IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Warwick Township :

:

v. : No. 2071 C .D. 20 1 6

: Argu ed: June 8 , 20 1 7 Jaime Winters and Jason Winters, :

Appellants :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Ju dge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE PELLEGRINI FILED: July 21, 2017

Jaime Winters and Jason Winters (collectively, the Winters) , husband

and wife, appeal from an order of the Court o f Common Pleas of Chester County

(trial court) denying their post

- trial motion and entering judgment against them for
$19,651.49, consisting of a $500 fine

, a $148.50 filing fee as well as $19,002.99 in

attorney fees relating to their violation of the Warw ick Township (Township) Zoning

Ordinance (Ordinance).

I.

The Winters own property located at 423 Rock Run Road, Pottstown,
Pennsylvania (property) but do not reside there. The property is located in the R

- 3
residential zoning d istrict of the Township an d contains a single

- family dwelling

which the Winters lease to a tenant
, as well as a two

- story “garage” that was2

renovated by a previous owner for the purpose of being used as a residence. It is
undisputed that neither the previous owners nor the Winters obtained a zoning permit
or variance to use the detached garage as a second dwelling.

On January 29, 2014, Township Zoning Officer Joseph Boulanger
(Officer Boulanger) mailed the Winters a “ Violation and Cease and Desist

Enforcement Notice ” ( Enforcement Notice ) 1 alleging that they were utilizing the
detached garage on their property as a second dwelling in violation of the Ordinance

. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 394a.) As pertinent, t he Enforcement Notice provides
for three zoning violations: conducti ng two principal uses on the same parce l in

violation of Section 1900(C) of the Ordinance ; failing to obtain a proper zoning
permit for a change in use of land or buildings without first obtaining a proper permit

in violation of Section 2101(B)&(C) of the Ordinance ; and failing to obtain a

1 As pertinent, Section 616.1 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) provides, in relevant part:

(a) If it app ears to the municipality that a violation of any zoning ordinance enacted under this act or prior enabling laws has occurred, the municipality shall initiate enforcement proceedings by sending an enforcement notice as provided in this section.

(b) The enf

orcement notice shall be sent to the owner of record of the parcel on which the violation has occurred, to any person who has filed a written request to receive enforcement notices regarding that parcel, and to any other person requested in writing by the owner of
record.

A ct of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended , 53 P.S. §§ 10101

– 11202; Section 616

. 1 (a),(b) of the
MPC was added by Section 60 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 55 P.S. §
10616.1 (a),(b)

.3

certificate of occupancy in violation of Section 2104(B) of the Ordinance

. The

Enforcement Notice further advised, “ 

### Therefore you are 

### hereby 

### directed to cease

and 

### desist this 

### activity within fifteen (15) days

. ” (R.R. at 395a) (emphasis in
original). The Enforcement Notice went on to provide:

Failure to discontinue the above violations within the time frame specified, unless an appeal of this Notice of Violation has been filed with the Zoning Hearing Board, constitutes a violation of the Township Zoning Ordinance. Violation of the Zoning Ordinance may result in the institution of [a] civil enforcement proceeding before a District Justice where the district Just ice may impose a Civil Penalty of up to Five hundred ($500.0 0) dollars plus court costs, inc luding the Township's attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result of such action. Each day that the violation continues shall constitute a separate violation and may subject you to a daily fine. The Township may also institute o ther appropriate action at law or in equity which may be necessary to enforce the provisions of the Zoning Ordinance.

* * *

Please be advised that you have the right to appeal this Notice of Violation and Cease and Desist Order in writing to the Township Zoning Hearing Board within thirty (30) days if you believe that I have misinterpreted or misapplied the Zoning Ordinance.

(R.R. at 395a

- 396a

. )

The Winters did not appeal the Enforcement Notice to the Township
Zoning Hearing Board ( ZHB )

, choosing to f orego the associated costs of an appeal

, and instead directly contacted Officer Boulanger about the alleged violations. During4

those discussions

, the Winters repeatedly denied using the garage as a dwelling and

insisted that there was no violation that th ey could “cease and desist

. ” However,
Officer Boulanger was unable to confirm the veracity of the Winters’ protestations

because they prohibited him or any other Township official from coming onto their

property.

