.

Appellant responded that the orphans’ court “made a final decision ...

when it denied Appellant’s request for a de novo hearing and denied 
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Appellant’s petition for citation to show cause why the Order granting letters 

of administration should not be reversed.” Appellant’s Response, 8/15/22, at 

1. Appellant emphasized his challenge to the orphans’ court’s decision that 

he is “not fit to administer the Estate of his daughter, who died in a train 

accident.” Id. He argued:

The Orphans’ Court granted letters of administration to [Mother] 

and [she] has instituted a lawsuit relating to the incident which 

caused decedent’s death. The claims adjudicated in the Orphans’ 

Court related solely to who would administer the Estate of 

decedent. The Orphans’, Court made a final decision in this regard 

when it denied Appellant’s request for a de novo hearing and 

denied Appellant’s petition for citation to show cause why the 

Order granting letters of administration should not be reversed. 

In other words, [Mother] can administer the Estate in the 

underlying lawsuit, while the Appellant has no say in the matter. 

Therefore, Appellant’s claims have been disposed of.

***

The basis of Appellant’s claim is that he should be able to 

administer the Estate of his daughter during the underlying 

lawsuit. Once the underlying lawsuit is over, Appellant’s claims 

are moot. If this Court were to quash Appellant’s appeal, 

Appellant would have no right to make important decisions in the 

administration of his daughter’s Estate.

Id. at 1-2 (citing In re Est. of Tigue, 926 A.2d 453, 456–57 (Pa. Super. 

2007)).

On September 9, 2022, this Court entered an order quashing Appellant’s 

appeal from the June 23, 2022, order. We stated,

the appeal is QUASHED in part insofar as it is taken from the June 

23, 2022 order denying Appellant’s motion for de novo hearing. 

McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 349 (Pa. 

2002) (reiterating that appeal properly lies only from final order

unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute); see also Pa.R.A.P. 
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341(b)(1) (defining final order as one that disposes of all claims 

in and parties to action).

Order, 9/9/22.

As to the June 24, 2022, order, we stated:

The rule is discharged, and the appeal shall proceed only insofar 

as it is taken from the June 24, 2022 order denying Appellant’s 

petition for citation to show cause. This ruling, however, is not 

binding upon this Court as a final determination as to the propriety 

of the appeal. The parties are advised that the issues may be 

revisited by the merits panel to be assigned to this appeal, and 

the parties should be prepared to address, in their briefs or at the 

time of oral argument, any concerns the panel may have 

concerning these issues.

Id.

Appealability

We are persuaded by Appellant’s finality argument and his reliance on 

In re Est. of Tigue, as well as Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(5) (titled “Appealable 

Orphans’ Court Orders” and providing “an appeal may be taken as of right ... 

from an order determining the status of fiduciaries, beneficiaries, or creditors 

in an estate, trust, or guardianship”).

2

Appellant correctly observes that the June 24, 2022, order disposed of 

Appellant’s challenge to Mother’s administration of Julianna’s estate. It 

appears that as administrator, Mother would impact “the status of fiduciaries, 

beneficiaries, or creditors,” contrary to Rule 342.

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2 Appellant cites Pa.R.A.P. 341 (Final Orders; Generally) as the basis for this 

Court’s jurisdiction in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 1. However, in his 

docketing statement, Appellant indicates that in addition to Rule 341, 

Pa.R.A.P. 301 (Requisites for an Appealable Order) and 342 (Appealable 

Orphans’ Court Orders) support this appeal. See Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania, Civil Docketing Statement, 7/14/22, at 1. 
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Moreover, we have stated:

The register’s decision to issue letters is a judicial act. Estate of

Osborne, 363 Pa. Super. 200, 525 A.2d 788, 794 n. 9 (1987). A 

party contesting that act may appeal to the orphans’ court. [In 

re Estate of] Dilbon, 690 A.2d [1216], 1218-1219 [(Pa. Super. 

1997)]. In turn, a party challenging a ruling of the orphans’

court may, of course, appeal to this Court. See [In re

Estate of] Klink, 743 A.2d [482,] 484 [(Pa. Super. 1999)]; 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 742.

