UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Todd M. Ladson, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil No. 14-cv-001586 (APM) ) The George Washington University, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Todd M. Ladson filed this lawsuit against his former employer, Defendant The George Washington University (“GW” or “the University”), allegi ng that he was terminated from his position as a campus police officer due to: (1) race discri mination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the D.C. Hu man Rights Act; and (2) age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employ ment Act and the D.C. Human Rights Act. This lawsuit stems from a complaint made in March 2013, when Plaintiff, a 24-veteran of the GW campus police, was accused by a fellow officer of mak ing inappropriate comments about her sexual preference and activities. The University ini tiated a months-long investigation into the complaint, which uncovered more evidence of inappropri ate comments by Plaintiff. Defendant ultimately determined t hat Plaintiff’s behavior viola ted the University ’s policy against sexual harassment and created a hostile work environment for hi s colleagues. In September 2013, Plaintiff was terminated from his position. Plaintiff views these events differently. He denies making th e comments in question and argues that, even if he did, they were not harassing and discri minatory, but rather were innocent2 and misinterpreted. He further argues that the University’s in vestigation was unfair and one-sided. Finally, Plaintiff contends that the University terminated him due to his race and age while it failed to punish other instances of similar, or more egregious, conduc t by white officers and younger officers. The court now considers Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgmen t. Having reviewed the parties’ briefing and the evidence, the court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that George Washington University discriminated against Plaintiff ba sed on his race or his age when it terminated him. The court there fore grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. The Complaint Against Officer Ladson Plaintiff Todd Ladson began working at The George Washington Un iversity (“GW” or “the University”) in 1989. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ . J., ECF No. 15 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n], at 8. By 2013, Plaintiff was serving a supervisory rol e as a Master Patrol Officer in GW’s police force. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 14 [hereinafte r Def.’s Mot.], Def.’s Stmt. of Material Facts, ECF No. 14-2 [her einafter Def.’s Stmt.], ¶ 1; P l.’s Opp’n, Stmt. of Material Facts in Dispute, ECF No. 15-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Stmt.], ¶ 1. In Ma rch 2013, one of Plaintiff’s colleagues, GW police officer Tiffany Justice, complained to th e University that Plaintiff had made inappropriate comments about her sexual preference and activiti es. Def.’s Mot, Ex. 1, March 27, 2013, Email from Tiffany Justice to Tara Pereira, ECF No. 14-3 [hereinafter Justice Email]. Specifically, Officer Justice alleged that Plaintiff had made t hree inappropriate remarks, namely: (1) he made comments to Officer Linda Queen regarding her (Quee n’s) sexuality and suggesting that she was sexually involved with Officer Justice; (2) he sug gested to another officer that Officer3 Justice was “one of you,” there by implying that Officer Justice was a lesbian; and (3) he warned a new officer that she will “have men and women after her.” Just ice Email at 1; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 2; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 2. GW prohibits sexual harassment by its employees. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4;
see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2, Interim Sexual Harassment and Sexual Viole nce Policy and Procedures, ECF No. 14-4. 1 Pursuant to its policy, upon r eceiving Officer Justice’s comp laint against Plaintiff, GW began an investigation into Plaintiff’s c omments. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 9. Plaintiff was suspended with pay on April 2, 2013, “pending an investigation regarding recent allegations that you have been improperly making unwante d comments of a sexual nature about a co-worker and her private life.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 7, L etter to Officer Ladson from Chief Kevin Hay, April 2, 2013, ECF No. 14-9.
2. The Investigation by GW Into Officer Ladson’s Comments Tara Pereira, GW’s then-Assistan t Title IX Coordinator and Dire ctor of Campus Inclusion Initiatives, received the initial complaint from Officer Justic e and conducted the investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged comments. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 10, Email from Tara Pereira to Officer Ladson, April 3, 2013, ECF No. 14-12. As part of her investigation, Ms . Pereira interviewed approximately 13 people and met with Plaintiff multiple times. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 13-14; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 13-14. Through her efforts, Ms. Pereira learned—among other things—tha t Plaintiff had made “lots of racist and sexually graphic” comments; that he had new officer trainees “bark like a dog” as they crawled through a small tunnel; and that he had taught an offic er how to smoke marijuana without being caught. Officer Justice, in particular, told Ms. Pereira that Plaintiff’s comments “impacted

