FI N A L RE P O RT

O F T H E

AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S

RE V I E W B O A R D

“All government records concerning the assassination

of President John F. K e n n e d y

should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure.”
LE T T E R O F TR A N S M I T T A L

i

BO A R D ME M B E R S: John R.Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EX E C U T I V E DI R E C T O R: Laura A. Denk • DE P U T Y DI R E C T O R: Tracy J. Shycoff
LE T T E R O F TR A N S M I T T A L

iii

BO A R D ME M B E R S: John R.Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EX E C U T I V E DI R E C T O R: Laura A. Denk • DE P U T Y DI R E C T O R: Tracy J. Shycoff
LE T T E R O F TR A N S M I T T A L

v

BO A R D ME M B E R S: John R.Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson

EX E C U T I V E DI R E C T O R: Laura A. Denk • DE P U T Y DI R E C T O R: Tracy J. Shycoff
AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D

The Honorable John R. Tu n h e i m

C h a i r m a n

Henry F. Graff

Kermit L. Hall

William L. Joyce

Anna K. Nelson

vii
AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D STA F F

( SE P T E M B E R 1 9 9 8 )

Laura A. Denk, Esq.

Executive Director

Tracy J. Shycoff

Deputy Director

Ronald G. Haron, Esq.

General Counsel

K. Michelle Combs

Associate Director for Research and Analysis

Eileen A. Sullivan Douglas P. Horne

Press and Public Affairs Off i c e r Chief Analyst for Military Records 

Robert J. Skwirot Kevin G. Ti e r n a n

Chief Analyst for CIA R e c o r d s Chief Analyst for FBI Records 

Irene F. Marr, Senior Analyst

Sarah Ahmed, Analyst

Marie Fagnant, Analyst

James C. Goslee, II, Analyst

Benjamin A. Rockwell, Analyst

Peter H. Voth, Analyst/Assistant Computer Specialist

Charles C. Rhodes, Computer Specialist

Jerrie Olson, Executive Secretary

Catherine M. Rodriguez, Technical Assistant for Research and Analysis

Janice Spells, Administrative Assistant

viii
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x i i i

Chapter 1: 

The Problem of Secrecy and the Solution of the JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. The Problem of Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B. Prior Investigative Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1. The President’s Commission to Investigate the Assassination 

of President John F. Kennedy (Warren Commission) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. The President’s Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities 

Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

3. The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 

with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

4. The Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives 

(Pike Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

5. The Select Committee on Assassinations of the House of Representatives (HSCA) . 3

6. Additional Congressional Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

7. Records Held by Executive Branch Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

8. Investigative Records in the Custody of Non-Federal Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

C. Skepticism Concerning the Government’s Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

D. The Solution: The JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

E. Legislative History of JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

F. Key Provisions of JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Chapter 2: 

Establishment of the Review Board and Definition of “Assassination Record” . . . . . 13

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

B. Delay in Start Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1. JFK Act Deadlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

a. Ninety days for President to appoint Review Board members.

b. 300 days for government offices to review, identify,

and organize assassination records.

c. 300 days for NARA to establish JFK Collection.

d. Three years for Board to complete work.

2. Passage of H.R. 1553 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

C. Defining “Assassination Record” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1. Statutory Definition of “Assassination Record” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2. Congressional Intent Concerning Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

3. Review Board’s Early Deliberations and Draft Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4. Comments from Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

a. Notice and Comment.

b. Public Hearings.

ix

TA B L E O F CO N T E N T S
5. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

a. Scope of assassination records.

b. Scope of additional records and information.

c. Sources of assassination records and additional records and information.

d. Types of materials included in scope of assassination records and additional

records and information.

e. Assassination records released in their entirety.

f. Originals and copies.

D. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Chapter 3: 

Public Activities of the Assassination Records Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

B. Public Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

C. Public Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

D. Experts Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

E. Outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

1. Outreach to Academics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2. Outreach to Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3. Outreach to Assassination Researchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

4. Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

F. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Chapter 4: 

Developing the Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

B. JFK Act Requirements for Processing Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

C. Basic Elements of the Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

D. Electronic Identification Aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

E. Tracking the Review of Assassination Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

1. Review Track Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2. Fast Track Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

F. Consent Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

G. Board Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

H. Miscellaneous Bottlenecks and Problems in the Review Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

1. Duplicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

2. Equities and Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

a. Managing referrals.

b. Dunning letters.

c. Review Board joint declassification sessions.

I. Document Processing After Review Board Votes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

J. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Chapter 5: 

The Standards for Review: Review Board “Common Law” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

A. Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

1. Current Guidelines for Release of Assassination-Related Information . . . . . . . . 41

2. Key Distinctions Between Standards of Release Under the FOIA, 

the Executive Order, and the JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence. . . . . . . . 43

c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement against

public interest in release. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

x
d. Segregability and substitute language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

3. Federal Agency Record Groups and the Standards Applied to Them . . . . . . . . . 44

a. The FBI’s “core and related” files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

b. The CIA’s Lee Harvey Oswald “201” file. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

c. The FBI’s “House Select Committee on Assassinations” (HSCA) subject files. . . 45

d. The CIA’s “segregated collection” files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

e. FBI re c o rds on the congressional committees that investigated the assassination. . 45

f. Requests for additional information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

B. Declassification Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

a. Review Board guidelines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

b. Commentary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

i. “Rule of Reason.”

A. “NBR” Guidelines: Records that Review Board judged were

“not believed relevant” to the assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

B. Segregated Collection Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2. Intelligence Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

a. CIA officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

b. “John Scelso” (pseudonym). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

c. Information that identifies CIA officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

d. Names of National Security Agency employees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

3. Intelligence Sources and Methods and Other Matters 

Relating to the National Security of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

a. CIA sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

b. CIA pseudonyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

c. CIA crypts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

d. CIA sluglines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

e. CIA surveillance methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

f. CIA installations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

h. CIA job titles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

i. CIA file numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

xi
i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

j. CIA domestic facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

k. CIA official cover. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

l. Alias documentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

m. Foreign intelligence cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

n. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

o. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary and overview of foreign counterintelligence appeals.

A. The FBI’s May 1996 Appeals to the President

B. Post-appeal decisionmaking

p. Information that reveals the FBI’s investigative interest in a diplomatic 

establishment or diplomatic personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

q. Technical sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

r. Other classified file numbers relating to FBI foreign counterintelligence. . . . . . . 60

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary

s. FBI mail cover in foreign counterintelligence investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

i. Review Board guidelines

ii. Commentary

t. FBI tracing of funds in foreign counterintelligence investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

i. Review Board guidelines

ii. Commentary.

u. FBI physical surveillance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

v. Operational details concerning Department of Defense operations. . . . . . . . . . . 62

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

w. National Security Agency sources and methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary

x. National Security Agency intercept traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

i. Review Board guidelines

ii. Commentary

4. Personal Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

a. Personal privacy generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

i. Review Board guidelines

ii. Commentary.

b. Prisoner of War issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

i. Review Board guidelines.

xii
ii. Commentary.

c. Names of individuals in Secret Service “threat sheets.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

5. Informant Postponements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

a. Informant postponements generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

A. A note on the statutory framework for review of FBI informant 

postponements

B. History of Review Board’s decisionmaking on informant postponements

C. Effect of prior disclosures

b. Individuals who provided information to the FBI, but who did not have 

an ongoing confidential relationship with the FBI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

c. Individuals who gave the FBI information to which they had access by 

virtue of their employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

d. Deceased informants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

e. “Negative Contacts”: Informants who provided no assassination-related 

information to the FBI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

f. “Positive Contacts”: Informants who provided at least some 

assassination-related information to the FBI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

g. FBI informant symbol numbers and file numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

6. Confidential Relationships Between Government Agents and 

Cooperating Foreign Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

a. Foreign liaison postponements in FBI files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

i. Review Board guidelines.

ii. Commentary.

7. Presidential Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

C. JFK Act Exemptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

1. Tax Return Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

2. Records Under Seal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

D. Appeals to the President Pending as of September 30, 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

E. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Chapter 6, Part I:

The Quest for Additional Information and Records in Federal Government Off i c e s . . . 81

A. Records Related To Lee Harvey Oswald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

1. Pre-assassination records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

a. CIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

i. Security file.

ii. Records in the defector file.

iii. HTLINGUAL records.

b. FBI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

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c. Secret Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

d. IRS/Social Security Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

e. INS records on Lee and Marina Oswald. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

f. House Un-American Activities Committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

2. Military records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

a. U.S. Marine Corps records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

i. U.S. Marine Headquarters copy of enlisted personnel file and medical file.

ii. Additional relevant U.S. Marine Corps unit diaries.

b. Military identification card. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

c. Possible ONI post-defection investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

3. In the U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

a. CIA operations in Moscow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

b. American Embassy personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

c. Search for American Embassy records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

d. DCD/OO alleged debriefing of Lee Harvey Oswald. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

4. In Mexico City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

a. Technical surveillance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

i. Audio and photographic.

ii. Tapes, transcripts, and photographs in existence.

b. Cable traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

c. Win Scott files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

d. Sylvia Duran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

e. Legat administrative files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

f. Anne Goodpasture deposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

B. Records On Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

1. CIA Record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

2. Military Records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

a. Joint Staff Secretariat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

b. Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

c. Office of the Secretary of Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

d. Joint Chiefs of Staff history. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

3. Presidential Library collections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

a. JFK Library records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

b. LBJ Library records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

4. Church Committee Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

C. Records On Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

1. CIA Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

2. Military records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

a. Joint Staff Secretariat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

b. Office of the Secretary of Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

c. Joint Chiefs of Staff history. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

3. Presidential Library collections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

a. JFK Library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

b. LBJ Library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

4. Church Committee Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

D. Records of Senior Agency Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

1. CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

a. Allen Dulles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

b. John McCone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

c. Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

d. Richard Bissell, William Colby, and Richard Helms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

e. James J. Angleton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

f . Lawrence Houston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

g . William Harvey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

2. FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

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a. Hoover and Tolson records, including “Official and Confidential” 

files, chronological files, and phone logs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

b. Miscellaneous administrative files from the Director’s Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

c. John P. Mohr Records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

3. Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

4. Office of the Secretary of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

5. Office of Naval Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

6. Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

7. National Security Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

8. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

9. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

a. Office of Information and Privacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

b. Criminal Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

10. Department of the Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

11. IRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

E. Pro and Anti-Castro Cuban Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

a. FBI field office files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

b. CIA records on Richard Gibson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

c. Department of Justice Criminal Division files on FPCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

2. Cuban COINTELPRO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

3. Anti-Castro Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

4. Cuban Intelligence Activities in the U.S.; Cuban Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

5. Anti-Castro Cuban Groups, Including DRE, Alpha 66, 

SFNE, JURE, FRD, CRC, and Commandos-L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

6. Threats Against the Life of Fidel Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

a. CIA DS&T records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

b. FBI file captioned “Threats Against the Life of Fidel Castro.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

7. American Gambling Interests in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

8. Sergio Arcacha-Smith, Antonio Veciana, and Bernardo de Torres . . . . . . . . . . . 103

F. Records on Organized Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

1. Sam Giancana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

2. FBI Electronic Surveillance of Carlos Marcello: BriLab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

3. Department of Justice Criminal Division Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

G. Warren Commission Staff and Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

1. FBI Files on Warren Commission Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

2. CIA and FBI Files on Warren Commission Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

a. Mark Lane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

b. Harold Weisberg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

c. Josiah Thompson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

d. Edward J. Epstein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

e. Paul Hoch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

f. David S. Lifton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

g. Sylvia Meagher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

H. Name Searches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

1. John Abt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

2. Edward Becker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

3. Carlos Bringuier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4. George Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

5. Ed Butler and Information Council of the Americas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

6. Claude Barnes Capehart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

7. Lawrence Cusack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

8. Adele Edisen, Winston de Monsabert, Jose Rivera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

9. Billie Sol Estes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

10. Judith Campbell Exner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

11. H.L. Hunt and Family and Clint Murchison and Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

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12. Joseph P. Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

13. Oswald LeWinter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

14. Marita Lorenz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

15. John Thomas Masen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

16. John Anthony McVickar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

17. Elizabeth Catlett Mora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

18. Gordon Duane Novel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

19. Orest Pena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

20. Carlos Quiroga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

21. Charles Small . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

22. Clarence Daniel Smelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

23. Richard Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

24. Marty Underwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

25. General Edwin Walker/Minutemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

I. Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

1. CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

a. The U-2 connection and the fake manuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

b. The “Family Jewels.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

2. FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

a. “Research Matters” file on John F. Kennedy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

b. Liaison with other federal agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

i. Secret Service/Protection of the President.

ii. CIA.

iii. NSA.

iv. Customs.

v. ATF.

3. Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

a. Protective survey reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

b. Shift reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

c. Eileen Dinneen memoranda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

4. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

5. Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

a. U.S. Army’s Investigative Records Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

b. Army Security Agency records and files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

c. Army Inspector General 1973 report on domestic surveillance abuses in the U.S. 116

6. White House Communications Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

7. Presidential Library Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

a. William Manchester interviews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

b. Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes at the LBJ Library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

J. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Chapter 6, Part II: 

Clarifing the Federal Record on the Zapruder Film and the Medical and 

Ballistics Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

B. Medical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

1. Medical issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

C. Zapruder Film . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

1. Ownership of the Zapruder film . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

2. Staff examination of films designated as “in-camera” original, and

first-generation copies, by NARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

3. Eastman Kodak’s Pro Bono Work for the Review Board Related to the 

Zapruder Film (and Autopsy Photographs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

4. The Review Board Staff’s Study and Clarification of Paul Hoch’s

FOIA Lead “CIA Document 450” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

D. Ballistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

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Chapter 7: 

Pursuit of Records and Information from Non-Federal Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

A. Pursuit of Records and Papers from Private Citizens and Organizations . . . . . . . . 131

1. Gary Aguilar: Interviews with Drs. Humes and Boswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

2. Richard Barnes: AP Wire Copy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

3. Dr. George Burkley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

4. E d w a rd Scannell Butler: Materials from the Information Council of the A m e r i c a s . 132

5. Mrs. Marion Ebersole: Records of Dr. John J. Ebersole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

6. President Gerald Ford: Desk Diaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

7. Justice Abe Fortas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

8. Captain J.W. “Will” Fritz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

9. Jim Garrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

10. James P. Hosty, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

11. Wesley Liebeler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

12. David Lifton: Medical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

13. Holland McCombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

14. Richard Case Nagell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

15. New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

16. Gerald Posner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

17. Frank Ragano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

18. J. Lee Rankin: Warren Commission Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

19. Clay Shaw: Personal Papers and Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

20. Walter Sheridan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

21. Sixth Floor Museum Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

22. Martin Underwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

23. Edward Wegmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

24. Thomas W. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

B. Pursuit of Audio-Visual Material from Private Citizens and Organizations . . . . . . 137

1. Tom Alyea: Film from Inside the Texas School Book Depository . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

2. Charles Bronson: Film of Dealey Plaza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

3. CBS Outtakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

4. Robert Groden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

5. Lt. Everett Kay: Audio Surveillance Tape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

6. Vincent Palamara: Interviews with Secret Service Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

7. David Powers: Film of Motorcade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

8. David Taplin: November 24, 1963, Coverage of Dallas Police Department . . . . . 132

9. Stephen Tyler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

10. Janet Veazey: KTVT Outtakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

11. Moses Weitzman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

12. Robert White: Evelyn Lincoln Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

C. Pursuit of State and Local Government Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

1. New Orleans District Attorney Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

2. Dallas City and County Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

D. Pursuit of Records from Foreign Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

1. Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

2. Belarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

3. Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

4. Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

5. Other Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

E. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Chapter 8:

Compliance with JFK Act by Government Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

B. Federal Agency Compliance with the JFK Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

1. Central Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

3. Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

4. National Security Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

5. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

6. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

a. Office of Information & Privacy.

b. Criminal Division.

c. Civil Division.

d. Civil Rights Division.

e. Office of Legal Counsel.

7. Department of the Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

a. Main Treasury.

b. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms.

c. Customs Service.

d. Internal Revenue Service.

8. National Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

9. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

10. Immigration & Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

11. Office of the Secretary of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

12. Defense Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

13. Department of the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

a. Investigative Records Repository.

14. Department of the Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

a. Office of Naval Intelligence.

b. National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda.

15. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

16. Department of the Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

17. Joint Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

18. White House Communications Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

19. U.S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

20. Social Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

21. Drug Enforcement Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

22. NARA, including Presidential Libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

a. NARA, Washington, D.C.

b. NARA, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas.

c. Gerald R. Ford Library.

d. John F. Kennedy Library.

e. Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

23. General Services Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

C. Congressional Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

1. House Select Committee on Assassinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

2. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 

Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

3. House Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

4. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil & Constitutional Rights

(the Edwards Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1655

5. House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information 

and Individual Rights (the Abzug Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

6. House Committee on Un-American Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

7. Library of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

8. Other Congressional Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

D. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

xviii
Review Board Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Appendices

Appendix A: The Members of the Assassination Records Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Appendix B: The Staff of the Assassination Records Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Appendix C: President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 . . . . . 183

Appendix D: Assassination Records Review Board Guidance for Interpretation 

and Implementation of the President John F. Kennedy 

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Appendix E: Meetings of the Review Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Appendix F: Summary of Review Board Votes on Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

xix
AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D FI N A L RE P O RT

PR E FA C E

This Final Report of the A s s a s s i n a t i o n

Records Review Board details the Board’s

extensive work in fulfilling its statutory mandate. The JFK Act, however, necessitates that

the Review Board’s report be different from

reports of other assassination-related commissions and committees. Previous assassination-related commissions and committees

were established for the purpose of issuing

final reports that would draw conclusions

about the assassination. Congress did not,

however, direct the Review Board to draw

conclusions about the assassination, but to

release assassination records so that the public could draw its own conclusions. Thus, this

Final Report does not offer conclusions about

what the assassination records released did

or did not prove. Rather, it identifies records

that the Board released and describes the

processes and standards that the Board used

to release them. The Board believes that its

most substantial contribution has been to

enhance, broaden, and deepen the historical

re c o rd relating to the assassination. The

American public ultimately will be the beneficiaries of the JFK Act and the Review

Board’s work in ensuring access to the extensive reach of the JFK Collection. 

The first two chapters of the Report describe

the Review Board and its establishment.

Chapter one describes the context in which

Congress passed the JFK Act and briefly

introduces some of the records that Congress

directed the Review Board to examine and

release if appropriate. Chapter two describes

how the JFK Act both enabled and delayed

the Review Board’s start-up. Chapter two

also explains the Review Board’s first challenge—defining the statutory term “assassination record”—so that its search for records

would be broad enough to ensure public confidence in the Board’s work but narro w

enough not to consume Board time and

resources on unrelated documents. 

Chapter three explains how the Review

B o a rd interacted with a very intere s t e d

American public. Chapter three outlines the

ways in which Review Board members and

staff worked with members of the public to

develop policy and seek records.

Chapters four through eight of the Report

describe the heart of the Review Board’s

work—the identification and release of assassination records. Chapter four explains how

the Review Board developed a re v i e w

process that would ensure consistent review

of an enormous volume of records. Chapter

five describes in detail the standards that the

Review Board established for the release or,

in some cases, protection of federal records.

Chapter six lists the numerous requests for

additional information and records that the

Review Board made to federal agencies to

ensure that it did not leave important stones

unturned. Throughout its brief history,

countless individuals and groups made

requests of the Board for specific information. The Board had to respond to these by

asking whether meeting these re q u e s t s

would yield additional documents. Chapter

seven describes the Board’s quest for additional information and records, albeit from

non-federal sources, and thus expands upon

chapter six. Chapter seven also describes the

types of assassination re c o rds that the

Review Board sought from state and local

governments as well as foreign governments.

Chapter eight provides details about the

cooperation, or lack thereof, that the Review

B o a rd received from each federal agency

with which it dealt, outlining in detail the

Review Board’s “compliance program.” 

The last part of this report consists of the

Review Board members’ conclusions and

their recommendations to the President, to

Congress, and to existing and future federal

agencies. The Board recognizes that for

xxi
decades to come the federal government will

continue to face the challenge of finding the

most efficient way to declassify its records,

an activity the Board believes is essential to

maintaining our freedom. Although the

problems caused by government secrecy are

magnified in the context of an assassination

of a President in which there is great public

interest, these problems are indeed present

t h roughout the federal government. The

remedies for excessive secrecy can be universally applied with positive results.

xxii
EX E C U T I V E SU M M A RY

The Assassination Records Review Board

was a unique solution to a unique problem.

Although the tragic assassination of President John F. Kennedy was the subject of

lengthy official investigations, beginning

with the Warren Commission in 1964, and

continuing through the House Select Committee on Assassinations, in 1978-79, the

American public has continued to seek

answers to nagging questions raised by this

inexplicable act. These questions were compounded by the government penchant for

secrecy. Fears sparked by the Cold War discouraged the release of documents, particularly those of the intelligence and security

agencies. Even the records created by the

investigative commissions and committees

were withheld from public view and sealed.

As a result, the official record on the assassination of President Kennedy re m a i n e d

shrouded in secrecy and mystery.

The suspicions created by government

secrecy eroded confidence in the truthfulness

of federal agencies in general and damaged

their credibility. Finally, frustrated by the lack

of access and disturbed by the conclusions of

Oliver Stone’s JFK, Congress passed the Pres -

ident John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act), mandating

the gathering and opening of all records concerned with the death of the President. 

The major purpose of the Review Board was

to re-examine for release the records that the

agencies still regarded as too sensitive to

open to the public. In addition, Congress

established the Review Board to help restore

government credibility. To achieve these lofty

goals, Congress designed an entity that was

unprecedented. 

T h ree provisions of the Act were at the heart

of the design. First, Congress established the

Review Board as an independent agency.

Second, the Board consisted of five citizens,

trained in history, a rchives, and the law, who

w e re not government employees but who

had the ability to order agencies to declassify government documents—the first time

in history that an outside group has had

such power. Third, once the Board made the

decision that a document should be declassified, only the President could overrule its

decision. Fortunately, Congress also gave

the Board a staff whose work was critical to

its success. 

The JFK Act required all government agencies to search for the records in their possession concerning the assassination and place

them in the National Archives. The Act provided for the appointment of the members of

the Review Board within ninety days, but the

transition between the Bush and Clinton

administrations caused an 18-month delay

between passage of the Act and the swearing-in of the Board members. Only then

could the Board hire staff and arrange for

office space. This delay had two ramifications. First, the Act stated that the work of the

Board was to be completed in three years, an

unrealistic goal since more than 18 months

had already elapsed. (The Board’s work was

eventually extended to four years.) Second,

agencies were sending documents to the

National Archives before the Board established its guidelines for their release. Consequently and unfortunately, once the Review

Board did provide guidance to the agencies,

much of their initial work had to be revised,

further slowing the processing and re -

reviewing by the Board and its staff. 

The Board’s first task was to define the term

“assassination record” in order to frame the

search for relevant records. The statutory definition, a record “related to the assassination

of President John F. Kennedy,” specifically

included any record from the investigating

xxiii
agencies, and records in the possession of the

federal government, and any local or state

government that assisted in the inquiry into

the assassination. But, as noted in the Senate

report, “it is intended and emphasized that

the search and disclosure of records under

this Act must go beyond those records.” Congress empowered the Board to determine

whether a document was an assassination

re c o rd and to cast a broad net for such

records. Board members engaged in extensive discussion and sought advice from the

public before finally issuing its broad definition. The definition enabled the Board to look

beyond the narrower confines of the assassination to find and release valuable documents from the early 1960s that enhance the

historical understanding of that era, and the

political and diplomatic context in which the

assassination occurred.

The Review Board overcame its early challenges and, with the help of its able staff,

developed guidelines for the release of documents. These served as the yardstick for both

its staff and the federal agencies.

The Board’s most important task was to

review the information the agencies wished

to postpone rather than release and then to

vote either to sustain the postponement or

release the information. Since the Board was

working in uncharted territory, it developed

c reative methods. Three review stages

evolved over the four years of the Board’s

existence. At first, the Board scrutinized each

document with infinite care, and by choosing

to meet often, made decisions on a document-by-document basis working to understand both the body of information at issue

and the balance required by the JFK Act. It

eschewed the more generic issue approach

which was preferred by the agencies.

During the second stage, the Board delegated some routine decisionmaking to its

B o a rd staff, which proceeded with such care

that even the slightest question about a document brought it to the Board’s attention.

F i n a l l y, agencies recognized the voting pattern of the Board and for purposes of eff iciency began bypassing the review pro c e s s

on their own initiative and releasing re c o rd s

under the Board’s guidelines. The Board ’ s

review process ultimately ensured that the

Review Board scrutinized each piece of

withheld information so that the A m e r i c a n

public would be confident that assassination re c o rds were open to the fullest extent

possible. 

The JFK Act established a stringent standard

for postponing the opening of a record. Its

minimal list of required postponements and

emphasis on the bias toward disclosure separated it from either the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the Executive Order that

provides for disclosure of national security

information. The Board proceeded cautiously

as it examined its first documents under the

provisions of postponement in Section 6 of

the JFK Act. In particular, the Board balanced

evidence for postponement against the public interest in release, bearing in mind the

Act’s “presumption of immediate disclosure.” Before agreeing to postponement, the

Board applied the stringent requirements for

the “clear and convincing evidence” required

by the Act. Decisions had to be made on

names, dates, places, crypts, pseudonyms,

file numbers, sources of information and the

method by which it was obtained. Ultimately, the Board created a set of principles,

a kind of “common law,” that could be

applied to many of the documents. Although

the agencies often objected to the Board’s

decisions, they accepted both the statute and

the Board’s interpretation of it and, for the

most part, cooperated.

The JFK Act specifically instructed the Review

B o a rd to go beyond the scope of pre v i o u s

inquiries. Since both the Board and its staff

had high level security clearances, no agency

could prevent a search through every file.

After locating files designated by the agencies,

the Review Board staff members pursued new

s o u rces of assassination re c o rds. Most of the

Review Board’s additional requests for

re c o rds went to the CIA and FBI, but there

w e re also requests to the Secret Service, the

Departments of State snd Defense, the

National Security A g e n c y, and The Pre s i d e n t ’ s

F o reign Intelligence Advisory Board. 

Given the massive volume of federal records,

the search for additional records was time

consuming and often frustrating. For every

assassination record located and included in

the collection, the staff literally re v i e w e d

h u n d reds of documents. The documents

located through this search for additional

xxiv
records are among the most important in the

collection—many were never reviewed by

the prior investigations.

The Review Board, in its effort to make the

JFK Collection valuable to historians, encouraged private citizens and organizations that

possessed records of their own to donate

them to the JFK Collection. The collection

was significantly enriched by these donations. They included, for example, the desk

diaries of former President and Warren Commission member Gerald Ford, the personal

files of Jim Garrison, the New Orleans prosecuting attorney, notes taken during interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald by both a

Dallas Police Captain and a former FBI agent,

and films from individuals in Dallas and

P resident Kennedy’s aide, Dave Powers.

They also include a donation of papers from

the son of J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of

the Warren Commission, and the diary of

Clay Shaw, the only person tried for the murder of John F. Kennedy (and subsequently

acquitted). The Review Board added to the

collection, too, information from state and

local offices and officials who were tied to the

Oswald investigation.

The JFK Act also encouraged the Review

Board to work with the Department of State

to include documents from foreign governments. The Board sought records from Russia, Belarus, Cuba and Mexico. For the most

part, these attempts proved frustrating and

fruitless owing to political and diplomatic

constraints. Although many leads were pursued, only a few new records were obtained.

Although this is a genuine loss to the historical completeness of the assassination records,

work continues on these attempts and the

B o a rd is hopeful that eventually these

records, particularly the voluminous KGB

surveillance re c o rds on Oswald, will be

added to the JFK Collection. 

In the spirit of openness embodied in the JFK

Act, the Review Board devoted a significant

amount of time and resources listening to

and corresponding with its various constituencies. It held a total of seven public

hearings, one each in Dallas, Boston, New

Orleans, and Los Angeles and three in Washington, DC. In addition, Board members participated in meetings of historical associations, spoke to countless public groups, and

cooperated with assassination re s e a rc h e r s

and the Coalition on Political Assassinations.

Over 100 press releases were issued, and

Board members made themselves available

for many media interviews.

Twice, the Review Board called together a

g roup of invited guests who are “experts” in

their fields. The first conference was held in

May 1995. It provided the Review Board and

the staff with the opportunity to discuss

prior investigative efforts that were

thwarted due to lack of access to re c o rd s .

The participants provided the Board staff

with recommendations for further searc h e s .

The second conference, held in April 1998,

focused narrowly on the issue of document

declassification. This informative meeting

helped Board members to formulate re c o mmendations for this final re p o r t .

From time to time the frequent and sustained

contact with the public diverted the staff

from its primary responsibilities—identifying and releasing records. However, the benefits far outweighed the costs. The Review

Board received valuable leads from the public about the existence of other assassination

records and, more important, received donations that enhanced the collection at the

National Archives.

Finally, the Review Board staff implemented

a program to ensure, to the fullest extent possible, that each agency complied with the JFK

Act. A signed declaration was required from

each agency, under penalty of perjury. This

compliance statement described the record

searches that the agency completed, records

that it located, and other actions it took to

comply with the law.

Before agencies submitted their Final Declarations of Compliance, the staff worked with

them to resolve outstanding problems. In the

compliance statement, each agency

addressed the scope and adequacy of its

search, the adequacy of its response to the

requests for additional information, and the

timeliness with which it processed its records

for release. The Board and staff also decided

to depose officials of agencies with poor

records systems and those that failed to comply with the spirit of the Act. 

The legacy of the JFK Review Board lies in

xxv
Major Accomplishments of the Assassination Records Review Board

• Reviewed and voted on over 27,000 previously redacted assassination records;

• Obtained agencies’ consent to release an additional 33,000+ assassination records;

• E n s u red that the famous “Zapruder Film” of the assassination belonged to the A m e r i c a n

people and arranged for the first known authenticity study of the Zapruder Film;

• Opened previously redacted CIA records from the Directorate of Operations;

• Released 99% of the “Hardway/Lopez Report” documenting the CIA’s records on Lee Harvey Oswald’s trip to Mexico City before the assassination;

• Conducted a three-day audiotaped interview of former FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty,

one of two agents who were responsible for the FBI’s cases on Lee and Marina Oswald prior

to the assassination;

• Acquired for public release two sets of original notes from Lee Harvey Oswald’s interrogation in the Dallas Police Department taken by FBI Agent James Hosty and Dallas Homicide

Division Captain “Will” Fritz (prior to the Board’s existence, it was thought that no original

notes existed);

• Clarified the controversial medical record of President Kennedy’s autopsy and his treatment

at Parkland Hospital by deposing 10 Bethesda autopsy participants, five Parkland Hospital

treating physicians, and conducting numerous unsworn interviews of Parkland and Bethesda

personnel;

• Secured records relating to District Attorney Jim Garrison’s prosecution of Clay Shaw for

conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy, including Shaw’s diaries, records from Shaw’s

defense attorneys, investigative records from the District Attorney’s office, and grand jury

records;

• Obtained the full release of FBI documents that describe the FBI’s attempts to track

Oswald’s activities in Europe prior to the assassination;

• Made available to the public all FBI and CIA documents from previous official investigations;

• Acquired for the American people film footage depicting events surrounding the assassination, portions of which had never been seen before, including the Dallas television station

KTVT outtakes of President and Mrs. Kennedy in Dallas and the aftermath of the assassination;

• S p o n s o red ballistics and forensic testing of Wa r ren Commission Exhibit 567, the bullet

“nose fragment” from the front seat of the Presidential limousine, (the HSCA F i rearms Panel

first recommended the testing in 1978, but the testing was not conducted until the Review

B o a rd existed);

the more than four million pages of records

now in the National Archives and available

to the public with remarkably few redactions. These records include critical documentation on the events in Dallas, Lee Harvey Oswald, and the reactions of government

agencies to the assassination. They also

include documents that enhance the historical understanding of that traumatic event in

recent American history by placing it in the

broader context of political and diplomatic

events.

xxvi
• Permanently preserved all the autopsy photographs of President Kennedy in digitized form,

and conducted sophisticated digital enhancement of selected, representative images;

• Reviewed IRS and Social Security tax, employment, and earnings records on Lee Harvey

Oswald, the authenticity of which has been questioned by researchers who have not been

allowed access to such material. Required IRS to prepare a releasable report without releasing

tax return information, the disclosure of which is prohibited by Federal law.

xxvii

Review Board Recommendations

With the passage of the JFK Act and the creation of the independent Review Board, Cong ress took a large step toward rebuilding public confidence in the federal government,

confidence lost through years of excessive

s e c re c y. The Review Board urges the Congre s s ,

government agencies, and the public to continue the effort to open documents under the

p rovisions of the JFK Act and to build on the

foundation created by the Board. To that end,

the Review Board makes the following re c o mm e n d a t i o n s :

Recommendation 1:

The Review Board recommends that future

declassification boards be genuinely independent, both in the stru c t u re of the org a n i z a t i o n

and in the qualifications of the appointments.

Recommendation 2:

The Review Board recommends that any serious, sustained effort to declassify records

requires congressional legislation with (a) a

presumption of openness, (b) clear standards

of access, (c) an enforceable review and

appeals process, and (d) a budget appropriate to the scope of the task. 

Recommendation 3:

The Review Board recommends that its

“common law” of decision, formed in the

context of a “presumption of disclosure” and

the “clear and convincing evidence of harm”

criteria, be utilized for similar information in

future declassification efforts as a way to

simplify and speed up releases.

Recommendation 4:

The Review Board recommends that future

declassification efforts avoid the major shortcomings of the JFK Act: (a) unreasonable time

limits, (b) employee restrictions, (c) application

of the law after the Board terminates, and (d)

p roblems inherent with rapid sunset pro v i s i o n s .

Recommendation 5:

The Review Board recommends that the

cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive problem of referrals for “third party

equities” (classified information of one

agency appearing in a document of another)

be streamlined by (a) requiring representatives of all agencies with interests in selected

groups of records meet for joint declassification sessions, or (b) uniform substitute language be devised to deal with certain categories of recurring sensitive equities.

Recommendation 6:

The Review Board recommends that a compliance program be used in future declassification efforts as an effective means of eliciting full cooperation in the search for records.

Recommendation 7:

The Review Board recommends the following

to ensure that NARA can exercise the pro v isions of the JFK Act after the Review Board terminates: (a) that NARA has the authority and

means to continue to implement Board decisions, (b) that an appeals pro c e d u re be developed that places the burden for pre v e n t i n g

access on the agencies, and (c) that a joint

oversight group composed of re p re s e n t a t i v e s

of the four organizations that originally nominated individuals to serve on the Review Board

be created to facilitate the continuing execution

of the access provisions of the JFK A c t .

Recommendation 8:

The Review Board recommends that the

Review Board model could be adopted and

applied whenever there are extraordinary

circumstances in which continuing controversy concerning government actions has

been most acute and where an aggressive

effort to release all “reasonably related” federal records would serve usefully to enhance

historical understanding of the event.

Recommendation 9:

The Review Board recommends that both the
Freedom of Information Act and Executive

Order 12958 be strengthened, the former to

narrow the categories of information automatically excluded from disclosure, the latter

to add “independent oversight” to the

process of “review” when heads of agencies

decide that records in their units should be

excluded from release.

Recommendation 10:

The Review Board recommends the adoption of

a federal classification policy that substantially

(a) l i m i t s the number of those in government

who can actually classify federal documents, (b)

re s t r i c t s the number of categories by which documents might be classified, (c) re d u c e s the time

period for which the document(s) might be classified, (d) e n c o u r a g e s the use of substitute language to immediately open material which

might otherwise be classified, and (e) i n c re a s e s

the re s o u rces available to the agencies and

N A R A for declassifying federal re c o rd s .

xxviii
CH A P T E R 1

TH E PR O B L E M O F SE C R E C Y

A N D T H E SO L U T I O N O F T H E J F K AC T

A. THE PROBLEM OF SECRECY

Uncage the documents.

Let them see light. 1

The P resident John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992 was a unique

solution to the problem of secre c y. The pro blem was that 30 years of government secre c y

relating to the assassination of President John

F. Kennedy led the American public to believe

that the government had something to hide.

The solution was legislation that re q u i red the

government to disclose whatever information

it had concerning the assassination.

The American public is well aware of the

facts of this particular case: at approximately

12:30 p.m. on November 22, 1963, as President Kennedy traveled in a motorc a d e

through Dealey Plaza in downtown Dallas,

Texas, he was shot and suffered a massive

head wound. Doctors at Parkland Memorial

Hospital in Dallas pronounced the President

dead shortly thereafter—at 1:00 p.m. 

Later that day, Dallas police officers arrested

Lee Harvey Oswald as a suspect in the President’s murder. Oswald was also a suspect in

the murder of a Dallas patrolman that had

occurred that afternoon. By 1:30 p.m. on

November 23, the Dallas police had charged

Oswald with assassinating the Pre s i d e n t .

Less than 24 hours later, Lee Harvey Oswald

was shot and killed by Jack Ruby during the

Dallas Police Department’s transfer of

Oswald from the city jail to the county jail.

Television cameras captured the scene of

Ruby shooting Oswald.

Dallas police officers arrested Jack Ruby. He

was tried and convicted of Oswald’s murder

in March 1964. (In October 1966, the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the verdict and ordered a new trial. Ruby died of

cancer three months later before his new trial

began.) Ruby maintained that he was not

involved in the assassination of the President

and that he had not known Oswald prior to

hearing his name in connection with the

assassination. Ruby claimed that his fury

over the assassination led him to kill Oswald.

Aside from the assassination investigations

that the Dallas police, the FBI, and the Secre t

Service conducted, President Lyndon B. Johnson immediately established the Pre s i d e n t ’ s

Commission to Investigate the A s s a s s i n a t i o n

of President Kennedy. Chief Justice of the U.S.

S u p reme Court Earl Wa r ren headed the

e fforts of the Wa r ren Commission. Te n

months later, the Wa r ren Commission Report

concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald acted

alone and shot the President from a sniper’ s

nest on the sixth floor of his workplace, the

Texas School Book Depository. For a variety

of reasons, not the least of which was that the

Wa r ren Commission conducted some of its

investigations in secret and sealed many of its

re c o rds, the American public never tru s t e d

the Commission’s conclusion. Subsequently,

other federal entities conducted partial or

complete reinvestigations of the assassination. The most significant of these re i n v e s t igations was the House Select Committee on

Assassinations (HSCA), which concluded in

1979 that President Kennedy’s death was the

result of a probable conspiracy.

In 1991, Oliver Stone’s JFK popularized a version of President Kennedy’s assassination

that featured U.S. government agents from

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the

military as conspirators. While the movie

was largely fictional, the information that

Stone conveyed in the movie’s closing trailer

was true: the HSCA had reinvestigated the

murder and issued a provocative report, but

their records were sealed until the year 2029.

1
Stone suggested at the end of JFK that Americans could not trust official public conclusions when those conclusions had been made

in secret. Congress passed legislation—the

JFK Act—that released the secret records that

prior investigations gathered and created.

N u m e rous re c o rds of previous investigative

bodies such as the Wa r ren Commission, the

C h u rch Committee, and the HSCA w e re

s e c ret. Yet members of these commissions

reached conclusions based on these investigative re c o rds. The American public lost faith

when it could not see the very documents

whose contents led to these conclusions. 

B. PRIOR INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS

T h e re exists widespread suspicion

about the government’s disposition

of the Kennedy assassination records

stemming from the beliefs that Federal officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination

records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House

Assassination Committee) and (2)

have heavily redacted the re c o rd s

released under FOIAin order to cover

up sinister conspiracies.2

The American public has expressed its dissatisfaction with both the work and the conclusions of the official investigations of the assassination and it was this dissatisfaction that

was primarily responsible for Congress’ initiative to establish the Assassination Record s

Review Board (Review Board). Section 3(2) of

the JFK Act defines the re c o rds of each of

these official investigative entities as assassination re c o rds. As such, the Review Board

worked to review and release a l l re c o rds that

these investigative entities used in re a c h i n g

their conclusions about the assassination.

At the same time, a brief description of each

entity and the records it generated is useful

for understanding the enormity of the

Review Board’s task.

1. President’s Commission to Investigate

the Assassination of President John F.

Kennedy (Warren Commission)

The Warren Commission was the only investigative body to identify a specific individual—Lee Harvey Oswald—as the lone assassin of President Kennedy.

The Wa r ren Commission did not, however,

reach its conclusion before conducting an

extensive investigation.3 During its tenure ,

the Wa r ren Commission deposed or interviewed 552 witnesses and generated or

g a t h e red approximately 360 cubic feet of

re c o rds, including some artifacts and

exhibits. The Wa r ren Commission’s September 1964, 888-page report came with 26

volumes—over 16,000 pages—of testimony

and exhibits. 

President Johnson recognized the high public

interest in the Warren Commission’s unpublished records and initiated a plan for release

of the material. The Johnson plan resulted in

the release of 98% of the Warren Commission’s records by 1992. Thus, at the time that

C o n g ress passed the JFK Act, only 3,000

pages of Wa r ren Commission material

remained for the agencies and the Review

Board to release.

All Wa r ren Commission re c o rds, except

those records that contain tax return information, are available to the public with only

minor redactions.

2. The President’s Commission on 

Central Intelligence Agency Activities 

Within the United States 

(Rockefeller Commission)

The 1975 Rockefeller Commission investigated the CIA’s illegal domestic activities.4

In

the course of its work, the Commission

touched on several assassination-related topics, including the identity of the “thre e

tramps,” the possibility of CIA involvement

in the assassination, and ballistics issues.5

The Commission concluded that the CIAwas

not involved in the assassination, and that

the President had not been hit by a shot fired

from in front of the Presidential limousine. 

As of 1992, the Commission’s assassinationrelated files consisted of approximately 2,500

to 4,000 pages, 95% of which were still secret

and in the custody of the Gerald Ford Presidential Library when Congress passed the

JFK Act.6

2
3. The Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations with Respect

to Intelligence Activities 

(Church Committee)

In 1975 and 1976, the Senate investigated illegal domestic activities of government intelligence agencies.7 The Church Committee’s

investigation uncovered allegations such as

CIA assassination plots against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in the 1960–1963 period.

The CIA did not communicate the existence

of the plots to the Warren Commission, even

though former CIA Director Allen Dulles (a

Warren Commission member) was aware of

them.

The Church Committee’s initial findings led

Committee member Senator Richard

Schweiker to call for a reinvestigation of the

assassination. Through Senator Schweiker’s

efforts, the Church Committee formed a subcommittee to evaluate the intelligence agencies’ handling of the JFK assassination investigation. The subcommittee interviewed or

deposed over 50 witnesses, acquired over

5,000 pages of evidence from intelligence

agencies, and reviewed thousands of additional pages.8

As of 1992, the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence possessed approximately 5,000

pages of assassination-related material from

the Church Committee’s investigations.9

Although the Church Committee published

some material in its reports, the bulk of the

Committee’s records remained closed. 

4. The Select Committee on Intelligence

of the House of Representatives 

(Pike Committee)

In 1975, the House of Representatives also

established a committee to investigate illegal

domestic activities of government intelligence agencies. The Pike Committee devoted

less time to issues related to Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy’s assassination than did the Church

Committee, but it completed some relevant

work. However, due to the Pike Committee’s

internal conflicts, as well as conflicts that it

had with the executive branch over access to

records, the Committee never issued a report.

The Committee did touch on some issues

related to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy. At the time that Congress passed

the JFK Act, the number of Pike Committee

re c o rds that contained information that

might be related to President Kennedy’s

assassination was unknown.

5. The Select Committee on 

Assassinations of the House of 

Representatives (HSCA)

In 1976, the House of Representatives established its Select Committee on Assassinations. The HSCA reinvestigated Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy’s assassination and the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The HSCA

concluded that President Kennedy was probably murdered as a result of a conspiracy and

suggested that organized crime may have

played a role in the conspiracy. At the same

time, the HSCA concurred with the Warren

Commission’s findings that Lee Harvey

Oswald fired the two bullets that hit the President, and that one of those bullets struck

both President Kennedy and Governor John

Connally of Texas (the so-called “single-bullet theory”).

During its tenure, the HSCA took testimony

from 335 witnesses and held 38 days of public hearings. The HSCA generated approximately 414,000 pages of records relating to

the assassination.11 In 1992, the HSCA’ s

unpublished records resided with the House

Administration Committee (now the House

Oversight Committee). 

Because the HSCA investigated so many different possibilities in its investigation into

possible conspiracies, its records, and federal

agency records that the HSCA used, have

been among the most important records that

the Review Board processed.

6. Additional Congressional 

Investigations 

In addition to investigations of the above-re fe renced special committees and commissions,

various congressional committees have

examined aspects of the assassination story.

The House Un-American Activities Committee, for instance, compiled a small number of

p re-assassination re c o rds relating to Lee Harvey Oswald’s activities in New Orleans. At the

time of the assassination, the Senate Internal

Security Subcommittee, had ongoing investi3
gations into the political situation in Cuba and,

when the President was killed, it conducted a

limited inquiry into the assassination. 

To the extent that these two committees provided materials to the Warren Commission,

their records remained under the control of

succeeding congressional committees and

had not been released prior to consideration

of the JFK Act. 

L a t e r, in 1975, two House subcommittees held

public hearings on issues relating to the tre a tment of assassination re c o rds. These were the

House Judiciary Committee’s Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee (Edward s

Committee) that investigated the destru c t i o n

of the so-called “Hosty note” which Lee Harvey Oswald had left at the FBI Dallas field

o ffice for Special Agent James Hosty on

November 6, 1963. After the assassination,

Hosty destroyed the note on the instru c t i o n s

of his superior, Special Agent in Charge J.

G o rdon Shanklin. Its existence re m a i n e d

unknown outside the FBI for 12 years. The

Government Information and Individual

Rights Subcommittee of the Government

Operations Committee (Abzug Committee)

examined issues of access and openness re l a ting to Wa r ren Commission re c o rds. 

While the latter two hearings were published, it was not known during consideration of the JFK Act whether additional and

unpublished records remained in the committees’ files. 

7. Records Held by Executive 

Branch Agencies

All of the major investigative efforts re c e i v e d

assistance from the FBI and the CIA. Other

agencies, such as the Secret Service, the

Department of State, and the Department of

Justice, were also involved in official investigations. Federal agencies generated re c o rd s

for the investigative entities they worked

with, but they also retained a vast body of

re c o rds. At the time of legislative consideration of the JFK Act, for instance, the FBI had

a l ready released some 220,000 pages of assass i n a t i o n - related material under the Fre e d o m

of Information Act (FOIA). Nonetheless, the

B u reau estimated that approximately 260,000

pages of additional assassination re c o rd s

remained withheld or unpro c e s s e d .1 2 At the

same point in time, the CIA had re l e a s e d

a p p roximately 11,000 pages of an estimated

250,000 to 300,000 pages of assassination

re c o rd s .1 3 Other agencies with smaller caches

of assassination re c o rds had released varying

p e rcentages of their holdings by 1992.

8. Investigative Records in the Custody

of Non-Federal Sources

The JFK Act also provided the Review Board

with authority to seek assassination records

from non-federal sources. Various local law

e n f o rcement agencies assisted the Wa r re n

Commission and the FBI in their post-assassination investigation. Some local authorities

also possessed relevant pre - a s s a s s i n a t i o n

records. New Orleans District Attorney Jim

Garrison’s investigation and trial of Clay

Shaw for complicity in the assassination is a

prominent example of a non-federal investigative effort that generated extensive assassination records. Other potential assassination records, however generated, exist in the

custody of private citizens and foreign governments. Subject to time and resource constraints, the Review Board also identified and

secured as much of this indeterminate group

of records as possible.

C. SKEPTICISM CONCERNING THE

GOVERNMENT’S CONCLUSIONS

The circumstances of President Kennedy’s

assassination invited public skepticism from

the start. His death raised profound doubts

in the minds of many Americans who could

not understand the apparently confused and

obscure motives of the alleged assassin, Lee

Harvey Oswald. The murder of Oswald by

Jack Ruby caused further skepticism as it

suggested both a conspiracy and a cover-up. 

When President Johnson established the

Warren Commission in an apparent effort to

prevent parallel investigations, calm domestic fears, and defuse any potential international re p e rcussions of the assassination,

many Americans welcomed a simple explanation of this event. Others, however,

observed incongruities in the Warren Commission’s investigation.

Wa r ren Commission member and future Pre sident Gerald Ford declared early on that “the

monumental re c o rd of the President’s Com4
mission will stand like a Gibraltar of factual

l i t e r a t u re through the ages to come.”1 4 T h re e

decades later, an American author likened the

Commission’s work to “a dead whale decomposing on a beach.”1 5 The juxtaposition of

these similes, as well as their temporal distance from one another, tells a story about the

changing perception of the Wa r ren Commission’s work over time. And while neither is

fully accurate, they concur, at least, on the

issue of size. The Wa r ren Commission’s work

p roduct was massive. The size and scope of

the published material provided critics with

“a species of Talmudic text begging for commentary and further elucidation.”1 6

Critics found ammunition with which to

attack the Commission’s work. First, the

Commission’s time and resource constraints

forced it to rely mainly on the FBI to conduct

the day-to-day investigation of the murder.

Second, the Commission failed to examine

some of the most critical evidence in the case:

the photographs and x-rays from President

Kennedy’s autopsy.

Chairman Earl Warren felt that these materials were too gruesome to allow into the public record. He thought that it “would make a

morbid thing for all time.” The Commission

relied instead on artistic renderings of the

photographs pre p a red by an illustrator

working from verbal descriptions provided

by the chief autopsy prosector. Some critics

viewed the Commission’s failure to view the

photographs and x-rays as gross negligence.

Doubts about the medical evidence were

compounded for critics by the Commission’s

forensic conclusion that the President’s back

and neck wounds, and Governor Connally’s

back, chest, wrist, and thigh wounds, were

all caused by the same bullet. Nothing the

Commission wrote or subsequently said

could convince critics that Commission

Exhibit 399, the so-called “magic bullet”

(usually described as “pristine”), could have

caused so many wounds while sustaining so

little damage itself. Critics argued that if the

Commission was incorrect about the singlebullet theory, then the Commission’s conclusion that Oswald acted alone could not stand.

Critics found a number of inconsistencies

when they measured the report against the

26 volumes of published evidence. Critics

believed that the unpublished evidence

would further undermine the report’s conclusions. Once additional Warren Commission records dribbled out to the public at the

National Archives in the mid-1960s, critics

such as Mark Lane and Edward Epstein

began to publish books that questioned the

Commission’s conclusions.

In 1967, New Orleans District Attorney Jim

Garrison’s indictment and trial of Clay Shaw

for conspiracy to murder the President provided a credible platform and new momentum for Wa r ren Commission critics. Flamboyant and articulate, Garrison was a media

sensation. Although the American public

had differing opinions concerning Garrison,

his investigation altered the assassination

debate. The investigation popularized a radical critique of the official version of the

assassination. In addition to generating

assassination re c o rds, the Clay Shaw trial

was also the venue for an important assassination re c o rd milestone: the first public

showing of Abraham Zapru d e r’s film

footage of the assassination. 

When President Gerald Ford established the

Rockefeller Commission, he started a trend

to examine U.S. government intelligence

actions during the 1960s and early 1970s. As

part of its forensic review of the assassination, the Rockefeller Commission viewed the

Z a p ruder film in February 1975. Shortly

thereafter, the television program Goodnight

America showed the film. When the American public saw the film, many concluded that

President Kennedy’s fatal head wound had

been caused by a shot from the front.

At the same time, the Church Committee

u n c o v e red U.S. government assassination

plots against foreign leaders, including

Cuba’s Fidel Castro, during the 1960–1963

period. Some of these plots involved organized crime figures. The Committee found

the intelligence agencies (primarily the CIA

and the FBI) deficient in their investigation of

President Kennedy’s death, and critics called

for a reinvestigation.

In September 1976, the HSCA began its

work. By this time, skepticism concerning

the official explanation of the assassination

had hardened in the minds of millions of

A m e r i c a n s .1 7 This skepticism was fueled by a

5
small cottage industry of authors, lecture r s ,

and assassination re s e a rchers who noted

that the government had not released germane re c o rds and had even lied to itself

about the case.

Initially critic-friendly, the Committee eventually sought to establish some distance between

its inquiry and that of Wa r ren Commission

critics. In the end, the Committee’s re p o r t

reflected an interesting mix of conclusions

which only whetted re s e a rchers’ appetites for

the Committee’s re c o rds. Although the

H S C A’s report stated that it believed the Pre sident’s death was the result of a conspiracy, it

could not conclusively identify any conspirators other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

The HSCA criticized the performance of the

Warren Commission and investigative agencies like the FBI and the CIA for their initial

assassination investigations, but it concluded

that Lee Harvey Oswald had killed the President and that the single-bullet theory was

sound. Despite these conclusions, however,

the HSCA did validate some of the criticisms

of the Warren Commission by concluding

that there was a “high probability” that two

gunmen fired at President Kennedy.

18

Under House rules, the HSCA’s unpublished

records were sealed for 50 years, until 2029.

Because the HSCA investigation was marked

by internal squabbling and disillusioned

staffers, the Committee’s records were the

subject of ongoing contro v e r s y. Some exstaffers claimed the HSCA report did not

reflect their investigative work, and that

information that did not conform with the

Committee leadership’s preconceived conclusions was ignored or left out of the report

and supporting volumes. 

Four years after the HSCAissued its report, a

former member of the Committee introduced

legislation to open the Committee’s records.19

The House Administration Committee held

hearings, but the House never voted on the

resolution and the HSCA records remained

closed until Congress passed the JFK Act.

When Congress did finally vote to open

HSCAand other assassination records, it had

less to do with the ameliorative effect of

time’s passage than it did with a popular if

controversial film, JFK.

D. THE SOLUTION: THE JFK ACT

This resolution was introduced because

of the renewed public interest and concern over the records pertaining to the

assassination of President John F.

Kennedy.... There has been considerable

debate about these records, including

accusations that these re c o rds, if

released, would contain evidence of a

government coverup or complicity of

government agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy.

20

By 1992, the American public had expressed

its desire for legislative action. Even executive branch agencies, who were more insulated than Congress from public outrage,

were anxious to put the issue of assassination

records behind them. The Senate report ultimately stated that “records related to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy

a re the most publicly sought-after, unreleased records of our government.”21

E. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF JFK ACT

When the second session of Congress opened

in January 1992, members of Congress began

to introduce bills and resolutions that would

mandate the release of assassination

records.22 While none of these early proposals

enjoyed support from the Congre s s i o n a l

leadership, they did start a discussion in

Congress about secrecy and the assassination

that resulted in passage of the JFK Act. Meanwhile, influential voices joined the call to

open the government’s assassination records,

perhaps most notably former President Gerald Ford, the last surviving member of the

Warren Commission.23

On March 26, 1992, Congressman Louis

Stokes introduced H.J. Res. 454 in the House

of Representatives with 40 co-sponsors.24 On

the same day, Senator David Boren introduced S.J. Res. 282 in the Senate with nine cosponsors.

25 Within weeks, both the House

and Senate held hearings on the legislation.26

In the hearings, members of Congress, representatives from government agencies, and

the public agreed on the need to open assassination records. The CIAand the FBI, in particular, committed themselves to full cooperation with Congress. Only the Department of

Justice, on behalf of the White House, raised

6
serious concerns about the legislation. These

had to do, first, with constitutional issues

relating to the appointment process and status of the proposed Review Board and, second, the proposed criteria for the continued

withholding of certain types of information. 

The hearings established that existing mechanisms for the release of assassination re c o rd s

w e re not working and the only way to re l e a s e

assassination re c o rds was legislation. 

During the summer of 1992, committees in

both the House and Senate reported favorably on the legislation.2 7 The full Senate

passed the legislation on July 27, 1992. The

House of Representatives passed a somewhat different version on August 12, 1992.

Differences between the House and Senate

bills were unresolved as the end of the legislative session drew near, so the House of

Representatives passed the Senate version on

September 30, 1992, the date of enactment of

what was Public Law 102–526, The President

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec -

tion Act of 1992.

President George W. Bush signed the bill into

law on October 26, 1992, just days before the

1992 federal election, but left the appointment of the Review Board to his successor,

President William J. Clinton. President Clinton nominated the five members of the

Review Board in the latter half of 1993 and,

after Senate review and confirmation, they

were sworn in on April 11, 1994. The JFK Act

included a specific sunset date (two years

from the date of the statute’s enactment) with

an option for a one-year extension. This timeframe proved unrealistic, mainly due to the

long delay between the date of enactment

and the actual appointment, confirmation,

and swearing in of the Review Board. Congress therefore decided to reset the time clock

in 1994, passing the President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Extension Act

of 1994.

28 In 1997, Congress extended the life

of the Review Board one final time, until September 30, 1998, through enactment of Public

Law 105–25.29

The JFK Act is a unique statute. Its intent is to

secure the public release of records relating to

President Kennedy’s assassination and, in

doing so, assure the public that the federal

government was not withholding material

information about this tragic event.

The JFK Act established a neutral and independent body—the Review Board — t h a t

could ensure maximum disclosure of federal

government records on the Kennedy assassination and, in the process, restore the public’s confidence that their government was

not keeping secret any relevant information.

The JFK Act envisioned that government

agencies and the Review Board could achieve

c o m p rehensive and rapid disclosure of

records, unimpeded by the usual obstacles to

release. Congress crafted each of the JFK

Act’s statutory provisions to accomplish

these objectives.

F. KEY PROVISIONS OF JFK ACT

Congress stated that records relating to the

assassination would “carry a presumption of

immediate disclosure.” Since most assassination records were more than 30 years old,

Congress stipulated that, “only in the rarest

of cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection.” 

Accordingly, Congress declared that the government would establish a collection of

re c o rds on the assassination of Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy at the National A rchives and

Records Administration (NARA). The JFK

Collection’s purpose would be to make

records available to the public.

C o n g ress defined the term “assassination

record” broadly to encompass all relevant

records. In the JFK Act’s legislative history,

members of Congress specifically stated that

they expected the Review Board to further

define the term “assassination record.”

The JFK Act obligated all government offices

to identify, review, process, and transfer to

NARA all assassination records within their

possession. The Act directed agencies not to

destroy or alter assassination records in their

c u s t o d y. The Act prohibited government

offices from withholding or redacting any

assassination records if those records had

previously been disclosed to the public. And

government offices could not withhold or

redact any assassination records created outside the government.

7
To the extent that a government office had

“any uncertainty” as to whether its records

were “assassination record[s] governed by”

the JFK Act, the Act directed the government

office to transmit the records to the Review

Board, which would determine whether the

records were, indeed, assassination records.

The Act empowered the Review Board to

obtain physical custody of federal re c o rd s

“for purposes of conducting an independent

and impartial review” or “for an administrative hearing or other Review Board function.”

In addition, this section re q u i red government

o ffices to “make available to the Review

B o a rd any additional information and

re c o rds” that the Review Board had reason to

believe it re q u i red for conducting a re v i e w.

Once government offices identified assassination re c o rds, the Act re q u i red them to

transmit the records to the Archivist, and

make the records immediately available to

the public to the extent possible. If government offices believed that release of certain

assassination records should be postponed,

in full or in part, the Act instructed the offices

to transmit the original record to NARAto be

included in a “protected collection,” which

would not be publicly available.

H o w e v e r, the JFK Act mandated that all

postponed assassination re c o rds be opened

to the public no later than the year 2017 (25

years from the date of enactment of the JFK

Act). Government offices could continue to

postpone public release of material in assassination re c o rds after the year 2017 if “the

P resident certifies” that (1) “continued postponement is made necessary by an identifiable harm to the military, defense, intelligence operations, law enforcement, or

conduct of foreign relations” and (2) “the

identifiable harm is of such gravity that it

outweighs the public interest in disclosure . ”

Without such certification, NARA w i l l

release all postponed re c o rds or portions of

re c o rds in 2017.3 0

The JFK Act established standards for postponement to ensure that the JFK Act would

release more information than was released

under the FOIA and Executive Orders governing declassification. Thus, government

offices could request the Review Board to

agree to postpone the release of information

in an assassination record only if the agency

could demonstrate—by providing “clear and

convincing evidence” to the Review Board—

a compelling need for postponement.

Section 7 of the JFK Act was perhaps the

Act’s cornerstone in that it created a truly

independent board that would oversee the

federal government’s implementation of the

Act. The Act instructed the President to nominate five citizens “to serve as members of the

Review Board to ensure and facilitate the

review, transmission to the Archivist, and

public disclosure of government re c o rd s

related to the assassination of President John

F. Kennedy.” The Act required members of

the Board to be “impartial private citizens”

who were not presently employed by the federal government and had not “had any previous involvement with any official investigation or inquiry conducted by a federal,

state, or local government, relating to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy.”

The Act further instructed the President to

nominate “distinguished persons of high

national reputation in their respective fields

who are capable of exercising...independent

and objective judgment.” The Act envisioned

a board consisting of at least one professional

historian and one attorney, and it stated that

the President should consider recommendations from the following professional associations: the American Historical Association,

the Organization of American Historians, the

Society of American A rchivists, and the

American Bar Association.

The Act called for the President to appoint the

B o a rd members and the Senate to confirm

them. To ensure independence, the Act stipulated that the President could not re m o v e

B o a rd members except by “impeachment and

conviction” or for specific cause. It also

re q u i red that the President issue a report to

C o n g ress specifying the reason for re m o v a l .

Having set out the parameters for establishing an independent board, the Act delineated

the Board’s responsibilities and powers. The

Act gave the Review Board the power to

identify, secure, and release records relating

to President Kennedy’s assassination.

A c c o rd i n g l y, the Review Board possessed

authority to “render decisions” on (1)

“whether a record constitutes an assassina8
tion record” and (2) “whether an assassination record or particular information in an

assassination record qualifies for postponement of disclosure under this Act.”

In addition, the JFK Act gave the Review

Board power to obtain additional records

and information from government offices.

Further, the Act authorized the Review Board

to issue “interpretive regulations.”

The Act gave the Review Board certain

responsibilities to fulfill upon completion of

its work. Thus, “[u]pon termination,” the Act

required the Review Board to submit a final

report to the President and Congress. In

addition, the “Review Board shall transfer all

of its records to the Archivist for inclusion in

the collection, and no records of the Review

Board shall be destroyed.”

The JFK Act directed the Review Board to

appoint an Executive Director and staff to

perform the work of, and report to, members

of the Review Board. To ensure independence, staff members could not be present

employees of the federal government, nor

could the Executive Director be affiliated

with any prior official investigation of the

Kennedy assassination. 

The Act directed the Board to provide, if possible, a summary of the redacted information

or a substitute record explaining the redacted

information. The Act further instructed the

Review Board to release parts of records that

could not be released in full.

In addition to notifying NARA of its decisions to release or postpone assassination

records, the Act also required the Review

Board to notify the originating agency as well

as the public of any Board determination to

designate a record as an assassination record.

While the JFK Act authorized the Review

B o a rd to make final and binding determinations concerning the release or postponement

of a re c o rd, it provided that the Pre s i d e n t

could reconsider any Board determination:

“After the Review Board has made a formal

determination concerning the public disclos u re or postponement of disclosure of an

executive branch assassination re c o rd or

information within such a re c o rd,...the Pre s ident shall have the sole and nondelegable

authority to re q u i re the disclosure or postponement of such re c o rd or information

under the standards set forth in section 6 [of

the JFK Act]....” Thus, if agencies disagre e d

with a Review Board determination to re l e a s e

information in a re c o rd, the affected agency

could “appeal” to the President and re q u e s t

that he overturn the Review Board’s decision.

Finally, the Act required the Review Board to

submit, to the President and Congre s s ,

annual reports regarding its work.

The Act addressed public release of certain

special categories of records that may relate

to the assassination, including records under

seal of a court and foreign records. The law

expressed the “sense of Congress” that the

Secretary of State should contact Russia to

secure public release of records of the former

Soviet Union that may relate to the assassination. Congress also urged the Secretary of

State to contact other foreign governments

that might have relevant records.

Congress clearly emphasized the supremacy

of the JFK Act over other laws that might preclude disclosure of assassination-re l a t e d

records. Thus, where the JFK Act required

public disclosure of a record, the Act would

“take precedence over any other law..., judicial decision construing such law, or common

law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit

such transmission or disclosure....” The only

re c o rds that the Act exempted from its

“supremacy clause” were (1) IRS tax-related

records in which Section 6103 of the IRS Code

p recluded disclosure, and (2) re c o rd s

donated to the United States under a deed of

gift whose terms precluded disclosure.

The Act provided that provisions of the JFK

Act pertaining to the operation of the Review

Board ceased to be effective when the term of

the Review Board expired. However, all

remaining provisions of the JFK Act continue

in force: “The remaining provisions of this

Act shall continue in effect until such time as

the Archivist certifies to the President and the

Congress that all assassination records have

been made available to the public in accordance with this Act.” This provision is significant because it underscores the continuing

obligation of federal agencies to re l e a s e

records on the assassination after the Review

Board’s term expires.

9
F i n a l l y, Congress recognized that the

Review Board would need power to re q u e s t

materials that the agencies themselves

would not have identified as assassinationrelated. The Act guaranteed that the Review

B o a rd could enforce its authority through its

use of the subpoena power and the power to

grant immunity.

In sum, the JFK Act provided a new and unusual

legislative remedy to the

problem of government

secrecy. It required federal agencies to disclose,

forthwith, their re c o rd s

on the assassination and

it empaneled an independent board to ensure

the full identification and

release of those records.

Years of secrecy about the Kennedy assassination investigations finally fell with the passage of this unique new law guaranteeing a

presumption of openness and independent

review of the records.

10

The American public believes

the truth has been hidden from

them for over three decades. If

there is truly nothing to hide,

then there is no better reason for

any and all classified documents to be herewith declassified. Only then can the people’s

trust be restored.

—Stephen Ty l e r, June 28, 1 9 9 5
CHAPTER 1

ENDNOTES

1 House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Assassina -

tion Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings on H.J. Res. 454, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 96.

(Prepared Statement of Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to President Johnson from November

1963 to June 1966).

2 Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hear -

ings on S.J. Res. 282, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 1992, 96. (Prepared Statement of Athan G. Theoharis,

Professor, Department of History, Marquette University).

3 Exec. Order No. 11,130 (1963) (Issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson).

4 Exec. Order No. 11,828 (1975) (Issued by President Gerald R. Ford. The Rockefeller Commission released its report on June 16, 1975 and terminated that same month).

5 P resident’s Commission on Central Intelligence Activities Within the United States, F i n a l

Report of the Pre s i d e n t ’s Commission on Central Intelligence Activities Within the United States ( Wa s hington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 251–269.

6 In accordance with practice at the time, President Ford retained Rockefeller C o m m i s s i o n

re c o rds as part of his personal papers when he left office. This practice was ended by the Pre s idential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (1994). President Ford subsequently donated

these and other re c o rds to his presidential library in Ann A r b o r, Michigan. 

7 The United States Senate established the Church Committee with S. Res. 21 on January 27,

1975. The Committee formally terminated on May 31, 1976.

8 U.S. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence A c t i v i t i e s , The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the

Intelligence Agencies, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976. S. Rept. 755, 1 (Book V).

9 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d

sess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 15. This was the House Judiciary’s report on H.J. Res. 454.

10 Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations 19 (July 17, 1979).

11 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d

sess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, Part 1.

12 Ibid., 12.

13 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d

sess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 13.

14 Quoted in Summers, Anthony and Robbyn Summers, “The Ghosts of November,” Vanity

Fair, December 1994, 88.

15 Mailer, Norman. Oswald’s Tale: An American Mystery. New York: Random House, 1995, 351.

16 Ibid. Author Norman Mailer, like many before and after him, would find it “startling to discover, as one pans these government volumes for bits of gold, how much does gleam in the

sludge” (352).

17 Doubts about the Warren Commission’s findings were not restricted to ordinary Americans. Well before 1978, President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and four of the seven members of

the Warren Commission all articulated, if sometimes off the record, some level of skepticism

about the Commission’s basic findings.

18 House Select Committee on Assassinations, Findings and Recommendations, 95th Cong., 2d

sess., 1979, H. Rept. 1828, 65.

19 H. Res. 160 was introduced by Congressman Stewart McKinney of Connecticut. It was cosponsored by four additional former members of the HSCA: Representatives Robert Edgar,

Harold Sawyer, Harold Ford, and Walter Fauntroy.

11
20 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d

sess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 33. (Statement of Representative Louis Stokes).

21 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rept. 328.

22 These early proposals were H.R. 4090, introduced by Congressman Trafficant of Ohio on

January 3, 1992, H. Res. 325, introduced by Congressman Gonzalez of Texas on January 22,

1992; H. Res. 326 and H.R. 4108, both introduced by Congressman DeFazio of Oregon on January 24.

23 George Lardner, Jr., “Ford Urges House Leaders to Seek Release Of All Records on

Kennedy Assassination,” Washington Post, 30 January 1992, A–12.

24 Congressional Record, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 138, daily ed. (26 March 1992): H1984– 86.

2 5 C o n g ressional Record, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 138, daily ed. (26 March 1992): S4392–97. 

26 The House Government Operations Committee held hearings on April 28th, May 15th and

July 22nd. The House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on May 20th. In the Senate, the Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on May 12th. 

2 7 The House Government Operations Committee approved the legislation in June (Report

102–625 I, June 29, 1992) and the House Judiciary Committee in August (Report 102–625 II,

August 11, 1992). The Senate Governmental A ffairs Committee approved legislation in July

(Report 102–328, July 22, 1992). The Senate committee approved an amendment in the nature of

a substitute; the bill forwarded to the full Senate for its consideration there f o re had a new designation, S. 3006. This was the bill the full House eventually voted on in September.

28 Public Law 103–345 was enacted October 6, 1994. The Extension Act had been introduced

as H.R. 4569.

29 Introduced as H.R. 1553 by the Chairman of the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana, the bill was approved by the House on June 23,

1997 and by the Senate two days later. President Clinton signed the bill into law on July 3, 1997.

30 Many of the postponements agreed to by the Review Board in fact have release dates that

are much earlier than 2017.

12
CH A P T E R 2

ES TA B L I S H M E N T O F T H E RE V I E W BO A R D A N D

DE F I N I T I O N O F “ AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D”

A. INTRODUCTION

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Col -

lection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) provided optimistic deadlines by which Congress believed

that government offices, the National

A rchives and Records A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

(NARA), and the Assassination Record s

Review Board should complete particular

activities. This chapter describes the actions

taken by the Review Board to begin its work.

Initially, it was clear that the Review Board

needed to provide critical guidance by defining the term “assassination re c o rd.” The

Board’s definition of that term was the foundation that enabled the Board to begin the

critical task of reviewing records.

B. DELAY IN START UP

When Congress drafted the JFK Act, it estimated that the Review Board would require

a maximum of three years to accomplish its

work. There were, however, a number of

delays in the early phase of the Board’s operation that affected the ability of the Board to

meet the deadline set by Congress. 

Although President Bush signed the JFK A c t

into law on October 26, 1992, and although the

act re q u i red the President to make nominations within ninety days, President Bush

made no nominations. President Clinton did

not nominate the members of the Review

B o a rd until September 1993, well after he took

o ffice in January 1993, and the Board was not

confirmed and sworn in until April 1994. During the 18 month period between the passage

of the JFK Act and swearing-in of the Review

B o a rd members, some government agencies

p roceeded with independent reviews of their

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related files, as the JFK A c t

re q u i red, but without the Review Board ’ s

guidance. Unfortunately, once the Review

B o a rd began work, it became apparent that

government offices re a lized that they would

need to re - review files

under the Review Board ’ s

strict standards. Thus,

while Congress passed

the JFK Extension Act in

1 9 9 41to reset the clock

and to give the Board a

full three-year mandate, it did not foresee the

additional delays that occurred as a result of

government offices’ early attempts to comply

with the JFK Act without the Review Board ’ s

g u i d a n c e .

1. JFK Act Deadlines

a. Ninety days for President to appoint Review

Board members. Section 7(a)(2) of the JFK A c t

stated that the President would appoint

Review Board members within ninety days

after enactment of the statute. The statute

envisioned that the Board members would

start work by the end of January 1993. Of

course, the Review Board members could not

begin work until after they were sworn in on

April 11, 1994, 15 months later than Congre s s

had intended. During the original ninety day

period set out by the JFK Act, the Bush administration was replaced by the Clinton administration, and although the delay caused by the

change in administration was fully understandable, it significantly affected the schedule originally contemplated by Congress. The

Review Board’s early pro g ress was also

slowed by the fact that the Congress did not

a p p ropriate funds for the Board’s operation

until October 1, 1994. The early months were

funded solely by a small transfer of funds

f rom the White House budget. 

b. 300 days for government offices to re v i e w,

i d e n t i f y, and organize assassination re c o r d s. Section 5 of the JFK Act re q u i red each government office to re v i e w, identify and org a n i z e

assassination re c o rds within its custody.2 N o

13

The term or definition of the term

“assassination records” is likely

to be the most important administrative decision the Board will

m a k e .

—Mark Zaid and Charles

S a n d e r s, October 11, 1 9 9 5
government office completed its work

within 300 days as the statute directed, and

as the Review Board terminated its operations in September 1998, some government

o ffices still had not reviewed, identified, and

o rganized all assassination re c o rds within

their custody. For example, the Review

B o a rd entered into memoranda of understanding with the FBI and the CIA to allow

them to process selected groups of re c o rd s

such as duplicate documents and newly disc o v e red CIA audiotapes from its Mexico

City Station after the Review Board terminated its operations.

The Act specifically re q u i red each government office to: (1) determine which of its

re c o rds fit within the statutory definition of

assassination re c o rds, (2) determine which

of its assassination re c o rds contained information from another government office and

consult with the other government off i c e

concerning the information in the re c o rd, (3)

determine which of its assassination re c o rd s

it could release, unredacted, to the public,

and (4) determine which of its assassination

re c o rds were eligible for withholding under

Section 6 of the Act, and then pre p a re those

re c o rds for review by the Review Board .3 To

the extent that a government office had “any

uncertainty” as to whether its re c o rds were

“assassination re c o rd[s] governed by” the

JFK Act, the Act directed the government

o ffice to transmit the re c o rds to the Review

B o a rd for a determination as to whether the

re c o rds were, indeed, assassination re c o rd s .4

Federal agencies, particularly the CIA and

FBI, did not review and process the statutorily defined “assassination records” in the

time allotted and make them available for

Review Board action. Moreover, even if government offices had been able to meet the

300-day deadline, the delay in the appointment of the Review Board prohibited federal

agencies from obtaining early guidance on

the questions of the definition of “assassination record” and the standards for postponements under Section 6 of the JFK Act. 

Congress realized that agencies would begin

their JFK Act compliance before the Review

Board began to operate, but as the Senate

Report on the JFK Act states, they trusted

that the pre-Review Board compliance would

not cause additional delays.

T h e re is a sufficient volume of known

assassination re c o rds [for the agencies] to

o rganize and review at the outset. Howe v e r, it is intended that the Review Board

issue guidance to assist in articulating

the scope or universe of assassination

re c o rds as government offices and the

Review Board undertake their re s p o n s ibilities. Such guidance will be valuable

notwithstanding the fact that government offices will begin to organize and

review their re c o rds before the Review

B o a rd is established. Government off i c e s

a re re q u i red to begin the review and disc l o s u re of re c o rds upon enactment to

expedite public access to the many

re c o rds which do not re q u i re additional

review or postponement. However, the

ultimate work of the Review Board will

involve not only the review of re c o rd s

recommended for postponement, but

requiring government offices to pro v i d e

additional information and re c o rd s ,

w h e re appropriate. Guidance, especially

that developed in consultation with the

public, scholars, and affected government offices, will prove valuable to

e n s u re the fullest possible disclosure and

c reate public confidence in a working

definition that was developed in an independent and open manner.5

Unfortunately, once the Review Board provided guidance to the agencies, much of the

initial work of the agencies needed to be

revised, which, in turn, slowed down their

processing and reviewing of assassination

records. For example, after Congress passed

the JFK Act in 1992, the FBI began to review

and release to NARAthe records that it made

available to the HSCA. Once the Review

Board came into existence and established

strict standards for release, the FBI re -

reviewed every page of its HSCA files using

the Board’s standards. The FBI then made

“supplemental” releases to NARA.

In summary, the agencies, for different reasons, had not completed the work assigned

to them by the JFK Act. The Review Board

attributed such delays by the CIAand the FBI

both to the manner in which the agencies

declassified material and to the enormous

volume of work that they had not been able

to complete within the short deadlines provided by Congress.

14
c. 300 days for NARA to establish JFK Collec -

t i o n. Section 4 of the JFK Act instru c t e d

NARA to establish the JFK Collection within

300 days after Congress enacted the Act. On

August 23, 1993, exactly 300 days after the

enactment of the JFK Act, NARA officially

opened the JFK Collection.

d. Three years for Board to complete work. The

JFK Act envisioned that the Review Board

could start up, complete its work, and close

down within three years. The Act, however,

contained certain provisions that considerably

slowed the early phase of the Review Board ’ s

operation and delayed the point at which it

could operate effectively in its review of

re c o rds. As an independent agency, the Board

had to locate and construct office space that

was suitable for the storage of classified material. At the same time, the Board had to hire a

s t a ff and obtain clearances for the staff at the

Top Secret level. In an effort to ensure the

independence of the Board, the JFK Act provided that the Review Board could not hire (or

detail) individuals employed by other federal

agencies. The Review Board did not have

enough staff members to begin to review and

p rocess government re c o rds until the beginning of 1995—two and one-half years after

P resident Bush signed the JFK Act. 