On July 10, 2014, almost seven months af ter serving the Enforcement

Notice

, the Township f

iled a n enforcement action i n the magisterial district court
seeking civil penalties and attorney fees

. 2 In response, in August 2014, th e Winters

allowed Officer Boulanger onto their property, but prohibit ed him from taking any
pictures. Officer Boulanger was, however, provided with photographs taken prior to
the inspection

.

The Si te Visit Report (Report) generated as a result of Officer
Boulanger’s visit provides that the property’s detached “garage” is actually a two

story accessory structure with a metered electrical system. The garag e’s ground floor

i s unfinished and pr imarily used for storage, but contains a fully functioning washing
machine and dryer as well as a gas

- fired furnace heat system that serves the upper

floor via a forced air duct system

. No overhead gara ge door provides access to the
ground floor space.

2 Section 617.1 of the MPC provides that ma gisterial district courts “shall have initial jurisdiction over proceedings brought under section 617.2.” 53 P.S. § 10617.1. Section 617.2(a) of the MPC authorizes a municipality to commence an action seeking civil penalties for violations of a zoning or dinance. 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a).5

The garage’s upper floor is accessed through stairs on the side of the
building opposite the driveway. This floor has both electrici ty and heating and is
completely finished with hardwood floors , tiling and walls that are dry

- walled and
painted. There is a bathroom with a tile shower area, but no fixtures were in place at
the time of the inspection

. Adjacent to the bathroom appear s t o be a bedroom that

has a built

- in closet . This room contains a mattress and bed frame

, several

containers

, some books and personal items

, as well as an unconnected gas

range / stove

. The upper floor also has a kitchen area that contains an installed air

c onditioning unit, cabinets in an “L” shape and wire shelving containing household

items. There appears to be a living room and/or office area, which contains two
sofas, a large flat panel television connected to the cable wall outlet, and a folding

table and desk chair. On the table at the time was a computer printer and stacks of

papers

. The Report further notes:

Much of the paperwork that was readily visible had letterhead for a company called North American Roofing. To the best of our knowledge, nei ther Mr. n or Mrs. Winters works for this company. During the inspecti on Mr. Winters was asked if all the items in the structure were his. He stated “ No, most of it belongs to a friend but some of it was his

. ” There is also a Jeep Wrangler parked in the driveway adjacent to the structure, whi ch Mr. Winters stated belonged
to a friend, which is not the tenant of the main house. The Jeep does not have a valid inspection or registration sticker on the license plate.

(R.R. at 146a

. )

Based on Officer Boul anger’s observations and “ numerous pictures that

document someone with a white pick

- up truck parked in the driveway directly6

adjacent to the structure on many n ights until the n ext morning, it is difficult to

conclude that someone isn’t using the space for sleeping and general habitation.

. . . I

believe th at the citations issued against the [Winters] are valid .” ( Id. )

On October 13, 2014, the magisterial district ju dge entered a default
judgment against the Winters for $648.50, consisting of a $500 fin e plus $148.50 in

fees and costs. However, because the judgment failed to award reasonable attorney

fees

, 3 o n November 13, 2014, the Township appealed

.

II.

A.
In December 2014, the Township filed a complaint, later amended,
seeking “ an amount of $500, p lus court costs and attorneys’ fees, including at least
$4,783 incurred up to the hearing before the M agisterial District Justice [sic] and all
reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in pursuing this appeal.” (R.R. at 49a.) In

response, t he Winters filed an Answer , New Matter and Counterclaim, denying that

t he garage w as used as a second dwelling, alleging that the enforcement action was

the result of “ personal animosity ” and seeking judgment in their favor, legal costs and
fees, as well as emotional and pun itive damages. (R.R. at 75a.) Following
preliminary objections by t he Township and responses thereto, o n May 15, 2015, the

trial court su s tain ed those objections and dismissed the Winters’ New Matter and

3 Section 617.2(a) of the MPC expressly provides that any person found liable for violating a zoning ordinance “shall .

. . pay a judgment of not more than $500 plus all court costs, including reasonable attorney fees incur red by a municipality as a result thereof.” 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a); accord Township of South Whitehall v. Karoly, 891 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).7

Counterclaim “ without prejudice to replead [ sic ] w ithin twenty (20) days of entry of

this Order

. ” (R.R. at 125a.)