1 Plaintiff was well-aware of his employer’s policy prohibiting sexual harassment and had attended a training on preventing harassment as recently as March 2013. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 5-8; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 5-8; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6, Preventing Harassment Certificate of Completion, ECF No. 14-8.4 her safety, her environment, her work performance, and the cult ure of [Plaintiff’s] shifts.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 9, Dep. of Tara Pereira, ECF No. 14-11 [hereinafter P ereira Dep.], at 61-75. Officer Justice further reported that Plaintiff’s comments “mak[e] it h ard to come to work,” and that Plaintiff had once asked her “[w]hy are you staring at me? Do I owe you child support?” Def.’s Mot., Ex 12, Pereira Investigation Notes, ECF No. 14-14. When Plaintiff and his union representative met with Ms. Perei ra as part of the investigation, he denied making these comments and suggested th at the witnesses who had come forward were lying because they were jealous of him for “making the most overtime” and being “very popular” and a “happy-go-lu cky person.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 3, Dep. of Todd Ladson, ECF No. 14-5 [hereinafter Ladson De p.], at 85-86. However, Plainti ff was unable to point to any evidence to corroborate his claim that the officers who had tes tified against him were jealous of him, id . at 86, or that his accusers had lied during the investigation , id . at 95. At the conclusion of her investigation, Ms. Pereira found thatPlaintiff’s conduct was “longstanding” and “pervasive” and had impacted numerous officers. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 33; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 22; Pereira Dep. at 100. Aft er the investigation, Plaintiff and his union representative met with Ms. Pereira and Kevin Hay, Chief of the GW Police Department. Def.’s Stmt ¶ 34; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 22. The parties were unable to reach a resolution and so, pu rsuant to University policy, Chief Hay requested that a formal hearing be held. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 15, Memorandum Requesting Formal Hearing Regarding Allegati ons Against Officer Ladson, EC F No. 14-17, at 1-2. On August 1, 2013, the University convened a Special Panel 2 to hear the complaint filed against Plaintiff alleging se xual harassment and conduct that c reated a hostile work environment.

2 The members of the Special Panel were: (1) Christopher A. Bra cey (Chair), Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Professor of Law, GW Law School; (2) Kimberly D. A cquaviva, Director of Faculty Development, and Associate Professor of Nursing, GW School of Nursing; (3) Eric Annis, Production Manager, Lisner Auditorium; (4)5 Def.’s Mot., Ex. 11, Special Panel Report Regarding Complaint A gainst Officer Todd Ladson, August 14, 2013, ECF No. 14-13 [hereinafter Special Panel Repor t], at 1. At the hearing, Chief Hay and Plaintiff made opening statements. Id . at 3. Chief Hay then presented five witnesses, including Officer Justice and Ms. Pereira. Id . Those witnesses “testified as to remarks and comments made by Officer Ladson regarding their sexuality or th e sexuality of others.” Id . at 6. The Special Panel heard numerous examples of inappropriate comm ents made by Plaintiff and their effect on his coworkers, including:

 Officer Justice testified that Plaintiff had told the parents o f another officer that their daughter was in a relations hip with Officer Justice;

 Security Officer Octavia Livingston testified that Plaintiff ha d told her that he did not approve of homosexuals and tried “ to convince her that she shou ld be with men”;

 Former Police Officer Suzanne Combs testified that she had hear d Plaintiff make negative comments following her ma rriage to her female partner in 2011;

 Security Officer Livingston testified that Plaintiff had made g raphic comments while interrogating her about her sexua l behavior. She further testi fied that she had “submit[ted] herself” to Plaintiff’s treatment and did not file a formal complaint because Plaintiff’s recommendation was critical to her own stat us as an officer in the GW Police Department;

 Officer Queen testified that Plai ntiff had inquired whether she and Officer Justice “were fucking” and recalled being told that Plaintiff described her as “crazy as shit” and that she “fucks with gi rls when she wants to”;

 Three witnesses testified that Plaintiff’s conduct made it more difficult for lesbian officers to work among and be accepted by their fellow officers , and mentioned specific ways in which that “chilling eff ect” changed their feelings or behavior; and

 Witnesses testified that they “d readed their training period” w ith Plaintiff and at least two witnesses testified that they had requested not to be assig ned to serve with Plaintiff.
Id . at 6-7.