F i n a l l y, federal agencies submitted to the

Review Board more requests for postponements than the framers of the statute anticipated. While the JFK Act states that “only in

the rarest cases” would agencies have a “legitimate need for continued protection” of assassination re c o rds, agencies submitted tens of

thousands of pages of re c o rds to the Board

with requests for postponements. Thus, Cong ress’ three-year timeline for the Review Board

to fulfill its mandate was based on a view of

agency re c o rds that the agencies did not share. 

By the spring of 1996, the Review Board

believed that in order for it to be faithful to its

historical responsibility and commitment to

release to the public all known assassination

records, it required an additional year. Therefore, it recommended to Congress that the

JFK Act be extended for one year.

2. Passage of H.R. 1553

On May 8, 1997, Congressman Dan Burton

i n t roduced H.R. 1553, a bill that would

amend the JFK Act to provide one additional year for the Review Board to complete its work. Congressman Louis Stokes

and Congressman Henry Waxman co-spons o red the bill.

On June 4, 1997, the National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the House Government Reform

and Oversight Committee held a hearing on

H.R. 1553. The Honorable Louis Stokes,

Review Board Chair John Tunheim, writer

Max Holland, and teacher Bruce Hitchcock

all testified in support of H.R. 1553. On July

3, 1997, President Clinton signed H.R. 1553

into law, thus extending the authorization of

the Review Board for one additional year, to

September 30, 1998.

Following the passage of H.R. 1553, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight required the Review Board to provide

monthly status reports regarding the projected completion of the Board’s mandate.

Beginning in August 1997, the Review Board

sent monthly letters to the Committee Chairman, Congressman Burton. 

The Review Board used its additional year to

complete its work and terminated its operations, as promised, on September 30, 1998.

C. DEFINING “ASSASSINATION RECORD”

In order for the Review B o a rd to begin the

d e c l a ssification of re c o rds related to the

assassination of President Kennedy, it first had

the task of establishing the definition of an

“assassination record.” 

The Review Board was

aware that prior commissions and committees

that examined the assassination operated in

secret, and that the problems caused by such

s e c recy had ultimately

led Congress to pass the

JFK Act and establish the

Review Board. Thus, the

B o a rd determined that

its deliberations on how to define the term

“assassination record” must be conducted in

the public eye. 

15

[H]ow the term “ K e n n e d y

Assassination Records” should

be defined. . .is a very significant

question because it goes to the

heart of this Board’s capacity to

restore the confidence of the

American people that they have

a right to know their own history.. . .”

—James Lesar, October 11,1995
In an effort to receive as much comment as

possible from members of the public, the

Review Board held public hearings devoted

to its definition of the term. In addition, the

Board published its proposed definition in

the Federal Register to attract additional public comments.

Through its solicitation of public opinion, the

Review Board received affirmation of its

position in favor of a broad definition, as

members of the public supported a broad

definition of the term “assassination record.”

Given the wide range of assassination theories that existed, the Board members believed

that the definition could not exclude records

that would enhance the historical understanding of the event, even if those records

did not mention the assassination. 

As their definition reflects, the Review Board

members ultimately concluded that the term

“assassination re c o rd” had to encompass

records beyond those that mentioned central

topics such as one of the assassination investigations, Lee Harvey Oswald, his wife

Marina, his mother Marguerite, or Jack Ruby.

The Review Board, four of whom were

trained historians, recognized that the definition had to encompass records that would

enhance the historical understanding of the

event. Although the Review Board intended

to search for any “smoking gun” documents

that might still exist, the Board knew that its

greatest contribution would likely be to provide to the public those records that would

frame the tragic event.

1. Statutory Definition of 

“Assassination Record”

The JFK Act defined “assassination record”

as a record “related to the assassination of

President John F. Kennedy, that was created

or made available for use by, obtained by, or

otherwise came into possession of” the federal government (or state or local law

enforcement offices that assisted in an investigation of President Kennedy’s assassinat i o n ) .6 C o n g ress noted specifically that

“assassination re c o rds” encompassed

records relating to the Kennedy assassination

among the files of the Warren Commission,

the Rockefeller Commission, the Pike Committee, the House Select Committee on

Assassinations (the “HSCA”), the Library of

Congress, the National Archives, “any Presidential Library,” “any Executive agency, ”

“any independent agency,” and “any other

office of the federal government,” as well as

“any state or local law enforcement office”

that assisted in an inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy.

7

The Senate Report on the JFK Act explains

that Congress carefully crafted its definition

but expected that the Review Board would

need to further define the term.

The definition of assassination re c o rds is

a threshold consideration for the successful implementation of the Act. Its

scope will be the barometer of public

confidence in the release of assassination

re c o rds. While the re c o rds of past pre s idential commissions and congre s s i o n a l

committees established to investigate

the assassination of President Kennedy

a re included as assassination re c o rd s

under this Act, it is intended and emphasized that the search and disclosure of

re c o rds under this Act must go beyond

those re c o rds. While such re c o rds are

valuable, they reflect the views, theories,

political constraints and prejudices of

past inquiries. Proper implementation of

this Act and providing the A m e r i c a n

public with the opportunity to judge the

s u r rounding history of the assassination

for themselves, re q u i res including not

o n l y, but going beyond, the re c o rds of

the Wa r ren and Rockefeller Commissions, and the Church and House Select

Assassination Committees.8

The JFK Act explicitly empowered the

Review Board to decide “whether a record

constitutes an assassination re c o rd . ”9 T h e

Review Board took seriously its obligation to

locate assassination records that fell outside

the scope of previous inquiries. Before the

Review Board could embark on its search for

such records, however, it had to grapple with

the question of how extensive its searc h

should be.

2. Congressional Intent Concerning 

Definition

Having directed the Review Board to further

define the term “assassination re c o rd,” Cong ress specifically gave the Review Board the

16
power to issue interpretive re g u l a t i o n s .1 0 T h e

legislative history of the Act explains why

C o n g ress thought that the Review Board — a n d

not the Congress—had to define the term.

The term “assassination record” was not

more specifically defined by the Committee because to do so before more is

known about the universe of records

would have been premature, and would

have further injected the government

between the records and the American

public.11

C o n g ress was so interested in how the

Review Board would define “assassination

record” that it requested each Board member

to provide written answers to the following

question as part of the confirmation process:

The definition of “assassination re c o rd s ”

contained in the Records Review A c t

establishing this Board was intentionally

left very broad. What kinds of criteria

and factors will you use in determining

whether or not a document or other item

will fall within the definition?

All of the Review Board members answered

that they favored a broad definition of the

term, but each recognized that the Board

members would, in Judge Tunheim’s words,

have to “more fully understand the scope of

the potential records before attempting to

define the term.”12 Congress also asked the

Review Board members to respond to questions concerning assassination records in the

possession of private citizens, as well as

questions concerning the Board’s authority

to administer oaths and subpoenas and grant

immunity to witnesses in furtherance of compelling disclosure of assassination records

from private and foreign sources.13

3. Review Board’s Early Deliberations

and Draft Definition

On July 12, 1994, at one of the Review

Board’s first meetings, it began to consider

the scope of its definition of “assassination

record.” At that meeting, the Board members

a g reed that they would need to conduct

more research before they would be able to

craft a definition as Congress intended. The

purpose of the Review Board’s October 11,

1994, public hearing was to gather public

input on how to define

the term. At that hearing,

members of the public

encouraged the Board to

define the term broadly.

By mid-November 1994,

only weeks after the

Board’s senior staff had

begun work, those staff

members were circ u l a ting draft definitions of

this crucial statutory

term. The Review Board

and its senior staff spent

the month of December

1994 discussing the most

important sections of the

definition, including provisions about whether

certain types of records

w e re relevant to the

assassination, whether

assassination artifacts

should become part of the JFK Collection,

and whether the Collection could include

copies of original documents.

The Review Board members ultimately

decided on a proposed definition and published the draft in the Federal Register in an

attempt to solicit public comment. The January 8, 1995, Federal Register contains the

Board’s proposed definition. 

4. Comments from Public

With their proposed definition complete, the

Board members began to solicit comments

from members of the public and from government agencies about the definition.

a. Notice and Comment

The Review Board sought public comment

on a proposed definition and set a 30-day

period for the purpose of receiving written

c o m m e n t s .1 4 The Review Board re c e i v e d

written comments on its proposed definition

from numerous federal agencies, state and

local government entities, and individuals. 

Nearly all of the commentators supported

the comprehensiveness and flexibility of the

Board’s definition. Respondents made both

substantive and technical suggestions, many

of which the Board adopted into the final def17

One involves setting the boundaries of, q u o t e , “ a s s a s s i n a t i o n

m a t e r i a l .” The joint resolution

defines the term “ a s s a s s i n a t i o n

m a t e r i a l ”as “a record that relates

in any manner or degree to the

assassination of President Jo h n

F. K e n n e d y .” Given the wide

ranges of theories that have

developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why , m a n y

types of records arguably relate

in some way to the assassinat i o n .What records regarding, f o r

e x a m p l e , C u b a , Vi e t n a m , a n d

organized crime should be covered? This matter requires careful consideration.

—Senator David L. Boren,

May 12, 1992
inition. Commentators addressed a bro a d

range of concerns, such as whether the

Board’s proposed definition was too broad or

too vague, and whether the Board should

provide a list of names and subjects that, to

the extent they appeared in documents,

would presumptively be assassination

records. The Board also received comments

about whether the definition should cover

state and local government records, private

records, and assassination artifacts.

b. Public Hearings. The Review Board also

h e a rd testimony at public hearings on

aspects of the proposed interpretive regulations. In these public hearings, the Review

Board received testimony from NARA and

the FBI on the scope of the definition. Members of the public also offered comments on

the Board’s proposed definition.

The Review Board considered all comments

and created its final draft of the definition.

The Board discussed its final draft at a public

meeting, and explained how it had incorporated many of the comments received by the

Review Board on the proposed definition.

The Review Board’s Federal Register n o t i c e

establishing the final definition of the term

“assassination re c o rd” summarized the principal substantive comments received and the

Review Board’s responses to those comments.1 5

5. Definition

The Review Board’s final definition of an

“assassination record” was published in the

Federal Register on June 28, 1995.

As the Supplementary Information accompanying the proposed definition stated, the Review

B o a rd’s goal in issuing the guidance was:

to implement congressional intent that

the JFK Collection contain ‘the most comp rehensive disclosure of re c o rds re l a t e d

to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t

K e n n e d y. ’1 6 The Board is also mindful of

C o n g ress’s instruction that the Board

apply a ‘broad and encompassing’ working definition of “assassination re c o rd ”

in order to achieve the goal of assembling

the fullest historical re c o rd on this tragic

event in American history and on the

investigations that were undertaken in

the assassination’s aftermath. The Board

recognizes that many agencies have

a l ready begun to organize and re v i e w

re c o rds responsive to the [JFK Act] even

b e f o re the Board was appointed and

began its work. Nevertheless, the Board ’ s

aim is that this guidance will aid in the

ultimate assembly and public disclosure

of the fullest possible historical re c o rd on

this tragedy and on subsequent investigations and inquiries into it.1 7

The Review Board’s definition intended “to

identify comprehensively the range of

re c o rds reasonably related to the assassination of President Kennedy and investigations

undertaken in its aftermath,” and “to aid in

the consistent, effective, and efficient implementation of the JFK Act and to establish proc e d u res for including assassination re c o rds in

the JFK Assassination Records Collection

established by Congress and housed at

N A R A’s facility in College Park, Maryland.”1 8

a. Scope of assassination re c o r d s.

1 9 The Board

ultimately determined that any re c o rds that

w e re “reasonably related” to the assassination

would be assassination re c o rds. The Review

B o a rd believed that its mandate from Congre s s

was to assemble all materials reasonably re l a t e d

to the assassination in the JFK Collection.

Section 1400.1 of the Board’s final definition

of “assassination record” reads:

(a) An assassination record includes, but

is not limited to, all records, public and

private, regardless of how labeled or

identified, that document, describe,

report on, analyze, or interpret activities, persons, or events re a s o n a b l y

related to the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy and investigations of

or inquiries into the assassination.

(b) An assassination re c o r d f u r t h e r

includes, without limitation:

(1) All records as defined in Sec. 3(2)

of the JFK Act;

(2) All re c o rds collected by or segre g a t e d

by all federal, state, and local government

agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the

assassination of President Kennedy (for

18
example, any intra-agency investigation

or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination; any inter-agency communication

re g a rding the assassination; any re q u e s t

by the House Select Committee on A s s a ssinations to collect documents and other

materials; or any inter- or intra-agency

collection or segregation of documents

and other materials);

(3) Other records or groups of records

listed in the Notice of A s s a s s i n a t i o n

R e c o rd Designation, as described in

§1400.8 of this chapter.

In its work, the Review Board often turned

back to the breadth of its definition of the term

“assassination re c o rd.” Indeed, in the Board ’ s

last weeks of work, a re p resentative from one

government office told the Review Board that

he did not believe that his office’s re c o rds were

assassination re c o rds because the re c o rds did

not mention the assassination, or any of the

central assassination figures. When it was

defining the term “assassination re c o rd,” the

B o a rd anticipated that federal agencies and

others who possessed relevant re c o rds would

challenge the Board’s judgment. 

b. Scope of additional records and informa -

tion.

20 The Review Board determined that it

would request additional records and information when necessary for identifying, evaluating, or interpreting assassination records,

including assassination records that agencies

may not have initially located or identified.

The Review Board’s regulatory definition

included a description of some items the

Review Board might request from government agencies that included backgro u n d

information about how the agencies operate

and, in particular, how agencies performed

their declassification review.

The work of the Review Board staff hinged on

the breadth of the Board’s definition of “additional re c o rds and information.” Often, the

s t a ff located a particular code name or number in a federal agency re c o rd and needed the

authority to re q u i re the federal agency to provide information that would reveal the

underlying information. For example, in CIA

documents, the Review Board staff encount e red pseudonyms and needed to know the

t rue name of the individual in the re c o rd .

S i m i l a r l y, in FBI re c o rds, the Review Board

s t a ff often reviewed re c o rds that contained

“symbol number informants” where the FBI

had substituted a number in place of an informant’s name. In part because of the Review

B o a rd’s regulation, the staff could request the

FBI to reveal the informant’s true name and

review the informant’s file.

c. Sources of assassination records and addi -

tional records and information.21 The Review

Board sought to cast a wide net in terms of

where it might locate assassination records.

The Board’s regulation, therefore, allowed it

to seek assassination records in the possession of all federal government entities, all

state and local government entities, private

individuals, private institutions, all courts,

and all foreign governments.

When the Review Board later sought to

obtain re c o rds from non-federal sourc e s ,

their regulatory definition proved useful.

Over the objection of New Orleans District

Attorney Harry Connick, Sr., the Review

Board was able to obtain for the JFK Collection records that had been in the possession

of the New Orleans District Attorney’s office

since the 1960s when former New Orleans

District Attorney Jim Garrison prosecuted

Clay Shaw for conspiring to murder President Kennedy. In litigation over the records,

the Review Board relied in part on its regulation defining the term “assassination record.”

The regulation also proved helpful in the

Review Board’s efforts to secure assassination records from former government officials. For example, the Board sought the

records of Walter Sheridan, former investigator for Robert F. Kennedy, whom the Review

Board had reason to believe might possess

assassination re c o rds. Although Sheridan

was deceased, he owned such records “by

virtue of [his] service with a government

a g e n c y, office, or entity” and thus, the

Review Board was able to subpoena Mrs.

Sheridan to determine whether he retained

any assassination records.

d. Types of materials included in scope of assassi -

nation records and additional records and informa -

t i o n .2 2 The Review Board tried to be as inclusive

as possible in identifying the type of material it

could seek for inclusion in the JFK Collection,

and it included papers, maps, and other documentary material, photographs, motion pic19
t u res, sound and video re c o rdings, machinereadable information in any form, and artifacts.

N A R A wanted the Review Board to exclude

the term “artifacts” from its definition of

“assassination re c o rd.” NARA believed that

extensive public access to assassination artifacts would undermine NARA’s ability to preserve them. The Board members concluded

that the term must become part of the definition, but agreed to establish pro c e d u res for

placing artifacts in the JFK Collection.2 3 T h e

B o a rd agreed to allow NARA to make judgments about when and to whom it would

allow access to artifacts. To the extent that

N A R A could not allow access to members of

the public who wished to view particular artifacts, the Board’s regulation allowed NARA t o

p rovide the public with photographs, drawings, or similar materials depicting the artifact.

The Review Board did act on its inclusion of

the term “artifacts” in the definition when it

requested that NARA become involved in

the testing of Warren Commission Exhibit

567, a bullet fragment found in President

Kennedy’s limousine on November 22, 1963,

and stored at NARAin the intervening years.

The Review Board oversaw testing of tiny

strands of fiber on that bullet fragment as

well as testing of other material on the bullet

fragment. NARA was hesitant to approve

testing of the fragment, but had the Review

Board not included the term “artifact” in its

definition, the Board almost certainly could

not have played a role in the testing.

e. Assassination records released in their

entirety.

24 The Review Board further required

that, in accordance with the JFK Act, assassination records be released in their entirety

unless the Board sustained agency postponements. Practically, the Board meant that

agencies could not object to the disclosure of

all or part of an assassination record “solely

on grounds of non-relevance.” The Board

specifically wrote that it, not the agencies,

would make determinations about whether

particular records were relevant. 

This section of the Board’s 1995 Guidance

specifically affected the FBI. From early 1993

until the Board issued its definition in 1995,

the FBI designated large parts of FBI files as

“NAR,” or “not assassination re l a t e d . ”

Indeed, with re g a rd to the majority of the

re c o rds to which the FBI assigned the “NAR”

a c ronym, the Review Board agreed that the

re c o rds were not relevant to the assassination.

For example, the FBI designated as “NAR”

those sections of their HSCA a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

file that related to the HSCA’s investigation

into the assassination of Martin Luther King,

J r. However, the Board’s regulation mandated

that the Board, and not the FBI, make determinations as to relevance, so the FBI abolished

the “NAR” designation and made all such

re c o rds available to Board staff for re v i e w.

On the other hand, in several of the FBI’s

appeals to the President, the FBI argued that the

information that the Review Board had voted to

release was not relevant to the assassination. In

those cases, the Review Board was able to arg u e

e ffectively that the Board should determine

whether information was relevant to the assassination and the appeals were withdrawn.

f. Originals and copies. The Review Board

defined when it would be willing to accept

copies of assassination re c o rds in lieu of original

assassination re c o rds for the JFK Collection.2 5

With regard to motion pictures, the Review

B o a rd stated that “the camera original,

whenever available,. . . may be placed in the

JFK Collection.” The regulation quietly

expressed the Review Board’s preference for

original motion pictures, but when the

Review Board resolved that the JFK A c t

worked a “taking” of the Zapruder film such

that the film belonged to the U.S. government and not the Zapruder family, the Board

believed that a copy of the camera original

Zapruder film could not substitute for the

camera original. 

Finally, the Board’s regulation established a

p ro c e d u re by which it would designate

records as assassination records.26

D. CONCLUSION

Congressional and presidential delays, combined with unrealistic statutory deadlines,

unfortunately contributed to a delay in the

commencement of the Board’s work. Once

the Review Board began to meet, however, its

careful determination, following full public

debate, of the scope of the term “assassination record” laid the foundation for later

review of thousands of important records. 

20
CHAPTER 2

ENDNOTES

1 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. 1998).

2 JFK Act at § 5(c)(1). 

3 JFK Act at § 5(c)(2)(A)–(H).

4 JFK Act at § 5(c)(2)(F).

5 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d. sess., 1992, S. Rept.

102–328, at 21. (hereafter “Senate Report”).

6 JFK Act at § 3(2).

7 JFK Act at § 3 (2)(A)–(L). Section 3(2) of the JFK Act specifically excluded from the definition of “assassination re c o rd” autopsy re c o rds donated by the Kennedy family to the National

A rchives pursuant to a deed of gift. 

8 Senate Report at 21.

9 JFK Act at § 7(I)(2)(A).

10 JFK Act at § 7(n).

11 Senate Report at 21.

12 Nominations of Graff, Tunheim, Nelson, Joyce, and Hall. The Review Board’s precise

answers to the question as to how they would define the term “assassination record” follow: 

Henry Graff wrote, “Plainly any document that directly or tangentially deals with the assassination will be subsumed under the head of ‘assassination record,’ but I believe that some

documents and classes of documents will have to labeled such on an ad hoc basis.” Judge Tunheim wrote that it was his view that, “the Board should more fully understand the scope of

the potential records before attempting to define the term. I favor a broad definition in order

to fulfill the clear intent of Congress. One important criteria will be the extent to which the

record adds to the public understanding of the events and characters involved in the assassination and its aftermath.” Anna Nelson explained that, “My sense at this point is that the

Board should encourage this broad definition of records while we establish the parameters of

the issue. Defining the records is the perfect topic for public hearings. Most individuals who

have extensively studied the available information have opinions on this matter. In addition,

the index of names from the [HSCA] report, and the subject index in the National Archives will

help clarify the issues for us. I’m sure the Board will spend considerable time on this issue

because of its importance to the work of the Board.” William Joyce wrote that, “The definition

of ‘assassination records’ will be a major challenge for the Review Board to resolve in a workable manner. In my view, the Review Board will need to establish criteria addressing: (a) the

temporal proximity of the record in relation to the assassination, (b) the content of the record

relative to the assassination, and (c) the relation of the record to important factors and issues

perceived to be related to the assassination.” And Kermit Hall stated that, “The statute creating the Review Board defines an assassination record as [statutory definition]. These materials

are certainly, therefore, the core of what constitutes the ‘assassination records’ that the Board

is duty bound to treat. Any of these materials that are held in private hands are also covered

by the statute and are subject to its provisions. In general, I think that the Board should take a

broad view of what constitutes an assassination record within the terms of statute.”

13 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Nominations of Graff, Tunheim, Nelson, Joyce, and

Hall, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 1994, S. Rept. 103–877.

14 In an effort to receive comments from all interested parties, the Review Board sent copies

of the proposed interpretive regulations to agencies known to have an interest in and to be

affected by the Review Board’s work, particularly those that either created or now hold assassination records, and to the appropriate oversight committees in Congress. The Review Board

21
also sent notices of the proposed interpretive regulations and requests for comments to many

organizations and individuals who have demonstrated an interest in the release of materials

under the JFK Act or who have engaged in research into the assassination of President

Kennedy.

15 Guidance for Interpretation and Implementation of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 36 C.F.R. § 1400 et seq. (1995). (hereafter “Definition”).

16 Senate report at 18. 

17 60 Fed. Reg. 7506 (1995).

18 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400 et seq.

19 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.1.

20 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.2.

21 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.3.

22 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.4.

23 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.7.

24 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.5.

25 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.6.

26 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.8.

22
CHAPTER 3

PU B L I C AC T I V I T I E S O F T H E AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S

RE V I E W BO A R D

The underlying principles guiding the

legislation are independence, public confidence, efficiency and cost eff e c t i v e n e s s .1

A. INTRODUCTION

While the Review Board members and staff

focused the majority of their efforts on the

identification, re v i e w, and release of assassination re c o rds, the P resident John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ( J F K

Act) also directed the Review Board to “re c e i v e

information from the public re g a rding the

identification and public disclosure of assassination re c o rds” and to “hold hearings.”2

Prior commissions and committees that

examined the assassination conducted their

work in secret and then closed their records.

The Review Board members recognized that

they must set themselves apart by conducting their work in public. Thus, when the

Board confronted major policy decisions, it

solicited comments from the public. For

example, when the Review Board defined the

term “assassination record,” it held a public

hearing on the topic and solicited public

comments. Likewise, the Review Board recognized that the government’s secretive handling of the Zapruder film has been fodder

for conspiracy theorists. In an effort to avoid

causing further speculation about the film,

the Board determined that it must conduct its

deliberations about the Zapruder film in

public. To that end, the Board held a public

hearing on the issue of whether the Zapruder

film was already or should become the property of the American people.

The Board did not, however, consult the public only on major policy decisions. It also

received thousands of comments from members of the public as to where the Board

might locate additional records and information related to the assassination. The Board

received such comments through its experts

conferences, open meetings, public hearings,

and extensive, ongoing contact with members of the public who wrote and called the

Review Board.

To fulfill its statutory obligations, the Review

Board held public hearings, open meetings,

and conferences, and it actively solicited

input from the public and conducted ongoing efforts to keep the public informed of all

Review Board decisions. 

B. PUBLIC HEARINGS

In an effort to gather as

much information as possible from the A m e r i c a n

public about the existence and location of

“assassination re c o rd s , ”

the Review Board conducted a total of seven

public hearings—one each

in Dallas, Boston, New

Orleans, and Los A n g eles, and three in Wa s h i n gton, D.C. The Review

B o a rd believed that in order to ascertain what

materials existed throughout the country, it

was important to hold such hearings outside

of Washington, D.C., and primarily in cities

w h e re key witnesses might be located or

w h e re important assassination-related events

had occurred. At each hearing, the Review

B o a rd invited members of the public to test i f y, and the witnesses provided input about

materials related to the assassination of Pre s ident Kennedy.

By all accounts, the Review Board’s public

hearings were a success. One of the first

Review Board hearings was held in Dallas,

Texas. In Chairman Tunheim’s opening

remarks he said, “We are holding this hearing in Texas because we believe there are

23

[N]o one is going to get everything they want out of this

Board or out of this governm e n t , but I think it is terribly

important to start the right

wa y , as you are, by plugging

into the research , being open,

being inclusive; that is a very

good sign.

—John Newman,

October 11, 1995
records in this area, in this state, that are

essential to a complete record of this event.”

In all, 19 witnesses testified and provided

suggestions to the Review Board as to where

it might find records related to the assassination. Of all Review Board hearings this particular one had the most witnesses, and it

was at this hearing that many members of the

public and the Review Board members met

for the first time.

The Boston hearing

allowed the Review

B o a rd to meet Priscilla

Johnson McMillan, a

journalist who had conducted extensive interviews with Marina

Oswald Porter for her

book, Marina and Lee. As

a result of her positive

contacts with the Review

B o a rd, Ms. McMillan

determined to include a

provision in her will donating to the JFK Collection at NARA all of the material she gathered for her book. Likewise, in New Orleans,

Lindy Boggs, United States Ambassador to

the Vatican and wife of the late Congressman

Hale Boggs, served as the Review Board’s

ambassador in New Orleans. Hale Boggs’

papers are available at Tulane University,

and Lindy Boggs granted the Review Board

access to her husband’s papers from his service on the Warren Commission. 

One of the Review Board’s primary goals in

conducting its public hearings was to inform

the American public that the Review Board

existed and that it sought assassination

records. In New Orleans, the public hearing

ferreted out a treasure trove of assassination

records, including long-lost grand jury transcripts from New Orleans District Attorney

Jim Garrison’s prosecution of Clay Shaw for

conspiring to murder President Kennedy.

Prior to the public hearing, the man who possessed the grand jury transcripts, Gary Raymond, a former investigator on Connick’s

staff, maintained the records in his home. As

a direct result of the Review Board’s hearing,

Mr. Raymond decided that he had a duty to

turn the records over to the custody of the

government. Several days after returning to

Washington, the Review Board members

received a package containing grand jury testimony of individuals such as Marina

Oswald Porter, Ruth Paine, and Perry Raymond Russo, who played a role in Oliver

Stone’s JFK.

These stories of the Review Board’s acquisitions of invaluable records relating to the

assassination of President Kennedy are

recounted in the other chapters of this report,

but they serve as excellent examples of the

benefits that resulted from the Review

Board’s public hearings.

Finally, the Review Board used the public

hearing format to make policy on its definition of the term “assassination record” and

on the disposition of the famous “Zapruder

film.” Thus, the Review Board did take seriously Congress’ guidance to “receive information from the public” on its most important decisions.

C. PUBLIC MEETINGS

While the majority of the Review Board’s

meetings were not open to the public,

because of the need to review and discuss

classified or confidential material, the

Review Board did hold twenty public meetings. As opposed to the public hearings,

where the Review Board would hear testimony from witnesses, public meetings

allowed members of the public to observe the

Board at work. The Review Board discussed

a variety of business in its public meetings,

including such topics as its policy regarding

documents that the Review Board found to

be of no believed relevance to the assassination, and the drafting of its Final Report.

D. EXPERTS CONFERENCES

Twice during the Review Board’s tenure, it

determined that it would benefit from the

reflections of a group of invited guests who

are specialists in their fields. The Review

B o a rd held each “experts conference” in

Washington, D.C.

The first conference occurred in May 1995, and

included a group of authors and re s e a rc h e r s

who had studied the assassination, as well as

s t a ff members from both the Wa r ren Commission and the HSCA. The roundtable discussion provided the Review Board and staff

with an opportunity to determine which

24

I know that you are trying to

redress the harm and the wound

that was done to the American

spirit in 1963 and the confusions that have arisen since so

that we may—the American

people may be free to move on

to the current history, w h i ch

clamors for its attention.

—Priscilla Johnson McMillan,

March 24, 1995
re c o rds were of the most interest both to the

public and to those whose prior investigative

e fforts had been thwarted due to the lack of

access to re c o rds. The participants in the discussion also provided a great number of re commendations about where the Review

B o a rd might find assassination re c o rds. 

P rofessor Robert Blakey, former Chief Counsel of the HSCA, reminded the Review

B o a rd of the HSCA’s belief that it would

have benefitted from the FBI’s fuller disclos u re of its electronic surveillance materials

f rom its organized crime files. As a dire c t

result of Professor Blakey’s suggestion, the

Review Board requested from the FBI a

b road cross-section of organized crime elect ronic surveillance files, the most significant

of which was certainly the FBI’s electro n i c

surveillance of Carlos Marcello, alleged

New Orleans crime boss. 

Another participant, Paul Hoch, suggested

that the Review Board obtain the records in

the possession of Clay Shaw’s attorneys. In

April 1996, the Review Board released the

files of the late Edward Wegmann, who was

a member of the legal team that defended

Clay Shaw at his 1969 assassination conspiracy trial. Mr. Wegmann’s family agreed to

donate the files, consisting of approximately

6,000 pages, to the JFK Collection.

In April 1998, the Review Board held another

experts conference, this time narro w l y

focused on the issue of declassification of

government documents. The Review Board

tailored its invitation list to include experts in

Washington’s declassification world. Ultimately, the Review Board gathered twelve

representatives from both the private and

public sector to discuss access—and lack

thereof—to government records, the problems and possible solutions to the problem of

secrecy, lessons learned from the implementation of the JFK Act, and possible recommendations to be made by the Review Board

in its Final Report. The participants included

representatives from the Project on Government Secrecy, Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the National

Security Council, the non-governmental

National Security Archive, NARA, CIA, and

the Information Security Oversight Off i c e

(ISOO), as well as representatives from Congress and from the media. 

The panelists discussed various issues

including the simplification of the referral

process throughout the intelligence community, and the need for declassification entities

such as the Review Board to be independent

in nature. They also discussed different policies for review, such as the declassification of

records for special cases like the assassination of President Kennedy vs. agency-wide

declassification. Overall, the day long conference was an informative session wherein the

panelists talked about the guidelines for the

release of information and how it could realistically be done.

E. OUTREACH

Given that one of the primary objectives of the

C o n g ress in passing the

JFK Act was to re s t o re

public confidence in government, the Review

B o a rd recognized that it

would need to maintain regular contact with

members of the public who expressed an

i n t e rest in the Board’s work. As part of its

e fforts to communicate with the public, the

Review Board maintained both a regular mailing list and an e-mail mailing list consisting of

a p p roximately 1,000 contacts. These mailings

included press re l e a s e s ,

periodic updates on the

Review Board’s activities,

updates on the results of

Review Board meetings,

information about documents transferred to the

JFK Collection, and information about the Review

B o a rd’s Federal Register notices. 

F rom time to time, Review Board members

and staff spoke to groups of students, public

g roups, the media, and re s e a rchers re g a rd i n g

the Board’s work. In addition, Board members

and staff described their work to civic gro u p s .

1. Outreach to Academics

In 1996, the members of the Review Board

made presentations at meetings of the A m e r ican Historical Association, the Org a n i z a t i o n

of American Historians, and the Society of

American A rchivists. The Review Board ’ s

25

The real question about the

impact of the [Review] Board—

how much impact has the

Board had on the way agencies

b e h a v e ?

—Professor David Garrow,

April 14, 1998

In this era of cynicism about

government, your mission is of

critical importance.

—Lindy Boggs, June 28, 1995
e fforts allowed approximately 200 historians

to become familiar with the work of the Board .

2. Outreach to Students

During its tenure, the Review Board hosted

six groups of high school students fro m

Noblesville, Indiana. The

students, along with their

history teacher, Mr. Bru c e

Hitchcock, came to the

Review Board offices to

serve as interns. The students provided the

Review Board staff with

invaluable assistance in

c reating databases and

p rocessing newly declassified documents for

release to the A m e r i c a n

public. Mr. Hitchcock also

played an important ro l e

in the Review Board ’ s

extension of one year, as

he provided testimony to the National Secur i t y, International A ffairs, and Criminal Justice

Subcommittee in support of the Review

B o a rd’s request for a one-year extension.

All Board members took the time to speak

periodically to groups of students about the

work of the Review Board.

3. Outreach to Assassination Researchers

In 1994 and again in 1995, Review Board

Chairman John Tunheim spoke to the fall

c o n f e rence of the Coalition on Political

Assassinations, updating the group on the

Board’s progress. Former Executive Director

David Marwell spoke to the conference in

1996. The following day, the Review Board

invited researchers to an open house at the

Review Board’s office. 

Chairman Tunheim also submitted Review

Board updates to journals and newsletters

that serve the research community, including

articles about the Review Board to the AARC

Q u a r t e r l y, Open Secre t s, and P ro b e, all of

which cater to researchers and are circulated

worldwide.

4. Media

Board members and staff devoted significant

time to answering questions from the news

media throughout the Board’s existence. The

Board believed its responsibility was to be as

open as possible in discussing the effort to

open the assassination records.

The Review Board took both a proactive and

reactive approach to its media relations program. The Review Board disseminated

a p p roximately 100 press releases and

updates to members of the media thro u g hout its short lifetime. The Board also

responded to many requests for interviews

and requests for information from members

of the media about its declassification

e fforts. Contrary to prior commissions and

committees, the Review Board was willing

to talk to members of the media to keep

them informed of the Board’s latest activities. The Review Board was about openness,

and one way to keep as many members of

the public as possible informed about Board

activities was through the media.

Although the Review Board as an agency

was not necessarily a household name

a round the world, the Board members

understood and appreciated the high public

i n t e rest in the assassination itself and theref o re made themselves available to the

media. The Review Board and staff participated in countless newspaper, radio, and

television interviews at both the local,

national, and international level. For example, stories about the work of the Review

B o a rd were covered by all the major networks, CNN, Associated Press, the national

radio networks, and most major newspapers throughout the country, including The

Washington Post, The Los Angeles Ti m e s ,

and the Dallas Morning News. Internationa l l y, television networks in Germany and

Japan conducted interviews with Board and

s t a ff members, and an interview with a staff

member appeared in a newspaper in

Poland. Whether it was a local radio station

in Arkansas or the national CBS Evening

News with Dan Rather, in the spirit of

openness the Review Board went to gre a t

lengths to accommodate all requests for

interviews. 

26

The only option for rightfully

restoring and renewing the

public trust in its government

is by countermanding a history

of political constraints and past

prejudices in assassination

inquiries through an active and

massive declassification of all

records relating directly and

indirectly to the President’s

assassination, and the time and

opportunity is obviously now.

—Richard Trask,

March 24, 1995
F. CONCLUSION

As we move toward the hopeful goal of

full disclosure, I hope that all of you will

continue to have an interest in the work

of the Review Board, in the work that

we are trying to do, and hope that you

all realize that you are our partners in

this very important effort as we move

forward.3

In the spirit of the JFK Act, the Review Board

devoted a significant amount of time and

resources talking to and corresponding with

27

its constituency. From time to time the frequent and sustained contact with the public

diverted the staff from its primary responsibilities—identifying and releasing re c o rd s .

However, the benefits far outweighed the

costs. The Review Board received valuable

input from the public about the existence of

“assassination records,” and most important,

received donations of records and artifacts

f rom private citizens that have gre a t l y

enhanced the JFK Collection at NARA. There

is no doubt that the interaction with the public allowed the Review Board to more completely satisfy the objectives of the JFK Act. 
CHAPTER 3

ENDNOTES

1 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rept. 102–328,

17.

2 JFK Act at § 7(j)(1)(E) and (F).

3 Chairman Tunheim at the Review Board’s hearing in Dallas, TX, November 1994.

28
A. INTRODUCTION

When the Assassination Records Review

Board (Review Board) and its staff began to

process assassination records in late 1994,

they realized they would need a streamlined

process to track thousands of documents. It

took two years, but with the help of a computer specialist, the staff transformed an

unwieldy, paper-driven, labor-intensive system into a document-based, computerized

system that automatically tracked each document through the review process. 

Developing a tracking system, however, was

just one logistical problem. Each federal executive agency and government office had its

own particular problems complying with the

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec -

tion Act of 1992 (JFK Act.) This reality forced

the Review Board to develop a re v i e w

process that was broad enough to address

each agency’s specific needs. This chapter

explains how that review process worked.

B. JFK ACT REQUIREMENTS FOR

PROCESSING DOCUMENTS

Section 3(2) of the JFK Act defines assassination records to include any records “created

or made available for use by, obtained by, or

otherwise came into possession of” the federal government (or state or local law

enforcement offices that assisted in an investigation of President Kennedy’s assassination). To ensure “expeditious public transmission to the archivist and public disclosure

of such records,” Section 5 of the JFK Act

required each government agency to identify

and organize all records it had pertaining to

the Kennedy assassination and send them to

the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) along with an electro n i c

finding aid to ensure easier public access.

The entire process, including each agency’s

review of its records, was to take no more

than 300 days.

Generally, federal government agencies and

offices held one or more of the following

types of records: 

(1) records relating to an agency’s assassination investigation;

(2) records relating to an individual or to

a subject that is relevant to the assassination;

(3) records that one of the official investigative entities used in an official assassination investigation, or 

(4) records relating to an agency’s assistance of another agency in an official

assassination investigation.

The JFK Act placed the largest burden on

such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA), Secret Service, and the Department of

Defense because those agencies were deeply

involved in the investigation of the assassination.1 The JFK Act required the FBI, for

example, to re v i e w, process, and transfer

more than 795,000 pages to NARA, with

identification aids, within 300 days. 

After the agencies had

identified and re v i e w e d

every assassination re c o rd ,

the JFK Act re q u i re d

them to create an elect ronic identification aid

for each assassination

re c o rd. Congress believed

that this identification

system would allow

NARA to build a central

directory of identification aids, making it easier for the public to access every assassination record in the JFK Collection.2 Unfortunately, it also slowed down the process.3

29

CHAPTER 4

DE V E L O P I N G T H E RE V I E W PR O C E S S

That’s what we hoped would

happen, and its literally happening, as people are able to

look at the database and provide us with precise information

on documents that they’re interested in.

—Steven D. Tilley,

August 6, 1996
NARA provided each agency with the computer software to create its identification

aids. NARA wanted each assassination

record to bear a unique identification number

(as well as other document-specific information, such as the date, number of pages, originator, recipient, subjects, etc.). This unique

number consists of 13 digits divided into

three parts. The first 3 digits identify the

agency (for example all CIA records begin

with “104”), the middle five digits identify

the floppy disk number on which the agency

created the identification aid, and the last

five digits identify the particular record on

the agency’s floppy disk. (See illustration of

record identification aid.)

Generally, NARA describes textual records

by box or series of boxes. An archivist prepares a finding aid for a group of records

which consists of a general summary of the

records, and a list of folder titles. In the JFK

Act, however, Congress required that every

document in the collection be assigned a

record identification number. Tracking a collection of records such as the JFK Collection

on a document-by-document basis is therefore alien to conventional archival practice.

But Congress’ intent to account for every

assassination record made it necessary to go

beyond conventional practice. 

C. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE REVIEW PROCESS

The JFK Act was a novel approach to government declassification, and the Review Board

wanted the process to reflect the fact that five

American citizens would judge whether government secrets should continue to remain hidden. The Review Board decided at its earliest

meetings that it would meet often and make

decisions on a document-by-document basis,

rather than on an issue-by-issue basis.4In other

words, rather than immediately making

“Review Board policy” on postponements

relating to protecting the privacy of individuals, the Review Board chose to review every

privacy postponement claimed by an agency.

The Review Board believed that its cautious

a p p roach would fulfill the JFK Act’s objective—to instill public confidence that all information that could be released would be

released. The detailed review also allowed the

B o a rd to educate itself about the information in

the re c o rd, something that could not be done

except on a document-by-document basis.

As part of its document-by-document re v i e w,

the Review Board re q u i red agencies to provide specific evidence supporting their postponement claims—as the JFK Act re q u i re d .5

(The JFK Act re q u i red release of all information in assassination re c o rds in the year 2017,

25 years after the passage of the act, so the

Review Board employs the term “postponed”

to mean “redacted until the year 2017.”) By

reviewing and evaluating every postponement at its earliest meetings, the Review

B o a rd developed a full understanding of the

issues and of the types of evidence the agencies would provide. Once the Review Board

became comfortable with the issues and with

the quality of agency evidence, it could delegate more authority to the staff to present re commendations for full Board action.

The Review Board staff realized its review

system would need the following elements: 

First, the federal agency would review its

records and tell the Review Board the location of its proposed postponements.

30
Second, the Board staff would then review

the record and recommend that the Review

Board either sustain or overrule the agency’s

request for postponement. 

Third, after making its recommendation, the

staff would schedule the document for the

Review Board’s next meeting. To issue its

Federal Register notices in a timely way—as

the JFK Act required—the staff tracked the

document number, the agency’s request for

postponements within the document, and

the staff’s recommendation before the

Review Board voted on the record. 

Once the Review Board voted on the record,

the Review Board staff could notify the

agency of its determination, publish the

Review Board vote in the Federal Register, and

transmit the record to NARA, unless the

agency requested the Review Board to reconsider its decision.

In the summer and fall of 1995, the Review

Board staff developed database systems for

reviewing assassination records and tracking

Review Board votes. The system allowed the

s t a ff to review any assassination re c o rd ,

regardless of its originating agency. The staff,

with the help of a computer specialist,

designed its primary tracking system, called

“Review Track,” to resemble NARA’s electronic identification aid database. 

Given that the JFK Act required the Review

Board to publish all Board votes in the Federal

Register, the staff designed the Review Track

database to be able to generate Federal Regis -

ter notices.

D. ELECTRONIC IDENTIFICATION AIDS

NARA’s electronic identification aid database system has its flaws, although these do

not lie in faulty computer pro g r a m m i n g .

Instead, the JFK Act’s well-intentioned

requirements that the Review Board track

documents on a postponement-by-postponement basis was, at times, the “tail that

wagged the dog.” Further, it is not clear that

the best way to create an accessible, easy-touse JFK Collection was to require agencies to

attach a separate piece of paper to each

record they processed. Because of these and

other problems, the Review Board urg e s

Congress to think twice before including the

type of “electronic identification aid” language that exists in the JFK Act in future

records management legislation.

In compliance with sections 5(d)(1)(A) and

(B) of the JFK Act, NARA c reated its database

system and loaded it onto 5 and 1/4 inch

floppy disks. NARA assumed that any government office could load data from the disk

onto a computer, produce electronic identification aids to accompany its assassination

re c o rds, and then send the same disks back to

NARA. NARA then would integrate the disks

into the main database for the JFK Collection. 

Despite the predictable problems, such as

agencies’ lack of appropriate computer

equipment, or, more often, agencies’ lack of

employees to enter the data, most government agencies managed to create electronic

identification aids. 

The Review Board secured copies of all available disks from NARA and installed agencyspecific databases on its computer network.

Every Review Board staff member had access

to these databases, and the database structure disks served as a foundation for the

Review Board’s computer specialist to build

the Review Track database. 

The Review Board and the federal agencies

quickly learned that creating electronic identification aids and keeping databases

updated was a time-consuming, confusing,

and cumbersome process. Usually the originating agency would create its electro n i c

identification forms on NARA’s floppy disks.

But in some cases the originating agencies—

primarily within the Department of

Defense—had accessioned to NARA classified records, and were unwilling to create

identification aids for assassination records.

For example, the Review Board staff agreed

to create identification aids for thousands of

records from the Army’s Califano papers and

for the records of the Office of the Secretary

of Defense. 

The agencies typically created electro n i c

identification aids during their initial review

of records. Ideally, the agencies would have

created identification aids and sent them to

NARA without modification. But, because

the electronic identification aids contained

information relating to the Review Board’s

31
actions—or votes—on the records, the agencies and the Review Board were constantly

modifying and updating the data on the

disks. 

A number of pro b l e m s

plagued the creation of

the NARA e l e c t ro n i c

identification aid database. Generating an identification aid for each

re c o rd placed a heavy

burden on NARA and on

every agency that

reviewed records under

the JFK Act. Resourc e s

that the Review Board

and the agencies allocated to electronic identification aid pro d u c t i o n

were resources that agencies could have applied

to review and release of

records. The information

included on the RIF was

often sketchy, since the

indexers who created the

forms were not always

the individuals most

knowledgeable on the

subjects. Thus, the databases do not always provide entirely accurate or

complete search results.

The JFK databases did, however, open information on the records in the JFK collection to

the public, especially when NARA made the

databases available on the Internet. Those

identification aids furnished useful information to researchers and facilitated the pageby-page review that the Review Board

adopted.

The Review Board re commends that any future

decisions concerning the

indexing of records take

into account the pro blems and the benefits of

creating separate identification aids for individual records. Much of the

information that agencies provided on the

identification aids might have been more

useful to researchers if it had been indexed

according to folder, rather than to individual

documents.

E. TRACKING THE REVIEW OF

ASSASSINATION RECORDS

1. Review Track Database 

As noted above, the Review Track database is

a modified NARA electronic identification

aid database that Review Board staff used to

process assassination records. The Review

Track system evolved out of the Review

Board staff’s early handwritten review, and it

continued to evolve as the Board and its staff

streamlined the review process to meet the

increasing volume of documents agencies

could process.

The CIA, FBI, and NARAhad identified large

numbers of assassination records. Each of

these three agencies established JFK Act task

forces and, due to the deadlines imposed by

the JFK Act, developed units to pro c e s s

records that the JFK Act covered before the

Review Board staff existed. The agencies had

internal models for addressing large declassification projects, including the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA) model and the

model the agencies use to implement the

Executive Order related to declassification.

Congress, however, had expressly rejected

both the FOIAand the Executive Order models in its passage of the JFK Act. 

Knowing that agencies had each processed

their assassination re c o rds diff e re n t l y, the

Review Track had to accommodate a number

of variations in the electronic identification

aids. Some agencies had released redacted

assassination records to NARA without submitting the records to the Review Board for a

vote. Other agencies had initially, but not

completely, reviewed records, but had given

the records unique identifying numbers anyway. Still other agencies had created electronic identification numbers for records that

the agency did not believe were assassination-related, and which the Review Board

agreed were not related. Clearly, had the

Review Board existed when the agencies

began to review their records, some of the

time-consuming computer glitches may have

been avoided. 

32

D r. Joyce: Are these forms

related in any way to more—to

broader descriptions of the

records in question?

Mr. Tilley: No, its strictly the

information that was created

when the—captured when the

agencies did the database entry

on each document. It is strictly

the record identification form.

They can see the whole form.

So,they can see all twenty-three

fields, and they can get all the

subjects. And they can see them

on the screen and they can print

that out. But there is no additional information beyond what

was originally captured.

Dr. Joyce: And there is no text of

the documents?

Mr. Tilley: No. No, we have not

done any text entry. There has

been no scanning of documents

at this time.

—William Joyce and 

Steven D. Tilley,

August 6, 1996

Tracking the large number of

documents through the review

process was a major information technology challenge. We

reinvented the process and the

systems on a month-by-month

basis.

—Charles Rhodes,

July 30, 1998
Even so, the Review Board staff generally

received from the agencies electronic identification aids indicating that the agency had

performed its duties under the JFK Act. The

Review Board staff then reviewed the document using Review Track. The staff copied

the agency’s electronic identification aid

from a disk, and evaluated each claimed

postponement according to the Review

B o a rd’s guidelines. (See illustration of

Review Track identification aid.)

The following chapter discusses the Review

Board’s guidelines in great detail. In general

terms, once the Board became sufficiently

familiar with a particular issue, it would

grant the staff decisionmaking authority over

it. The Board called these “green” issues. 

If analysts were unsure of the Board’s position on a specific postponement, they labeled

the record “yellow” and put it on the agenda

for the next Board meeting. Similarly, if analysts did not know the Board’s position on a

type of postponement, they would designate

the record a “red” document, and put it on

the next Board meeting agenda. The staff also

labeled a record red if it contained a type of

information that the Review Board usually

agreed to postpone but the staff believed

should be released because the information

was of higher public interest. 

The distinction between red and

yellow records was never completely clear, but over time—as

the staff and the agencies came to

better understand what the Board

wanted—the staff identified

fewer and fewer items for discussion. When the number of documents the Review Board

processed increased dramatically

through 1996 and 1997, the number of red documents decreased

while green re c o rds dominated

meetings. 

2. Fast Track Database 

The Review Board’s meetings in

1995 and 1996 focused on the core

assassination records, such as files

re g a rding Lee Harvey Oswald,

Jack Ruby, the Warren Commission investigation, and the assassination investigations conducted

by the agencies themselves. The

Review Board applied the

strictest scrutiny to claimed postponements in these files, which

set the tone for the release of all

remaining assassination records. 

After the Review Board finished reviewing

the bulk of the core files, it turned its attention to the review of the thousands of pages

of less relevant, but still important, files.

Because of time constraints, the Board

decided to pare down the review process for

these documents.6 S p e c i f i c a l l y, the Board

modified Review Track, calling the new system “Fast Track.” 

Where Review Track required analysts to

enter large amounts of data into the computer concerning each re c o rd, Fast Tr a c k

required analysts and administrative staff to

enter only the unique identifying number

and the number of claimed postponements.

33
Board analysts and their agency counterparts

documented their review of the documents

on the actual documents. For example, a

Review Board analyst and an FBI analyst

would sit down with an assassination record,

apply the Board’s standards of whether to

release or postpone the information at issue,

initial the document, and move on to the next

record. This significant revision in the review

process allowed analysts

to spend less time entering data and more time

with the assassination

records themselves. (See

illustration of Fast Track

identification aid.)

The Review Board also

developed uniform substitute language codes so

that the analyst could jot

the code directly onto

the re c o rd, either in the

m a rgin or above the

re d a c t i o n .7

Following the on-the-document review by a

B o a rd analyst, the analyst or a Board administrative staff member would enter the re c o rd

identification number and the number of postponements into the Fast Track database. Then

the staff would present all of its green re c o rd s

to the Review Board at its next meeting and ask

the Board to accept the staff re c o m m e n d a t i o n s .

F. CONSENT RELEASES

Once the Review Board established its voting

patterns, the agencies recognized that the

B o a rd would not sustain postponements of

certain types of information. Thus, rather than

submit documents to the Review Board that

the agencies knew that the Board would

release, the agencies began to simply re l e a s e

the documents without asking the Board to

postpone information in them. Many agencies

ultimately released a large number of assassination re c o rds in full because they pre d i c t e d

that the Board would release the re c o rd if it

w e re presented to them for a vote. When

agencies released re c o rds before the Board

ruled on them and because they knew the

B o a rd would release the re c o rd anyway, the

B o a rd called the release a “consent release.” 

Most of the consent release documents had elect ronic identification aids and were in the

Review Board’s tracking system. The Board created a separate database for these re c o rd s ,

which allowed the Board to determine how

many agency re c o rds were released. Every

agency that possessed assassination re c o rd s

released at least some of its re c o rds as consent

releases. In fact, most of the documents re l e a s e d

under the JFK Act were consent re l e a s e s .

G. BOARD PROCEDURES

At each of its closed meetings, the Review

B o a rd members examined re c o rds. The

Board met in a closed conference room and

followed established rules of order with one

Board member, usually Chairman John Tunheim, mediating discussion, entertaining

motions, and calling for votes. The Board

determined that a quorum of three members

was necessary before a vote could take place,

and that a majority of the full Board was necessary to carry a vote. A staff member, usually the executive secretary, took minutes,

and an audiotape recorded the proceedings.

Staff members presented records to the Board

34

Agencies supplied the Review

Board with only one copy of the

original security classified document and did not allow for

further copying, thereby causing another logistical problem.

The solution to this problem

was a Rube Goldberg arrangement of two television monitors

connected to a relative of the

overhead projector called an

“ E l m o .” Thus the five Board

members were able to examine

simultaneously each document.

—Anna Kasten Nelson, 1998
members for their consideration and provided analysis of each postponement along

with information that might provide the

Board members with a context for understanding the document at issue. Staff members or representatives of the agencies presented the evidence that agencies submitted

to support postponements.

The process was laborious, especially in the

early meetings when Board members were

developing their views on the postponement

criteria. For the most part, the Board re v i e w e d

re c o rds in the conference room. But the Board

members did refine the manner in which they

accomplished the physical review of re c o rd s .

In the early phases of the process, the full

Board examined and debated on each postponement in each record. This method was

effective and allowed the Board to establish

many of the guidelines that facilitated more

efficient review.

Once the Board established guidelines, they

streamlined their review by requesting that

the staff present to the full Board (in the conference room) only those records that presented new issues. The full Board still

wanted to have at least one Board member

review each document, however. Thus, for a

limited time, staff members prepared, made

recommendations, and boxed re c o rds for

review by individual Board members. Board

members then voted on computer to accept

s t a ff recommendations or they marked

records for discussion by the full Board in the

closed conference room. Eventually, the

Board members were confident that the staff

applied their guidelines correctly and the

Board members began to vote to approve

large numbers of “green” issues (in which

the staff simply applied the Board’s guidance

to records.) The Board could then reserve

meeting time for unresolved issues.

H. MISCELLANEOUS BOTTLENECKS AND

PROBLEMS IN THE REVIEW PROCESS

1. Duplicates 

Nearly every assassination record appears at

least twice in the JFK Collection. In some

cases, the originating agency had two or

more copies of its own record. In other cases,

two or more agencies possessed copies of the

same record. The Review Board’s challenge,

therefore, was to attempt to ensure that it

processed all copies of the same document in

the same way.

W h e re possible, the Review Board and the

originating agencies used information fro m

the electronic identification aids to identify

duplicates prior to the Board’s review of the

re c o rd. For example, the FBI indexed its

re c o rds so that it could keep track of all duplicates of a particular re c o rd. The agency also

listed the re c o rd numbers of all duplicate

copies on the electronic identification aid. 

Other agencies were not as organized as the

FBI. When processing CIA records, the Board

staff often encountered more than a dozen

copies of records. Because the CIAhas decentralized files, neither the agency nor the

Review Board could determine where duplicates of particular records might be. 

Since CIA files do contain so many duplicate

records, the Board and the Agency ultimately

agreed that, once the Board had voted on

postponements in one copy of a record, the

CIA would have to assume primary responsibility for processing duplicates to match the

first copy. The CIA identified the duplicates

in a re-review of the JFK Collection, and the

Board staff made sure the records the agency

identified as duplicates were in fact duplicates. The CIA has agreed to transfer all

duplicates to NARA by September 1999. 

2. Equities and Referrals 

When one agency uses another agency’s

information to create a re c o rd, the other

agency’s information is called an “equity.”

Understandably, agencies try not to release

other agencies’ equities without first consulting with them. The process by which the

agency that possesses the record consults

with the agency whose equities are present in

the record is called the “referral” process.

Agencies also sometimes refer re c o rds to

other agencies when the first agency believes

that the other agency has an interest in the

record of the first agency. For example, if representatives from the Customs Service and

the CIA were at the same meeting and Customs created a record to memorialize the

meeting, Customs would likely “refer” the

meeting report to the CIA before agreeing to

release the report.

35
In processing government records for release

under the terms of the

FOIA or under the terms

of the Executive Ord e r

governing declassification, agencies:

(1) identify other

agency’s equities in their

records;

(2) send to the other

agency a copy of the

record that contains that

agency’s equity; and

(3) wait patiently—

sometimes for years—for

the other agency to

process its equity in the

re c o rd and return the

record.

Only after the other

agency returns the re c o rd

to the referring agency

does the referring agency

begin to process the

re c o rd to protect its own

information. For example, if the CIA p ro v i d e d

the FBI with information

about Lee Harvey

Oswald’s activities in

Mexico City in 1963, the

FBI would report, in its

own document, the information that CIA p rovided to the FBI. When

the FBI evaluates this

re c o rd for release, the

first thing it does is send the re c o rd to CIA,

requesting the CIA to evaluate whether CIA

information in the re c o rd can be released. CIA

evaluates its information and eventually

returns the re c o rd to the FBI. Only then does

the FBI begin to evaluate whether it can

release the FBI information in the re c o rd. 

The agencies are reluctant to change this

process and they protect information that

originates with another agency. Using the

above example, if the FBI does not consult

with the CIA before releasing the information, the CIA then may choose to release FBI

information without consulting with FBI.

Because the agencies guard their own information so carefully, they have strong incentives not to modify the referral process.

Because the JFK Act did not consider or

a d d ress the referral issue, the pro c e s s

impeded the pace of review and the Review

Board’s ability to release records. The Review

Board realized that, to complete its work, it

could not allow the agencies to engage in

their traditional referral process. Instead, the

Board would have to engineer the referral

process in one of three ways:

(1) managing the referrals itself;

(2) sending “dunning letters” to agencies

that were delinquent in returning referred

documents; or

(3) sponsoring joint declassification sessions at the Review Board offices. 

a. Managing referrals. When the Review

Board controlled the referral process, as it did

with the Wa r ren Commission, the House

Select Committee on Assassinations, and

presidential library records, agencies tended

to return referred records much more quickly

than if the record came from another agency

through traditional channels. Managing the

referrals, however, took an enormous

amount of staff time and forced the Review

Board to spend much of its time managing

records rather than reviewing them. 

36

Current procedures for processing records with multiple equities are expensive and complex.

An agency referring classified

records to another agency for its

review must make copies of the

records and specially pack a g e

and transport them in compliance with security procedures

( w h i ch , depending on the

r e c o r d s ’ classification levels, c a n

range from sending them via

registered mail to having them

personally transferred to a government courier by a staff person with appropriate cleara n c e s ) . This process is repeated

for every record that contains

a g e n cy equities and can occur

multiple times if a single document needs to be referred to

more than one agency and also

when that record is returned to

the referring agency only partly

d e c l a s s i f i e d . At every step of this

p r o c e s s, additional costs are

i n c u r r e d . Not only is the process

burdensome and costly for agenc i e s, but there are no deadlines

by which agencies must respond

to such referrals. The result can

be lengthy delays before a

review is completed and information released to the public.

—The Commission on

Protecting and Reducing

Government Secrecy,

March 3, 1997
b. Dunning letters. When agencies were

delinquent in returning referred documents,

the Review Board mailed letters to the agencies simply stating that if the agency did not

process and return the record by a specified

deadline, the Review Board would automatically vote to release the record. The dunning

letters proved to be very effective in convincing agencies to return their referrals. 

c. Review Board joint declassification sessions.

“Joint declassification sessions” emerged as

the Review Board’s most effective tool in

addressing the problems caused by the referral process. The Review Board staff invited to

these sessions re p resentatives from each

agency that had equities in a given group of

re c o rds. The re p resentatives came to the

Review Board’s office to review the records.

By the end of the one- or two-day session, the

referral process was complete. (See illustration of Review Board joint declassification

session form.)

The Review Board sponsored six joint declassification sessions. An unforeseen advantage

of the sessions was that agencies were more

likely to agree to release a record when they

realized that other agencies had alre a d y

agreed to do so.

I. DOCUMENT PROCESSING AFTER REVIEW

BOARD VOTES

The JFK Act stated that agencies must deliver

records to NARAwithin 45 days of a Review

Board vote. The 45-day limit proved to be

u n reasonable and, as such, the agencies

rarely, if ever, adhered to the deadline. 

After the Review Board voted on an assassination re c o rd, the JFK Act re q u i red the

s t a ff to attach a “final determination form”

to the re c o rd. For Review Track re c o rds, the

final determination form identified each

postponement, its location within the document, and the substitute language for the

postponement. For Fast Track re c o rds, the

final determination form identified the

number of Review Board approved postponements in the document and listed the

substitute language options that corresponded to codes noted on the document.

(See illustrations of Review Track Final

Determination Form and Fast Track Final

Determination Form.)

37
Finally, after the Review Board staff completed its final determination forms and

attached the forms to the records, they placed

the document’s electronic identification aid

into a database called the “Review Track

Archive.” The Review Track Archive contains

all assassination re c o rds on which the

Review Board voted.

J. CONCLUSION

The Review Board’s most basic task was to

review postponements claimed by federal

agencies in their assassination re c o rds and to

vote either to sustain or release the information at issue. The review of claimed postponements consumed more Review Board staff

hours than any other task and was the primary focus of most of the Review Board ’ s

38

interactions with the agencies. The Review

B o a rd voted on more than 27,000 documents

in which the agencies had requested that the

Review Board postpone information. Each of

these documents re q u i red the attention of a

Review Board analyst to shepherd the document through the process of: (1) evaluating

the postponed information according to the

B o a rd’s guidelines; (2) presenting the document to the Review Board for a vote; (3)

re c o rding the Review Board’s vote on the

postponed information; (4) notifying the

agency of the Review Board’s decision; (5)

publishing the decision in the Federal Register;

and (6) preparing the document for transfer to

the JFK Collection. The Review Board ’ s

review process ensured that it scru t i n i z e d

each piece of withheld information so that the

American public could have confidence that it

did not postpone any significant information.
CHAPTER 4

ENDNOTES

1 The National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”), of course, also was affected

by Congress’ passage of the JFK Act, as they were responsible for establishing the John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (“JFK Collection”).

2 JFK Act at § 4(a)(2)(B).

3 JFK Act at § 4(a)(2).

4 For a group of five citizens who were otherwise fully employed, the Review Board members met as a group very often—once or twice each month. The Review Board held the majority of its regular meetings in Washington, D.C. Due to the Review Board’s need to discuss classified and privacy protected material, the Review Board voted to close most of its meetings to

the public. During its tenure, the Review Board held 48 closed meetings and processed for

release more than 60,000 documents. All of these documents are now a part of the JFK Collection at NARA.

5 Section 6 of the JFK Act lists criteria that agencies can cite when requesting postponements.

The criteria and the Review Board’s standards for sustaining claimed postponements are fully

explained in Chapter 4 of this report.

6 The next chapter explains in detail the standards that the Review Board established for the

review of the “Segregated Collections.”

7 FBI Substitute Language Codes a re as follows: A. Informant Name; B. Informant Identifying

Information; C. Informant Symbol Number; D. Informant File Number; E. Operational Detail;

F. Identifying Information to Protect the Privacy of an Individual; G. File Number; H. Classified Case Caption. C I A Substitute Language Codes a re as follows: 01 Crypt; 02 Digraph; 03 CIA

Employee; 04 Asset; 05 Source; 06 Name of Person; 07 Pseudonym; 08 Identifying Information; 09 Date; 10 Location; 11 Country; 12 CIA Installation in Africa/Near East*; 13 CIA I n s t a llation in East Asia/ Pacific*; 14 CIA Installation in Northern Europe*; 15 CIA Installation in

Western Europe*; 16 CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere*; 17 Cable Prefix for

Africa/Near East*; 18 Cable Prefix for East Asia/ Pacific*; 19 Cable Prefix for Northern

E u rope*; 20 Cable Prefix for Western Europe*; 21 Cable Prefix for Western Hemisphere*; 22

Dispatch Prefix; 23 File Number; 24 Operation Details; 25 None; 26 Scelso; 27 CIA Job Ti t l e ;

28 CIA; 29 Name of Organization; 30 Social Security Number; 31 Alias Documentation; 32

O fficial Cover (Details of Official Cover) [*a second number is included with this type of postponement to facilitate tracking individual locators throughout the Collection]. Military Sub -

stitute Language Codes a re as follows: A. Operational Details; B. Name of Person; C.

S o u rce/Asset; D. Identifying information to Protect the Privacy of an Individual; E. Location;

F. Country/Nationality; G. Name of Organization; H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Off icer; I. No Suitable Substitute Language.

39
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992,1

(JFK Act), established a short list of reasons

that federal agencies could cite as a basis for

requesting postponement of public disclosure of records relating to the assassination of

President Kennedy. The JFK Act directed the

Review Board to sustain postponements

under Section 6 only in the “rarest cases.”

Beyond the statute’s presumption of disclosure,2

the Review Board had little guidance

from Congress concerning how to apply each

of the grounds for postponement. This chapter explains how the Review Board analyzed

and applied each of the postponement standards of the JFK Act.

1. Current Guidelines for Release of

Assassination-Related Information

Before Congress passed the JFK Act, members of the public who wished to review the

government’s assassination re c o rds could

either request the records under the Freedom

of Information Act (FOIA)3 or await the

release of the records under the then-current

Executive Order on declassification.4 As of

1992, some agencies had a five year backlog

in responding to FOIA requests, and members of the public often waited for long periods of time to receive information that might

be heavily redacted. Moreover Pre s i d e n t

Reagan’s Executive Order 12356, in effect in

1992, was aimed more at protecting secrets

than releasing information.

Like the JFK Act, the FOIA is a disclosure

statute that assumes that all government

records, except for those that fit within one of the

enumerated exemptions, may be released.5 Also

like the JFK Act, the FOIA places upon the

government the burden of proving that material fits within the statutory exemptions. The

nine FOIA exemptions that allow government agencies to withhold information from

the public include exemptions for information that relates to the national security, information that is related to law enforcement

activities, and information that would invade

the personal privacy of individuals. The

FOIA also allows agencies to protect information if its release would cause agencies to

operate in a fishbowl. For example, agencies

can withhold information that relates solely

to personnel practices or reveals the deliberative process in its decision making. The

FOIA further protects trade secrets, certain

information relating to financial institutions,

and certain geological and geophysical information. Finally, exemption b(3) of the FOIA

works to exempt any information from disclosure if the Director of Central Intelligence

determines that the material may not be

released.

The second set of guidelines that governed

disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy before Congress

passed the JFK Act was provided by President Reagan’s Executive Order 12356. Executive Order 12356 was not as disclosure-oriented as Executive Order 12958, enacted by

President Clinton in 1995. The Senate Report

for the JFK Act notes that,

Executive Order 12356, National Security Information, has precluded the

release of [assassination] records.. . .

[L]egislation is necessary. . . because E.O.

12356, “National Security Information,”

has eliminated the government-wide

schedules for declassification and

downgrading of classified information

and has prevented the timely public disclosure of assassination records. . .

6

President Clinton’s Executive Order 12958,

currently in effect,7is significantly more dis41

CHAPTER 5

TH E STA N D A R D S F O R RE V I E W:

RE V I E W BO A R D “ CO M M O N LAW”
c l o s u re-oriented than President Reagan’s

order. The current Executive Order applies to

all Executive branch records and, unlike the

JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a systematic declassification of all records more

than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives

agencies five years—until April 2000—to

declassify all classified information that is (1)

more than 25 years old, and (2) is of permanent historical value unless the “agency

head” determines that release of the information would cause one of the nine enumerated

harms. The Executive Order provides for

continuing protection for sources and methods where disclosure would damage the

national security. It also protects, inter alia,

information that involves diplomatic relations, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans

that are still in effect, and protection of the

President.8

The JFK Act guidelines

that governed the disclosure of records relating to

the assassination of President Kennedy were

detailed in section 6 of

the JFK Act.9 The JFK Act

allowed the Review Board to postpone the

release of assassination re c o rds only where

the agencies provided clear and convincing

evidence that one of five enumerated harms

would occur if the Review Board re l e a s e d

the re c o rd a n d that the harm outweighed

the public interest in disclosure. The statute

allowed protection of intelligence agents

and intelligence sources and methods if the

agency could show that the agent, sourc e ,

or method currently re q u i red pro t e c t i o n .

The statute further allowed the Board to

p rotect the identity of living persons who

p rovided confidential information to the

government if the agency could show that

d i s c l o s u re of the person’s identity would

pose a substantial risk of harm to the person. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board

to postpone release of information if re l e a s e

would constitute an unwarranted invasion

of personal privacy or if release would comp romise the existence of an understanding

of confidentiality between a government

agent and a cooperating individual or foreign government. Finally, the JFK A c t

allowed the Review Board to protect current information concerning protection of

government off i c i a l s .

2. Key Distinctions Between Standards

of Release Under the FOIA, the Executive Order, and the JFK Act

In considering whether the JFK Act was necessary to guarantee public access to assassination records, Congress evaluated the effectiveness of both the FOIA and the

then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the

House and the Senate concluded that the

FOIA and the Executive Order, as administered by the executive branch, had failed to

guarantee adequate public disclosure of

assassination records.

At the time that the JFK Act became law, the

largest collections of records concerning the

assassination were under the control of the

FBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Committees who investigated the assassination. The

FOIA provides special protections for each of

these entities, and thus could not serve as the

mechanism for maximum disclosure of

assassination re c o rd s . First, the FOIA

exempts CIA operational files from disclos u re .1 0 S e c o n d , the FOIA p rovides bro a d -

based protection for law enforcement files

and therefore allows the FBI to protect a substantial amount of its information from disclosure.11 Third, the FOIA does not apply to

unpublished Congressional records.12 Congress found that the FOIA did not require

adequate disclosure in those records that it

did cover. Thus, Congress believed that the

FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for

guaranteeing disclosure of assassination

records.13

P resident Clinton did not sign Executive

Order 12958 until April 17, 1995—over two

years after Congress passed the JFK Act.

Clearly, the terms of the Executive Order

applied to most assassination records since

they were of permanent historical value and

were over 25 years old. Even if President

Clinton’s Executive Order had been in effect

prior to 1992, it could not have achieved the

maximum disclosure accomplished by the

JFK Act. The problem with the Executive

Order is that it allowed “agency heads” to

make the decision to exempt records from

automatic declassification provided that the

“agency head” expected that disclosure of

the records would result in one of the nine

enumerated categories of harm. As many sections of this Report explain, the Review

42

We need to separate sources

from methods. This could be the

most lasting effect of the Board.

—Steven Garfinkle,

April 14, 1998
Board found that “agency heads” tended to

be quite reluctant to release their agencies’

s e c rets. The Executive Ord e r, while wellintentioned, failed to provide for any independent review of “agency heads’” decisions

on declassification. Thus, although the Executive Order’s standards for declassification

appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Executive Order failed to hold agency heads

accountable for their decisionmaking.

The JFK Act did require agencies to account

for their decisions. To ensure such accountability, Congress included four essential provisions in the JFK Act: first, the JFK Act presumed that assassination re c o rds may be

released; second, the JFK Act stated that an

agency could rebut the presumption of disclosure only by proving, with clear and con -

vincing evidence, that disclosure would result

in harm and that the expected harm would

outweigh any public benefit in the disclosure; third, the JFK Act created an independent

agency—the Review Board—whose mandate

was to ensure that agencies respected the

presumption of disclosure and honestly presented clear and convincing evidence of the

need to protect information; and fourth, the

JFK Act required agencies to provide the

Review Board with a c c e s s to government

records, even when those records would not

become part of the JFK Collection. Without

these accountability provisions, the JFK Act

would not have accomplished its objective of

maximum release of assassination records to

the public. So, while the FOIA and the Executive Order each expressed the goal of

obtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Act

ensured that the goal would be met. The two

accountability provisions that relate directly

to the Section 6 grounds for postponement—

the presumption of release and the standard

of proof—are discussed in detail below. The

t h i rd provision discussed below is the

Review Board’s obligation to balance the

weight of the evidence in favor of postponement against the public interest in release.

a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of 

assassination records.

The most pertinent language of the JFK Act

was the standard for release of information.

According to the statute, “all Government

records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a pre -

sumption of immediate disclosure.”14 The statute

further declared that “only in the rarest cases is

there any legitimate need for continued protection

of such records.”15

b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear

and convincing evidence.

If agencies wished to withhold information

in a document, the JFK Act required the

agency to submit clear and convincing evidence that the information fell within one of the

n a r row postponement

criteria.16

C o n g ress selected the

clear and convincing evidence standard because

“less exacting standards,

such as substantial evidence or a pre p o n d e rance of the evidence,

were not consistent with

the legislation’s stated goal” of prompt and

full release.17 The legislative history of the

JFK Act emphasized the statutory requirement that agencies provide clear and convincing evidence.

There is no justification for perpetual

secrecy for any class of records. Nor can

the withholding of any individual

record be justified on the basis of gen -

eral confidentiality concerns applicable

to an entire class. Every record must be

judged on its own merits, and every

record will ultimately be made available

for public disclosure.18

When agencies did present to the Review

Board evidence of harm that would result

from disclosure, it had to consist of more

than speculation.

The [Review] Board cannot postpone

release because it might cause some con -

ceivable or speculative harm to national

s e c u r i t y. Rather in a democracy the

demonstrable harm from disclosure must

be weighed against the benefits of

release of the information to the public.19

The Review Board’s application of the clear

and convincing evidence standard is covered

in more detail in Section B of this chapter.

43

The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing docum e n t s. The onus will be on those

who would withhold documents

to prove to the Review Board and

the American people why those

documents must be shielded from

public scrutiny.

—Senator John Glenn,

May 12, 1992
Section B includes a discussion of the “Rule

of Reason” that the Review Board ultimately

adopted with regard to receiving evidence

from the agencies.

c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to 

balance evidence for postponement against

public interest in release.

Assuming that agencies did provide clear

and convincing evidence that information

should be protected from disclosure, the

terms of section 6 required that information

not be postponed unless the threat of harm

outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

As used in the JFK Act, “public interest”

means “the compelling interest in the prompt

public disclosure of assassination records for

historical and governmental purposes and

for the purpose of fully informing the American people about the history surrounding

the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy.”20 The Review Board interpreted

the balancing requirement to mean that agencies had to provide the Review Board with

clear and convincing evidence of the threat of

harm that would result from disclosure .

However, to the extent that the JFK Act left

room for discretion in evaluating the historical significance, or public interest, of particular assassination records, it was the Review

Board—not the agency that originated the

document—that was to exercise this discretion. The burden was on the agencies to make

the case for postponement, not to judge the

level of public interest in a particular document. The JFK Act established the Review

Board as a panel of independent citizens with

expertise as historians and archivists precisely in order to secure public confidence in

such determinations.21

d. Segregability and substitute language.

When the Review Board determined that the

risk of harm did outweigh the public interest

in disclosure, it then had to take two additional steps: (1) ensure that the agency

redacted the least amount of information

possible to avoid the stated harm, or “segregate” the postponed information, and (2)

provide substitute language to take the place

of the redaction.

3. Federal Agency Record Groups and

the Standards Applied to Them.

The JFK Act defines “assassination records”

to include records related to the assassination

of President Kennedy that were “created or

made available for use by, obtained by, or

otherwise came into the possession of” the

following groups: the Warren Commission,

the four congressional committees that investigated the assassination, any office of the

federal government, and any state or local

law enforcement office that assisted in a federal investigation of the assassination.22

When it passed the JFK Act, Congre s s

intended for the JFK Collection to include the

record groups that it identified in section

3(2), but it also intended for the Review

Board to consider carefully the scope of the

term “assassination record” and to issue an

interpretive regulation defining this crucial

term.23 The Act requires government agencies

to identify, organize, and process those assassination records that are defined as assassination records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 of

this report explains how the Review Board

interpreted its responsibility to define and

seek out “additional records and information.” Set forth below is a description of some

of the core government holdings on the

assassination which were released under the

standards of the Review Board.

a. The FBI’s “core and related” files.

The FBI’s “core and related” files consist of

those re c o rds that the FBI gathered in

response to FOIA requests that it received in

the 1970s for records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The “core” files

include the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald

and Jack Ruby, as well as the FBI’s Warren

Commission files and the JFK assassination

investigation file. The “related” files include

FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald’s wife

Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald’s

friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the

Oswalds’ Dallas friends Ruth and Michael

Paine. The FBI began its processing of the

core and related files in 1993. The Review

Board applied strict standards to its review of

postponements in the core and related files.

44
b. CIA’s Lee Harvey Oswald “201” file.

CIAopens a 201 file on an individual when it

has an “operational interest” in that person.