The Winters then filed an Amended New Matter and Amended

Counterclaim, c ontending that the Township’s enforcement action is “ unenforceable
and not effective,” (R.R. at 126a) and that the en forcement action was the result of
personal animosity. Once more, they sought judgment in their favor, costs and fees
associated with litigation

, as well as emotional and punitive damages

. 4 Following
another round of preliminary objections and responses, o n No vember 6, 2015, the

trial court entered an order sustaining the objections and dismissing the Amended

New Matter and Amended Counte rcla im. The trial court noted :

Defendants’ Amended New Matter and Amended Counterclaim attempt to allege that the Tow nship’ s Enforcement Action was “ unenforceable and not effective”

. However, once a landowner has been given notice of a zoning violation pursuant to the [ MPC ] , that landowner can only contest the asserted violations by way o f an appeal to the municipality’ s zoning hearing board. Defendants failed to appeal the Cease and Desist Notice to the Warwick Township Zoning Hearing Board. In addition, with regard to the validity of the Notice itself , we find that it complies with 53 P.S. §10616.1(c). Given our res olution of Plaintiffs ’ first Objection, we do not reach the remaining Objections.

4 The Winters do not raise any issues relating to claims of bad faith, including the allegedly high cost s for appealing the Enforcement Notice. See Raum v. Board of Supervisors of Tredyffrin Township

, 370 A.2d 777 ( Pa. Cmwlth. 1976); see also Highway Materials, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Whitemarsh Township , 974 A.2d 539 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)

.8

(R.R. at 209a ) (internal citations omitted).

B.

O n April 28, 2016, the trial court held a de novo hearing because the
Winters refused to stipulate to limiting the de novo appeal to whether the Townshi p was entitled to attorney fees “ incurred in prosecuting this matter over the past two

years, two months, and thirty days .” (R.R. at 225a.)

Before the trial court, t he Township offered the testimony of Officer
Boulanger , th e Township Z oning O fficer who issued the Enforcement Notice and
inspected the garage

. Officer Boulanger testified that his investigation began after he

received a complaint from the Winters’ neighbor, who later provided photographs
relating to the garage’ s use as a second dwelling

. Officer Boulanger stated that after

he issued the Enforcement Notice, Mrs. Winters called him denying the violation. At
no time during these conversations did Officer Boulanger tell Mrs. Winters that she
did not need to appeal the Enforcement Notice. He did, however, ask to inspect the

property to confirm Mrs. Winters’ protestations or to see whether the activity ceased

and desisted

. Mrs. Winters denied that request.

In August 2014, Officer Boulanger finally inspected the g arage. After
testifying about his observations during this inspection, which mirror those made in

his Report, Officer Boulanger then concluded “ that the structure, to our determination

after the site visit, was still being used as a second residence on th e property. ” (R.R.

at 294a.) When asked how he could be certain that someone was living in the garage

, Officer Boulanger explained :9

Because it appeared that somebody was living there. There

was a TV. There was a couch. There were chairs. There

was a table set up with all kinds of business documentation that does not relate to Mr. Winters’ business. There was a bed and a box spring and bed frame in the bedroom. [There] were numerous boxes stacked up in a closet. There were also numerous piles of

-- I'm not sure what, but for some reason it was felt they had to be covered up. There was all kinds of other stuff on the storage racks there that Mr. Winters stated was not his. So, there’s a separate electric service there. There were air conditioners i n the windows. There’ s a central heating system that doesn’t serve the first floor, but serves the second floor only. There’ s a washer and a dryer in the first floor. There’ s a smoke detector, I believe. There’ s functioning lighting. If it walks like a duck and looks like a duck, usually it is a duck.