Huda M. Ayas, Executive Director , International Medical Program s; (5) Moira E. Secrest, Business Manager, National Health Policy Forum; and (6) Joy ce M. Whitmore, Serials Acquisi tions Manager, Gelman Library.6 When it was his turn to present evidence, Plaintiff “did not . . . present any witnesses, testimony, or evidence.” Id . at 3. According to the Special Panel Report, Plaintiff was “ given multiple opportunities” to offer witnesses, testimony, or evide nce to show that the statements heard by the panel were false, but declined to do so, instead offerin g only a “blanket denial of all allegations” in his opening and closing statements. Id . at 7. Plaintiff admits that he “presented no evidence that any of the testimony [heard by the panel] was fal se.” Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 31. He complains, however, that his counsel who was present at the hearing “was n ot allowed to speak or utter a work [sic] and/or interrupt the proceedings.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. Following the hearing, the Special Panel found that there was “ample evidence” to support Officer Justice’s original allegations, along with additional e vidence of inappropriate comments made by Plaintiff. Id . at 4, 6. Those allegations led the Special Panel to conclude that “Officer Ladson’s conduct created a hostile work environment.” Id . Rather than recommend a punishment, the Report deferred to the GW Police Department to determine ho w best to sanction Plaintiff. Id

. at 7. The Report urged the GW Police Department to consider, a mong other things, “[t]he duration of Officer Ladson’s service at the University and, in particula r, his long record of relatively distinguished service” and that this was the first complaint al leging harassment brought against him. Id