The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee Harvey

Oswald in December 1960 when it received a

request from the Department of State on

defectors. After President Kennedy’s assassination, the Oswald 201 file served as a depository for records CIA gathered and created

during CIA’s wide-ranging investigation of

the assassination. Thus, the file provides the

most complete record of the CIA’s inquiry in

the months and years immediately following

the assassination.

c. The FBI’s “House Select Committee on

Assassinations”(HSCA) Subject Files.

During the HSCA’s tenure, the Committee

made a number of requests to the FBI for

records that the Committee believed might

be relevant to their investigation of the

Kennedy assassination. In response to the

HSCA’s requests, the FBI made available to

the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages

of FBI files. The FBI began its processing of

the “HSCASubject” files in 1993. The Review

Board applied its “Segregated Collection”

guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA

subject files. 

d. The CIA’s “Segregated Collection” files.

HSCA investigators gained access to CIA

files. Upon completion of the HSCA’s work,

the CIA kept separate the files that it had

made available to the HSCA and retained

them as a segregated collection. This collection is divided into two parts: paper records

and microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paper

re c o rds available to the HSCA s t a ff. The

paper records consist, in many cases, of particular records that CIA culled from various

files. The 64th box of the CIA’s segregated

collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and

represents the entire set of files from which

records were made available to the HSCA.

Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files

contain material well beyond the scope of the

HSCA investigation and may, for example,

cover an agent’s entire career when only a

small portion of it intersected with the assassination story.

e. FBI records on the congressional commit -

tees that investigated the assassination.

The JFK Act defined “assassination record”

to include records relating to the Kennedy

assassination that were used by the congressional committees who investigated events

surrounding the assassination.24

B e f o re President Clinton appointed the

Review Board, the FBI collected and began to

process its administrative files relating to its

involvement with each of these committees.

In large part, the records contained in the

Bureau’s administrative files related to topics

other than the Kennedy assassination. To the

extent that the Review Board found records

in these files that concerned topics other than

the Kennedy assassination, it designated the

records not believed relevant (or “NBR” as

that acronym is defined infra) and removed

them from further consideration. 

f. Requests for Additional Information.

Congress included in the JFK Act a provision

that allowed the Review Board to obtain

additional information and records beyond

those that were reviewed by previous investigations. Chapter 6 of this report explains

the requests that the Review Board made and

the assassination re c o rds designated as a

result of those requests. 

B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS

The Review Board’s primary purpose, as outlined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to

determine whether an agency’s request for

postponement of disclosure of an assassination record met the criteria for postponement

set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of an

introductory clause, which established the

“clear and convincing evidence” standard,

and five subsections that set forth the criteria

under which the Review Board could agree

to postpone public disclosure of assassination-related information.

1. Standard of Proof: Clear and 

Convincing Evidence

Text of Section 6

Disclosure of assassination records or par -

ticular information in assassination records

45
to the public may be postponed subject to the

limitations of this Act if [agencies provide]

clear and convincing evidence that [the

harm from disclosure outweighs the public

interest in release.]

a. Review Board guidelines. For each recommended postponement, the JFK Act requires

an agency to submit “clear and convincing

evidence” that one of the specified grounds

for postponement exists. 25 The Review Board

required agencies to submit specific facts in

support of each postponement, according to

the Review Board’s guidelines for each postponement type.

b. Commentary. Although the agencies

argued that the clear and convincing evidence standard could be

satisfied by a general

explanation of those

agencies’ positions in

support of postponements, the Review Board

determined that the clear

and convincing evidence

requirement was a document-specific one. Thus,

the Board required agencies to present evidence

that was tailored to individual postponements

within individual documents.

The JFK Act clearly

required agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence in support

of their postponements,

but it did not establish a

mechanism for when and

how such evidence should be presented. The

legislative history provides a clue as to Congress’ intent: “[T]o the extent possible, consultation with the government offices creates

an understanding on each side as to the basis

and reasons for their respective recommendations and determinations.”26 The Review

Board did consult with government offices to

determine fair, efficient, and reasonable procedures for presenting evidence.

The Review Board began its review of assassination records by considering pre- assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an

attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the

Board asked the staff to present the records

on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, with

FBI records, the Review Board first scheduled a group of FBI records for review and

notified the FBI of the meeting date at which

it intended to vote on the re c o rds. The

Review Board invited the FBI to present its

evidence. Second, the FBI requested that it be

allowed to brief the members of the Review

Board. At the briefing, the FBI presented its

position to the Board—both in an oral presentation and in a “position paper.” The FBI’s

“position papers” summarized the FBI’s general policy preferences for continued classification of certain categories of information.

T h i rd, the Review Board staff re s e a rc h e d

existing law on each of the FBI’s “positions”

and determined that the arguments that the

FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act postponements were essentially the same arguments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA

cases. Of course, in legislating the declassification standards of the JFK Act, Congress

intended for the JFK Act standards—and not

the FOIA standards—to apply. Aware of congressional intent, the Review Board rejected

the FBI’s general policy preferences on the

basis that the arguments did not constitute

the clear and convincing evidence necessary

to support a request for a postponement

under section 6. The FBI did appeal the

Review Board’s decisions to the President,

but the Review Board’s document-specific

interpretation of the clear and convincing

evidence standard ultimately pre v a i l e d

when the vote was withdrawn.

i. “Rule of Reason.” Of course, some assassination records are of greater interest than

others. With regard to records that had a

close nexus to the assassination, the Review

Board strictly applied the law. For example,

the Review Board voted to release in full

nearly all of the information in the FBI’s preassassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the

bulk of the information in the HSCA’s report

on CIA activities in Mexico City—the

“Lopez” report—because of the high public

interest in that material. With regard to the

FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments

were compelling enough to merit appeals to

the President on nearly all of the Review

Board’s decisions on the pre-assassination

Lee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, the

Review Board, the White House Counsel’s

46

I think today a great gulf exists

between people and their

elected officials. Doubts about

this particular matter are a

symptom of that, and so I think

the purpose of this hearing is to

ask some questions. Why does

information need to be withheld? At this moment in time,

what compelling interests are

there for the holding back of

information? Are there legitimate needs in this respect? Who

and what is being protected?

W h i ch individuals, w h i ch

agencies, which institutions are

in the need of protection, and

what national security interests

still remain?

—Senator William S. Cohen,

May 12, 1992
O ffice, and ultimately the Department of

State spent a substantial amount of time

resolving the issues that arose in the appeal

process, and for those important records that

were at issue, the Review Board considered

its time well-spent. The Review Board similarly dealt with other key records and spent

as much time as was necessary to deliberate

and decide upon those records.

The postponement-by-postponement review

at each early Review Board meeting proved

to be a slow and careful process. The postponement-by-postponement review proved

to be a necessary educational process for the

Board members. The Board members were a

group of five citizens who were selected not

for their familiarity with the subject of the

assassination, but for their professional competence in history and law. Thus, through

reviewing individual documents at its early

meetings, the Board essentially educated

itself about the assassination.

While the Review Board did need time to educate itself and to develop its policies, the

B o a rd’s pace eventually increased. In an eff o r t

to streamline its work, the Review Board consulted with federal agencies such as the CIA

and FBI to work out an approach for review of

re c o rds that would allow the Review Board to

make informed decisions, but not re q u i re

agencies to spend hundreds of hours locating

evidence for and providing briefings on each

postponement within an assassination re c o rd. 

The first step to developing a reasonable

approach was for the Review Board to formulate general rules for sustaining and

denying postponements. The Review Board’s

“guidance” to its staff and the agencies

became a body of rules—a Review Board

“common law.” Once the Review Board notified an agency of its approach on a particular

type of postponement, the agency learned to

p resent only those facts that the Review

Board would need to make a decision. For

example, with regard to FBI informants, the

Review Board notified the FBI of what it considered to be the relevant factors in its decisionmaking. In other words, it defined for the

Bureau what it considered to be “clear and

convincing” evidence. Then, the Review

Board worked with the FBI to create a onepage form titled an “Informant Postponement Evidence Form” that the FBI could use

to provide evidence on an informant. (See

illustration.) The form allowed the FBI to

simply fill in the answers to a series of questions about the informant in question, which

in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on

those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in

a particular document. This approach had

the added benefit of providing consistency to

the Review Board’s decisionmaking.

A large number of records that the JFK Act

defined as “assassination records” proved to

be of very low public interest. The JFK Act

required the Review Board to process all

records that were “made available” to the

Warren Commission and the Congressional

Committees that investigated the assassination, whether or not the records were used by

the Commission or the committees. Many of

these records, while interesting from a historian’s perspective, are not closely related to

the assassination. For those documents that

were of little or no public interest, the Review

Board modified its standards in the two ways

described below.

A. “NBR” Guidelines: Records that Review

Board judged were “not believed relevant” to the

assassination. For those records that truly had

no apparent relevance to the assassination,

the Review Board designated the records

“not believed relevant” (NBR). The “NBR”

Guidelines allowed the Review Board to

remove irrelevant records from further consideration. Records that the Review Board

designated “NBR” were virtually the only

groups of records that the Review Board

agreed to postpone in full. Thus, the Review

Board was always extremely reluctant to designate records “NBR” and rarely did so.

B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those

records that were not immediately relevant,

but shed at least some light on issues that the

congressional committees that investigated

the assassination explored as potentially relevant to the assassination, the Review Board

created the “Segregated Collection Guidelines.” The segregated collections records,

although marginally relevant, were not

appropriate for “NBR” designation, as the

“NBR” Guidelines would have resulted in

withholding re c o rds in full. Instead, the

Board passed the “Segregated Collection”

Guidelines, which ensured that the Review

Board staff would review every page of the

47
marginally relevant records, but would not

require agencies to present the same amount

of evidence in support of postponements.

The regulations that the Review Board

adopted on November 13, 1996, define “Segregated Collections” to include the following:

(1) FBI records that were requested by the

HSCA in conjunction with its investigation

into the assassination of President Kennedy,

the Church Committee in conjunction with

its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy

assassination, and the Pike Committee and

Rockefeller Commission that investigated

issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA

records including the CIA’s segregated collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of

microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes

of CIA staff “working files.” The Review

Board adopted revised guidelines on April

23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the

review process of postponements in the segregated collections, and ensure a page-bypage review of all documents in the segregated collections. The guidelines state,

“. . . even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year

1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method

of review.” Where the Review Board’s standards differed between core files and segregated collection files, the guidelines set forth

below note the distinction.

Thus, throughout its tenure, the Review

Board sought to be vigorous in applying the

law, but, in order to complete its work, found

it necessary to employ a “rule of reason.”

2. Intelligence Agents

Text of Section 6(1)(A)

. . . clear and convincing evidence that the

threat to the military defense, intelligence

operations, or conduct of foreign relations of

the United States posed by the public disclo -

sure of the assassination record is of such

gravity that it outweighs the public interest,

and such public disclosure would reveal—

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity

currently requires protection. . .

a. CIA officers.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board usually protected the names of CIA

officers who are still active or who retired

under cover and are now living in potentially

risky circumstances. The Review Board usually released names of deceased CIA officers

and the names of CIAofficers whose connection to the CIA was public knowledge. When

the Review Board postponed names, it usually substituted the phrase, “CIAEmployee.”

ii. Commentary. Names of numerous CIA

officers appeared in the CIA’s assassination

records. The Review Board and the CIA had

to confront the challenge presented by the

statute, which re q u i res name-specific evidence, but gathering such evidence proved to

be time-consuming and burdensome for the

CIA and the names of CIA officers in the

re c o rds were not always relevant to the

assassination. The statute, of course, states

that the only way that the Review Board

could protect names of intelligence agents

was if the CIAprovided clear and convincing

evidence that the CIA officer’s identity “currently” required protection.

The CIAinitially believed that the solution to

the above-referenced challenge was for the

Review Board to agree with CIA that the

names of all CIA officers within the JFK Collection should be postponed until the year

2017. The CIA supported its request for blanket postponements with two arguments: first,

since many CIA employees are “under

cover,” CIA argued that its intelligence gathering capability depended on employees

maintaining cover, and, second, even though

the majority of CIA officer names in the Collection are names of retired CIA employees,

CIA is bound by a confidentiality agreement

to protect the relationship. Many of these former employees objected to release of their

former Agency affiliation, complaining that it

violates this agreement and suggesting that

such release might jeopardize business relationships or threaten personal safety.

Mindful of the JFK Act’s requirement that

agencies provide name-specific evidence, the

Review Board would not agree to CIA’ s

request for blanket postponements of CIA

names. Instead, the Review Board requested

CIA to provide evidence for each name. 

48
The CIA, however, was reluctant to produce

name-specific evidence and, on occasion,

C I A failed to furnish evidence when it

promised to do so. CIA’s initial refusal to

supply evidence on individual names was

met, not with the wholesale release of names

by the Board, but with a firm insistence that

the Agency meet the requirements of the Act.

The Review Board released the names of a

few individuals who were of central importance to the assassination story early in the

process, but gave the Agency a number of

additional opportunities to provide specific

evidence on other names.

For example, in December 1995, the Review

Board designated one day of their meeting

“name day,” and invited CIA to provide evidence for names the Review Board had

encountered in CIArecords during the previous six to seven months. On that day, CIA

again requested the Review Board to sustain

the postponement of all CIA names. The

Review Board did not want to jeopardize the

personal safety of individuals and gave CIA

more time to provide evidence. The Board set

other “name days” in May 1996 and May

1997. As deadlines for submission of evidence approached, CIA a g reed to re l e a s e

some names, but in most cases, continued to

offer less than satisfactory evidence on those

they wished to protect. Gradually, the CIA

did begin to provide supporting evidence of

the postponement of individual names. 

By May 1996, the Review Board had decided

what evidence would meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. If the CIA provided evidence that the individual retired

under cover or abroad, or evidence that the

individual objected to the release of his or her

name when contacted (CIAagreed to attempt

to contact former employees), the Review

Board would protect the CIA officer’s name.

Moreover, where the CIA specifically identified an ongoing operation in which the individual was involved or CIA could demonstrate that the person was still active with

CIA, the Review Board would protect the

name. Because the JFK Act re q u i red the

Review Board to balance the potential harm

from disclosure against the public interest in

release, there were cases in which the Review

Board determined that, even though the CIA

had provided the re q u i red evidence, the

Review Board believed that the individual

was of sufficiently high public interest that it

would require the CIA to provide additional

evidence before it would consider protecting

the name. In these cases, the Review Board

asked CIA to provide information on the

employee’s current status, his or her location,

and the nature of the work he or she did for

the CIA. 

The Review Board determined that names

were of high public interest when the CIA

officer at issue had a substantive connection

to the assassination story or where the CIA

officer’s name appeared in CIA’s Oswald 201

file. By July 1997, the Review Board had

determined that where CIAofficer names did

not fit within one of the “high public interest” categories, it would require CIA to provide significantly less evidence in support of

its requests for postponement. Given the

large number of CIAofficer names in the CIA

records, the Review Board determined that it

had to adopt the practical high public interest/low public interest approach, particularly since it had limited time and resources

available to complete its own review of CIA

records. The Review Board would have preferred to review each name at the same high

level of scrutiny that it used to review names

of high public interest. Nevertheless, the

B o a rd’s approach compelled the CIA t o

release many more names than it would have

desired. 

b. “John Scelso” (pseudonym).

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board protected the true name of the individual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso

until May 1, 2001 or three months after the

decease of the individual, whichever comes

first.

ii. Commentary. The CIA employee who

was head of CIA’s division “Western Hemis p h e re 3” during the period immediately

after the assassination of President Kennedy

testified before the HSCA and the Churc h

Committee under the “throw-away” alias

John Scelso. His true name appears on hund reds of documents in the JFK collection,

many of which were the product of the

Agency’s extensive post-assassination investigation that spanned the globe. In re v i e w i n g

this particular name, the Review Board ’ s

d e s i re to satisfy the public’s interest in re l e a s e

49
clashed with the CIA’s strong evidence in

support of postponement. Initially, the Board

was inclined to release Scelso’s true name, but

the Agency argued convincingly against

release. CIAp rovided evidence on the curre n t

status of the individual, shared corre s p o ndence sent by him, and even arranged an

interview between him and a Review Board

s t a ff member. As an interim step, the Review

B o a rd inserted his prior alias “Scelso” as substitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at its

May 1996 meeting, Board members determined to release “Scelso’s” true name in five

years or upon his death.

c. Information that identifies CIA officers.

i. Review Board guidelines. For specific

information that, if released, would reveal

the identity of an individual CIA officer that

the Board had voted to protect, the Review

Board protected the information.

ii. Commentary. Whenever the Review

B o a rd voted to protect the identity of an individual throughout federal agency assassination re c o rds, it had to be realistic enough to

realize that some information about individuals is so specific that release of the information

would reveal the individual’s identity. Examples of specific identifying information include

home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names

of family members, and other less obvious, but

equally revealing pieces of information.

d. Names of National Security Agency

employees.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

B o a rd protected the names of all National

Security Agency employees that it encount e red. The Review Board would have conside red releasing names of National Security

Agency employees if it determined that a particular name was extremely relevant to the

a s s a s s i n a t i o n .

ii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSA

information, few NSA employee names

a p p e a red in NSA’s assassination re c o rd s .

Even though the Review Board did not often

encounter NSA employee names, it did have

to vote on those names that it did confro n t .

N S A’s policy of not releasing the names of its

employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of

the JFK Act that presumed release of such

information unless NSA could prove that

individual NSA employee names re q u i re d

p rotection. NSA a rgued that the release of any

names, other than those of publicly acknowledged senior officials, jeopardized the potential security of U.S. cryptographic systems

and those individuals. As it did with the

names of other intelligence agents and off icers, the Review Board considered the names

of NSA o fficers on a document-by-document

basis. Given the nature of NSA i n f o r m a t i o n ,

the Review Board members agreed that none

of the few names which appear in the documents, and for which NSA requested pro t e ction, was of high enough public interest or

central to an understanding of the assassination story. Thus, it protected the names.

3. Intelligence Sources and Methods,

and Other Matters Relating to the

National Security of the United States

Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)

50
. . . clear and convincing evidence that the

threat to the military defense, intelligence

operations, or conduct of foreign relations of

the United States posed by the public disclo -

sure of the assassination record is of such

gravity that it outweighs the public interest,

and such public disclosure would reveal—

(B) an intelligence source or method which

is currently utilized, or reasonably expected

to be utilized, by the United States Govern -

ment and which has not been officially dis -

closed, the disclosure of which would inter -

f e re with the conduct of intelligence

activities; or

(C) any other matter currently relating to

the military defense, intelligence operations

or conduct of foreign relations of the United

States, the disclosure of which would

demonstrably impair the national security of

the United States;

a. CIA sources.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board handled CIA sources, assets, informants, and specific identifying information

under standards similar to the Board’s decisions for CIA officers. Where the Review

Board believed names held a high level of

public interest, either because the name was

central to the story or because assassination

researchers expressed interest in the name,

the Review Board subjected them to close

scrutiny. The Board generally protected the

identity of foreign nationals unless they were

of high public interest and then the Review

Board required CIA to provide specific evidence in support of its claimed postponements. The Review Board protected domestic

sources, assets and informants where CIA

demonstrated that release would jeopardize

ongoing operations or harm individuals. If

CIA did not provide evidence of one of the

two above-re f e renced harms, the Review

Board released the name at issue. In addition,

where the public already knew the names of

individuals who were connected to the CIA,

especially if the government had previously

released the information, the Review Board

released the information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board

a d d ressed the issue of whether to postpone or

release source names at the same time that it

c o n s i d e red CIA employee names, and

e n c o u n t e red the same problems as it had in

the review of CIA employee names. As with

C I A employee names, CIA was reluctant to

p rovide name-specific evidence to the Review

B o a rd, opting instead to offer general principles supporting CIA’s request that the Review

B o a rd redact all names.

The Review Board ultimately decided to protect

the names of sourc e s ,

assets, and informants in

cases where the identity

of the source is of

reduced public intere s t

because CIA sources live

in countries other than

the U.S. and were more

likely to face harm if the

B o a rd disclosed their

relationship with CIA. In

those records where the

source’s identity was of

possible public intere s t

in relation to the assassination story or was

important to understanding information related to

the assassination, the

Review Board re q u i red the CIA to pro v i d e

additional evidence to support the pro t e c t i o n

of the source’s identity.

When the Review Board postponed release of

source names, it did so for ten years except in

cases where a foreign government might

accuse the source of committing treason for

assisting the CIA. In those cases, the Review

Board protected the source’s name and identifying information until 2017.

b. CIA pseudonyms.

i. Review Board guidelines. With only a

few exceptions, the Review Board released

the pseudonyms of individuals. In some

instances, the Review Board used pseudonyms as substitute language for the individual’s true name.

ii. Commentary. Very early in the review

process, the Review Board determined that,

since pseudonyms were a sort of “throw

away” identity for individuals who were

under cover, the Review Board could release

51

The Review Board should consider a variety of factors related

to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and

m e t h o d s, including the age of

the record, whether the use of a

particular source or method is

already well known by the public (e.g. that the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City was bugged

during the alleged visit of Lee

Harvey Oswa l d ) , and whether

the source or method is inherently secret, or whether was the

information it collected which

was secret.

—Senate Report on JFK Act,

July 22, 1992
the pseudonym without harming the individual. The CIA did not object to the Review

Board’s policy to release pseudonyms. The

CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it

believed to be particularly sensitive, and

demonstrated to the Review Board with clear

and convincing evidence that release of those

pseudonyms would do irreparable harm.

c. CIA crypts.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

B o a rd released some CIA “ c r y p t s ” — c o d e

words for operations and individuals. The

Review Board also generally released CIA

“digraphs”—the first two letters of a crypt

that link a particular crypt to a particular

location. CIA often created crypts to refer to

other U.S. government agencies; for example,

the FBI was “ODENVY.” The Review Board

made a blanket decision to release all U.S.

government crypts. The Review Board nearly

always released CIA crypts where those

crypts denoted operations or individuals

relating to Mexico City or Cuba. (The

digraph for Mexico City was “LI,” and for

Cuba, it was “AM.”) For all other crypts, the

Review Board protected the digraph and

released the remainder of the crypt. The

Review Board established a few exceptions,

and where exceptions applied, the Board

required CIA to provide crypt-specific evidence of the need to protect. 

ii. Commentary. The Review Board had

to determine whether it believed that release

of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations

and individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of

the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement of CIA crypts. The Review Board

required the CIA to provide crypt-specific

clear and convincing evidence that CIA currently used, or expected to use the crypt and

that CIA had not previously released the

crypt. Thus, in order to convince the Review

Board to sustain postponements, the Board

required CIA to research each crypt to determine whether CIAstill used the individual or

the operation and provide that evidence to

the Review Board.

As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially

requested the Review Board to sustain postponements of all CIA c r y p t s — e v e n

“ODENVY”—the CIA’s old crypt for the FBI

that CIA had already released in other CIA

records. CIAargued that its use of crypts was

an operational method that should remain

secret, even though CIAhad replaced most of

the crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believed

that if the Review Board released the crypts,

researchers would be able to piece together

the records and determine the identity of

operations and individuals. CIA f u r t h e r

argued that the burden of locating evidence

on each crypt was too heavy.

The Review Board, conversely, believed that

CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the

identity of an operation or an individual, and

so the Review Board could release the crypts

and not compromise the operation or the

individual. As with CIA agent names, the

Review Board allowed the CIAample time to

locate evidence on each crypt. Finally, the

Review Board released a group of CIAcrypts

from Mexico City with the “LI” digraph. CIA

eventually agreed to release its crypts and

digraphs in assassination records, and the

Review Board eventually agreed to protect

certain sensitive crypts.

The Review Board recognized that it could

not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for

every CIA record that it encountered. CIA

records contain hundreds of thousands of

crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the

Review Board decided that, for all crypts

e x c e p t the “LI,” “AM,” and “OD” series

crypts, it would agree to postpone the location-specific digraph and release the actual

crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most

crypts in the collection and the most relevant

digraphs. The Review Board did make three

exceptions to its general rule: it protected the

digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt

appeared next to a true name that had been

released, (b) when the crypt appeared next to

specific identifying information, and (c)

when CIA provided clear and convincing

evidence that the Review Board should protect the digraph. 

d. CIA sluglines.

i. Review Board guidelines. “Sluglines” are

CIA routing indicators, consisting of two or

more crypts, that appear above the text in

CIA cables. (See illustration.) The Review

Board released CIAsluglines according to the

same criteria it applied to crypts and

digraphs. 

52
ii. Commentary. The Review Board

released CIA sluglines because the Agency

never offered the Review Board any evidence

to explain why the Board should not release

them. An example of a CIA slugline is

“ RY B AT GPFLOOR.” “RY B AT” is a CIA

crypt that meant “secret,” and GPFLOOR

was the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey

Oswald during its post-assassination investigation. CIA initially asked the Review Board

to postpone the CIAslugline even where CIA

had released the individual crypts that made

up the slugline elsewhere. For example, in

the case of “RYBAT GPFLOOR,” the CIA

agreed to release the crypt “RYBAT” in two

places elsewhere in the document at issue,

and the CIA a g reed to release the crypt

GPFLOOR when it appeared in the text. CIA

told the Review Board that it could not, howe v e r, release the slugline “RY B AT

GPFLOOR.” CIA o ff e red no substantive

arguments to support its request for postponement of the slugline. Given the statute’s

demand that CIA provide clear and convincing evidence in support of its requests for

postponement, the Review Board voted to

release CIA sluglines.

e. CIA surveillance methods.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board generally released CIA surveillance

methods, the details of their implementation,

and the product produced by them where the

Review Board believed the methods were relevant to the assassination. The Review Board

sustained postponements of CIAsurveillance

methods where CIA p rovided convincing

evidence that the method still merited protection. Where the Review Board sustained

the CIA’s requests for postponement of surveillance methods, it substituted the language “surveillance method,” “operational

details,” or “sensitive operation.”

ii. Commentary. As with all its sources

and methods, CIA initially requested the

Review Board to postpone all of its surveillance methods since, CIA argued, CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. The

Review Board, on the other hand, believed

that it was not a secret that CIA currently

conducts surveillance operations. Moreover,

the Review Board did not believe that its

votes to release CIA surveillance methods in

Mexico City in 1963 would jeopardize current CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the

Review Board recognized that certain CIA

surveillance operations in Mexico City in

1963 were already well-known to the public

because the U.S. government had disclosed

details about those operations. CIA surveillance, particularly telephone taps and photo

operations, was a major element in the story

of Oswald’s 1963 trip to Mexico City. (See

illustration.)

The Board, therefore, concluded that the public interest in disclosure far outweighed any

risk to national security and directed release

of the information. However, in records that

CIA proved did contain information about

current operations, the Review Board voted

to postpone the information.

f. CIA installations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board used date “windows” within which it

released the locations of CIA installations

where the location was relevant to the assassination. Specifically, the Review Board

released the location of CIA i n s t a l l a t i o n s

relating to Mexico City during the time

period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review

53
Board generally released the location of all

CIA installations that were relevant to the

assassination during the time period

between the date of the assassination—

November 22, 1963—and the date that the

Warren Commission issued its report in September 1964. Finally, the Review Board generally released the location of all CIAinstallations that appeared in Oswald’s 201 file

during the time period January 1, 1961

through October 1, 1964. The Review Board

did grant CIA a few exceptions to its general

rule, and except for the specific time windows described above, the Review Board

protected all information that identified CIA

installation locations.

The Review Board created substitute language for its postponement of CIA installations to enable researchers to track a particular CIA installation through the JFK

collection without revealing the city or country in which it is located. To accomplish this,

the Review Board divided the world into five

regions: Western Hemisphere, We s t e r n

Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia/ Pacific,

and Africa/ Near East/ South Asia. Then the

Board added a number to refer to each different location in the region. Thus, “CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1” serves as a

place holder for a particular installation in all

CIA assassination records.

ii. Commentary. Initially, the Review

Board released CIA installation locations in

CIA documents relevant to Oswald’s visit to

Mexico City. CIA did not raise significant

objections to the Review Board’s release of its

installations in these records.

When the Review Board began to vote to

release the location of additional CIA installation locations, the CIA did object, but did

not offer evidence of the harm to national

security that it believed would result from

d i s c l o s u re of the information. The CIA

54
threatened to appeal to the President to overturn the Review Board’s votes, but the

Review Board’s position was that the JFK Act

required release of information where CIA

did not provide convincing evidence to support their postponements. The Review Board

allowed the CIA ample time to gather and

present its evidence to support its requests

for postponements as both the CIA and the

Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal

to the President. 

U l t i m a t e l y, the CIA determined that it would

t rust Review Board members with the information that the Review Board re q u i red to

postpone the release of the location of a

small number of CIA installations. In an

e ffort to balance high public interest in the

location of CIA installations and the need to

p rotect certain installations, the Review

B o a rd decided to establish date “windows”

within which it would release CIA i n s t a l l ation locations.

The CIAnever appealed a Review Board vote

to the President.

g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report).

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dispatch, and field report “prefixes” are identifiers that CIA uses on its communications to

indicate the installation that generates a particular message. Where the Review Board

had voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board also

voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and

field report prefixes that the installation generated. Likewise, the Review Board protected

cable, dispatch, and field report pre f i x e s

where it voted to protect the location of the

CIA installation.

The Review Board replaced the prefixes that

it protected with substitute language similar

to that used for CIA installations. An example of substitute language for CIAprefixes is:

“Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western

Hemisphere 1.” 

ii. Commentary. Once the Review Board

voted to release the location of a particular

C I A installation, the Review Board and CIA

did not disagree that the Board should re l e a s e

cable, dispatch and field report prefixes. 

h. CIA job titles.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board voted to release CIA employees’ job

titles except when the Board’s disclosure of

the title might reveal the identity of an individual or CIA installation requiring protection.

ii. Commentary. Although the Review

Board did not believe that it should vote to

protect CIAjob titles, standing alone, it sometimes voted to protect titles if they revealed

other information that the Review Board had

voted to protect.

i. CIA file numbers.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA organizes

many of its files by country and assigns

“country identifiers” within particular file

numbers. The Review Board released nearly

all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico

City. The Review Board protected the “country identifiers” in CIA file numbers for all

other countries with the exception of country

identifiers “15” and “19.” The Review Board

generally released all CIA “201” or “personality” file numbers where the files related to

the assassination.

ii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objected

to the Review Board’s release of its file numbers.

j. CIA domestic facilities.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board released references to domestic CIA

facilities where the CIA has previously officially disclosed the existence of the facility.

The Review Board did not release information that would reveal the location of domestic CIA facilities where the CIAprovided evidence that the facility was still in use.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board rarely

encountered the issue of whether to release

the location of CIA domestic facilities in

assassination re c o rds, as CIA o ff i c i a l l y

acknowledges most of its domestic facilities.

When the Review Board did vote to postpone

the location of CIA domestic facilities, it

required the CIA to provide extensive evidence as to why the CIAhad to keep the location of those facilities secret.

55
k. CIA official cover.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA “official

cover” is a means by which a CIA officer can

operate overseas in the guise of an employee

of another government agency. In congres -

sional documents, the Review Board released

general information about official cover but

protected specific details. With regard to exec -

utive branch documents, the CIA convinced the

Review Board that, while Congress might

reveal information about official cover, the

executive branch does not generally reveal

information about official cover because to

do so would damage the national security.

Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA’ s

postponements regarding official cover in

executive branch documents unless the U.S.

government had previously officially disclosed the information at issue.

The Review Board inserted the phrase “official cover” as substitute language when it

postponed such information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board initially considered the issue of official cover to

be an “open secret” that was well-known to

the public. Thus, they were loathe to withhold

such obvious information. The CIA, however,

supported its strong objections in briefings

and negotiations with the Board, and eventually convinced the Review Board that the

harm in releasing information about off i c i a l

cover outweighed any additional information

that assassination re s e a rchers might gain fro m

knowing details about official cover.

l. Alias documentation.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA employees and agents use aliases and the CIA creates documentation to support its employees’ and agents’ aliases. The Review Board

released information that revealed that CIA

employees and agents used aliases. The

Board protected specific details about how

CIA documents particular aliases.

ii. Commentary. The CIA argued that it

currently uses alias documentation and that

aliases are vital to CIA’s performance of its

intelligence operations. The CIA also argued

that the Review Board’s release of specific

information about alias documentation

would not be useful to assassination

re s e a rchers. The Review Board members

accepted CIA’s arguments, primarily because

they agreed that the public interest in the

specific details about alias documentation

was low. The Review Board determined that

it did not want the CIA to spend a large

amount of time gathering evidence in support of postponements that were of low public interest and, thus, it did not require the

CIA to provide evidence in support of every

postponement relating to alias documentation.

m. Foreign intelligence cooperation.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board postponed references to foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board vigorously debated the issue of foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA a n d

demanded extensive evidence and multiple

briefings from the CIA on the subject.

Though in some instances Board members

judged that the information might add to the

historical understanding of the assassination,

the Review Board, with some dissent, determined that the evidence to postpone the

information outweighed this potential value.

n. Human sources in FBI foreign 

counterintelligence (assets).

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board evaluated the need to postpone the

identity of human sources in foreign counterintelligence operations on a case-by-case

basis. Where the human source was a foreign

national, the Review Board generally agreed

to protect the individual’s identity unless the

individual’s connection with the FBI was

already known to the foreign government at

issue. Where the human source was a United

States citizen interacting with foreign govern -

ment officials, the Review Board sometimes

released the identity of the individual if the

public interest in the name of the asset was

high. Where the human source was a United

States citizen interacting with other United

States citizens, the Review Board tended to

evaluate the release of the source’s name

more like other domestic informants.

ii. Commentary. In its position paper, the

FBI defined “intelligence source” as “any

56
individual who has provided or is currently

providing information pertaining to national

security matters, the disclosure of which

could reasonably be expected to result in

damage to the FBI’s intelligence and counterintelligence-gathering capabilities.” 

The FBI off e red the following arguments in

support of its request to keep intelligence

s o u rces’ identities secret: (1) Review Board

d i s c l o s u re of intelligence sources would harm

the FBI’s ability to develop and maintain new

and existing sources, because sources would

reasonably believe that the government

would reveal their identities, and (2) disclos u re of intelligence sources may subject the

s o u rces, their friends, and their families to

physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism. 

The Review Board’s interpretation of the

“clear and convincing” evidence standard

re q u i red it to reject the FBI’s general policy

a rguments, and instead re q u i red the FBI to

p resent asset-specific evidence that explained

the particular harm that the FBI expected the

asset to face if the Review Board voted to disclose his or her identity. As a general rule, the

Review Board usually protected the identities

of foreign nationals who could be pro s e c u t e d

in their home countries for espionage. Likewise, where the asset was a United States citizen interacting with foreign government off icials, the Review Board considered whether

the individual was in a position of trust with

the foreign government and whether he or

she might be in danger if the Review Board

disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI.

Unlike the above-re f e renced scenarios, the

s o u rce who was a United States citizen interact -

ing with other United States citizens was generally evaluated according to the Board ’ s

domestic informant standards. 

o. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a general

rule, the Review Board believed that most

aspects of the FBI’s foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc

countries during the cold war period were

well-known, were of high public interest,

and were not eligible for postponement pursuant to § 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act. 

ii. Commentary and overview of foreign

counterintelligence appeals. The FBI’s assassination re c o rds contain information that

reveal many of the FBI’s foreign counterintelligence activities during the cold war period.

Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board

considered how it could release as much

information as possible in the records without jeopardizing operations that still require

protection.

In spring 1996, the

Review Board considere d

and voted on a group of

FBI re c o rds relating to the

FBI’s foreign counterintelligence activities. In

response to the Review

B o a rd’s requests for evidence on the fore i g n

c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e

re c o rds, the FBI had provided its “position paper”

on foreign counterintelligence activities. In its

p a p e r, the FBI defined

“intelligence activities” as

“intelligence gathering action or techniques

utilized by the FBI against a targeted individual or organization that has been determined

to be of national security interest.” The FBI’s

primary argument in support of its request for

continued secrecy of intelligence activities

was that disclosure of specific information

describing intelligence activities would re v e a l

to hostile entities the FBI’s targets and priorities, thereby allowing hostile entities to

develop countermeasure s .

Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement. In

addition, the JFK Act’s legislative history

instructed the Review Board to consider a

variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and

methods, including the age of the record,

whether the use of a particular source or

method is already well-known by the public,

whether the source or method is inherently

secret, or whether the information collected

was secret.27

The Review Board considered the FBI’s evidence and weighed it against public interest

in the records. After careful consideration,

the Review Board decided to release some

foreign counterintelligence information. The

Board’s primary reason for releasing such

57

In all cases where the Review

Board is considering postponement, it should keep the withheld information to an absolute

minimum, and ensure that the

postponement is narrowly

drawn for the shortest possible

d u r a t i o n . In so doing, t h e

Review Board should release as

m u ch information from the

records as is possible.

—Senate Report on JFK Act,

July 22, 1992
records was its belief that the FBI’s evidence

did not enumerate specific harms that would

result from disclosure. 

A. The FBI’s May 1996 Appeals to the

President. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI

appealed to the President to overturn the

Board’s vote on 17 records relating to the

FBI’s surveillance of officials and establishments of four Communist countries—the

Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and

Poland—during the 1960s. The FBI’s overarching arguments were that disclosure of the

information would reveal sensitive sources

and methods that would compromise the

national security of the United States, and

that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance—the four Communist countries—

would harm the foreign relations of the

United States. 

The FBI sought to postpone five types of

source and method capabilities: tracing of

funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs),

mail cover, electronic surveillance, and typewriter and fingerprint identification. The

Review Board’s response briefs to the President dealt with each source or method in

turn. Specific details regarding the appeal of

each issue are discussed below.

In response to the FBI’s overarching argument that disclosure of the information

would reveal sensitive sources and methods

and compromise the national security, the

Review Board responded that if the national

security would be harmed by release of this

information, the harm would have already

occurred, since the FBI had already released

both the identities of the target countries and

the sources and methods that the FBI used in

its operations.

In response to the FBI’s arguments that disc l o s u re of the targets of the surveillance

would harm the foreign relations of the United

States, the Review Board responded in three

parts. F i r s t, the information that the FBI

sought to protect is widely available in the

public domain, from both official government sources and secondary sources, so if

foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of

the information, then the harm has already

o c c u r red. S e c o n d , the FBI simply did not

prove its argument that it may have violated

international law or “diplomatic standards”

by employing the sources or methods at issue

since the FBI did not cite the laws or treaties

to which it referred and the Review Board

could not locate any laws or treaties that

were in effect at the time that the records

were created. Third, despite the FBI’s assertion to the contrary, the Review Board had

evidence that other governments do acknowledge that, in past years, they conducted foreign counterintelligence operations against

other countries.

The Review Board believed that the FBI had

not provided evidence of a “significant,

demonstrable harm” to current foreign re l ations or intelligence work. Thus, the Board

asked the President to deny the FBI’s re q u e s t s

for postponement. The White House did not

e x p ressly rule on the appeals. Instead, after

several meetings involving re p re s e n t a t i v e s

f rom the Review Board, the FBI, and the White

House, the White House directed the FBI to

p rovide the Review Board with specific evidence in support of its postponements. The

White House requested the Review Board to

reconsider the Bureau’s specific evidence. The

FBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of its

pending appeals, including some re c o rds in

which the Review Board voted to re l e a s e

information obtained from a technical source. 

B. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After further negotiations, the Review Board and the

FBI agreed to release most information

re g a rding its foreign counterintelligence

activities against Communist Bloc countries

as “consent releases.” In those few cases

where the Bureau believed that foreign counterintelligence activity against Communist

Bloc countries still required protection, the

Bureau submitted for the Board’s determination postponement-specific evidence.

To the extent that the information in the FBI’s

p roposed redaction did not meaningfully

contribute to the understanding of the assassination, the Review Board allowed the FBI

to postpone direct discussions of fore i g n

counterintelligence activities against n o nCommunist Bloc countries. With regard to

the FBI’s “segregated collections,” the

Review Board stated in its segreated collection guidelines, 

It is presumed that the FBI will, at least

partially, carry over its post-appeal stan58
dards for disclosing foreign counterintelligence activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the

HSCA subjects reflect foreign counterintelligence activities against other

nations that have not been addressed by

the Review Board in the “core” files, the

FBI will be allowed to redact direct discussion of such activities, unless the

information in the proposed redaction

meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination. 

p. Information that reveals the FBI’s

investigative interest in a diplomatic 

establishment or diplomatic personnel.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board released information that revealed that

the FBI had an investigative interest in Communist Bloc countries’ diplomatic establishments and personnel. Likewise, the Review

Board generally agreed to protect information that reveals that the FBI has an investigative interest in a non-Communist Bloc

foreign diplomatic establishment or in foreign personnel. 

ii. Commentary. In the FBI’s May 1996

appeals to the President, the overriding issue

was whether the FBI could, in 1996, keep

secret its 1960s investigative interest in the

diplomatic establishments and personnel of

Communist Bloc countries. (For a full discussion of the Review Board’s decisionmaking

with regard to the FBI’s foreign counterintelligence activities, see section B.3.o.2.B above.)

q. Technical sources in FBI foreign 

counterintelligence.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

B o a rd usually released nearly all general

information and some specific information

(or operational details) regarding the FBI’s

n o n - c u r rent technical sources where the

source provided information on Communist

Bloc targets.

“General” information is information that

the FBI obtains from its technical sources on

Communist Bloc countries’ diplomatic establishments and personnel, including transcripts from electronic surveillance. “ S p ecific” information is information regarding

installation, equipment, location, transmittal,

and routing of technical sources. The Review

B o a rd evaluated “specific” information

about technical sources on a case-by-case

basis, agreeing to sustain postponements

provided that the FBI proved that the “operational detail” at issue was currently utilized

and not officially disclosed.

As a general rule, the Review Board agreed

to postpone until the year 2017 symbol and

file numbers for technical sources provided

that the source was still properly classified

pursuant to the current executive order. The

Review Board released classified symbol and

file numbers for technical sources if the number had been previously released in a similar

context, or if the source was of significant

interest to the public. The Review Board

a g reed that the phrases, “source symbol

number” and “source file number” would

provide adequate substitute language.

Even for that material which did not contribute in a meaningful way to the understanding of the assassination, the Review

Board still released as much information as

possible about the FBI’s use of technical

s o u rces in its foreign counterintelligence

activities against non-Communist Bloc countries. In these less relevant cases, the Review

Board did, however, often protect the identity of the country that was the target of the

FBI’s surveillance. The Review Board was

m o re willing to protect specific details

regarding installation, equipment, location,

transmittal, and routing of technical sources

where the FBI proved (1) that the source currently required protection, and (2) that the

U.S. government had not officially disclosed

the source.

ii. Commentary. The legislative history

for the JFK Act mentions that the Review

Board could release information that specifically identifies “listening devices on telephones.” The history states that these are an

“intelligence source or method” that should

not be postponed in circumstances where

they are “already well-known by the

public.”28

The Review Board believed that the FBI’s use

of non-human sources or methods (e.g., electronic surveillance and “black bag jobs”) in

f o reign counterintelligence operations

against Communist Bloc countries’ diplo59
matic establishments and personnel was, in

many aspects, a matter of official public

record. The FBI appealed to the President a

number of Review Board decisions involving

non-human sources or methods. The Review

Board staff called to the President’s attention

those prior disclosures that were relevant to

deciding the issues on appeal. 

In its May 10, 1996, appeal of the Review

Board’s decisions on foreign counterintelligence records, the FBI requested that the

President override the Review Board’s decisions to release information that related to

electronic intercepts of telephone and teletype communications involving Communist

Bloc officials. In its appeal briefs, the FBI

argued that the identities of its electronic surveillance targets were secret. The Review

Board collected a large body of evidence

proving that, at least with regard to Communist-Bloc countries, the government has

a l ready acknowledged that the FBI conducted extensive technical surveillance of

foreign establishments during the 1960s. In

fact, the official public record and secondary

sources revealed information regarding wiretaps and electronic surveillance against foreigners and foreign establishments that was

more specific than information that the FBI

sought to protect.

Although the President did not make a decision, the FBI ultimately agreed to release general information acknowledging that the FBI

had technical sources against Communist

Bloc targets during the Cold War period.

r. Other classified file numbers relating to FBI

foreign counterintelligence.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board generally agreed to protect classified

file numbers in FBI foreign counterintelligence files, provided the FBI could prove that

the file number corresponded to a current

and ongoing operation. However, where the

FBI had released a particular classified file

number in other contexts, the Review Board

voted to release the number.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board

agreed that file numbers corresponding to

current and ongoing intelligence operations

w e re entitled to protection under section

6(1)(B) and (C). The only question, then, was

whether the Review Board would allow the

FBI to protect classified file numbers when

the corresponding operation was no longer

current. The Review Board took the position

that non-current classified file numbers were

not entitled to protection. In its May 28, 1996,

appeal on foreign counterintelligence

records, the FBI argued that if the Review

Board released classified file numbers for terminated operations, that release would

prompt people to file FOIA requests for the

underlying files, “resulting inevitably in

more and more information from the file

being released.”29 In its response, the Review

Board stated simply that “[m]aking it more

difficult for researchers to file FOIA requests

is not among the reasons for postponement

provided by the JFK Act.” 

The President did not decide the issues on

appeal, but the FBI ultimately agreed to re l e a s e

some non-current classified file numbers.

s. FBI mail cover in foreign counterintelli -

gence investigations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board released information that revealed that

the FBI conducted mail cover operations

against the Soviet Embassy in the 1960s. The

Review Board did not encounter a gre a t

number of additional records regarding mail

cover operations. When the Review Board

did encounter mail cover operations in other

FBI records, it released the information at

issue unless the FBI could provide evidence

that the operation was still ongoing and

required protection. The Review Board did

not relax its standard on this issue in the segregated collection files.

ii. Commentary. With re g a rd to the FBI’s

use of mail cover, the Review Board had to

decide whether and to what extent it should

reveal the Bureau’s use of this method in conducting foreign counterintelligence activities.

The Review Board used the same reasoning it

employed for other foreign counterintelligence activities—mainly that foreign counterintelligence operations against the USSR and

other Communist Bloc countries during the

Cold War no longer merit protection. Moreo v e r, the Review Board believed that the public is already well aware that the FBI used the

methodology of mail cover and, thus, such

operations should not be pro t e c t e d .

60
In its May 10, 1996, appeal to the President,

the FBI asked the President to overturn the

Board’s decision to release information from

two documents that the FBI alleged would

reveal that the FBI engaged in a “mail cover”

operation against the Soviet Embassy in

Washington, D.C. in 1963. The Bureau argued

that the “[h]ow, when where, and [the] circumstances” of its mail cover operation were

among its most “closely guarded secrets.” 

The Review Board responded that the information that the Bureau sought to redact had

a l ready been released. In the 1970s, the

Church Committee disclosed the mail cover

operation at issue—the “Z-coverage” program. In addition, the Review Board produced three previously released assassination records in which the FBI disclosed that

the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. was

targeted under the “Z-coverage” program, a

program that the document discloses existed

pursuant to an agreement with the Post

Office. As with the other foreign counterintelligence records that the FBI appealed, the

FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and

began to treat this type of information as a

consent release.

t. FBI tracing of funds in foreign

counterintelligence investigations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

B o a rd released information that disclosed

that the FBI was capable of tracking funds

and examining bank accounts of Communist

Bloc enterprises during the Cold War era.

ii. Commentary. The issue arose re g a rding the FBI’s tracing of funds as to whether

the Review Board should release the FBI’s

monitoring of financial re c o rds and bank

accounts for the purpose of investigating

espionage. The Review Board decided that

since the U.S. government had pre v i o u s l y

disclosed this method to the public, it

should not protect the information. The

Review Board voted to release FBI re c o rd s

re g a rding tracing of funds transferred to

Oswald in Russia and re c o rds re g a rding the

FBI’s ability to track funds from diplomatic

establishments. 

In its May 10, 1996, appeal to the President,

the FBI and the Department of State asked

the President to overturn the Review Board’s

decision to release information from six documents related to the FBI’s ability to track

funds from diplomatic establishments. The

FBI and the Department of State argued, first,

that disclosure would reveal sensitive

sources and methods, and second, that disclosure would reveal that Soviet government

bank accounts were the target of FBI counterintelligence activities.

The Review Board responded that the

“sources and methods” employed in tracking

of funds already has been disclosed. The

Board cited FBI documents that reveal the

FBI’s ability to trace funds, as well as other

federal government records that explained

that the FBI engaged in covert examination of

financial records and bank accounts in order

to determine whether an individual was

engaged in espionage. In addition, the

Review Board noted that the FBI cannot now

classify that the Soviet government was the

principal target of the Bureau’s foreign counterintelligence activities in the United States,

again citing FBI documents as well as a

lengthy list of publicly available federal government publications that disclosed the FBI’s

interest in Soviet financial activities in the

United States. In late 1996, the National Security Agency and the CIA removed whatever

fig leaf remained covering the FBI’s tracing of

funds. In the NSA/CIA joint publication,

Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American

Response 1939-1957 (Robert Louis Benson &

Michael Wa r n e r, eds., 1996), the agencies

released records that explicitly stated that the

FBI monitored Soviet bank accounts in the

United States. The Venona releases also show

that the Soviets knew about the FBI’s monitoring of their finances in the 1940s. 

The Review Board concluded that previous

official disclosures of the FBI’s ability to trace

funds in foreign counterintelligence investigations prevented the FBI from making a

convincing argument that the method

remained a secret. The White House did not

make a decision on the appealed records.

Ultimately, the Bureau agreed to release the

documents at issue.

u. FBI physical surveillance.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board released information that disclosed

that physical surveillance is a method that

61
the FBI employs in conducting investigations. Moreover, the Review Board specifically released information that the FBI conducted physical surveillance in its foreign

counterintelligence investigations against

Communist Bloc countries.

ii. Commentary. In the course of many

FBI investigations, physical surveillance is

not a classified operation and thus would

not be protectable under section 6(1). Howe v e r, as part of its May 10, 1996, appeal to

P resident Clinton, the FBI requested that the

P resident overturn the Review Board’s decision to release one document because it

revealed that the FBI conducted physical

surveillance on the Soviet Embassy and that

it kept a “lookout log” that re c o rded visitors

to the Embassy. 

The Review Board voted to release the record

because the FBI had not offered adequate evidence in support of its redactions and

because it was important to the story.

The Review Board again stressed the statutory requirement that the FBI provide document-specific, clear and convincing evidence

in support of its proposed redactions. In its

response brief, the Review Board noted that

the FBI had previously officially acknowledged the particular physical surveillance

operation that the document at issue

revealed, and that former Director Webster

had publicly acknowledged that the FBI conducts physical surveillance and used the

physical surveillance of the Russian Embassy

as an example. 

The Review Board concluded that previous

o fficial disclosures of the FBI’s physical

surveillance of the Soviet Embassy prevented

the FBI from making any plausible or convincing argument that the method was one

that should remain secret. The FBI ultimately

withdrew its appeal of the Board’s decision

on “lookout logs.”30

The Review Board also took the position that,

even in documents where the Board might

agree to protect the identity of a particularly

sensitive target of the FBI’s physical surveillance, the fact that the FBI uses the method of

physical surveillance in conducting investigations is not secret and is not eligible for

postponement.

v. Operational details concerning Department

of Defense operations.

i. Review Board guidelines. In many military records, particularly Joint Chiefs of Staff

records and Army records, the Review Board

often upheld agency requests for postponements under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.

The Review Board protected details of force

deployments (i.e., numbers of ships, aircraft,

troops, warheads, etc.), details concerning

precise targeting information, details of proposed operational activities or OPLANs, and

information that revealed real-world exercise

situations or real-world threat environments.

The Department of Defense had to provide

evidence that disclosure of the information

today, because the similarity of some currently proposed combat operations or

OPLANs, was so close to those used in the

documents in question that it would demonstrably impair the national security of the

United States. 

The Review Board substituted the phrase

“operational details” wherever it agreed to

the above-referenced postponements.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board

e n c o u n t e red operational details when it

reviewed the first large groups of military

records on Cuba and Vietnam policy.

w. National Security Agency sources 

and methods.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board generally protected National Security

Agency sources and methods such as targeting, intercept, and transmission indicators,

internal production indicators, and routing

and dissemination information unless the

Review Board determined that the specific

source or method was important to an understanding of the assassination or events surrounding the assassination

ii. Commentary. With re g a rd to signals

intelligence (SIGINT), NSA informed the

Review Board that specific information

revealed in raw intercept traffic or intercept

reporting can provide a great deal of information to foreign entities on U.S. government targeting, intercept, and cryptographic

capabilities which could harm current SIGINT capabilities. Revealing to a foreign gov62
ernment or entity that the U.S. government

was capable of targeting and reading some or

all of their communications, even in 1963,

could provide information to that government or entity as to whether NSAhas the targeting, intercept, and cryptographic capabilities to read similar communications today.

NSA’s position was that it is often not the

basic information contained in the intercept

but rather the fact of the intercept or the specific technical details of how and from where

the intercept was acquired that requires protection. The Review Board protected NSA

information such as specific details like

transmission times, transmission methods,

geographic locations, and government buildings or military unit numbers where the

Board determined that such information was

not important to an understanding of the

events surrounding the assassination. 

x. National Security Agency intercept traffic.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review

Board generally protected National Security

Agency intercept traffic unless the Review

Board determined that the specific source or

method was important to an understanding

of the assassination or events surrounding

the assassination

ii. Commentary. NSA’s position is that

the nature of intercept traffic is such that it

picks up a wide variety of information and a

significant amount of non-relevant information. NSA summaries of intercept traffic usually examine a wide variety of intercepts on

many different subjects worldwide. Thus, the

Review Board protected blocks of information where it believed the information did

not appear to be relevant to an understanding of the Kennedy assassination story. The

Review Board developed substitute language

that described NSA information that it voted

to postpone.

4. Personal Privacy

Text of Section 6(3)

. . . clear and convincing evidence that the

public disclosure of the assassination record

could reasonably be expected to constitute

an unwarranted invasion of personal pri -

vacy, and that invasion of privacy is so sub -

stantial that it outweighs the public interest

a. Personal privacy generally.

i. Review Board guidelines. During the

course of the Review Board’s work, the

B o a rd almost never agreed to sustain

agency’s requests for postponements on personal privacy grounds. The two exceptions to

the Review Board’s policy to release records

with privacy postponements were social

security numbers and information about

prisoners of war. The Review Board determined that the public interest in disclosure of

social security numbers was so small that any

risk of harm would outweigh it. Accordingly,

the Board routinely protected social security

numbers throughout assassination records.

Likewise, the Board protected significant

amounts of information in files of prisoners

of war, as explained below.

In the segregated collections, the FBI rarely

requested that the Review Board sustain privacy postponements, and so the FBI unilaterally released the information that would fall

into the category of “personal privacy” information. In some segregated collection

records, the Review Board agreed to postpone personal privacy information where

agencies provided the Review Board with

evidence that the person in question is alive,

living in the same area, the public interest in

the information is extremely low, and the

individual would truly suffer a substantial

intrusion of privacy if the Board releases the

information. For example, the Review Board

agreed to sustain the postponement of the

identity of a 13-year-old girl who was a rape

victim. The name in question appeared in the

file of an organized crime figure who was

himself only of marginal relevance to the

assassination story.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board began

its document review work in its closed meeting

on January 25, 1995. At that meeting, the

Review Board discussed personal privacy

information in four Warren Commission

re c o rds, but did not vote on the four re c o rds at

that meeting, opting instead to defer final decision on the re c o rds. On March 6 and 7, 1995, the

Review Board staff presented to the Review

B o a rd a briefing book on personal privacy

postponements. The Board’s General Counsel

p rovided the Board with a memorandum that

identified several types of information that

would potentially implicate privacy concerns.

63
The Review Board discussed the scope and

intent of section 6(3) and how the personal privacy provisions of the JFK Act might apply to

18 sample documents. At the end of the meeting, the Review Board again decided that it

would defer a vote on the re c o rds and on the

personal privacy postponements in general.

Later in 1995, the Review Board made its first

decisions on privacy issues.

Although the Review Board expected that it

would encounter a number of personal privacy postponments, the FBI and CIA d i d

not request many postponments citing section 6(3).

In one case, the FBI appealed to the President

the Review Board’s vote to release information about a prominent Warren Commission

critic that the FBI requested be postponed on

personal privacy grounds. The Review Board

c a refully considered the privacy concerns

involved and requested that the President

uphold the Board’s decision to release the

important information in the record. As of

this writing, the White House had not

resolved the issues on appeal.

b. Prisoner of War issues

i . Review Board guidelines. Military re c o rd s

that contained information re g a rding Kore a n

War prisoners contained issues of personal

privacy that the Review Board resolved in the

following manner. The Review Board determined that it would release the name of the

POW subject of interest, dates and basic facts

of his imprisonment, any documents describing or quoting written or oral statements

made by the POW subject of interest for the

imprisoning authority during his confinement, and debriefing statements the POW

subject of interest made about himself, or any

statements others made about him. The

Review Board agreed to postpone until the

year 2008 personal identifiers of both the subject of interest and all other individuals mentioned in the subject’s debriefing file (e . g ., date

and place of birth and military service number), the names of those who made statements

about the subject of interest during debriefings,

and all statements made during debriefings

about POWs other than the subject of intere s t .

ii. Commentary. The Review Board was

eventually confronted with the challenge of

deciding whether, and how, privacy postponements requested under Section 6 (3) of

the JFK Act would be applied to Korean War

POW records in general, and specifically, to

POW debriefing records, in cases where the

Review Board deemed the individual at issue

to be relevant to the assassination. Initially,

the Army and the Defense Prisoner of

War/Missing Personnel Management Office

(DPMO) requested that the Review Board

sustain postponements of all prisoner of war

debriefing records on privacy grounds. Ultimately, the Review Board and the Army

came to agreement that the Review Board

could release the most relevant information

in POW records without causing an unwarranted infringement on personal privacy.

The Army requested that the Review Board

postpone information for 10 years, until

2008, on the basis of its belief that most surviving POWs from the Korean conflict

would be deceased by that time. The subject

of POW re c o rds from the Vietnam war or

other conflicts did not come before the

Review Board .

c. Names of individuals in Secret Service

“threat sheets.”

i. Review Board guidelines. Because of high

public interest in the information, the Review

B o a rd voted to release the identities of individuals who threatened President Kennedy

even where the Secret Service maintained

mental health re c o rds and other personal

information concerning such individuals.

ii. Commentary. The Secret Service kept

re c o rds on individuals whom the Secret Service’s Protective Research Section conside red to be potential threats to Pre s i d e n t

K e n n e d y, Vice President Johnson, and their

families, between March and December

1963. HSCA s t a ff member Eileen Dinneen

reviewed the Secret Service files and kept

detailed notes on the material that she

reviewed. Dinneen’s documents identified

the names of the individuals, and contained

condensed information about their personal

b a c k g round and affiliations. In some cases,

the documents contained brief information

about an individual’s mental health history.

Although the Secret Service did not oppose

the release of the text of these documents, it

a rgued that many of the names should be

64
postponed pursuant to Section 6(3) of the

JFK Act as an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 

The Review Board afforded the Secret Service

the opportunity to present clear and convincing evidence as to why the names in the documents should be postponed. Through written submissions and oral presentations, the

Secret Service primarily offered policy reasons in support of its arguments for postponement of the names. After carefully considering the Secret Service’s arguments, the

Review Board determined that the Secret Service had not met its statutory burden of proof

by “clear and convincing evidence,” and

voted to release four re c o rds, including

names, in April 1998. 

The Secret Service appealed the Review

B o a rd’s decision to the President, and

included with their appeal numerous letters

f rom mental health professionals. The Secre t

Service enlisted the assistance of the mental

health community in defending its ability to

cooperate with that community in performing its duty of protecting government off icials. The Secret Service had not pro v i d e d

the Review Board with such letters when it

requested that the Board protect the names

that it provided to the President. In its re p l y

to the Secret Service’s appeal, the Review

B o a rd argued that the Secret Service failed to

meet its statutory burden of proof with

respect to the postponement of these names,

and urged the President to release these historically significant documents in full.3 1 As of

this writing, the White House had not made

a decision as to whether to uphold or overturn the Review Board’s votes. The Review

B o a rd believes that the re c o rds, including

the names, should be opened and stro n g l y

u rged the President to uphold the Review

B o a rd’s decisions.

5. Informant Postponements

Text of Sections 6(2) and 6(4)

section (2). . . clear and convincing evidence

that the public disclosure of the assassina -

tion record would reveal the name or iden -

tity of a living person who provided confi -

dential information to the United States and

would pose a substantial risk of harm to that

person

section (4). . . clear and convincing evidence

that the public disclosure of the assassina -

tion record would compromise the existence

of an understanding of confidentiality cur -

rently requiring protection between a Gov -

ernment agent and a cooperating individual

or a foreign government, and public disclo -

sure would be so harmful that it outweighs

the public interest;

a. Informant postponements generally.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a general

rule, the Review Board did not postpone

information that would reveal the identity of

an informant unless the FBI could pro v i d e ,

at least, evidence that the informant was

alive and still living in the same area. The

Review Board recognized two significant

exceptions to the general rule. First, even

w h e re the FBI provided such evidence, the

Review Board released informant identities

if it found that the informant’s identity was

of high public interest. Second, the Review

B o a rd did, in some cases, allow postponement of informant identities even though the

FBI could not provide evidence that the

informant was alive and living in the same

a rea if the FBI could prove that disclosure

would subject the informant to a significant

t h reat of harm.

Where a person’s relationship with the FBI

had already been made public, the Review

Board did not agree to protect the fact of the

relationship between the government and

the individual.

ii. Commentary.

A. A note on the statutory framework for

review of FBI informant postponements. The

FBI initially cited sections 6(2) and 6(4) in

support of informant postponements. Section 6(2) clearly re q u i red that the Bure a u

p rove that the informant was living and that

the informant faced a substantial risk of

harm if the Review Board released the information. Because section 6(2) re q u i red informant-specific evidence, the FBI decided to

rely exclusively on Section 6(4) for informant postponements, and not Section 6(2)—

even though most of the re c o rds, as originally processed by the FBI, re f e r red to both

subsections in support of informant postponements. 

65
B. History of Review Board’s decision-making on

informant postponements. The Review Board

first considered informant postponements in

its meeting on May 2 and 3, 1995. The FBI’s

initial evidence in support of informant

postponements consisted of a briefing that

FBI officials gave to the Review Board, followed by the FBI’s “position papers” on confidential informant postponements. In the

position paper, the FBI distinguished among

informants, explaining that informants diff e r

depending on the type of information they

p rovided to the FBI and the level of confidentiality that existed between the FBI and

the informant at the time that the informant

p rovided the information. The FBI further

explained that, whether or not the FBI

e x p ressly promised to keep informant

names confidential, they had a “moral contract” with people who provided the FBI

with information. 

After hearing the FBI’s general policy arguments, the Review Board informed the FBI

that it interpreted the “clear and convincing”

evidence standard to require the agencies to

provide very specific evidence tailored to

individual postponements. 

In the summer of 1995, the Review Board

considered four documents containing informant postponements. Three of the documents concerned symbol number informants. The fourth document disclosed the

name of a deceased informant. Because the

FBI did not present document-specific evidence in support of its postponements, the

B o a rd voted to release the re c o rds. On

August 11, 1995, the FBI appealed to the President the Review Board’s decisions on those

four records. The FBI argued that disclosure

of informant information would result in the

following harms: first, harm to existing informants; second, harm to the FBI’s ability to

re c ruit new informants and its ability to

obtain cooperation from existing informants,

and third, harm to the government’s “word”

since disclosure results in a breach of a

promise of confidentiality.

In its response briefs to the President, the

Review Board emphasized the JFK Act’s clear

and convincing evidence standard and

explained that speculative harm does not provide sufficient grounds for withholding of

information. In addition, the Review Board

o ff e red examples of prior releases that had not

resulted in expected harm. The FBI did agre e

to provide particularized evidence on three of

the four documents. The FBI’s evidence was to

interview the informants to determine

whether they would object to having their

identities disclosed. Of course, all of the informants or their relatives objected to disclosure

of their identities. Upon receipt of the FBI’s

evidence, the Review Board re c o n s i d e red the

informant postponements and determined

that it would release all information except for

the numeric portion of the symbol numbers.

The Review Board’s September 28, 1995, letter to the FBI informing the FBI of its decisions on the documents provided useful and

specific guidance as to what type of evidence

the Review Board was looking for—interviewing informants would not be necessary,

nor would the Review Board find it useful.

Instead, the Review Board needed to know

whether informants were still alive and

whether the informant file contained corroborating evidence of harm that would befall

the informant if his identity were disclosed.

Ultimately, the FBI was able to satisfy the

Review Board’s requests for evidence on

informant issues by providing information

that was available at FBI headquarters.

After the FBI appealed the Review Board ’ s

decisions on four informant re c o rds, the FBI

eventually eliminated general policy arg uments from its evidence submissions and

p rovided evidence in support of informant

postponements on standard forms titled

“Informant Postponement Evidence Form.”

Once the Review Board received the FBI’s

specific evidence, it developed a group of

guidelines for the review of informant postp o n e m e n t s .

C. Effect of prior disclosure s. If the name

of an informant in a particular re c o rd had

a l ready been released in a context that d i s c l o s e d

the informant relationship with the FBI, then the

Review Board released the name. If an informant symbol number in a particular re c o rd had

a l ready been released in a context where the

same informant symbol number provided the

same information as in the re c o rd at issue, the

Review Board released the symbol number. 

As a practical matter, both the FBI and the

Review Board made an effort to track the

66
names and symbol numbers of FBI informants whose relationships with the FBI had

already been made public. When Review

Board staff members encountered informant

names or symbol numbers that were eligible

for postponement, staff members researched

whether the name or symbol number had

a l ready been released. Similarly, the FBI

maintained and checked an informant card

file that tracked those informant names and

symbol numbers that had been publicly disclosed and in what contexts.

b. Individuals who provided information to

the FBI, but who did not have an ongoing

confidential relationship with the FBI.

i. Review Board guidelines. Where an individual provided information to the FBI and

requested that the FBI protect his or her identity, but the FBI provided no evidence of an ongo -

ing confidential relationship with the individual,

the Review Board voted to disclose all identifying information about that individual.

ii. Commentary. When the FBI first began

to present evidence to the Review Board in

defense of its attempts to protect its informants, it asked that the Review Board protect

the identity of any individual who either

expressly or implicitly requested confidentiality when providing information to the

Bureau. Persons who provide information in

exchange for express promises of confidentiality may include neighbors or other

acquaintances of a subject of investigation, as

well as employees of state and local governments, financial institutions, airlines, or

hotels. According to the FBI, 

Where such a promise is given, documents containing such information will

contain the name of the person providing the information as well as language

specifically setting forth the fact that

confidentiality was requested. No file is

opened on such persons and no symbol

numbers are assigned to protect their

identities.32

I n i t i a l l y, the FBI’s policy was to protect “the

identities of persons who gave the FBI information to which they had access by virtue of

their employment,” re g a rdless of whether

“their providing the information). .. i n v o l v e [ d ]

a breach of trust,” provided that the person in

question requested confidentiality. More o v e r,

the FBI implied that, even where a request for

confidentiality is not explicit on the face of the

document, the identities of such persons will

be withheld in cases where their providing the

information to the FBI involved a “breach of

t rust” (e . g ., a phone company employee who

gives out an unlisted number.) 

The Review Board rejected the FBI’s argument and voted to release the names pursuant to Section 6(4) of the JFK Act. Section

6(4) required that the FBI provide clear and

convincing evidence that disclosure would

compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a government agent and a

cooperating individual. That the individual

lacked one of the Bureau’s many informant

designations (e.g., potential security informant (“PSI”), potential criminal informant

(“PCI”), panel source, established sourc e ,

informant symbol number) suggested to the

Review Board that the individual did not

have an ongoing relationship with the FBI. To

the extent that the FBI believes that a particular “protect identity” source did have an

ongoing relationship with the FBI, it provided evidence to the Review Board of the

relationship. Without the benefit of such evidence, the Review Board assumed that “protect identity” sources were not sources with

an “understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection.” The Review

Board learned that FBI agents often offered

confidentiality as a matter of course to interviewees, whether or not the individual

requested or required confidentiality. Eventually, the Review Board and the FBI agreed

that the FBI would release the names of these

individuals unilaterally.

c. Individuals who gave the FBI information

to which they had access by virtue of their

employment.

i. Review Board guidelines. The FBI unilaterally released the identities of individuals

who gave the FBI information to which they

had access by virtue of their employment,

such as telephone company employees and

utility employees.

ii. Commentary. Until the summer of 1995,

the FBI protected the identities of all persons

who gave the FBI information to which they

67
had access by virtue of their employment provided one of the two following circ u m s t a n c e s

existed: (1) the employee requested confident i a l i t y, or (2) the employee’s providing the

information involved a breach of trust (e . g . , a

phone company employee who gave out an

unlisted number.) The Review Board believed

that disclosure of the identities of such individuals would not subject the individuals to

the type of harm that the JFK Act re q u i red to

sustain informant postponements. Once the

Review Board voted to release the identities of

persons who gave the FBI information to

which they had access by virtue of their

employment, the FBI acquiesced and proceeded to release unilaterally the identities of

such individuals.

d. Deceased informants.

i. Review Board guidelines. With very few

exceptions, the Review Board released the

identities of deceased informants in the core

and related files.

In the segregated collection files, the Review

Board did not require that the FBI provide

evidence that an informant was alive to sustain a postponement unless the Review Board

staff member had some reason to believe that

the informant was deceased. Thus, unless the

informant was of relatively high public interest, the Review Board voted to protect the

informant’s identity. In the cases where a

staff member had a reason to believe that an

informant was deceased, the staff did request

the FBI to provide evidence concerning the

informant and released the informant’s identity if the informant was deceased.

ii. Commentary. A “named informant” is

an individual whose name appeared in

assassination re c o rds and who had some

type of ongoing confidential re l a t i o n s h i p

with the FBI. The FBI records often refer to

such informants as “PSIs” (potential security

informants) or “PCIs” (potential criminal

informants), but “established sourc e s , ”

“panel sources,” and others also fell into the

category of “named informants.” The Review

Board attempted to categorize informants

according to the level of confidentiality that

existed between the FBI and the informant.

While the Review Board was often willing to

sustain postponements of named informants

when the FBI could demonstrate that the

informant was still living, it believed that

deceased informants were generally not entitled to protection. 

However, in its response to the FBI’s informant appeals, the Review Board did state

that, in some rare cases, the FBI might be able

to prove clearly and convincingly that a

“confidential relationship” with a deceased

informant currently required protection. For

example, the FBI could have shown that the

relatives of a high-level organized crime

informant could still be at risk of retaliation. 

The Review Board debated extensively the

issue of what constituted adequate evidence

that an informant was currently living.

Specifically, the Board had to determine what

evidence was necessary to prove that someone who, according to a search of the FBI’s

computer databases, is now living, is in fact

the same individual named as an FBI informant.

U l t i m a t e l y, the Review Board determined

that the FBI must verify that the informant

was still alive by matching the informant’s

name plus date of birth or Social Security

number. The Review Board did not consider

name alone or name plus general location to

be adequate evidence that an informant was

still living.

e. “Negative Contacts”: Informants who 

provided no assassination-related 

information to the FBI.

i. Review Board guidelines. When an FBI

agent asked an informant for information on

a particular topic and the informant reported

that he or she had no information to provide,

the FBI called the contact a “negative contact.” Where the FBI adequately identified

the “negative contact” informant as still living, the Review Board agreed to postpone for

ten years “negative contact” named informants and all specific identifying information, such as street addresses, telephone

numbers, and informant-specific portions of

FBI case numbers and file numbers. A n

informant was “adequately identified as still

living” if the FBI identified him or her

through current information with a living

person with the same name and other specifically identifying information (e.g., name and

date of birth or Social Security number.)

68
Where the FBI did not adequately identify

the informant as still living, the Review

Board voted to release the name and any

accompanying identifying information.

The FBI unilaterally released all unclassified

“negative contact” symbol number informants. 

ii. Commentary. In the FBI’s early investigations into the assassination of President

Kennedy, Director Hoover ordered special

agents to ask all informants for re l e v a n t

information. Even when informants reported

that they knew nothing that would assist the

FBI in its investigation, FBI agents filed

reports in the assassination investigation file

documenting the “negative contact.”

As a result of Director Hoover’s broad directive to agents to question all informants concerning the assassination, the assassination

investigation file provides a reasonably comprehensive picture of the state of the FBI’s

informant network in late 1963 and early

1964. The FBI, of course, preferred that this

overview of its informant operations not be

disclosed to the public. The Review Board

acknowledged that the public had little or no

interest in knowing the identities of each

“negative contact” informant. At the same

time, the Review Board believed that the

public did have an interest in having accurate information concerning the FBI’s activities in the days and weeks following the

assassination. As a compromise, the FBI

agreed that it would unilaterally release all

unclassified negative contact symbol number

informants (on the theory that, with no additional information from or about the informant, no researcher could ever determine the

identity of the informant) and the Review

Board agreed that it would protect those

“negative contact” named informants that

were still alive (on the theory that, since they

provided no information about the assassination, there was little value to be gained from

disclosing the identities of hundreds of living

FBI informants.)

f. “Positive Contacts”: Informants who pro -

vided at least some assassination-related

information to the FBI.

i. Review Board guidelines. “Positive contact” informants provided at least s o m e

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related information. Where the

FBI adequately identified the informant as

still living, the Review Board adopted a caseby-case approach, considering the factors

listed in the commentary below. When the

Review Board voted to postpone the identity

of a “positive contact” informant, it voted to

postpone it for ten years, and adopted

a p p ropriate substitute language. The

Review Board released informant names if

the informant was of particular relevance to

the assassination. 

Where the FBI did not adequately identify

the informant as still living, the Review

Board released the informant’s name and any

accompanying information. See 4. (Deceased

Informants) above.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board ’ s

decision making with regard to “positive

contact” informant postponements involved

an evaluation of some combination of the following factors: 

(A) the significance of the information that

the informant provided to understanding

of the assassination;

(B) the importance of the identity of the

informant to assessing the accuracy of the

reported information; and

(C) the significance of the threat of harm to

the informant from disclosure, considering

the following:

(1) whether the informant is still living,

and if so, whether the informant still lives

in the same area;

(2) the amount of time that has passed

since the informant last provided information; 

(3) the type of information the informant provided; 

(4) the level of confidentiality that

existed between the FBI and the informant

at the time that the informant provided the

information; and 

(5) any specific evidence of possible

harm or retaliation that might come to the

informant or his or her relatives.

69
Although no one factor was dispositive in

every case, the Board considered certain factors to be more important than others in

making decisions to release re c o rds. For

example, if public interest in a particular document was high, the Board released informant names in the document even though

the Bureau was able to provide evidence that

would have otherwise justified postponement of the informant’s identity.

In those cases where the Review Board agre e d

to protect an informant’s name and specific

identifying information, substitute language

such as “informant name,” “ s t reet addre s s , ”

“informant file number,” or “informant symbol

number” replaced the redacted information.

g. FBI informant symbol numbers and file

numbers.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a general

rule, the Review Board routinely agreed to

postpone for ten years the “numeric” portion

of informant symbol numbers and the “case

number” portion of informant file numbers,

provided that the informant’s symbol number

had not already been made public. The

Review Board used the phrases “informant

symbol number” and “informant file number” as substitute language.

Routine exceptions to this rule occurred in

two types of documents. First, in documents

that refer to an informant by both name and

symbol (and/or file) number, the Review

B o a rd considered the symbol number to be

specific information that might identify an

i n f o r m a n t. Second, the FBI agreed to unilaterally release the entire symbol number for

“unclassified negative contacts”—those FBI

informants who were asked about a particular subject, but had no “positive” information.

(S e e c. FBI Informants: Negative Contacts.)

The non-routine exception to the general ru l e

a rose in documents in which the unre d a c t e d

information in the document u n a m b i g u o u s l y

identified the informant. Such documents were

not routine because the Board did not agree to

p rotect the numeric portions of the informant’s

symbol and file number in a document that

otherwise revealed the informant’s identity. 

ii. Commentary. When the FBI had an informant who provides “valuable and sensitive

information to the FBI on a regular basis”

(quoting FBI position paper), the FBI may

have assigned a “symbol number” to the

informant. The informant did not know his

or her symbol number. Rather, the symbol

number was an internal number that allowed

an FBI agent to write reports about the informant and information that the informant

p rovided to the FBI without writing the

informant’s name. Most informant symbol

numbers consisted of three parts—the prefix

indicated the field office to which the informant reported (e.g. “NY” for New Yo r k ,

“DL” for Dallas, “TP” for Tampa), the

numeric portion corresponded directly to a

particular informant, and the suffix indicated

whether the informant usually provided the

FBI with information about criminal (C) or

security (S) cases. In longer, formal FBI

reports from field offices to headquarters,

where many informants were used, the FBI

added yet another layer of security to the

informant’s identity by assigning temporary

symbol numbers (T-1, T-2, etc.. . .). 