(R.R. at 321a

- 322a

. ) 5

Mr. Winters also provided testimony at this hearing. As pertinent, he

t estified that the garage was never used a s a dwelling but instead for storage space by

the Winters and a f

riend. Mr. Winters denied that anyone has ever slept in the
garage, although he admitted to going to the garage with other people several times a
week to “watch football games and baseball games and relax and watch TV and have

a couple drinks. ” (R.R. at 347a.) Mr. Winters explained that he and his wife refused
an inspection following the Enforcement Notice because they “ were getting ready to

5 Regar din g the assessment of attorney fees, the Township also offered the testimony of Patrick McKenna, who serves as a solicitor in a number of municipalities in Chester County, including Warwick Towns hip. Mr. McKenna admitted that there were several entries in t he
itemized bill submitted for attorney fees relating to Pennsylvania Uniform Construction Code (UCC)

, 34 Pa. Code §§ 401.1

– 405.42, viol ations against the Winters that were dismissed by the magisterial district judge. (R.R. at 334a.)10

go on vacation for several weeks ” and did not come back until late February. (R.R. at

344a.) He explained that t hey did not appeal the Enforcement Notice because “Joe
Boulanger said that you don’ t have to, and so did the supervisors .” (R.R. at 354a.)
They also did not contact the Township after their vacation because they assumed the

matter was “just water under t he bridge.” (R.R. at 355a.) Mr. Winters admits that

s ince Officer Boulanger’s visit , the garage has remained substantially the same.

On July 19, 2016, the t rial c ourt issued a verdict against the Winters for

an amount totaling $19,651.49, consisting of a $500 fine

, $148.50 in filing fees as

well as $19,002.99 in attorney fees. 6 Shortly thereafter

, the Winters filed po st

- trial

motions for “ a new trial and/or a Judgment N.O.V. and/or limit the amount of
attorney fees in an amount to be determined reasona ble at the time of the District
Justice Hearing. ” (R.R. at 404a.) On November 22, 2016, the trial court issued an
order denying these motions, reasoning:

The record is clear that the noticed violations by the Township continued past the fifteen (15) day cease and desist period set forth in the [Enforcement Notice]

. The evidence presented by the Township establishes that the garage was used as a residence or a business office by someone other than the Winters in violation of Township ordinances after the fifteen (15) day cease and desist period. . . . [T] here is sufficient evidence that the garage continued to be used in violation of the Township ordinances by

6 Given that it was undisputed that the Winters did not appeal the Enforcement Notice, we are nonplussed as to why the Township did not file for judgment on the pleadings when the appeal was taken. See, e.g.

, Lower Mount Bethel Township v. North River Co., LLC , 41 A.3d 156, 161 (Pa. Cmwlth . 2012) (holding that trial court did not err when granting judgment on the pleadings where the property owners failed to appeal an enforcement notice to the ZHB). However, the Winters do

not take issue with that failure

.11

someone other than the Winters after the fifteen (15) day cease and desist period. Evidence co ntrary presented by Jason Winters at trial was not found to be credible. After the i ssuance of the Notice of Violation, and despite Defendants [’] protestations that there was no ongoing violation of the zoning ordinances as set forth in the Notice, the To wnship was denied access to the property for months when seeking to conduct an inspection to insure compliance with Township ordinances. When Township officials eventually were able to gain access in order to conduct the inspection, there was evidence of habitation of the structure and use of it as an office by someone other than the Winters.