. On September 4, 2013, Chief Hay sent Plaintiff a letter termina ting his employment. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 48; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 35; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 17, Notice of Termination of Employment, ECF No. 14-15, at 1. Chief Hay explained during his deposition that he had determined that Plaintiff should be fired due to the “[t]otality of circumstanc es based on the finding of the investigation conducted by Tara P ereira,” “[t]he egregiousness of the testimony given at the hearing, the fact that there was multiple victims involved, and the fact that he was essentially in a7 supervisory role as a field training officer, and as a master p atrol officer.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 24, Dep. of Kevin Hay, ECF No. 14-26 [he reinafter Hay Dep.], at 21. B. Procedural History On August 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. See Ladson v. George Washington University , Case No. 2014 CA 005029 B. Defendant removed the case to this court on September 18, 2014. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. On September 25, 2015, after discovery concluded, Defen dant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Plaintiff was not discriminated against o n the basis of his race or his age, but rather that he was terminated from his employment for a leg itimate, non-discriminatory reason, namely, multiple instances of sexual harassment in violation of University policy. See generally Def.’s Mot. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Oppositio n to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that his termination constituted d iscrimination on the basis of his race and age. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. On November 6, 2015, Defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition. See generally Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n, EC F No. 16 [hereinafter Def.’s Reply].
III. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court should grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] t he moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a)). A material fac t is one that is capable of affecting the outcome of litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing suffic ient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, [ ] on which that pa rty will bear the burden of proof at8 trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the dis trict court of the basis for its motion” and identifying those portions of the record that it believes “ demonstrate the abse nce of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Once the moving party has made an adequate showing that a fact cannot be disputed, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to “set fo rth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 250 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). The nonmoving party may oppose th e motion using “any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves, and it is from this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which [the Court has] referred.” Celotex Corp ., 477 U.S. at 324. “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable infe rences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255 (citations omitted). However, “to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must offer more than mere unsupported allegations or denials.” Dormu v. District of Columbia , 795 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D .D.C. 2011) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324). In o ther words, if the nonmovant’s evidence is “merely c olorable” or “not significantly p robative,” summary judgment may be granted. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50. Summary judgment, then, is appropriate w hen the nonmoving party fails to offer “evid ence on which the jury could r easonably find for the [nonmovant].” Id. at 252.
IV. DISCUSSION The court first considers whether a reasonable jury could concl ude that Plaintiff’s termination constituted illegal discrimination based on race. The court then turns to Plaintiff’s claim that he was terminated due to his age.9 A. Plaintiff’s Race Discrimination Claim Plaintiff claims that Defendant ’s decision to terminate him con stituted unlawful race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Ac t, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Cod e § 2-1401.01 et seq . The legal standards applicable to his claims are the same: All three “re quire proof of intentional discrimination, which may be shown by direct or indirect eviden ce.” Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2006) (citations omitted). “Wh ere, as here, the plaintiff has proffere d no direct evidence of intentional discr imination, race discrimination claims under both the DCHRA and Section 1981 are evaluated using the s ame framework as claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id . (citations omitted). Thus, the court analyzes all three race discrimination claims under the framewo rk set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Weber v. Battista , 494 F.3d 179, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2007). A Title VII plaintiff bears ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuadi ng the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally disc riminated” against him. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To proceed under the McDonnell Douglas standard, a plaintiff “must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a pr ima facie case of [race, sex, age] discrimination.” Bennett v. Solis , 729 F. Supp.2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802). However, in cases where the employer has a sserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the de cision, “the district court nee d not— and should not —decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case unde r McDonnell Douglas .” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Instead, the court “must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evi dence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non -discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the10 employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on th e basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?” Id . (citations omitted). In this case, Defendant has ass erted a legitimate, non-discrim inatory reason for terminating Plaintiff—namely, that he violat ed the University’s policy on s exual harassment. Thus, the court turns to the central issue: whether Plaintiff has produced evi dence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s sta ted reason was not the actual re ason and that instead it intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. See id . at 495. Plaintiff asserts three arguments to suggest that GW’s stated reason for firing him was pretext for racial discrimination: (1) that GW terminated Plaintiff based on “subjective” criteria; (2) that t he investigation into Plaintiff’s comments was “one-sided”; and (3) that Defendant punished white officers less harshly for similar conduct. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. The court consid ers each argument in turn.
1. Whether Plaintiff was Fired Based on Subjective Criteria Plaintiff argues that the allegations of sexual harassment brou ght against him were “vague, ambiguous, subjective and open to any thousands of possibilitie s and interpretations,” suggesting that the stated reason for his t ermination was pretext for a mo re nefarious purpose. To support this allegation, Plaintiff points to the three incidents that Office r Justice included in her initial complaint and implies that all three could have been interprete d in a non-sexual, non-offensive way. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. Plaintiff also points to the testimony of Suzanne Combs, a fellow GW police officer, who testified that Plaintiff had not made any c omments to her about her own sexual orientation, but that she had heard from her colleagues that Pl aintiff was homophobic and that “his aura and his energy” suggested tha t he held antipathy for gays. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3; see also Pl.’s Opp’n., Ex. 4, Dep. of Suzanne Combs, ECF No. 15-4 [hereinafter Combs Dep.], at 13, 28, 38. According to Plaintiff, whether his alleged comments to Officer Justice and others were offensive11 and harassing is an entirely subj ective assessment. What might be offensive and harassing to one person, he seems to argue, might be viewed as in perfectly good fun to someone else. From that questionable premise, he conten ds that his termination—based on a subjective evaluation of his behavior—is inherently “su spect.” Pl.’s Mot. at 15. Plaintiff is correct that “courts traditionally treat explanat ions that rely heavily on subjective considerations with caution.” Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr ., 156 F.3d 1284, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1998). To that end, courts should view with caution explanatio ns for employment decisions based on language such as “dedicated,” “enthusiasm,” “in terpersonal s kills,” and “being upbeat.”
See Bennett , 729 F. Supp. 2d at 66. But the court in Aka also explained that “employers may of course take subjective considerations into account in their emp loyment decisions.” Id . If an employer uses subjective criteria to make an employment decisio n but has “other, well-founded reasons” for the decision, summary judgment for the defendant m ay be appropriate. Id

. Furthermore, employers often have to make employment decisions “based on credibility assessments, circumstantial evid ence, and incomplete informatio n.” Brady , 520 F.3d at 496. If GW had fired Plaintiff based solely on Officer Combs’ view t hat Plaintiff had an “aura” and an “energy” that suggested he disapproved of homosexuals, P laintiff might have reason to complain. But Defendant’s cons ideration of Plaintiff’s well-do cumented boorish and crude behavior is not the kind of “subj ective consideration” that is cautioned against by the court in Aka