The Review Board came to believe that, in the

majority of the FBI’s assassination re c o rd s ,

d i s c l o s u re of the numeric portions of the symbol number (and the numeric portions of the

c o r responding informant file) were of little

public interest. Rather than re q u i re the FBI to

re s e a rch the status of every symbol number

informant, the Review Board determined that

it would allow the FBI to protect the numeric

portions of informant symbol numbers and

file numbers, reserving the right to re q u e s t

evidence on any informant the Review Board

c o n s i d e red to be of significant public intere s t .

In support of its argument to keep the symbol

and file numbers for informants secret, the

FBI argued that the “mosaic theory” justified

postponement of any portion of an informant’s symbol number. The Review Board

rejected the mosaic theory as the sole basis for

postponement of symbol numbers, or for any

other particular postponement issue, simply

because the mosaic theory itself contains no

limiting principle. However, the JFK A c t

re q u i red the Review Board to balance any

i n c rementally greater risk that the release of

further information would lead to disclosure

of (and harm to) the informant against the

public interest in releasing the information. In

striking this balance, the Review Board gave

g reat weight to the public interest in the infor70
mation provided. In the “core and re l a t e d ”

files, the Review Board did not postpone the

information provided by symbol number

informants even though it would postpone

the numeric portion of the symbol number.

The Review Board has consistently released

the prefixes and suffixes of informant symbol

numbers, even in cases where it sustained the

“numeric” part of the symbol number. Thus,

for the hypothetical symbol number “NY

1234-C,” “NY” and “-C” would be released,

even if the Review Board sustained postponement of the “1234.” After the Review

Board’s action, researchers would know that

the informant was run by the New York City

field office and reported on criminal (rather

than “security”) cases, but may not know the

informant-specific numeric portion of the

symbol number.

In the “core and related” files, the Review

B o a rd did not postpone any part of a “Tsymbol” number. Rather, the FBI began to

unilaterally release these “temporary symbols” under the JFK Act after the Review

B o a rd’s first few discussions about informant postponements.

6. Confidential Relationships Between

Government Agents and Cooperating

Foreign Governments.

Text of Section 6(4)

. . .clear and convincing evidence that the

public disclosure of the assassination re c o r d

would compromise the existence of an

understanding of confidentiality curre n t l y

requiring protection between a Government

agent and a cooperating individual or a for -

eign government, and public disclosure

would be so harmful that it outweighs the

public intere s t ;

a. Foreign liaison postponements in the FBI

files.

i. Review Board guidelines. Information

that the FBI receives from cooperating for71
eign governments appears throughout the

FBI’s files. The official position of the FBI is

that any foreign government information in

FBI files is the property of the foreign government, and as such, the FBI cannot release

the information without first obtaining the

consent of the foreign government that provided the information. When the Review

B o a rd believed that information in FBI

re c o rds truly was “foreign government”

information, it worked with the FBI to

a p p roach the foreign government and

attempt to persuade the foreign government

that it is in our countries’ mutual interests to

release liaison information in assassination

records. When necessary, the Review Board

requested the assistance of the Department of

State in approaching foreign governments.

In the segregated collection files, the Review

Board recognized that the cost of releasing

f o reign government information far outweighed the benefits of releasing information

of marginal relevance, as most of the segregated collection files are. Thus, the Board sustained postponements of foreign government

information in the segregated collection files,

provided the information was not assassination-related. 

ii. Commentary. Given that the FBI has a

g reat deal of foreign government information in

its files, the FBI asked the Review Board to postpone release of all such information because it

a d h e res to the position that it does not have

authority to release another government’s information. The Review Board did not necessarily

a g ree with the FBI’s position that the United

States cannot unilaterally release information

received from another government. 

On August 8, 1995, the FBI appealed to the

President the Review Board’s decisions to

release five documents that contained foreign relations postponements. The FBI made

three arguments in support of its postponements: first, the fact of the liaison relationship

between the FBI and the foreign government

in question was a classified secret; second, the

FBI had never officially released documents

demonstrating the nature of the relationship

between the FBI and foreign government;

and third, release of information about the

relationship would cause dramatic harm to

the United States’ foreign relations with the

foreign government in question.

On August 11, 1995, the Review Board

responded to the President that its research

72
in publicly available sources supported the

Review Board’s decisions to release the five

records at issue. In response to the FBI’s first

two arguments, the Review Board explained

that the FBI had publicly announced its liaison relationship with the foreign government

at issue more than thirty years ago, and that

the FBI h a d a l re a d y released assassination

records that described the FBI’s liaison relationship with the foreign government. The

Review Board offered a three-part response

to the FBI’s third argument that harm would

result from release of information about the

liaison relationship: first, the FBI had not met

the “clear and convincing evidence” standard because it had not identified a particular harm that would result; second, if foreign

relations would be harmed as a result of

release of information about the liaison relationship, the harm would have alre a d y

occurred when the relationship was previously disclosed by the FBI; and third, harm to

foreign relations was unlikely because the

information in the documents is the type of

information that we would expect governments to share in law enforcement activities.

The FBI then consulted representatives of the

foreign government to ask whether the foreign government would object to an official

disclosure of the liaison relationship. The foreign government asked the FBI not to reveal

the relationship, and the FBI argued to the

P resident that the United States should

respect the request of the foreign government. The Review Board noted that, had the

FBI released the records without consulting

the foreign government, foreign re l a t i o n s

would not have been harmed, but since the

FBI did consult the foreign government, the

FBI itself had created a foreign re l a t i o n s

problem. Despite the paradox that resulted

from the FBI’s consultation with the foreign

government, the Review Board took the position that the foreign government’s desire that

the FBI not release the information was a relevant factor in the balancing test but that, in

this case, the public interest in disclosure outweighed the foreign government’s unexplained desire to protect the information.

After the FBI and the Review Board briefed

the issues to the President, representatives of

the Review Board and the FBI met with the

White House Counsel’s Office. The White

House asked the Review Board to reconsider

its decisions on the documents on appeal, but

also instructed the FBI to provide the Review

Board with postponement-specific evidence

in support of its claimed postponements. The

Review Board and the FBI agreed to the

White House request and entered into a Stipulation on August 30, 1995.

The Review Board then met with re p re s e n t atives of the Department of State and the United

States Ambassador for the foreign government

to discuss the documents at issue. As a result of

the meeting, the foreign government agreed to

release of the overwhelming majority of information in the documents. The Review Board

a g reed to sustain the one postponement that

the foreign government requested, which was

the name of an employee of the foreign government, recognizing that the identity of the

individual was of little or no interest to the

public. (See illustration.)

After the appeals process had ended, the FBI

maintained its position that it could not re l e a s e

f o reign government information without the

consent of the foreign government. The

Review Board recognized that it simply did

not have the time or the re s o u rces to pursue

release of each postponement in the same way

that it pursued release of the five appealed

documents. Initially, the Review Board had

hoped to approach each foreign government

separately in an attempt to convince the governments that release of liaison information in

assassination re c o rds would benefit both the

United States and the foreign governments. In

the end, the Review Board recognized that the

easiest way to release the foreign information

in the FBI re c o rds would be for the FBI,

t h rough its “Legats” (Legal Attaches), to

request the foreign government at issue to

release the information. The Review Board

saw three advantages to this approach: f i r s t , i n

those cases where the FBI was successful in

obtaining release of the information, the re c o rd

at issue would be available to the public with

no further action by the Review Board; s e c o n d ,

allowing the FBI to request release of fore i g n

information using the same channels thro u g h

which they obtain foreign information makes

it possible for the FBI to maintain positive re l ations with their foreign contacts; and t h i r d , t h e

Review Board relinquished no rights to make

its own approach to the foreign government,

either before or after the FBI Legat had

a p p roached its foreign contacts.

73
Practically, the FBI sent the records at issue to

its Legats with a letter from Director Freeh

explaining to the foreign government how

important release of the information was to

the FBI and to the American people. In addition to materials from the FBI, the Review

Board enclosed a letter to the foreign government explaining our statute and our mission

and requesting release of the records. 

When the Legats were unsuccessful in obtaining the consent of the foreign government to

release the information, either because the

Legat’s contacts did not approve the release or

because the Legat’s local contacts no longer

existed, the Review Board requested the

Department of State to approach the fore i g n

government dire c t l y. Diplomatic channels

p roved to be a time-consuming way to re l e a s e

re c o rds. The Department of State was still

awaiting responses from some foreign government officials as to whether the government

could release their information in FBI re c o rd s .

The Department of State assured the Review

B o a rd that it would continue to pursue re l e a s e

of this information even after the Review

B o a rd terminated its operations on September

30, 1998, and provide the information to the

JFK Collection when it received decisions fro m

the foreign governments at issue.

If the Review Board adopted the same policy

on marginally relevant foreign government

information in the segregated collections that

it followed for records more closely related to

the assassination, the Review Board and its

staff would have spent the majority of the

last year of the Review Board’s operations

approaching foreign governments to try to

obtain the release of information that was of

little public interest. The Review Board came

to believe that the cost of release of the information outweighed the benefits of releasing

this marginally relevant information in the

segregated collection files. Thus, in its April

1998 meeting, it agreed to designate the irrelevant information as “NBR” and applied its

“NBR” guidelines. 

7. Presidential Protection

Text of Section 6(5)

. . . clear and convincing evidence that the

public disclosure of the assassination record

would reveal a security or protective proce -

d u re currently utilized, or re a s o n a b l y

expected to be utilized, by the Secret Service

or another Government agency responsible

for protecting Government officials, and

public disclosure would be so harmful that it

outweighs the public interest.

To date, the Secret Service has not relied on

Section 6(5) of the JFK Act to support any

requests for postponement of records. 

C. JFK ACT EXEMPTIONS

In addition to deciding postponements, the

Review Board also had to address certain categories of information exempted from the

JFK Act.

1. Tax Return Information

The Review Board encountered a wide variety of tax return information in its review of

assassination records. Although current federal law prohibits the IRS and other federal

agencies from disseminating tax return information, in the 1960s, the IRS often shared its

information with law enforcement agencies

including the FBI and investigative bodies

such as the Warren Commission. The Warren

Commission, in particular, collected tax data

on many of the individuals that it studied,

including Lee Harvey Oswald. 

When Congress was considering the JFK Act,

the IRS requested that the JFK Act trump current federal law protecting tax return information and allow the IRS to release tax return

records relating to the assassination of the

President. Congress refused to allow the IRS,

or any other federal agency, to disclose tax

return information. Thus, section 11(a) of the

JFK Act reads, in relevant part,

When this Act requires transmission of a

record to the Archivist or public disclosure, it shall take precedence over any

other law (except section 6103 of the Inter -

nal Revenue Code) . . .that would otherwise prohibit such transmission or disclosure. . . .

Section 6103 is the section of the Internal Revenue Code that prohibits federal government

agencies that possess tax return information

from disclosing that information. 

74
While the Review Board understands congressional reluctance to recklessly release the

tax return information of American citizens,

it is truly unfortunate that the Review Board

could not make available to the public the tax

return records of Lee Harvey Oswald for the

years prior to the assassination. The Review

Board received many inquiries from the public requesting that the Board release the

Oswald tax returns so that the public could

resolve inconsistencies in the data concerning Oswald’s earnings. Although the IRS

determined that the Review Board necessarily had to review tax return information in

order to complete its work, it could not allow

the Review Board to disclose tax return information unless Congress granted a specific

exemption to the strictures of section 6103. 

Thus, the Review Board recommends that

C o n g ress enact legislation exempting Lee

Harvey Oswald’s tax return information,

Oswald employment information obtained

by the Social Security Administration, and

other tax or IRS related information in the

files of the Wa r ren Commission and the

HSCA from the protection afforded it by section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, and

that such legislation direct that these records

be released to the public in the JFK Collection.

2. Records Under Seal

Section 10 of the JFK Act allows the Review

Board to identify records under seal of court

and request the Attorney General’s assistance in petitioning a court to lift its seal on

the records. The Review Board only identified one instance where it believed that

important assassination re c o rds re m a i n e d

under seal of court and it requested and

obtained the assistance of the Department of

Justice in lifting the seal on the records.

D. APPEALS TO THE PRESIDENT PENDING AS OF

SEPTEMBER 30, 1998

As of this writing (September 1998), the FBI

and Secret Service appeals to the President—

both relating to the Review Board’s votes to

release information the agencies believed to

invade privacy—were pending.

75

E. CONCLUSION

When it first assembled, the Review Board

faced the daunting task of setting the standard for the declassification of hundreds of

thousands of federal records. These records

included those under the purview of the

CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO), which

traditionally has been exempt from declassification review. In addition to the raw intelligence material included in the DO’s files,

CIA records also included sensitive records

from the Counterintelligence Staff, the Office

of Personnel, and Security. The Board also

c o n f ronted the task of reviewing re c o rd s

from the National Security Agency, most of

which were classified at the “Sensitive Compartmented Information” (SCI) level and previously never had been subject to any review

outside of NSA. The Review Board ultimately reviewed for declassification some of

the most secret records from many other

agencies and offices, including FBI source

files and Protective Research Section files of

the Secret Service. 

The Review Board received little guidance

either from past governmental experience or

f rom Congress in the legislative history

behind the JFK Act. The words of Section 6

proved, however, to be of significant importance to the Review Board and for the accomplishment of its work. As interpreted and

applied by the Review Board over an

e x t remely wide range of documents, the

words of Section 6 established an entirely

new standard for the release of governmental

information. The “common law” developed

by the Review Board and largely accepted by

the agencies stands as an important part of

the Review Board’s legacy of public release

of government records.
CHAPTER 5

ENDNOTES

1 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) (hereinafter “JFK Act”). 

2 “[A]ll Government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy should carry

a presumption of immediate disclosure.” JFK Act, § 2(a)(2).

3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (hereinafter “FOIA”).

4 President Reagan’s Executive Order was in effect at the time that the JFK Act was passed.

See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982-1995) (hereinafter “Executive Order 12356”). The

current Executive Order is Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995-present) (hereinafter

“Executive Order 12958”).

5 The Freedom of Information Act Exemptions.

(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—

(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept

secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and

(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order;

(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title),

provided that such statute

(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no

discretion on the issue, or 

(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged and confidential;

(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by

law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent

that the production of such law enforcement records or information 

(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,

(B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,

(C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,

(D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished

information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled

by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an

agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, 

(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions

if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or 

(F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

76
77

(8) contained in or related to examination operating, or condition reports prepared by, on

behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

6 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 17, 20.

7 Because the audience for this report presumably will encounter the current Executive Ord e r

m o re often, the standards for release of information under Executive Order 12958 are quoted.

We have not quoted the standards for release of information under Executive Order 12356.

8 Executive Order 12958, Section 3.4(a)–(b): Automatic Declassification (April 17, 1995).

(a) Subject to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of this order, all classified

information contained in records that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been

determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall be

automatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed. Subsequently, all

classified information in such records shall be automatically declassified no longer than 25

years from the date of its original classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), below.

(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a),

above, specific information, the release of which should be expected to:

(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the

application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States;

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass

destruction;

(3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;

(4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology

within a U.S. weapon system;

(5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;

(6) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between

the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine

ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;

(7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of

United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other officials for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized;

(8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national

security emergency preparedness plans; or

(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.

9 JFK Act Section 6: Grounds for postponement of public disclosure of records.

Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the

public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincing

evidence that—

(1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations

of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to

be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed,

the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or
(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or

conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;

(2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of a

living person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose a

substantial risk of harm to that person;

(3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest;

(4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of an

understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent

and a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so

harmful that it outweighs the public interest;

(5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective

procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret Service or

another Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest.

10 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).

11 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).

12 The Senate believed that the “legislation is necessary” in part “because congressional

records related to the assassination would not otherwise be subject to public disclosure until

at least the year 2029.” S. Rep. at 20. The “FOIAdoes not provide public access to unpublished

congressional records.” CRS Report for Congress: President John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Disclosure: An overview (March 3, 1993).

13 See House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of

1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, pt. 1, at 18.

14 Section 2(a)(2) (emphasis added). 

15 Section 2(A)(7) (emphasis added). 

16 See Sections 6, 9(c)(1).

17 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of

1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, pt. 1, at 25.

18 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of

1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, at 16 (emphasis added). 

19 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of

1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, at 26 (emphasis added).

20 JFK Act, Section 3(10). 

21 See, e.g., Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 30.

22 JFK Act, Section 3(2).

23 The JFK Act, section 7(n), allows the Review Board to issue interpretive regulations. In its

report on the JFK Act, the Senate noted,

Government offices are required to begin the review and disclosure of records upon

enactment to expedite public access to the many records which do not require additional

review or postponement. However, the ultimate work of the Review Board will involve

not only the review of records recommended for postponement, but requiring government offices to provide additional information and records, where appropriate. 

24 JFK Act, section 3(2).

78
25 JFK Act, sections 6, 9(c)(1).

26 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 31. 

27 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 2977.

28 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328 (emphasis added). 

29 FBI’s May 28, 1998, Appeal at 8.

30 Review Board’s Reply Memorandum to the President, May 22, 1998, and Surreply Memorandum, June 19, 1998.

31 Review Board’s Reply Memorandum to the President, May 22, 1998, and Surreply Memorandum, June 15, 1998.

32 FBI Memorandum, FBI Informant/Confidentiality Postponements, p. 3.

79
A major focus of the Assassination Records

Review Board’s work has been to attempt to

answer questions and locate additional information not previously explored related to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board’s “Requests for A d d i t i o n a l

Information and Records” to government

agencies served two purposes. First, the additional requests allowed Review Board staff

members to locate new categories of assassination re c o rds in federal government files. In

some files, the Review Board located new

assassination re c o rds. In other files, it discove red that the file contained no re l e v a n t

re c o rds. In both cases, the Review Board staff

memorialized their findings in written memoranda, with the hope that the public would

be able to easily determine what files the staff

reviewed. Second, the additional re q u e s t s

allowed Review Board staff to request backg round information that could assist in the

review of re c o rds that it had identified as re levant to the assassination. For example,

Review Board staff members might encounter

particular cryptonyms, abbreviations, informant symbol numbers, file numbers, or off i c e

designations in assassination re c o rds, but

could only determine the meaning of those

a b b reviations, numbers, and codewords by

requesting and reviewing additional files.

While the Review Board made most of its

additional requests to the FBI and the CIA, it

also made requests to other agencies, such as

the Secret Service, the Department of State,

and the National Security Agency (NSA). The

government offices answered each of the

Review Board’s requests for additional information and re c o rds, as the P resident John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of

1 9 9 2 (JFK Act) re q u i re d .1 This chapter serves

as an overview of the Review Board’s re q u e s t s

rather than as a complete detailed explanation

of each request. The only way for the public to

fully evaluate the success of the Review

B o a rd’s approach is to examine the Review

B o a rd’s re c o rds as well as the assassination

re c o rds that are now at the National A rc h i v e s

and Records Administration (NARA) as a

d i rect result of the Review Board’s re q u e s t s .

M o re o v e r, because the Review Board’s re q u e s t s

w e re not always consistent in theme, the chapter is necessarily miscellaneous in nature .

Scope of Chapter

Section 3(2) of the JFK Act defined the term

“assassination record” to include all records

that were “created or made available for use

by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the

possession of” any official entity that investigated the assassination. 

This chapter does not discuss those records

that government offices identified for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

Section 7(j)(1)(C)(ii) of the JFK Act empowe red the Board to direct government off i c e s

to make available “additional information and

re c o rds” that the Review

B o a rd believed it needed

to fulfill its re s p o n s i b i l ities under the Act. A s

the JFK Act specifically

i n s t ructed the Review

B o a rd to go beyond 

the scope of pre v i o u s

inquiries, the Review

B o a rd tailored its additional requests to encompass those materials that

no previous investigative body had identified

as assassination-related. This chapter covers o n l y those re c o rds that the Review

B o a rd sought, pursuant to its authority, to

request additional information and

re c o rd s .

81

CHAPTER 6

PA RT I: TH E QU E S T F O R AD D I T I O N A L IN F O R M AT I O N

A N D RE C O R D S I N FE D E R A L GO V E R N M E N T OF F I C E S

We cannot prevent the speculation that someone did cover up,

but the arguments that a coverup continues and will continue,

can somewhat at least, be lessened.What has been lost cannot

be replaced. But what we do

have can be made public. We

should have access and our students should have access to

what still exists.

—Bruce Hitchcock, May 1997
It is widely known that the Wa r ren Commission and the House Select Committee

on Assassinations conducted extensive

investigations of Jack Ruby, and, as a re s u l t

government offices processed voluminous

Ruby re c o rds. The Review Board made

only two additional requests for information and re c o rds concerning Ruby. Theref o re, this chapter does not have a separate

section on Ruby. Similarly, the JFK Collection contains a considerable number of

re c o rds concerning Lee Harvey Oswald’s

activities in New Orleans, but the Review

B o a rd made only a few requests for additional information and re c o rds re g a rd i n g

Oswald in New Orleans. 

A. RECORDS RELATED TO LEE HARVEY

OSWALD

The Review Board’s additional re q u e s t s

focused upon locating all records concerning

Lee Harvey Oswald held by the U.S. government. The Review Board requested each

agency to check their

archives, files, and databases for information

directly related to either

Lee Harvey Oswald or

his wife Marina Oswald.

Given that many conspiracy theories allege

U.S. government involvement with Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the

assassination, the Review Board was particularly interested in locating re c o rds that agencies had created or maintained prior to the

assassination. In some

cases, the Review Board

simply released more

information from files

that the public has long

known about, such as

the CIA 201 file on Lee

Harvey and Marina

Oswald or the FBI files

on Lee Harvey Oswald. In other cases, the

Review Board’s additional requests led to

the release of new re c o rds, such as the CIA’ s

security file on Lee Harvey Oswald, or

resulted in the release of previously denied

re c o rds, such as the original files on the

Oswalds from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

1. Pre-Assassination Records

The question of what U.S. government

records existed on Lee Harvey Oswald on

November 22, 1963, has never been answered

to the satisfaction of the public. Thus, a primary goal of the Review Board was to clarify

the pre-assassination re c o rds held by the

agencies which were most involved in the

post-assassination investigation.

a. CIA.

At the time of the assassination, the CIA held

four types of records which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 or personality file which was released to the public

in 1992; an Office of Security file which

nearly duplicated the pre-assassination 201

file; HTLINGUAL re c o rds; and re c o rd s

within a general file on U.S. citizens who had

defected to another country.

i. Security file. CIA’s search of its Office

of Personnel Security database produced the

original Office of Security’s subject file on

Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) established

circa 1960. The first volume of the Security

file contains 19 documents, similar but not

absolutely identical to the pre-assassination

volume of Oswald’s 201 file. The Review

B o a rd identified an additional six documents, which appear to pre-date the assassination, in later volumes of the Security file.

Although the HSCA reviewed the Office of

Security file in 1978, Congress did not

include this file with the other material

viewed by the HSCA that it sequestered.

Consequently, this file did not end up in the

CIAsequestered collection.2 As a result of the

Review Board’s request, CIA transmitted its

Office of Security file to the John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at NARA.

ii. Records in the defector file. CIA established its 12-volume Office of Security Defector file (#0341008) circa 1950 for the purpose

of re c o rding information on U.S. citizens

who defected to other countries and information on foreign citizens who were considering defecting to the United States. The

Review Board staff reviewed the entire defector file for records related to Lee Harvey

Oswald. The staff located records on Lee

Harvey Oswald, including research notes,

82

One if the problems of secrets is

that Americans are incapable of

keeping secrets very long. Anything like this would have

leaked out by now.

—Richard Helms,

February 7, 1996

We did not understand how

intelligence agencies worked.

The CIA “gave [us] nothing

more than what was asked for.

Every time we asked for a file,

we had to write a letter. There

were no fishing expeditions.

—Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway
press clippings, and duplicates of records

found in the Security file, and identified the

records as appropriate for inclusion in the

JFK Collection.

iii. HTLINGUAL re c o r d s . H T L I N G U A L i s

the crypt for CIA’s mail opening and mail

cover program for 1952 to 1973. The CIA

reported to the Review Board that it

d e s t royed most of its formal HTLINGUAL

re c o rds in 1990 at the direction of CIA’s Off i c e

of General Counsel. The CIA s e q u e s t e red collection, however, does contain several “soft”

or working files on Lee Harvey Oswald and

the HTLINGUAL p roject, including the “soft”

file held by the Special Investigations Gro u p

of the Counterintelligence Staff (CI/SIG). In

response to the Review Board’s request for

additional information, the CIA located additional re f e rences to HTLINGUAL re c o rds in

a rchival files of the CIA’s Deputy Director of

Plans (now the Deputy Director of Operations). CIA p rocessed the relevant re c o rds for

release to NARA.

b. FBI.

The FBI opened its file on Lee Harvey

Oswald in 1959 when press reports from

Moscow announced that Oswald, a twenty

year old former Marine had renounced his

U.S. citizenship and had applied for Soviet

citizenship. Between 1959 and November 22,

1963, the FBI filed approximately 50 records

f rom several government agencies in its

Headquarters file on Oswald (105–82555).

Although the FBI processed all of the preassassination documents in Oswald’s file

under the JFK Act, the Review Board made

several additional requests to the FBI to

determine whether it had other pre -

assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald

in its files.

For example, the Review Board staff found

documents cross-referenced from files captioned “Funds Transmitted to Residents of

Russia” and “Russian Funds.” The Review

Board requested access to files with these

case captions from FBI Headquarters and the

Dallas and New York Field offices for the

years 1959 through 1964. The Review Board

staff located assassination records concerning attempts by Marguerite Oswald, Lee

Harvey Oswald’s mother, to send money to

her son while he was in the Soviet Union,

and recommended to the FBI that these

records be included in the JFK Collection.

The Review Board also sought to determine

whether the FBI maintained a file in Mexico

City on a “Harvey Lee Oswald” under the

file number 105–2137. The Mexico City Legal

Attache (Legat) opened a file on Lee Harvey

Oswald (105–3702) in October 1963 following

Oswald’s visit to Mexico City. Some of the

documents in the Legat’s file contain notations for routing records to a file numbered

105–2137, and were captioned “Harvey Lee

Oswald.” One researcher conjectured that

this file would predate the Lee Harvey

Oswald file, 105–3702, and might lead the

Review Board to other FBI documents on Lee

Harvey Oswald. In response to the Review

Board’s request, the FBI searched its Legat’s

files for a file numbered 105–2137 and captioned “Harvey Lee Oswald,” but it did not

find such a file.

c. Secret Service.

The Review Board reviewed the Secret Service’s Protective Research Files and determined that the Secret Service did not open a

p rotective re s e a rch file (CO–2) file on Lee

Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination.

S e c ret Service re c o rds extant indicate that

the Secret Service also did not have any

information on Lee Harvey Oswald fro m

other government agencies prior to the

a s s a s s i n a t i o n .

d. IRS/Social Security Administration. 

To shed light on questions regarding Lee

Harvey Oswald’s employment history and

sources of income, the Review Board sought

to inspect and publicly release Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Social Security

Administration (SSA) re c o rds on Oswald.

Although the Review Board staff did review

IRS and SSA records, Section 6103 of the

Internal Revenue Code prohibits the disclosure of tax return information, and section

11(a) of the JFK Act explicitly preserves the

confidentiality of tax return information.

Thus, the Review Board unfortunately could

not open Lee Harvey Oswald’s tax returns.

The next chapter of this report explains, in

the IRS compliance section, the mechanics of

the Review Board’s and the IRS’s efforts to

release this information.

83
e. INS records on Lee and Marina Oswald. 

Many researchers have asked how Lee Harvey Oswald, a defector to the Soviet Union,

could have been allowed to re-enter the

United States in 1962 with his wife, a Soviet

national, and how Marina Oswald would

have been permitted to leave the Soviet

Union when emigration was, at best,

extremely difficult. In an attempt to shed

light on these questions, the Review Board

requested and released original files on Lee

and Marina Oswald from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Subsequently, in late 1997, INS discovered in its

investigative section, that it had an extensive

working file on Marina Oswald that contained 1963–64 records directly relating to the

assassination. 

f. House Un-American Activities Committee. 

As of this writing the Review Board had

obtained authorization of the House Judiciary Committee to release its HUAC files on

Lee Harvey Oswald. The records predominantly postdated the assassination. However,

HUAC held a few pre-assassination records

on Oswald, including articles on his defection to the U.S.S.R. and his return to the U.S.

2. Military records

The question of whether the Marine Corps

conducted a post-assassination investigation

and produced a written report on former

Marine Private Lee Harvey Oswald, circa late

1963 and early 1964, has never been re s o l v e d

to the satisfaction of the

public. Similarly, many

have wondered whether

the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) conducted a

post-defection “net damage assessment” investigation of Lee Harvey

Oswald circa 1959 or 1960.

Various former Oswald

associates and military

investigators have re c a l l e d

separate investigations.3

R e s e a rchers have also

questioned whether

Oswald was an “authentic” defector, a “false

defector” in a pro g r a m

run by an agency of the U.S. government, or a

false defector sent on a mission to the U.S.S.R.

for a particular purpose and then used for diff e rent purposes by some members of the intelligence community following his return to the

United States.

a. U.S. Marine Corps records.

The Review Board asked the Marine Corps to

search for any records relating to post-assassination investigations that the U.S. Marine

Corps might have completed, as some

researchers believe. The U.S. Marine Corps

searched files at both U.S. Marine Corps HQ

in Quantico, and at the Federal Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, but the Marine

Corps did not locate evidence of any internal

investigations of Lee Harvey Oswald, other

than correspondence already published in

the Warren Report. 

i. U.S. Marine Headquarters copy of

enlisted personnel file and medical file. In 1997,

the Review Board transferred to the JFK Collection at NARA the original (paper) copies

of Lee Harvey Oswald’s U.S. Marine Corps

Enlisted Personnel File, and Medical Treatment File. Previously, these files had been

maintained at U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia and had only been

available in microfiche format in response to

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests

that people made to the Marine Corps.

ii. Additional relevant U.S. Marine Corps

unit diaries. The Review Board obtained from

U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters at Quantico, Virginia, additional official U.S. Marine

Corps unit diaries from the units in which

Oswald served. These additional diaries

complement the partial collection of unit

diaries gathered by the HSCA. Together, the

Review Board and HSCA unit diary records

appear to constitute a complete unit diary

record for Oswald. Researchers can compare

the in and out transfer dates in Oswald’s personnel file with the original entries in the pertinent diaries to which they correspond.

b. Military identification card.

To resolve questions about whether Oswald’s

D D – 1173 Military Identification card provided some indication that Oswald had a

connection to CIA, the Review Board

84

[T]he enduring controversy of

who Oswald really wa s, w h a t

he wa s, is an inherent part of the

historical truth of this case. . .

O s wa l d , as you know, is the

most complex alleged or real

political assassin in American

h i s t o ry. . . the idea that, for the

first time, citizens will be the

judge of the balance between

government secrecy and what

we know, rather than the agencies themselves or the courts, I

think is extraordinary. . .

—Philip Melanson,

March 24, 1995
requested and received additional information from the Federal Records Center in St.

Louis, Missouri, from the personnel files of

other Marines who had served with Oswald

(for comparison purposes), and from the U.S.

Marine Corps and the U.S. Army’s Military

History Institute.

c. Possible ONI post-defection investigation.

The Review Board became aware of an individual named Fred Reeves of California, who

was reputed to have been in charge of a postdefection “net damage assessment” of Oswald

by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

shortly after Oswald’s defection to the U.S.S.R.

The Review Board contacted Reeves, interviewed him twice by telephone, then flew him

to Washington, D.C., where the Review Board

s t a ff interviewed him in person.4

In 1959, Reeves was a civilian Naval Intelligence Operations Specialist.5 Reeves told the

Review Board that a week or so after Oswald

defected to the U.S.S.R., two officers from

ONI in Washington, D.C.,6called him and

asked him to conduct a background investigation at the Marine Corps Air Station in El

Toro, California—Oswald’s last duty station

before his discharge from the Marine Corps.

Reeves said that he went to El Toro, copied

Oswald’s enlisted personnel file, obtained

the names of many of his associates, and

mailed this information to ONI in Washington, D.C. He said that ONI in Washington ran

the post-defection investigation of Oswald,

and that the Washington officers then

directed various agents in the field. Although

Reeves did not interview anyone himself, he

said that later (circa late 1959 or early 1960),

approximately 12 to 15 “119” reports concerning Oswald (OPNAV Forms 5520–119 are

ONI’s equivalent of an FBI FD–302 investigative report), crossed his desk. Reeves said he

was aware of “119” reports from Japan and

Texas, and that the primary concern of the

reports he read on Oswald was to ascertain

what damage had been done to national

security by Oswald’s defection. Reeves

reported that he also saw eight to ten “119”

reports on Oswald after the assassination,

and that he was confident he was not confusing the two events in his mind.

In the spring of 1998, Review Board staff

members met with two Naval Criminal

Investigative Service (NCIS) records management officials, one of whom personally verified that he had searched for District Intelligence Office records (with negative results)

from the San Diego, Dallas, and New Orleans

District Intelligence Offices in 1996 with negative results. This search included “11 9 ”

reports from the time period 1959–1964, during an extensive search of NCIS record group

181. The search included any records that

would have been related to Oswald’s defection. Thus, the Review Board ultimately

located no documentary evidence to substantiate Reeves’ claims.

3. In the U.S.S.R.

Various authors interested in Lee Harvey

Oswald have suggested that Oswald was a

C I A s o u rce, asset, or operative at the time of

his defection to the U.S.S.R. in October 1959.

R e s e a rchers further suggest that Oswald either

performed some sort of mission for the CIA,

met with CIA personnel in the Soviet Union, or

was debriefed by CIA personnel upon his

return. The Review Board staff re q u e s t e d

information and re c o rds from CIA and other

agencies in an effort to pursue re c o rds that

might shed light on such allegations.

a. CIA operations in Moscow.

The Review Board staff examined extensive

CIA records concerning the history and operations of the CIA in or against the Soviet

Union in the late 1950s and early to mid

1960s. The Review Board found no records

that suggested that Oswald had ever worked

for the CIA in any capacity, nor did any

records suggest that Oswald’s trip and defection to the Soviet Union served any intelligence purpose. The Review Board staff also

interviewed the senior CIAofficer in Moscow

at the time of Oswald’s arrival and the CIA

Chief of Station present when Oswald

departed the Soviet Union. Both individuals

stated that they had no knowledge of Oswald

prior to the assassination, and they did not

believe that Oswald’s trip and defection to

the Soviet Union was orchestrated for any

intelligence purpose.

b. American Embassy personnel.

R e v i e w B o a rd staff interviewed, or informally

spoke with, numerous individuals assigned

85
to the American Embassy in Moscow during

the time period 1959–1963. The clarity of individual memories of Oswald and/or the

Moscow Embassy varied widely and few stories were consistent. One of the most intere s ting was the interview of Joan Hallett, the

receptionist at the American Embassy and the

first embassy person to meet Oswald. Hallett

was the wife of Assistant Naval Attache Commander Oliver Hallett and a temporary

receptionist during the summer A m e r i c a n

Exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow. Hallett’s recollections of Oswald’s visit place him

at the embassy before the end of the Exhibition on September 5, 1959. Available re c o rd s

show Oswald in the USSR no earlier than

October 15, 1959. While Hallett’s Department

of State employment re c o rds document her

recollection that she was not employed as a

receptionist as late as October 31, 1959, the

Review Board found no documentary evidence to explain the variation in dates.

c. Search for American Embassy records.

In an effort to account for the widely varying

stories from the interviews of personnel

assigned to the American Embassy in

Moscow, the Review Board staff reviewed

the Department of State post files for

Moscow for the period 1959–1963, which are

available to the public at NARA. The Department of State was not able to locate the visitors book for Moscow circa 1959 nor any list

of visitors and tourists for late 1959.

d. DCD/OO alleged debriefing of 

Lee Harvey Oswald.

Part of the mystery surrounding Oswald’s

defection and return to the U.S. is the question of whether the CIA’s Office of Operations (later the Domestic Contacts Division)

interviewed Oswald upon his return from

the Soviet Union. The

available evidence is cont r a d i c t o r y. The Review

B o a rd requested additional information and

records in an attempt to

coroborate a November

25, 1963, memorandum

which discusses the recollections of a CIA staff

o fficer that the A g e n c y

c o n s i d e red interviewing

Oswald. The CIA, however, did not locate

any corroborating information or records in

its files.

In an effort to better understand this myst e r y, the Review Board searched for re c o rd s

which might confirm or deny whether there

was any contact between Oswald and the

C I A b e f o re or after his time in the Soviet

Union. The Office of Operations (OO), which

in 1963 was a part of the Directorate of Intelligence, interviewed American citizens who

might have come into contact with information or individuals of intelligence intere s t

while overseas.7 The Review Board staff

examined OO re c o rds and operational histories to gain an understanding of OO practices in the early 1960s. The Review Board

s t a ff found no evidence of contact between

Oswald and OO either before or after his

time in the Soviet Union. While the re c o rd s

showed that OO was interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general

information in the 1950s, by 1962 only travelers with special access, knowledge, or

skills were of intelligence interest. OO had

no specific policy covering contacts with

returning defectors; however, a local field

o ffice could initiate a contact if justified by a

particular situation. CIA could not locate

any re c o rds or reporting showing any OO

contact with Oswald.

While a DCD “A” file does exist in the CIA’s

s e q u e s t e red collection, most of the documents in the file are from the mid-1970s; none

predate the assassination. Furthermore, the

file appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of

contacts with Oswald in response to various

c o n g ressional investigative bodies. CIA

processed this file for release to NARA.

4. In Mexico City

Lee Harvey Oswald’s visit to Mexico City in

S e p t e m b e r-October 1963, remains one of the

m o re vexing subplots to the assassination

s t o r y. Oswald’s fascination with the Soviet

Union and Cuba is well-known, yet there

exists no consensus of opinion as to why he

spent time at both the Soviet and Cuban

Embassies during his brief stay in Mexico

City in late September and early October

1963. Why did Lee Harvey Oswald make

this mysterious trip to Mexico just six weeks

86

[T]he CIA, with thorough photographic surveillance of both the

Cuban and Soviet Embassies,

had at least ten opportunities to

photograph Oswa l d , yet CIA

records at the time of the assassination allegedly did not contain

a single photograph match i n g

the man arrested in Dallas.

—Peter Dale Scott
prior to the assassination? Was the purpose

of this trip merely to apply for a transit visa

at the Cuban Embassy in a desperate

attempt to return to Moscow after the Soviets had re b u ffed his direct approach? Since

the Mexico City chapter is so puzzling, and

p rovides fertile ground for speculation, the

Review Board sought to ensure that all government re c o rds on this subject were

released and took action to pursue additional re c o rds. The Review Board facilitated

the release of thousands of previously sanitized and closed documents on the subject of

Oswald’s trip to Mexico, including but not

limited to re c o rds from CIA, FBI, Department of State, the Wa r ren Commission and

the HSCA. The Review Board also pursued

leads suggested by re s e a rchers and submitted requests to agencies for additional

re c o rds and/or evidence.

a. Technical surveillance.

At the time of Oswald’s trip to Mexico, with

the Cold War well underway and the

Kennedy Administration preoccupied with

Cuba, the CIA’s Mexico City Station housed

one of the Agency’s major foreign clandestine operations in the Western Hemisphere.

The station maintained a multifaceted surveillance coverage of the Soviet and Cuban

diplomatic installations. CIA electronic surveillance confirmed that Lee Harvey Oswald

visited and communicated with both the

Cuban Consulate and the Soviet Embassy

between September 27 and October 1 or 2,

1963. Despite requests from several congressional investigative bodies and the Review

Board, the CIA never located photographic

evidence of Oswald’s visit to either embassy.

Although CIA has transcripts of the calls

believed to have been made by Oswald, the

CIA has consistently maintained that it did

not retain tapes from the period of Oswald’s

visit as the Station continually recycled the

tapes after it transcribed any useful information. According to the transcripts, only one of

the calls, made to the Soviet Consulate, actually identifies a Lee Oswald as the caller.

Since CIA had already erased the tapes, in

accordance with the Station’s standard procedures, it could not perform post-assassination voice comparisons.

Given the importance of the Mexico City Station, the Review Board worked to ensure that

the re c o rds on the Station and Oswald’s Mexico City visit in the JFK Collection at NARA

re p resent the full universe of re c o rds. Recognizing the existence of gaps in the JFK Collection, the Review Board staff worked to verify

whether any additional extant re c o rds could

p rovide further information on or more tangible evidence of Oswald’s trip to Mexico City

and alleged contacts with the Soviet and

Cuban Embassies. The Review Board staff

examined the CIA s e q u e s t e red collection, the

Oswald 201 file, and the then unpro c e s s e d

files maintained by longtime CIA o fficer Russ

Holmes in an effort to locate any leads toward

unique information on Oswald’s visit and the

C I A Station in Mexico City.

i. Audio and photographic. C I A h a s

acknowledged that in 1963, at the time of

Oswald’s visit, the Mexico City Station had

in place two telephone intercept operations—covering both the Soviet and Cuban

Embassies; three photographic surveillance

operations targeting the Soviet compound;

and one photographic surveillance operation, which employed at least two cameras,

targeting the Cuban compound. Painstaking

negotiations between the Review Board and

CIA on the protection or release of technical

and operational details resulted in CIA’s disclosure of a great deal of previously withheld

information concerning audio and photographic surveillance. This process then

paved the way for the Review Board to ask

for specific types of records pertaining to

CIA’s surveillance activities.

The Review Board submitted formal and

informal requests to CIA relating to electronic surveillance operations. Several members of the Review Board staff reviewed the

sequestered collection microfilm, which contained a broad universe of records on CIA

technical operations and covered a period

that extended beyond the assassination.

Because the release of the Warren Commission Report in 1964 had a bearing on certain

surveillance operations in Mexico City, the

Review Board sought to ensure that it

marked for inclusion in the JFK Collection all

records reflecting any changes in or suspension of surveillance activity around the time

that the Wa r ren Commission released its

report. In addition, the Review Board

explored any newly identified operations or

surveillance activity.

87
During its review of all project files and

operational reports, the Review Board found

direct references to electronic bugs and hidden microphones at the Cuban Embassy and

requested CIA to provide additional information. The Review Board attempted to

determine whether CIA had any other electronic intelligence that may have recorded

Oswald’s visits inside the Cuban consulate or

discussions about his visits. In response to

this request, CIA provided evidence from a

Mexico City history stating that its bugging

operation was not in place at the time of

Oswald’s visit. CIA p rovided no further

information on hidden microphones. 

Although CIAhad photographic surveillance

targeting the front gates of both the Soviet

and Cuban Consulates, CIA reports that it

did not locate photographic evidence of

Oswald’s visits. In an effort to obtain additional records on this subject, the Review

B o a rd submitted additional requests for

information pertaining to technical surveillance. The Review Board staff also reviewed

project files concerning all known telephonic

and photographic operations. The Review

Board designated as assassination records all

technical operational reports pertaining to

the 1963–64 time frame that CIA had not

already placed in the JFK Collection. These

new re c o rds included periodic pro g re s s

reports, contact sheets, project re n e w a l

reports and related documentation on telephone and photographic surveillance, logs

that corresponded to photographic surveillance, contact sheets from photographic surveillance, and transcripts of telephonic surveillance.

ii. Tapes, transcripts, and photographs in

e x i s t e n c e . C I A reported that it ro u t i n e l y

erased tapes from telephone operations after

two weeks, unless CIA identified a conversation on a tape that was of particular intelligence value. CIA stated that it destroyed

tape[s] containing Oswald’s voice and other

related calls as a matter of routine procedure,

even though the Mexico City Station’s interest in the Oswald conversations at the time

that CIA intercepted them was such that the

Station transcribed them and reported them

to CIA Headquarters in an October 8, 1963,

cable. CIA reported that its interest at the

time was in an American talking to the Soviet

and Cuban Embassies, not in Oswald in particular, and thus, the tape recordings themselves were not of intelligence value.

On the day of the assassination when Oswald

was named as the alleged assassin, CIA

Headquarters instructed its Mexico City Station not to erase any tapes until it provided

further notification. Although CIA did not

locate tapes from the September- O c t o b e r

time frame, the Review Board’s additional

requests resulted in CIA’s identifying

approximately 185 additional tapes from the

Station’s telephone operation from the days

immediately following the assassination and

the next few weeks. The Review Board designated all of the tapes as assassination records

and the CIA is currently processing the tapes

for release to NARA.

The Review Board’s efforts to locate new

photographic evidence of Oswald in Mexico

City were unsuccessful. The Review Board

explored the possibility that CIA had additional re c o rds pertaining to CIA p h o t ographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy.

Although the Mexico City Station ran three

operations during the relevant time period,

the HSCA investigators found photographic

evidence and log sheets from only one of

these CIA operations.8 The HSCA material—

including the photographs of the man who

was initially misidentified as Oswald—is

available to the public at NARA.

Beyond the photographic evidence from the

time period of Oswald’s visit, the CIA

s e q u e s t e red collection microfilm contained

additional log sheets and copies of film fro m

the Cuban and Soviet surveillance operations. The Review Board believed these

re c o rds may be useful to re s e a rchers for the

purpose of establishing a frame of re f e re n c e

or modus operandi, and for understanding

the scope of CIA coverage in 1963. In light of

the historical value of this material, the

Review Board declared all photographic

coverage for 1963 that it found in the CIA

s e q u e s t e red collection microfilm as assassination re c o rd s .

b. Cable traffic.

The Review Board determined that, while

much of the Mexico City Station cable traffic

existed in the JFK Collection, the traffic contained numerous gaps, particularly in com88
munications between Mexico City and the

CIAStation in Miami, JMWAVE.9 The Review

Board deemed these gaps to be significant

because both CIA stations played roles in

U.S. operations against Cuba. The cable traffic that the Review Board reviewed in the

CIA’s sequestered collection commences on

October 1, 1963, and contains the earliest

known communication—an October 8, 1963,

cable—between the Mexico City Station and

CIA Headquarters concerning Lee Harvey

Oswald.

In 1995, the Review Board submitted a formal request for additional information

regarding the above-referenced gaps in CIA

cable traffic. CIA did not locate additional

traffic for the specified periods. CIA completed its response to this request in February

1998 explaining that:

In general, cable traffic and dispatches

are not available as a chronological collection and thus, for the period 26

through 30 September 1963 it is not possible to provide cables and dispatches in

a chronological/package form. During

the periods in question, the Office of

Communications (OC) only held cables

long enough to ensure that they were

successfully transmitted to the named

recipient. On occasion. . . cables were

sometimes held for longer periods but

not with the intention of creating a longterm reference collection.

In addition, CIA informed the Review Board

that it did not have a repository for cables

and dispatches from stations in the 1960s.10

Although originating offices maintained

temporary chronological files, the off i c e s

generally destroyed the temporary records in

less than ninety days. After the assassination,

the Office of the Deputy Director of Plans

ordered relevant CIA offices to retain cables

that they would have otherwise destroyed.

The HSCAused the remaining cable traffic to

compile its Mexico City chronology. Had CIA

offices strictly applied the ninety-day rule,

there might have been copies of cable traffic

commencing as early as August 22, 1963,

rather than October 1, 1963, available to CIA

on November 22, 1963. (See illustration.)

89
c. Win Scott files.

Winston M. (Win) Scott was the CIA Chief of

Station in Mexico City at the time of

Oswald’s visit. While the CIA had processed

some of Scott’s files as part of its sequestered

collection, the Review Board followed up on

several leads suggesting that CIAmight have

additional Scott files from his Mexico City

days. Scott apparently had an interest in the

assassination, and was a prodigious record

keeper. The Review Board asked the CIA to

search for any additional extant records that

Scott had maintained. According to Anne

Goodpasture, who had worked with Scott in

Mexico City, Scott kept a collection of classified documents from his tenure as Chief of

Station which he stored in a safe in his home

following his retirement. While the details of

the story are unclear, the Review Board

understands that shortly after Scott’s death

in 1973, CIACounterintelligence Chief James

J. Angleton, one of Scott’s longtime friends,

traveled to Mexico City to make arrangements with Scott’s wife

for CIA personnel to

review Scott’s classified

material. CIA produced

what it says are its complete files on Scott,

including inventory lists,

some documents which

a p p e a red to be fro m

Scott’s personnel file,

and Scott’s semi-autobiographical novel. The

Review Board examined

these documents for

information relevant to

the assassination. The Review Board determined a small number of the records to be

assassination records.

d. Sylvia Duran.

Silvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national

who worked as a receptionist at the Cuban

Consulate in Mexico City at the time of

Oswald’s visit, assisted Oswald in his quest

to apply for a visa to ultimately return to the

U.S.S.R., and thus became a key figure in the

Mexico City chapter of the assassination

s t o r y. In the immediate aftermath of the

assassination, the Mexican federal security

service, Direccion Federal de Seguridad

(DFS), arrested and interrogated Silvia

Tirado de Duran. 

CIAhad transcribed intercepts of phone calls

made between Silvia Duran and the Soviet

Consulate in Mexico City that related to her

dealings with Oswald. Duran’s statement to

the DFS after the assassination corroborated

the information in CIA’s intercepts—that Lee

Harvey Oswald went to the Cuban Consulate to request a transit visa. The DFS provided Duran’s interrogation reports to U.S.

authorities in Mexico City and the reports

were widely disseminated to U.S. federal

agencies in the immediate aftermath of President Kennedy’s death. 

Given that the initial ten-page “confession”

or interrogation appeared to be a summary

report of Duran’s account and the statements

of several other individuals who also were

a r rested and questioned with Duran, the

Review Board wondered whether the CIA

had an “original” transcript from Duran’s

arrest. The Review Board requested that CIA

search for such a transcript, but CIA searches

all returned to the ten-page summary and

CIA did not locate additional records.

e. Legat administrative files.

The FBI keeps administrative files on each of

its field offices and its Legal Attache, or

Legat, offices. The Legat administrative files

contain communications between the Legat

and FBI Headquarters concerning personnel,

real estate, supplies, construction, and to a

lesser extent, relations between the FBI Legat

and re p resentatives of other government

agencies abroad. The Review Board

requested and received from the FBI access to

its Mexico City Legat administrative file with

the hope that the file might contain records

concerning the assassination itself or records

concerning Oswald’s pre-assassination travels to Mexico. The Review Board also asked

the FBI for access to its Legat administrative

files for London, England; Bern, Switzerland;

and Paris, France during the periods of

1960–1965 and 1977–1979 (the period of the

HSCA investigation.) The Review Board did

not locate assassination re c o rds in the Legat

files for London, Bern, or Paris files, or in the

1977–1979 Mexico City Legat file. The Review

B o a rd did designate approximately thirty documents from the Mexico City Legat file for

1960-1965 that discussed FBI staffing of the

90

The Committee has found. . . the

FBI investigation, as well as the

CIA inquiry [into the Kennedy

assassination], was deficient on

the specific question of the significance of Oswald’s contacts

with pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups for the many months

before the assassination.

—Senate Report on JFK Act,

July 22, 1992
Mexico City Legat both before and after the

a s s a s s i n a t i o n .

f. Anne Goodpasture deposition.

Anne Goodpasture worked for Mexico City

Chief of Station Win Scott for many years and

possessed a thorough understanding of the

operations of the Mexico City Station. The

Review Board deposed Goodpasture at

length and she provided information concerning the daily routine of the Mexico City

Station, the types of operations performed by

the station, the management of operations

performed by the station, and the working

style of Win Scott. The Review Board believes

that researchers will be particularly interested in information she provided on the

handling of audio surveillance tapes in the

station which may have recorded Lee Harvey

Oswald’s voice.

B. RECORDS ON CUBA

In the mid-1970s, the Church Committee publicly revealed what journalists had been alleging since 1967—that the U.S. government had

s p o n s o red assassination attempts at various

times against Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Cast ro presumably knew about these attempts

long before the U.S. public, and some historians and re s e a rchers have questioned whether

he retaliated by assassinating Pre s i d e n t

K e n n e d y. The Review Board sought to find

re c o rds that would illuminate a slightly diff e rent but related area of interest: the degre e

to which the U.S. government sponsore d

potential uprisings and military coups within

Cuba, and the extent of possible U.S. plans to

invade Cuba by overt military force. The

B o a rd believed that such re c o rds would be of

i n t e rest not only to mainstream historians,

but also to many who believe there was a

conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. For

example, evidence of serious, or imminent,

contingency plans to invade Cuba with U.S.

military forces during the Kennedy A d m i n i stration, if found, could provide either a

motive for retaliation by Castro or a motive

for domestic malcontents who might have

been displeased that such plans were not

immediately implemented by the administration. The Review Board believed that there

would be strong public interest in any re c o rd s

which would illuminate U.S. government

policy deliberations on Cuba.

F u r t h e r, Lee Harvey

Oswald’s connection with

the Fair Play for Cuba

Committee made the

Review Board’s search for

any re c o rds on U.S.-Cuba

policy all the more re l evant. The degree to which

U.S. policy toward Cuba following Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy’s assassination did or did not change

p rovides a final reason to search for re c o rds to

enhance the historical understanding, or context, of the assassination.

1. CIA Records

Most of the relevant CIA records on Cuba

that the Review Board staff identified as

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related existed in the CIA

s e q u e s t e red collection before the Review

Board began making requests for additional

records and information. The Review Board

identified additional records pertaining to

the period 1960–1964 from some contemporary working files of a CIA office concerned

with Latin American issues. Most of these

records concerned the existence or activities

of the JMWAVE Station in Miami. Small

numbers of records pertaining to Cuba or

U.S.-anti-Cuban activities were identified in

the records of the Directorate of Plans (now

the Directorate of Operations) and in the files

of several senior officers of the CIA during

the 1960–65 period. CIA processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection those records that

the Review Board marked as assassination

records.

2. Military Records

The Review Board staff located military

records on Cuba in four different collections

of records.

a. Joint Staff Secre t a r i a t .

The staff of the Joint Staff Secretariat searc h e d

for re c o rds related to both Cuba and Vi e t n a m

policy and flagged selected re c o rds fro m

1961–1964 from the files of Joint Chiefs of

S t a ff Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell

Ta y l o r, and Earle Wheeler, and selected

re c o rds from 1961–1964 from the Central Files

of the Joint Staff for examination and consideration by the Review Board staff. The

Review Board staff flagged all but one of the

91

The Oswald visit was not, certainly to my knowledge,ever an

operation, so it was just a flash

in the pan, a product of something that happened. . .

—Anne Goodpasture, 1995
147 re c o rds selected as appropriate for inclusion in the JFK Collection. A p p ro x i m a t e l y

t w o - t h i rds of the 147 re c o rds related to Cuba

policy from 1961–196411—the re m a i n d e r

related to Vietnam policy.

b. Army.

In 1963, Joseph Califano served as both General Counsel to Secretary of the Army Cyru s

Vance and as Special Assistant to the A r m y

S e c re t a r y. NARA identified six Federal

R e c o rds Center boxes containing the Cuba

policy papers of Joseph Califano from 1963.

The Review Board designated the six boxes of

“Califano Papers,” in their entire t y, as appropriate for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

During 1963, Secretary Vance was the “DOD

Executive Agent” for all meetings of the governmental task force, the “Interdepartmental

Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs,”

(ICCCA). As Vance’s special assistant, Califano often represented him at meetings of the

ICCCA, and was part of all ICCCA policy

deliberations. The collection of Califano

Papers represents a unique find and reflects

much of the interagency planning activities

related to Cuba during 1963.

c. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

A small number of

re c o rds (appro x i m a t e l y

forty) from the papers of

S e c retary of Defense Robert

McNamara at NARA contain some material on

Cuba policy. The Review

B o a rd processed these

records for inclusion in

the JFK Collection.

d. Joint Chiefs of Staff

history.

The Review Board staff

reviewed and identified

as assassination records

two volumes of The His -

tory of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, written by Walter S.

Poole (Volume VIII:

1961–1964, Part II— T h e

Succession of Crises; and

Volume VIII: 1961–1964,

Part III—The Global Challenge). Poole is

presently updating and rewriting the two

volumes to improve their scholarship. When

he has finished, Poole will submit the volumes for a security review and the Joint Staff

S e c retariat will forward the volumes to

NARA.

3. Presidential Library Collections

In response to public interest in, and speculation about, the possible connection between

Cuba or U.S. policy toward Cuba and the

assassination of President Kennedy, the

Review Board requested the John F. Kennedy

and Lyndon Baines Johnson Pre s i d e n t i a l

Libraries to search their holdings of Cuba

records for assassination-related information.

The Presidential Libraries identified additional assassination re c o rds in the Cuba

Country files, the National Security files, various office files, personal papers of White

House officials, and certain unpro c e s s e d

collections of presidential aides and policy

advisors.

a. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library

records.

Augmenting the JFK Library’s initial search

and identification of assassination records, a

joint team of Review Board staff and representatives from other agencies, visited the

JFK Library in June 1996 to conduct a comprehensive review of JFK Library closed collections. The Review Board staff reviewed all

of the Library’s National Security Files containing records on Cuba from the Kennedy

Administration. As a result of this effort, the

JFK Library released thirty boxes of Cuba

files to the JFK Collection. The Library also

opened its Presidential recordings on the

Cuban Missile Crisis and sent copies of these

to the JFK Collection.

Subsequent to this visit, the Library identified

additional assassination re c o rds on Cuba. Of

particular value were those re c o rds which

discussed the Kennedy Administration’s policy toward Cuba, proposed anti-Castro activities, and Operation Mongoose planning.

Most of these re c o rds were generated by the

Standing Group Committee of the National

Security Council with additional CIA a n d

OSD memoranda discussing sensitive Cuban

operations. The Review Board staff also iden92

The Kennedy Library very

m u ch appreciates that it has

been able to open in excess of

30,000 pages of previously classified material, primarily on

Cuba, through the efforts of the

Assassination Records Review

Board.

—Stephanie Fawcett,

September 1998

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe

that the Cuban problem must be

solved in the near future.

—Memorandum for the 

Secretary of Defense,

Robert McNamara from the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, L.L. Lemnitzer,

April 10, 1962.
tified Cuban re c o rds in the JFK Library’s

closed papers of Attorney General Robert F.

K e n n e d y, Richard Goodwin, and Ralph Dungan and in the Department of Justice Criminal Division microfilm collection.

The Review Board discovered a wealth of

Cuba material within the Robert F. Kennedy

(RFK) papers, though it did not declare all

of the re c o rds as assassination re c o rds. To

e n s u re that the JFK Library opened the RFK

papers, however, the Review Board designated those re c o rds which it believed to be

relevant. This group of re c o rds was subject

to a Deposit A g reement requiring the

e x p ress permission of the RFK donor committee, then headed by Michael Kennedy, to

authorize their re l e a s e .1 2 The Review Board

has not yet secured the final release of all of

the RFK papers, but the JFK Library fore i g n

policy staff is working with the Review

B o a rd to attempt to obtain the release of the

RFK papers.1 3 Upon approval by the committee, the JFK Library will send these

important re c o rds to the JFK Collection at

N A R A .

b. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential

Library records.

To ensure a more complete review of the LBJ

Library’s holdings for assassination records,

two members of the Review Board staff and a

NARA representative visited the Library in

March 1997. The Review Board conducted a

comprehensive review of the closed National

Security files, including a targeted review of

Cuban records. As expected, the LBJ Library

was not as rich as the JFK Library in material

pertaining to Cuba. In addition to identifying

records that had direct reference to the assassination, the Review Board was also interested in those records that could reveal continuity or shifts in policy between the Kennedy

and Johnson Administrations. The Review

B o a rd designated additional assassination

records pertaining to Cuba found in Johnson’s Vice Presidential Security files, Cuba

Country Files, and various Office Files of

White House aides.

4. Church Committee Records

The JFK Collection contains extensive

records relating to the Church Committee’s

investigation of alleged assassination plots

against Fidel Castro, and includes materials

relating to the Church Committee’s examination of Operation Mongoose and AMLASH.

In addition, the JFK Collection includes testimony from key government officials knowledgeable on U.S. policy toward Cuba in the

1960s, such as Robert McNamara, McGeorge

Bundy, Roswell Gilpatric, Richard Helms,

and John McCone.

C. RECORDS ON VIETNAM

The debate among historians continues over

whether President Kennedy would have escalated U.S. involvement in the Vietnam Wa r

had he lived, or whether he would have lessened involvement and even withdrawn fro m

Vietnam. The Review Board, there f o re ,

sought to locate any re c o rds that would illuminate this debate or illuminate any diff e rences between the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s

mid- and-late 1963 Vietnam policy and the

Johnson Administration’s 1964 Vietnam poli c y. Much of the Review Board’s interest in

Vietnam re c o rds, as in the case of the Review

B o a rd’s search for Cuba re c o rds, is in enhancing the historical understanding or context of

the assassination.

1. CIA Records

The Review Board’s additional re q u e s t s

added few CIA re c o rds on Vietnam to the

JFK Collection. The Review Board identified

a small number of re c o rds pertaining to Vi e tnam in the files of the Directorate of Plans

(now the Directorate of Operations) and in

the files of several senior CIA o fficials fro m

1963–65. Some re c o rds designated as assassination re c o rds concern CIA reporting on the

assassination of South Vietnamese Pre s i d e n t

Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother in November 1963. Many of the Vietnam re c o rd s

examined by the Review Board staff dealt

wholly with CIA and military liaison and

operations after 1965. CIA p rocessed for the

JFK Collection the few Vietnam re c o rd s

Review Board staff members identified as

assassination re c o rd s .

2. Military Records

The Review Board staff located military

records on Vietnam in three different collections of records.

93
a. Joint Staff Secretariat.

The staff of the Joint Staff Secre t a r i a t

searched for records related to Vietnam policy and flagged selected re c o rds fro m

1961–1964 from the files of Joint Chiefs of

Staff Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell

Ta y l o r, and Earle Wheeler, and selected

re c o rds from 1961–1964 from the Central

Files of the Joint Staff, for examination and

consideration by the Review Board staff. The

Review Board selected approximately fifty

records for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

b. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Review Board identified for inclusion in

the JFK Collection a small number of records

( a p p roximately forty) from the personal

papers of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at NARA that contain some materials

on Vietnam policy.

c. Joint Chiefs of Staff history.

The Review Board identified a three-part Joint

Chiefs of Staff off i c i a l

history titled The Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the War

in Vietnam, 1960-1968, as

appropriate for inclusion

in the JFK Collection.

3. Presidential Library

C o l l e c t i o n s

During most of President

Kennedy’s time in office,

the Vietnam War was not

the pressing issue for the White House that it

became, a problem which had begun to heat

up shortly before Kennedy’s death. Vietnam,

as a foreign policy priority, then went on to

consume the Johnson presidency. The perceived change in Vietnam policy between

these two presidential administrations has

provided another source of fodder for conspiracies. In response to concerns expressed

by the assassination research community that

the Vietnam question had not been adequately addressed by past investigations, the

Review Board extended its search of both the

Kennedy and Johnson Presidential Library

materials to include records on Vietnam. The

Review Board was primarily interested in

obtaining records that could indicate any

changes in President Kennedy’s plans

regarding military involvement in Vietnam

and any shift or continuity of policy at the

beginning of President Johnson’s administration.

a. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.

The JFK Library identified a small number of

Vietnam-related documents in its National

Security files. Most of the Vietnam records

date from August 1963 through the assassination, as the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

began to pay attention to events in Vietnam.

The Library also released copies of Presidential recordings to the JFK Collection for the

same period, which contained additional

information pertaining to Vietnam. 

b. Lyndon Baines Johnson 

Presidential Library.

In response to the public’s desire to know

more about any shift in policy between the

Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the

Review Board extended its search at the LBJ

Library to include Vietnam materials from

the transitional period. Two members of the

Review Board staff visited the LBJ Library in

1997 and reviewed a vast collection of

National Security Files and White House

Office Files. Not surprisingly, the search for

relevant Vietnam-related material at the LBJ

Library proved to yield more records than

the search for Cuba-related records. Most of

the additional assassination records identified at the LBJ Library from this transitional

period concerned Vietnam. Some of these

records indicate that Vietnam, rather than

Cuba, was quickly becoming a priority for

President Johnson’s White House.

4. Church Committee Testimony

Among the major issues involving Vietnam

was the assassination of President Diem and

his brother in November 1963 shortly before

P resident Kennedy’s assassination. The

Review Board released classified Churc h

Committee testimony on this issue by CIA

officers William Colby and Lucien Conein.

The Church Committee’s report on the Diem

assassination relied heavily on their testim o n y, which had remained classified for

over twenty years.

94

Several colleagues have called

my attention to the role of the

Assassination Records Review

Board in potentially effecting

the public release of documents

related to Vietnam policy and

perhaps other issues of foreign

policy in late 1963. . . I write

now to add my voice directly to

those calling for the complete

release of such materials.

—Professor James K. Galbraith
D. RECORDS OF SENIOR AGENCY OFFICIALS

To the extent that agencies such as the CIA,

FBI, or Secret Service maintained the working files of those individuals who served as

senior agency officials during the time of the

Kennedy assassination, the Review Board

requested agencies to search those files for

assassination records.

1. CIA

The CIA maintains few working files of

senior CIA officers from the 1950s and 1960s.

To the extent that CIA p reserves such

records, the records exist in the general filing

system under the office that the individual

held at the time, e.g. the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI) or their Deputy Directors

(DDCI). Based on the Review Board ’ s

observations, the contents of the DCI and

DDCI working files primarily tend to be correspondence files, briefing papers, and working files on general subjects rather than indepth collections of detailed material. 

The Review Board staff requested and

reviewed files of DCIs Allen Dulles and John

McCone, DDCIs Charles Cabell and Marshall

Carter, and the office files of the Deputy

Director of Plans (DDP) (now the Directorate

of Operations) for the time period 1958–1968.

Because records such as the briefing papers

that CIA officers prepared for the DCI are

sensitive and worldwide in nature, the

Review Board designated only the relevant

portions of the re c o rds as assassination

records.

a. Allen Dulles.

CIA reviewed most of the files of DCI Allen

Dulles under its Executive Order 12958

declassification program. The Review Board

staff reviewed some of Dulles’ papers and his

office calendars for the relevant time period.

The Review Board marked some pages of the

calendars, which re c o rded Dulles’ off i c i a l

and social activities, as assassination records.

b. John McCone.

The Review Board staff examined CIA’s index

to DCI John McCone’s files, reviewed files of

possible relevance, and marked relevant documents as assassination re c o rds. A c c o rding to

the box and folder index

listings of McCone’s files,

McCone did not maintain

files on the assassination

of President Kennedy, the

assassination investigation, Lee Harvey Oswald,

or the Wa r ren Commission. McCone re c o rds do

include memoranda, briefing reports, and transcripts

which discuss Oswald, the assassination, and

the assassination investigation. 

Within the McCone papers, the Review Board

noticed several file folders with notations or

sheets indicating documents on a wide variety of subjects which are either missing or

w e re destroyed. Of the missing or destro y e d

documents, two refer to the Kennedy assassination. One document from a 1963 listing is

described as “Date of Meeting—26 Nov; Participants—DCI & Bundy; Subjects Covere d —

Msg concerning Pres. Kennedy’s assassination.” The second document is described as

“Date of Meeting—19 May ‘64; Participants—

DCI, J.J. McCloy; Dinner at Residence—Re:

Oswald.” This document is annotated

“ D e s t royed 1–28–72.” CIA historians noted

that both documents were missing when they

reviewed the files in 1986. The Review Board

designated as assassination re c o rds all re l evant documents from the McCone files

including the notations on the destroyed and

missing re c o rd s .

c. Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter.

Review Board staff located only a small number of assassination records in the records of

DDCIs Charles Cabell for 1959–1962 and

Marshall Carter for 1962–1965. The DDCIs’

records consist primarily of personal correspondence, official correspondence, and

briefing papers.

d. Richard Bissell, William Colby, and

Richard Helms.

C I A p rovided the Review Board with a massive index to the files of the Office of the

Deputy Director of Plans (later the Deputy

D i rector of Operations) covering the period

f rom the late 1940s to the present. Review

B o a rd staff carefully reviewed the index and

identified potentially relevant material.

95

The Board has an obligation to

examine the records of former

public officials who participated in any aspect or phase of

investigation concerning the

assassination, or of former public officials closely allied with

Kennedy.

—Anna Kasten Nelson
A c c o rding to CIA, it incorporated into these

o ffice files all of the still existing re c o rds of

R i c h a rd Bissell, William Colby, and Richard

Helms as DDPs. Again, due to the sensitive

and worldwide nature of many of the

DDP/DDO files, the Review Board designated

only certain portions of the re c o rds for re l e a s e

to the JFK Collection.

e. James J. Angleton.

Knowledge of the re c o rds that James J. A n g l eton, Chief of Counterintelligence for thirty

years, allegedly created, and the pro b a b l e

d e s t ruction of those

records after his retirement, has generated

extensive public intere s t .

In an attempt to satisfy the

public’s curiosity about

Angleton’s files, the

Review Board asked the

C I A (1) to search for any

extant re c o rds that A n g l eton maintained, and (2) to

account for the destru ction of his files or the incorporation of his files

into other filing systems. In response, the Dire ctorate of Operations provided three memoranda that document CIA’s multi-year re v i e w

of Angleton’s counterintelligence files.1 4 T h e s e

memoranda state that CIA reviewed A n g l eton’s re c o rds and incorporated a small perc e n tage into the files of the Directorate of Operations. CIA d e s t royed other re c o rds, either

because the re c o rds were duplicates or because

C I Adecided not to retain them. The Dire c t o r a t e

of Operations did not provide destru c t i o n

re c o rds to account for the Angleton files. 

f. Lawrence Houston.

L a w rence Houston was the CIA G e n e r a l

Counsel for much of the agency’s early years.

Few of his working papers, however, still

exist today. The Review Board staff reviewed

a small number of papers identified as

belonging either to the files of Lawrence

Houston or the Office of the General Counsel

for the time period 1959–1964. The staff did

not detect any additional assassination

re c o rds in this collection of Houston’s

papers. However, the Office of the General

Counsel had retained a file on CIA records

that were held by the Warren Commission.

The Review Board determined that this file

was an assassination record and marked it

for inclusion in the JFK Collection at NARA.

g. William Harvey.

William Harvey was intricately involved in the

planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion and the

various assassination plots against Fidel Cast ro. The Review Board received a query from a

re s e a rcher concerning the possible existence of

“operational diaries” that Harvey may have

c reated. CIA s e a rched its Directorate of Operations re c o rds and did not locate any re c o rd s

belonging to Harvey. The introduction to the

1967 CIA Inspector General’s (IG) report on

plots to assassinate Castro notes that Richard

Helms directed that, once the IG’s office produced the report, CIA should destroy all notes

and source material that it used to draft the

report. CIA may have destroyed Harvey’s

alleged diaries in response to Helms’ dire c t i v e .

F i n a l l y, Review Board staff also asked various

C I Areviewers who worked on re c o rds re l a t i n g

to the Bay of Pigs whether they had located

any operational diaries belonging to Harvey.

Despite its efforts, the Review Board did not

locate any diaries.

2. FBI

The Review Board attempted to determine

whether the FBI retained any sets of working

files of its top officials during the years surrounding the assassination. Public speculation regarding the alleged secret files of FBI

Director J. Edgar Hoover is widespread. Of

course, following Hoover’s death, his

personal secretary, Helen Gandy, destroyed

many of his “Personal and Confidential”

files, so that the full extent of Hoover’s Personal files will never be known. Although the

FBI has processed over 15,000 pages of

Hoover’s “Official and Confidential” files

under the FOIA, the public speculates that

some of Hoover’s secret files are still extant.

In an effort to locate any working or secret files

of FBI officials, the Review Board re q u e s t e d

and received from the FBI access to re c o rd s

that might shed light on the question of what,

if any, files are still in the FBI’s custody.

a. Hoover and Tolson records, including

“Official and Confidential” files, chronolog -

ical files, and phone logs.

The Review Board requested that the FBI

96

Because the files that were once

known as Angleton’s have been

dispersed within the DO records,

they are no longer identifiable as

a collection.

—From CIA Response to

Review Board informal request

CIA-IR-4 for information on

James Angleton files,

August 24, 1998
s e a rch for Hoover and Tolson “working”

re c o rds relevant to President Kennedy’s

assassination. The FBI made Dire c t o r

H o o v e r’s “Official and Confidential” (O&C)

files available to the Review Board and the

Review Board designated as assassination

re c o rds the two O&C files on John Kennedy,

the O&C file relating to Secret Service-FBI

a g reements on Presidential protection, a

memorandum re g a rding Hoover’s conversation with Lyndon Johnson about the assassination (from the Johnson O&C file), and several other documents from the O&C files. The

Review Board also reviewed Dire c t o r

H o o v e r’s telephone logs. Recognizing that

the FBI has already made the logs public in its

F O I A reading room, the Review Board

relieved the FBI from the burden of further

p rocessing the logs under the JFK Act. Finally,

Hoover maintained various subject files

(apart from the O&C files), including materials on the assassination. The Review Board

asked the FBI to locate these materials, but the

FBI has not been able to locate the materials.

The Review Board also requested and

received from the FBI access to the files of

Clyde Tolson, which consisted solely of original memoranda from Director Hoover.

Unfortunately, the chronological file started

with January 1965, and the FBI could not

account for any 1963–64 files that Tolson may

have maintained. The Review Board identified several documents as assassination

records.

b. Miscellaneous administrative files from 

the Director’s Office.

The Review Board requested access to a variety of FBI Director’s Office administrative

files. The Review Board examined files for

the relevant time period with the following

case captions: Assistant Dire c t o r’s Off i c e

Administrative File, the Attorney General,

Attorney General’s Briefing, Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, Director’s

Office Administrative File, Executive Conference, National Security Council, Office Memoranda, Protection of the Attorney General,

Threats Against the Attorney General, and

White House. The Review Board staff designated a small number of documents from

these files—primarily on organized crime—

as assassination records.

c. John P. Mohr records.

When Director Hoover died in 1972, Clyde

Tolson inherited the bulk of Hoover’s estate.

When Tolson died, John P. Mohr, former

Assistant Director for Administration of the

FBI, served as the executor of Tolson’s estate.

Some authors allege that Mohr purged J.

Edgar Hoover’s personal files after Hoover’s

death in 1972. When Mohr died in February

1997, the Review Board issued a subpoena to

his estate to determine whether Mohr

retained any re c o rds related to Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy’s assassination or to the FBI’s investigation of the assassination. Mohr’s estate

p roduced, and the Review Board staff

inspected, Mohr’s records. Mohr’s records

included three files of Mohr’s personal correspondence, a set of Warren Commission volumes, and the FBI’s initial reports on President Kennedy’s assassination. The Review

B o a rd staff found no new assassination

records, and, as such, released Mohr’s estate

from any obligation to turn records over to

the JFK Collection.

3. Secret Service

In response to the Review Board’s request for

files of Secret Service officials, Secret Service

reported that it did not maintain office files

for senior officials such as Chief James J.

Rowley, Chief of the Protective Research Section Robert Bouck, or Chief Inspector

Thomas Kelly.

The Secret Service located various Rowley

correspondence and memoranda, but did not

provide any information as to the disposition

of any working files maintained by Chief

Rowley. The Review Board also sought information as to the identity and disposition of

any working files maintained by Bouck

because Bouck was responsible for the collection of information relating to potential

threats to the President and Vice-President.

Mr. Bouck testified before the Warren Commission re g a rding protective intelligence

information gathered in connection with

President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. As with

Chief Rowley, the Secret Service identified

various Bouck documents, but did not (or

could not) account for whether there were

any personal working files maintained by

Mr. Bouck.15

97
4. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

In 1997, the Review Board staff met with officials from OSD and emphasized the importance of identifying and reviewing records

for Secretary of Defense McNamara, who

had executed an affidavit for the Warren

Commission stating that Oswald was not an

informant or intelligence agent for the U.S.

military. McNamara was also an important

figure because of his direct and daily involvement in creating U.S. policy on Cuba and

Vietnam. 

The Review Board also asked OSD to locate

and review files of the OSD General Counsel

who had “serve[d] as the liaison with the

[Warren] Commission for the Department of

Defense.”

The OSD advised the Review Board that

“[a]ll official files of Secretary McNamara

[had] been searched” and that “[n]o items

relating to the Wa r ren Commission were

found.” Inventories of Secretary McNamara’s re c o rds were forwarded to the

Review Board. In addition, a detailed inventory of additional records of Secretary McNamara at NARAwas also provided. Within the

McNamara records at NARA, the Review

Board identified a file relating to Operation

Mongoose, which was subsequently opened.

The Review Board identified as assassination

re c o rds approximately forty re c o rds fro m

McNamara’s files that are relevant to U.S.

policy in Cuba or Vietnam. A d d i t i o n a l

records relating to the Warren Commission

were located among the General Counsel’s

files and additional records relating to the

H S C A w e re located among Secretary of

Defense Harold Brown’s files.

5. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

The Review Board requested that the Navy

and ONI search for the re c o rds of Director of

Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Rufus Ta y l o r.