. . .
In addition, the [Enforcement Notice] provided the Winters with fifteen (15) days within which to cease and desist the noticed violation activity. The Notice is sufficiently specific to inform the Winters that they were in violation and had fifteen (15) days within which to cease any activity in violation of Township ordinances as noticed. Furthermore, the Notice also informed the Winters that they could chall enge the zoning violation determination by appealing to the Township Zoning Hearing Board. A fair reading of the Notic e suggests that any activity in violation of the Township zoning laws cited in the Notice outside of fifteen (15) days would be subject t o civil enforcement proceedings and a civil penalty of up to $500 per day per violation, plus costs. The Winters’ failure to appeal because they took the position that there were no ongoing zoning ordinance violations does not preclude the Township from i nitiating enforcement proceedings. An appeal to the ZHB by the Winters would challenge whether there was a violation of the zo ning ordinance as noticed, and whether the notice of violation was sufficient. Failure to appeal waives these issues. See Towns hip of Penn v. Seymour , 708 A.2d 861 (Pa. Cmw1th 1998); Moon Township v. Cammel

, 687 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Cmwl th 1997). Therefore, the only question before this court is whether the penalty imposed
was proper. The Township sought enforcement for only 1 day of violation on only 1 noticed zoning provision ($500 plus costs). This penalty is proper.12

Finally, the Township ’ s attorneys’ fees, although significant when compared to the fine and costs involved, are warranted pursuant to 53 P.S. § 10617.2 and were estab lished by competent evidence. See Lower Mount Bethel Township v. North River Company, LLC , 41 A.3d 156 [ ( Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) ]

.

(R.R. at 497a

- 498a.) This appeal by the Winters followed

. 7

II I

. A.
On appeal, the Winters contend that the Township ’s enforce ment action

is invalid because the Enforcement Notice was defective and deprived them of the
ability to appeal to the ZHB. As best as we can discern, this is because the

Enforcement Notice allegedly failed to inform the Winters that they needed to appeal

to the ZHB

, regardless of whether they stopped using the garage as a dwelling.

Section 616 .1 (c ) of the MPC provides that an enforcement notice shall
state at least the following:

(1) The name of the owner of record and any other person against whom the municipality intends to take action.

(2) The location of the property in violation.

7 When reviewing the trial court’ s denial of post

- trial motions, our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Commonwealth ex rel. Corbett v. Manson, 903 A.2d 69, 73 n. 4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).13

(3) The specific violation with a description of the requirements which have not been met, citing in each instance the applicable provisions of the ordinance.

(4) The da te before which the steps for compliance must be commenced and the date before which the steps must be completed.

(5) That the recipient of the notice has the right to appeal to the zoning hearing board within a prescribed period of time in accordance wit h procedures set forth in the ordinance.

(6) That failure to comply with the notice within the time specified, unless extended by appeal to the zoning hearing board, constitutes a violation, with possible sanctions clearly described.

53 P.S. § 10616.1 (c )

. We have explained that a township cannot initiate a civil
enforcement proceeding or collect civil penalties under Section 617.2 of the MPC , 53

P.S. § 10617.2, unless the enforcement notice satisfies the se requirements

. See , e.g. , City of Erie v. Freit us , 681 A.2d 840 , 842 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)

.

Contrary to the Winters’ protestations , t he Enforcement Notice complies
with all the requirements set forth in Section 616.1 (c) of the MPC. It is addressed to
the Winters, identifies the garage and outline s the specific provisions of the

O rdinance in violation. The Enforcement Notice also directs them to stop the
violating use within 15 days or

, in the alternative, advises that they had the right to
appeal to the ZHB “ within thirty (30) days if you believe that I have misinterpreted or misapplied the Zoning Ordinance. ” (R.R. at 396.) “ Failure to discontinue the above
violations within the time frame specified, unless an appeal of this Notice of
Violation has been filed with the Zoning Hearing Board, constitutes a violation of the
Township Zoning Ordinance. ” (R.R. at 395.)14

In any event

, the Winters cannot in good faith argue that the
Enforcement Notice deprived them of an appeal to the ZHB. By th eir own
admission, the Winters declined to appeal to the ZHB for financial reasons.

Moreover, their adamant refusal to accept that they used the garage as a dwelling
belies any assertion that they attempted to “cease and desist” that violation . Because

the Winters were clearly of the belief that Officer Boulanger “mis interpreted or misapplied the Zoning Ordinance

, ” (R.R. at 396a) they were informed of their right to

app eal to the ZHB within 30 days.