In re Est. of Tigue, 926 A.2d at 456 (emphasis added).

As indicated above, there is precedent for this Court to review a claim 

that the orphans’ court improperly “determine[d] the proper individual to act 

as administrator[.]” In re Est. of Klink, 743 A.2d at 485. See also Est. of

Fritz v. Fritz, 798 A.2d 243 (Pa. Super. 2002) (deciding appeal and vacating 

orphans’ court order affirming Register of Wills’ grant of letters of 

administration to first executor and denying letters of administration to second 

executor). Most recently, we affirmed the orphans’ court order affirming the 

Register of Wills’ refusal to appoint the appellant as administrator of an estate

in In re Est. of Schwartz, 275 A.3d 1032 (Pa. Super. 2022). Accordingly, 

we address Appellant’s substantive issue.

Appellant’s Challenge to Mother as Administrator

Appellant presents the following question for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s Petition for 

Citation to Show Cause Why the Register’s Order of April 19, 

2022 Should Not be Reversed, when the Hearing Officer and 

Trial Judge relied on facts that are immaterial to the analysis 

of whether one is qualified to serve as an administrator?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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We have explained:

If the orphans’ court has held an evidentiary hearing, we will then 

afford the court’s findings the same weight as a jury verdict, and 

we will disturb the court’s decree only if it is unsupported by the 

evidence or if it includes an error of law. Dilbon, 690 A.2d at 

1218. However, if the orphans’ court did not take evidence, 

then our appellate review is limited to determining if the 

register abused its discretion. Klink, 743 A.2d at 484. An 

abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment. In Re

Paxson Trust I, 893 A.2d 99, 112 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, it

involves bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, or misapplication of 

law. Id.

In re Est. of Tigue, 926 A.2d at 457 (emphasis added).

Here, the orphans’ court conducted a conference and heard argument 

but did not “take evidence.” See id. We thus consider whether the Register 

abused its discretion. Id.

Appellant argues he was erroneously disqualified “from serving as an 

administrator of his daughter’s estate on the grounds that he failed to properly 

identify her county of residence.” Appellant’s Brief at 9 (citing In re Friese’s 

Estate, 176 A. 225, 227 (Pa. 1934)).

3

 Appellant argues the decision was 

based on “external factors that do not properly indicate [A]ppellant’s ability to 

serve as administrator.” Id.

The Register of Wills grants letters of administration pursuant to the 

following statutory provisions:

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3 Mother counters: ”Appellant was not disqualified; rather, [Mother] was 

determined to be the individual who would best administer the Estate.” 

Appellee’s Brief at 8.
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(b) Letters of administration.--Letters of administration shall 

be granted by the register, in such form as the case shall require, 

to one or more of those hereinafter mentioned and, except for 

good cause, in the following order:

(1) Those entitled to the residuary estate under the will.

(2) The surviving spouse.

(3) Those entitled under the intestate law as the 

register, in his discretion, shall judge will best administer 

the estate, giving preference, however, according to the sizes 

of the shares of those in this class.

(4) The principal creditors of the decedent at the time of his 

death.

(5) Other fit persons.

(6) If anyone of the foregoing shall renounce his right to letters 

of administration, the register, in his discretion, may appoint a 

nominee of the person so renouncing in preference to the 

persons set forth in any succeeding paragraph.

(7) A guardianship support agency serving as guardian of an 

incapacitated person who dies during the guardianship 

administered pursuant to Subchapter F of Chapter 551 (relating 

to guardianship support).

(8) A redevelopment authority formed pursuant to the act of 

May 24, 1945 (P.L. 991, No. 385), known as the Urban 

Redevelopment Law.

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3155(b) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).

We have stated:

As Section 3155 makes clear, it is the register who has the 

authority and duty to issue letters. When doing so, the register 

has some degree of discretion in selecting the 

appointee. However, that discretion must be exercised within the 

strictures of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3155. More specifically, the register 

can exercise discretion only within the class of entitled persons 
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and cannot, without good cause, deviate from the order of 

appointment set forth in the statute.