The Review Board acquired a copy of an

unsigned September 21, 1964, affidavit re g a rding Oswald that Taylor appears to have executed and forwarded to Secretary of Defense

McNamara. The affidavit states that that ONI

never utilized Lee Harvey Oswald as an agent

or an informant. (See illustration.) ONI did not

locate any files belonging to Ta y l o r. 

6. Army

The Review Board staff requested that the

Army identify for review under the JFK Act

98
certain additional, discrete record groups.

S p e c i f i c a l l y, the staff asked the Army to

locate the 1963–64 files for top Army officials,

including the Secretary of the A r m y, the

Chief of Staff for the Army, the Assistant

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Assistant

Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and

top officials of the U.S. Army Intelligence and

Security Command. The Army located no

assassination re c o rds in response to the

Review Board’s requests. 

7. National Security Agency

The Review Board requested that NSA locate

the original files of top NSA officials during

the period of the Warren Commission (NSA

Director Lt. Gen. Gordon Blake and NSA

Deputy Director Dr. Louis Tordella). NSA

located materials on the Warren Commission

from files of Deputy Director Tordella.

8. Department of State

The Review Board ensured that the Department of State inventoried all files of its top

o fficials who would have had some off i c i a l

involvement with the investigation of the

assassination, including Secretary of State

Dean Rusk, Undersecretary George Ball,

Deputy Undersecretary Alexis Johnson,

Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador Thomas

Mann, and other State Department off i c i a l s .

The Department of State was very cooperative

in making available to the Review Board manifests for these archive re c o rds. 

9. Department of Justice

a. Office of Information and Privacy (OIP)

The Review Board raised with the Department of Justice’s OIP the issue of whether

there were any separately maintained files

for Attorneys General Robert F. Kennedy,

Nicholas Katzenbach, and Ramsey Clark in

view of their positions and re s p e c t i v e

involvement with investigations of the assassination. OIP reported that records of the

Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General were not maintained as a separate file

system until 1975 under Attorney General

Edward Levi.16 Two archivists for the Department of Justice also confirmed that distinct

files for the Office of Attorney General were

not archived prior to 1975 and that there

w e re no separately maintained files for

Messrs. Kennedy, Katzenbach, and Clark.

The archivists believed that such files most

likely would have been stored at a presidential library.

With respect to Attorney General files postdating 1975, the Review Board sought to

inspect the files of Attorney Generals Edward

Levi and Griffin Bell for any materials relating to the Kennedy assassination investigations of the Church Committee and the

HSCA. The Office of Information and Privacy made available for inspection certain

original files for Attorneys General Levi and

Bell, which yielded additional assassination

records. The Review Board designated as

assassination re c o rds files that primarily

related to DOJ’s work with the HSCAand the

Church Committee.

b. Criminal Division

The Review Board requested that the Criminal Division make available all files separately maintained by Herbert J. Miller, Jr.,

Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal

Division at the time of the assassination. Mr.

Miller had been designated as DOJ’s “liaison” to the Warren Commission. The Review

Board also sought the files of J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General for the Internal Security Division, to determine whether

he (or his office) had any pre-assassination

records relating to Oswald. The Criminal

Division reported that it maintained no discrete files for Miller17 and Yeagley.

18

10. Department of the Treasury

The Review Board requested that Main Treasury review its holdings to identify records of

C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury

at the time of the assassination and Warren

Commission investigation. Review Board

staff independently reviewed archive transmittal forms for Treasury records and identified certain Treasury re c o rds for re v i e w,

which Treasury provided to Board staff. As a

result of its review, the Review Board staff

identified files of J. Robert McBrien relating

to his work as Treasury’s liaison to the HSCA

and Church Committee.19

The Review Board also requested a complete

accounting for the files of high-level Treasury

99
officials who would have had involvement in

the assassination investigation, especially

important because Secret Service was part of

the Department of the Treasury and ultimately reported to Secretary Dillon. Accordi n g l y, the Review Board asked for an

accounting of the files of Secretary Dillon,

Special Assistant to the Secretary Robert Carswell, Treasury Secretary John Connally, and

General Counsel at the time of the Warren

Commission investigation G. D’Andelot

Belin. Treasury officials reviewed its inventories and reported that its “review disclosed

no additional JFK-related records.”20 Treasury

also reported that it did “not have custody of

any Dillon files,”21 which presumably reside

with a presidential library.

11. IRS

Although the IRS reported that it searched

for records of top IRS officials who assisted in

the Wa r ren Commission investigation, it

stated that it did not locate any such records.

E. PRO- AND ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN MATTERS

Both the Warren Commission and the HSCA

considered the possibility that pro-Castro or

anti-Castro activists had some involvement

in the assassination of President Kennedy, as

both pro- and anti-Castro groups in the U.S.

had contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. The

Warren Commission investigated Oswald’s

Communist and pro - C a s t ro sympathies,

including his involvement with the Fair Play

for Cuba Committee, and his September 1963

trip to Mexico City. In addition, the Church

Committee, an internal CIA Task Force, and

the HSCA all re-examined the extent to

which the Cuban government or pro-Castro

activists in the U.S. might have been

involved in the assassination.

Given the amount of time that prior investigative bodies spent considering the possibility that either pro- or anti-Castro Cuban

forces may have played a role in President

Kennedy’s assassination, the Review Board

sought to collect and process all relevant federal records relating to such groups. To the

extent that both pro- and anti-Castro Cuban

groups coordinated their activities within the

United States, the FBI would be the agency

most likely to have investigative records on

their activities. Thus, the Review Board ’ s

e fforts to uncover re c o rds beyond those

examined by prior investigative bodies

focused primarily on FBI records.

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC)

was a pro-Castro organization with headquarters in New York. The FPCC had chapters in many cities, but Lee Harvey Oswald

was its founding and, it seems, only member

in New Orleans. In the summer of 1963,

Oswald distributed handbills that he had

printed that advocated “Hands Off Cuba!”

and invited members of the public to join the

New Orleans chapter of the FPCC. The Warren Commission and the congressional committees that investigated the assassination

discuss Oswald’s connection to the FPCC in

their respective reports. As such, the Review

Board’s routine processing of federal agency

records from Warren Commission files and

files concerning other congressional committees encompassed records on the FPCC. Not

all FPCC records, however, found their way

into the existing collections. Where Review

Board staff noticed gaps in the documentation regarding the FPCC, it requested that

federal agencies provide access to additional

records and information.

a. FBI field office files.

When the FBI processed its “core and

related” files and “HSCA Subject” files, it

processed the FBI Headquarters file on the

FPCC, but it did not process any records

from the FBI’s New York and Dallas field

office files on the FPCC. Thus, the Review

Board staff requested access to these two

field office files.

The only records that the Review Board staff

located in the Dallas field office file were

duplicates of Headquarters records that the

FBI had already processed as part of its “core

and related” files or HSCA files. The FBI

a g reed to include the Dallas field off i c e

copies in the JFK Collection.

The New York field office file proved to be

much more voluminous than the Dallas file

and yielded more assassination records. A

number of the records that the Review Board

s t a ff designated as assassination re c o rd s

from the New York file involved June Cobb,

100
a woman who was an intelligence asset during the 1960–64 period, primarily for the CIA

but also for the FBI, regarding Castro, Cuba,

and the FPCC. In addition, Cobb was the

asset who first informed the CIA of Elena

G a r ro De Paz’s allegation that Oswald

attended a “twist” party in Mexico City with

Sylvia Duran. For the above reasons, the

Review Board staff recommended to the FBI

that it process as assassination records any

FPCC documents that referenced June Cobb.

The Review Board also found assassinationrelated records in the New York field office

file concerning the FBI’s efforts to infiltrate

and disrupt the FPCC.

The bulk of the remaining records that the

Review Board staff designated as assassination records from the New York FPCC file

involve the FBI’s investigation of the FPCC.

Many researchers view Oswald’s role in the

FPCC as an indication that he may have been

an asset of one or more U.S. intelligence

agencies. That is, they theorize that he was a

“plant,” an intelligence asset sent on a counterintelligence mission against the FPCC.

Thus, Review Board staff designated as

assassination records those documents which

address the urgency with which the Bureau

viewed the FPCC, the priority the Bureau

placed on infiltrating the group, and Bureau

intentions/plans to initiate counterintelligence activities against the group. The

Review Board staff employed similar reasoning in designating records as assassinationrelated in the FBI’s Cuban Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) file

referenced below.

b. CIA records on Richard Gibson.

In 1960–63, Richard Thomas Gibson was the

Director of the New York chapter of the

FPCC. CIA opened a 201, or personality, file

on Gibson because of his support of both

Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba. The

1960–1964 records include the Warren Commission’s investigation of Gibson, and CIA

included those records in the JFK Collection.

c. Department of Justice Criminal Division

files on FPCC.

The Review Board staff requested that the

Department of Justice Criminal Division

search for records relating to the FPCC. The

Review Board located some assassination

records regarding the FPCC and Vincent T.

Lee within the Criminal Division’s files.

2. Cuban COINTELPRO

Early in its tenure, the Review Board examined the FBI’s FOIA “reading room” records

on the FBI’s COINTELPRO against pro-Castro Cubans—primarily the FPCC and the

July 26th Movement—during the early 1960s.

The Review Board’s examination of the reading room materials led the Review Board to

make a request to the FBI for a Headquarters

file entitled, “Cuban Matters—Counterintelligence Program—Internal Security—Cuba”

and for any other Headquarters files documenting efforts by the FBI or other agencies

of the U.S. government to disrupt, discredit,

or bring into disrepute the FPCC or its members or activities. The FBI made its records

available to the Review Board and, but for

some very recent, unrelated documents, the

Review Board designated all records in the

Cuban COINTELPRO file as assassination

records. 

Records that the Review Board designated as

assassination records from the COINTELPRO file include FPCC and July 26th Movement membership and mailing lists. The file

further details the FBI’s basis for initiating its

counterintelligence program against the two

p ro - C a s t ro organizations. Finally, the file

provides details concerning the methods that

the Bureau used to disrupt the activities of

the FPCC and the July 26th Movement. 

3. Anti-Castro Activities; IS 

(Internal Security)-Cuba

In the spring of 1996, the Review Board

received a letter from a member of the

re s e a rch community noting that one of the

“Hands Off Cuba” pamphlets that appeare d

in the New Orleans FPCC file contained a

c ro s s - re f e rence to a file entitled “Anti-Castro

Activities; IS–Cuba” and numbered NO (New

Orleans) 105–1095. The Review Board staff

established that the FBI had not processed this

particular file under the JFK Act, and then

requested that the FBI provide access to all

files bearing the above-re f e renced caption

f rom Headquarters and from the New

Orleans, Miami, Tampa, New York, and Dallas

field offices during the relevant time period.

101
After reviewing New Orleans file 105–1095,

the Review Board staff designated two volumes of the file as assassination records. 

4. Cuban Intelligence Activities in the

U.S.; Cuban Situation 

During its review of the FBI’s assassination

records, the Review Board staff saw file references to cases captioned “Cuban Intelligence

Activities in the U.S.” and “Cuban Situation.” The Review Board requested access to

Headquarters files and files from the Miami,

Tampa, New York, Washington, D.C., and

Dallas field offices with the above-referenced

captions, and designated forty records from

those files as assassination records. Most of

the relevant records concern activity in the

anti-Castro community following the Bay of

Pigs invasion and following Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy’s assassination.

5. Anti-Castro Cuban Groups, Including

DRE, Alpha 66, SFNE, JURE, FRD,

CRC, and Commandos-L

In an effort to gather and

review re c o rds re l a t i n g

to the activities of prominent anti-Castro Cuban

groups who might have

had some involvement in

the assassination of President Kennedy, the Review

Board requested the FBI

to provide access to files

on the above-referenced

a n t i - C a s t ro Cuban gro u p s

for Headquarters and the

New Orleans, Miami,

Tampa, New York, and

Dallas field offices. The

FBI kept voluminous files on each anti-Castro Cuban group. Review Board staff members reviewed hundreds of volumes of

re c o rds in search of assassination-re l a t e d

material. The files did yield approximately

seventy assassination records.

The Review Board also requested the CIA to

provide files on the above-referenced groups,

to the extent that the CIA had not already

processed such records under the JFK Act.

The Review Board identified additional

re c o rds from 1960–1964 in contemporary

working files of a CIA office concerned with

Latin American issues. Most of the relevant

C I A re c o rds concerned the existence and

activities of the CIA’s JMWAVE station in

Miami. The Review Board also identified a

small number of records pertaining to U.S.

anti-Cuban activities in the Directorate of

Plans files and in the files of DCI John

McCone. The Review Board marked relevant

records and requested that CIA process the

records for inclusion in the JFK Collection at

NARA.

6. Threats Against the Life of 

Fidel Castro

As widely reported, the U.S. government

attempted, at various times, to assassinate

Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Due to the high

level of public interest in this topic, the

Review Board requested that agencies locate

any relevant records and provide them to the

Review Board staff.

a. CIA DS&T records.

At the request of the Review Board, the CIA

s e a rched its Directorate of Science and Te c hnology (DS&T) databases and re c o rds for files

on possible assassination attempts against

Fidel Castro .2 2 C I A’s search produced only

one re c o rd—a handwriting analysis. The

Review Board staff reviewed the re c o rd and

determined that it was not relevant to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

b. FBI file captioned “Threats Against the 

Life of Fidel Castro.”

An HSCA Outside Contact Report dated

F e b ruary 18, 1978, indicates that the HSCA

requested access to an FBI file captioned

“ T h reats Against the Life of Fidel Castro” or

some similar caption. The HSCA never made

a formal request for such a file, and the FBI

did not provide to the HSCA a file with such

a caption. The Review Board re q u e s t e d

access to any FBI Headquarters files with

this or a similar caption. The FBI located and

p rovided two re c o rds that re f e re n c e d

“ T h reats Against the Life of Fidel Castro , ”

which summarized Walter Winchell’s radio

b roadcasts, and compared the bro a d c a s t s

with information that the FBI had concerning threats against Castro. The Review Board

designated both of these re c o rds for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

102

I was completely convinced

during this entire period, that

this operation had the full

authority of every pertinent

echelon of CIA and had full

authority of the White House,

either from the President or

from someone authorized and

known to be authorized to speak

for the President.

—William Harvey’s testimony

before the Church Committee

June 25, 1975
7. American Gambling Interests in Cuba

As part of its efforts to gather records relating

to a Cuban connection to the assassination,

the Review Board staff requested that the FBI

provide access to all Headquarters, Miami,

Tampa, and Havana files captioned, “American Gambling Interests in Cuba.”

The FBI’s Miami field office (into which all of

the Havana Legal Attaché’s, or Legat’s, files

were forwarded when the Legat closed) and

Tampa field office reported to FBI Headquarters that they did not have any files with the

above-referenced caption. The Review Board

staff did not locate any material in the FBI

Headquarters files related to the assassination of President Kennedy. Most of the files

that the FBI located consisted of pre-1959

records monitoring the activities of Florida

racketeers who were trying to establish gambling and hotel facilities in Cuba. 

8. Sergio Arcacha-Smith, Antonio

Veciana, and Bernardo de Torres

S e rgio A rcacha-Smith, Antonio Veciana, and

B e r n a rdo de To r res were anti-Castro Cuban

activists in the early 1960s. A rc a c h a - S m i t h

was the New Orleans re p resentative to the

Cuban Revolutionary Council until 1962, and

in that capacity, he used an office in the building at 544 Camp Street. The 544 Camp Stre e t

a d d ress was printed on FPCC literature that

Lee Harvey Oswald distributed in New

Orleans in August of 1963. Veciana led

Alpha–66, a violent anti-Castro org a n i z a t i o n

that engaged in paramilitary operations

against Castro’s Cuba as well as assassination

attempts against Castro. Veciana testified to

the HSCA that he acted as an agent of the U.S.

government, and that he met Lee Harvey

Oswald in Dallas in 1963 in the presence of

his American “handler.” To r res was a Cuban

exile living in Miami who later worked with

New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison

in his investigation of Clay Shaw.

The HSCA reviewed FBI Headquarters files

on Arcacha-Smith, Veciana, and de Torres, so

the FBI processed some records on these

three men with its “HSCA Subject” files. The

Review Board requested that the FBI conduct

an additional search at Headquarters, and in

the New Orleans, Houston, and Dallas field

offices to determine whether the FBI had

other assassinationrelated information on

these three individuals.

The Review Board designated thirty-three documents for processing as

assassination re c o rd s

from the many files the

FBI produced in

response to the Review

B o a rd’s request. The relevant documents

concern the Cuban exile community’s reaction to President Kennedy’s assassination.

F. RECORDS ON ORGANIZED CRIME

The question as to

whether organized crime

played a role in a possible conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy

is one that nearly every

government investigation into the assassination has addressed. Thus,

the Review Board processed a large number

of files on organized crime figures and organized crime activities simply because federal

agencies made their organized crime files

available to previous government investigations. For example, the FBI’s “HSCA subject

files” contain large portions of the FBI’s files

on organized crime figures such as Santos

Trafficante, Carlos Marcello, Angelo Bruno,

Frank Ragano, the Lansky brothers, Johnny

Roselli, Nick Civella, and Joe Campisi. The

majority of records that Review Board analysts processed in these files were not directly

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related, but because prior

investigative bodies considered these men to

be relevant, the records have been included

in the JFK Collection. In several instances,

however, the Review Board pursued additional records that had not been reviewed by

prior investigative bodies.

1. Sam Giancana

From the time he was a young man, Sam

Giancana rose within the Chicago organized

crime syndicate until he became syndicate

leader in 1957. After an eight-year stint in

Mexico, Giancana was deported back to

Chicago where he was murdered in 1975,

shortly before he was scheduled to testify

before the Church Committee. The Review

103

We had begun to see a general

outline of the truth in 1979, as

the House Select Committee on

Assassinations finished its

investigation: leaders of organized crime were behind the

President’s murder.

—Robert Blakey, Fatal Hour

The most durable conspiracy

theory is that the Mafia killed

the president.

—Anthony and Robbyn 

Summers, in “The Ghosts of

November,”Vanity Fair,

December 1994
Board considered Giancana to be of historical

interest with respect to the Kennedy assassination for a number of reasons: (1) Giancana

was involved in the CIA plots to assassinate

Fidel Castro; (2) Giancana expressed hostility

t o w a rd the Kennedys because of the

Kennedys’ war against organized crime; (3)

Giancana had associates in common with

President Kennedy (namely, Frank Sinatra

and Judith Campbell Exner); (4) Giancana

allegedly contributed to Kennedy’s 1960

presidential campaign; and (5) Giancana was

allegedly linked to Joseph P. Kennedy

through the illicit liquor trade.

The FBI Headquarters file on Sam Giancana

consists of 37 volumes of records dating from

1954 to 1975. When the Review Board staff

began to review the FBI’s “main” file on Sam

Giancana in early 1995, it realized that the

FBI had not designated for processing any

re c o rds that predated January 1, 1963.2 3

Apparently, the HSCA had requested access

to the entire FBI file on Giancana, but the FBI

p rovided only portions of its file to the

HSCA. The Review Board staff requested

and received access to sections spanning the

years 1958–1962. After reviewing the additional volumes, the Review Board designated

the earlier-dated material as assassination

records in the summer of 1995, and the FBI

processed the records under the JFK Act.

2. FBI Electronic Surveillance of Carlos

Marcello: BriLab

Many of the books on the

assassination of Pre s ident Kennedy discuss

the possibility that Carlos Marcello, alleged

o rganized crime boss of

New Orleans, was

involved in the assassination. In the late 1970s, the FBI investigated

M a rcello on an unrelated matter—the

bribery of organized labor. As part of the

“BriLab” investigation, the FBI conducted

a p p roximately eight months of electro n i c

surveillance on Marcello’s home and on his

o ffice at the Town and Country Motel.

A c c o rding to several sources, the “BriLab”

tapes contained conversations in which Carlos Marcello or his brother Joseph admitted

that they were involved in the Kennedy

a s s a s s i n a t i o n .2 4

The FBI maintains its tapes and transcripts

from the “BriLab” surveillance, but because

the FBI’s source of authority for the surveillance was 18 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (Title III), the

“take” from the surveillance remained under

court seal.25 Thus, the assassination research

community was not able to confirm or reject

allegations that the tapes or transcripts contain information relevant to the assassination. Once the Review Board obtained a court

order allowing it access to the materials, the

staff reviewed all of the transcripts from the

FBI’s surveillance on Marcello in New

Orleans. Although the staff did not locate the

specific conversations that the researchers

mentioned, it did locate thirteen conversations that it believed to be assassination

records. Most of the conversations took place

in the summer of 1979 during the period that

the HSCA released its report. The conversations primarily focused on Marcello’s reaction to the HSCA’s allegations that he may

have been involved in the assassination. With

the help of the U. S. Attorney’s Office in the

Eastern District of New Orleans, the Review

Board obtained a court order to release transcripts of the 13 conversations to the public. 

3. Department of Justice Criminal

Division Records

The Review Board sought to inspect the

Criminal Division’s extensive org a n i z e d

crime files on individuals who were alleged

to have had involvement in the assassination,

who were associated in some manner with

Jack Ruby, or who had made claims of organized crime involvement in the assassination. The Review Board staff reviewed these

files and designated specific materials as

assassination records. As noted by the Criminal Division, the Division had, “[i]n an

unprecedented approach,. . . ully opened its

files and indices to the Review Board . ”

“Hundreds of organized crime case files and

other files of a general nature were made

available for Review Board staff scrutiny. . . ”

G. WARREN COMMISSION STAFF AND CRITICS

Given that the Warren Commission constituted the first official investigation into the

events surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy, the Review Board clearly had

an interest in ensuring that all federal agency

104

The most telling evidence in our

investigation of organized crime

was electronic surveillance of

major underworld figures by

the FBI.

—Robert Blakey, in Fatal Hour
records on the Warren Commission and its

activities became part of the JFK Collection.

Although the agencies processed a larg e

number of Warren Commission era documents as part of their core files, the Review

Board staff questioned whether federal agencies such as the FBI and the CIA opened and

maintained files on the Warren Commission

staff members because they were working for

the Wa r ren Commission. Likewise, the

Review Board staff questioned whether federal agencies such as the FBI and CIAopened

and maintained files on critics of the Warren

Commission because they were criticizing

the Warren Commission’s conclusions. 

1. FBI Files on Warren Commission Staff

In an effort to determine whether the FBI

opened or maintained files on Warren Commission staff, the Review Board requested

FBI Headquarters file references on Warren

Commission Assistant Counsel Norman

Redlich. While reviewing the files provided

in response to the Review Board’s request for

Norman Redlich’s files, the Review Board

staff observed a reference to General Counsel

J. Lee Rankin’s request that the FBI conduct a

b a c k g round investigation on Redlich and

also on Assistant Counsel Joseph A. Ball. The

staff then asked for FBI Headquarters file references on Rankin and Ball, as it seemed that

the FBI may have maintained a file on Ball’s

investigation. Redlich’s file also showed that

the Civil Service Commission (CSC) had conducted a background investigation on

Redlich before Rankin asked the FBI to do an

investigation. Consequently, the Review

Board questioned whether the CSC had carried out background checks on other Warren

Commission staff members. In an effort to

determine whether similar files existed at the

FBI for other Warren Commission staffers,

the Review Board ultimately extended the

request to include Assistant Counsel Leon D.

Hubert, Jr. (whose file the Review Board

thought may also contain re f e rences to

Hubert’s career in New Orleans politics). In

addition, the Review Board asked the FBI to

provide a statement on whether it opened

any files, individually or collectively, on

other individuals who worked as Warren

Commission Assistant Counsels or staff

members, because of their employment with

the Warren Commission. 

In response to the Review

B o a rd’s request, the FBI

p rovided all of its headquarters file re f e rences on

all of the Wa r ren Commission staff members.

F rom the Redlich re q u e s t ,

the Review Board designated as assassinationrelated a group of re c o rd s

on Redlich within the

FBI’s file on the Emergency Civil Liberties

Committee. Otherwise,

although Review Board staff did locate some

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related re c o rds, the FBI had

a l ready processed most of the re c o rds as part

of its core files. The Review Board did n o t

locate any information to indicate that the FBI

systematically kept re c o rds on Wa r ren Commission staff members simply because they

w e re employed by the Wa r ren Commission.

2. CIA and FBI Files on Warren

Commission Critics

In an effort to determine whether the FBI

opened or maintained files on Warren Commission critics because they criticized the

Warren Commission’s work and findings,

the Review Board requested access to all

records on prominent Warren Commission

critic Mark Lane and to all pre-1973 Headquarters file references to the other Warren

Commission critics listed below.

a. Mark Lane.

When the Review Board began to examine the

FBI’s “core and related” files, it noticed that a

number of re c o rds that mentioned the name

Mark Lane cro s s - re f e renced the FBI’s main file

on Lane. Because the FBI had not slated the

Lane main file for JFK Act processing, the

Review Board requested access to all file re f e rences to Mark Lane or to Lane’s Citizens’

Committee of Inquiry in the files of FBI Headquarters and the New York field office. The

Review Board staff’s examination of the Lane

main file revealed that approximately eight

volumes of the file contained a significant percentage of documents relating to the Kennedy

assassination. The Review Board re c o mmended that those eight volumes be included

in the JFK Collection. In addition to the Lane

main file, the Review Board designated as

105

In the case of the Kennedy

a s s a s s i n a t i o n , u n p r e c e d e n t e d

belief in all kinds of nonsense,

coupled with extraordinary

disrespect for the Wa r r e n

C o m m i s s i o n , has waxed in

good times and bad times and

flourishes among remarkable

numbers of otherwise soberminded people.

—Max Holland,

November 1995
a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related the entire file on the Citizens’ Committee of Inquiry, as well as re c o rd s

in the FBI’s Communist Party COINTELPRO

file, and a select few re c o rds about Lane that

a p p e a red in the files of other individuals. The

Review Board’s inquiry revealed that the FBI

maintained substantial files on Lane’s

p rofessional and personal activities, and kept

detailed files on Lane’s political activism.

The CIA did not open a 201 file on Lane. The

Agency’s records on Lane consist of: a dispatch dated January 23, 1970, an Office of

General Counsel letter dated March 29, 1977,

six FOIA requests, and one public affairs

request. Review Board staff reviewed these

records but did not designate them as assassination records. Review Board staff found

one additional reference to Lane in a foreign

government document and designated the

information as assassination related.

b. Harold Weisberg.

FBI records on Warren Commission critic

Harold Weisberg related to Weisberg’s previous employment with the Department of

State, We i s b e rg’s public participation in

political issues, and We i s b e rg’s published

work as a journalist. The only assassinationrelated file on Weisberg the FBI produced in

response to the Review Board’s request was

its file concerning a FOIA lawsuit that Weisberg brought against the Department of Justice. The Review Board recommended that

the FBI process the FOIA litigation file as an

assassination record under the JFK Act.

The Review Board determined that the CIA

p rocessed most of its files on We i s b e rg as part

of the CIA s e q u e s t e red collection. The Review

B o a rd examined a CIA O ffice of Security file

on We i s b e rg and identified a small number of

documents as assassination re c o rds. 

c. Josiah Thompson.

In FBI files containing the name of Josiah

Thompson, the Review Board staff located

one assassination-related document that the

FBI had processed as part of its “core” files

on the JFK Assassination. The document was

about Thompson’s book Six Seconds in Dallas.

The Review Board instructed the FBI to

process the document as a duplicate of the

record that appeared in the “core” files.

The CIA has a small 201 file on Thompson

which indicates that he was considered to be

of possible operational interest to the Agency

in the early 1960s while he was living overseas. CIA lost interest however, and the CIA

records that the Review Board examined do

not appear to reflect that Thompson worked

for the CIA in any capacity. The Review

Board staff did not locate any assassination

records in the 201 file.

d. Edward J. Epstein.

FBI records containing the name Edward Jay

Epstein concern Epstein’s general journalistic

activities. The few assassination-re l a t e d

records in Epstein’s file were processed by

the FBI as part of their “core” files. Thus, the

Review Board staff did not designate any

additional records as assassination records.

CIA located an Office of Security file and a

Publications Review Board file on Epstein as

well as three CIA records documenting the

CIA’s destruction of records under a stand a rd re c o rds destruction schedule. The

d e s t royed re c o rds related to three FOIA

requests. None of the FOIA requests asked

for information on Epstein. The Review

Board staff did not designate any additional

records as assassination records.

e. Paul Hoch.

Aside from the few assassination-re l a t e d

records in FBI files containing the name Paul

Hoch that were processed by the FBI as part

of their “core” files, the Review Board did not

locate any additional assassination records.

f. David S. Lifton.

The name David S. Lifton appeared only in the

FBI’s “core” files. The FBI did not produce any

additional files that contained Lifton’s name.

g. Sylvia Meagher.

FBI files relating to Sylvia Meagher contained five documents that the Review

B o a rd believed to be assassination-re l a t e d .

The FBI processed these five documents as

part of the “core” files. The Review Board

i n s t ructed the FBI to process these five documents as duplicates of re c o rds that appeare d

in the “core” files.

106
The CIA reported that it no longer had any

re c o rds on Meagher. At one time, the Office of

Security had a file on Meagher and a 1968

Ramparts magazine article. The Review Board

also located a re f e rence to a Privacy A c t

request made by Meagher. CIA d e s t royed the

Privacy Act request and the Office of Security

folder under normal re c o rd control schedules.

H. NAME SEARCHES

The Review Board requested searches of federal records for new or additional information and records on individuals who proved

to be of interest to investigative bodies such

as the Warren Commission and the HSCA.

In addition, the Review Board received hund reds of letters, telephone calls, and telefaxes from members of the public re q u e s t i n g

the Board to locate government re c o rds on

individuals who the public believed were

linked in some way to the assassination.

O b v i o u s l y, the Review Board staff could not

request and review re c o rds on every name

that came to its attention. The Review Board

requested additional information and

re c o rds on some individuals, and this section attempts to summarize the bulk of the

Review Board’s requests for information on

names that are not mentioned in other places

within this Report.

1. John Abt

Following his arrest on November 22, 1963,

Lee Harvey Oswald stated to representatives

of the media that he wanted to be represented by John Abt. Abt was an attorney who

had re p resented the Communist Party,

USA.26 Abt’s primary residence was in New

York City, but he was spending the weekend

of November 22, 1963 at his cabin in Connecticut. Thus, the Review Board requested

access to the FBI’s files on John Abt from FBI

Headquarters and from the New York and

New Haven field offices. Although the New

Haven office reported that it had no file refe rences to Abt, the FBI made available

re c o rds from Headquarters and from the

New York field office. The Review Board designated 24 records (all dated after November

22, 1963) for processing under the JFK Act.

Some of the designated re c o rds relate to

whether Abt and Oswald knew each other

prior to President Kennedy’s assassination.

The remainder of the records involve Communist Party meetings at which attendees

discussed the Kennedy assassination.

2. Edward Becker

E d w a rd Becker claims that, in September 1962,

he met with Carlos Marcello and three other

men, and heard Marcello threaten to have

P resident Kennedy killed. The HSCA

reviewed the FBI’s headquarters file on

E d w a rd Becker and, as such, the FBI pro c e s s e d

it under the JFK Act. The Review Board

requested access to the Los Angeles field off i c e

file on Edward Becker, as well as access to the

c o n t rol file on the Los Angeles informant who

d i s c redited Becker’s allegation. The Review

B o a rd designated two documents from the Los

Angeles field office file on Becker and one document from the Los Angeles informant’s cont rol file. All three of the designated re c o rd s

concerned Becker’s allegation that Marc e l l o

t h reatened President Kennedy.

3. Carlos Bringuier

Carlos Bringuier was an anti-Castro Cuban

activist in New Orleans who had re p e a t e d

contact with Lee Harvey Oswald in the

summer of 1963. Bringuier managed a clothing store in New Orleans, and he was also

the New Orleans re p resentative of the antiC a s t ro organization Directorio Revoluc i o n a ro Estudiantil (the DRE). Oswald visited Bringuier’s store in early August 1963

w h e re the two engaged in a discussion on

the Cuban political situation. A c c o rding to

B r i n g u i e r, Oswald portrayed himself as

being anti-Castro and anti-communist. Several days later, someone told Bringuier that

an American was passing out pro - C a s t ro

leaflets in New Orleans. Bringuier and two

others went to counter-demonstrate, and

Bringuier was surprised to see that Oswald

was the pro - C a s t ro leafleter. Bringuier and

Oswald argued and both were arrested for

disturbing the peace. The publicity from the

a l t e rcation and trial (Oswald pleaded guilty

and was fined $10 and Bringuier and his

friends pleaded not guilty and the charg e s

w e re dismissed) resulted in a debate on

WDSU radio between Bringuier and

Oswald on August 21, 1963. The Review

B o a rd designated six serials from the New

Orleans file on Bringuier.

107
4. George Bush

A November 29, 1963, memorandum from

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the Director

of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at

the Department of State refers to the fact that

information on the assassination of President

Kennedy was “orally furnished to Mr.

G e o rge Bush of the Central Intelligence

Agency.” At the request of the Review Board,

the CIA made a thorough search of its

records in an attempt to determine if the

“George Bush” referred to in the memorandum might be identical to President and former Director of Central Intelligence George

Herbert Walker Bush. That search determined that the CIA had no association with

George Herbert Walker Bush during the time

frame referenced in the document. 

The records that the Review Board examined

showed that the only other “George Bush”

serving in the CIA in 1963 was a junior analyst who has repeatedly denied being the

“George Bush” referenced in the memorandum. The Review Board staff found one reference to an Army Major General George

Bush in the calendars of Director of Central

Intelligence Allen Dulles. There was no indication if this General Bush could be the referenced George Bush. The Review Board

marked the calendar page as an assassination

record.

5. Ed Butler and Information Council of

the Americas (INCA)

E d w a rd Scannell Butler debated Lee Harvey

Oswald in New Orleans in the summer of 1963

on the radio station WDSU. The radio debate

o c c u r red shortly after Oswald was arrested for

disturbing the peace in August 1963. Following the assassination, but before Pre s i d e n t

Johnson formed the Wa r ren Commission, Butler testified before a Senate Internal Security

Subcommittee re g a rding his contact with

Oswald. Butler had long been associated with

the Information Council of the A m e r i c a s

(INCA), a New Orleans-based clearinghouse

for anti-Communist information, and particularly for anti-Castro Cuban information.

The Review Board requested access to all FBI

headquarters and New Orleans field office

files on Edward Scannell Butler and the

Information Council of the Americas. The

Review Board designated five records to be

processed under the JFK Act. All of the designated records concern Butler’s contact with

Oswald in August 1963.

Chapter 7 of this Report discusses the

Review Board’s attempts to obtain records

directly from Mr. Butler and INCA.

CIA processed all of its records on Butler as

part of its sequestered collection.

6. Claude Barnes Capehart

One re s e a rcher inquired whether a Claude

Barnes Capehart was ever an employee,

d i rectly or indire c t l y, under any name,

whether on salary or contract, of the CIA, or a

c o m p a n y, business, agency, or other entity

operated by the CIA. The HSCA was interested in Capehart, who claimed to have been

in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963, as a

C I Aemployee. The CIAgranted Review Board

s t a ff full access to its re c o rds on Capehart.

C I A re c o rds state that Capehart worked for

two diff e rent private business contractors on

U.S. government classified projects, but the

re c o rds the Review Board examined do not

show that CIA ever employed him as an off ic e r, staff e r, asset, or source. The re c o rds indicate that at least one of the private contractors

for whom Capehart worked, Global Marine,

Inc., did have CIA contracts. The re c o rds further indicate that a background investigation

was run on Capehart in August and September 1973, so that he could work on those contracts as a crane operator/driller from October

30, 1973 to July 9, 1975. As part of his work

with Global Marine Inc., Capehart signed

s e c recy agreements with CIA in October 1973

and January 1975.

The CIA holds two files on Capehart—an

Office of Security File and a medical file. The

CIA processed its Office of Security file as

part of the segregated collection. The medical

file, not part of CIA’s segregated collection,

concerns an accident which occurred on one

of the construction sites, and the Review

Board did not believe it was relevant. The

medical file does not contain any information

on or evidence of any possible psychological

problems. The CIA reported that it has never

had an Office of Personnel file or a 201 file on

Capehart.

108
T h e re is no evidence in either the Office of

Security file or the medical file to suggest that

Capehart worked for the CIA on any additional contracts nor in any capacity, direct or

i n d i rect, other than as the employee of a private contractor, Global Marine, Inc., working

on CIA contracts. There is no evidence in the

files that the Review Board saw to suggest

that CIA ever assigned him a pseudonym or

that he used another name. Finally, there is no

information in the re c o rds to support Capehart’s allegations concerning the Kennedy

assassination nor to confirm his where a b o u t s

during the relevant time period.

7. Lawrence Cusack

The late Lawrence Cusack was a prominent

New York attorney in the 1950s and 1960s

who represented, among other clients, the

Archdiocese of New York. The Review Board

received information that Cusack performed

some legal work for Joseph P. Kennedy and

that Cusack’s son was engaged in an attempt

to sell a group of allegedly salacious documents regarding Cusack’s professional (but

secret) relationship with President Kennedy.

The documents at issue allegedly contained

information regarding President Kennedy’s

relationship with Marilyn Monroe and with

various mafia figures. Questions were raised

concerning the authenticity of the documents, and Cusak’s son subsequently was

indicted on fraud charges.

In an effort to determine whether the FBI had

any information on Lawrence Cusack’s relationship with the Kennedy family, the

Review Board requested access to all FBI

Headquarters and New York field office files

on Lawrence X. Cusack. The Review Board

did not find any assassination records in the

materials provided by the FBI.

8. Adele Edisen, Winston de Monsabert,

Jose Rivera

Dr. Adele Edisen has written several letters to

the Review Board and has also provided

public testimony to the Review Board. In her

letters and testimony, Dr. Edisen stated that,

in New Orleans on November 24, 1963, she

recounted to an FBI agent and a Secret Service agent her knowledge of apparent dealings between Dr. Jose Rivera, Mr. Winston de

Monsabert, and Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963.

The Review Board requested FBI records on

these individuals from FBI Headquarters and

field offices in Baltimore, Dallas, Denver,

New Orleans and Washington, D.C. The FBI

retrieved only a few records relating to the

individuals referenced above, all of which

the Review Board designated as assassination records.

9. Billie Sol Estes

In the 1980s, Billy Sol Estes alleged that Lyndon Johnson was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. Estes was reportedly a con artist who claims to have had a

financial relationship with Lyndon Johnson.

The Review Board requested access to all FBI

Headquarters files on Billie Sol Estes. The

Review Board designated eight serials for

processing as assassination records under the

JFK Act. All of the designated records concern Estes’ alleged knowledge of persons

connected to the assassination of President

Kennedy.

10. Judith Campbell Exner

Judith Campbell Exner claims to have been a

link between President Kennedy and Mafia

members Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli.

Introduced to John Kennedy by Frank Sinatra during Kennedy’s 1960 presidential primary campaign, she claimed to have had a

relationship with John Kennedy that lasted

from the winter of 1960 until March of 1962.

In 1975, Ms. Exner gained national media

attention when she testified before the

Church Committee in its investigation of the

C I A plots to assassinate Fidel Castro .

Between 1976 and 1997, Ms. Exner filed

numerous lawsuits against the FBI seeking

access to all information the FBI held on her.

The Review Board requested access to all FBI

Headquarters and field office main files on

Judith Campbell Exner. The FBI produced

several small field office files containing

p ress clippings the FBI collected on Ms.

Exner, as well as several files which reflect

Ms. Exner’s efforts to gain access to her information in the FBI’s files. The FBI also produced several files with references to women

with names similar to Judith Campbell

E x n e r. The Review Board designated as

assassination records all main files on Ms.

Exner, as well as all records that made reference to Ms. Exner. The Review Board also

109
designated the entire FBI file on the murder

of Johnny Roselli which the FBI produced in

response to this request.

11. H.L. Hunt and Family and Clint

Murchison and Family

Some researchers allege that the assassination of President Kennedy was masterminded by wealthy Dallas oilmen H.L. Hunt

and Clint Murchison. The Review Board

requested access to all FBI headquarters and

Dallas field office files on the following individuals during the period 1960 through 1969:

H.L. Hunt, Nelson Bunker Hunt, Lamar

Hunt, Clint Murchison, Sr., Clint Murchison,

Jr., and Paul M. Rothermel. FBI files contained many references to the Hunts, the

Murchisons, and Rothermel, but the documents were primarily concerned with their

business dealings or their political activities.

The Review Board designated for the JFK

Collection ten documents from the files the

FBI produced in response to the Review

Board’s request.

12. Joseph P. Kennedy

In light of allegations that Joseph P.

Kennedy’s organized crime connections

helped to fund John Kennedy’s 1960 campaign for the Democratic nomination, the

Review Board requested FBI files on Joseph

P. Kennedy. Given that Joseph P. Kennedy

was a prominent American who served in

many high-level government positions, the

Review Board limited its request for FBI files

on Joseph P. Kennedy to: (1) a list of file numbers and case captions of files where Mr.

Kennedy was the main subject of the file; and

(2) field office files for the 1956 FBI investigations of Kennedy in connection with his

appointment to the Presidential Board of

Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the U.S. government. The Review

B o a rd singled out Kennedy’s 1956 background investigation because of its proximity

to the 1960 presidential election, and the allegations of organized crime influence during

that election. The Review Board also

requested that the FBI provide a list of file

numbers and case captions that contained

documents mentioning Joseph P. Kennedy.

The vast majority of records that the FBI produced concerning Joseph P. Kennedy were

not related to the assassination of President

K e n n e d y. The Review Board found only

three records that it believed to be assassination-related, all relating to threats that were

made by private citizens to Joseph P.

Kennedy and his sons.

13. Oswald LeWinter

In 1997, the Review Board received a query

f rom a re s e a rcher as to whether a man

named Oswald LeWinter had any ties, current or past, with the CIA. A c c o rding to the

re s e a rc h e r, LeWinter claimed to be the current Deputy Director of Countere s p i o n a g e

for the CIA with information on the assassination of President Kennedy. The Review

B o a rd staff examined CIA and FBI re c o rd s

on LeWi n t e r. FBI and CIA files indicate that

L e Winter is a well-known fabricator with

an interest in intelligence and law enforc ement activities who frequently makes

claims related to sensational or unusual

news events. The re c o rds that the Review

B o a rd examined did not show that Oswald

L e Winter was ever employed by or worked

for the CIA in any capacity. Further, CIA

reported that it has never employed anyone with a title or position equivalent to

“Assistant or Deputy Director of Count e re s p i o n a g e . ”

14. Marita Lorenz

Marita Lorenz allegedly was involved in the

early plots to assassinate Fidel Castro; associated with some of the more colorful gunrunning characters in the assassination

story; and has worked as an informant for

government agencies, including the Dru g

E n f o rcement A g e n c y. A c c o rding to former

H S C A s t a ffers, Lorenz claimed to have witnessed a meeting between Frank Sturg i s ,

a.k.a. Frank Fiorini, and E. Howard Hunt,

both of whom had denied knowing each

other in testimonies to the Rockefeller Commission. Although there are extensive FBI

files on Lorenz, the Review Board located no

additional files in the CIA collections under

her name. Upon the suggestion of former

H S C A s t a ffers to look further into Marita

L o renz, the Review Board requested DEA

and INS to search their respective agency

files for re c o rds on Lorenz. While INS had no

re c o rds, DEA p roduced two files, none of

which contained information of relevance to

the assassination.

110
15. John Thomas Masen

John Thomas Masen was a Dallas area gun

dealer who was arrested on gun smuggling

c h a rges two days before the assassination of

P resident Kennedy. During the fall of 1963,

Masen supplied arms to the Directorio Revolucianario Estudiantial (DRE), an anti-Castro

g roup based in Miami. The FBI interviewed

Masen during the assassination investigation

re g a rding allegations that he may have sold

6.5 mm Mannlicher- C a rcano ammunition to

Lee Harvey Oswald. Some re s e a rchers have

alleged that Masen had connections to

Oswald. The Review Board requested access

to FBI files on John Thomas Masen from the

following locations: Headquarters, San A n t onio, Dallas, and Miami. The FBI reported that

the Miami field office file had been destro y e d ,

but the Review Board designated as assassination re c o rds the Headquarters, San A n t o n i o ,

and Dallas field office files in their entire t y.

These files describe the FBI’s investigation of

Masen in 1963 and 1964, and his association

with the DRE.

16. John Anthony McVickar

John Anthony McVickar was a consular officer in Moscow from 1959 to 1961 where he

dealt with Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina

Oswald. McVickar shared an office with consular officer Richard Snyder in 1959 and so

was present to hear Snyder’s October 31

interview with Oswald. McVickar was interviewed by members of the Review Board

staff and provided affidavits to the Review

Board. McVickar said he had no connections

to the CIA. The “John A. McVickar” file that

exists in the CIAsequestered collection is that

of an individual with a diff e rent middle

name and no connection to the assassination. 

17. Elizabeth Catlett Mora

Elizabeth Catlett Mora was a pro m i n e n t

American communist who lived in Mexico

City in the early 1960s. Mora was an associate

of Vincent T. Lee, head of the FPCC, and traveled to Cuba with him in December 1962. The

Review Board requested access to FBI Headquarters and Mexico City file references to

Mora to determine if the Communist community in Mexico City had any contact with

Oswald during his trip to Mexico City in the

fall of 1963. The Review Board designated 12

serials from the Headquarters file on Mora

which concerned the Oswald investigation in

Mexico City.

18. Gordon Duane Novel

Gordon Novel came to

the attention of New

Orleans District Attorney

Jim Garrison after making claims that he was an

employee of the CIA in

New Orleans in 1963 and

knew both Lee Harvey

Oswald and Jack Ruby.

The CIA has a 201 and an

Office of Security file on

Gordon Novel. The 201

file includes a Domestic

Contacts Division “A” file which CIA incorporated into the 201 file. The Review Board

reviewed both files and designated as assassination records the entire Office of Security

file, and relevant documents from the 201 file

which did not duplicate re c o rds alre a d y

found within the CIA sequestered collection.

19. Orest Pena

Orest Pena was a New Orleans bar owner

and an anti-Castro activist. Pena and Oswald

obtained passports on the same day in the

summer of 1963. Pena testified before investigative committees, and claimed he was an

FBI informant. In an effort to verify his claims

that he was an informant, the Review Board

requested access to any Headquarters or field

office files under the “134” or “137” classification (the FBI file classification for its informant source files). The FBI found no files

responsive to this request.

20. Carlos Quiroga

Carlos Quiroga was an anti-Castro Cuban

activist in New Orleans who had contact

with Lee Harvey Oswald in the summer of

1963. Quiroga received Oswald’s flyer on the

FPCC, contacted Oswald, and feigned interest in the FPCC. In addition, Quiroga spent

time with Oswald in an effort to determine

whether the FPCC was a serious pro-Castro

group in New Orleans. The Review Board

requested access to all Headquarters and

New Orleans field office files regarding Carlos Quiroga. The Review Board designated

111

At the time it seemed to me that

LHO was reciting propaganda

f o r m u l a s, as well as phrases

used in connection with his

demand for citizenship renunciation, that he perhaps did not

fully understand himself, and

that he may have been coached

by persons unknown.

—From Affidavit of John A.

McVickar, June 23, 1997
six serials from the New Orleans file as assassination records.

21. Charles Small

Charles Small was a prominent American

Communist who lived in Mexico City in the

early 1960s. The Review Board requested

access to FBI Headquarters and Mexico City

file references to Small to determine if the

Communist community in Mexico City had

any contact with Oswald during his trip to

Mexico City in the fall of 1963. The Review

Board designated as assassination records 18

serials from the files produced in response to

this request. These documents primarily

relate to the Mexico City Communist community’s reaction to the assassination and to

the fact that Oswald had visited Mexico City

shortly before the assassination.

22. Clarence Daniel Smelley

C l a rence Daniel Smelley was a member of the

International Bro t h e rhood of Teamsters in

Birmingham, Alabama, who alleged in 1964

that he had information in his possession that

Teamster President Jimmy Hoffa had cons p i red to and carried out the assassination of

P resident Kennedy. The Review Board

requested access to the FBI Headquarters file

titled “James Riddle Hoffa; Clarence Daniel

Smelley; Unknown Subjects,” as well as the

c o r responding Memphis and Birmingham

field office files. The Review Board designated the entire Headquarters file for pro c e s sing under the JFK Act. This file documented

the Bureau’s investigation of Smelley and his

allegations. The FBI reports that it destro y e d

c o r responding Memphis and Birmingham

field office files in the 1970s. 

23. Richard Snyder

R i c h a rd Snyder was the Department of State

consular officer on duty at the A m e r i c a n

Embassy in Moscow when Lee Harvey

Oswald appeared at the embassy to announce

his defection on October 31, 1959. Though

Snyder had briefly worked for the CIA in 1949

and 1950, the Review Board staff could locate

no evidence in CIA files that he still had any

connection to the CIA at the time of Oswald’s

defection. CIA p rocessed its 201 re c o rd on

Snyder as part of the sequestered collection.

The Review Board staff examined Snyder’ s

O ffice of Personnel file, but did not designate

any re c o rds as assassination re c o rd s .

24. Marty Underwood

Marty Underwood was an advance man who

worked for both President Kennedy and Pre sident Johnson. He was part of the team that

accompanied President Kennedy to Texas in

November 1963. Certain re s e a rchers contend

that when Judith Campbell Exner in April 1960

allegedly delivered a satchel of cash to Mafia

boss Sam Giancana as a favor to then pre s idential candidate Senator John F. Kennedy,

Underwood was on the same train from Wa s hington, D.C. to Chicago, with instructions to

“keep an eye” on her. The Review Board was

also interested in learning more about Underwood’s relationship with Winston Scott, the

C I A Chief of Station in Mexico City, whom he

met during the Johnson administration. The

Review Board requested access to all file re f e rences on Marty Underwood. The FBI produced two documents responsive to this

request, and neither re c o rd contained any

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related information. A l t h o u g h

Underwood’s oral history is at the LBJ Library,

he has refused to sign a deed to open the hist o r y. While the Review Board considered the

oral history to be an assassination re c o rd ,

Underwood gave permission to open only

those sections which pertain directly to the

assassination. The LBJ Library will send those

sections to the JFK Collection.

25. General Edwin Walker and the

Minutemen

General Edwin Walker, a retired Army Major

General, was an extreme right-wing political

activist living in Dallas in 1963. He was

forced into retirement from the U.S. Army in

1961 for distributing right-wing literature to

soldiers under his command. General Walker

was involved in organizing the protests of

James Meredith’s matriculation to the University of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, as

well as protests of Adlai Stevenson’s visit to

Dallas in October 1963. After the events of

November 22–24, 1963, Marina Oswald confided to authorities that she believed it was

Lee Harvey Oswald who shot at General

Walker’s home in April 1963. 

The Review Board was interested in whether

the FBI had any information which indicated

112
that Walker or his followers: (1) had

expressed any desire to assassinate President

Kennedy; (2) had any contact with Lee Harvey Oswald; or (3) had any information

regarding the Walker shooting. The Review

Board requested access to Headquarters and

Dallas field office files on General Walker, the

Minutemen, the Headquarters file number

100–439412, and the Dallas field office file

number 105–1475. The FBI produced numerous files in response to this request, and the

Review Board recommended 191 documents

from the various files be processed as assassination re c o rds. These documents concerned threats against President Kennedy

and members of the Kennedy Administration and reactions within the right-wing

political community to the assassination of

President Kennedy.

The Review Board also requested the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to

search for files on Walker. The Review Board

staff located a small number of assassination

records in the Criminal Division’s files.

I. MISCELLANEOUS

This section, organized by agency, sets forth

some of the searches for additional information and records which did not easily fit

within other sections or chapters.

1. CIA

At the request of the Review Board, the CIA

undertook a search for and located the original

early re c o rds re g a rding the development of the

U–2 plane. The CIA also located one of the few

extant, unredacted, and still closely held copies

of the so called “Family Jewels” document.

a. The U–2 connection and the “fake” manuals.

Many researchers have wondered whether

Lee Harvey Oswald learned enough about

the U–2 airplane during his U.S. Marine

Corps service in Japan to provide useful

information to the Soviets as to its airspeed

and altitude or whether he might have

played a diff e rent role re g a rding Soviet

knowledge of the airplane. In his 1994 personal memoir, Ben Rich, the former director

of Lockheed’s research and design “Skunk

Works,” states that Lockheed flight engineers

produced four false test flight manuals at

Richard Bissell’s request. The false test flight

manuals contained incorrect information on

the plane’s weight, speed, altitude, and load

factor limits. Rich claims that Lockheed produced the four manuals but only Bissell

knew how or if the CIA got them to the Soviets. Did Oswald, or others like him, carry

these fake manuals into Soviet hands?

In an effort to locate re c o rds to confirm

Rich’s story, the Review Board staff contacted several individuals who were

involved with the U–2 program at CIA. In

addition, the Review Board staff examined

n u m e rous files from the earliest days of the

U–2 including some of the original test flight

manuals. The Directorate of Science and

Technology found no mention of any fake

U–2 manuals in its archives or database. In

addition, Lockheed, when queried, re p o r t e d

that re c o rds of that age, if they still existed,

w e re neither indexed nor archived. In short,

the Review Board staff was unable to find

any individual who had ever heard of any

fake U–2 manuals or any re c o rd which even

hinted at the existence of any manuals. Wi t h

Rich and Bissell both deceased, the existence

or plans for four fake U–2 manuals re m a i n s

a mystery.2 7

b. The “Family Jewels.”

The 693-paged “Family Jewels” is not a single written document or report, but rather a

collection of separate memoranda or letters

f rom individuals, branches, divisions, and

o ffices within the CIA. It grew out of a

request by James Schlesinger, then Dire c t o r

of Central Intelligence, instructing individual Agency components to detail acts or

p rograms being conducted by the A g e n c y

which might possibly violate the charter of

the CIA. Although Schlesinger did not place

a time limit on responses, the majority of the

material detailed in the “Family Jewels” is

f rom the late 1960s and early 1970s. The

“Family Jewels” contains multiple copies of

memoranda as diff e rent authors attached

p revious branch, office, or division materials to individual treatises, retorts, elaborations, or addenda. The collection does not

have a table of contents, sequence, or org anizational rationale. CIA stamped the pages

c o n s e c u t i v e l y, and they appear roughly to

be numbered in the order in which they

w e re collected.

113
In response to the Review Board’s informal

request CIA–IR–08, the CIA agreed to meet

with a member of the Review Board staff to

review the “Jewels” and identify assassination-related material. Portions of 27 pages

were marked as assassination records to be

processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection

at the National Archives.

2. FBI

a. “Research Matters” file on John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board requested access to file

number 94–37374 in the summer of 1995.

The file was one of the 164 files that comprised J. Edgar Hoover’s “Official and Confidential (O&C)” files, which were re m o v e d

f rom Hoover’s office after his death and are

c u r rently maintained by the FBI as a gro u p

to maintain their integrity. The file consists

of five volumes, and three “EBFs,” or enclos u res behind file. The FBI processed the

e n t i re file under the JFK Act. The file consists

of a mix of material relating to John

K e n n e d y. Volumes 1, 2, 3, and the first half of

Volume 4 all predate the assassination. The

second half of Volume 4 and all of Volume 5

contain documents that are dated after the

assassination and consist of condolence letters and other material relating to Pre s i d e n t

K e n n e d y. The earliest documents in the file

date back to the late 1940s, when John

Kennedy ran for and was elected to Cong ress. The pre-assassination file contains

social and professional corre s p o n d e n c e

between Kennedy and Director Hoover. It

also contains a significant number of newspaper articles and information about

Kennedy’s election races. Once Kennedy

became President, the file captured information about Presidential protection and liaison with the Secret Service. The file also contains letters and call reports from members

of the public to the FBI generally and to

D i rector Hoover specifically relating to Pre sident Kennedy. 

b. Liaison with other federal agencies.

In his Warren Commission testimony, Secret

Service agent Rowley commented that, had

federal agencies shared their information

relating to Lee Harvey Oswald, the government could have compiled a list of at least 18

items that would have alerted the Secret Service that Oswald was a threat to the President. In light of allegations that federal agencies neglected to adequately share law

enforcement information, the Review Board

staff believed that information of the 1960s

era, which related to liaison between federal

government agencies on law enforc e m e n t

matters generally and matters affecting Presidential protection specifically, would be relevant for purposes of the JFK Collection. 

i. Secret Service/Protection of the President.

The Review Board requested access to the

FBI’s files captioned “Liaison with the Secret

Service” and “Presidential Protection.” Both

of these files had previously been available in

the FBI’s FOIA reading room in a heavily

redacted form. The FBI’s file on Presidential

Protection does not begin until 1964, and the

Review Board designated all documents

from 1964, and 27 documents from post-1964,

as assassination records. The Review Board

also designated the FBI’s entire file on the

Dillon Commission as assassination-related.

ii. CIA. Although the HSCA re v i e w e d

portions of the FBI’s liaison file with the

CIA, the Review Board requested access to

additional sections of the FBI/CIA l i a i s o n

file covering the period 1957 through 1969 in

an effort to locate new assassination re c o rd s .

The Review Board designated all documents

f rom the CIA liaison file for the years 1963

and 1964 as well as 67 documents from the

period before and after 1963 and 1964 for

p rocessing as assassination re c o rds. These

documents cover a wide variety of topics

related to the assassination including information about how the FBI and the CIA

s h a red information when their intere s t s

overlapped. 

iii. NSA. The Review Board staff’ s

review of the FBI liaison file with NSAfor the

years 1959–1964 produced no additional

assassination records.

iv. Customs. The Review Board staff’s

review of the FBI’s liaison file with the Customs Service produced no additional assassination records.

v. ATF. The Review Board staff’s review

of the FBI’s liaison file with the Bureau of

Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms produced no

additional assassination records.

114
3. Secret Service 

a. Protective survey reports.

Whenever the President traveled outside of

Washington, D.C., the Secret Service would

generate a Protective Survey Report, or a

“trip report.” Trip reports, composed by

S e c ret Service agents who conducted

advance work for the President’s trips, contained information ranging from logistical

details about seating arrangements to details

about individuals in the area known to have

made threats against the President’s life.

Some of the survey reports document information Secret Service received from other

agencies such as the FBI or the CIA. 

The survey reports detail Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy’s travel, whereabouts, associations,

and activities for his entire administration.

They also provide a complete picture of the

S e c ret Service’s protection of Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy.

b. Shift reports.

The White House Detail consisted of Secret

Service agents whose duties were to personally protect the life of the President, the Vice

President, and their respective families. The

White House Detail kept “shift reports,” usually authored by the Special Agent in charge

of the shift, that detailed the activity of each

section during their assigned working hours. 

c. Eileen Dinneen memoranda.

Eileen Dinneen, a staff researcher for the

HSCA, obtained access to protective intelligence files and Protective Survey Reports.

Dinneen documented her review of these

files in memoranda and reports. The Review

Board staff found useful Dinneen’s documentation of information contained in the

Secret Service protective intelligence files of

individuals whom the Secret Service considered to be dangerous to the lives of the President, the Vice President, and their families

from March to December 1963. For each protective intelligence file she reviewed, Dinneen created a one-page report documenting

the name of the individual and various biographical and background information the

Secret Service maintained on the individual.

The Board’s vote to release in full these

“threat sheets” was the subject of the Secret

Service’s May 1998 appeal to the President.

4. Department of State

Robert Edward Webster was a technician

working on the American Exhibition in

Moscow in the summer of 1959 when he

decided to renounce his citizenship and defect

to the Soviet Union. Webster appeared at the

U.S. Embassy to announce his defection two

weeks prior to Oswald’s visit. Researc h e r s

have suggested that accounts of Oswald’s

appearance at the embassy differ because

embassy personnel have confused the arrivals

of Webster and Oswald. In an effort to explore

any physical similarities between the two

men, the Review Board asked the Department

of State to locate a circa 1959 passport photograph of We b s t e r. The Department of State

p roduced its passport file on We b s t e r, and

t r a n s f e r red the file to the JFK Collection. The

passport file includes new, detailed information on We b s t e r’s defection.

5. Army

The Review Board’s two primary concerns

with Army records were: first, to open the

counterintelligence files located at the Investigative Records Repository (IRR) at Fort

Meade; and second, to determine whether

Army intelligence units had any re g u l a r

responsibilities for protection of the President as part of their normal duties circa 1963.

a. U.S. Army’s Investigative Records 

Repository.

This facility at Fort Meade in Maryland, a

part of the Army’s Intelligence and Security

Command (INSCOM), contains investigative

files on individuals of counterintelligence

interest to the Army. The HSCA studied 34

IRR “case files,” and thus, the A r m y

processed those records for inclusion in the

JFK Collection. The Review Board requested

three additional files and designated them

assassination records. The three additional

case files declared as assassination records by

the Review Board pertain to Alfredo Mirabal

Diaz, Jordan James Pfuntner, and Clemard

Joseph Charles. The Review Board staff also

designated one additional file consisting of

an assortment of extracts from various Army

Intelligence Regulations.

115
b. Army Security Agency records and files.

The Review Board did not locate any additional assassination records from the Army

Security Agency’s files. Review Board staff

searched for information and records concerning ASA electronic surveillance from the

1960s, but was unsuccessful in its efforts to

locate any such material. Army personnel

provided to the Review Board staff a unit history which gave a generic description of ASA

surveillance activities in Mexico City in 1963.

The one paragraph that addressed this activity was short, not very detailed, and

described the ASA surveillance effort of the

Cuban and Soviet Embassies as larg e l y

unsuccessful, due to technical diff i c u l t i e s .

This paragraph did not provide any raw

intelligence or surveillance data. 

c. Army Inspector General 1973 report on

domestic surveillance abuses in the U.S.

In 1997, the Review Board requested that the

Army’s Inspector General’s Office locate and

provide a copy of its own 1973 report on

domestic surveillance abuses in the United

States, in the hope that this document might

mention domestic surveillance activity in the

early 1960s and provide leads to the Review

Board. (The Church Committee cited this

report in detail.) The Army IG off i c e

responded to the Review Board staff that it

could not locate its own report.

6. White House Communications Agency

WHCAwas, and is, responsible for maintaining both secure (encrypted) and unsecured

(open) telephone, radio, and telex communication between the President and the government of the United States. Most of the personnel that constitute this elite agency are

U.S. military communications specialists;

many, in 1963, were from the Army Signal

Corps. On November 22, 1963, WHCA was

responsible for communications between

and among Air Force One and Two, the

White House Situation Room, the mobile

White House, and with the Secret Service in

the motorcade.

The Review Board sought to locate any audio

recordings of voice communications to or

from Air Force One on the day of the assassination, including communications between

Air Force One and Andrews Air Force Base

during the return flight from Dallas to Washington, D.C. As many people are now aware,

in the 1970s, the LBJ Presidential Library

released edited audio cassettes of unsecured,

or open voice conversations with Air Force

One, Andrews Air Force Base, the White

House Situation Room, and the Cabinet Aircraft carrying the Secretary of State and other

o fficials on November 22, 1963. The LBJ

Library version of these tapes consists of

about 110 minutes of voice transmissions, but

the tapes are edited and condensed, so the

Review Board staff sought access to

unedited, uncondensed versions. Since the

edited version of the tapes contains considerable talk about both the forthcoming autopsy

on the President, as well as the reaction of a

government in crisis, the tapes are of considerable interest to assassination researchers

and historians.

Given that the LBJ Library released the tapes

in the 1970s, the paper trail is now sketchy and

quite cold. The LBJ Library staff is fairly confident that the tapes originated with the White

House Communications Agency (WHCA).

The LBJ Library staff told the Review Board

s t a ff that it received the tapes from the White

House as part of the original shipment of Pre sident Johnson’s papers in 1968 or 1969.

A c c o rding to the LBJ Library’s documentation, the accession card reads: “WHCA?” and

is dated 1975. The Review Board staff could

not locate any re c o rds indicating who performed the editing, or when, or where .

The Review Board’s repeated written and oral

inquiries of the White House Communications Agency did not bear fruit. The WHCA

could not produce any re c o rds that illuminated the provenance of the edited tapes.

7. Presidential Library Materials

The JFK Act obliged both the John F. Kennedy

and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Libraries

to grant the Review Board access to donorrestricted material and to re c o rds stored under

a deposit agreement to determine whether the

material contains assassination information.

I n i t i a l l y, both presidential libraries were re l u ctant to release their most closely guard e d

re c o rds involving Jacqueline Kennedy, Robert

K e n n e d y, and William Manchester. In the case

of both libraries, privacy concerns, as well as

116
political motivations, delayed the decisionmaking process. The Review Board was able to

s e c u re the LBJ Library’s agreement to re l e a s e

the Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes and trans c r i p t s ;2 8 obtain William Manchester’s permission to allow a member of the Review Board

s t a ff to review his papers on The Death of a

P re s i d e n t; and secure the cooperation of the JFK

Library in approaching the Kennedy family

re g a rding the release of the sealed tapes and

transcripts of Manchester’s interviews with

Jacqueline B. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy.

a. William Manchester interviews.

Most of William Manchester’s work papers

relating to his work on The Death of a Pre s i d e n t

a re stored at the JFK Library under a 1967

Deposit A g reement. Of particular historical

value are the extensive personal interviews he

conducted in the early aftermath of the Pre s ident’s death. In contrast to other re c o rds in the

Collection that shed light on the assassination

investigations, the Manchester interviews

c h ronicle the human side of the story. Manchester envisioned that The Death of a Pre s i d e n t

w o u l d p rovide “one complete, accurate

account about the assassination,. . .that would

be based on material gathered while the memories were still fre s h . ”2 9 The interviews capt u red and re c o rded the early recollections and

reactions of people closest to Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy and provide a lens through which

the tragedy of the event can be seen and

understood in the context of the times. 

Beginning in early 1995, the Review Board

made repeated attempts to gain access to

M a n c h e s t e r’s papers at the JFK Library. In

June 1998, Manchester agreed to allow a

Review Board staff member to review his

material at the Library. This review re v e a l e d

that, while much of the information Manchester obtained from the interviews is

incorporated into his book, his raw notes

would be of great value and interest to

re s e a rchers. 

Although Manchester recorded some of his

interviews on tape, the recordings were not

available at the Library. Only the written

notes and/or transcripts of his interviews are

in this collection. Furthermore, not all of the

interviews that Manchester referenced in The

Death of a President are accounted for in the

notebooks and transcripts he deposited in

117

the JFK Library. Because

of their unique historical

value, the Review Board

regards these interviews

as highly relevant to the

assassination. This outstanding collection of

materials should be

made available to the

public as soon as possible. At this point, howe v e r, Manchester has

refused to cooperate and

it is unfortunately impossible to open the records

without his consent.

The tapes and transcripts of William Manc h e s t e r’s interviews of Robert F. Kennedy and

Jacqueline B. Kennedy are subject to a 1967

legal agreement which states that they were

not to be made public for 100 years “except. . .

on the express written consent of plaintiff

[Jacqueline B. Kennedy].” With Mrs. Onassis’s death, her daughter Caroline Kennedy

became her re p resentative and is the only

person with authority to give consent to open

this material. 

The Review Board recognizes that the interviews

have extraordinary historical value and so it

pursued this matter with

the JFK Library and with

William Manchester. A f t e r

evaluating whether the

the court order could be

lifted, the Review Board

decided to approach Caroline Kennedy to discuss

the possibility of having

the tapes and transcripts

opened at the Kennedy

L i b r a r y. Caroline Kennedy wrote to the

Review Board in late August 1998, informing

the Board of her decision n o t to release the

material at this time, nor would she agree to

allow one of the Review Board members to

review the material to determine whether

the tapes contained assassination-re l a t e d

m a t e r i a l .

The Review Board was very disappointed

that Caroline Kennedy declined to even allow

the Review Board access to the material. The

The public was curious, a n d

that curiosity could not be satisfied without revealing what

we had decided to omit. At the

same time, some political figures described in the manuscript demanded that they be

presented in glowing terms. I

balked and refused to make

changes that would falsify hist o r y .

—William Manchester, in

Death of a President

In my view, the Manch e s t e r

interviews have an extraordinarily unique historical value

and are the most important

records not yet released. . . I am

hopeful that you might agree to

release the material before the

Review Board completes its

work in September so we can

help manage the release in an

appropriate manner.

—Hon. John R. Tunheim’s letter

to Caroline B. Kennedy
B o a rd hopes that she will agree to public

release at a later time.

b. Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes at the 

LBJ Library.

T h e re are six re c o rded telephone conversations between Jacqueline B. Kennedy and

P resident Johnson within the collection of

p residential re c o rdings at the LBJ Library.

The Review Board has worked consistently

with the LBJ Library to secure their re l e a s e .

The LBJ Library was concerned about donor

restrictions associated with the release of

these tapes. Finally , in March 1998 the LBJ

Library decided to release the six conversations provided that they be opened along

with the next scheduled release of Pre s i d e n t

Johnson’s re c o rdings. The Review Board

understands that these tapes will be

released on September 18, 1998, along with

the release of the August to November 1963

re c o rd i n g s .

118

J. CONCLUSION

The Review Board examined a large number of

records in its efforts to identify additional federal records and information related to the

assassination, many of which are not detailed

in this report. For every assassination record

that the Review Board located and included in

the JFK Collection, the staff literally reviewed

hundreds of documents. The need to review

every file on a document-by-document basis

meant that the Review Board simply did not

have time to request additional information

and records on every research lead that it

received. For those requests that the Review

Board staff did make, the Review Board staff

team leaders kept notebooks that documented

the Review Board staff’s efforts to locate additional records at the FBI, CIA, and Department

of Defense. To the extent that the public is

i n t e rested in finding information on the

Review Board’s additional requests, the notebooks document which records Review Board

staff reviewed and which records the Review

Board has designated as assassination-related.
CHAPTER 6

PART I: ENDNOTES

1 JFK Act, § 5(c)(2)(H).

2 Chapter 5 of this Report defines the CIA’s Sequestered Collection.

3 In Volume 11 of its report, the HSCA attempted to deal with allegations of a possible military investigation of Oswald by the Marine Corps following the assassination. Also, some former USMC associates of Oswald have told researchers that they recall civilian investigators

asking questions about Oswald following his defection in late 1959 or early 1960.

4 The in-person, unsworn interview was tape-recorded, and the three written interview

reports are dated August 5, August 13, and September 16, 1997, respectively.

5 Reeves served in the District Intelligence Office of the San Diego, California 11th Naval

District.

6 One of the officers who called Mr. Reeves was Rufus Taylor, who was Director of Naval

Intelligence in 1964.

7 The Office of Operations later became the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD) of the Directorate of Operations.

8 See the HSCA’s report on Oswald in Mexico City, The Lopez Report, where the subject of

CIA photographic surveillance operations is discussed at length. 

9 The Review Board was not able to locate cables or dispatches from the following periods:

Mexico City Station to Headquarters (September 26–30, 1963); Headquarters to Mexico City

Station (September 26–30, 1963); JMWAVE to Headquarters (September 26–November 21,

1963); Headquarters to JMWAVE (September 26–November 21, 1963); and all traffic between

the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE for the periods September 26–October 20, 1963 and

November 22–December 30, 1963.

10 According to CIA, in the 1960s, offices of record for cable traffic and dispatches did not create cable and dispatch files for reference collection purposes. 

11 Approximately half of the records on Cuba were from 1962 and the other half were from

1963. Very few records from 1961 or 1964 were present.

12 The RFK donor committee was established in the 1970s for the purpose of overseeing the

processing of RFK papers which were held on a deposit agreement at the JFK Library. It traditionally has been comprised of Kennedy family members and scholars and is now headed by

Max Kennedy, one of Robert F. Kennedy’s sons.

13 When the Review Board decided in 1996 that it would not object to the JFK Library keeping custody of the RFK Cuba-related records, provided that the JFK Library agree to release

the records, the JFK Library moved to process the records as part of the executive order

mandatory review declassification. Consequently, the Library included the RFK records in the

pilot scanning project conducted by CIA, with the stipulation that they be reviewed under JFK

Act guidelines. The process was delayed due to a combination of technical problems with the

scanning project and a change in leadership of the donor committee following the death of

Michael Kennedy.

14 The CIAmemoranda bear the dates November 23, 1976; August 5, 1977; and November 29,

1979. 

15 Secret Service Final Declaration of Compliance.

16 OIP Final Declaration of Compliance.

17 Mr. Miller was later subpoenaed by the Review Board, and he had retained numerous

records from his tenure as Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division.

18 Criminal Division Initial Statement of Compliance (dated January 29, 1997).

119
120

19 Dec. 19, 1996, Review Board Letter to Main Treasury.

20 Main Treasury Final Declaration ¶ 10.

21 Id. ¶ 19.

22 In the early 1960s, the Technical Services Division (TSD), was a part of the Directorate of

Plans (now the Directorate of Operations). Later administrative shifts moved TSD (renamed

the Office of Technical Service) to the DS&T and the files of the relocated office were incorporated into the DS&T system.

23 The FBI had only designated for processing under the JFK Act sections 17–18 and 20–37 of

the Giancana file. Section 17 of the file began with the year 1963, and so the FBI had not designated for processing any volumes of records that predated January 1, 1963.

24 Robert Blakey and Richard Billings, Fatal Hour (1981); Anthony Summers, Conspiracy

503–504 (1980); Gerald Posner, Case Closed 459–460 (1993); John H. Davis, Mafia Kingfish,

519–524 (1989); Ronald Goldfarb, Did the Mob Kill JFK?, Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1995 at C3:1.

2 5 When the FBI determines that electronic surveillance is a necessary component of a particular investigation, the FBI goes to a federal court and obtains authorization pursuant to Title III

to establish the surveillance. Title III operates to automatically place a l l materials obtained fro m

the overhear under court seal. Then, if the U.S. Attorney wants to use the tapes in a pro s e c ution, they have to petition the federal court to have the seal lifted only for the portions of the

tapes that will be played at trial. The practical effect of this pro c e d u re is that everything that is

n o t played at trial remains under seal. Thus, in order for the Review Board staff to obtain access

to the BriLab surveillance, it had to move to unseal the materials for the purpose of its re v i e w.

Then, when the Review Board staff located assassination re c o rds within the BriLab materials, it

requested the Title III court to unseal the re c o rds for the purpose of public disclosure. 

26 The Worker newspaper, to which Oswald subscribed, often mentioned Abt.

27 Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years At Lockheed. New

York: Little Brown, and Company. 1994. 

28 Scheduled to be released on September 18, 1998.

29 William Manchester, Foreward to The Death of a President, Harper & Row, Publishers, New

York, p. ix–x.
A. INTRODUCTION

Many students of the assassination believe

that the medical evidence on the assassination of President Kennedy, in concert with

the ballistics evidence and film recordings of

the events in Dealey Plaza, is the most important documentation in the case, as indeed it

would be in any homicide investigation. The

Review Board believed that, in order to truly

address the public’s concerns relating to possible conspiracies and cover-ups relating to

the assassination, it would need to gather

some additional information on all three of

these topics. The pages that follow detail the

Review Board’s efforts to develop additional

information on these highly relevant and

interesting topics.

B. MEDICAL EVIDENCE1

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) did not

task the Assassination Records Review Board

with the mission of investigating the assassination or of attempting to resolve any of the

substantive issues surrounding it. But the

JFK Act did authorize the Review Board to

pursue issues related to the documentary

record, including the completeness of records

and the destruction of records. In an informal

discussion with the Review Board, Congressman Louis Stokes, former Chairman of the

House Select Committee on Assassinations

(HSCA), strongly encouraged the Review

Board to do what it could to help resolve

issues surrounding the documentary record

of the autopsy. He advised the Board that the

medical evidence is of particular importance

and that he hoped that it would do all it

could to complete the record. Despite being

hampered by a 33-year-old paper trail, the

Review Board vigorously pursued additional

records related to the medical evidence and

the autopsy, commencing in 1996.

1. Medical Issues

One of the many tragedies related to the

assassination of President Kennedy has been

the incompleteness of the autopsy record and

the suspicion caused by the shroud of secrecy

that has surrounded the records that do exist.

Although the professionals who participated

in the creation and the handling of the medical evidence may well have had the best of

intentions in not publicly disclosing information—protecting the privacy and the sensibilities of the President’s family—the legacy of

such secrecy ultimately has caused distrust

and suspicion. There have been serious and

legitimate reasons for questioning not only

the completeness of the autopsy records of

President Kennedy, but the lack of a prompt

and complete analysis of the records by the

Warren Commission. 