B.

T he Winters also contend that the trial court abused its discretion when
imposing a one day fine for violating t he O rdinance because “[t]he overwhelming
weight of evidence in this case is that the [garage] was not used by the Winters as a
‘second dwelling’ after the issuance of the Notice.” (The Winters’ Brief at 20.)
However, we have explained:

If a landowner does n ot appeal a zoning violation notice to the zoning hearing board, the failure to appeal renders the violation notice unassailable

. Therefore, in the event a landowner does not appeal to the zoning hearing board and the municipality files an enforcement act ion with a district justice, neither the district justice nor a common pleas court may conduct a de novo review of the question of whether the landowner violated the zoning ordinance. In that circumstance, the only question before the district justice and the Common Pleas Court is whether the penalty imposed for the violation was proper.

Township of Penn v. Seymour , 708 A.2d 861, 864

– 65 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (emphasis

added). Because the Winters admit to receiving the Enforcement Notice from which15

they nev er appealed, that Enforcement Notice resulted in a conclusive determination
that their use of the garage was a violation of the Ordinance.

In any event

, the evidence shows that the garage was used as a dwelling

15 day s after service of the Enforcement No tice. Officer Boulanger’s testimony,
along with the Report and photos that he offered, all le a d to the conclusion that the
garage was being used as a dwelling well beyond the cease and desist period

, and Mr.
Winters admits that since Officer Boulanger’s v isit, the garage has remained
substantially the same. The trial court also found any contrary testimony and
evidence provided by the Winters not to be credible. Because the “ weight to accord
to evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or

none of the evidence and to determin e the credibility of witnesses, ” we will not

disturb the trial court’s determination. Rising Sun Entertainment, Inc. v.

Commonwealth , 829 A.2d 1214, 1219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v.

Small , 741 A.2d 666, 672 (Pa. 1999)).

IV

.

Finally, the Winters contend that the trial court erred in awarding

$ 19,002.99 in attorney fees when the Township only took the appeal to collect $4,783
in attorney fees resulting up until the de novo appeal

. 8 T he Winters also contend that
“the fees collected for the violation of zoning ordinances must be a figure even lower
than $4,783.00, because that figure included attorney time for the consultation,

8 Be yond those fees resulting from the Township’s prosecution of alleged UCC violations,

t he Winters do not specifically articulate what attorney fees and c osts contained in the Township’s
invoices are unreasonable

.16

preparation of notices and pleadings, and prosecution of alleged UCC violations,
upon which the Township did not prevail.” (The Winters’ Brief at 28

- 29 .) We have
explained:

Section 617.2(a) of the [MPC] provides that any person

who has violated the provisions of a zoning ordinance enacted under the MPC “ shal l , upon being found liable therefor in a civil enforcement proceeding commenced by a municipality, pay .

. . reasonable attorney fees incurred by a municipality as a result thereof.” 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a) (emphasis added). “[A]n award of costs and attorne y fees pursuant to [s]ection 10617.2 [sic] of the MPC is not limited to costs and fees incurred as a result of the action before the district justice but includes all costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of the violation.” Borough of Bradford Wood s v. Platts , 799 A.2d 984, 991 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Whether an award of attorney fees is reasonable depends upon “the amount of work performed, the character of services rendered, the difficulty of the problems involved, and the professional skill and stan ding of the attorney in the profession.” Township of South Whitehall v. Karoly , 891 A.2d 780, 784 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). The trial court has discretion to decide the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees, and an appellate court s hould not alter the tr ial court’ s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Borough of Bradford Woods , 799 A.2d at 991.

Lower Mount Bethel Township v. Gacki , 150 A.3d 575, 581 (Pa. Cmwlth . 2016)
(emphasis in original)

.