In re Est. of Tigue, 926 A.2d at 456 (citations omitted).

Section 3155 “preserves a register’s ability to deny letters of 

administration for ‘good cause.’ 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3155(b).” In re Est. of

Schwartz, 275 A.3d at 1035. Referencing the note to § 3156, which governs 

persons who are not qualified to administer an estate, we have observed that

the statutory scheme was intended to be “declaratory of existing 

law [...] in allowing the register to disregard unfit persons 

[citing Friese's Estate.]” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3156 Editor’s Note (Jt. 

St. Govt. Comm. – 1949).

Id.

Our recent decision in In re Est. of Schwartz is instructive. In that 

case, the appellant was a creditor of the decedent and unsuccessfully sought 

appointment as administrator of the estate.4 On appeal, this Court concluded 

that “the record supports a finding of good cause for the register’s decision to 

deny [a]ppellant’s petition” seeking to be granted letters of administration. 

Id. at 1037. Our decision was informed by the appellant’s “lack of candor.” 

Id. at 1036, n.5. We stated:

Appellant did not disclose that he intervened in Decedent’s action 

to set aside the tax sale, and that the matter is still pending. Nor 

did Appellant disclose [the a]ppellee’s mortgage action pertaining 

to the Property. ... In other words, the record supports a 

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4 Appellant purchased the decedent’s home “at the upset tax sale, and 

[d]ecedent’s action to set the tax sale aside, in which [the a]ppellant has 

intervened, remain[ed] pending.” In re Est. of Schwartz, 275 A.3d at 1035.
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finding that Appellant was less than fully forthcoming in his 

petitions.

Id. at 1036 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court likewise observed:

Even if, as asserted by counsel for [Appellant], there had been no 

intentional misrepresentation on [Appellant’s] part to the effect 

that his daughter was residing with him in Beaver County, 

[Appellant’s] averment of [Julianna’s] residence in Beaver County

was nonetheless in disregard of the Register’s Certification of 

Death and indicative of either a failure to responsibly review or an 

inability to comprehend that certification. The record establishes 

the disconcerting fact of an unsupportable assertion under oath 

that Julianna resided in Beaver County.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 6.

The court reasoned:

The decision to exclude [Appellant] as administrator or coadministrator rested upon the uncontroverted fact of [Appellant’s] 

assertion under oath that his daughter resided in Beaver County. 

Indeed, in the Petition for Citation filed on [Appellant’s] behalf it 

is “denie[d] that [Appellant] knew that Decedent was a resident 

of Allegheny County.” A death certificate constitutes only prima 

facie evidence of its contents. Certainly, however, an application 

for letters of administration, which includes the submission of a 

death certificate as part of the necessary process, anticipates the

applicant’s knowledge of fundamental components of the death 

certificate. An application that is inconsistent with, disregards or 

indicates an incapacity to comprehend such components of the 

death certificate would seem to suggest unfitness for competent

administration of an estate and incapacity to serve responsibly in 

the role of administrator of an estate.

This matter concerns a Petition to Show Cause Why the 

Resister’s Order of April 19, 2022, should not be reversed. The 

Register awarded letters of administration to [M]other and 

declined to, instead, issue letters to [Appellant]. The burden 

rested with [Appellant] to demonstrate cause for setting aside the 

Register’s Order. That burden consisted both of demonstrating 

the unfitness of the then-current administratrix and also 
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demonstrating the fitness and appropriateness of [Appellant] to 

assume the role of administrator. Even assuming that it had been 

demonstrated in this case that [M]other was unfit to serve as 

administratrix, it would not necessarily have followed that the 

[Appellant] should then, by default, be appointed as 

administrator. Based on the record presented, it could not be 

concluded that [Appellant] could serve responsibly as an 

administrator of the estate.

Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted).

The orphans’ court’s rationale is supported by “the record presented.” 

See id. Consistent with both the record and prevailing legal authority, we 

discern no abuse of discretion in the Register’s appointment of Mother as

administrator. We thus affirm the denial of Appellant’s petition for citation to 

show cause why the Register’s order of April 19, 2022 should not be reversed.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/9/2023