Among the several shortcomings regarding

the disposition of the autopsy records, the

following points illustrate the problem. First,

there has been confusion and uncertainty as

to whether the principal autopsy prosector,

Dr. James J. Humes, destroyed the original

draft of the autopsy report, or if he destroyed

notes taken at the time of the autopsy. Second, the autopsy measurements were frequently imprecise and sometimes inexplicably absent. Third, the prosectors were not

shown the original autopsy photographs by

the Wa r ren Commission, nor were they

asked enough detailed questions about the

autopsy or the photographs. Fourth, the persons handling the autopsy records did not

c reate a complete and contemporaneous

accounting of the number of photographs

nor was a proper chain of custody established for all of the autopsy materials. Fifth,

when Dr. Humes was shown some copies of

autopsy photographs during his testimony

before the HSCA, he made statements that

were interpreted as suggesting that he had

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PA RT II: 

CL A R I F I N G T H E FE D E R A L RE C O R D O N T H E ZA P R U D E R F I L M A N D T H E

ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E
revised his original opinion significantly on

the location of the entrance wound. These

shortcomings should have been remedied

shortly after the assassination while memories were fresh and records were more readily recoverable.

The first step taken by the Review Board in

re g a rd to the medical evidence was to

arrange for the earliest possible release of all

relevant information in the Warren Commission and HSCA files. Prior to the passage of

the JFK Act, the files from the HSCA contained numerous medical records that had

never been released to the public. After the

JFK Act came into effect, but before the

Review Board was created, the National

A rchives and Records A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

(NARA) released many of these re c o rd s .

Once the Review Board staff was in place in

fall of 1994, it attempted to identify all

remaining records that appeared to be connected to the medical evidence and arranged

for their prompt release. All of these records

were sent to NARA by early 1995 without

redactions and without postponements. 

The Review Board queried several government entities about possible files related to

the autopsy, including the Bethesda National

Naval Medical Center, the Armed Forc e s

Institute of Pathology, the Naval Photographic Center, the Senate Select Committee

on Intelligence (for Church Committee

Records), and the President John F. Kennedy

Library. The Review Board also attempted to

contact all former staff members of the House

Select Committee on Assassinations. With

the exception of the autopsy photographs

and x-rays, which are exempt from public

disclosure under the JFK Act, the Review

Board arranged for the release of all governmental records related to the autopsy. There

are no other restricted records related to the

autopsy of which the Review Board is aware.

The Review Board’s search for re c o rds thereupon extended to conducting informal interviews of numerous witnesses, taking depositions under oath of the principal persons who

c reated autopsy re c o rds, and arranging for

the digitizing of the autopsy photographs.

There were many notable successes resulting

from the Board’s work, a few of which may

briefly be mentioned here. With the generous

and public-spirited cooperation of the Eastman Kodak Company, NARA, the FBI, and a

representative of the Kennedy family, the

Review Board was able to provide secure

transportation to ship the autopsy photographs to Rochester, New York, to be digitized on the most advanced digital scanner in

the world. The digitized images will be capable of further enhancement as technology

and science advance. The digitizing should

also provide assistance for those who wish to

pursue the question of whether the autopsy

photographs were altere d .2 The Review

Board also was able to identify additional

latent autopsy photographs on a roll of film

that had (inaccurately) been described as

“exposed to light and processed, but showing no recognizable image.” Again with the

generous cooperation of Kodak, the latent

photographs were digitized and enhanced

for further evaluation. These digitized

records have already been transferred to the

John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at NARA. Access to

these materials is controlled by a representative of the Kennedy family.

On another front, through staff efforts, the

Review Board was able to locate a new witness, Ms. Saundra Spencer, who worked at

the Naval Photographic Center in 1963. She

was interviewed by phone and then bro u g h t

to Washington where her deposition was

taken under oath in the presence of the

autopsy photographs. Ms. Spencer testified

that she developed post-mortem photographs of President Kennedy in November

1963, and that these photographs were diff e rent from those in the National A rc h i v e s

since 1966. In another deposition under oath,

D r. Humes, one of the three autopsy pro s e ctors, acknowledged under questioning—in

testimony that appears to differ from what

he told the Wa r ren Commission—that he

had destroyed both his notes taken at the

autopsy and the first draft of the autopsy

report. Autopsy prosector Dr. “J” Thornton

Boswell, in an effort to clarify the impre c ision in the autopsy materials, marked on an

anatomically correct plastic skull his best

recollection of the nature of the wounds on

the President’s cranium. The autopsy phot o g r a p h e r, Mr. John Stringer, in detailed test i m o n y, explained the photographic pro c ed u res he followed at the autopsy and he

raised some questions about whether the

122
supplemental brain photographs that he

took are those that are now in NARA. His

former assistant, Mr. Floyd Riebe, who had

earlier told several re s e a rchers that the

autopsy photographs had been altered based

upon his examination of photographs that

have been circulating in the public domain,

re-evaluated his earlier opinion when shown

the actual photographs at NARA. 

P e rhaps the most challenging aspect of the

Review Board’s work on the medical evidence was the preparation and taking of the

depositions of the principal persons with

knowledge about the autopsy and autopsy

re c o rds. Although conducting such work

was not re q u i red by the JFK Act, the Review

B o a rd sought to obtain as much information

as possible re g a rding the documentary

re c o rd. A c c o rd i n g l y, it identified all of the

still-living persons who were involved in

the creation of autopsy re c o rds and bro u g h t

virtually all of them to NARA. For the first

time, in the presence of the original color

t r a n s p a rencies and sometimes first-generation black-and-white prints, the witnesses

w e re asked questions about the authenticity

of the photographs, the completeness of the

autopsy re c o rds, the apparent gaps in the

re c o rds, and any additional information in

their possession re g a rding the medical evidence. The witnesses came from as far away

as Switzerland (Dr. Pierre Finck) and as

close as Maryland (Dr. “J” Thornton

Boswell). In conducting the depositions, the

Review Board staff sought to approach the

questioning in a professional manner and

without prejudging the evidence or the witn e s s e s .

Near the end of its tenure, the Review Board

also took the joint deposition of five of the

Dallas physicians who treated the President’s

wounds at Parkland Memorial Hospital on

November 22, 1963.

There were three closely related problems

that seriously impeded the Review Board’s

efforts to complete the documentary record

surrounding the autopsy: a cold paper trail,

faded memories, and the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. An example of the cold

paper trail comes from Admiral Georg e

Burkley, who was President Kennedy’s military physician and the only medical doctor

who was present both during emergency

t reatment at Parkland Memorial Hospital

and at the autopsy at Bethesda Naval Hospital. In the late 1970s, at the time of the

HSCA’s investigation, Dr. Burkley, through

his attorney, suggested to the HSCA that he

might have some additional information

about the autopsy. Because Dr. Burkley is

now deceased, the Review Board sought

additional information both from his former

lawyer’s firm, and from Dr. Burkley’s family.

The Burkley family said it did not possess

any papers or documents related to the assassination, and declined to sign a waiver of

attorney-client privilege that would have

permitted the Review Board access to the

files of Mr. Illig (also now deceased),

Burkley’s former attorney.

Memories fade over time. A very important

f i g u re in the chain-of-custody on the autopsy

materials, and the living person who perh a p s

m o re than any other would have been able to

resolve some of the lingering questions re l a t e d

to the disposition of the original autopsy

materials, is Robert Bouck of the Secret Service. At the time he was interviewed he was

quite elderly and little able to remember the

important details. Similarly, the re c o rds show

that Carl Belcher, formerly of the Department

of Justice, played an important role in pre p a ring the inventory of autopsy re c o rds. He was,

h o w e v e r, unable to identify or illuminate the

re c o rds that, on their face, appear to have been

written by him.

Finally, a significant problem that is well

known to trial lawyers, judges, and psychologists, is the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. Witnesses frequently, and inaccurately,

believe that they have a vivid recollection of

events. Psychologists and scholars have longsince demonstrated the serious unreliability

of peoples’ recollections of what they hear

and see. One illustration of this was an interview statement made by one of the treating

physicians at Parkland. He explained that he

was in Trauma Room Number 1 with the

President. He recounted how he observed

the First Lady wearing a white dress. Of

course, she was wearing a pink suit, a fact

known to most Americans. The inaccuracy of

his recollection probably says little about the

quality of the doctor’s memory, but it is

revealing of how the memory works and

how cautious one must be when attempting

to evaluate eyewitness testimony.

123

A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E
The deposition transcripts and other medical

evidence that were released by the Review

Board should be evaluated cautiously by the

public. Often the witnesses contradict not

only each other, but sometimes themselves.

For events that transpired almost 35 years

ago, all persons are likely to have failures of

memory. It would be more prudent to weigh

all of the evidence, with due concern for

human error, rather than take single statements as “proof” for one theory or another.

C. ZAPRUDER FILM

In the spring of 1996, the Review Board

began to consider how it might answer questions about chain-of-custody, or provenance,

of selected film records, or enhance or better

preserve selected film records.

1. Ownership of the Zapruder Film

At the time that Congre s s

passed the JFK A c t ,

Abraham Zapru d e r’ s

famous 8mm film depicting the death of Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy was in the possession of NARA. The

Z a p ruder film, which

re c o rds the moments

when President Kennedy

was assassinated, is perhaps the single most

important assassination

re c o rd. In 1978, A b r a h a m

Z a p ru d e r’s son, Henry G.

Z a p ru d e r, deposited the

original Zapruder film

with the National

A rchives for safekeeping.

Legal ownership of the

film, however, was still

retained by the Zapru d e r

f a m i l y. As the Zapru d e r

family stated upon transmission of the film to the

National A rchives, “the Film will be held by

the A rchives solely for storage purposes

a nd. . .the A rchives has acquired no rights

whatsoever to the Film.”3

In March 1993, shortly after passage of the

JFK Act, Henry Zapruder sought unsuccessfully to remove the original film from the

National A rchives. In October 1994, the

Zapruder family, through its attorney, again

sought return of the original film. NARA

declined to return the original film, knowing

that the JFK Act may have affected the legal

ownership status of the film.

Thereafter, NARA, the Review Board, and

the Department of Justice sought to clarify

the status of the original film under the JFK

Act, including whether the U.S. government

could legally acquire the original film and

what the value of compensation to the

Zapruder family would be under the takings

clause of the Fifth Amendment. In addition,

the U.S. government had numerous discussions with legal counsel for the Zapruder

family regarding a legal “taking” of the film,

the compensation to be accorded to the family, and copyright issues regarding the film.

In 1997, the Review Board deliberated, and

ultimately asserted, its authority under the

JFK Act to acquire legal ownership of the

original Zapruder film. On April 2, 1997, the

Review Board held a public hearing “to seek

public comment and advice on what should

be done with the camera-original motion picture film of the assassination that was taken

by Abraham Zapruder on November 22,

1963.” The issue facing the Board was

whether the Zapruder film was an “assassination record” that “should be in the JFK

Collection at the Archives” and whether it

“should. . . be Federal Government property

rather than the property of private citizens.”5

The Review Board also had to consider how

to acquire the film for the American people,

whether through the exercise of a takings

power or through negotiation with the

Zapruder family.

At its April 1997 hearing, the Review Board

h e a rd testimony from six experts who

a d d ressed a variety of issues, including the

constitutional and legal issues involved in

e ffecting a “taking” of the film and the benefits in having U.S. government ownership of

the original film. Following the Zapruder film

hearing, the Review Board held an open meeting on April 24, 1997, and resolved to secure

legal ownership of the original Zapruder film

for the American people. The Board’s “Statement of Policy and Intent with Regard to the

Z a p ruder Film,” adopted unanimously by the

B o a rd, resolved: (1) that the Zapruder film

was an assassination re c o rd within the mean124

W hy is this [Zapruder] film so

important? It is enormously

i m p o r t a n t , if you want to know

what happened in Dealey Plaza,

this film shows you, as much as

any film can. All queries and

challenges to. . .[ i t s ]. . . a u t h e nt i c i t y , if this film is in government hands, can be satisfa c t orily overcome. When that is

d o n e , this film then becomes a

baseline for all additional studies for what happened in Dealey

P l a z a. . . there should be a protocol established as for how a digitized copy is made with the

state of the art equipment. . . t h a t

digitized copy, w h i ch is then

fully authenticated, should then

be the basis of all research in

the future.

—Josiah Thompson,

April 2, 1997
ing of the JFK Act; (2) that the Board would

attempt to ensure that the best available copy

of the film be made available to the public at

the lowest reasonable price; (3) that the Board

would work cooperatively with the Zapru d e r

family to produce the best possible copy for

scholarly and re s e a rch purposes, establish a

base re f e rence for the film through digitization, and to conduct all appropriate tests to

evaluate authenticity and to elicit historical

and evidentiary evidence; and (4) that the

original film be transferred to the JFK Collection on August 1, 1998 and that the Review

B o a rd would work with Congress to re s o l v e

this issue.

In June 1998, Congressman Dan Burton,

Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, which oversees the work of the Review Board, wrote to

the Department of Justice expressing Congressional support for the efforts of DOJ to

carry out the “Board’s commitment to ensuring that the original Zapruder film remains

in the custody of the American people as the

most important ‘assassination record.’”6 At

the time of this Report, the Department of

Justice was engaged in negotiations with the

Zapruder family to resolve all outstanding

issues relating to the legal transfer of the film

f rom the family to the U.S. government,

including the issue of compensation to be

paid to the family for the film. The transfer of

the original Zapruder film to the JFK Collection was effective August 1, 1998.

2. S t a ff Examinations of Films 

Designated as “In-Camera” Original,

and First Generation Copies, by NARA

The Review Board determined that there

should be an examination of the Zapruder

films at NARAdesignated as the original and

the two Secret Service copies (believed to be

first generation copies) for the purpose of

recording characteristics of the three films.

(See illustration.) (The Review Board subsequently determined that the LMH Company—the Zapruder family’s company—

possessed a third first generation copy of the

Zapruder film.) The Review Board hoped

that the recorded observations would serve

to provide information to a public that would

not be able to obtain physical access to these

films, and second, would determine whether

the film should be examined by photographic experts. Ultimately, the staff recommended, and the Review Board agreed, that

it would approach Eastman Kodak to request

that Kodak examine the Zapruder film.

3. Eastman Kodak’s Pro Bono Work for the

Review Board Related to the Zapruder

Film (and Autopsy Photographs)

The Review Board first met with the Eastman

Kodak Company in June 1996 in Washington

to discuss a wide variety of possible research

topics related to a host of potential film

issues. At that time, Kodak stated that it

would provide a limited amount of pro bono

work for the Review Board. The Review

Board continued discussions with Kodak laboratory officials based in Rochester, New

York, and subsequently met with Kodak

technical experts James Milch and Roland

Zavada in Washington, D.C. At that meeting,

the Review Board identified three major

areas of interest, only one of which related to

the Zapruder film: (1) the possible digitization and enhancement of the Zapruder film,

as well as edge print analysis of the original

and first generation copies, and study of the

optical characteristics of the Zapruder cam125

A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E
era in relation to perceived “anomalies” in

the original film; (2) the possible enhancement and, if necessary, optical (i.e., film, not

medical) analysis of autopsy images; and (3)

a study of the provenance of film materials

subpoenaed by the Review Board fro m

Robert J. Groden for examination. Kodak laboratory experts Milch and Zavada viewed

the original Zapruder film, a Secret Service

first generation copy, and some of the Groden materials for the first time at NARA during their September 1996 visit to Washington. 

Kodak subsequently

offered to contribute up

to $20,000 of labor and

materials to the Review

Board in pro bono work—

the equivalent of roughly

35 days of effort. Kodak

confirmed, at a meeting

with the Review Board in

August of 1997, that

Zavada, a retired Kodak

film chemist who was formerly Kodak’s preeminent 8 mm film expert, was the consultant that Kodak had hired to: (1) attempt to

write a “primer” explaining the optical and

mechanical operating characteristics of Abraham Zapruder’s 8 mm Bell and Howell home

movie camera; (2) explain the relationship, if

any, between the camera’s operating characteristics and perceived “anomalies” in the

original film; and (3) answer questions about

the provenance of the original film and the

first generation copies. (“Provenance” issues

that Mr. Zavada took on included studying

the chain-of-custody documents executed in

November 1963 by Abraham Zapruder; conducting interviews of surviving personnel

involved in the development of the original

film, and the exposure and developing of the

three first generation copies; and studying

manufacturer’s edge print, processing lab

edge print, and the physical characteristics of

the optical printer believed to have been used

to create the three first generation copies on

November 22, 1963.)

In addition, in August 1997 James K. Toner,

the Laboratory Head of Kodak’s Imaging Science Resources Lab in Rochester, presented a

methodology for making the best possible

direct digitization of the original Zapruder

film. Kodak also began to make arrangements with NARA and the Review Board for

the digital preservation and enhancement of

the autopsy images of President Kennedy,

under the direct guidance of Toner.

In September 1997, Toner and Zavada visited

Washington and, in addition to studying

selected autopsy film and x-ray images at

NARA, they also studied perceived anomalies in the inter-sprocket areas of the original

Zapruder film, and the emulsion characteristics and edge print characteristics of what

NARA presumed to be the camera-original

Zapruder film and the two Secret Service first

generation copies. (See the 3 illustrations on

page 121.) Following this visit, Zavada began

writing his extensive report on Zapruder film

issues, which expanded in scope as his

research into camera optics and printer characteristics continued. This report was scheduled for completion by Kodak no later than

September 30, 1998; six copies were scheduled for deposit at NARA in the JFK Collection.

Kodak ultimately spent appro x i m a t e l y

$53,000 on work related to the digitization

and enhancement of the President’s autopsy

images, and approximately $11,000 on work

related to Zapruder film issues, significantly

exceeding its original estimate of donated

labor and materials. The Review Board gratefully acknowledges the public service provided to the American people by the Eastman Kodak Company.

4. The Review Board Staff’s Study and

Clarification of Paul Hoch’s FOIA

Lead “CIA Document 450”

The Review Board staff located and interviewed two former employees of the CIA’ s

National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and questioned them about

“ C I A Document 450,” a 1970s Freedom Of

Information Act release—original document undated—that indicates NPIC had a

version of the Zapruder film, made

“internegatives” and “copies,” conducted a

“print test,” and performed a shot-and-timing analysis based on interpretation of the

film’s content.

Both individuals indicated that the internegatives made were of single frames only, and

the prints made (from these same internegatives) were of single frames only—for brief126

To call Zapruder’s film remarkable is an exaggerated unders t a t e m e n t . It is, due to the subject matter and the clear angle of

view undoubtedly one of the

most historically important, i f

not the most important, m o v i e

films ever made.

—Richard Trask, April 2, 1997
ing boards—and that they never reproduced

(or altered) the film as a motion picture. They

identified portions of the document related

to this activity—magnification and reproduction of small motion picture frames as prints.

To this extent, the document has been demystified. However, other questions, such as who

conducted the shot-and-timing analysis, and

who assembled the briefing boards, remain

unanswered.

D. Ballistics 

In April 1995, a member of the public wrote

to Attorney General Janet Reno to advise her

that Warren Commission Exhibit 567 (CE

567)—a bullet fragment—may have embedded in it tiny strands of fiber that the writer

believed came from President Kennedy’s

shirt collar. [See illustration.] In January 1996,

John Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, wrote to FBI Director Louis Fre e h

requesting that the FBI “initiate an inquiry

into specific aspects of the assassination theory related to collected bullet fragments and

residues now in the possession of the federal

government.”

The Review Board determined that the

Firearms Examination Panel of the HSCA

recommended analysis of CE 567 more than

19 years ago. For unknown reasons, the

Panel’s recommendation did not appear in

the HSCA’s March 1979 final report. The

Review Board contacted former HSCA staff

members to determine why this recommendation was deleted from the draft when the

final HSCA report was published, but the

127

A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E
former HSCA staff members and Firearms

Panel members contacted were not able to

provide a reason for the omission of the recommendation.

In March 1996, the Review Board, the FBI, the

Department of Justice, and NARA began a

series of meetings to discuss re-examination

of the ballistics evidence. In June 1996, the

FBI provided its report to the Review Board

and stated that “a complete fiber analysis

could be conducted on the fibrous debris

adhering to CE 567 and the materials composing the shirt and the tie [of President

Kennedy].”

In August 1998, after lengthy consideration

about whether the testing would be appropriate, NARA finally agreed to allow limited

testing of CE 567 to complete the earlier recommendation of the HSCA’s Firearms Panel.

NARA also determined that the bullet fragment should be tested for “suspected biological tissue and/or organic material,” the presence of which was noted by the HSCA in

1978 and the FBI in 1996. 

In September 1998, testing began on CE 567

and, at the time of this writing (September

1998), was ongoing. NARA will issue its re p o r t

on the results of the testing in October 1998.

128
CHAPTER 6

PART II: ENDNOTES

1 Most of the section of this Report relating to medical evidence and medical issues was

printed and distributed to the public in a Staff Report dated July 31, 1998 when the Review

Board released its deposition transcripts and written reports of unsworn interviews relating to

medical issues.

2 Although the Review Board does not offer opinions on the substantive issues related to the

assassination, it believes that trained medical personnel will possibly be able to provide additional illuminating explanations regarding the autopsy after examining the enhanced images.

It should be noted, however, that although the digitizing significantly enhanced the clarity of

the images, many questions are likely to remain unanswered.

3 July 10, 1978 Letter from Henry G. Zapruder to James Moore, National Archives.

4 Transcript of Review Board Proceedings, Hearing on the Status and Disposition of the

“Zapruder Film,” April 2, 1997, at 5 (statements of Chairman Tunheim). 

5 Id., at 11 (statements of General Counsel Gunn). 

6 June 5, 1998 Letter from Chairman Burton to Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General

for the Civil Division.

129

A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E
A. PURSUIT OF RECORDS AND PAPERS FROM

PRIVATE CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS

The Review Board actively encouraged private citizens and organizations who possessed assassination records to donate them

to the JFK Collection to make the collection

as historically rich as possible. Fortunately,

private citizens were willing to donate materials, often in the form of a deed of gift, to the

collection. The Review Board also received

countless essays, interview transcripts and

books, usually not accompanied by a deed of

gift. These, too, will become part of the JFK

Collection. Below is an overview of materials

donated by private citizens.

1. Gary Aguilar: Interviews with 

Drs. Humes and Boswell

Dr. Gary Aguilar of San Francisco provided

the Review Board with an audiotape of his

1994 telephone interviews with Dr. James J.

Humes and Dr. “J” Thornton Boswell, the

two Navy prosectors at President Kennedy’s

autopsy.

2. Richard Barnes: AP Wire Copy

Richard Barnes, a former Associated Press

reporter, donated to the JFK Collection AP

wire copy for November 22 through November 26, 1963. The material chronicles the first 

A P news reports of President Kennedy’s

assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald’s arrest,

Jack Ruby’s shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald,

and President Kennedy’s funeral. Barnes, a

San Francisco-based A P reporter in 1963,

obtained permission from his editor to keep

the wire copy, which would otherwise have

been thrown away.

3. Dr. George Burkley

The Review Board contacted the children of

deceased Vice Admiral George G. Burkley,

former military White House physician to

P residents Kennedy and Johnson, to find out

if their father had deposited his papers at

any institution, or if they possessed any

assassination re c o rds. The staff came up

e m p t y - h a n d e d .

According to House Select Committee on

Assassinations re c o rds, Burkley’s personal

attorney apparently told the HSCA that his

client believed there was a conspiracy to kill

President Kennedy. Mr. Illig, Burkley’s attorney, however, is now deceased. The Review

Board staff asked Burkley’s daughter, the

executor of his estate, to sign a waiver allowing the Review Board access to papers at

Illig’s law firm, but she declined to sign and

return the waiver.

131

CHAPTER 7

PU R S U I T O F RE C O R D S A N D IN F O R M AT I O N

F R O M NO N- FE D E R A L SO U R C E S

I firmly believe that the Board has an obligation to seek out assassination

records from all sources; public and private. The goal of Congress in passing S.

3006 was to ensure broadest possible disclosure of the records relating to the

assassination. The fact that a document exists only in private hands should not

deter the Board in any way from seeking to compel its transmission to the

National Archives.—Judge Tunheim at the Review Board nomination hearings.

Through fair and impartial application of the criteria developed by the Review

Board and keeping in mind always the express purposes of the enabling legislation, I believe that the Review Board should be as aggressive as it needs to be

to achieve disclosure of relevant records. That also applies to records held by

private citizens...—William Joyce at the Review Board nomination hearings.
4. Edward Scannell Butler: Materials

from the Information Council of the

Americas

Chapter 6 of this report discusses the Review

B o a rd’s attempts to locate government

records on Edward Scannell Butler and his

organization, the Information Council of the

Americas. INCA is a New Orleans-based

clearinghouse for anti-communist information, and particularly for anti-Castro Cuban

information.

Although Butler allowed Review Board staff

to view INCA files, he said he could not provide copies of them to the JFK Collection

until he catalogued the material. He also

declined the Board’s offer to send its staff

members to New Orleans to determine what

INCA records would be of value to the JFK

Collection. 

5. Mrs. Marion Ebersole: Records of Dr.

John J. Ebersole

The Review Board staff contacted the widow

of Dr. John J. Ebersole, the Navy radiologist

who was on duty the night of President

Kennedy’s autopsy at Bethesda National

Naval Medical Center. Although he was not

yet board-certified, he served as the consulting radiologist during the procedure. Ebersole said she did not have any of her husband’s personal papers or any assassination

records.

6. President Gerald Ford: Desk Diaries

P resident Gerald Ford donated to the JFK Collection selected entries from his desk diaries

(calendars) from 1963 and 1964 during the

period that he served as a member of the Wa rren Commission. The Review Board staff

reviewed the calendars for relevance and

selected excerpts for donation to the JFK Collection with the cooperation of President Ford .

7. Justice Abe Fortas

Former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas,

who was an adviser to President Johnson,

kept papers that include drafts of President

Johnson’s and Lady Bird Johnson’s written

statements to the Warren Commission and

documents rebutting passages from William

Manchester’s book, The Death of a President.

Fortas donated his papers to Yale University,

but the Review Board secured copies of the

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related material for the JFK

Collection. NARA will open Fortas’ assassination-related papers in January 2001, which

is the same date that Yale will open the

remainder of his papers.

8. Captain J.W. “Will” Fritz

Dallas Police Department Captain J.W. “Will”

Fritz served as Lee Harvey Oswald’s primary

interrogator when Oswald was in police custody from the afternoon of November 22

until the morning of November 24, 1963.

Fritz was the chief of the Dallas Police

Department’s Homicide and Robbery

B u reau. In November 1997, the Review

B o a rd acquired and released handwritten

notes that Fritz apparently made following

his interviews with Oswald. 

9. Jim Garrison

The late Jim Garrison was the New Orleans

District Attorney who investigated and prosecuted Clay Shaw for conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy and swho was portrayed in Oliver Stone’s film, JFK.

Garrison’s family donated 15,000 pages of his

assassination papers, which include records

from his investigation and prosecution of

Shaw, as well as other files on individuals or

subjects that Garrison believed to be connected to the assassination.

10. James P. Hosty Jr.

In November 1996, the Review Board interviewed James P. Hosty, Jr., the FBI agent

responsible for handling the Lee Harvey

Oswald and Marina Oswald cases when they

lived in Dallas. Hosty was present during the

initial Dallas police interrogation of Oswald

and took contemporaneous handwritten

notes. Although the notes were believed to

have been destroyed, Hosty donated the

notes, and other materials relating to the

assassination and the FBI’s investigation, to

the JFK Collection.

11. Wesley Liebeler

Wesley Liebeler, former Assistant Counsel to

the Warren Commission, testified before the

132
Review Board at its Los Angeles public hearing in September 1996. At the time of his test i m o n y, Liebeler provided to the Review

Board copies of six chapters from his unfinished book on the assassination. In addition,

Liebeler provided the Review Board with a

report on the Zapruder film written by

UCLAPhysics professor Brian Jones. Liebeler

had apparently requested that Jones examine

the Zapruder film and prepare the report.

12. David Lifton: Medical Evidence

David Lifton, author of Best Evidence: Disguise and Deception in the Assassination of John

F. Kennedy, testified before the Review Board

at its public hearing in Los Angeles in September 1996. During his testimony, Lifton

announced that he would donate to the JFK

Collection his 35mm “interpositive” of the

Zapruder film. Interpositives are valuable

because they are made directly fro m

internegatives, which in turn are made from

the original film. They there f o re pro v i d e

denser colors and better resolution than projection prints. 

Lifton also donated compact disk copies of

interviews he conducted with medical witnesses from both Parkland Hospital in Dallas

and Bethesda National Naval Medical Center. Some of Lifton’s medical interviews date

from as early as 1966.

In addition, Lifton provided the Review

B o a rd staff with audiotapes, videotapes,

and transcripts of selected witness interviews. Lifton’s donations are now in the JFK

C o l l e c t i o n .

13. Holland McCombs

Holland McCombs, now deceased, was a L i f e

magazine correspondent in Dallas at the

time of the assassination. A private citizen

told the Review Board that there were assassination re c o rds in Mr. McComb’s papers,

which are housed at the Paul Meek Library

of the University of Tennessee at Martin. In

July 1996, a Review Board staff member

reviewed hundreds of boxes of McComb’s

papers and located seven boxes relating to

his interest in the assassination. The Board

s t a ff marked approximately 600 re c o rds and

t r a n s f e r red photocopies of those re c o rds to

the JFK Collection.

14. Richard Case Nagell

In his book The Man Who Knew Too Much,

author Dick Russell wrote about Richard

Case Nagell, a former Army Counterintelligence Officer who told Russell he: (1) had

conducted surveillance on Lee Harvey

Oswald for both the CIA and the KGB; (2) had

been re c ruited by a KGB agent (masquerading as a CIA operative) to persuade Oswald

n o t to participate in a plot against Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy; (3) had been instructed by the KGB

to kill Oswald if he could not dissuade him

f rom participating in the plot; (4) was in possession of a Polaroid photograph that had

been taken of himself with Lee Harvey

Oswald in New Orleans; (5) had audio tape

re c o rdings of Oswald and others discussing a

forthcoming assassination attempt on Pre s ident Kennedy; and (6)

had sent a letter, via re gi s t e red mail, to FBI Dire ctor J. Edgar Hoover in

September 1963, warning

of a conspiracy to kill

P resident Kennedy in late

September 1963 in Wa s hington, D.C. (and had

documentary proof of the

mailing of said letter). 

The Review Board sent a

letter to Nagell dated

October 31, 1995, requesting that Nagell contact the Review Board’s Executive Director to

discuss any assassination records he might

have in his possession. Subsequently, the

Review Board was informed that Nagell had

been found dead in his Los Angeles apartment the day after the ARRB’s letter was

mailed. (The coroner ruled that he died as a

result of natural causes.)

A member of the Review Board staff traveled

twice to California to inspect the effects of

Nagell in an attempt to find assassination

records. During the first trip, the Review

Board staff member, along with Nagell’s son

and niece, inspected Nagell’s apartment in

Los Angeles. During the second trip, the

Review Board staff member inspected, again

with the assistance of the son and niece,

material contained in some footlockers found

in storage in Phoenix, Arizona. The Review

Board staff did not locate any of the items

that Dick Russell references above.

133

. . . the intent of the conspirators,

according to Nagell, was to pin

the blame [for the assassination

of the President] on Castro’s

Cuba and spark an invasion of

the island. . .he has indicated to

me in the past that, if he was

ever subpoenaed by a government agency, he would be willing to testify.

— D i ck Russell, M a r ch 24, 1 9 9 5
A considerable amount of documentary

material on Nagell from the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Army’s Investigative

Records Repository (IRR) was placed in the

JFK Collection as a result of the JFK Act and

the efforts of the Review Board staff.

The CIA processed as part of its sequestered

collection a 201 and Domestic Contacts Division file on Nagell. The Review Board staff

also reviewed a CIA Office of Security file on

Nagell. The entire file was designated an

assassination record.

15. New Orleans Metropolitan Crime

Commission

The Metropolitan Crime Commission is a

private, anti-crime organization that, since

the 1950s, has investigated public corruption

and organized crime in the New Orleans

area. HSCA staff members reviewed MCC

records on organized crime figures, such as

Carlos Marcello, and on the Garrison investigation. The MCC also granted the Review

B o a rd permission to review its re c o rd s .

Board staff members initially identified 12

boxes that they believed would enhance the

JFK Collection. 

About half of the MCC records copied by

Board staff concern New Orleans District

Attorney Garrison’s investigation of the

assassination. The remaining half of the

records are files that had belonged to Guy

Banister. Most of the Banister material dates

from the early 1950s when he worked for the

New Orleans Police Department. A l a rg e

number of those documents—NOPD “Internal A ffairs” investigative files detailing

small-time police corru p t i o n — w e re irre l evant to the Kennedy assassination. 

Review Board staff members designated as

assassination re c o rds only the MCC documents

that were not exclusively related to NOPD’s

internal affairs. It still was a sizable number.

U l t i m a t e l y, the Board added some 3,000 pages

of MCC re c o rds to the JFK Collection.

16. Gerald Posner

Gerald Posner, author of the book C a s e

C l o s e d , testified before Congress during

debate over the JFK Act that he had interviewed both Navy autopsy prosectors, Drs.

Humes and Boswell. When asked if he would

donate his notes of those interviews to the

JFK Collection and if he had any audiotapes

of those interviews, Posner responded, “I

would be happy, Mr. Chairman, to ask Drs.

Humes and Boswell if they would agree for

their notes to be released to the National

Archives.” The Review Board’s initial contact

with Posner produced no results. The Review

Board never received a response to a second

letter of request for the notes.

17. Frank Ragano

Frank Ragano, who died in 1998, was an

attorney for reputed organized crime figures.

Ragano reperesented both Jimmy Hoffa and

Santo Trafficante. In Ragano’s 1994 book,

Mob Lawyer, Ragano claimed that Jimmy

Hoffa used him as a messenger to ask Trafficante and Carlos Marcello to arrange for the

murder of President Kennedy. Ragano further wrote that in 1987 Trafficante confessed

to him that he, Trafficante, had been involved

in the assassination. 

Ragano also stated in his book that he possessed original, contemporaneous notes of

meetings with organized crime figures. To

determine whether Ragano’s notes were relevant to the assassination, the Review Board

subpoenaed the notes and deposed Ragano.

He produced several handwritten notes

regarding the assassination, but he could not

definitively state whether he took them during the meetings in the 1960s or later when he

was working on his book in the 1990s. 

The Review Board submitted the original

notes to the Secret Service to see if it could

determine when Ragano created the notes,

but the Secret Service was unable to provide

a conclusive answer. Ragano’s testimony to

the Review Board is now available to the

public in the JFK Collection as a transcript

and an audio recording. Ragano’s notes are

attached to his deposition transcript.

18. J. Lee Rankin: Warren 

Commission Papers

James Rankin Jr., the son of the late J. Lee

Rankin, the General Counsel of the Warren

Commission, testified at the Review Board’s

public hearing in Los Angeles and subsequently agreed to donate his father’s papers

134
to the JFK Collection. J. Lee Rankin’s Warren

Commission files include memos and handwritten changes to draft chapters of the Commission report that Commission members

Gerald Ford, John McCloy and Allen Dulles,

among others, recommended.

19. Clay Shaw: Personal Papers and Diary

Clay Shaw, the New Orleans businessman

whom District Attorney Jim Garrison pro s ecuted for conspiracy to murder Pre s i d e n t

K e n n e d y, left personal papers with one of his

friends. The Review Board acquired the

papers for inclusion in the JFK Collection. The

papers, which fill seven boxes, include Shaw’s

diary from the time of the trial; re c o rds fro m

Shaw’s criminal case; and Shaw’s corre s p o ndence, business re c o rds, passports, personal

re c o rds, and photographs.

20. Walter Sheridan

In its effort to comply with the JFK Act, the

John F. Kennedy Library reviewed its holdings for groups of re c o rds that could contain

assassination re c o rds. Among others, it

found the re c o rds of Walter Sheridan, an

investigator who worked for Robert F.

Kennedy and later for NBC. The library

identified folders of materials, primarily

notes, related to Sheridan’s work as an

investigative reporter for NBC covering the

p rosecution of Clay Shaw. In 1967, Sheridan

p roduced an hour-long television special on

the assassination. 

In 1994, the library informed Sheridan that it

was processing his records and sending them

to the JFK Collection at NARA. Sheridan

requested that the library return the identified assassination records to him, and the

library honored his request. Sheridan, however, died in January 1995. NBC then claimed

it owns the rights to the Sheridan papers. The

dispute is now pending.

21. Dallas Sixth Floor Museum Records

The Sixth Floor Museum in Dallas, Texas, is

dedicated to providing information to the

public about President Kennedy’s assassination, and it contains an archives section that

holds original films and documents. The

museum is on the sixth floor of the former

Texas School Book Depository, the exact location from which Lee Harvey Oswald

allegedly shot President Kennedy.

The Review Board sosught to identify

museum records that should be part of the

JFK Collection. After deposing Sixth Floor

Museum officials and negotiating with the

museum, the Review Board secured copies of

Parkland Hospital records on the medical

t reatment of President Kennedy; autopsy

records for Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby,

and Dallas police officer J.D. Tippit; court

papers from Jack Ruby’s criminal trial; Parkland physician Dr. Charles J. Carrico’s

papers; and several home movies depicting

the Presidential motorcade in Dallas.

22. Martin Underwood

Martin Underwood, a

former advance man for

P residents Kennedy and

Johnson, was a member

of President Kennedy’s

advance team in Texas 

in November 1963. A

re s e a rcher who worked

with Seymour Hersh on

his book, The Dark Side of

C a m e l o t , told the Review Board that Underwood claimed that President Johnson sent

Underwood to Mexico City in 1966 or 1967 to

see what he could learn about the Kennedy

assassination. Underwood allegedly met

with Win Scott, former CIA Chief of Station

in Mexico City.

The researcher provided the Review Board

with copies of handwritten notes, on White

House stationery, ostensibly pre p a red by

Underwood and documenting his meeting

with Scott. The notes state that Scott told

Underwood that the CIA “blew it” in Dallas

in November 1963. On the morning of

November 22, the agency knew that a plane

had arrived in Mexico City from Havana,

and that one passenger got off the plane and

b o a rded another one headed for Dallas.

Underwood’s notes state that Scott said that

C I A identified the passenger as Fabian

Escalante. 

The re s e a rcher also stated that someone

i n s t ructed Underwood to follow Judith

Campbell Exner on her 1960 train trip from

Washington, D.C., to Chicago, during which

135

My family and I would like to

contribute all of my fa t h e r ’s

papers that relate to his Wa r r e n

Commission service to the American people, to be included in the

National Arch i v e s.

—James Rankin, September 17,

1996
she was alleged to have carried money

between Senator Kennedy (the Democratic

Party nominee) and organized crime boss

Sam Giancana. 

The Review Board staff informally interviewed Underwood. Underwood confirmed

that he traveled to Mexico City in 1966, but

said that he went to advance President Johnson’s trip and not to look into circumstances

surrounding President Kennedy’s assassination. While in Mexico City, Underwood met

with Scott concerning the details of President

Johnson’s trip. During Underwood’s meeting

with Scott, he said they did discuss President

Kennedy’s assassination and that Scott told

him the story that the researcher relayed to

the Review Board. 

When Review Board staff asked Underwood

about any notes he may have taken, he initially claimed to have no memory of any

notes. Upon viewing copies of the notes that

the researcher provided to the Review Board,

Underwood said that he had written the

notes in 1992 or 1993 for a researcher to use

for Hersh’s book. Underwood explained that

the notes are on White House stationery

because he has a lot of extra White House

stationery left over from his work with President Johnson. 

Underwood could not remember whether he

had contemporaneous notes from his meeting with Scott. He also denied that he followed Judith Campbell Exner on a train and

that he had no knowledge about her alleged

role as a courier.

After the informal interview, Underwood

forwarded to the Review Board a set of typed

notes from his 1966 trip to Mexico City and

his meeting with Scott. The typed notes documented Underwood’s activities in Mexico

City and briefly mentioned his meeting with

Scott. The notes do not mention Underwood’s conversation with Scott about the

Kennedy assassination. Instead, the notes

state that Underwood sought Scott’s assistance in staging a big welcome for President

Johnson. The Review Board subsequently

requested Underwood to testify under oath,

but due to health problems, he was not available. Underwood’s notes now are part of the

JFK Collection.

23. Edward Wegmann

Cynthia Wegmann, the daughter of the late

Edward Wegmann, a New Orleans lawyer

who assisted in defending Clay Shaw during

his conspiracy trial, testified before the

Review Board at its New Orleans hearing

and donated his assassination-related papers

to the JFK Collection.

Wegmann’s collection includes some documents from Garrison’s office files that Wegmann and his colleagues obtained from former Garrison investigator William Gurvich.

While working for Garrison, Gurvich became

disenchanted and decided to quit. Before

leaving, he made copies of Garrison’s memoranda and witness interviews. He later gave

his copies to Shaw’s attorneys. 

The Wegmann papers contain some 6,000

pages and are now in the JFK collection.

24. Thomas W. Wilson

On September 11, 1998, Mr. Thomas W. Wilson of Pennsylvania made a presentation to

Review Board staff summarizing his eight

years of research into the authenticity and

significance of the JFK autopsy images and

the Zapruder film, and additional study of

the Mary Moorman Polaroid photograph,

using “photonics” as a technological tool.

Mr. Wilson donated the following materials

to the JFK Collection: (1) a 20-page “executive summary” of his work; (2) a graphic presentation of Mr. Wilson’s research conclusions about President Kennedy’s head

wounds, using “A.D.A.M.” software to display his conclusions; (3) a 20-minute audiotape of a discussion between Mr. Wilson and

former Navy x-ray technician Jerrol Custer,

dated 3/28/98; and (4) a commercially sold

videotape summarizing his work.

Mr. Wilson believes he possesses a considerable amount of scientific and physical evidence, accumulated over eight years (from

1988-1996), proving his contention that President Kennedy was shot from the front, not

from behind. He is willing to donate all of

this material to the JFK Collection if FBI or

Department of Justice officials will first allow

him to make his full two-day presentation on

the evidence he has collected regarding the

136
Moorman photograph, the Zapruder film,

and the autopsy photographs of President

Kennedy.

B. PURSUIT OF AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIAL

FROM PRIVATE CITIZENS AND

ORGANIZATIONS

Below is a list of the audio-visual material

from private citizens and organizations that

the Board was able to obtain.

1. Tom Alyea: Film from Inside the Texas

School Book Depository

Tom Alyea, a cameraman for Dallas television station WFAA, shot film while he was

trapped in the Texas School Book Depository,

which was sealed by the Dallas Police

Department after the assassination. Alyea’s

footage includes shots of the sixth floor

sniper’s nest. 

In May 1996, Review Board staff met with

Alyea, who agreed, in writing, to donate his

original 16mm film to the JFK Collection.

Alyea gave the film to the JFK Collection at

that time, and as agreed, the Review Board

sent Alyea a 16mm positive copy and a

16mm negative copy.

Alyea later decided that he wanted the Board

to return the film to him. The Review Board,

however, could not do so because the film

was then at the National Archives, a federal

agency, and therefore came under Section 5

of the JFK Act. Section 5 requires agencies to

place all assassination records in their possession in the JFK Collection.

2. Charles Bronson: Film of Dealey Plaza

The Review Board approached the family of

the late Charles Bronson, a private citizen

who filmed the scenes in Dealey Plaza

shortly before and after President Kennedy’s

assassination, and requested that they consider donating Bronson’s film. The family

declined.

3. CBS Outtakes

The Review Board approached executives at

CBS, the network holding the largest volume

of television coverage and subsequent specials about the assassination, to request that

they consider donating their outtakes to the

JFK Collection. CBS owns rare interview outtakes with individuals such as Marina

Oswald Porter.

CBS agreed to donate its outtakes from its

television specials to the JFK Collection. The

Review Board anticipates that the CBS

records eventually will become part of the

JFK Collection.

4. Robert Groden

Robert Groden, a photo-optics technician,

was the first to publicly screen the famous

Zapruder film as a motion picture. Subsequently he served as an unpaid photographic

consultant for the HSCA. 

G roden’s collection of assassination photos

and films is renowned throughout the assassination re s e a rch community, and many

suspect that Groden made unauthorized

copies of the HSCA’s photos and films when

he worked with the Committee. A f e w

re s e a rchers believe that Groden kept original photos and films and returned copies to

the Committee.

One researcher believes that Groden may

have a photograph from the Pre s i d e n t ’ s

autopsy that is not at NARA. The researcher

recalled that he had seen an autopsy photograph at Groden’s home in 1980 that was not

in NARA’s official collection. The researcher

urged the Review Board to find this “extra”

photograph.

The Review Board subpoenaed all original

and first-generation assassination films in

Groden’s possession, and deposed Groden.

Under oath, Groden claimed he did not possess any original or first-generation assassination films or images of any kind. With the

help of NARA, the Board collected Groden’s

materials, studied their provenance, and

returned them in July 1998. Groden did not

turn over to the Review Board any autopsy

photographs that are not already part of

NARA’s official collection. 

5. Lt. Everett Kay: Audio Surveillance Tape

Lt. Everett Kay (Ret.), formerly with the

Miami Police Department Intelligence Unit,

donated to the JFK Collection an audio sur137
veillance tape of a November 9, 1963, meeting between Miami police informant William

Somersett and Joseph Milteer, who alleged

that President Kennedy would be killed by a

rifle shot from an office window.

6. Vincent Palamara: Interviews with

Secret Service Personnel

Vincent Palamara conducted extensive interviews with former Secret Service personnel.

Palamara donated three audio cassettes of

these interviews to the JFK Collection.

7. David Powers: Film of Motorcade

David Powers, a close aide to Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy, was riding in the Secret Service follow-up car directly behind the President’s

limousine on November 22, 1963. Close by

President Kennedy’s side, he filmed many of

the President’s activities that day with his

home movie camera. His film ends minutes

before the motorcade entered Dealey Plaza.

The Kennedy Presidential Library holds the

original film, but Powers, now deceased, graciously agreed to make a copy of his film

available in the JFK Collection.

8. David Taplin: November 24, 1963,

Coverage of Dallas Police Department

Gerald Nathan Taplin Sr. filmed the exterior

of the Dallas Police Department building on

the morning that the DPD scheduled its

transfer of Lee Harvey Oswald to the county

jail. On that morning, Jack Ruby shot Oswald

inside the DPD building. The Taplin film contains images of the arrival of the armored car

that the DPD intended to use as a decoy during the Oswald transfer, footage of other film

crews covering the event, and scenes on the

s t reet. David Taplin, Gerald Taplin Sr. ’ s

grandson, donated a videotape copy of his

grandfather’s film to the JFK Collection.

9. Stephen Tyler

In 1992, Stephen Tyler produced “He Must

Have Something,” a 90-minute television

documentary about Jim Garrison’s investigation of President Kennedy’s assassination.

Tyler testified at the Review Board’s public

hearing in New Orleans, and announced that

he would donate to the JFK Collection a copy

of his documentary along with the outtakes

of approximately 30 interviews that he conducted for the documentary. Among those

interviewed are former District Attorney Jim

Garrison, New Orleans witness Perry Russo,

and Warren Commission critic Mark Lane.

10. Janet Veazey: KTVT Outtakes

In November 1995, the Review Board

launched a special initiative in Dallas,

appealing to residents to consider donating

any film or photographs they may have relating to the assassination. As a result, the

Review Board acquired important KTVT outtakes from Janet Veazey.

Veazey had the film because her father’s

friend, Roy Cooper Jr., was a photographer at

KTVT in Dallas. Cooper retrieved the outtakes from the KTVT trash and spliced them

together, creating a 45-minute, 16mm silent

film. The original film, already in the JFK

Collection, contains footage of Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy in Dallas, and

the aftermath of the assassination. A first

generation copy of these outtakes are now

also part of the JFK Collection.

11. Moses Weitzman

Moses Weitzman is a special effects film

expert who employed Robert Groden as a

trainee and junior level staffer in the late

1960s. Weitzman worked for his client, TimeLife, on the original Zapruder film in the late

1960s and was the first to enlarge the 8mm

Zapruder footage to 35mm format.

Although Weitzman gave his best Zapruder

footage to Time-Life, he retained some

imperfect 35mm internegatives (exhibiting

track and framing error) he had made

d i rectly from the original Zapruder film.

Weitzman used these internegatives to

demonstrate his technical ability to enlarge

8mm film directly to a 35mm format. 

Weitzman made these imperfect internegatives available to Groden during the late

1960s. Most likely Groden used prints made

from these internegatives when he publicly

screened the Zapruder film in the mid-1970s.

Weitzman testified about the historical

importance of the Zapruder film at the

Review Board’s April 1997 public hearing,

and he donated a 16mm copy to the JFK Col138
lection. Weitzman informed the Review

B o a rd that he no longer possesses any

Zapruder film materials.

12. Robert White: Evelyn Lincoln 

Materials

In January 1997, the Review Board contacted

the beneficiaries of Evelyn and Harold Lincoln’s wills to determine whether Evelyn,

President Kennedy’s personal secretary, had

accumulated assassination-related items.

One of the beneficiaries, Robert White, who

collected Kennedy memorabilia and had

been friends with the Lincolns for more than

20 years, apparently had more than 100,000

items in his collection. Many of them were

Evelyn Lincoln’s, including an entire file cabinet and Kennedy memorabilia such as briefcase, signing table, rocker, and stereo.

After the Review Board sent a letter to White,

he contacted an attorney. In a February 1997

letter to the Board, his attorney stated that

White “did not receive nor was he is in possession of any assassination-related artifacts

and/or memorabilia originating from the

Lincolns or from any source.” 

White agreed to speak with Review Board

s t a ff on April 10, 1997. At this meeting,

White provided a brief, handwritten list of

the items Evelyn Lincoln had left him in

her will. White also briefly described his

involvement with cataloguing and appraising the items in the two Lincoln estates.

White reiterated that his inventory of the

estate did not reveal any items related to

the assassination, other than the diaries

and appointment books that had been

bequeathed to the Kennedy Library.

After meeting with White, the Review Board

continued to receive information that White

possessed assassination-related items and

later learned that White planned to auction

items from his collection at Guernsey’s auction house in New York City on March 18

and 19, 1998. The Board, with the help of the

Department of Justice, subpoenaed White,

requiring him to produce all objects and

records relating to the Kennedy assassination, and all re c o rds pertaining to the

Kennedy and Johnson administrations on

Cuba, the FBI, the CIA, organized crime, and

other topics. The subpoena also sought

inventories of White’s collection and a list of

items that White had received as a beneficiary of the Lincolns’ wills. 

The Review Board staff deposed White in

March 1998. During the deposition, White

described his friendship with Evelyn Lincoln

and discussed the various Kennedy-related

objects that she had given him. In certain

cases, White relayed Lincoln’s comments or

documentation about the provenance of various objects. Among the records that White

produced were Texas trip advance sheets, a

Secret Service White House Detail photograph book, memoranda authored by President Kennedy, and 23 White House Dictabelt

tapes. The Board found that four of the memoranda written by President Kennedy contained classified, national security information, and forwarded them to the Information

Security Oversight Office. 

On the last day of his deposition, White told

the Review Board that he had just donated

the Dictabelts to the Kennedy Presidential

L i b r a r y. The Dictabelts contain telephone

conversations, dictations and discussions

between President Kennedy and other individuals. Specific topics on the Dictabelts

include President Kennedy’s dictation during the week of November 4, 1963, discussions of the Berlin Crisis, conversations

re g a rding the Cuban Missile Crisis, and

thoughts dictated by President Kennedy on

November 12, 1963. 

C. PURSUIT OF STATE AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT RECORDS

An assassination re c o rd. . . i n c l u d e s ,

without limitation: All records collected

by or segregated by all federal, state and

local government agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis

of or inquiry into the assassination of

President Kennedy. . .

1

1. New Orleans District Attorney

Files

Harry F. Connick, Sr., District Attorney of

New Orleans, testified at the Review Board’s

New Orleans public hearing in June 1995.

Connick stated that he was in possession of

139
former District Attorney Garrison’s investigative files. He said he intended to donate

the files to the JFK Collection.

Several days later, a package from New Orleans

arrived in the R e v i e w

B o a rd’s offices. It contained what appeared to

be original transcripts

from the grand jury Garrison convened for his investigation of Clay

Shaw.

The man who mailed the records, a former

Connick investigator, said that Connick had

given them to him to throw out when Connick was cleaning out the District Attorney’s

o ffice. Instead, the investigator took the

materials home and stored them in his basement. When he heard about the Review

Board’s effort, he said he felt compelled to

send the transcripts to the Board.

Connick responded by demanding that the

Board return the records to the District Attorney’s office. He said the records were the

property of the state of Louisiana and were

subject to the seal of the Louisiana state

courts. Connick further warned that unless

the Review Board returned the grand jury

records, he would not donate the Garrison

investigative records.

The Review Board refused. Since the records

w e re in the possession of a government

office, namely the Review Board, the Board

believed it was compelled by the JFK Act to

review, organize, and process them for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

A flurry of subpoenas followed. Connick

subpoenaed the Review Board for the return

of grand jury records; the Review Board subpoenaed Connick for the investigative

records. With the Department of Justice’s

help, the Review Board successfully argued

that Louisiana could not subpoena a federal

agency for the records. Connick, however,

was unable to fend off the Review Board’s

subpoena for the Garrison files. Connick

sued unsuccessfully. Both the investigative

records and the grand jury transcripts are

now in the JFK Collection. 

2. Dallas City and County Records

On November 22, 1963, immediately after

President Kennedy was shot, David Burros, a

Dallas motorcycle policeman, found a piece

of bone on Elm Street in Dealey Plaza. The

policeman gave the bone fragment to Deputy

Constable Seymour Weitzman, who presumably gave it to the Secret Service. The Secret

Service then sent the fragment to the White

House physician, then Rear Admiral George

Burkley. The Secret Service placed medical

materials from the autopsy in the safe of

Robert Bouck, the Chief of the Secret Service’s Protective Research Section. However,

the April 26, 1965, inventory of Bouck’s safe

did not list this bone fragment (or any others

in Burkley’s possession in November 1963)

as part of its contents.

The Review Board staff wrote to the Dallas

County records management officer and the

Dallas city archivist to find out if they had

any photographs x-rays, or other records in

their files regarding this bone fragment. Neither archive had any record of it.

D. PURSUIT OF RECORDS FROM FOREIGN

GOVERNMENTS

Assassination re c o rds and additional

records and information may be located

at, or under the control of. . . Foreign

governments.2

In an effort to compile a more complete

record of the assassination, the Review Board

focused considerable attention on an effort to

obtain copies of records contained in the files

of foreign governments. The JFK Act states

that it is the “sense of Congress” that the

Department of State should take steps to

obtain such records which have been the

object of much interest since the assassination. In particular, the Board focused much of

its efforts on the KGB records thought to be

maintained both in Russia and in Belarus,

and on Cuban and Mexican government

records. Congress anticipated, and indeed

specifically provided in the JFK Act, that the

Department of State “should contact” the

Russian government and “seek the disclos u re of all re c o rds of the former Soviet

Union” relating to the assassination.3 Furt h e r m o re, the Department of State was

re q u i red to “cooperate in full with the

140

But we think that what you are

doing is important and we think

that what we can hopefully add

to what you’re doing. . .

—District Attorney 

Harry F. Connick,Sr.,

June 28, 1995
Review Board” in seeking disclosure of relevant records.4 While the Department of State

occasionally helped facilitate contacts with

f o reign counterparts and individual State

Department employees provided helpful

assistance and advice, overall the Department of State was more of a hindrance than a

help to the Review Board. The Board certainly expected much more help than it

received from a Department that obviously

did not consider pursuit of foreign records

about the Kennedy assassination to be a priority. Letters of request to the Department

from the Board went unanswered for long

periods of time, cables that contained communications from foreign sources or from

United States Embassy personnel to the

Board sat for months on the desks of State

Department employees without being transmitted to the Board, and important opportunities were missed because the Department

did not believe the issue was important

enough to raise. The Review Board has identified significant records, but does not believe

that these collections will be obtained in full

until the Department of State determines that

such an effort is an important priority.

1. Russia

The Review Board believes that the re c o rds of

the former KGB exist in Moscow that (1)

reflect surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald

and Marina Oswald during 1959–1962, and

that (2) reflect the Soviet investigation into the

c i rcumstances of the Kennedy assassination.

The United States Embassy made requests for

these re c o rds and a Review Board delegation

later visited Moscow and met with re p re s e ntatives of three diff e rent archives where it was

believed that re c o rds existed. The Board

received a number of individual re c o rd s

which have been released in the JFK Collection but was unsuccessful in obtaining permission to review or copy the larger sets of

files which exist in Moscow. The Board

received a significant boost to its efforts when

Vice President Gore asked Russian Prime

Minister Chernomyrdin in March 1998 to

release the files. Unfortunately, the National

Security Council declined to raise the re q u e s t

in September 1998 during the Clinton-Ye l t s i n

summit meeting. Additional approaches to

the Russians continue, but the Review Board

s t rongly recommends that the United States

government in general, and the State Department in particular, continue to pursue the

release of these important KGB re c o rd s .

2. Belarus

With the assistance of the United States

Embassy in Minsk, Chairman Tunheim, Board

Member Hall and Executive Director Marwell

in November 1996 reviewed the extensive

KGB surveillance file kept in Minsk by the

B e l a rusian KGB. The file details over two

years of extensive surveillance and analysis by

the KGB of Lee Harvey Oswald during the

time that he resided in the Belarusian capital.

Some of these re c o rds were utilized by Norman Mailer in his book O s w a l d ’s Ta l e. The

B o a rd was unable to obtain a copy of the file,

in part due to the deteriorating re l a t i o n s h i p

between the United States and Belarus in

1997–98. Mailer’s collaborator in O s w a l d ’s Ta l e,

L a w rence Schiller, agreed, in response to the

B o a rd’s request, to donate copies of documents from the Minsk files, but the re c o rd s

will not be released in the JFK Collection until

a later date. Additional efforts are still underway to obtain the files which are unquestionably of strong historical interest. Again, the

B o a rd strongly recommends that all possible

e fforts be made to obtain for the A m e r i c a n

people this important re c o rd of the activities

of accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald during the years prior to the assassination.

3. Cuba 

The Review Board initiated a dialogue with

Cubans stationed in the Cuban Interest Section in the Swiss Embassy to try to find out if

the Castro government has any records relevant to the assassination. The Chief of the

Cuban Interest Section, who agreed that the

release of Cuban records would be beneficial

to Cuba and the United States, launched an

effort to locate records. However, he noted

that record keeping in Cuba was spotty in the

years immediately following Castro’s rise to

power, but agreed to work with the Board in

an effort to promote a better understanding

of these issues. The Review Board appreciated the excellent cooperation it re c e i v e d

from Cuban officials.

The Review Board continued to actively

work with officials in the Cuban Interest Section to determine what, if any, information

exists in Cuba relating to the assassination.

141
4. Mexico

Since the Mexican government conducted an

investigation into the activities in Mexico

City of Lee Harvey Oswald, and the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS), the Mexican federal security service, conducted interrogations of Silvia Duran, who met with

Oswald in Mexico City, the Review Board

sought Mexico’s cooperation in its search for

additional re c o rds. At the behest of the

Review Board, the Department of State

requested the Mexican government to search

its files for possible records relevant to the

assassination. To date, the only records the

Mexican government has made available to

the JFK Collection were copies of the same

diplomatic correspondence between the

Mexican Foreign Ministry and the Department of State that it submitted to the Warren

Commission. Copies of these communications already were in the JFK Collection.

5. Other Governments

The Review Board also requested records

that were relevant to the assassination from

other foreign governments. The Board

received records from the archives of Great

Britain and Canada. These records are now

available in the JFK Collection.

E. CONCLUSION

The JFK Act paved the way for a single government entity, for the first time, to be able to

search for, identify, and assemble donations

from citizens and local governments, and

then place them in a central location, open to

the public. 

Although not all of the Board’s efforts were

successful, the Review Board hopes that the

fact that it strenuously upheld its mandate to

search for, obtain, and disclose assassinationrelated material in an open and documented

fashion will help restore trust in the government’s desire and ability to be responsive to

citizens’ concerns. 

Public hearings held in several cities by the

Review Board, independent researcher

“expert’s conferences,” and working luncheons

held with Review Board staff and Board members, were instrumental in providing leads that

p roved most useful to the search for re c o rd s .

The Review Board is grateful for the contributions made by citizens who participated in

these meetings, made important re s e a rch suggestions to the Review Board, and donated

assassination re c o rds so that all citizens can

enjoy access to these important materials.

142
CHAPTER 7

ENDNOTES

1 44 C.F.R. § 1400.1.

2 44 C.F.R. § 1400.3(i).

3 President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, section 10(b)(2) (Supp. V 1994).

4 JFK Act, § 10(b)(3).

143
A. INTRODUCTION

Are federal agencies cooperating fully,

or is there resistance that fosters public

distrust of the government?1

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) directed federal agencies to search for re c o rds re l a t i n g

to the assassination of President Kennedy

and to transfer those re c o rds to the John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

(JFK Collection) at the National A rc h i v e s

and Records Administration (NARA) for

public disclosure. As explained earlier in

this report, agencies began their compliance

activities even before the Senate confirmed

the nomination of the A s s a s s i n a t i o n

R e c o rds Review Board members in 1994.

Once the Review Board convened, it

assessed the efforts of federal agencies to

comply with the terms of the JFK Act. 

In late 1996, the Review Board initiated a formal program to ensure that all re l e v a n t

agencies were complying with the JFK A c t .

The Review Board used its compliance program to ensure that government offices fulfilled their JFK Act obligations. The pro g r a m

re q u i red agencies to certify that:

(1) the agency conducted a thoro u g h

s e a rch for assassination re c o rds as that

term is defined by the JFK Act and the

Review Board’s regulation further defining

the term;

(2) the agency identified, organized, and

reviewed its assassination records;

(3) the agency prepared its assassination

records for public release at NARA;

(4) the agency responded to each of the

Review Board’s requests for additional information and records; and

(5) the agency transmitted its assassination

records to NARA.

Chapter 6 of this Report describes both the

Review Board’s requests for additional information and records to federal agencies and

federal agencies’ responses to those requests. 

The Review Board’s compliance pro g r a m

stressed agency obligations to search for and

publicly release records relating to President

Kennedy’s assassination. As part of its compliance program, the Review Board asked

each agency to submit a declaration, under

penalty of perjury, describing the re c o rd

searches that it completed, the assassination

records that it located, and any other actions

it took to release assassination records. The

Review Board established the compliance

program in furtherance of the JFK Act’s mandate that there be “an enforceable, independent and accountable process for the public

disclosure” of records on the Kennedy assassination.2

The Review Board worked extensively with

agency personnel to resolve outstanding

compliance issues prior to submission of

Final Declarations of Compliance.

B. FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE

JFK ACT

Each section of this chapter describes work

that a particular agency completed, both

before and during the Review Board’s existence.3

1. Central Intelligence Agency

The Review Board considered the CIA’s compliance with the JFK Act, including complete

disclosure of all CIA records relating to Lee

Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination, to be one of its highest priorities.

The CIA complied with the JFK Act through

the auspices of the Agency’s Historical

145

CHAPTER 8

CO M P L I A N C E W I T H T H E JFK AC T

B Y GO V E R N M E N T OF F I C E S
Review Program (previously the Historical

Review Group or HRG). HRP reviewed documents, re f e r red documents within CIA,

answered questions, negotiated issues with

the Review Board staff, and, after Board voting, processed documents for release to

NARA. The HRP reviewers were all CIA

annuitants, with twenty years or more experience, working as independent contractors.

Beginning with a 14-member staff in 1992,

the staff grew steadily to 29 reviewers and

nine administrative personnel by the summer of 1998. HRP also drew on the resources

of numerous other offices at CIA for record

searches, answers to Review Board questions, and the provision of records for inspection by the Board. From

1992 until December 1997,

HRG functioned as part of

the Center for Studies in

Intelligence and its Chief

was the Director of Central Intelligence’s personal re p resentative to the

Review Board. In January

1998, the CIA’s re o rg a n ization renamed HRG the

Historical Review Program and moved it to join

other CIA d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

e fforts in the Office of

Information Managem e n t .

In 1992 and 1993, the CIA’s Historical Review

Group proceeded to assemble CIA records

relating to the assassination. In early 1992,

prior to enactment of the JFK Act, the Chief

of the History Staff located and inventoried

the CIA records on the assassination that CIA

held pursuant to an agreement between the

C I A and the HSCA (the CIA–HSCA

sequestered collection). This material comprised 64 boxes. In addition, the History Staff

secured the 16 boxes of the original Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file. Following passage of

the JFK Act, the CIA reviewed and declassified with numerous redaction the Oswald

201 file and files within the CIA–HSCA

sequestered collection, and in 1993 the CIA

transmitted those records to the JFK Collection at NARA.

In October 1993, the CIA’s HRG requested the

various CIA d i rectorates to search for additional re c o rds on Lee Harvey Oswald and on

the JFK assassination. (The directorates were

the Directorate of Operations, the Dire c t o r a t e

of Intelligence, the Directorate of A d m i n i s t r ation, and the Directorate of Science & Te c hn o l o g y.) As a result of this search dire c t i v e ,

the CIA identified 31 boxes of potentially

responsive re c o rds, and these were forw a rded to the HRG for review under the JFK

Act. Included were 19 boxes of working files

on the Kennedy assassination by CIA o ff i c e r

Russ Holmes (for many years he was the

Agency’s focal point officer with re s p o n s i b i l i t y

for responding to questions related to CIA’ s

Kennedy assassination-related re c o rds); two

boxes on KGB defector Yuri Nosenko; seven

boxes of Latin American Division re c o rd s ;

and three boxes related to the Bay of Pigs. The

Review Board identified 22 boxes as re s p o nsive under the JFK Act, although many of the

re c o rds were duplicates of re c o rds contained

in the Oswald 201 file or the CIA–HSCA

s e q u e s t e red collection files.

The Review Board requested numerous categories of additional CIA records in an effort

to ensure the most complete disclosure of

information relating to the Kennedy assassination. The Review Board made 16 formal

requests in writing, and 37 informal requests,

for additional information and records from

the CIA.

In anticipation of the Review Board ’ s

requests for additional information and

records, the CIA, in April 1995, requested

each directorate and the DCI administrative

officer “to appoint a focal point officer” for

the JFK Act. Review Board inquiries were

referred by the HRG to the appropriate CIA

office. A number of CIA officers facilitated

the difficult processes of securing access to

CIA files, as well as negotiating issues relating to the release of records. The Board found

that, whenever it and its staff were able to

deal directly with knowledgeable experts

throughout the Agency on substantive issues

or records, more often than not the result was

a mutually acceptable release or postponement. These compromises reasonably balanced the public interest in disclosure with

legitimate needs for continued secrecy on

limited issues. The Review Board encountered early CIA resistance to making records

available to the Review Board, as well as

resistance to the ultimate disclosure of

records. A small number of CIA staff officers,

almost exclusively from the Directorate of

146

[T]he only thing more horrifying to me than the assassination

itself is the insidious, perverse

notion that elements of the

American Government, that my

own Agency, had some part in

it. I am determined personally

to make public or to expose to

disinterested eyes every relevant

scrap of paper in CIA’s possession, in the hope of helping to

dispel this corrosive suspicion.

—CIA Director Robert Gates,

May 12, 1992
Operations, unnecessarily impeded the

process and damaged the Agency’s interests

by resisting compromise with all-or-nothing

positions.

In response to the Review Board requests, the

Board staff was granted access to review

original, unsanitized CIA f i l e s — i n c l u d i n g

original files of the highest officials at CIA

during the time of the assassination—to confirm the existence (or non-existence) of materials relating to the assassination. Since the

CIAfiles covered other matters in addition to

the assassination, the CIA was initially reluctant to provide whole files for Review Board

inspection. In order to obtain access to certain

sets of files, and thus examine them in their

original form, the Review Board agreed to

limit access to one or two Board staff members. The Board believed that agreeing to this

limitation was of practical benefit because it

secured access to entire original sets of files.

As a result of the Review Board’s requests

and inspection of various CIA files, the

Review Board staff identified additional

materials relating to the assassination in

addition to those initially identified in 1992

and 1993.

In 1997, the CIA provided the Review Board

staff with several briefings by representatives

of each directorate with respect to their files

and re c o rd keeping systems and their

searches for assassination-related records. In

its searches for records on the assassination,

the CIA conducted both manual and electronic database searches. In 1998, the Review

Board expressed to the CIA concern regarding the thoroughness of CIA’s initial 1992–93

record searches. The Review Board’s concern

arose out of the CIA’s belated discovery of

several files relating directly to Lee Harvey

Oswald, including (a) a multi-volume Office

of Security file on Oswald; (b) a previously

undisclosed continuation of the Oswald 201

file containing a small number of documents

post-dating the 1977–78 HSCA investigation;

(c) another, small file on Oswald designated

by the CIA as an “A” file; and (d) additional

records relating to a KGB source with information relating to Lee and Marina Oswald.

None of these files had been identified by the

CIA in 1992–93, when the CIA first assembled its files on the Kennedy assassination.

These files were located through Review

Board inquiries regarding specific records.

The Review Board was disturbed by the

belated discovery of these records, particularly given its mandate to assure the public

that all relevant materials on the Kennedy

assassination were being released by the U.S.

government.

In an effort to ensure that the CIA had conducted thorough and adequate searc h e s

under the JFK Act, the Review Board specifically requested that CIA D i rector Georg e

Tenet issue a directive to all components of

CIA requesting that they identify any records

relating to the assassination. Director Tenet

issued the directive. Other measures were

suggested by the Review Board, and these

w e re undertaken by CIA. In particular,

offices most likely to contain assassination

records (e.g., Counter- Intelligence and Latin

American Division) were asked to conduct

targeted searches following Review Board

guidelines.

The Executive Dire c t o r, the third highest

level official of the CIA, certified under oath

that the CIAhad fully complied with the JFK

Act. In its Final Declaration of Compliance,

the CIA stated that each of its directorates, as

well as the official responsible for the DCI

a rea, had certified that “their re s p e c t i v e

offices or directorates [had] properly and

fully responded to requests from the Board.”

CIA further represented, under oath, that it

had “made diligent searches to locate and

disclose. . . all records in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy” and that it was

“ a w a re of no other assassination-re l a t e d

records in its possession being withheld.. . .”

The Central Intelligence Agency submitted

its Final Declaration of Compliance dated

September 24, 1998.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation identified its primary files on the Kennedy assassination in the 1970s in response to public

requests for disclosure under the Freedom of

Information Act. These re c o rds, re f e r red to by

the FBI as the “core and related” files, consist

of headquarters and field office files on the

following subjects: Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack

R u b y, the JFK assassination investigation, the

FBI administrative file on the Wa r ren Com147
mission, Marina Oswald, Ruth Paine, Georg e

de Mohrenshildt, Clay Shaw, David Ferrie,

the FBI administrative file on the Churc h

Committee, and the FBI administrative file on

the House Select Committee on A s s a s s i n ations. The FBI established its JFK Task Forc e

(which consisted of five document re v i e we r s )4

in 1992 as Congre s s

debated legislation to

accelerate disclosure of

all re c o rds related to the

assassination of Pre s i d e n t

K e n n e d y. The FBI conducted re c o rds searc h e s

of the core and re l a t e d

subjects in its Central Records System and its

automated electronic surveillance index

(ELSUR Index) to determine that they had

g a t h e red all core and related files in FBI headquarters and field offices. 

The FBI identified a second major category of

records to be processed under the JFK Act

which the FBI refers to as the “HSCA Subjects.” In its investigation of the Kennedy

assassination, the House Select Committee

on Assassinations (HSCA) requested access

to records responsive to FBI searches on more

than 600 different subjects. The HSCA cast a

wide net in its investigation, and the HSCA

subjects range from individuals who had

direct contact with Lee Harvey Oswald to

major figures in organized crime and antiCastro Cuban political activity. The HSCA

secured an agreement from the FBI in 1978

that the Bureau would retain the HSCA subjects as a “sequestered collection” which

would be filed as a set of records apart from

the FBI’s central records system. 

All of these records (the core and related files

and the HSCA subjects) were identified, and

the FBI had begun its JFK Act processing

prior to the appointment of the Review

Board. The FBI delivered its first shipment of

assassination records to the JFK Collection in

December 1993. As of September 30, 1998, the

FBI has made 22 shipments of assassination

records to the JFK Collection.

As described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this

report, the Review Board streamlined its

review processes in 1997 to ensure that all

assassination records would be reviewed by

the close of the Review Board’s term. In the

spring and summer of 1997, the FBI assured

the Review Board that it would attempt to

finish its processing of assassination records

as a result of the streamlined processes. In

March 1998, the FBI wrote a letter to the

Review Board stating that it did not expect to

finish its assassination re c o rds pro c e s s i n g

until February 2000. After a series of meetings between the Review Board and the FBI,

the FBI again committed to finishing its JFK

Act processing before the end of September

1998.

The Review Board formally submitted to the

FBI more than 50 requests for additional

re c o rds. In response to the Board’s re q u e s t s ,

the FBI made its original files available. In a

limited number of instances, the Bureau provided documentation on those files that were

d e s t royed according to the FBI’s re c o rds re t e ntion schedule. The Review Board designated

thousands of documents for assassination

re c o rds processing as a result of these re q u e s t s .

In January 1997 and again in April 1998, the

staff of the Review Board met with the FBI to

a d d ress any outstanding matters with

respect to the Bureau’s compliance with the

JFK Act. The compliance program with the

FBI focused primarily on the scope of the

FBI’s searches under the JFK Act. The Review

Board staff raised additional records issues,

including the identification of any working

files of top FBI officials with responsibility

for overseeing the investigation of the

Kennedy assassination and accounting for all

relevant electronic surveillance that related

to the assassination. Acting on the Review

Board’s concerns, the FBI requested all FBI

Headquarters Divisions to conduct searches

for any materials not retrievable through the

FBI central records system and for records

that may have been maintained by top FBI

officials. While the FBI has discovered some

new assassination records as a result of this

search, they have not found any working

files maintained by top FBI officials from the

early 1960s.

On the issue of electronic surveillance, the FBI

requested all 56 of its field offices to identify

any electronic surveillance in which assassinat i o n - related figures were either speaking, or

re f e r red to, in conversations monitored by the

FBI. The FBI searched its ELSUR indices under

the core file subjects. The FBI certified that it

identified only one instance where a core sub148

The FBI is absolutely committed

to achieving the maximum disclosure of JFK material.

—FBI Director Louis J. Freeh,

November 24, 1993
ject was a target of FBI electronic surveillance,

and that was the electronic surveillance of

Marina Oswald in Dallas following the assassination. All other responsive electronic surveillance identified by the FBI consisted of socalled “overhears,” where a person is

mentioned in a conversation. Nonetheless, the

FBI certified that these would be re v i e w e d

and processed under the JFK Act. 

The FBI has a well-indexed, centralized filing

system, and the FBI’s official main files on

the Kennedy assassination were readily identified and processed under the JFK Act. The

bulk of FBI records relating to the assassination have been placed in the JFK Collection.

However, at the time of this Report, the FBI

was still processing some additional materials for inclusion in the JFK Collection.

The FBI submitted its Final Declaration of

Compliance on August 20, 1998. 

3. Secret Service

The Secret Service transferred its official case

file on the Kennedy assassination to NARA

in 1979.

In December 1992, after the JFK Act was

passed, the Assistant Director for the Secret

Service Office of Administration directed the

Secret Service to inventory its records in an

attempt to locate records relating to the assassination. In response, the Chief of the Policy

Analysis & Records Systems Branch within

the Office of Administration reviewed the

inventories of Secret Service records in storage. Secret Service made these inventories, as

well as archive re c o rds, available to the

Review Board staff for inspection. In 1995,

the Assistant Director for the Office of

Administration instructed each A s s i s t a n t

Director and the Chief Counsel to search for

assassination-related records. In December

1996, the same Assistant Director issued

another search directive to each employee.

In addition to the Secret Service’s search of its

a rchival re c o rds, the Review Board submitted

to the Secret Service more than twenty separate requests for re c o rds. The Secret Service

was generally cooperative in making the

requested re c o rds available to the Review

B o a rd. As a result of the Service’s own

s e a rches, as well as Review Board requests for

re c o rds, the Secret Service identified, as assassination re c o rds under the JFK Act, additional

materials beyond those contained in the off icial case file for the Kennedy assassination.

C o n g ress passed the JFK Act of 1992. One

month later, the Secret Service began its compliance efforts. However, in January 1995, the

S e c ret Service destroyed presidential pro t e ction survey reports for some of Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy’s trips in the fall of 1963. The Review

B o a rd learned of the destruction appro x imately one week after the Secret Service

d e s t royed them, when the Board was drafting

its request for additional information. The

B o a rd believed that the Secret Service files on

the President’s travel in the weeks pre c e d i n g

his murder would be re l e v a n t .

The Review Board requested the Secret Service

to explain the circumstances surrounding the

d e s t ruction, after passage of the JFK Act. The

S e c ret Service formally explained the circ u mstances of this destruction in corre s p o n d e n c e

and an oral briefing to the Review Board. 

The Review Board also sought to account for

certain additional re c o rd categories that

might relate to the Kennedy assassination.

For example, the Review Board sought information regarding a protective intelligence

file on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee

(FPCC) and regarding protective intelligence

files relating to threats to President Kennedy

in the Dallas area (the Dallas-related files

were disclosed to the Warren Commission).