. The uncontested evidence shows that, following a wide-ranging i nvestigation, Plaintiff was fired because he was found to have repeatedly made offensive and inap propriate sexual comments to multiple colleagues, while occupying a supervisory role. Hay D ep. at 21. Officer J ustice originally complained about three statements concerning her sexuality, whi ch made her “feel disrespected, uncomfortable, and uneasy and has created a hostile work enviro nment for me.” Justice Email12 at 1. But those comments were only the tip of the iceberg. Th e subsequent investigation uncovered numerous similar comments made to multiple GW officers, includi ng Plaintiff telling a coworker he did not approve of “homosexuals”; trying to convince a cowor ker “that she should be with men – that ‘this is what G-O-D inte nded’”; using crude and inapprop riate language; and asking if female coworkers were involved sexually. Special Panel Report at 6. The University’s Title IX investigator described Plaintiff’s conduct as “one of the most significant sexual harassment cases” that she has seen. Pereira Dep. at 77, 100. The Special Panel confirmed the investigator’s findings. Special Panel Report at 5-6. There is nothing “subjective”—in the Aka sense—about the foregoing evidence, and thus there is nothing about GW’s reliance on such evidence that woul d give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. Indeed, Plaintiff admitted as much when he conceded that if, in fact, he had said the things that Officer Justice and others accused him of saying, that he should have been fired. See Ladson Dep. at 89-90 (“Q: You agree that if you said these th ings that you ’re accused of, you should very [sic] fired, rig ht? A: Yes, sir.”).
2. Whether GW’s Investigation was Unfair Next, Plaintiff contends that GW ’s investigation was “botched a nd one-sided” because GW “intentionally ignored non-colla borating evidence from other wi tnesses and also refused to interview Ladson’s witnesses.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 16. Plaintiff a lso contends that his counsel was not allowed to question witnesses at the Special Panel hearing and was “instructed not to say a word.”
Id . at 3, n. 16. It is true that an “employer’s investigation that is so unsyste matic and incomplete that a factfinder could conclude that the employer sought, not to disc over the truth, but to cover up its own discrimination can also permit a factfinder to find pretext .” Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail13 Corp. , 801 F.3d 290, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But here, Plaintiff does not in any meaningful way identify how the investigation against him was deficient, let a lone “so unsystematic and incomplete” as would enable a tr ier of fact to infer pretext. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Pereira failed to interview witnesse s that would have been favorable to him, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 11, but he does not identify any such witness by name or what such a witness would have said, see id. at 11, 16. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Pereira ignored evidence from officers who had worked with Plaintiff bu t had never heard him utter any harassing comments. See id. at 12. However, this argument is difficult to understand, as Plaintiff does not explain whether Ms. Pereira simply refused to intervie w such witnesses or whether she buried favorable evidence after interviewing them. Nor does he explain how such evidence would have either negated the specific accusations against him or bol stered his denials. See id. In any event, even if Plaintiff had identified shortcomings in the inv estigation, he canno t argue that he was prevented from calling favorable witnesses before the Speci al Panel. After all, he elected to call no witnesses. See Special Panel Report at 3, 7 (stating that Plaintiff declined t he opportunity to present witnesses, testim ony, or evidence at the hearing). Plaintiff’s assertion that the Special Panel was a “kangaroo co urt” because his counsel was unable to speak on his behalf is equally without merit. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 n.16. Whatever one thinks of university procedures that mi nimize the role of the accused’ s counsel or advisor at a hearing— and there are critics of such policies 3 —Plaintiff has not pointed to an y deviation from Defendant’s

3 See, e.g., Emily D. Safko, Are Campus Sexual Assault Tribunals Fair?: The Need for Judicial Review and Additional Due Process Protections in Light of New Case Law , 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2289, 2330 (2016) (“Congress should enact legislation that requires schools to allow students representat ion during disciplinary proceedings. In the due process and Title IX contexts, courts generally have not recognized an absolute right to attorney representation for students at school disciplinary proceedings.”); Robert B. Groholski, The Right to Representation by Counsel in University Disciplinary Proceedings: A Denial of Due Process of Law, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 739, 800 (1999) (“Given the importance of the interest at sta ke and the existence of proced ural safeguards which would reduce any burden placed on a university, the right to representation by retained counse l should be required as an element of due process in university disciplinary proceedings.”).14 established policies in this case that would give rise to an in ference of pretext. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 2, The George Washington Univ ersity Interim Sexual Harassme nt and Sexual Violence Policy and Procedures, ECF No. 14-4, at GWU 01019 (providing that “[n] o advisor, including an attorney who may be acting as an advisor, may speak on behalf of the par ty, make an opening or closing statement, present testimony or examine witnesses”).
3. Whether GW Selectively Enforced it s Sexual Harassment Policy Based on Race Lastly, Plaintiff argues that D efendant’s decision to terminate him was inconsistent with— and more harsh than—the University’s treatment of white officer s who have engaged in similar conduct. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. He points to three current or form er GW campus police officers who, according to Plaintiff, made comparable comments or committed c omparable acts but were treated with more leniency by the University: George Brittle, Reed Jon es, and Christopher Brown. Id . at 5. Plaintiff argues that, due to the similarities in their emp loyment statuses and because they too were subject to GW’s sexual harassment policy, the only explana tion for why the three officers were “treated better for doing and saying much worse” than Plai ntiff is because they are white. Id