Although a township or municipality is entitl ed to attorney fees incurred
on appeal

, see Platts , 799 A.2d at 991 , what complicates this matter is that a de novo
appeal was made by the Township for the collection of fees that should have been
awarded by the district judge

. Notwithstanding, the appeal invol ved more than the17

recoupment of fees because the Winters refused to stipulate to a hearing solely on that

issue and , instead, made numerous filings challenging the validity of the enforcement
proceeding. Accordingly, the issue is whe n can attorney fees re sulting from an
appeal for attorney fees constitute “ costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of the

violation.” See Platts , 799 A.2d at 991 ; see also 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a )

.

If

, at the outset of the appeal, the parties stipulated to limit the trial

c ourt’s hearing to the collection of attorney fees, it would be clear that any costs
advanced by the Township would not be borne by the W inters because the appeal was

not for the enforcement of a zoning violation

. Notwithstanding

, once t he Winters

refused to stipulate to the scope of the appeal and challenged the entire en forcement
action, the Township was stuck with having to present the merits of the case at the de

novo hearing

.

The Winters also challenge any fees awarded for pursuit of fees incurred

in enforcing the violations regar ding the UCC

. Because

, under Section 617.2(a) of

the MPC

, attorney fees can only be awarded for enforcement proceedings brought to
enforce provisions of a zoning code, to the exten t that any fees were awarded to
enforce prov isions of the UCC , those fees are improper.

Given all of the above, we affirm in part the trial court’s order, but
vacate that portion of the order awarding the Township attorney fees and costs.
Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instruction to recalculate the amount
of attorney fees and costs that the Township incurred as a result of the Winters’18

zoning violation, excluding those fees expended solely for the purpose of collecting
attorney fees or prosecuting alleged UCC violations.

__ ______________________________ DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior JudgeIN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Warwick Township :

:

v. : No. 2071 C .D. 201 6

: Jaime Winters and Jason Winters, :

Appellants :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 2 1 s t day of July , 2017, it is hereby ordered that the

Court of Common Pleas of Chester County ’s (trial court) order dated November

22, 2016, is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and this matter is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings consi stent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

________________________________ DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior JudgeIN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Warwick Township :

:

v. : No. 2071 C.D. 2016

: Argued : June 8, 2017 Jaime Winters and Jason Winters

, : Appella nt s :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: July 21, 2017

I join the Majority’s well

- written opinion regarding the attorney fees and the
adequacy of the “Violation and Cease and Desist Enforcement N otice ”

(Enforcement Notice) issued by Warwick Township. I also agree with the
Majority that a landowner’s failure to appeal an enforcement notice to the zoning
hearing boar d precludes the owner from challenging whether there was a zoning

violation on the date of the e nforcement n otice. I write separately because I agree

with the Winters that the Enforcement Notice issued in this case is ambiguous
about whether timely compliance with the Enforcement Notice would still subject

an owner to enforcement remedies

. The Majority explains that “[i]f a landowner does not appeal a zoning
violation notice to the zoning hearing board, the failure to appeal renders theRCJ

- 2

violation not ice unassailable,” and that “neither the district justice nor a common
pleas court may conduct a de novo review of the question of whether the
landowner violated the zoning ordinance.” (Majority Op. at 14 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Twp. of Penn v. Seymou r , 708 A.2d 861, 864

- 65 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) ) .)

Moreover, a landowner “can contest the asserted [zoning] violations only by way
of appeal to the municipality’s zoning hearing board and cannot merely defend the
charge when the municipality seeks ordinance vi olation fines before a district
justice.” City of Erie v. Freitus , 681 A.2d 840, 842 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (citing
Johnston v. Upper Macungie Twp. , 638 A.2d 408 , 410 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)).
However, Section 616.1(c)(6) of the Pennsylvania M unicipalities P lanni ng C ode

(MPC) 1 also requires enforcement notices to state that “ failure to comply with the
notice within the time specified , unless extended by appeal to the zoning hearing
board, constitutes a violation.” 53 P.S. § 10616.1(c)(6) (emphasis added). This

C ourt has explained that “ [i]f after receiving an enforcement notice, the landowner

continues to violate the zoning ordinance without appealing the enforcement
notice, Section 616.1(c)(6) of the MPC . . . dictates a conclusive determination of

violation . . . .” Woll v. Monaghan Twp. , 948 A.2d 933, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 200 8 )

( bold emphasis added , italics omitted ).