The FPCC and Dallas-related files apparently

w e re destroyed, and the Review Board

sought any information re g a rding the

destruction. As of this writing, the Service

was unable to provide any specific information regarding the disposition of these files.

The Secret Service submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated September 18,

1998, but did not execute it under oath. The

Review Board asked the Service to re-submit

its Final Declaration.

4. National Security Agency

Despite the highly classified nature of its operations, the National Security Agency (NSA)

conducted searches for assassination re c o rd s .

In March 1993, NSA’s Deputy Director of

Plans, Policy, and Programs (DDP) dire c t e d

149
that an NSA-wide search be conducted for

re c o rds responsive to the JFK Act. Wi t h i n

NSA, the Office of Policy coordinated re v i e w

of NSA’s assassination-related re c o rd s .

A c c o rding to NSA, “[a] search of all files and

databases believed to hold such [assassinat i o n - related] re c o rds was conducted by each

of the Directorates within NSA....” In addition

to database searches, NSA assigned ten individuals to hand-search approximately 200

boxes of archived material from the 1963–64

time frame. The Directorate of Operations and

the NSA A rchives also conducted searches in

response to specific requests of the Review

B o a rd in 1995. As a result of NSA’s 1993 and

1995 searches, NSA identified a total of 269

re c o rds to be processed under the JFK Act. In

1998, an additional 109 assassination re c o rd s

w e re identified by NSA to be processed under

the JFK A c t .

NSA located the bulk of its assassination

records in the NSA Legislative Affairs Office

and General Counsel’s Office. These records

related to NSA responses to prior investigational inquiries regarding the assassination.

In March 1995, the NSA briefed the Review

Board members as to how it conducted its

searches for assassination records and, in

addition, submitted answers to specific questions of the Review Board concerning assassination records in the possession of NSA.

The Review Board subsequently submitted

additional questions to NSA, particularly

regarding NSA intelligence records relating

to Cuba or the Soviet Union. NSA answered

the Board’s questions, submitting a detailed

set of responses to Review Board inquiries

regarding intelligence holdings on Cuba and

the Soviet Union that might lead to relevant

information relating to the assassination.

NSA stated that “both Cuba and the USSR

were targets of high interest [to NSA] during

the time of the assassination,” and that NSA

searched its files relating to those countries.

NSA concluded that “[t]hese searches produced records that primarily reflected reactions to the assassination.”

With respect to NSA’s review of its intelligence holdings, NSA “certifie[d] that it has

neither located, nor is it withholding, any

intelligence records containing information

of investigatory significance to the Kennedy

assassination.” NSA advised the Review

Board that its relevant intelligence records

had “report[ed] on reactions to the assassination” and that they did not contain “unique

information” on the “planning , execution, or

investigation” of the assassination.

The National Security Agency submitted its

Final Declaration of Compliance dated

August 18, 1998.

5. Department of State

The Department of State transferred its main

record holdings regarding the assassination

to NARA in 1989. These were “lot files” consisting mostly of re c o rds re g a rding the

Department of State’s work relating to the

Warren Commission investigation. The files

originated in the Department of State Legal

Advisor’s Office and the Office of Security

and Consular Affairs. After Congress passed

the JFK Act, the Department of State opened

these files to the public in August 1993.

The Department of State designated its Office

of Freedom of Information, Privacy & Classification Review (within the Bureau of

Administration) as the entity responsible for

identifying and processing assassination

records under the JFK Act. The office in turn

appointed a retired Department of State historian to coordinate the Department’s JFK

Act compliance.

The Department of State staff conducted

numerous searches of its records to ensure

compliance with the JFK Act. For example, in

1993, the Department searched its Central

Foreign Policy records. The search included a

review of manifests of retired files of Departmental offices and foreign posts, as well as

computerized searches of its automated document systems. Also in 1993, the Assistant

S e c retary of State for Administration formally requested various offices within the

Department to search for records relating to

the assassination. 

Among the records located by the Department were 25,000 pages of material relating

to condolences, funeral attendance arrangements, and memorial activities. Also, “virtually every diplomatic conversation held during the month or so after the assassination

contained oral condolences or references to

the recent American tragedy.” After processing approximately 3,000 such records for the

JFK Collection, the Department discontinued

150
p rocessing these kinds of re c o rds and

“restricted its search to documents relevant

to the murder investigation.” The Review

Board did not object to this approach.

Former Foreign Service Officers, working as

re-employed annuitants, reviewed Department of State-originated documents and

documents re f e r red by other agencies to

State. Other entities within the Department

of State also participated in review and

declassification, including the Bureau of

Diplomatic Security, the Office of Passport

P o l i c y, and the Bureau of Intelligence &

R e s e a rch. Department of State re v i e w e r s

w e re sent to NARA, the CIA, the House and

Senate Intelligence Committees, and the JFK

Library to review and declassify Department

of State re c o rds. More than 10,000 such

re c o rds were processed under the JFK Act. In

addition, Department of State re v i e w e r s

p rocessed approximately 4,500 documents

re f e r red to State from other agencies.

Since 1997, a team of Department of State

reviewers also has been declassifying

Department records pursuant to Executive

O rder 12958. These reviewers were

i n s t ructed to identify any assassinationrelated materials in the course of their

re v i e w. Many of the re c o rds that were

s e a rched under the JFK Act have been

processed under Executive Order 12958 and

sent to NARA. In view of the Department of

State’s representations regarding its declassification efforts under the Executive Order,

the Review Board determined that a further

detailed review of these records for assassination-related materials was not necessary.

Among the re c o rds identified under the JFK

Act and transferred to NARA w e re: diplomatic cables re g a rding foreign reaction to the

assassination; re c o rds from the Mexico City

Post File; documents from the re c o rds of

Llewellyn E. Thompson, former A m b a s s a d o r

to the Soviet Union; re c o rds of Secretary Dean

Rusk, including memoranda summarizing

telephone conversations he had re g a rding the

assassination; and working files on the assassination maintained by U. Alexis Johnson,

then Deputy Undersecretary of State.

The Department of State submitted its Final

Declaration of Compliance dated March 18,

1998.

6. Department of Justice

The Review Board worked separately with

each of the relevant divisions of the Department of Justice to identify and release records

under the JFK Act. Accordingly, the Review

Board worked with the Office of Information

& Privacy (OIP), responsible for “leadership

o ffices,” the Criminal Division, the Civil

Division, the Civil Rights Division, and the

Office of Legal Counsel. The work of each

Division is summarized below.

a. Office of Information and Privacy.

This office is responsible for re c o rds of the

“leadership offices” of the Department of Justice, including re c o rds of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and A s s o c i a t e

Attorney General. In addition, OIP is re s p o nsible for handling FOIA requests and appeals

d i rected against all entities within the Department of Justice. OIP assigned staff to carry out

its obligations under the JFK Act, including a

senior counsel, a Department of Justice

a rchivist, and two FOIA/declassification specialists. The senior counsel was appointed as

the OIP re p resentative to coordinate OIP’s

e fforts under the JFK A c t .

After passage of the JFK Act, OIP had identified materials relating to FOIAlitigation over

records relating to the JFK assassination, and

these materials were placed in the JFK Collection. OIP also located and designated as

assassination records the following: (1) certain files of Robert Keuch, who was DOJ’s

liaison to the HSCA; (2) a file of Attorney

General Edward Levi (entitled, “FBI/JFK

Assassination Investigation”); (3) a file of

Attorney General William Barr; (4) files from

DOJ’s Office of Public Affairs; (5) documents

from DOJ’s Departmental Review Committee involving administrative appeals of FOIA

requests; and (6) a historical file containing

assassination-related documents from “leadership offices” and those that have been the

subject of past FOIA litigation.

The Office of Information and Privacy submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance

dated August 6, 1998. 

b. Criminal Division.

After passage of the JFK Act, the Acting A s s i stant Attorney General for the Criminal Divi151
sion instructed high-level officials within the

Division to forward any assassination re c o rd s

to the Freedom of Information/Privacy A c t

( F O I / PA)Unit within the Division. In addition, re c o rd searches were conducted by the

F O I A / PA Unit and the Criminal Division

R e c o rds Unit. Files relating to the assassination were identified and placed into the JFK

Collection in 1993. Among the Criminal Division files in the JFK Collection are the Division’s main file on the assassination and a file

on FBI handling of the assassination investigation. In the course of complying with the

JFK Act, the Criminal Division utilized four

attorneys and support personnel.

In complying with Review Board requests, the

Criminal Divison made available for Review

B o a rd inspection numerous original files re l a ting to organized crime and internal security

matters. As of September 1998, major categories of assassination re c o rds in the custody

of the Criminal Division had not yet been

t r a n s f e r red to the JFK Collection at NARA.

These consisted of the re c o rds identified by

the Board from its review of the org a n i z e d

crime and internal security files. The Review

B o a rd is disappointed that these re c o rds have

not been processed and transferred to the JFK

Collection, but the Criminal Division has committed to completing the process of re l e a s i n g

these re c o rds to the JFK Collection. 

The Criminal Division has also generated

additional records regarding recent ballistics

testing of one of the bullet fragments and has

committed to placing those records in the JFK

Collection. 

The Criminal Division submitted its Final

Declaration of Compliance dated September

2, 1998.

c. Civil Division.

In March 1993, the Acting Assistant A t t o r n e y

General for the Civil Division directed all Division offices to identify any assassinationrelated re c o rds that might be in their custody.

In addition, the Civil Division appointed the

Division’s attorney in charge of its FOI/PA

Unit to coordinate release of assassination

re c o rds under the JFK A c t .

As a result of the search directive, the Civil

Division identified four categories of records

as potentially responsive to the JFK Act: (1)

case files relating to FOIA litigation in which

plaintiffs sought access to U.S. government

records on the Kennedy assassination; (2) a

case file relating to compensation for the U.S.

government’s taking of the Oswald rifle

(Marina Oswald Porter v. United States) (this

file, however, had been destroyed in 1991

according to the Department’s records retention/destruction schedule); (3) a Criminal

Division file relating to the Kennedy family’s

agreement to donate certain personal items

of President Kennedy to NARA; and (4) miscellaneous materials relating to the assassination located with the Director of the Federal

Programs Branch. 

In 1993, the Civil Division transferred to

NARAthe small collection of documents that

had been discovered among the secured files

of the Director for the Federal Pro g r a m s

Branch. This collection of materials included

pictures of the President’s clothing after the

assassination, documents relating to the

a u t o p s y, and memoranda relating to the

availability of Warren Commission materials.

Aside from these materials, no other assassination-related records had been placed in the

JFK Collection at that time.

The Civil Division defends federal agencies in

suits arising under the FOIA, and the Division

had numerous FOIA litigation cases bro u g h t

against the government for denying access to

Kennedy assassination re c o rds. The Review

B o a rd requested that the Civil Division

p rocess its FOIA litigation case files relating to

assassination re c o rds under the JFK Act. The

Civil Division took the position that FOIA l i t igation files on JFK assassination re c o rds need

not be reviewed or released under the JFK A c t .

H o w e v e r, the Review Board prevailed upon

the Civil Division to release these FOIA f i l e s

under the JFK Act. The various JFK-re l a t e d

F O I A cases were identified to the Civil Division by the Review Board, and they were

transmitted to the JFK Collection.

The Civil Division submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated July 29, 1998. 

d. Civil Rights Division.

The Civil Rights Division located one file

responsive to the JFK Act. This file consisted

of a civil rights complaint made against New

152
Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, and

it is in the JFK Collection.

The Civil Rights Division submitted its Final

Declaration of Compliance dated July 2, 1997.

e. Office of Legal Counsel.

The Office of Legal Counsel collected documents spanning from the date of the assassination through the Congressional inquiries

of the 1970s pertaining to legal aspects of the

assassination, the start-up of the Wa r re n

Commission, access to Warren Commission

evidence, legislation making Pre s i d e n t i a l

assassination a federal crime, and public

inquiries about the assassination. These

records have been transmitted to the JFK Collection.

The Review Board did not request a declaration of compliance from the Office of Legal

Counsel.

7. Department of the Treasury

The Review Board worked with various components of the Department of Tre a s u r y,

including Main Treasury (i.e., the Office of

the Secretary), Secret Service (discussed

above), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),

the Customs Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF). 

a. Main Treasury.

In December 1992, the Assistant Director for

Policy, Plans and Paperwork Management

requested the Departmental Offices Records

Officer to identify any assassination-related

records under the JFK Act. No assassination

records were identified at that time. In 1995,

the Review Board began to make specific

additional requests for information and

re c o rds, and Treasury searched for the

records that the Board requested. In addition,

Treasury made available original records for

Review Board inspection.

In late 1996, Main Treasury designated the

Departmental Offices Records Officer to coordinate Treasury’s work under the JFK Act. In

addition, a senior attorney from the Office of

General Counsel was tasked to handle JFK A c t

matters. These officials assisted in the pro c e s sing of identified assassination re c o rds and in

making available to the Review Board additional re c o rds for inspection.Treasury has confirmed that all of its identified assassination

records have been transferred to the JFK Collection at NARA.

The Department of the Treasury submitted

its Final Declaration of Compliance dated

August 12, 1998.

b. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF).

In 1992, ATF’s Assistant

D i rector (Administration) directed each of the

heads of offices within

ATF to locate any records

relating to the assassination. No assassination

records were identified at

that time. In addition, in

1995, ATF re v i e w e d

inventories of re c o rd s

held in storage, and no

assassination re c o rd s

were identified through

that review. In particular,

ATF reported that the

Fort Worth Records Center held no ATF records

from the 1960s. ATF also

made search 

The Review Board sought to have ATF locate

any 1963–64 re c o rds relating to ATF’s assistance in the investigation of the JFK assassination, as well as re c o rds from the late 1970s

relating to ATF’s work for the HSCA. The

Review Board specifically requested that AT F

check for re c o rds from the ATF Field Office in

Dallas, as well as re c o rds for the ATF Dire c t o r

and ATF Chief Counsel, and this was done.

ATF was fully cooperative and documented

its search efforts in detail and under oath.

ATF located only a handful of records, all of

which related to its work with the HSCA. 

One factor that may explain the inability of

ATF to locate any relevant records from the

1960s was the fact that ATF was not created

as an independent entity until 1972. ATF’s

predecessor agency was the Alcohol Tobacco

Tax Unit of the Internal Revenue Service. The

Review Board therefore requested that IRS

153

[T]he Department of the Treasury supports the purpose

underlying this Joint Resolution

and agrees with its intention of

making the greatest number of

government documents available to the public. Perhaps these

additional disclosures, and the

unfettered review by the public

of the documents, will help

relieve the lingering concerns

and anxieties surrounding this

tragedy, and restore the confidence of the American people

that there are no more mysteries

associated with the tragedy.

—Department of Treasury,

Senate Hearings on JFK Act 
determine whether it had any pre-1972 ATF

records relating to the assassination. IRS was

unable to locate any ATF assassination

records within its files.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated November 11, 1997.

c. Customs Service.

After passage of the JFK Act, Customs conducted a search of its Washington, D.C. headquarters files through computerized

searches, as well as extensive review of its

archival files with the assistance of Review

Board staff. In addition, Customs instructed

its field offices to search for assassination

records. Customs identified a modest number of assassination records. 

The Review Board staff requested additional

searches of Customs headquarters records,

but no additional records were identified. In

an effort to determine whether field offices

kept records that headquarters might have

destroyed, the Review Board asked that Customs have its Dallas field office re-check for

any relevant files.

Customs Service submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated June 30, 1997.

d. Internal Revenue Service.

The identification and

release of assassinationrelated re c o rds in IRS’s

custody has been diff i c u l t

because Section 11(a) of

the JFK Act explicitly provides that tax-related

records continue to be

exempt from public disc l o s u re under Section 6103

of the IRS Code. The

Review Board believes that significant assassin a t i o n - related re c o rds of the IRS were precluded from release under the JFK Act. Most

s i g n i f i c a n t l y, the JFK Act failed to secure IRS’s

public release of the original Lee Harvey

Oswald tax returns and significant tax-re l a t e d

material in the files of the Wa r ren Commission.5

Notwithstanding Section 6103, the Review

B o a rd requested that the IRS collect and

identify all records it had relating to the

assassination. In 1994, IRS reported that it

had identified, pursuant to the JFK A c t ,

approximately fifty documents. These documents apparently related to a tax proceeding

involving Jack Ruby’s estate. At the time, no

further work was undertaken by IRS to

release these documents or to identify any

other records under the JFK Act.

In late 1996, the Review Board sought to

clarify what IRS did to locate additional

re c o rds relating to the assassination and

what it intended to release in light of Section 6103. In addition, the Review Board

sought to inspect assassination re c o rds that

w e re, or would be, collected by IRS, including original tax returns of Lee Harvey

Oswald, and re c o rds relating to IRS work

with the Wa r ren Commission. The Review

B o a rd also sought to ascertain the status

and anticipated treatment of such re c o rd s

by IRS under the JFK Act. While IRS cons i d e red such re c o rds under Section 6103

exempt from release, the Review Board

asserted its legal authority, under the JFK

Act, to confidentially inspect IRS assassination re c o rds. However, the assassination

re c o rds collected by the IRS were not made

available for the Review Board’s inspection.

Only a year later did IRS affirm the Review

B o a rd’s legal authority to inspect IRS assassination re c o rd s .

In 1998, the Review Board requested that IRS

formally document its actions and compliance under the JFK Act. The Review Board

requested that the IRS search for records that

might relate to the assassination and that the

IRS specifically identify any such records that

it believed could not be released under Section 6103. The Review Board also requested

that IRS review the tax-related records in the

Warren Commission and HSCA holdings to

determine which records could be released

consistent with Section 6103.

At the request of the Review Board, the IRS

intends to forward to the JFK Collection all

tax-related assassination records identified

by IRS, including those records to remain

confidential pursuant to Section 6103. The

records covered by Section 6103, although

transmitted to the JFK Collection, will not be

released pending any later determination as

to their status under the IRS code.

154

[T]he department and the IRS

have no objection to lifting the

bar to public disclosure of the

tax information previously provided to the Warren Commission and the House and Senate

Committees.

—Department of Treasury,

Senate Hearings on JFK Act
The Review Board has received draft compliance statements from the Internal Revenue

Service but has not received the IRS’s Final

Declaration of Compliance.

8. National Security Council

The National Security Council did not initially do any work in response to the JFK Act

following its passage. In 1997, the Review

B o a rd contacted the NSC to ascertain

whether it might have any re c o rds that

would be relevant under the JFK Act. The

NSC was fully cooperative in identifying and

making available the records within its custody and control. NSC provided the Review

Board with various inventories to records

held off-site and certain re c o rds from its

vault in the Old Executive Office Building.

Review Board staff worked with senior NSC

records officials to designate assassinationrelated records under the JFK Act. Among

the early 1960s records designated were minutes of NSC and Special Group meetings.

The materials covered issues regarding Cuba

and Vietnam.

The National Security Council submitted its

Final Declaration of Compliance dated April

30, 1998.

9. The President’s Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board

In early 1997, the Review Board re q u e s t e d

that the President’s Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board (PFIAB) make available any

1962–64 re c o rds that might relate to the

Kennedy assassination. The PFIAB agreed to

make available certain re c o rds for the

Review Board’s inspection. Over several

months, the Review Board staff inspected

these re c o rds and identified certain excerpts

as assassination re c o rds. When the Review

B o a rd sought to have the re c o rds pro c e s s e d

for public release, The PFIAB took the position that these re c o rds were, in fact, not

releasable under the JFK Act. Senator Wa r re n

Rudman, Chairman of The PFIAB, appeare d

b e f o re members of the Review Board in

August 1998 to present The PFIAB’s view

that its re c o rds were not covered by the JFK

Act and, furthermore, that particular re c o rd s

identified by the Review Board were not

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related within the meaning of

the statute.

The Review Board proceeded to formally designate the identified The PFIAB re c o rd s

(many of which dealt with U.S. policy toward s

Cuba) as assassination re c o rds under the JFK

Act. Challenging the Review Board’s authority to designate pertinent re c o rds as assassination re c o rds under the Act, The PFIAB

requested a document-by-document justification re g a rding the relevance of the re c o rds, the

public interest in their release, and whether

The PFIAB documents contained unique

information. The Board had previously articulated the relevance of the materials to The

PFIAB and considered the requested analysis

to be unnecessary, burdensome, and ultimately an obstacle to release. At the time of

this Report, The PFIAB reserved its right to

appeal to the President any Board decision to

release The PFIAB re c o rd s .

10. Immigration & Naturalization 

Service

In 1993, the Immigration & Naturalization

Service (INS) conducted a re c o rds search in

response to passage of the JFK Act. Specific a l l y, INS’s Assistant Commissioner for the

R e c o rds System Division directed all INS

components to search for re c o rds that met the

statutory definition of an assassination

re c o rd. INS designated a Management A n alyst for the Headquarters Records Management Branch to receive and process INS

assassination re c o rds under the JFK Act. Most

of the files identified by INS were files on various individuals who had some connection to

the assassination story, and there f o re had previously been made available to Congre s s i o n a l

committees, including the HSCA. After consultation with other agencies, INS identified

additional files as being pertinent under the

JFK Act. (A list of the INS files pro c e s s e d

under the JFK Act is set forth in the INS Final

Declaration of Compliance.) While INS had

identified over 65 files to be processed under

the JFK Act, none had been transferred to

N A R A until late 1996. INS ultimately devoted

substantial re s o u rces to processing these files

for release under the JFK A c t .

INS had not, at the time of this Report, completed the transmission of its identified

assassination records to the JFK Collection.

Although INS had forwarded numerous files

to the JFK Collection, including files on Lee

and Marina Oswald, INS had yet to forward

155
files on certain lesser-known figures, some

miscellaneous documents from its subject

files, and a work file on Carlos Marcello. INS

attributes the delay, in part, to the time-consuming processing of referring documents to

other agencies for review and awaiting agencies’ release of their equities. INS has committed to completing the transmission of all

remaining assassination-related files to the

JFK Collection. 

The Immigration and Naturalization Service

submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated September 11, 1998.

11. Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

had not identified any assassination records

by August 1993, the first deadline imposed

by the JFK Act. In October 1995, Review

Board staff met with various Department of

Defense officials and identified topics and

record categories to be searched for under the

JFK Act. As a result, components of the

armed forces under the Secretary of Defense

were instructed to search for assassination

records and, in addition, OSD’s own archival

re c o rds were searched. Miscellaneous

records were thereafter identified from the

Secretary of Defense official correspondence

files, including records on Cuba and correspondence with the HSCA.

The OSD’s Directorate for Correspondence &

D i rectives was diligent in attempting to

address the record-related issues raised by

the Review Board. The OSD’s Records Section ran computerized record searches and

inventoried its archive re c o rds and ultimately responded to all Review Board

searches. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance

dated May 21, 1998.

12. Defense Intelligence Agency

In 1993, DIA forwarded to NARA approximately one box of materials for the JFK Collection consisting mostly of correspondence

with the HSCA. The Review Board staff met

with DIA in early 1997 and determined that

DIA had not reviewed all of its relevant

archive holdings. The Review Board then

began to make specific requests for additional information from DIA. All requests

were ultimately answered.

In an effort to locate records responsive to the

Review Board’s additional requests, a special

DIA task force worked at the Washington

National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, conducting a page-by-page review of

all pertinent pre-1965 Agency file series.

After this review of its archive records, DIA

identified additional assassination-re l a t e d

documents. These records have been placed

in the JFK Collection. 

The Defense Intelligence Agency submitted

its Final Declaration of Compliance dated

April 10, 1998.

13. Department of the Army

In response to the JFK Act, the Army conducted in 1993 an “Army-wide canvassing

for relevant records.” Another canvassing of

records was done in 1997. The Army reported

that it conducted “a complete review of the

70,000 line item listing of the Army’s holdings in the Federal Records Centers... . ” The

Army identified various assassination

records, including: (a) material relating to

ballistics research performed by the Army in

connection with the assassination; (b) the

1965 typewritten notes of Pierre Finck, the

Army pathologist who participated in the

Kennedy autopsy; (c) records of the Army

Corps of Engineers relating to the design and

construction of the Kennedy gravesite; (d)

materials relating to the polygraph examination of Jack Ruby from the Defense Polygraph Institute at Fort McClellan, Alabama;

(e) records on Cuba from the files of Joseph

Califano, created while he was a Special

Assistant to the Secretary of the Army in the

Kennedy administration; and (f) Army intelligence files on various individuals connected with the Kennedy assassination story.

In addition, the Army made available microfilm records of the Pentagon Telecommunications Agency, and the Review Board designated certain documents from the 1963–64

period as assassination records.

The Department of the Army submitted its

Final Declaration of Compliance dated September 11, 1998.

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a. Investigative Records Repository.

The Review Board staff also worked separately with the IRR at Fort Meade, the

Army’s storage facility for counter-intelligence files. The IRR has released several

intelligence files under the JFK Act, including

files on Gerald P. Hemming and anti-Castro

activists. The IRR was cooperative in determining whether it had any files on other individuals related to the assassination. In many

cases, they found no records for the names

submitted. The Review Board requested the

IRR to determine whether it had any office or

work files for certain Army intelligence officials located in the Dallas area in 1963–64.

The IRR stated that it had no such files. In

addition, the Review Board requested that

the IRR provide any additional information

or documentation with respect to an Army

intelligence dossier maintained on Oswald.

The Army destroyed this file in 1973 as part

of a program to purge domestic surveillance

files. The Review Board developed no new

information on the file or its destruction

beyond that developed by the HSCA.

The Review Board received the Final Declaration of Compliance of the Investigative

Records Repository on January 23, 1998.

14. Department of the Navy

The Review Board considered records of the

Department of the Navy essential in view of

Lee Harvey Oswald’s tenure with the

Marines, which is administratively a part of

Navy. Under the JFK Act, the Navy identified

and placed into the JFK Collection at NARA

certain core files relating to Lee Harvey

Oswald—(1) the personnel and medical

Marine Corps files for Oswald and (2) Office

of Naval Intelligence records on Oswald. 

After passage of the JFK Act, the Navy’s

Criminal Investigative Service transferred, in

1994, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

records that had been maintained on Lee

Harvey Oswald.6In 1995, the General Counsel of the Navy directed that a further review

of the Navy’s files be undertaken pursuant to

the JFK Act. This directive went to the Chief

of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the

Marine Corps, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Naval Historical Center.

The Navy identified no additional assassination records. In 1996, the Marine Corps transmitted to the Review Board the original personnel and medical Marine Corps files on

Oswald. The Review Board transmitted these

records to the JFK Collection. 

Notwithstanding the Navy’s identification of

these core materials, the Review Board

requested the Navy to search additional

re c o rd categories to ensure that all re l e v a n t

materials had been identified. In December

1996, the Navy designated two officials within

the Office of General Counsel to coord i n a t e

the Navy’s further search and processing of

a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related re c o rds under the JFK

Act. In early 1997, after the Navy consulted

with Review Board staff re g a rding categories

of potentially relevant re c o rds, the General

Counsel’s office issued another search dire ctive to the Chief of Naval Operations, the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Judge

Advocate General of the Navy, the Naval

Criminal Investigative Service, the Secre t a r y

of the Navy’s Administrative Division, and

other components within the Navy. The

Review Board asked the Navy to search for

files of high-level officials of the Marine

Corps, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and

the Navy during the years 1959 through 1964.

The Navy conducted an extensive review of

files, including a review of files from the Secretary of the Navy’s Administrative Office, the

Chief of Naval Operations, and the Marine

Corps. The Navy located miscellaneous documents relating to the Wa r ren Commission and

H S C A f rom files of the Administrative Off i c e

for the Secretary of the Navy as a result of this

s e a rch. Among the re c o rds found was an

unsigned copy of an affidavit by the Dire c t o r

of ONI, pre p a red at the time of the Wa r re n

Commission, stating that Lee Harvey Oswald

was not used as an agent or informant by

ONI. The Navy confirmed that it had not,

h o w e v e r, located the 1959–1964 files for the

D i rector of ONI. 

The Department of the Navy submitted its

Final Declaration of Compliance dated

December 3, 1997.

a. Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Review Board pursued the matter of ONI

re c o rds separately. A c c o rd i n g l y, the Board

requested that ONI submit its own certification of its compliance with the JFK A c t . In its

157
Final Declaration of Compliance, ONI stated

that it conducted an extensive review of ONI

re c o rds held at Federal Records Centers

t h roughout the country. ONI did not identify

any additional assassination re c o rds. ONI was

unable to find any relevant files for the Dire ctor of ONI from 1959 to 1964. ONI also

acknowledged that there were additional ONI

re c o rds that were not reviewed for assassination re c o rds, but that these re c o rds would be

reviewed under Executive Order 12958 re q u i ring declassification of government re c o rd s .

The Office of Naval Intelligence submitted its

Final Declaration of Compliance dated May

18, 1998.

b. National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda.

The Review Board also pursued assassination

re c o rds with the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland (NNMC). The

NNMC was cooperative and conducted

extensive searches. An unsigned original of

the JFK autopsy report was located in a safe at

the NNMC’s Anatomic Pathology Division.

The NNMC located miscellaneous FOIA

requests relating to autopsy re c o rds. The

Review Board asked the NNMC to re - c h e c k

whether it had any 1963–64 files for the top

o fficials of the NNMC, including Commanders Humes and Boswell. Humes and Boswell

w e re the Navy pathologists who conducted

the autopsy of President Kennedy. The

NNMC re-certified that it had no such files.

The National Naval Medical Center submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated

June 27, 1997, and its Supplemental Declaration of Compliance on December 23, 1997.

15. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

The Review Board worked directly with the

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP).

A F I P designated its A rchivist for the National

Museum of Health and Medicine to serve as

the official responsible for conducting A F I P ’ s

s e a rches under the JFK Act. As with the

National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda,

Maryland, the Review Board sought to identify

any re c o rds from A F I P that might relate to the

autopsy of President Kennedy (Lt. Col. Pierre

Finck, one of the autopsy pathologists, was

Chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch of A F I Pa t

the time). A F I P located some materials of Dr.

Finck, including two 1965 reports he pre p a re d

for General Blumberg re g a rding the Kennedy

autopsy and his 1969 memorandum re g a rd i n g

testimony he gave at the Clay Shaw trial. The

Review Board also asked A F I P for any 1963–64

files of top A F I P o fficials who might have had

information re g a rding the autopsy of Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy. AFIP did locate one additional

re c o rd, an oral history interview with Dr.

Robert F. Karnei, Jr., in which he briefly discusses his role at the JFK autopsy.

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance

dated June 12, 1997.

16. Department of the Air Force

In 1995, the Air Force directed certain A i r

F o rce commands to undertake searches for

assassination re c o rds. The only assassination

re c o rd found was an operations logbook

f rom A n d rews Air Force Base that had

re c o rded events at the base on the day of the

assassination. The Review Board asked the

Air Force to conduct further searches for

assassination re c o rds. The Review Board

asked the Air Force to: (1) identify and

review the 1963–64 files for the highest off icials in the Air Force, including the Secre t a r y

of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for the

Air Force; (2) more thoroughly review the

files of the Office of Special Investigations

for any re c o rds related to Oswald; and (3)

determine whether there were any re c o rd s

relating to Air Force One on November 22,

1963, including specifically searching for any

audiotapes of transmissions to or from A i r

F o rce One on the day of the assassination.

As the Review Board requested, the A i r

F o rce conducted a targeted search. The A i r

F o rce did not, however, forward additional

re c o rds to the JFK Collection. After the A i r

F o rce submitted its Final Declaration, the

B o a rd requested that the Air Force further

account for specific Air Force re c o rds, particularly re c o rds for the Air Force’s Office of

P residential Pilot and the Historical

R e s e a rch Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base

in Alabama. The Air Force, at the time of this

Report, had not followed up on the Review

B o a rd’s re q u e s t .

The Air Force submitted its Final Declaration

of Compliance dated November 21, 1997.

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17. Joint Staff

The Chief of the Information Management

Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Staff, coordinated the Joint Staff’s compliance with the

JFK Act. The Joint Staff searched its archived

files for records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

from the early 1960s, including files of Joint

Chiefs Chairmen Lyman L. Lemnitzer,

Maxwell Taylor, and Earle G. Wheeler. The

Joint Staff estimated that it spent 210 hours

searching for assassination records in such

files. The Joint Staff allowed the Review

Board access to these records.

The Joint Staff responded to the Review

Board’s requests for additional information

relating to Cuba and Vietnam.

In the course of identifying relevant records,

the Review Board learned that the Joint Staff

had destroyed minutes and/or transcripts of

meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1947

to 1978. Since the re c o rds would have

included minutes of meetings in 1963 and

1964 which might have been relevant to the

assassination, the Review Board requested

that the Joint Staff account for the destruction. The Joint Staff explained that, in 1974,

the Secretary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ordered these materials destroyed and, at

that time, also established a disposition

schedule for such records. In 1978, according

to the Joint Staff, the “practice of recording

meeting minutes was discontinued.. . . ”

The Joint Staff submitted its Final Declaration

of Compliance dated November 13, 1997.

18. White House Communications

Agency

The White House Communications Agency

(WHCA) did not identify any assassination

re c o rds before its first meeting with the

Review Board in early 1997. The Review

B o a rd contacted WHCA to determine

whether it retained any archived re c o rd s

from 1963–64 relating to the assassination.

The Review Board formally requested that

WHCA search for any 1963–64 records that

might have pertained to the assassination.

WHCA located and placed into the JFK Collection an historical file that contained statements of WHCA personnel regarding events

on the day of the assassination and, in addition, a WHCA memorandum providing a

“list of telephone calls recorded by the White

House switchboard on 22 November 1963.” 

The Review Board further re q u e s t e d

W H C A to undertake a broad search for any

re c o rds reflecting White House communications re g a rding the assassination, including any communications to or from A i r

F o rce One on the day of the assassination.

The Commander of WHCA i n s t ructed his

o ffices to conduct a search for assassinat i o n - related re c o rds. WHCA located no

additional assassination re c o rds. The

Review Board then requested that WHCA

c e r t i f y, under penalty of perjury, that it had

no other re c o rds from the 1963–64 period

that might relate to the assassination.

W H C A certified that it had no re c o rds fro m

the 1963–64 time period nor any re c o rd s

relating to their disposition.

The White House Communications Agency

submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated April 22, 1998.

19. U.S. Postal Service

In 1993, the Postal Service located its original

file on the Kennedy assassination investigation composed of Postal Service investigative reports re g a rding the assassination. The

file had been located among the arc h i v e d

re c o rds for the Chief Postal Inspector, and

the file was subsequently transferred to the

JFK Collection. The Review Board suggested

additional searches. The Postal Service was

diligent in following those suggestions, but

no additional assassination re c o rds were

u n c o v e re d .

20. Social Security Administration

In response to a directive in 1993 by the

Department of Health & Human Services

(HHS) regarding compliance with the JFK

Act, the Social Security Administration (SSA)

inventoried its holdings relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby. SSA sequestered

the records at the Review Board’s request.

These same SSA records were later acquired

by IRS and IRS deposited them in the JFK

Collection, but Section 6103 of the Internal

Revenue Code prevents disclosure of tax

return records.

159
In early 1997, the Review Board staff met

with SSA to verify what assassinationrelated re c o rds SSA might have and to

determine if any such re c o rds could be publicly released. The Review Board re q u e s t e d

that SSA assemble all earnings-re l a t e d

re c o rds for Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack

R u b y, quarterly reports filed by Oswald’s

employers (to verify Oswald’s employment

history and income), and the original file

opened for Marina Oswald’s claim for survivor benefits following Lee Harvey

Oswald’s death. 

The SSA was extremely diligent in collecting

and assembling these re c o rds. The SSA p rotected some of these re c o rds under Section

6103, but the balance were transmitted to

the JFK Collection. SSA placed its assassination re c o rds that contain information protected by Section 6103 in the JFK collection

w h e re they will be kept confidential by

NARA. The SSA confirmed that these

re c o rds are being pre s e r v e d .

As with Oswald’s tax returns, the Review

Board regrets that Oswald’s earnings information and employment history, as contained in employer reports on file with SSA,

have not been released to the public as of the

date of this Report.

21. Drug Enforcement Administration

The Drug Enforcement A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

(DEA) was cooperative with the Review

Board in making files available for review. In

May 1998, the Review Board asked DEA to

formally process certain records as assassination records under the JFK Act. In addition,

the Review Board asked for a formal statement of DEA’s compliance. However, DEA

has taken no steps to formally designate

assassination records, nor has it submitted a

compliance report as requested. 

22. NARA and the Presidential Libraries

The Review Board worked separately with

N A R A in Washington, D.C., the Federal

Records Center in Fort Worth, Texas, the Ford

P residential Library, the JFK Pre s i d e n t i a l

Library, and the LBJ Presidential Library. The

compliance status for each of these entities is

set forth below.

a. NARA, Washington, D.C.

NARA has legal and physical custody of

numerous federal government records that

a re transferred to it by federal agencies.

Accordingly, the JFK Act required NARA to

identify any assassination records that may

have been in its legal custody at the time the

JFK Act was passed.

After the JFK Act was passed, NARA identified three major record categories in its custody: (1) records of the Warren Commission;

(2) the main Department of Justice Criminal

Division file on the Kennedy assassination;

and (3) the main Secret Service file on the

assassination. Many of the records within

these files were already open to the public

when the JFK Act was passed. NARA also

identified administrative re c o rds for the

United States Archivist and Deputy Archivist

relating to the handling of assassinationrelated materials maintained by NARA,

including administrative records regarding

Warren Commission holdings. In addition,

NARA staff identified various federal agencies that had cooperated with the Warren

Commission and searched those records for

assassination records.

In December 1992, the Assistant Archivist

issued a directive to the staff of NARA

requesting that any other assassinationrelated records be identified. Some miscellaneous records were included in the JFK Collection as a result of this search. In addition,

NARA—through its Center for Legislative

Archives—processed hundreds of boxes of

Congressional records relating to the assassination, including most importantly the

records of the House Select Committee on

Assassinations (HSCA).

In April 1998, staffs of the Review Board and

NARA met to review the status of NARA’s

identification and release of assassination

records. The Review Board asked NARA to

confirm that there were no other closed

re c o rds relating to the assassination that

might be among classified or closed files of

officials of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, including certain cabinet secretaries. In addition, the Review Board had

asked NARA to coordinate with the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts to identify and

secure for the JFK Collection court case files

160
for various FOIA suits involving the public’s

request to open up CIA, FBI, and other

agency files on the Kennedy assassination.

NARA has been working with the Administrative Office to obtain these court files. 

N A R A submitted its Final Declaration of

Compliance on September 14, 1998.

b. NARA, Southwest Region.

NARA had its Southwest regional facility

undertake searches pursuant to the JFK Act.

That facility is a repository for federal agency

records in the Dallas, Texas area. Among the

records identified under the JFK Act by the

Southwest Region were: (1) court files from

the federal district court in Dallas, Texas with

respect to litigation over the rifle used to

assassinate President Kennedy (United States

v. 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano Rifle and Marina

Oswald Porter v. United States); (2) court files

for the litigation brought by Claw Shaw

against Jim Garrison in federal district court

in New Orleans (Clay Shaw v. Jim Garrison);

(3) files from the U.S Attorney in Dallas relating to the litigation over the Oswald rifle;

and (4) records of the criminal proceedings

against Jack Ruby, also obtained from the

U.S. Attorney in Dallas.

The Southwest Region also identified within

its custody various medical equipment from

Trauma Room No. 1 at Dallas Parkland Hospital. This equipment was purchased from

Dallas County in 1973 when Parkland Hospital was being remodeled, and the equipment

was placed in storage by NARA at its Southwest Region facility. The Review Board

deferred to NARA’s decision to retain the

equipment in storage.7

In April 1998, Review Board staff met with off icials of the Southwest Region at its facility in

Fort Worth, Texas. The Review Board sought to

ascertain whether the Southwest Region had

legal custody of any 1963–64 re c o rds for various law enforcement, intelligence, or military

agencies with offices in the Dallas re g i o n ,

including Secret Service, AT F, FBI, and ONI.

The staff of the Southwest Region confirmed

that it had no such relevant re c o rds. 

The Southwest Region of NARA submitted its

Final Declaration of Compliance dated July

10, 1998.

c. The Gerald R. Ford Library.

The Ford Library had substantial holdings

that were relevant under the JFK Act, including files of the President’s Commission on

CIA Activities within the United States (the

Rockefeller Commission) and papers of former President Gerald R. Ford relating to his

work on the Warren Commission. The Ford

Library first identified assassination records

f rom among materials that were alre a d y

open to researchers, including records from

Gerald Ford’s Congressional and Vice-Presidential papers and records of Ford Administration officials.8 As a result of these searches,

the Ford Library transmitted approximately

six cubic feet of records to the JFK Collection

in August 1993. The Ford Library also

searched its unprocessed or closed “national

security collections.” This encompassed a

review of the Rockefeller Commission files,

as well as files of President Ford’s National

Security Advisor and the Presidential Counsel to the extent the files related to intelligence investigations of the mid-1970s (i.e.,

the Rockefeller Commission and Churc h

Committee investigations). The Ford Library

reviewed approximately 240,000 pages from

more than 20 different closed or unprocessed

collections, and the Library selected approximately 1,400 documents (11,500 pages) for

p rocessing under the JFK Act. The Ford

Library worked with the Review Board to

have relevant agencies release these assassination records.

The Ford Library submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated August 12, 1998.

d. The John F. Kennedy Library.

The identification of

assassination re c o rd s

within the holdings of the

JFK Library presented a

challenge to both the

Library and the Review

B o a rd in view of the

extensive material re l a ting to, and originated by,

o fficials within the

Kennedy administration.

After passage of the JFK Act, the JFK Library

s t a ff undertook an extensive review of

Kennedy administration re c o rds, personal

161

The National Archives and

Records Administration (NA R A )

fully supports the accelerated

r e v i e w , d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , a n d

release of records related to

the assassination of President

K e n n e d y .

—National Archives and

Records Administration, Senate

Hearings on JFK Act
papers, and oral histories in its possession. In

p a r t i c u l a r, the JFK Library reviewed its

closed or “unprocessed” holdings to identify

assassination re c o rds. Among the re c o rd s

reviewed by the JFK Library staff were President Kennedy’s National Security files and

office files. The Library staff also reviewed

material made available to investigative bodies in the 1970s such as the Church Committee. In addition, the Review Board staff, with

the Library, reviewed the classified Attorney

General file series of Robert F. Kennedy. The

JFK Library staff reviewed numerous collections of records from Kennedy administration officials, as well as numerous oral history interviews of such officials. The Library

processed many of these records as assassination records.

As of March 1995, the JFK Library had transmitted to the JFK Collection 33,000 pages of

documents identified under the JFK A c t .

These included papers of President Kennedy,

Robert F. Kennedy, C. Douglas Dillon,

T h e o d o re Sorenson, Burke Marshall, David

B ro d e r, Chet Huntley, and Arthur Schlesinger.

In addition, re c o rds from the Kennedy White

House were also transmitted. These included

re c o rds from the National Security files, the

White House Central Subject files, and the

P resident’s Office files. The Library also sent

all or parts of numerous oral history interviews to the extent that these interviews

touched upon the Kennedy assassination.

Additional materials were sent later, including Teddy White’s “Camelot papers,” which

contained notes of his interview with Jacqueline Kennedy for Life magazine, and Evelyn

Lincoln’s re c o rds consisting of log books,

daily diaries, and appointment books for

P resident Kennedy. Finally, the JFK Library

has stated that all remaining closed Dictabelts

of President Kennedy’s telephone conversations, as well as 25 hours of audio re c o rd i n g s

of President Kennedy’s meetings, will be

released this fall. The JFK Library committed

to releasing all remaining audio re c o rdings of

Kennedy meetings by 1999 under Executive

O rder 12958.

The Review Board attempted to ensure that

the Library had reviewed and identified all

relevant records in its custody, particularly

records that were closed and unavailable to

researchers. The Review Board submitted to

the JFK Library, in July 1998, a detailed set of

questions re g a rding the Library’s re c o rd

searches and its work under the JFK Act. The

questions were to be answered by Library

officials, under penalty of perjury, in the

Library’s Final Declaration of Compliance.

The Library submitted its Final Declaration

of Compliance shortly thereafter. The JFK

Library certified that “[a]ll records of President Kennedy, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis,

Evelyn Lincoln, and Robert F. Kennedy in the

custody of the Library have been reviewed

under the JFK Act.” The Library also stated

that further review of Robert F. Kennedy’s

papers had resulted in the identification of

additional assassination records that would

be processed for release. In addition, approximately 150 RFK documents previously identified for release were still in the process of

declassification or review by the RFK Donor

Committee at the time of this Report.9 While

recognizing the extensive work of the JFK

Library and its significant contribution to the

JFK Collection, the Review Board was disappointed in the delay in identification and

release of RFK papers. 

The JFK Library, at its suggestion, briefed the

members of the Review Board in August

1998 with respect to the work of the Library

under the JFK Act. At that presentation, the

Review Board was given assurances by the

Library, in the strongest terms, that it was

committed to completing release of all assassination-related records, including the RFK

records.10

The JFK Library submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated August 18, 1998.

e. The Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

The LBJ Library has extensive re c o rds that

w e re reviewed pursuant to the JFK Act. The

Library holds 505 collections of personal

papers, 59 bodies of federal re c o rds, and 1,227

p rocessed and deeded oral history interviews. Even before the JFK Act was passed in

1992, the Library, beginning in 1980, identified and made available materials that it had

relating to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t

K e n n e d y.

11 In 1993, the LBJ Library transmitted to the JFK Collection material on the

assassination from the LBJ White House Central files, White House Confidential files, and

the National Security files; the Library’s “Special File on the Assassination of Pre s i d e n t

162
K e n n e d y,” which was assembled by the

White House in late 1966 as a re f e rence file to

respond to William Manchester’s book, T h e

Death of a Pre s i d e n t ; P resident Johnson’s daily

diary re c o rds listing his appointments and

phone calls made during the period following

the assassination; office files of various White

House aides; White House telephone off i c e

re c o rds; personal papers of Under Secre t a r y

of State George Ball, Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and John Connally; and numero u s

oral history interviews. The LBJ Library also

released tapes of President Johnson’s conversations relating to the assassination (dating

mostly from 1963, 1964, and 1967—the time of

the Garrison investigation and publication of

the Manchester book).

In the Spring of 1997, the Review Board staff

conducted a comprehensive review of LBJ

Library National Security Files (NSF), closed

oral histories thought to be related to the

assassination, and various manuscripts,

archives and office files of key officials. The

s t a ff identified more than 300 additional

assassination re c o rds. The Review Board

coordinated with various agencies in declassifying these records.

Finally, the LBJ Library committed to releasing tapes of all of President Johnson’s

re c o rded telephone conversations thro u g h

October 1964 by September 1998. This release

will include six previously closed recordings

of President Johnson’s telephone conversations with Jacqueline Kennedy in December

1963 and January 1964. The LBJ Library will

also release additional telephone conversations identified as assassination-re l a t e d ,

including two involving McGeorge Bundy.

The Library plans to continue release of the

LBJ tapes (post-October, 1964) in chronological order, and has represented that additional

conversations relating to the assassination

will be forwarded to the JFK Collection. 

The LBJ Library submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated August 27, 1998.

23. General Services Administration

The General Services Administration (GSA)

conducted no records searches under the JFK

Act. The Review Board asked GSA in 1997 to

determine whether it might have records

relating to the assassination. This approach

was made because NARA, until 1984, was

under the auspices of GSA. Therefore, the

Review Board wanted to ensure that GSAdid

not have records relating to NARA’s handling of Warren Commission materials or the

handling of the JFK autopsy photos and xrays. GSA did identify files for the top officials of GSA from the 1960s but these were

already at NARA and fully available to the

public. GSA did not transfer any records to

the JFK Collection. 

GSA submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated January 26, 1998.

C. CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS

In addition to executive branch records, the

Review Board worked with various congressional committees, and NARA, to ensure disc l o s u re of various congressional re c o rd s

relating to the assassination. The most important record groups in this regard were the

records of the two congressional committees

that conducted independent investigations of

P resident Kennedy’s assassination—the

Church Committee in 1975–76 and the House

Select Committee on Assassinations in

1977–79. In addition, the Review Board

sought to ascertain whether there were relevant records among certain other Congressional Committees.

1. The House Select Committee on

Assassinations (the HSCA)

The files of the HSCA embody the collective work of that Committee in investigating

the assassinations of President Kennedy and

the Reverend Martin Luther King. A f t e r

issuance of the HSCA’s report in 1979, the

voluminous files of the HSCA w e re placed

in storage and were to be kept under seal

until 2029 (i . e ., fifty years from 1979).

Because these were Congressional re c o rd s ,

they were not subject to disclosure under

the FOIA. Oliver Stone’s film, J F K, unders c o red the existence of these closed files and

the fact that they would not be re l e a s e d

until 2029. After passage of the JFK A c t ,

N A R A made the opening of the HSCA f i l e s

the highest priorities. NARA opened the JFK

assassination portion of the HSCA re c o rd s

after consulating with the agencies that had

equities in the re c o rd s .

163
2. Senate Select Committee to Study 

Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities 

(the Church Committee)

Records of the Church Committee, like the

HSCA records, were of high public interest.

The Review Board made extensive efforts to

e n s u re the fullest disclosure of re l e v a n t

records. The Church Committee, in 1975–76,

investigated a range of issues involving the

operations of the intelligence agencies. Many

of these issues fell outside the scope of the

JFK Act, but the Church Committee investigated the Kennedy assassination and the

issue of assassination of foreign leaders.

After passage of the JFK Act, the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

inventoried the original re c o rds of the

Church Committee (some 450 boxes) and

transmitted approximately 40 boxes of assassination-related records to the JFK Collection.

This represented a significant effort by the

Committee, as well as by the agencies that

reviewed and declassified the re c o rd s .

NARA, however, surveyed the re c o rd s

placed in the Collection and concluded that

testimony directly relevant to the Kennedy

assassination (and cited in the Kennedy

assassination report of the Church Committee) was not included in the released materials. For approximately two years, the SSCI

did not explain or rectify this crucial gap in

the records provided to NARA. 

In 1997, the Review Board wrote to the SSCI

and, again, raised the issue of identifying and

processing testimony directly relevant to the

C h u rch Committee’s investigation of the

Kennedy assassination, as well as testimony

re g a rding alleged CIA assassination plots

against foreign leaders. The SSCI was cooperative and diligent in attempting to locate

and forward the specific transcripts that had

been identified by the Review Board and

NARA. Throughout 1997–98, the SSCI identified and produced scores of micro f i l m e d

copies of the requested transcripts. This testimony was processed and placed into the JFK

Collection. The transcripts include testimony

of FBI and CIA officials who worked on the

JFK assassination investigation, as well as

officials who testified regarding the alleged

assassination plots against Fidel Castro .

Among the officials whose testimony was

released under the JFK Act were Secretary of

Defense Robert McNamara; Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric; Special

Assistant for National Security McGeorge

Bundy; former Directors of Central Intelligence John McCone, Richard Helms, and

William Colby; Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence Marshall Carter; CIAofficer John

Scelso (alias); Secret Service Chief James

Rowley; Assistant FBI Director Alex Rosen;

FBI Special Agent in Charge for the Dallas

Field Office Gordon Shanklin; and FBI Agent

James Hosty.

While the SSCI had been successful in obtaining the microfilmed transcripts requested by

the Board, the Review Board remained concerned that the original hardcopy transcripts

for this testimony, and any accompanying

materials, had not been located by the SSCI

or otherwise accounted for. The Review

Board asked for access to all 450 boxes of

original Church Committee files. Again, SSCI

was cooperative and arranged to have the

original Church Committee files available for

the Board’s inspection (the originals had not

previously been reviewed by the staffs of

NARA or the Review Board). The Review

Board staff inspected all the original files,

and additional materials were designated as

assassination re c o rds. However, the hard

copy of testimony cited in the JFK Assassination Report was not among the materials.

Although microfilm copies of this testimony

were available, the Review Board specifically

asked the SSCI to explain the absence of the

hard copy files, particularly since they were a

discrete and significant body of records relating to the Kennedy assassination. At the time

of this Report, the SSCI could not explain the

absence of these original transcripts (and perhaps accompanying materials) relating to the

Kennedy assassination.

3. House Select Committee on 

Intelligence (the Pike Committee)

In 1975, the Pike Committee investigated various issues regarding the intelligence community. The Pike Committee also looked into

certain discrete, limited issues regarding the

assassination of President Kennedy. The Pike

Committee records have been under the custody of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). HPSCI identified

approximately three boxes of assassination164
related records of the Pike Committee and

has placed them into the JFK Collection. 

4. House Judiciary Subcommittee on

Civil & Constitutional Rights, 

Chaired by Congressman Don

Edwards (the Edwards Subcommittee)

In 1975 and 1976, the Edwards Subcommittee

investigated the FBI’s destruction of a note

that Lee Harvey Oswald delivered to the Dallas Field Office prior to the assassination of

P resident Kennedy. The Review Board raised

with NARA’s Center for Legislative A rc h i v e s

the issue of whether they had any original

files for this subcommittee. The Legislative

A rchives staff could not identify any such files

within its Judiciary Committee re c o rds. The

Review Board also asked the Clerk’s Office of

the House of Representatives for assistance in

locating these re c o rds. Unfortunately, no original re c o rds for this subcommittee have been

located, although copies of some of these

re c o rds can be found in the HSCA Collection. 

5. House Government Operation’s

Subcommittee on Government 

Information and Individual Rights,

Chaired by Congresswoman Bella

Abzug (the Abzug Subcommittee)

In 1975 and 1976, the Abzug Subcommittee

looked into issues relating to access to Warren Commission records and the destruction

of FBI records. It was the Review Board’s

understanding that these records remained

closed pursuant to House Rules. In 1996, and

again in 1997, the Review Board sought Congressional authorization to have any assassination-related records within the Abzug Subcommittee files reviewed and released under

the JFK Act. After receiving the appropriate

C o n g ressional authorization, the Review

Board staff inspected the original files of the

Abzug Subcommittee and designated various materials for release under the JFK Act.

6. House Un-American Activities 

Committee (HUAC)

During the 1950s and 1960s, this Committee

investigated “un-American” activities of various individuals and groups. In the summer of

1996, the staff of NARA’s Center for Legislative A rchives did an initial survey of the

HUAC files and identified files on Lee Harvey

Oswald, Marina Oswald, the Fair Play for

Cuba Committee (FPCC), and Mark Lane (a

Wa r ren Commission critic). Under House

Rules, investigative re c o rds of a House committee may be closed for fifty years after the

committee finishes their investigation and

shuts down. 

In November 1996, the Review Board

requested that Congress make these records

available for inspection by the Review Board

to confirm whether the records initially identified by NARA s t a ff were assassination

records and should be released to the public.

The Review Board received no responses and

raised the matter again in 1997. In January

1998, the Clerk’s Office sought permission

from the Judiciary Committee to open up the

HUAC files for Review Board inspection. The

Judiciary Committee initially denied the

Board’s request, but upon reconsideration

ultimately agreed to release substantial

HUAC files relating to the JFK assassination. 

7. Library of Congress

The Library of Congress did not transmit any

assassination re c o rds to the JFK Collection

after passage of the Act. In June 1994, the

Library of Congress responded to an inquiry

by the Review Board and reported that it had

located no assassination-related re c o rd s

within the classified holdings in its Manuscript Division. In 1996, the Review Board

asked the Library of Congress, including the

C o n g ressional Research Service, to ensure that

it had searched for any non-public re c o rds in

its custody that might relate to the assassination. The Library of Congress took no action

on the Review Board’s request, and the Board

made another formal request in October 1997.

The Congressional Research Service deferre d

compliance with the JFK Act pending explicit

C o n g ressional authorization. Aside from CRS,

h o w e v e r, the Library of Congress undertook

to survey its non-public holdings to identify

re c o rds relating to the assassination. This

entailed review of the Library’s closed re c o rd s

in its Manuscript Division. 

The Library of Congress filed a formal statement of compliance with the Review Board

and identified three sets of closed records

containing assassination-related materials:

(1) a “duplicate and partial” set of Rockefeller Commission records donated by Vice165
President Rockefeller and closed until March

25, 2002; (2) papers of Senator Daniel Moynihan from his tenure as Assistant Secretary of

Labor in the Kennedy Administration; and

(3) papers of Howard Liebengood, an aide to

Senator Howard Baker, who did work relating to the assassination for the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Library also identified

relevant collections that were pre v i o u s l y

open to the public, including papers of Earl

Wa r ren, David Atlee Phillips, and Elmer

Gertz (attorney for Jack Ruby). In addition,

the Library had one piece of correspondence

written by Lee Harvey Oswald while he was

in the Soviet Union. 

Once the relevant closed materials were identified, the Review Board sought the donors’

permission to open the records. The Review

Board obtained Senator Moynihan’s agreement to open his papers relating to the assassination, and the Board has been in the

process of obtaining Mr. Liebengood’s consent. The Library of Congress stated that its

Rockefeller Commission records were duplicates of the Rockefeller Commission files at

the Ford Library. The Ford Library reviewed

and processed assassination records from the

Rockefeller Commission under the JFK Act.

The Review Board has requested the Library

of Congress to ascertain whether its set of the

Rockefeller Commission papers contains any

assassination-related materials that have not

been released by the Ford Library.

In the Summer of 1998, the Congre s s i o n a l

R e s e a rch Service (CRS) identified one box of

memoranda relating to the assassination that

w e re pre p a red by CRS for the HSCA and other

entities. Having received appropriate Congre ssional authorization, CRS has agreed to forw a rd these materials to the JFK Collection.

8. Other Congressional Records

The NARA and Review Board staffs also

examined certain other Congre s s i o n a l

records to identify any materials that might

be considered “assassination-related” under

the JFK Act.

The Review Board was given appropriate

Congressional authorization to inspect files

of the Senate Select Committee on Improper

Activities in the Labor or Management Field

(the Mclellan Committee). This committee

investigated labor practices in the late 1950s;

then Senator John Kennedy was a member of

the committee and Robert F. Kennedy was

Chief Counsel. The records of the committee

include information on organized crime figures. It was determined that the records of

the committee did not qualify as assassination records under the JFK Act.

The Review Board surveyed the indices to

1949–51 records of the Senate Special Committee to investigate Organized Crime in

Interstate Commerce (the Kefauver Committee). Given the remoteness in time from the

events of the assassination, no records of the

Kefauver Committee were designated as

assassination re c o rds. More o v e r, Congre s s

has authorized NARA to open these records

in 2001. 

The Review Board and NARA i d e n t i f i e d

certain re c o rds of the Senate Judiciary’s Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (the

Eastland Committee) for review under the

JFK Act. Thirteen transcripts of executive

session testimony were subsequently identified for release under the JFK Act. These

w e re processed by the Center for Legislative

A rchives and transmitted to the JFK Collection. The re c o rds included 1961 testimony of

Edwin Walker and December 1963 testimony of Ruth Paine. In addition, the Center

for Legislative A rchives transmitted to the

JFK Collection three boxes of press clippings

re g a rding Lee Harvey Oswald and the

a s s a s s i n a t i o n .

D. CONCLUSION

Generally, government offices attempted to

s e a rch for and release their assassination

records in compliance with the JFK Act. Most

importantly, this was the case with the major

agencies, such as the FBI, CIA, Department of

State, Department of Justice, Secret Service,

NARA, and the Presidential Libraries, that

would be expected to have core materials

relating to the assassination. In some cases,

particular agencies conducted searches after

the Review Board notified them of their

obligations.

By initiating a compliance program, the

Board decided to require the relevant agencies to affirmatively document their work

under the JFK Act, including certification

166
that they had conducted diligent searches for

assassination records. The individual officials who represented the agencies were professional and cooperative in meeting the substantive and procedural requirements of the

Board’s compliance program.

With some limited exceptions, almost all of

the federal entities this chapter discusses

have explained and certified, under penalty

of perjury, their efforts to locate and release

all relevant records on the assassination of

P resident Kennedy. The Board anticipates

that these statements, under oath, will

enhance the public’s confidence that the

United States government, in good faith,

attempted to release all re c o rds on the

Kennedy assassination. 

167
CHAPTER 8

ENDNOTES

1 House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law,

Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings on H.J. 454, 102 Cong., 2d sess., 1992.

(Opening statement by Committee Chairman John Conyers, Jr.

2 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2)(a)(3).

3 Many of the descriptions of agency’s efforts to comply with the JFK Act were obtained

from the initial or final certifications that the agencies submitted to the Review Board.

4 At its peak in 1994, the FBI’s JFK Task Force had more than 90 employees working on

assassination records processing.

5 In the spring of 1997, Marina Oswald provided limited consent to the IRS to release Lee

Harvey Oswald’s tax returns to researchers Ray and Mary La Fontaine. Marina Oswald

declared her intent to have the La Fontaines release these returns to the public, but to our

knowledge they have not done so. Absent Marina Oswald’s consent, the IRS is legally obligated under Section 6103 to withhold the Oswald tax returns from public disclosure. 

6 Copies of these ONI re c o rds were also located in the files of the HSCA, and they were

released along with the other HSCA f i l e s .

7 In addition to records identified by the Southwest Region of NARA, the Southeast

Region had identified some papers of Senator Richard Russell relating to his work on the

Warren Commission. (NARA had been providing courtesy storage for these papers on behalf

of the University of Georgia.)

8 Among the Ford papers transmitted to the JFK Collection were excerpts of interviews

with President Ford conducted by Trevor Armbrister in connection with the writing of Ford’s

memoirs, A Time to Heal.

9 The Robert F. Kennedy Donor Committee controls access to all RFK papers under a Deed

of Gift agreement with the JFK Library.

10 In addition, the JFK Library is releasing the RFK and other papers pursuant to the declassification requirements of Executive Order 12958.

11 These materials were identified in a detailed index entitled, “Guide to Materials from the

Johnson Library Pertaining to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.”

168
The Final Report of the A s s a s s i n a t i o n

Records Review Board provides not only an

opportunity to detail the extraord i n a r y

breadth and depth of the Board’s work to

identify and release the records of the tragic

death of President John F. Kennedy, but also

to reflect on the Board’s shared experience in

carrying out this mission and the meaning of

its efforts for the much larger challenge of

secrecy and accountability in the federal government. It is true that the Board’s role was to

a large extent disciplined and tightly focused

on the assassination, its aftermath and the

b roader Cold War context in which the

events occurred. 

Any evaluation, however, of the unique

experience of the Review Board–five private

citizens granted unprecedented powers to

require public release of long-secret federal

records–inevitably presents the larger question of how the Board’s work can be applied

to federal records policy. There is no doubt

that for decades the pendulum had swung

sharply toward secrecy and away from openness. Changes wrought by the end of the

Cold War and the public’s desire to know

have begun to shift the balance. The Review

Board’s mandate represented a new frontier

in this changing balance—an entirely new

declassification process applied to the mostsought after government secrets. In this

chapter, the Board steps back and reflects on

its experiences, raises issues that will help

frame the declassification debate, and makes

recommendations on the lessons to be

learned from the path taken to release of the

Kennedy assassination collection. The dialogue about how best to balance national

security and privacy with openness and

accountability will continue both within government and beyond. The Review Board will

necessarily be part of that important debate.

The Review Board was created out of the

broad public frustration that the federal government was hiding important information

about the Kennedy assassination by placing

its records beyond the reach of its citizens.

Broad disagreement with the Warren Commission findings, explosive claims in the

popular movie JFK, and continued deterioration of public confidence in government led

to consensus that it was time to open the

files. Thus the debate in Congress largely

became a debate over what mechanisms

could constitutionally compel the opening of

the assassination files. 

The Review Board’s mandate was not to

investigate once again the assassination, but

to release as many of these heavily restricted

documents as possible. Lawmakers commented that the efforts of the Review Board

“will stand as a symbol and barometer of

public confidence in the review and release

of the government records related to the

assassination of President Kennedy....Several

provisions of [the JFK Act] are intended to

provide as much independence and accountability as is possible within our Constitutional framework.” Restoring public confidence in government is a difficult task under

any circumstances. The Review Board took

this responsibility seriously, however, and set

out in April 1994 to create the most complete

record possible of the documentary evidence

of the assassination so that in the end the

American public could draw its own conclusions as to what happened and why on that

fateful day in Dallas in November 1963. 

F rom the start, the Review Board did as much

of its work in public as it could possibly do,

given the classified material with which it

worked. The Board’s major policy decisions

w e re all made after carefully consulting with

the public through public hearings and F e d -

eral Register notices. Many of the Board ’ s

requests to agencies for additional information were suggested by the Board’s continu169

RE V I E W BO A R D RE C O M M E N D AT I O N S
ing dialogue with re s e a rchers, authors, and

experts. Frequent public hearings outside of

Washington, experts conferences, ongoing

public releases of the re c o rds, witness interviews, and media availability were among

the many tools the Board used to reach out

and communicate with a public stro n g l y

i n t e rested in the results of the Board’s work.

The result was that the Board was helped

immeasurably not only by the advice and

suggestions that resulted from this public dialogue, but by the re c o rds that were discove red and opened through the communications. The broad definition of “assassination

re c o rd” and the foundation for the taking of

the original Zapruder film were developed

t h rough public hearings. Furthermore, some

of the Board’s most significant acquisitions of

donated collections—for example, the Rankin

papers, the Wegmann papers, and the Garrison grand jury transcripts—were the result of

the public hearings. 

Public involvement in the Review Board ’ s

work was critical to the success of the Board ,

both because public participation was important for public confidence and because public

involvement produced results. The assassination re s e a rch community, in particular, provided many useful suggestions to the Board ,

but more importantly perhaps, monitored the

B o a rd’s work closely and did not permit the

B o a rd to back off in its search for re c o rd s .

The Review Board began its work at a slow

pace, which was necessary for a group of five

private citizens with no prior involvement

with the issue. Preparation to weigh the

important competing interests of national

security and privacy with the public interest

took time. Education of the Board and the

equally important development of tru s t

among the Board, its staff, and agency

reviewers takes time, and future declassification efforts need to take that into account.

What developed from the early extensive discussions between the Board, its staff and the

agency reviewers were thoughtful and wellreasoned decisions that reflected the Board’s

commitment to the legislation as well as the

Board’s collective interest in developing the

fullest possible historical record surrounding

this tragic event.

The precedents that developed from the

Board’s early deliberations guided the staff

in its review of the re c o rds and guided

agency reviewers in the positions they took

toward postponement requests. The development of this unique and valuable set of

decisions, which came to be known as the

Board’s “common law,” eventually resulted

in thousands of “consent releases,” in which

documents moved directly from the agencies

without redactions to NARA. 

There were, of course, many substantive disagreements between the Board and the agencies, but the course of the relationships were

characterized chiefly by growing mutual

understanding and markedly impro v e d

communications. The Board was gratified to

see agency reviewers and decisionmakers

grow increasingly aware that the responsible

release of information can provide an opportunity to create a more complete record of the

extensive work that many agencies did on

the issues raised by the assassination. Many

appeared also to gain a greater appreciation

of the tremendous costs of secrecy, both in

terms of public confidence and maintenance

of records.

There were critics of the Review Board, those

who believed that the “targeted declassification” of assassination records not only interfered with the goal of systematic declassification directed by Executive Order 12958, but

was also much too expensive. It is difficult, of

course, to compare one method of declassification with another, harder still to place a

price tag on the nature of the information

that is now released and available to the

American public. It is worth noting that the

Kennedy assassination records were largely

segregated due to the use of the records during the many prior government investigations of the assassination. But, the Review

Board does recognize that any meaningful

approach to declassification will of necessity

be multi-faceted, with diff e rent methods

adopted for different circumstances. The particular circumstances of the assassination of

President Kennedy and the highly secretive

governmental response have had an enormous impact on public confidence and made

the Review Board approach singularly

appropriate. When viewed in that light the

cost of this four-year project seems entirely

a p p ropriate, particularly when compare d

with the significant costs, both financial and

otherwise, of keeping the record secret. The

170
Board is confident that, in this setting, the

approach chosen by the Congress to open the

Kennedy assassination records was a highly

effective one.

The Review Board is certainly aware that

t h e re are a great many unresolved issues re l a ting to the assassination of President Kennedy

that will be addressed in the years to come.

The massive public collection of documents

that awaits the re s e a rchers will undoubtedly

shed light not only on the assassination, but

on its broader context as an episode of the

Cold Wa r. The community of professional historians, who initially exhibited comparatively

slight interest in the Board’s work, has begun

paying attention with the new accessibility of

re c o rds that reflect the Cold War context in

which the assassination was enmeshed. Ultim a t e l y, it will be years before the JFK Collection at NARA can be judged pro p e r l y. The test

will be in the scholarship that is generated by

historians and other re s e a rchers who study

the extensive documentation of the event and

its aftermath. Does the historical re c o rd

formed by the Board inspire confidence that

the re c o rd is now reasonably complete? Wi l l

the documents released under the JFK A c t

lead to still other materials? Will the mass of

documentary evidence answer the questions

posed by historians and others? Will the

B o a rd’s compliance program inspire confidence that the agencies have produced all the

relevant documentation that exists today in

agency files? What do the re c o rds tell us about

the 1960s and the Cold War context of the

a s s a s s i n a t i o n ?

The Review Board approach, the pre c e d e n t

c reated, the tools identified, and the lessons

learned will assist future re s e a rchers immeas u r a b l y. Agency reviewers will note that the

Republic has not collapsed under the weight

of threats to national security because of

Review Board actions and, perhaps, they will

also note that openness is itself a good thing

and that careful scrutiny of government

actions can strengthen agencies and the

p rocess of government, not weaken it. There

likely will be problems in the future that best

lend themselves to the extraordinary attention

that a similarly empowered Review Board can

focus. Formation of a historical re c o rd that can

augment understanding of important events

is central not only to openness and accounta b i l i t y, but to democracy itself.

At an early stage in the Review Board’s

e fforts, one of the Board members commented that the Board should strive to

accomplish as much as it could, to be remembered for what it attempted. Or, to paraphrase Robert Kennedy, the Board should

work hard to ensure that its reach continually

exceeded its grasp. The Board did not always

achieve that standard, but the sheer scope

and accessibility of the JFK Collection speaks

eloquently about the effort. The Board has

left to posterity a historical bequest that is

invaluable and unprecedented.

Recommendations

The Review Board presents recommendations that reflect the Board’s experience and

provides guidance for those who wish to

capitalize on that experience to further

reform the process of classification and

declassification of federal documents. The

Board recognizes that the JFK Act represents

but one approach to declassification, one

whose activity was designed to review sensitive records concerning a controversial event.

1. The Review Board recommends that future

declassification boards be genuinely independent,

both in the structure of the organization and in

the qualifications of the appointments.

The Review Board’s independence was

g rounded in the concept that the Board was

in fact an independent agency in the executive branch with powers granted through its

enabling legislation. This independence was

consequently as political as it was legal, facilitating the Board’s relations with the agencies.

Although appointed by the President, members of the Review Board could not be terminated except for just cause. By not submitting

the Review Board to the supervisory authority

of the executive branch, providing an independent staff who answered only to the

B o a rd, and establishing strong statutory stand a rds governing the review of re c o rds, the JFK

Act provided political and legal balance for

the conflict with agencies. This balance was

absolutely necessary for the Board to stand up

to experts and their national security claims.

Furthermore, the independent qualifications

of Board members is likewise important. A

group of five outsiders, uninvolved in previ171
ous investigations or research concerning the

assassination, but trained in historical,

archival, and legal issues that are central to

the records of the assassination, the Board

collectively brought a perspective framed by

p rofessional training and experience. The

absence of any connection or allegiance to the

agencies freed the Board to make truly independent decisions. The Review Board

absolutely needed its independence in order

to accomplish its statutory mandate. For any

g roup charged with declassifying secre t

re c o rds, independence is an essential

attribute.

2. The Review Board recommends that any

serious, sustained effort to declassify re c o r d s

requires congressional legislation with (a) a pre -

sumption of openness, (2) clear standards of

access, (3) an enforceable review and appeals

process, and (4) a budget appropriate to the scope

of the task.

The JFK Act established admirable and effective standards through its standards of “presumption of disclosure” for releasing records

and “clear and convincing evidence of harm”

in restricting them. Both standards helpfully

guided the Board in its decisionmaking, were

understandable and simple in application.

The Board strongly urges that these standards be applied to other efforts to declassify

federal records. The discerning enumeration

in the Act of criteria for sustaining restricted

access created an obligation both for the

Review Board and the agencies to apply

these criteria to the many issues presented in

the documents. These criteria for sustaining

restrictions, especially that of “clear and convincing evidence of harm,” provide a very

important focus and disciplined way of

thinking about federal records and the information they often contain.

The central fact that the access standards were

embodied in Congressional legislation was of

immeasurable assistance to the Review Board .

Although Congress’ inclusion of such stand a rds in the JFK Act nearly sparked a constitutional battle over the Act’s legality, the power

of independence by Congressional mandate

s u rely muted a fair number of agency disputes. Standards set through agency re c o mmendations and presidential inclusion in an

executive order would have limited the

B o a rd’s ability to compel disclosure .

Other powers conferred on the Board by the

JFK Act were similarly central to the exercise

of the Board’s duties. The agencies could

challenge Board decisions only by appealing

decisions to the President, who has the “nondelegable” responsibility to decide them.

This stringent provision raised our declassification activity to a threshold level that

prompted the agencies to weigh the ramifications of any appeal that expended valuable

political capital.

The access standards have been a central consideration in guiding the work of the Board,

never far from any discussion or decision.

Their importance cannot be overlooked, and

the pervading influence of the standards was

consistently reflected in our deliberations. In

balancing the public interest and harm of disclosure, the Board determined that the precept of a “presumption of disclosure” prevailed in every case where there was salient

information relative to the assassination.

The Board’s relationship with the agencies

often faltered over the “clear and convincing

evidence of harm” standard. This exacting

standard, borrowed from the criminal law,

was not only a new declassification criterion,

but it placed the burden on the agency to

explain why information should re m a i n

shrouded in secrecy. This occasioned conflict

and misunderstanding, especially as the

agencies complained that satisfying the test

required unwarranted expenditure of scarce

funds. The Board, however, insisted on

adherence to the legislative provisions, and

the agencies ultimately learned, for the most

part, how to satisfy the Board’s expectations.

As interpreted by the Review Board, “clear

and convincing evidence of harm” required

specific reasons for protection. General concepts of “national security” and “individual

privacy” were insufficient. If harm were to be

caused by release, the Board insisted on

understanding the harm. Thus, the specific

standard resulted in greater fidelity to the

law and more accurate decisionmaking by

the Review Board.

Moreover, the Congress provided adequate

and sufficient funds for the Board to hire staff

to undertake its work. The Board was fortunate to recruit talented and dedicated colleagues who worked closely with the Board

to fulfill its important mission. The Review

172
Board’s accomplishment is, in a direct way,

that of the staff, and the Board is indebted to

them. Other federal declassification efforts,

especially at NARA, need substantially more

resources if they are successfully to accomplish their mandates. The work of the Review

Board staff shows what adequate funding

can achieve.

3. The Review Board recommends that its

“common law” of decision, formed in the context

of a “presumption of disclosure” and the “clear

and convincing evidence of harm” criteria, be uti -

lized for similar information in future declassifi -

cation efforts as a way to simplify and speed up

releases.

The Review Board’s understanding of the

important standards of a “presumption of

disclosure” in the release of documents and

“clear and convincing evidence of harm” in

sustaining restricted access and its application of the more specific section 6 standards

developed slowly as the Board applied the

law to the many postponement issues raised

in the documents.

In time, the body of decisionmaking began to

g ro w, and with it what was termed the

Board’s “common law,” a collection of decisions that greatly informed staff and agency

reviewers how to apply the JFK Act and

saved an enormous amount of time by handling similar information in similar ways.

Many documents share common characteristics. The names of agents and informants,

crypts, digraphs, the location of CIA installations abroad, and other numerical data used

to identify documents, recurred constantly in

the documents examined by the Review

Board and helped form the Review Board

“common law” about how to treat redacted

information in federal documents.

As the effort to declassify federal documents

presses forward on other fronts, the Review

Board believes that there are common ways

of handling these categories of information,

so that similar substitute language may be

provided, and there might also be consensus

concerning how long the information needs

to be restricted. Handling restricted documents by adopting common substitute language as appropriate will also enhance the

efficiency of the review, lowering unit costs

for processing documents.

Codification of these rules of application

would permit restricted access to some of

this information, and yet still indicate to

researchers and other citizens what kind of

identifying information had been withheld

and for how long. The idea of substitute language for critical pieces of redacted information, together with less sweeping and more

discerning application of what is to be withheld, offers a promising way of limiting the

volume of restricted information in federal

documents, either through more uniform

and limited classification rules or through

earlier and more declassification.

4. The Review Board recommends that future

declassification efforts avoid the major shortcom -

ings of the JFK Act: (a) unreasonable time limits,

(b) employee restrictions, (c) application of the

law after the Board terminates, and (d) problems

inherent with rapid sunset provisions.