. at 17-18. If true, Plaintiff avers that such evidence suggests that the stated reason for Plaintiff’s termination was pretext for racial discrimination. Id . The court first describes the evidence concerning these comparators, and then analyzes whether that ev idence aids Plaintiff. a. The comparators i. George Brittle Plaintiff claims that George Brittle, a white officer, referred to another officer by her badge number, “69,” which refers to a sexual position, and “made freq uent sexual comments about gay15 men.” Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 27-28. Plainti ff further contends that Officer Britt le received fiveday suspensions for those transg ressions but was never terminat ed. Id

. Evidence shows that in 1991, Officer Brittle admitted saying t o a female officer that she “still use[s] the [locker] number 69.” Def.’s Mot., Ex 18, Me morandum Regarding Verbal Counseling – Corporal George Br ittle, ECF No. 14-20 [hereinafte r Brittle Verbal Counseling Letter]. Officer Brittle apologi zed for the remark and was “co unseled and warned” by his supervisor, Captain Anthony RoccoGrande, not to make jokes or e ngage in sexual innuendo about his colleagues. Officer Brittle was involved in another incident in 2008, wher e he “made comments perceived as homophobic and racially insensitive that belittled and embarrassed [his] subordinates.” Def.’s Mot., E x. 19, Letter of Warning to Lieut enant George Brittle, ECF No. 14- 21 [hereinafter Brittle Letter of Warning]. The Letter of Warn ing also referenced a third incident in 2007 when Brittle “made a sexually coercive remark that emba rrassed” his subordinate and “created a situation of professi onal embarrassment” for the sub ordinate, for Brittle, and for the GW Police Department. Id . Brittle’s supervisor at the time, Executive Assistant Chief I som, expressed disappointment and “gre at concern” over his behavior and required that Brittle (1) apologize to his shift; (2) take a University class in dive rsity; and (3) take a departmental class on working in a diverse environment. Id

. ii. Reed Jones Plaintiff next alleges that Of ficer Reed Jones, a 26-year old w hite officer, frequently used a racial slur to refer to African-American officers, for which he was suspended but not terminated. Compl. ¶ 29. In 2012, the GW Police Department received an ano nymous complaint alleging that Officer Jones had used racial slurs in reference to people of c olor. Def.’s Mot., Ex 25, Memo.16 From Frank Demes Regarding Compl. Against Officer Reed Jones, E CF No. 14-27 [hereinafter Jones Memo]. In response to that complaint, GW began an invest igation into Officer Jones’ conduct that involved more than 42 interviews. Id . Of all the individuals interviewed, one remembered hearing Officer Jones use the actual term “racial sl ur” but no one recalled him actually uttering a racial slur. Id . The investigation determined that the complaint was “unfound ed and completely without merit.” Id