In both Seymour and Johnston , this Court found th ose landowners’ failures
to appeal to the zoning hearing board rendered their enforcement notices
unassailable. In both cases, the landowners also failed to comply with the

enforcement notices. In Seymour

, a landowner refused to bring the number of dogs
on his property into compliance with the zoning limit and then sought to challenge

1 Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, added by Section 60 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, as amended , 53 P.S. § 10616.1 (c)(6)

.RCJ

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the or dinance’s constitutionality before the court of common pleas and before this
Court on appeal. In Johnston

, landowner s failed to comply with the notice by
continuing to use their residential property for business purposes past the specified

deadline. Such failure to timely comply, coupled with the failure to appeal,

rendered their enforcement notices unassailable, precluding them from the ability

to contest the asserted violations.
Relevant to this discussion, the Enforcement Notice here states that “you are in violation of [] the Warwick Township Zoning Ordinance . . .

. ” (R.R. at 52a.) It
also states in large, bold print: “you are hereby directed to cease and desist this
activity within fifteen (15) days.” ( Id. at 53 a .) With regard to penalties for the
zoning violations, the Enforcement N otice provides :

F ailure to discontinue the above violations within the time frame specified, unless an appeal of this Notice of Violation has been filed with the Zoning Hearing Board, co nstitutes a violation of the Township Zoning Ordinance. Violation of the Zoning Ordinance may result in the institution of civil enforcement proceeding befo re a District Justice where the [D] istrict Justice may impos e a Civil Penalty of up to Five hundred ($500.00) dollars plus court costs, including the Township’s attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result of such action. Each day that the violation continues shall constitute a separate violation and may subject you to a daily fine.
( Id

. ( e mphasis added). )

O ne interpretation of this Enforcement Notice is that it is the failure to
discontinue the zoning violation that will subject the owner to sanction and that
discontinuing the viol ation within the time specified will not. Thus, although a

landowner who d oes not appeal the Enforcement Notice and takes the affirmative
steps required to discontinue the violation effectually concedes that a violation
existed on his property at the time the notice was issued , it does not appear , based
upon the language used in the Township’s Enforcement Notice, that the landownerRCJ

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will be subject to sanction

. 2 Moreover, if he seeks to present evidence of his timely
compliance in a ny subsequent enforcement action against him, it would be
inaccurate to say that he “contest [ s ] the asserted violations

. ” Freitus , 681 A.2d at

842 (emphasis added). Rather, he would contest that he h a s no t complied with the

Enforcement Notice . His decision to comply

, and not appeal, should not preclude
him from presenting such evidence. T he magister ial district judge would then
make a factual inquiry into whether the landowner discontinue d the violation
within the time period specified by the violation notice in order to determine
whether the landowner is liable for continuing violations

. Th e ambiguity over whether timely compliance with th is Enforcement

Notice protects a landowner from sanctions does not aid the Winters in the present
case. Here, although the Winters attempt to argue that “after receipt of the Notice,

the Structure was not us ed as a dwelling,” ( s ee Appellant s ’ Br. at 13), the Majority
correctly points out that the Winters’ “adamant refusal to accept that they used the
garage as a dwelling belies any assertion that they attempted to ‘cease and desist’
that violation.” (Majorit y Op. at 14.) The Winters do not provide any evidence or
testimony that they took affirmative steps to change their property within the
period outlined in the violation notice. In effect, although they did also argue that
they “ceased and desisted,” give n these facts, the Winters are really seek ing to collaterally contest the Township’s application of the Enforcement N otice itself.

Thus, any confusion arising from the Enforcement Notice regarding the effect of
compliance is not applicable.

________ _____________________________ RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

2 Because this Enforcement Notice involves the imposition of a penalty, I believe the Rule of Lenity is applicable to our interpretation.