If the JFK Act represented a milestone in

articulating important new principles by

which to review classified records, there were

also shortcomings in the law that should be

avoided in future declassification eff o r t s .

They include:

• the timetable laid out for the Review Board

to accomplish its work was unrealistic and

re q u i red the Board to play “catch up” from the

beginning and re q u i red agencies to duplicate

their work after the Board began its work;

• the provision that the Board could not hire

staff who were currently working anywhere

in the government seemed unduly restrictive, and obliged the Board to undertake

costly and time-consuming security checks

for most employees, for whom security clearances were central to their work with classified documents;

• the Review Board sunsets but the JFK Act

does not and, as a result, there is uncertainty

about the status of openings that will occur

after September 1998, and whether any further appeals by agencies might be permitted,

and, if so, who would represent the interest

of openness;

• the sunset provision in the JFK Act, while

embodying the important concept that this

173
e ffort was not to be permanent, nonetheless

undermined the careful review and disposition of the re c o rds. The Board inevitably lost

critical staff in the final stages because they

had to seek job security for themselves and

their families. More o v e r, the sunset enabled

government agencies that were not inclined

to cooperate to simply try to outlast the

B o a rd. A m o re open-ended provision would

be preferable, in which the Board, supervised

by its congressional oversight committee and

the Office of Management and Budget, would

d e c l a re its pro g ress, but not set a termination

date until there was agreement concerning

the successful completion of the mandate.

5. The Review Board recommends that the

cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive

problem of referrals for “third party equities”

(classified information of one agency appearing in

a document of another) be streamlined by (A)

requiring re p resentatives of all agencies with

interests in selected groups of records to meet for

joint declassification sessions, or (B) devising

uniform substitute language to deal with certain

categories of recurring sensitive equities.

The practice of extensive classification of

government documents has created a jungle

of secrecy in which agencies are protective of

one another’s pre rogatives, meticulously

referring records to the originating agency in

all cases. The frequency of this occurrence

has had a substantial impact on the rate and

pace of release of such information. It is not

surprising that sensitive information is

s h a red extensively, especially among law

enforcement and intelligence agencies. One

consequence of this sharing is that one

agency’s restricted information is often

found in another’s files. When this occurs,

the agency creating the information must

agree to its release by another agency. Such

equities are expensive to search and release.

The Review Board developed an effective

means of mitigating these cumbersome referrals by convening on occasion representatives of agencies with interests in the documents so that a group of documents could be

collectively declassified at once, with representatives there to sign off on the specific

interests associated with each agency. A second means of easing this problem is to

develop a uniform means of dealing with

certain recurring categories of sensitive information. One such way would be to use

agreed-upon substitute language to avoid

the originating agency referral.

6. The Review Board recommends that a com -

pliance program be used in future declassification

efforts as an effective means of eliciting full coop -

eration in the search for records.

The Review Board compliance program was

established to ensure that all federal agencies

holding assassination records would warrant

under oath that every reasonable effort had

been made to identify assassination records

and that such records had been made fully

available for review by the Board. The Board

has remained concerned that critical records

may have been withheld from the Board’s

scrutiny and that the Board did not secure all

that was “out there.” It is all too easy to imagine that agencies and agency personnel not

inclined to cooperate might simply have

waited, using the JFK Act’s sunset provision

by waiting for it to take effect and ending the

need to cooperate.

The Review Board’s solution to this concern

was to develop a compliance program in

which each agency designated a “compliance officer” to warrant, under oath and

penalty of perjury, that re c o rds had been

diligently searched for and turned over to

the Board for review and/or release to

NARA. This program entails a detailed

review (overseen by Review Board staff) of

the effort undertaken by each agency in pursuit of such re c o rds and constitutes a re c o rd

to guide future re s e a rchers in examining

what assassination re c o rds were actually

u n c o v e red. The program is also intended to

be forward-looking, so that the agencies will

continue to follow the provisions of the JFK

Act after the Board terminates its role. The

p rogram has worked well.

7. The Review Board recommends the following

to ensure that NARA can exercise the provisions of

the JFK Act after the Review Board terminates:

a. that NARA has the authority and means

to continue to implement Board decisions,

b. that an appeals procedure be developed

that places the burden for preventing access on

the agencies, and

c. that a joint oversight group composed of

re p resentatives of the four organizations that origi -

174
nally nominated individuals to serve on the Review

Board be created to facilitate the continuing execu -

tion of the access provisions of the JFK Act.

The creation of the JFK Collection at NARA

established a large records collection undergoing intense use by researchers. Having created this national research resource, Congress should ensure that NARA receives the

additional re s o u rces necessary to manage

this collection responsibly, and that it is also

be given the authority to administer the

remaining provisions of the JFK Act. 

The Board recommends negotiation of a

memorandum of understanding among

NARA, the FBI, and the CIA that would

establish a common agreement on how to

resolve the inevitable issues concerning the

extensive assassination records of these two

agencies. This is particularly necessary since

additional records will be sent to NARA and

additional releases of documents are scheduled to take place after the termination of the

Review Board.

The formation of a liaison group composed

of individuals from professional organizations that originally nominated members for

the Review Board to oversee implementation

of the provisions of the JFK Act would ensure

the continuing representation of the public

interest by those trained to understand continuing historical, archival, and legal issues.

8. The Review Board recommends that the

Review Board model be adopted and applied

whenever there are extraordinary circumstances

in which continuing controversy concerning gov -

ernment actions has been most acute and where

an aggressive effort to release all “reasonably

related” federal records would serve usefully to

enhance historical understanding of the event.

The public stake is clear in creating a mechanism such as the Review Board to inform

American citizens of the details of some of

the most controversial events in American

history. Moreover, the release of documents

enables citizens to form their own views of

events, to evaluate the actions of elected and

appointed officials, and to hold them to

account. There will not be a large number of

such events, but there must be procedures

grounded in experience that might be used to

uncover the truth when these events, tragic

as most of them are, occur. The provisions of

the JFK Act have fostered the release of such

documents, and the Board’s experience

demonstrates that similar legislation would

be successful in the future.

9. The Review Board recommends that both the

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Execu -

tive Order 12958 be strengthened, the former to

narrow the categories of information automati -

cally excluded from disclosure, the latter to add

“independent oversight” to the process of

“review” when agency heads decide that records

in their units should be excluded from release.

Despite the sound public policy goals

encompassed in both the FOIA and Executive Order 12958, both of these measures fall

short of their goal of access, as evidenced by

the inability of re s e a rchers to use these meas u res to obtain access to assassination

re c o rds. The categories of exclusion are far

too broad in the FOIA to constitute a meaningful program of opening restricted federal

re c o rds, and the succession of executive

o rders issued since the FOIA was enacted

reflects the same problem. The most re c e n t ,

Executive Order 12958, also fails by not creating for federal agencies an “oversight”

p ro c e d u re to ensure that the decisions concerning access to agency re c o rds made by

that agency’s head will be independently

reviewed. The mandate to release should be

internalized in the agencies and penalties for

s e c recy must rival in consequence those for

unauthorized re l e a s e .

The mandate of the Review Board, unders c o red by powers conferred in the JFK A c t

and further aided by an adequate appro p r i ation, far exceeds what the FOIA and executive

o rders can accomplish because the Review

B o a rd has the authority and re s o u rces to both

review and release. Proponents of the FOIA

and executive order declassification would

benefit from consulting the JFK Act to identify how best to augment the re s o u rces and

authority of those measure s .

10. The Review Board recommends the adoption

of a federal classification policy that substantially:

a. limits the number of those in government

who can actually classify federal documents,

b. re s t r i c t s the number of categories by

which documents might be classified,

175
c. reduces the time period for which the doc -

ument(s) might be classified,

d. encourages the use of substitute language

to immediately open material which might other -

wise be classified, and

e. increases the resources available to the

agencies and NARA for declassifying federal

records.

The Review Board’s experience leaves little

doubt that the federal government needlessly and wastefully classified and then

withheld from public access countless

important re c o rds that did not re q u i re such

t reatment. Consequently, there is little doubt

that an aggressive policy is necessary to

a d d ress the significant problems of lack of

accountability and an uninformed citizenry

that are created by the current practice of

excessive classification and obstacles to

releasing such information. This need is not

something recently identified, although the

Moynihan Commission on Secrecy in Government is a recent expression of this longstanding concern. Change is long overd u e

and the Review Board’s experience amply

demonstrates the value of sharing important

information with the American public. It is a

matter of tru s t .

The Review Board’s recommendations are

designed to help ensure that the comprehensive documentary record of the Kennedy

assassination is both actively developed after

the Board terminates, and that the experience

of the Review Board be turned to the larger

purpose of addressing the negative consequences of the excessive classification of federal records. The Review Board’s effort to

accomplish the purposes of the JFK Act has

been focused and aggressive. It will be for

others, of course, to judge the Board’s success

in achieving these goals, but there can be no

doubt about our commitment to making the

JFK Act and an independent Review Board a

model for the future.

176
“The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint, without re g a rd

to political affiliation, five citizens to serve as

members of the Review Board to ensure and

facilitate the re v i e w, transmission to the

A rchivist, and public disclosure of Government

re c o rds related to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t

John F. Kennedy.” JFK Act at § 7 (b)(1).

Although the Review Board members were

Presidential appointees, the JFK Act recommended that the President select the Board

members from lists of names submitted to

the President by four professional associations—the American Historical Association,

the Organization of American Historians, the

Society of American A rchivists, and the

American Bar Association. The Review

Board’s biographies follow.

The Honorable John R. Tu nh e i m . The American Bar

Association re c o m m e n d e d

John R. Tunheim to the

P resident. Judge Tu n h e i m

is currently a United States

District Court Judge in the

District of Minnesota, and,

at the time of his nomination, was Chief Deputy

Attorney General of the state of Minnesota.

Judge Tunheim worked in the Office of the

Attorney General for 11 years as the Solicitor

General before his appointment as Chief

D e p u t y. Earlier, he practiced law privately and

served as Staff Assistant to U.S. Senator Hubert

H. Humphre y. He received his J.D. from the

University of Minnesota Law School, and his

B.A. from Concordia College in Moorh e a d ,

Minnesota. The Review Board members elected

Judge Tunheim to Chair the Review Board .

Henry F. Graff. Henry F.

Graff was recommended

to President Clinton by

the White House staff. He

is Professor Emeritus of

History at Columbia Univ e r s i t y, where he held

rank as Instructor to Full

Professor from 1946-1991.

He served as the Chairman of the History Department fro m

1961–1964. In the 1960s he served on the

National Historical Publications Commission, having been appointed by Pre s i d e n t

Lyndon B. Johnson. Dr. Graff was also a

Senior Fellow of the Freedom Forum Media

Studies Center from 1991-1992. He re c e i v e d

his M.A. and his Ph.D. from Columbia Univ e r s i t y, and his B.S.S. from City College,

New York. 

Kermit L. Hall. The Organization of American Historians nominated Kermit

L. Hall, Executive Dean of

the Colleges of the Arts

and Sciences, Dean of the

College of Humanities,

and Professor of History

and Law at The Ohio

State University. D e a n

Hall was appointed by Chief Justice

William Rehnquist to the Historical A d v isory Board of the Federal Judicial Center

and is a director of the American Society for

Legal History. Dean Hall received his Ph.D.

f rom the University of Minnesota, a Master

of Study of Law from Yale University Law

School, received his M.A. from Syracuse

U n i v e r s i t y, and his B.A. from The University of A k ro n .

177

APPENDIX A

TH E ME M B E R S O F T H E

AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D
William L. Jo y c e . The Society of American A rc h i v i s t s

recommended William L.

Joyce to the President. Dr.

Joyce is currently the A s s oc i a t e University Librarian

for Rare Books and Special

Collections at Princeton

University. Joyce previously served as A s s i s t a n t

D i rector for Rare Books and Manuscripts at the

New York Public Library. Dr. Joyce has also

held positions at the American A n t i q u a r i a n

S o c i e t y, initially as the Curator of Manuscripts,

and later as the Education Off i c e r. He re c e i v e d

his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, his

M.A. from St. John’s University, and his B.A.

f rom Providence College.

Anna Kasten Nelson. T h e

American Historical A s s ociation recommended to

the President Anna K.

Nelson, the Distinguished

Adjunct Historian in Residence at the A m e r i c a n

U n i v e r s i t y. Dr. Nelson has

been a professor of fore i g n

relations at the A m e r i c a n

University since 1986. In 1975, she served on

the staff of the Public Documents Commission. Dr. Nelson previously served as the

D i rector of the Committee on the Records of

Government and a member of the Historical

Advisory Committee of the State Department.

She was a Distinguished Visiting Professor at

Arizona State University in 1992. She re c e i v e d

her Ph.D. from George Washington Univers i t y, and both her M.A. and B.A. from the University of Oklahoma.

178
“ A person appointed to the staff shall be a private citizen of integrity and impartiality who

is not a present employee of any branch of the

Government and who has had no pre v i o u s

involvement with any official investigation or

inquiry relating to the assassination of Pre s ident John F. Kennedy” JFK Act, § 8 (b)(2).

Executive Directors. The JFK Act charged the

Review Board’s Executive Director with the

duties of overseeing all of the work of the

Review Board, including overseeing the

review and declassification process, and

serving as a liaison between the Review

Board and federal agencies.

David G. Marwell. David G. Marwell served

as Executive Director from August 1994 to

October 1997, the Review Board’s originally

scheduled sunset date. Dr. Marwell previously served as Director of the Berlin Document Center. He has also served as the Chief

of Investigative Research in the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice. Dr. Marwell received his Ph.D. from the

State University of New York at Binghamton

and his B.A. from Brandeis University.

T. Jeremy Gunn. In October 1997, the Review

Board members appointed T. Jeremy Gunn as

Executive Director. Dr. Gunn also served the

Review Board as its Associate Director for

Research and Analysis from November 1994

until October 1997, and as General Counsel

from January 1996 until July 1998.1 Dr. Gunn

came to the Review Board from the Washington, D.C. law firm of Covington and Burling.

He received his J.D. from Boston University

and his Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Laura A.Denk. In July 1998, the Review Board

members asked Laura Denk, the Review

Board’s Chief Analyst for FBI Records, to

serve as Executive Director during the final

months of the Board’s work. Ms. Denk

received her J.D. from the University of

Kansas and her B.A. from The College of

William and Mary.

Senior Staff. The Review Board’s Senior Staff

consisted of the Deputy Director, the General

Counsel, and the Associate Directors. Aside

from performing their specific job duties, the

Review Board’s Senior Staff acted as a team

to recommend Review Board policy and

assist the Executive Director in carrying out

his or her duties. 

Thomas E. S a m o l u k p reviously served as the

Review Board’s Deputy Dire c t o r. Mr.

Samoluk, who was an Assistant A t t o r n e y

General and Director of Communications in

the Massachusetts Attorney General’s off i c e

also served as the Review Board’s A s s o c i a t e

D i rector for Communications. He re c e i v e d

his J.D. from Suffolk University Law School

and his B.A. from the University of Massachusetts at A m h e r s t .

Tracy J. Shycoff. Tracy J. Shycoff served the

Review Board as Associate Director for

Administration from October 1994 until July

1998, when the Review Board asked her to

serve as Deputy Director during the final

months of the Board’s work. Ms. Shycoff previously served as the Associate Director for

Administration at the National Commission

on AIDS. She attended Southern Methodist

University.

Ronald G. Haron. Ronald Haron served as the

Review Board’s General Counsel during July,

August, and September of 1998. Mr. Haron

had previously served the Review Board as

179

APPENDIX B

TH E STA F F O F T H E

AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D

1

Sheryl L. Wa l t e r, formerly General Counsel of the private National Security A rchive, served as the Review

B o a rd’s General Counsel from November 1994 to May

1995, and departed the Review Board to become the

General Counsel on the Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan Committee on Government Secre c y. 
Associate General Counsel and as Senior

Attorney. Mr. Haron came to the Review

Board from the Washington, D.C. law firm of

Howrey and Simon. He received both his J.D.

and his B.A. from the University of Virginia.

K .M i chelle Combs. Michelle Combs served as

the Review Board’s Associate Director for

R e s e a rch and Review from March 1998 until

the Review Board’s closure. Dr. Combs previously served the Review Board as a Senior

Analyst. Dr. Combs received her Ph.D. in

Communication Studies from Northwestern

University and her B.A. from Va n d e r b i l t

U n i v e r s i t y.

P ress and Public Affairs Off i c e r. Given that

one of the JFK Act’s primary objectives was

to re s t o re public confidence in government,

the Review Board realized that it would

have to maintain fairly extensive public

a ffairs and communications programs, as

described in Chapter 2 of this report. Thus,

its Press and Public A ffairs Officer was a critical individual in evaluating the Review

B o a rd’s success or failure. 

Eileen A. S u l l i v a n . Eileen Sullivan served as the

Review Board’s Press and Public A ffairs Off icer from May 1997 until the Review Board ’ s

c l o s u re in September 1998. Ms. Sullivan pre v iously served as the Assistant Press and Public

A ffairs Off i c e r. Ms. Sullivan received her B.A.

f rom The American University.

Computer Specialist. As Chapter 4 of this

report describes in detail, computer programs that could track the Review Board’s

p rocessing of thousands of re c o rds were

essential components to the fulfillment of the

Review Board’s mandate. 

Charles C. Rhodes. Chet Rhodes served as the

Review Board’s Computer Specialist from

December 1994 until the Review Board’s closure in September 1998. Mr. Rhodes received

his B.S. from the University of Maryland.

R e s e a rch and Analysis Staff . Review Board

analysts identified and reviewed re c o rds and

made recommendations to the Review Board .

O rganized into three teams, FBI, CIA, and

M i l i t a r y, analysts developed working re l ationships with re p resentatives from the federal agencies within the analyst’s purview.

Analysts developed expertise into particular

subject matters—essential to providing the

Review Board members with information re levant to the Board’s decision making. Moreo v e r, analysts carried out the important

assignment of determining whether to

request additional re c o rds from agencies. 

Douglas P. H o r n e . Douglas Horne served as

the Review Board’s Chief Analyst for Military Records from March 1997 to September

1998. Mr. Horne previously served the

Review Board as a Senior Analyst. Prior to

his work at the Review Board, Mr. Horne

served in the U.S. Navy and also worked as

a civilian for the U.S. Navy. Mr. Horne

received his B.A. from The Ohio State Univ e r s i t y.

Robert J. S k w i r o t . Robert J. Skwirot served as

the Review Board’s Chief Analyst for CIA

R e c o rds from September 1997 to September

1 9 9 8 .2 M r. Skwirot previously served the

Review Board as a Senior Analyst. Mr. Skwiro t

received his M.A. from Villanova University

and his B.A. from La Salle University.

Kevin G. Ti e r n a n. Kevin G. Tiernan served as

the Review Board’s Chief Analyst for FBI

R e c o rds from July 1998-September 1998.3 M r.

Tiernan previously served as a Senior A n alyst for the Review Board. Mr. Ti e r n a n

received his B.A. from Mary Wa s h i n g t o n

C o l l e g e .

Joseph P. Freeman. Joe Freeman served as a

Senior Analyst for the Review Board. Mr.

Freeman had a Rotary International Foundation Fellowship at the School of Peace at the

University of Bradford, England, and he

received his B.A. from Harvard University.

Irene F. Marr. Irene Marr served as a Senior

Analyst for the Review Board. Ms. Marr

received her M.A. from The Fletcher School

180

2 Mary S. McAuliffe served as the Review Board’s first

Chief Analyst for CIA R e c o rds from April 1995 to

October 1996. Dr. McAuliffe received her Ph.D. fro m

the University of Maryland, and her B.A. from Principia College.

3

Philip D. G o l r i ck served as the Review Board’s first

Chief Analyst for FBI Records, and also as Counsel to the

Review Board, from November 1994 until March 1997.

M r. Golrick previously worked for the Washington law

firm of Covington and Burling. He received both his J.D.

and his B.A. from the University of Vi rg i n i a .
of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

and her B.A. from Smith College.

Sarah Ahmed. Sarah Ahmed served as an

analyst for the Review Board. Ms. A h m e d

received her B.A. from The George Wa s hington University.

Marie B. Fa g n a n t . Marie Fagnant served as an

analyst for the Review Board . Ms. Fagnant

received her B.A., from Arizona State Univ e r s i t y.

James C. Goslee, II. Jim Goslee served as an

analyst for the Review Board. Mr. Goslee is

an M.A. candidate at Georgetown University,

and he received his B.A. from the University

of Connecticut. Benjamin A. Rockwell. Ben

Rockwell served as an analyst for the Review

Board. Mr. Rockwell received his B.A. from

The George Washington University.

Peter H. Voth. Peter Voth served as an analyst

as well as the Assistant Computer Specialist

for the Review Board. Mr. Voth received his

M.A. from The American University and his

B.A. from Penn State University.

Administrative Staff . The Review Board ’ s

administrative staff, though skeletal in numb e r, performed a wide variety of tasks. Under

ideal conditions, the Review Board hoped to

have four to five administrative staff members.

H o w e v e r, the Review Board’s administrative

s t a ff often consisted of only three individuals.

Jerrie Olson. Jerrie Olson served as the Executive Secretary from June 1995 until the closure of the Review Board in September 1998.

Ms. Olson provided support to the Executive

Director, the General Counsel, staff investigators, and the Review Board members.

Catherine M. R o d r i g u e z . Cathy Rodriguez

served as the Technical Assistant for

Research and Analysis and provided support

to the General Counsel from August 1996

until the closure of the Review Board in September 1998. Ms. Rodriguez attended the

University of Maryland European Division at

Berlin, Germany.

Janice Spells. Janice Spells served as the

receptionist/administrative assistant for the

Review Board.

I n v e s t i g a t o r s .4 The Review Board hired two

full-time staff investigators to locate a variety of re c o rds from non-federal sources. The

investigators were successful in identifying

and locating significant private collections

of re c o rds and in arranging for donation of

those collections to the government. Moreo v e r, investigators played a critical role in

locating former government employees who

w e re subsequently interviewed re g a rd i n g

the possible existence and location of additional assassination re c o rd s .

181

4 Anne E. B u t t i m e r and David R. Montague served the

Review Board as investigators.
Section 1: 

Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “President John

F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992”.

Section 2: 

Findings, Declarations, and Purposes

(a) Findings and Declarations- The Congress

finds and declares that—

(1) all Government records related to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy

should be preserved for historical and governmental purposes;

(2) all Government records concerning the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy

should carry a presumption of immediate

disclosure, and all records should be eventually disclosed to enable the public to become

fully informed about the history surrounding

the assassination;

(3) legislation is necessary to create an

enforceable, independent, and accountable

p rocess for the public disclosure of such

records;

(4) legislation is necessary because congressional records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy would not

otherwise be subject to public disclosure

until at least the year 2029;

(5) legislation is necessary because the

Freedom of Information Act, as implemented

by the executive branch, has prevented the

timely public disclosure of records relating to

the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy;

(6) legislation is necessary because Executive Order No. 12356, entitled “National

Security Information” has eliminated the

declassification and downgrading schedules

relating to classified information across government and has prevented the timely public

disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; and

(7) most of the records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy are

almost 30 years old, and only in the rarest

cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection of such records.

(b) Purposes- The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to provide for the creation of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records

Collection at the National A rchives and

Records Administration; and

(2) to require the expeditious public transmission to the Archivist and public disclosure of such records.

Section 3: 

Definitions

In this Act:

(1) “Archivist” means the Archivist of the

United States.

(2) “Assassination record” means a record

that is related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, that was created or

made available for use by, obtained by, or

otherwise came into the possession of—

(A) the Commission to Investigate the

Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

(the “Warren Commission”);

(B) the Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities Within the United

States (the “Rockefeller Commission”);

(C) the Senate Select Committee to

Study Governmental Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities (the

“Church Committee”);

(D) the Select Committee on Intelligence

(the “Pike Committee”) of the House of Representatives;

(E) the Select Committee on Assassinations (the “House Assassinations Committee”) of the House of Representatives;

(F) the Library of Congress;

(G) the National Archives and Records

Administration;

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APPENDIX C

TH E PR E S I D E N T JO H N F. KE N N E D Y AS S A S S I N AT I O N

RE C O R D S CO L L E C T I O N AC T O F 1992 (JFK AC T)
(H) any Presidential library;

(I) any Executive agency;

(J) any independent agency;

(K) any other office of the Federal Government; and

(L) any State or local law enforcement

office that provided support or assistance or

performed work in connection with a Federal

inquiry into the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy, but does not include the

autopsy records donated by the Kennedy

family to the National Archives pursuant to a

deed of gift regulating access to those

records, or copies and reproductions made

from such records.

(3) “Collection” means the President John

F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

established under section 4.

(4) “Executive agency” means an Executive agency as defined in subsection 552(f)

of title 5, United States Code, and includes

any Executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the

Government, including the Executive Off i c e

of the President, or any independent re g ulatory agency.

(5) “Government office” means any office

of the Federal Government that has possession or control of assassination re c o rd s ,

including—

(A) the House Committee on Administration with regard to the Select Committee

on Assassinations of the records of the House

of Representatives;

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence

of the Senate with regard to records of the

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities and other assassination

records;

(C) the Library of Congress;

(D) the National Archives as custodian

of assassination records that it has obtained

or possesses, including the Commission to

Investigate the Assassination of Pre s i d e n t

John F. Kennedy and the Commission on

Central Intelligence Agency Activities in the

United States; and

(E) any other executive branch office or

agency, and any independent agency.

(6) “Identification aid” means the written

description pre p a red for each re c o rd as

required in section 4.

(7) “National A rchives” means the

National Archives and Records Administration and all components thereof, including

Presidential archival depositories established

under section 2112 of title 44, United States

Code.

(8) “Official investigation” means the

reviews of the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy conducted by any Presidential commission, any authorized congressional committee, and any Government agency either indep e n d e n t l y, at the request of any Pre s i d e n t i a l

commission or congressional committee, or at

the request of any Government off i c i a l .

(9) “Originating body” means the Executive agency, government commission, congressional committee, or other governmental

entity that created a re c o rd or particular

information within a record.

(10) “Public interest” means the compelling interest in the prompt public disclosure of assassination records for historical

and governmental purposes and for the purpose of fully informing the American people

about the history surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(11) “Record” includes a book, paper, map,

photograph, sound or video re c o rd i n g ,

machine readable material, computerized,

digitized, or electronic information, regardless of the medium on which it is stored, or

other documentary material, regardless of its

physical form or characteristics.

(12) “Review Board” means the Assassination Records Review Board established by

section 7.

(13) “Third agency” means a Government

agency that originated an assassination

record that is in the possession of another

agency.

Section 4: 

President John F. Kennedy Assassination

Records Collection at the National

Archives and Records Administration

(a) In General-

(1) Not later than 60 days after the date

of enactment of this Act, the National

A rchives and Records Administration shall

commence establishment of a collection of

re c o rds to be known as the President John

F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In so doing, the A rchivist shall ensure

the physical integrity and original pro v enance of all re c o rds. The Collection shall

consist of re c o rd copies of all Government

184
re c o rds relating to the assassination of

P resident John F. Kennedy, which shall be

transmitted to the National A rchives in

a c c o rdance with section 2107 of title 44,

United States Code. The A rchivist shall

p re p a re and publish a subject guidebook

and index to the collection.

(2) The Collection shall include—

(A) all assassination records—

(i) that have been transmitted to the

National Archives or disclosed to the public

in an unredacted form prior to the date of

enactment of this Act;

(ii) that are required to be transmitted

to the National Archives; or

(iii) the disclosure of which is postponed under this Act;

(B) a central directory comprised of

identification aids created for each record

transmitted to the Archivist under section 5;

and

(C) all Review Board records as required

by this Act.

(b) D i s c l o s u re of Records- All assassination

re c o rds transmitted to the National

A rchives for disclosure to the public shall

be included in the Collection and shall be

available to the public for inspection and

copying at the National A rchives within 30

days after their transmission to the

National A rc h i v e s .

(c) Fees for Copying- The Archivist shall—

(1) charge fees for copying assassination

records; and

(2) grant waivers of such fees pursuant to

the standards established by section 552(a)(4)

of title 5, United States Code.

(d) Additional Requirements-

(1) The Collection shall be preserved, protected, archived, and made available to the

public at the National Archives using appropriations authorized, specified, and

restricted for use under the terms of this Act.

(2) The National Archives, in consultation

with the Information Security Oversight

Office, shall ensure the security of the postponed assassination records in the Collection.

(e) Oversight- The Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Governmental

Affairs of the Senate shall have continuing

oversight jurisdiction with respect to the Collection.

Section 5: 

Review, Identification, Transmission to the

National Archives, and Public Disclosure

of Assassination Records by Government

Offices

(a) In General-

(1) As soon as practicable after the date of

enactment of this Act, each Government off i c e

shall identify and organize its re c o rds re l a t i n g

to the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy and pre p a re them for transmission

to the A rchivist for inclusion in the Collection.

(2) No assassination re c o rd shall be

destroyed, altered, or mutilated in any way.

(3) No assassination record made available

or disclosed to the public prior to the date of

enactment of this Act may be withheld,

redacted, postponed for public disclosure, or

reclassified.

(4) No assassination record created by a

person or entity outside government (excluding names or identities consistent with the

requirements of section 6) shall be withheld,

redacted, postponed for public disclosure, or

reclassified.

(b) Custody of Assassination Records Pending

Review- During the review by Government

offices and pending review activity by the

Review Board, each Government office shall

retain custody of its assassination records for

purposes of preservation, security, and efficiency, unless—

(1) the Review Board requires the physical

transfer of records for purposes of conducting an independent and impartial review;

(2) transfer is necessary for an administrative

hearing or other Review Board function; or

(3) it is a third agency record described in

subsection (c)(2)(C).

(c) Review-

(1) Not later than 300 days after the date of

enactment of this Act, each Government

o ffice shall re v i e w, identify and org a n i z e

each assassination record in its custody or

possession for disclosure to the public,

review by the Review Board, and transmission to the Archivist.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), a Government office shall—

(A) determine which of its records are

assassination records;

(B) determine which of its assassination

records have been officially disclosed or publicly available in a complete and unredacted

form;

185
(C)

(i) determine which of its assassination records, or particular information contained in such a record, was created by a

t h i rd agency or by another Government

office; and

(ii) transmit to a third agency or other

Government office those records, or particular information contained in those records, or

complete and accurate copies thereof;

(D)

(i) determine whether its assassination re c o rds or particular information in

assassination records are covered by the standards for postponement of public disclosure

under this Act; and

(ii) specify on the identification aid

re q u i red by subsection (d) the applicable postponement provision contained in section 6;

(E) organize and make available to the

Review Board all assassination records identified under subparagraph (D) the public disclosure of which in whole or in part may be

postponed under this Act;

(F) organize and make available to the

Review Board any record concerning which

the office has any uncertainty as to whether

the record is an assassination record governed by this Act;

(G) give priority to—

(i) the identification, re v i e w, and

transmission of all assassination records publicly available or disclosed as of the date of

enactment of this Act in a redacted or edited

form; and

(ii) the identification, re v i e w, and

transmission, under the standards for postponement set forth in this Act, of assassination records that on the date of enactment of

this Act are the subject of litigation under section 552 of title 5, United States Code; and

(H) make available to the Review Board

any additional information and records that

the Review Board has reason to believe it

requires for conducting a review under this

Act.

(3) The Director of each archival depository established under section 2112 of title 44,

United States Code, shall have as a priority

the expedited review for public disclosure of

assassination records in the possession and

custody of the depository, and shall make

such records available to the Review Board as

required by this Act.

(d) Identification Aids-

(1)

(A) Not later than 45 days after the date

of enactment of this Act, the Archivist, in

consultation with the appropriate Government offices, shall prepare and make available to all Government offices a standard

form of identification or finding aid for use

with each assassination re c o rd subject to

review under this Act.

(B) The Archivist shall ensure that the

identification aid program is established in

such a manner as to result in the creation of a

uniform system of electronic records by Government offices that are compatible with each

other.

(2) Upon completion of an identification

aid, a Government office shall—

(A) attach a printed copy to the record it

describes;

(B) transmit to the Review Board a

printed copy; and

(C) attach a printed copy to each assassination record it describes when it is transmitted to the Archivist.

(3) Assassination records which are in the

possession of the National Archives on the

date of enactment of this Act, and which have

been publicly available in their entirety without redaction, shall be made available in the

Collection without any additional review by

the Review Board or another authorized

o ffice under this Act, and shall not be

required to have such an identification aid

unless required by the Archivist.

(e) Transmission to the National Archives- Each

Government office shall—

(1) transmit to the Archivist, and make

immediately available to the public, all assassination records that can be publicly disclosed, including those that are publicly

available on the date of enactment of this Act,

without any redaction, adjustment, or withholding under the standards of this Act; and

(2) transmit to the Archivist upon approval

for postponement by the Review Board or

upon completion of other action authorized

by this Act, all assassination records the public disclosure of which has been postponed,

in whole or in part, under the standards of

this Act, to become part of the protected Collection.

(f) Custody of Postponed Assassination RecordsAn assassination record the public disclosure

of which has been postponed shall, pending

transmission to the Archivist, be held for reasons of security and preservation by the originating body until such time as the informa186
tion security program has been established at

the National Archives as required in section

4(e)(2).

(g) Periodic Review of Postponed Assassination

Records-

(1) All postponed or redacted records shall

be reviewed periodically by the originating

agency and the Archivist consistent with the

recommendations of the Review Board under

section 9(c)(3)(B).

(2)

(A) A periodic review shall address the

public disclosure of additional assassination

records in the Collection under the standards

of this Act.

(B) All postponed assassination records

determined to require continued postponement shall require an unclassified written

description of the reason for such continued

postponement. Such description shall be provided to the Archivist and published in the

Federal Register upon determination.

(C) The periodic review of postponed

assassination records shall serve to downgrade and declassify security classified information.

(D) Each assassination record shall be

publicly disclosed in full, and available in the

Collection no later than the date that is 25

years after the date of enactment of this Act,

unless the President certifies, as required by

this Act, that—

(i) continued postponement is made

necessary by an identifiable harm to the military defense, intelligence operations, law

enforcement, or conduct of foreign relations;

and

(ii) the identifiable harm is of such

gravity that it outweighs the public interest

in disclosure.

(h) Fees for Copying- Executive branch agencies shall—

(1) charge fees for copying assassination

records; and

(2) grant waivers of such fees pursuant to

the standards established by section 552(a)(4)

of title 5, United States Code.

Section 6: 

Grounds for Postponement of Public 

Disclosure of Records

Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to

the public may be postponed subject to the

limitations of this Act if there is clear and

convincing evidence that—

(1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public

disclosure of the assassination is of such

gravity that it outweighs the public interest,

and such public disclosure would reveal—

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity

currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method

which is currently utilized, or reasonably

expected to be utilized, by the United States

Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which

would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) any other matter currently relating

to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the

United States, the disclosure of which would

demonstrably impair the national security of

the United States;

(2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity

of a living person who provided confidential

information to the United States and would

pose a substantial risk of harm to that person;

(3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is

so substantial that it outweighs the public

interest;

(4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence

of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual

or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs

the public interest; or

(5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret

Service or another Government agency

responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so

harmful that it outweighs the public interest.

Section 7: 

Establishment and Powers of the 

Assassination Records Review Board

(a) Establishment- There is established as an

independent agency a board to be known as

187
the Assassinations Records Review Board.

(b) Appointment-

(1) The President, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate, shall appoint,

without regard to political affiliation, 5 citizens to serve as members of the Review

Board to ensure and facilitate the review,

transmission to the Archivist, and public disclosure of Government records related to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(2) The President shall make nominations to

the Review Board not later than 90 calendar

days after the date of enactment of this A c t .

(3) If the Senate votes not to confirm a

nomination to the Review Board, the President shall make an additional nomination

not later than 30 days thereafter.

(4)

(A) The President shall make nominations to the Review Board after considering

persons recommended by the American Historical Association, the Organization of

American Historians, the Society of American Archivists, and the American Bar Association.

(B) If an organization described in subparagraph (A) does not recommend at least 2

nominees meeting the qualifications stated in

paragraph (5) by the date that is 45 days after

the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall consider for nomination the persons recommended by the other organizations described in subparagraph (A).

(C) The President may request an organization described in subparagraph (A) to

submit additional nominations.

(5) Persons nominated to the Review

Board—

(A) shall be impartial private citizens,

none of whom is presently employed by any

branch of the Government, and none of

whom shall have had any previous involvement with any official investigation or

inquiry conducted by a Federal, State, or

local government, relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy;

(B) shall be distinguished persons of

high national professional reputation in their

respective fields who are capable of exercising the independent and objective judgment

necessary to the fulfillment of their role in

ensuring and facilitating the review, transmission to the public, and public disclosure

of records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and who possess an

appreciation of the value of such material to

the public, scholars, and government; and

(C) shall include at least 1 professional

historian and 1 attorney.

(c) Security Clearances-

(1) All Review Board nominees shall be

granted the necessary security clearances in

an accelerated manner subject to the stand a rd pro c e d u res for granting such cleara n c e s .

(2) All nominees shall qualify for the necessary security clearance prior to being considered for confirmation by the Committee

on Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

(d) Confirmation Hearings-

(1) The Committee on Governmental

Affairs of the Senate shall hold confirmation

hearings within 30 days in which the Senate

is in session after the nomination of 3 Review

Board members.

(2) The Committee on Governmental

Affairs shall vote on the nominations within

14 days in which the Senate is in session after

the confirmation hearings, and shall report

its results to the full Senate immediately.

(3) The Senate shall vote on each nominee

to confirm or reject within 14 days in which

the Senate is in session after reported by the

Committee on Governmental Affairs.

(e) Vacancy- A vacancy on the Review Board

shall be filled in the same manner as specified for original appointment within 30 days

of the occurrence of the vacancy.

(f) Chairperson- The Members of the Review

Board shall elect one of its members as chairperson at its initial meeting.

(g) Removal of Review Board Member-

(1) No member of the Review Board shall

be removed from office, other than—

(A) by impeachment and conviction; or

(B) by the action of the President for

inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in

office, physical disability, mental incapacity,

or any other condition that substantially

impairs the performance of the member’s

duties.

(2)

(A) If a member of the Review Board is

removed from office, and that removal is by

the President, not later than 10 days after the

removal the President shall submit to the

Committee on Government Operations of the

House of Representatives and the Committee

on Governmental Affairs of the Senate a

report specifying the facts found and the

grounds for the removal.

(B) The President shall publish in the

188
Federal Register a report submitted under

paragraph (2)(A), except that the President

may, if necessary to protect the rights of a

person named in the report or to prevent

undue interference with any pending prosecution, postpone or refrain from publishing

any or all of the report until the completion of

such pending cases or pursuant to privacy

protection requirements in law.

(3)

(A) A member of the Review Board

removed from office may obtain judicial

review of the removal in a civil action commenced in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia.

(B) The member may be reinstated or

granted other appropriate relief by order of

the court.

(h) Compensation of Members-

(1) A member of the Review Board shall be

compensated at a rate equal to the daily

equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay

p rescribed for level IV of the Executive

Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United

States Code, for each day (including travel

time) during which the member is engaged

in the performance of the duties of the

Review Board.

(2) A member of the Review Board shall be

allowed reasonable travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates

for employees of agencies under subchapter I

of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code,

while away from the member’s home or regular place of business in the performance of

services for the Review Board.

(i) Duties of the Review Board-

(1) The Review Board shall consider and

render decisions on a determination by a

Government office to seek to postpone the

disclosure of assassination records.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Review

B o a rd shall consider and render decisions—

(A) whether a re c o rd constitutes an

assassination record; and

(B) whether an assassination record or

particular information in a record qualifies

for postponement of disclosure under this

Act.

(j) Powers-

(1) The Review Board shall have the

authority to act in a manner prescribed under

this Act including authority to—

(A) direct Government offices to complete identification aids and organize assassination records;

(B) direct Government offices to transmit to the A rchivist assassination re c o rds as

re q u i red under this Act, including segregable portions of assassination re c o rds, and

substitutes and summaries of assassination

re c o rds that can be publicly disclosed to the

fullest extent;

(C)

(i) obtain access to assassination

records that have been identified and organized by a Government office;

(ii) direct a Government office to

make available to the Review Board, and if

necessary investigate the facts surrounding,

additional information, records, or testimony

from individuals, which the Review Board

has reason to believe is required to fulfill its

functions and responsibilities under this Act;

and

(iii) request the Attorney General to

subpoena private persons to compel testimony, records, and other information relevant to its responsibilities under this Act;

(D) require any Government office to

account in writing for the destruction of any

records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy;

(E) receive information from the public

regarding the identification and public disclosure of assassination records; and

(F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and

subpoena witnesses and documents.

(2) A subpoena issued under paragraph

(1)(C)(iii) may be enforced by any appropriate Federal court acting pursuant to a lawful

request of the Review Board.

(k) Witness Immunity- The Review Board

shall be considered to be an agency of the

United States for purposes of section 6001 of

title 18, United States Code.

(l) Oversight-

(1) The Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the

Committee on Governmental Affairs of the

Senate shall have continuing oversight jurisdiction with respect to the official conduct of

the Review Board and the disposition of

postponed records after termination of the

Review Board, and shall have access to any

records held or created by the Review Board.

(2) The Review Board shall have the duty

to cooperate with the exercise of such oversight jurisdiction.

(m) Support Services- The Administrator of

the General Services Administration shall

p rovide administrative services for the

189
Review Board on a reimbursable basis.

(n) Interpretive Regulations- The Review Board

may issue interpretive regulations.

(o) Termination and Winding up-

(1) The Review Board and the terms of its

members shall terminate not later than 2

years after the date of enactment of this Act,

except that the Review Board may, by majority vote, extend its term for an additional 1-

year period if it has not completed its work

within that 2-year period.

(2) Upon its termination, the Review Board

shall submit reports to the President and the

Congress including a complete and accurate

accounting of expenditures during its existence, and shall complete all other reporting

requirements under this Act.

(3) Upon termination and winding up, the

Review Board shall transfer all of its records

to the Archivist for inclusion in the Collection, and no record of the Review Board shall

be destroyed.

Section 8: 

Assassination Records Review Board 

Personnel

(a) Executive Director-

(1) Not later than 45 days after the initial

meeting of the Review Board, the Review

B o a rd shall appoint one citizen, without

regard to political affiliation, to the position

of Executive Director.

(2) The person appointed as Executive

Director shall be a private citizen of integrity

and impartiality who is a distinguished professional and who is not a present employee

of any branch of the Government and has

had no previous involvement with any official investigation or inquiry relating to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(3)

(A) A candidate for Executive Director

shall be granted the necessary security clearances in an accelerated manner subject to the

standard procedures for granting such clearances.

(B) A candidate shall qualify for the necessary security clearance prior to being

approved by the Review Board.

(4) The Executive Director shall—

(A) serve as principal liaison to Government offices;

(B) be responsible for the administration

and coordination of the Review Board ’ s

review of records;

(C) be responsible for the administration

of all official activities conducted by the

Review Board; and

(D) have no authority to decide or determine whether any record should be disclosed

to the public or postponed for disclosure.

(5) The Executive Director shall not be

removed for reasons other than by a majority

vote of the Review Board for cause on the

g rounds of ineff i c i e n c y, neglect of duty,

malfeasance in office, physical disability,

mental incapacity, or any other condition that

substantially impairs the performance of the

responsibilities of the Executive Director or

the staff of the Review Board.

(b) Staff-

(1) The Review Board may, in accordance

with the civil service laws but without regard

to civil service law and regulation for competitive service as defined in subchapter 1,

chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code,

appoint and terminate additional personnel

as are necessary to enable the Review Board

and its Executive Director to perform its

duties.

(2) A person appointed to the staff of the

Review Board shall be a private citizen of

integrity and impartiality who is not a present employee of any branch of the Government and who has had no previous involvement with any official investigation or

inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(3)

(A) A candidate for staff shall be granted

the necessary security clearances in an accelerated manner subject to the standard procedures for granting such clearances.

(B) A candidate for the staff shall qualify

for the necessary security clearance prior to

being approved by the Review Board.

(c) Compensation- The Review Board shall fix

the compensation of the Executive Director

and other personnel in accordance with title

5, United States Code, except that the rate of

pay for the Executive Director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable for

level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of that title.

(d) Advisory Committees-

(1) The Review Board shall have the

authority to create advisory committees to

assist in fulfilling the responsibilities of the

Review Board under this Act.

(2) Any advisory committee created by the

Review Board shall be subject to the Federal

190
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

Section 9: 

Review of Records by the Assassination

Records Review Board

(a) Custody of Records Reviewed by BoardPending the outcome of the Review Board’s

review activity, a Government office shall

retain custody of its assassination records for

purposes of preservation, security, and efficiency, unless—

(1) the Review Board requires the physical

transfer of records for reasons of conducting

an independent and impartial review; or

(2) such transfer is necessary for an administrative hearing or other official Review

Board function.

(b) Startup Requirements- The Review Board

shall—

(1) not later than 90 days after the date of

its appointment, publish a schedule for

review of all assassination records in the Federal Register; and

(2) not later than 180 days after the date of

enactment of this Act, begin its review of

assassination records under this Act.

(c) Determinations of the Review Board-

(1) The Review Board shall direct that all

assassination records be transmitted to the

Archivist and disclosed to the public in the

Collection in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that—

(A) a Government record is not an assassination record; or

(B) a Government record or particular

information within an assassination record

qualifies for postponement of public disclosure under this Act.

(2) In approving postponement of public

d i s c l o s u re of an assassination re c o rd, the

Review Board shall seek to—

(A) provide for the disclosure of segregable parts, substitutes, or summaries of

such a record; and

(B) determine, in consultation with the

originating body and consistent with the stand a rds for postponement under this Act, which

of the following alternative forms of disclos u re shall be made by the originating body:

(i) Any reasonably segregable particular information in an assassination record.

(ii) A substitute record for that information which is postponed.

(iii) A summary of an assassination

record.

(3) With respect to each assassination

record or particular information in assassination records the public disclosure of which is

postponed pursuant to section 6, or for which

only substitutions or summaries have been

disclosed to the public, the Review Board

shall create and transmit to the Archivist a

report containing—

(A) a description of actions by the

Review Board, the originating body, the President, or any Government office (including a

justification of any such action to postpone

d i s c l o s u re of any re c o rd or part of any

record) and of any official proceedings conducted by the Review Board with regard to

specific assassination records; and

(B) a statement, based on a review of the

proceedings and in conformity with the decisions reflected therein, designating a recommended specified time at which or a specified occurrence following which the material

may be appropriately disclosed to the public

under this Act.

(4)

(A) Following its review and a determination that an assassination record shall be

publicly disclosed in the Collection or postponed for disclosure and held in the protected Collection, the Review Board shall

notify the head of the originating body of its

determination and publish a copy of the

determination in the Federal Register within

14 days after the determination is made.

(B) Contemporaneous notice shall be

made to the President for Review Board

determinations regarding executive branch

assassination records, and to the oversight

committees designated in this Act in the case

of legislative branch re c o rds. Such notice

shall contain a written unclassified justification for public disclosure or postponement of

disclosure, including an explanation of the

application of any standards contained in

section 6.

(d) Presidential Authority over Review Board

Determination-

(1) Public Disclosure or Postponement of Dis -

closure- After the Review Board has made a

formal determination concerning the public

disclosure or postponement of disclosure of

an executive branch assassination record or

information within such a record, or of any

information contained in an assassination

record, obtained or developed solely within

the executive branch, the President shall

have the sole and nondelegable authority to

191
require the disclosure or postponement of

such record or information under the standards set forth in section 6, and the President

shall provide the Review Board with an

unclassified written certification specifying

the President’s decision within 30 days after

the Review Board’s determination and notice

to the executive branch agency as required

under this Act, stating the justification for the

President’s decision, including the applicable

grounds for postponement under section 6,

accompanied by a copy of the identification

aid required under section 4.

(2) Periodic Review- Any executive branch

assassination re c o rd postponed by the Pre s ident shall be subject to the re q u i rements of

periodic re v i e w, downgrading and declassification of classified information, and public disc l o s u re in the collection set forth in section 4.

(3) Record of Presidential Postponement- The

Review Board shall, upon its receipt, publish

in the Federal Register a copy of any unclassified written certification, statement, and

other materials transmitted by or on behalf of

the President with regard to postponement of

assassination records.

(e) Notice to Public- Every 30 calendar days,

beginning on the date that is 60 calendar

days after the date on which the Review

B o a rd first approves the postponement of

d i s c l o s u re of an assassination re c o rd, the

Review Board shall publish in the Federal

Register a notice that summarizes the postponements approved by the Review Board

or initiated by the President, the House of

R e p resentatives, or the Senate, including a

description of the subject, originating

a g e n c y, length or other physical description,

and each ground for postponement that is

relied upon.

(f) Reports by the Review Board-

(1) The Review Board shall report its activities to the leadership of the Congress, the

Committee on Government Operations of the

House of Representatives, the Committee on

Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the President, the Archivist, and the head of any Government office whose records have been the

subject of Review Board activity.

(2) The first report shall be issued on the

date that is 1 year after the date of enactment

of this Act, and subsequent reports every 12

months thereafter until termination of the

Review Board.

(3) A report under paragraph (1) shall

include the following information:

(A) Afinancial report of the expenses for

all official activities and requirements of the

Review Board and its personnel.

(B) The progress made on review, transmission to the Archivist, and public disclosure of assassination records.

(C) The estimated time and volume of

assassination records involved in the completion of the Review Board’s performance

under this Act.

(D) Any special problems, including

requests and the level of cooperation of Government offices, with regard to the ability of

the Review Board to operate as required by

this Act.

(E) A record of review activities, including a record of postponement decisions by

the Review Board or other related actions

authorized by this Act, and a record of the

volume of records reviewed and postponed.

(F) Suggestions and requests to Congre s s

for additional legislative authority needs.

(G) An appendix containing copies of

reports of postponed records to the Archivist

required under section 9(c)(3) made since the

date of the preceding report under this subsection.

(4) At least 90 calendar days before completing its work, the Review Board shall provide written notice to the President and Cong ress of its intention to terminate its

operations at a specified date.

Section 10: 

Disclosure of Other Materials and 

Additional Study

(a) Materials under Seal of Court-

(1) The Review Board may request the

Attorney General to petition any court in the

United States or abroad to release any information relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy that is held under seal

of the court.

(2)

(A) The Review Board may request the

Attorney General to petition any court in the

United States to release any information relevant to the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy that is held under the injunction of

secrecy of a grand jury.

(B) A request for disclosure of assassination materials under this Act shall be deemed

to constitute a showing of particularized

need under Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure.

192
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of the

Congress that—

(1) the Attorney General should assist the

Review Board in good faith to unseal any

re c o rds that the Review Board determines to

be relevant and held under seal by a court or

under the injunction of secrecy of a grand jury;

(2) the Secretary of State should contact the

Government of the Republic of Russia and

seek the disclosure of all records of the government of the former Soviet Union, including the records of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) and the Glaynoye

Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (GRU), relevant to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t

Kennedy, and contact any other foreign government that may hold information relevant

to the assassination of President Kennedy

and seek disclosure of such information; and

(3) all Executive agencies should cooperate

in full with the Review Board to seek the disclosure of all information relevant to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy

consistent with the public interest.

Section 11: 

Rules of Construction

(a) Precedence over Other Law- When this Act

re q u i res transmission of a re c o rd to the

Archivist or public disclosure, it shall take

precedence over any other law (except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial decision construing such law, or common

law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit

such transmission or disclosure, with the

exception of deeds governing access to or

transfer or release of gifts and donations of

records to the United States Government.

(b) Freedom of Information Act- Nothing in this

Act shall be construed to eliminate or limit

any right to file requests with any executive

agency or seek judicial review of the decisions pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United

States Code.

(c) Judicial Review- Nothing in this Act shall

be construed to preclude judicial re v i e w,

under chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code,

of final actions taken or required to be taken

under this Act.

(d) Existing Authority- Nothing in this Act

revokes or limits the existing authority of the

President, any executive agency, the Senate,

or the House of Representatives, or any other

entity of the Government to publicly disclose

records in its possession.

(e) Rules of the Senate and House of Representa -

tives- To the extent that any provision of this

Act establishes a procedure to be followed in

the Senate or the House of Representatives,

such provision is adopted—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power

of the Senate and House of Representatives,

respectively, and is deemed to be part of the

rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be

followed in that House, and it supersedes

other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the

rules (so far as they relate to the procedure of

that House) at any time, in the same manner,

and to the same extent as in the case of any

other rule of that House.

Section 12: 

Termination of Effect of Act

(a) Provisions Pertaining to the Review BoardThe provisions of this Act that pertain to the

appointment and operation of the Review

Board shall cease to be effective when the

Review Board and the terms of its members

have terminated pursuant to section 7(o).

(b) Other Provisions- The remaining provisions of this Act shall continue in effect until

such time as the Archivist certifies to the

President and the Congress that all assassination records have been made available to the

public in accordance with this Act.

Section 13: 

Authorization of Appropriations

(a) In General- There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out

this Act, to remain available until expended.

(b) Interim Funding- Until such time as funds

a re appropriated pursuant to subsection (a),

the President may use such sums as are available for discretionary use to carry out this A c t .

Section 14: 

Severability

If any provision of this Act or the application

t h e reof to any person or circumstance is held

invalid, the remainder of this Act and the

application of that provision to other persons

not similarly situated or to other circ u m s t a n c e s

shall not be affected by the invalidation.

193
The President John F. Kennedy 

Assassination Records Collection 

Extension Act of 1994

Section 1: 

Short Title

This Act may be cited as the “President John

F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Extension Act of 1994”.

Section 2: 

Extension of Act

Section 7(o)(1) of the President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is

amended—

(1) by striking “2 years after the date of

enactment of this Act” and inserting “September 30, 1996”; and

(2) by striking “2-year”.

Section 3: 

Amendments Relating to Review Board

Powers

Section 7(j)(1) of the President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is

amended—

(1) in subparagraph (E) by striking “and”

after the semicolon;

(2) in subparagraph (F) by striking the

period and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(G) use the Federal Supply Service in

the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of

the United States; and

“(H) use the United States mails in the

same manner and under the same conditions

as other departments and agencies of the

United States.”.

Section 4: 

Amendments Relating to Review Board

Personnel

(a) Security Clearance for Review Board Person -

n e l- Section 8 of the President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended

by adding at the end the following:

“(e) Security Clearance Required- An individual employed in any position by the Review

Board (including an individual appointed as

Executive Director) shall be required to qualify for any necessary security clearance prior

to taking office in that position, but may be

employed conditionally in accordance with

subsection (b)(3)(B) before qualifying for that

clearance.”.

(b) Appointment and Termination of Staff, Gen -

erally- Section 8(b) of the President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended

by striking “(b) Staff- ” and all that follows

through the end of paragraph (1) and inserting the following:

“(b) Staff- (1) The Review Board, without

regard to the civil service laws, may appoint

and terminate additional personnel as are

necessary to enable the Review Board and its

Executive Director to perform the duties of

the Review Board.”.

(c) Review Board Administrative Staff- Section

8(b)(2) of the President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

(44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended—

(1) by striking “A person” and inserting

“(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B),

a person”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) An individual who is an employee

of the Government may be appointed to the

staff of the Review Board if in that position

the individual will perform only administrative functions.”.

(d) Conditional Employment of Staff- Section

8(b)(3)(B) of the President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

(44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended to read as

follows:

“(B)

(i) The Review Board may offer conditional employment to a candidate for a staff

position pending the completion of security

clearance background investigations. During

the pendency of such investigations, the

Review Board shall ensure that any such

employee does not have access to, or responsibility involving, classified or otherwise

restricted assassination record materials.

(ii) If a person hired on a conditional basis

under clause (i) is denied or otherwise does

not qualify for all security clearances necessary to carry out the responsibilities of the

position for which conditional employment

has been offered, the Review Board shall

immediately terminate the person’s employment.”.

194
(e) Compensation of Staff- Section 8(c) of the

P resident John F. Kennedy A s s a s s i n a t i o n

Records Collection Act of 1992 (21 U.S.C.

2107 note) is amended to read as follows:

“(c) Compensation- Subject to such rules as

may be adopted by the Review Board, the

chairperson, without regard to the provisions

of title 5, United States Code, governing

appointments in the competitive service and

without regard to the provisions of chapter

51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that

title relating to classification and General

Schedule pay rates, may—

(1) appoint an Executive Dire c t o r, who shall

be paid at a rate not to exceed the rate of basic

pay for level V of the Executive Schedule; and

(2) appoint and fix compensation of such

other personnel as may be necessary to carry

out this Act.”.

Section 5: 

Technical Correction

Section 6(1) of the President John F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

(44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by inserting

“record” after “the assassination”.

195
Sections

1400.1 Scope of assassination record. 

1400.2 Scope of additional records and information. 

1400.3 Sources of assassination records and

additional records and information. 

1400.4 Types of materials included in scope

of assassination re c o rd and additional

records and information. 

1400.5 Requirement that assassination

records be released in their entirety.

1400.6 Originals and copies. 

1400.7 Additional guidance. 

1400.8 Implementing the JFK Act—Notice of

Assassination Record Designation.

Section 1400.1: 

Scope of assassination record

(a) An assassination record includes, but is

not limited to, all records, public and private,

regardless of how labeled or identified, that

document, describe, report on, analyze or

interpret activities, persons, or events reasonably related to the assassination of President

John F. Kennedy and investigations of or

inquiries into the assassination.

(b) An assassination record further includes,

without limitation:

(1) All records as defined in Section 3(2) of

the JFK Act;

(2) All records collected by or segregated

by all Federal, state, and local government

agencies in conjunction with any investigation or analysis of or inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy (for example,

any intra-agency investigation or analysis of

or inquiry into the assassination; any interagency communication regarding the assassination; any request by the House Select Committee on Assassinations to collect

documents and other materials; or any interor intra-agency collection or segregation of

documents and other materials);

(3) Other records or groups of records

listed in the Notice of Assassination Record

Designation, as described in Sec. 1400.8 of

this chapter.

Section 1400.2: 

Scope of additional records and 

information

The term additional records and information

includes:

(a) All documents used by government

offices and agencies during their declassification review of assassination records as well

as all other documents, indices, and other

material (including but not limited to those

that disclose cryptonyms, code names, or

other identifiers that appear in assassination

re c o rds) that the Assassination Record s

Review Board (Review Board) has a reasonable basis to believe may constitute an assassination record or would assist in the identification, evaluation or interpretation of an

assassination record. The Review Board will

identify in writing those records and other

materials it intends to seek under this section.

(b) All training manuals, instructional materials, and guidelines created or used by the

agencies in furtherance of their review of

assassination records.

(c) All records, lists, and documents describing the procedure by which the agencies

identified or selected assassination records

for review.

(d) Organizational charts of government

agencies.

(e) Records necessary and sufficient to

describe the agency’s:

(1) Records policies and schedules;

(2) Filing systems and organization;

(3) Storage facilities and locations;

(4) Indexing symbols, marks, codes,

instructions, guidelines, methods, and procedures;

(5) Search methods and procedures used in

197

APPENDIX D

36 CFR 1400—GUIDANCE FOR INTERPRETATION AND

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992
the performance of the agencies’ duties

under the JFK Act; and

(6) Reclassification to a higher level, transfer, destruction, or other information (e.g.,

theft) regarding the status of assassination

records.

(f) Any other record that does not fall within

the scope of assassination record as described

in Sec. 1400.1, but which has the potential to

enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical

record of the assassination.

Section 1400.3: 

Sources of assassination records and 

additional records and information

Assassination records and additional records

and information may be located at, or under

the control of, without limitation:

(a) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executing, legislative, and judicial branches of

the Federal Government;

(b) Agencies, offices, and entities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of

state and local governments;

(c) Record repositories and archives of Federal, state, and local governments, including

presidential libraries;

(d) Record repositories and archives of universities, libraries, historical societies, and

other similar organizations;

(e) Individuals who possess such records by

virtue of service with a government agency,

office, or entity;

(f) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have obtained such re c o rd s

from sources identified in paragraphs (a)

through (e) of this section;

(g) Persons, including individuals and corporations, who have themselves created or have

obtained such records from sources other

than those identified in paragraphs (a)

through (e) of this section;

(h) Federal, state, and local courts where such

records are being held under seal; or

(i) Foreign governments.

Section 1400.4: 

Types of materials included in scope of

assassination record and additional records

and information

The term record in assassination record and

additional records and information includes,

for purposes of interpreting and implementing the JFK Act:

(a) papers, maps, and other documentary

material;

(b) photographs;

(c) motion pictures;

(d) sound and video recordings;

(e) machine readable information in any

form; and

(f) artifacts.

Section 1400.5: 

Requirement that assassination records be

released in their entirety

An assassination record shall be released in

its entirety except for portions specifically

postponed pursuant to the grounds for postponement of public disclosure of re c o rd s

established in Sec. 2107.6 of the JFK Act, and

no portion of any assassination record shall

be withheld from public disclosure solely on

g rounds of non-relevance unless, in the

Review Board’s sole discretion, release of

part of a record is sufficient to comply with

the intent and purposes of the JFK Act.

Section 1400.6: 

Originals and copies

(a) For purposes of determining whether

originals or copies of assassination records

will be made part of the President John F.

Kennedy Assassination Records Collection

(JFK Assassination Records Collection) established under the JFK Act, the following shall

apply:

(1) In the case of papers, maps, and other

documentary materials, the Review Board

may determine that record copies of government records, either the signed original, original production or a reproduction that has

been treated as the official record maintained

to chronicle government functions or activities, may be placed in the JFK Assassination

Records Collection;

(2) In the case of other papers, maps, and

other documentary material, the Review

Board may determine that a true and accurate copy of a record in lieu of the original

may be placed in the JFK A s s a s s i n a t i o n

Records Collection;

(3) In the case of photographs, the original

negative, whenever available (otherwise, the

earliest generation print that is a true and

accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK

Assassination Records Collection;

(4) In the case of motion pictures, the cam198
era original, whenever available (otherwise,

the earliest generation print that is a true and

accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK

Assassination Records Collection;

(5) In the case of sound and video recordings, the original recording, whenever available (otherwise, the earliest generation copy

that is a true and accurate copy), may be

placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

(6) In the case of machine-readable information, a true and accurate copy of the original (duplicating all information contained in

the original and in a format that permits

retrieval of the information), may be placed

in the JFK Assassination Records Collection;

and

(7) In the case of artifacts, the original

objects themselves may be placed in the JFK

Assassination Records Collection.

(b) To the extent records from foreign governments are included in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, copies of the original

records shall be sufficient for inclusion in the

collection.

(c) In cases where a copy, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, is authorized by the

Review Board to be included in the JFK

Assassination Records Collection, the

Review Board may require that a copy be certified if, in its discretion, it determines a certification to be necessary to ensure the

integrity of the JFK Assassination Records

Collection. In cases where an original, as

defined in paragraph (a) of this section, is

required for inclusion in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, the Review Board

may, at its discretion, accept the best available copy. In such cases that records included

in the JFK Assassination Records Collection,

whether originals or copies, contain illegible

portions, such records shall have attached

thereto a certified transcription of the illegible language to the extent practicable.

(d) For purposes of implementing the JFK

Act, the term copy means a true and accurate

photocopy duplication by a means appropriate to the medium of the original record that

preserves and displays the integrity of the

record and the information contained in it.

(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to suggest that additional copies of

any assassination records contained in the

JFK Assassination Records Collection are not

also assassination records that, at the Review

Board’s discretion, may also be placed in the

JFK Assassination Records Collection.

(f) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted

to prevent or to preclude copies of any electronic assassination records from being reformatted electronically in order to conform to

different hardward and/or software requirements of audiovisual or machine readable

formats if such is the professional judgment

of the National A rchives and Record s

Administration.

Section 1400.7: 

Additional guidance

(a) A government agency, office, or entity

includes, for purposes of interpreting and

implementing the JFK Act, all current, past,

and former departments, agencies, off i c e s ,

divisions, foreign offices, bureaus, and deliberative bodies of any Federal, state, or local government and includes all inter- or intra-agency

working groups, committees, and meetings

that possess or created re c o rds relating to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

(b) The inclusion of artifacts in the scope of

the term assassination re c o rd is understood to

apply solely to the JFK Assassination Record s

Collection and to implement fully the terms

of the JFK Act and has no direct or indire c t

bearing on the interpretation or implementation of any other statute or re g u l a t i o n .

(c) Whenever artifacts are included in the JFK

Assassination Records Collection, it shall be

sufficient to comply with the JFK Act if the

public is provided access to photographs,

drawings, or similar materials depicting the

artifacts. Additional display of or examination by the public of artifacts in the JFK

Assassination Records Collection shall occur

under the terms and conditions established

by the National A rchives and Record s

Administration to ensure their preservation

and protection for posterity.

(d) The terms and, or, any, all, and the plural

and singular forms of nouns shall be understood in their broadest and most inclusive

sense and shall not be understood to be terms

of limitation.

(e) Unless the Review Board in its sole discretion directs otherwise, records that are

identified with respect to a particular person

shall include all records ralating to that person that use or reflect the true name or any

other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol

number, cryptonym, or alias used to identify

that person.

199
(f) Unless the Review Board in its sole discretion directs otherwise, records that are identified by the Review Board with respect to a

particular operation or program shall include

all records, pertaining to that program by any

other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol,

number, or cryptonym.

Section 1400.8: 

Implementing the JFK Act—Notice of

Assassination Record Designation

(a) A Notice of Assassination Record Designation (NARD) shall be the mechanism for

the Review Board to announce publicly its

determination that a re c o rd or group of

records meets the definition of assassination

records.

(b) Notice of all NARDs will be published in

the Federal Register within 30 days of the

decision to designate such records as assassination records.

(c) In determining to designate such records

as assassination records, the Review Board

must determine that the record or group of

record will more likely than not enhance,

enrich, and broaden the historical record of

the assassination.

200
April 12, 1994

Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

July 12, 1994

Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

October 11, 1994

Public Hearing, Washington, D.C.

November 18, 1994

Public Hearing, Dallas, Texas

December 13 – 14, 1994

Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

January 25, 1995

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

March 6 – 7, 1995

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

March 24, 1995

Public Hearing, Boston, Massachusetts

May 2 – 3, 1995

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

May 18, 1995

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

June 7, 1995

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

June 27 – 28, 1995

Open and Closed Meetings, New Orleans,

Louisiana

July 17 - 18, 1995

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

August 2 – 3, 1995

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

August 28 – 29, 1995

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 30, 1995

Special Meeting (Open), Washington, D.C.

September 20 – 21, 1995

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

October 23 – 24, 1995

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

November 13 – 14, 1995

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

December 12 – 13, 1995

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

January 5, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

January 30 – 31, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

February 29 – March 1, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

March 18 – 19, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

April 16 – 17, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

May 13 – 14, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

June 4 – 5, 1996

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

July 9 – 10, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 5 – 6, 1996

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

201

APPENDIX E

ME E T I N G S O F T H E RE V I E W BO A R D
September 17, 1996

Public Hearing and Open Meeting, Los

Angeles, California

September 27, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

October 15 – 16, 1996

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

November 13 – 14, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

December 16 – 17, 1996

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

January 8 – 9, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

January 29 – 30, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

February 13, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

March 13 – 14, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

April 2, 1997

Public Hearing and Open Meeting, 

Washington, D.C.

April 23 – 24, 1997

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

May 12 – 13, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

June 9 – 10, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

July 9, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 5, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

September 17, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

October 14, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

November 17, 1997

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

December 15 – 16, 1997

Closed Meeting, College Park, Maryland

January 22, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

February 17, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

March 10, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

April 13, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

May 12 – 13, 1998

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

June 4, 1998

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

June 17, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

July 7 – 8, 1998

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

July 20 – 21, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 6, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 25 – 26, 1998

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

September 8 – 9, 1998

Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

September 14, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

September 23, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

September 28, 1998

Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

September 29, 1998

Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

202
Documents Voted on by the Board—

By Agency

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Army Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,854

Carter Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Church Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,079

Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

DIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

DOJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

DOJ Civil Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Eisenhower Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,013

Ford Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

HSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,421

JCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Johnson Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Kennedy Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

NARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

203

APPENDIX F

SUMMARY OF REVIEW BOARD VOTES ON RECORDS

NSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

NSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Office of the Secretary of Defense . . 3

PFIAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Pike Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Warren Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Total Documents* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29,420

Sub Totals

Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,015

Libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Other Gov. Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427

CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,079

FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,013

HSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,421

*Accurate as of 9–12–1998. Some documents

may be counted more than once due to multiple consideration by the Review Board.
Documents Processed by the Board—

Consent Releases

By Agency

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929

Army Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,075

Carter Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Church Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,172

Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

DIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

DOJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

DOJ Civil Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Eisenhower Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,509

Ford Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

HSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,480

JCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Johnson Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

Kennedy Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

NARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

NSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

NSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Office of the Secretary of Defense . . 22

Pike Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Warren Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

Total* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,176

Sub Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,317

Libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726

Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569

Other Gov. Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403

CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,172

FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,509

HSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,480

*Accurate as of 9–12–1998.

204

FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
The Assassination Records Review Board would like to acknowledge the following individuals who contributed to the success of this project:

Former Staff Members of Assassination Records Review Board

David G. Marwell, Executive Director

T. Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director and General Counsel

Thomas E. Samoluk, Deputy Director and Associate Director for Communications 

Sheryl L. Walter, General Counsel

Philip D. Golrick, Chief Analyst for FBI Records/Counsel

Mary S. McAuliffe, Chief Analyst for CIA Records

Thomas L. Wilborn, Press and Public Affairs Officer

Timothy A. Wray, Chief Analyst for Military Records

Christopher M. Barger, Analyst

Mosemarie D. Boyd, Analyst

Eugene A. Burpoe, Senior Analyst

Anne E. Buttimer, Chief Investigator

Jessica L. DiFrisco, Analyst

Carrie J. Fletcher, Analyst

Andrew J. Funk, Analyst

Noelle C. Gray, Technical Assistant for Research and Analysis

Kim A. Herd, Senior Attorney/Analyst

Manuel E. Legaspi, Analyst

Tammi S. Long, Attorney/Analyst

Joseph R. Masih, Analyst

Christina P. Mays, Administrative Assistant

David R. Montague, Senior Investigator

Dennis J. Quinn, Attorney/Senior Analyst

D. Sydney Reddy, Analyst

Brian E. Rosen, Attorney/Senior Analyst

Valerie M. Sails, Special Assistant to the Executive Director

Eric N. Scheinkopf, Analyst

Michelle M. Seguin, Analyst

Joan G. Zimmerman, Senior Analyst

Interns

Robert R. Arreola

Tracy L. Brandt

Christopher J. Burton

Nabeena Chatterjee

Delaney M. DiStefano

Rochelle Juelich

Farand Kan

Krista B. LaBelle

Frank P. Menna

Daniel D. Wedemeyer

205

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Agency Personnel

Steven D. Tilley, Chief, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA

Martha Murphy, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA

Steven Hamilton, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA

Ramona Branch Oliver, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA

Roland Bordley, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA

Matt Fulgham, Center for Legislative Archives, NARA

Kris Wilhelm, Center for Legislative Archives, NARA

Dave Brown, Initial Processing/Declassification Division, NARA

Les Waffen, Motion Picture and Audiovisual Branch, NARA

Alan Lewis, Motion Picture and Audiovisual Branch, NARA

Margaret Ann Kelly, Document Conservation Laboratory, NARA

John Constance, Director, Congressional Affairs, NARA

William Grover, Special Access and FOIA Staff, NARA

Miriam Nisbet, Office of General Counsel, NARA

John Collingwood, Assistant Director for Press and Congressional Affairs, FBI

Carol Keeley, Chief, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBI

LuAnn Wilkins, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBI

Debbie Beatty, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBI

Carl Valentine, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBI

Terry O’Connor, Former Inspector in Charge, JFK Task Force, FBI

P. Grant Harmon, Supervisory Special Agent, JFK Task Force, FBI

J. Barry Harrelson, Chief, JFK Project, Historical Review Program, CIA

John Pereira, Former Chief, Historical Review Group, CIA

James Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program, CIA

Nina Noring, Department of State

Hugh Woodward, Department of State

Bruce Miller, Department of the Treasury, United States Customs Service

Anthony Radosti, Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans

Edmund McBride, Joint Staff Secretariat

Will Kammer, Joint Staff Secretariat

Paul Jacobsmeyer, Joint Staff Secretariat

Toni Bowie, United States Army

Clay Ferris, United States Army

Elaine Rogic, IRR, United States Army

Phyllis Birckhead, IRR, United States Army

Claudia Collins, Chief, Information Security Policy, National Security Agency

Lee Schroyer, JFK Act Project Officer, National Security Agency

Lisa Salvetti, Deputy Director of Access Management, National Security Council

John D. Podesta, The White House

Kimberly Newman, Office of Management and Budget

Maya Bernstein, Office of Policy

Calvin Snowden, Former Director, Agency Liaison Division, General Services Administration

Cassandra Browner, Agency Liaison Division, General Services Administration

Nicholas M. Freda, Typography and Design Division, U.S. Government Printing Office

Carlotta Wells, Civil Division, Department of Justice

Art Goldberg, Civil Division, Department of Justice

Tina Houston, Lydon Baines Johnson Presidential Library

Stephanie Fawcett, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library

Megan Desoyners, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library

The Assassination Records Review Board would also like to thank the numerous federal officials who were formally designated to ensure agency compliance with the JFK Act.

206
Cogressional Staff

Donald Goldberg

Daniel Moll

Jeff Schaffner

Brian Dettelbach

Kevin Sabo

The Eastman Kodak Company

James Milch

Fred Williamson

Jim Toner

Roland Zavada

Participants in Additional Ballistics Testing

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology

Dr. Mitchell Holland, Chief, Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL)

Edwin Huffine, Chief DNAAnalyst, AFDIL

Dr. Jerry Spencer, The Armed Forces Medical Examiner

FBI Laboratory

Dr. Chris Allen, Hairs and Fibers Unit

Steven Burmeister, Chief, Chemistry Unit

Douglas Deedrick, Chief, Trace Evidence Unit

Dr. Joseph DiZinno, Chief, DNA-II Unit

Robert Fram, Trace Evidence Unit

Donald Havekost, Materials Analysis Unit

Ronald Menold, Chemistry Unit

Charles Peters, Materials Analysis Unit

Dr. Jenifer Lindsey Smith, Chief, DNA-I Unit

Robert Sibert, Deputy Chief, Scientific Analysis Section

Independent Consultants

Dr. Mary Baker, Smithsonian Center for Materials Research (SCMRE)

Dr. Michael Zimmerman, Maimonides Medical Center

Experts at Review Board Experts’ Conferences

May 1995

The Quest for Additional 

Records and Information

G. Robert Blakey

David Garrow

Paul Hoch

James Lesar

David Lifton

John Newman

David Slawson

April 1998

The Problem of Secrecy

Steven Aftergood

Steven Garfinkel

David Garrow

Morton Halperin

William Leary

Mike Lostumbo

Kate Martin

Roslyn Mazer

Page Putnam Miller

Mary Ronan

Britt Snyder

Evan Thomas 

207

Leslie Atkinson

Joyce Larkin

Steve Katz

Richard Hertling

Michelle Mrdeza
Washington, D.C., October 11, 1994

Daniel Alcorn

Martin Barkley

Max Holland

John Judge

William Kelly

James Lesar

Harrison Livingstone

Page Putnam Miller

John Newman

Charles Sanders

Peter Dale Scott

Daryll Weatherly

Mark Zaid

Dallas, Texas, November 18, 1994

Gary Aguilar

Adele E.U. Edisen

Gary Mack

Jim Marrs

Beverly Oliver Massegee

John McLaughlin

Wallace Milam

David Murrah

Steve Osborn

Roy Schaeffer

Martin Shackelford

Kenneth Smith

Philip Tenbrink

Robert Vernon

Thomas Wilson

Boston, Massachusetts, March 24, 1995

George Michael Evica

Priscilla Johnson McMillan

Philip Melanson

Dick Russell

Edgar Tatro

Steve Tilley

Richard Trask

New Orleans, Louisiana, June 28, 1995

The Honorable Lindy Boggs

The Honorable Harry F. Connick, Sr.

Wayne Everard

Michael Kurtz

Steve Tilley

Stephen Tyler

Cynthia Anne Wegmann

Washington, D.C., August 6, 1996

Barry Harrelson

John Pereira

Steve Tilley

Los Angeles, California, September 17, 1996

David Belin

James DiEugenio

Eric Hamburg

Wesley Liebeler

David Lifton

James Rankin

Robert Tanenbaum

Steve Tilley

Washington D.C., Wednesday, April 2, 1997

Robert Brauneis

Debra Conway

James Lesar

Art Simon

Josiah Thompson

Richard Trask

Moses Weitzman

Witnesses at Public Hearings of the Assassination Records Review Board

208

The Review Board would also like to thank the many private citizens with whom it maintained

contact throughout its tenure. We thank you for your interest, your suggestions, and your support.