. iii. Christopher Brown Finally, Plaintiff contends that Officer Christopher Brown sexu ally harassed fellow officer Linda Queen when he asked her out on a date but was not fired f or his conduct. Ladson Dep. at 165. Plaintiff admits that he is unaware of any other allegati ons against Officer Brown. Id . at 166. An investigation by Ms. Pereira c oncluded that Officer Brown di d, in fact, ask Officer Queen and other officers to have breakfast with him in an attempt “to get to know his staff.” Pereira Dep. at
25. b. Analysis of comparator evidence “One way to discredit an employer’s justification is to show t hat similarly situated employees of a different race rece ived more favorable treatment .” Royall v. Nat'l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO , 548 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “For a plaintiff to prove that she is similarly situated to another employee, she must demonstrate th at she and the alleged similarlysituated employee ‘were charged with offenses of comparable ser iousness,’ and ‘that all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were nearly identi cal to those of the other employee.’” Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 812 F.3d 1109, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Burley , 801 F.3d at 301 (a lteration omitted)). “Fa ctors that bear on whether someone is an appropriate comparator include the similarity of the plainti ff’s and the putative comparator’s17 job and job duties, whether they were disciplined by the same s upervisor, and, in cases involving discipline, the similarity of their offenses.” Id. at 1116 (quoting Burley , 801 F.3d at 301) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these principles, not one of the three GW campus poli ce officers identified by Plaintiff is a valid comparator. Beginning with former Officer Brittle, he cannot be considered a comparator to Plaintiff because he was not supervised by Chief Hay. See Wheeler , 812 F.3d at 1116 (citing as a factor “whether [the plaintiff and putative c omparator] were disciplined by the same supervisor”). Plaintiff seems to admit as much. Pl.’s Op p’n at 6 (“even if we were to exclude Brittle out of the comparator calculus because he was not supervised by Chief Kevin Hay...”). With respect to Officer Jones, the GW Police Department conduc ted an investigation into an anonymous complaint that he made racial slurs about people o f color and, after more than 42 interviews, concluded only th at Officer Jones used the term “racial slur,” but did not actually use any racial slurs. Jones Memo at 1. The unsubstantiated al legation against Officer Jones in no way compare to the ultimately proven, repeated instances of sex ual harassment committed by Plaintiff. See Wheeler , 812 F.3d at 1116 (citing as a factor “the similarity of [the plaintiff’s and comparator’s] offenses”). Plaintiff fares no better with O fficer Brown. He contends tha t Brown sexually harassed his coworker Officer Queen when he “tr[ied] to date” her. Lads on Dep. at 165. Plaintiff offers no other evidence that Brown violated GW’s policy against sexual h arassment. Ms. Pereira investigated Brown’s alleged c onduct, but concluded that Brown had asked Officer Queen and other officers to have breakfast with him in an attempt to get to know his staff. Pereira Dep. at 25- 26. But even if Officer Brown had asked Officer Queen out on a date, and thereby violated University policy, the seriousness of that behavior pales in co mparison to that of Plaintiff. He was18 found to have asked Officer Queen—the very same officer who Bro wn allegedly asked out on a date—if she and Officer Justice “were fucking” and told another officer that Officer Queen “was crazy as shit” and “fucks with girls when she wants to.” Speci al Panel Report at 6. Any suggestion of comparability between Plainti ff and Officer Brown is wildly off the mark. In sum, none of the officers Plai ntiff cites are valid compara tors. As a result, Defendant’s treatment of Plaintiff in comparison to its treatment of those officers is not evidence of pretext. More generally, Plaintiff has not offered a shred of evidence t hat would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that he was terminated because of racial discriminatio n, rather than due to the numerous acts of sexual harassment that h is employer found him to have c ommitted. For the reasons stated above, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to Plaintiff’s race discrimination claims.
B. Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Claim Plaintiff also alleges that his termination was based on improp er age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, see id . ¶¶ 69-78, and under the DCHRA, see Compl. ¶¶ 44-52. But Plaintiff does not address his age discriminatio n claims in his summary judgment opposition; in fact, those claims are not even mentioned. As a result, the court will treat Defendant’s motion as to Plainti ff’s claims of age discriminati on as conceded. See Wilkins v.
Jackson , 750 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162 (D.D.C. 2010) (“It is well establish ed that if a plaintiff fails to respond to an argument raised in a motion for summary judgment, it is proper to treat that argument as conceded.”); Sykes v. Dudas , 573 F. Supp. 2d 191, 202 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[W]hen a party respo nds to some but not all arguments raised on a Motion for Summary Ju dgment, a court may fairly view the unacknowledged argumen ts as conceded.”).19 Moreover, even if Plaintiff has not conceded the claim, Defend ant has put forth a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for term inating Plaintiff—his violati on of the University’s sexual harassment policy—and Plaintiff has not responded with any evid ence whatsoever that suggests that that reason was pretext for an age-based motive. See Chappell-John son v. Powell , 440 F.3d 484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to both Title VII and ADEA claims.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff had the burden to show that age was the “but-for” cause of his termination. Bennett , 729 F.Supp.2d at 59-60 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009)). He has offered no evidence that wou ld allow him to meet his burden.
V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate order accompanie s this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: September 1, 2016 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge