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ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND UNIFORMITY IN CORPORATE DEFERRED AND NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 25, 2009 

Serial No. 111–52 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

DANIEL MAFFEI, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee, Chairman 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DANIEL MAFFEI, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

MICHONE JOHNSON, Chief Counsel 

DANIEL FLORES, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JUNE 25, 2009 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, and Member, 

Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law .................................. 1 

The Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Member, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative 

Law ........................................................................................................................ 2 

The Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Tennessee, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law ........................................................................................................... 4 

The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of North Carolina, and Member, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law ........................................................................................................ 6 

The Honorable William D. Delahunt, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Massachusetts, and Member, Subcommittee on Commercial 

and Administrative Law ...................................................................................... 7 

The Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law .................................................................................................. 121 

WITNESSES 

Ms. Eileen R. Larence, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

The Honorable Christopher J. Christie, former United States Attorney, District of New Jersey 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 46 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48 

The Honorable Gary G. Grindler, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 

the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 73 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 75 

The Honorable Chuck Rosenberg, former United States Attorney, Eastern 

District of Virginia, Hogan & Hartson, LLP 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 89 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 91 

Mr. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Professor of Law, The University of Michigan 

Law School 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 97 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 99 

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 149 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 151 

The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 154 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 156 

Page

IV 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Material submitted into the Record by the Honorable J. Randy Forbes, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Member, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law ......................................... 133 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from the Honorable Christopher J. 

Christie, former United States Attorney, District of New Jersey .................... 161 

Post-Hearing Questions submitted to the Honorable Gary Grindler, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, U.S. Department 

of Justice ............................................................................................................... 175 

Post-Hearing Questions submitted to the Honorable Chuck Rosenberg, former 

United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, Hogan & Hartson, 

LLP ........................................................................................................................ 178

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Professor 

of Law, The University of Michigan Law School ............................................... 180 

Letter from John Wesley Hall, President, National Association of Criminal 

Defense Lawyers .................................................................................................. 186 

Letter from Cynthia Hujar Orr, President-Elect, National Association of 

Criminal Defense Lawyers .................................................................................. 189 

(1) 

ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND UNIFORMITY IN CORPORATE DEFERRED AND 

NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL

AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:17 a.m., in 

room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John 

Conyers, Jr. (acting Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Cohen, Conyers, Delahunt, Watt, Sherman, Maffei, Lofgren, Johnson, Scott, Franks, Jordan, Coble, Issa, 

Forbes, and King. 

Also present: Representative Jackson Lee. 

Staff present: (Majority) Eric Tamarkin, Counsel; Adam Russell, 

Professional Staff Member; and (Minority) Daniel Flores, Counsel. 

Mr. CONYERS. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I have been 

invited by Subcommittee Chair Steve Cohen, to begin our important hearing this morning, and I call the Committee on the Judiciary, the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law to 

order. 

Welcoming our guests, we are very pleased to have Eileen 

Larence, the Honorable Christopher Christie, the Honorable Gary 

Grindler, the Honorable Chuck Rosenberg, Vikramaditya Khanna, 

and on the second panel we have two of our colleagues, the Honorable Frank Pallone and the Honorable Bill Pascrell. 

Because of the time limitations of some of the members in panel 

one, the Members of Congress who normally precede the regular 

witnesses we have, by agreement, allowed the panel to go first because of time constraints. 

We welcome you all and let me just say that—— 

[Pause in hearing.] 

Today, this Subcommittee revisits a matter that was first considered last year, the Department of Justice’s use of deferred or nonprosecution agreements in criminal cases involving corporate defendants. 

These deferred prosecution agreements, which we will be examining today, originally were created as an alternative to the prosecution of non-violent juvenile and drug offenders. Under these 

types of agreements the government agreed to refrain from prosVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Feb 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\062509\50593.000 HJUD1 PsN: 50593
2 

ecuting in exchange for a defendant’s agreement to admit wrongdoing, provide restitution and abide by certain other obligations. 

The government’s use of such agreements as a prosecutorial tool 

with respect to corporate defendants, however, grew in the aftermath of the Arthur Andersen case in the earlier part of this decade. 

Thousands of people now deemed to be innocent lost their jobs 

after the company collapsed in the face of criminal charges, the 

outcome of which was reversed in the higher court hearing on appeal. 

The thinking was that pre-trial agreements might allow the government to achieve a better balance between the competing imperatives of seeking justice from corporate wrongdoers on one hand 

and protecting innocent bystanders to corporate malfeasance on the 

other. 

But with the growth in the use of these deferred and non-prosecution agreements, it became evident that there were frequently 

not meaningful standards governing the circumstances under 

which the government might enter into such agreements or even 

what the scope of some of these agreements should be. 

Sometimes there was a lack of guidance with respect to the selection and the use of corporate monitors to implement such agreements, and so that is what brings us here today. 

One of the cases that are going to be discussed is the Zimmer 

case, in which then the former U.S. attorney for that area, Christopher Christie, selected former Attorney General Ashcroft to serve 

as a corporate monitor, and also we note that the former attorney 

general came before this Committee in the discussion of these matters. 

And so the Committee was prompted to hold a hearing last year, 

and the Department has taken some steps, which we will find out 

about, to revise some of the activity, but we are here to examine 

these questions, and I would like now if I can—— 

Oh, all right. Mr. Franks has a legislative responsibility on the 

House and we will hold—you will defer your statement until you 

return, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Until after the speakers have been around? 

Mr. CONYERS. Whenever you get back. 

Is there anybody on the Republican side that would have an 

opening comment in lieu of Mr. Franks’ absence? 

Steve King is usually so reticent that I hesitate to invite him to 

make a comment, but I will at this time. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate your demeanor and tone and your gentlemanliness, and I would be 

ashamed not to accept an invitation from the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. 

And so I will though adjust my tone to the tone that the Chairman has delivered this morning. And I am, of course, interested in 

the information we will be gathering here this morning and the 

testimony of all of the witnesses on the panels that will come forward. 

And as I frame my outlook on this issue, I would just seek to 

frame for this Committee that we have seen many of the members 

3 

of the former Bush administration before this Committee during 

his tenure as President of the United States and then after. 

And some of the subject of this is John Ashcroft, whom as I 

watched him testify before this Committee, it was an exemplary 

display of how a witness can come before this Committee fully informed, giving direct answers soundly based in legal analysis and 

theory, and having their recollection that was so impressive to me. 

If I had him for a client or if I had evaluated his professionalism 

I couldn’t raise it any higher than what I have seen in his full career and before this Committee as well. There have been a number 

of other members of the Bush administration that have been before 

this Committee, David Addington comes to mind. Doug Fife comes 

to mind. There are a number of others. 

And you know, I would just suggest that we have a lot of important issues before this country, and we are on the precipice of going 

forward, perhaps in this Congress, with some irrevocable decisions. 

I think at this point we are at the reversible point. The things that 

have happened so far during this Administration are reversible 

should the American people decide to do so. 

Once we cross this Rubicon into the three big issues that are 

ahead of us in this Congress, I don’t know that we can go back to 

the place where we are today, or the place, my preference, which 

was where we were before. 

But I would suggest that we should be forward-looking, rather 

than backward-looking, and the data that I have looked at indicates to me that there has been a positive result from some of these 

negotiations that have taken place. 

And if we are going to be looking backwards and I reflect backwards on some decisions that have been made by the Department 

of Justice agreements not to prosecute entities that are significantly engaged in affecting the political decisions on this Capitol 

Hill. 

So if we are going to look backwards, I may want to dig through 

some papers back into the history quite a ways and without specifying particularly what they are, in the meantime, hopefully this 

will be a balanced hearing and we can hear from the witnesses and 

we can evaluate this information without bias. 

And if there is a constructive result that has come and if the 

right things are done for the right reason, I am hopeful that in a 

bipartisan way we can congratulate the people who participated in 

that and move forward into the future rather than looking back. 

I think especially, gentlemen, Mr. Christie is part of the future 

leadership in this country, and hopefully this will enhance his ability to contribute to American society, and I would yield back the 

balance of my time and thank the Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. I want to thank you, Steve King, for striking such 

an appropriate and sensitive note. Now, would some of your reflections as you look back over history, would this be before the Compromise of 1876 or after the Compromise of 1876? 

Mr. KING. Being so junior on this Committee, Mr. Chairman, I 

would have to defer to your experience and seniority for the judgment call on that, and I will bring those issues up and you will be 

able to make that decision at the appropriate time. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, let us work on it together. 

4 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. I am very pleased now to call upon the Subcommittee Chairman himself, Steve Cohen. Steve Cohen who—the 

gentleman from Tennessee has a remarkably long career as a state 

legislator, a state senator and is now already the Chairman of one 

of the most important Committees in the Judiciary, Commercial 

and Administrative Law, and he has kindly allowed me to sit in 

the Chair for a short period of time, and I am very honored to call 

on him at this moment. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate your time 

that you have extended and the fact that we reciprocate on time 

as I have sat in the Chair for you. 

This hearing is one that my Subcommittee is very eagerly anticipating. There are several issues before us. One is whether or not 

deferred prosecutions are a good idea in general. Some in the Justice Department, I believe, still believe that they are good and they 

may be good. 

I understand that corporations are different than individual citizens in that they represent a large number of stockholders, and to 

punish a corporation in a certain way, and possibly with a death 

sentence if there is a criminal conviction, affects not just the corporation but all of its shareholders. 

On the other hand, corporations should abide by the law, and 

shouldn’t necessarily get a sweetheart deal because they are a corporation and be subjected to a different set of justice than an individual would. 

As a private practicing attorney you have an individual, sometimes a first offender, there is a deferred prosecution. And that 

gives that person a second chance and I hope that in some of the 

cases, and in most of them, that they are first offenders. I suspect 

that they are. 

But nevertheless, the offenses that the corporations are generally 

alleged to have committed, are more serious than the minor misdemeanor that a person might have committed as a first criminal 

offense. 

In the circumstance of an individual in a criminal court there is 

a public hearing, and there is public notice of what has happened 

even though the person can generally get their record expunged. 

In these corporate situations sometimes the public never knows 

of the wrongdoing of the corporation, and the public is harmed. 

And that is an issue we need to look into, what is the public good 

in having these agreements be private, in camera rather than public and giving notice to the public of possible wrongdoing and possible ramifications that could occur to an individual by these problems? 

The deferred prosecution agreements have really risen in the last 

few years, a lot more use of them. One of the cases of the most notoriety, I guess, is the medical devices in Zimmer and a corporate 

citizen in my community, Smith & Nephew. 

Issues have arisen, and I am aware of on how the monitors are 

chosen, and that is a serious issue. I think at all times that public 

monies are expended, no matter how they are done, they should be 

done in a transparent manner and in a fair manner, to where every 

5 

person has an opportunity to participate, to do justice and to be 

compensated for that justice. 

In these situations over three-fourths of the monitors, so says 

The New York Times in a current report, have been former government officials, and over half of them have been prosecutors which 

seems like it is an in-house shop for folks who have left their roles 

with Justice or left their roles in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to get lucrative business once they leave. 

Maybe they have the expertise, maybe they are getting an advantage of knowing the right people in the right place, and that is 

not the way justice should work—Government shouldn’t, never. 

But Justice should be like Caesar’s wife and beyond reproach. Circumstances in these cases make us think that Caesar’s wife would 

be blushing even more so than some governors’ wives might blush. 

The fact is when you select a monitor you ought to be selecting 

somebody from a panel of people who make themselves available. 

It should be publicly known, I believe, and I think that an independent third party like a judge should be involved in selecting the 

monitors to make sure that there is fairness, equal protection, due 

process and not just political influence. 

The companies are in a no-win position. They have the opportunity not to be convicted and they go through this monitor situation. But the monitor has them by very special, unique and tender 

posture, and accordingly the corporations can’t say a lot when they 

think they are wrong. 

And there should be some type of ombudsman there for the corporation to say, ‘‘The fees are outrageous. What they are doing is 

outrageous. It is unnecessary. The expenses are too great,’’ but they 

really can’t do it. 

And what happens is the monitors are put in a position where 

they can extract their own individual largesse at the expense of the 

corporation. And the corporation can’t complain because they are in 

a particularly special situation of avoiding prosecution, and in essence they are paying baksheesh to the monitors. They have no ombudsman to go to to complain, to see that the fees are appropriate 

or right. 

In the Zimmer case, it is my understanding that Mr. Ashcroft’s 

firm was paid $52 million. To me, that is outrageous. I don’t care 

what you did. It is not worth $52 million. Even if you took steroids 

and hit 70 home runs, it is not worth $52 million. 

In the case with Zimmer, there was not an opportunity to review 

the fees. As I understand it there were fees that the company were 

just told, ‘‘You are going to pay this up front. You have no choice,’’ 

and they had to do it. That is not America. That is not fair justice. 

I believe there needs to be a change in the way that the monitors 

are chosen, an impartial, fair manner. I think there needs to be an 

ombudsman to make sure that the corporations have an opportunity to voice their concerns and see that the fees are fair and 

right. 

And they need to be disclosed publicly so the public knows what 

fees are being paid and the relationships between the appointing 

authority, if there is one, whether it is a judge in a situation like 

I would suggest or in the past the U.S. attorney and possible conVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Feb 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\062509\50593.000 HJUD1 PsN: 50593
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flicts of interest that might exist in the appointments or in the relationship that exist. 

These are most important issues that we need to look at and see 

if there is reform that needs to take place that this Committee can 

recommend and the full Judiciary Committee and this Congress 

can pass to see that justice is, indeed, respected, justice is blind, 

justice is fair. That is the hope that I have that this Committee will 

come out with. 

I look forward to the testimony. Mr. Christie has most experience, I think, of almost any U.S. attorney in this country on these 

issues. He has been involved in quite a few of them, and can give 

us some information which I look forward to. 

And I don’t mean to cast an issue, but if there is some information I have—Bristol-Myers Squibb—that U.S. Attorney Christie required them to endow a chair in business ethics at his alma mater, 

Seton Hall. 

I am interested to hear about this because if a Member of Congress required anybody to endow a chair at a school there would 

be outrageous response. There would be outrage and a response 

from the public. 

And on the other side there would be questions for ethics and the 

idea that it is an ethics chair is indeed ironic. I think we have to 

have arm’s length transactions, and we have to know that we have 

to sometimes take our own personal interests and put them secondary to the public interest. 

I am sure that we will learn more about what has happened in 

the matters in past hearings, past monitors and hopefully come up 

with some recommendations that protect the public. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to make this statement, and I hope that all the past corporate or political papers that 

are brought forth by Mr. King will be after Hayes-Tilden because 

that way we can rely on you for experience. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Cohen. We deeply appreciate the exhaustive research that you put into this matter for 

today, and I am now pleased to recognize briefly a senior Member 

of the House Judiciary Committee who has been a Chairman, the 

Ranking Member, and extremely active across the years with our 

Committee, Howard Coble of North Carolina. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to tell you how much 

I enjoy the frequent and pleasant verbal exchanges between you 

and the gentleman from Iowa. You two keep us on our toes. Mr. 

Chairman, I won’t take the 5 minutes. I have a transportation 

hearing I am going to have to attend back and forth. 

But I just wanted to, for the benefit of the Committee Members 

who may not know it, and I think I am right about this, and I 

think deferred prosecutions were inaugurated by the Bush one administration, continued thoroughly by the Clinton administration. 

Furthermore continued thoroughly by Bush two, and, I believe, 

continuing presently under the Obama administration, so deferred 

prosecution is by no means a case of first impression before us. 

They have been around a pretty good while and I just wanted to 

put that on the record, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for having 

recognized me. 

Mr. CONYERS. It is a pleasure, indeed. 

7 

I would like to inquire if our former prosecutor from Massachusetts and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, Bill 

Delahunt, had an opening comment. If he does, he is recognized for 

it. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I might as well take advantage of the time 

then. The gentleman from Iowa talked about a Rubicon and I think 

it is important to understand that our justice system enjoys a reputation that is unparalleled in terms of the justice systems elsewhere in this world. 

And I think much of that can be attributed to the fact that there 

is a level of confidence in the integrity of that system by the American people. Now, that level of confidence fluctuates. At times it is 

diminished and at times it is at a high standard. 

Now, as the Chairman indicated to the full Committee, I myself 

was a prosecutor, an elected prosecutor, states attorney, district attorney in the Greater Boston area for 22 years, so I support the 

concept of prosecutorial discretion. I know that can be important so 

that injustices do not occur. 

But there have been a number of concerns that have been expressed regarding so-called deferred prosecutions, and by that I interpret that deferred prosecutions are in lieu of indictments. In 

other words, one could argue that there is a different set of standards, a different justice system, if you will, for one class that is 

American corporations that are accused of wrongdoing, and the 

vast majority of Americans who are accused of other crime. 

As I read through the briefing material and listening or reading 

RABA, the order of magnitude of improper gain apparently some 

corporations managed to realize, and the discretion was exercised 

by the prosecutor not to prosecute, or at least not to seek an indictment. And then I thought of many of the young men, particularly, 

that appeared in my courts who we prosecuted and sent to jail for 

long periods of time. 

What the view of the community at large would be to send a 

young man into the state prison system for maybe 4 or 5 years in 

the case of an unarmed robbery, and yet corporations who were 

committing crimes that impacted thousands of people were not indicted but managed to reach an agreement to avoid that indictment. 

You know, there are other options that are available to the government, but I don’t know if they have been seriously considered. 

A prosecutor and, Mr. Christie, I note that you are a former U.S. 

attorney, and I think there are others on the panel, a prosecutor 

can indict. 

So this is a statement to the public that that corporation has 

probably committed a crime. And then, if there is a decision that 

is in the best interest of the United States or an individual state, 

they can be diverted, a pre-trial diversion concept. 

But that, again, obviates, eliminates the need for, I think, the appearances that people question. I heard the Chair of the Subcommittee talk about fees of $52 million. I mean, I would like to 

see the billing on that. That is a high hourly rate and I am certainly not one that doesn’t believe that lawyers should be well paid, 

but it does raise issues. 

8 

And again, you know, and I am not suggesting or impugning 

anyone’s integrity here, but when the prosecutor makes the decision as to who the monitor is and I am sure that the monitors of 

those that are reviewing these agreements, presumably, are people 

of solid credentials and high integrity, but they are friends of 

former associates. 

Then the public is going to infer something, that it is the good 

old boy network at work or good old girl network at work, whatever 

the case may be. And these are appearances I would suggest that 

we want to avoid because, as I said at the beginning, our justice 

system depends on the confidence of the American people in terms 

of the integrity. 

You know, I am looking at some of the briefing material here 

and, you know, I am sure, I hope, that these decisions were made 

in good faith, but they reek of favoritism, high fees, and it is not 

a good situation, and secrecy. 

If you are going to have a viable justice system you need transparency. You have got to lay it out, and I would suggest, Mr. 

Chairman that it ought not to be the prosecutor. It ought to be the 

court that makes these assignments and enunciates and promulgates whatever guidelines are necessary. 

I see Mr. King is taking his glasses off. I am getting nervous. 

Maybe he will agree with me. But why not have the court, an independent body, rather than having the prosecutor who in the end 

has ultimate responsibility for the investigation and making charging decisions appoint someone that he may or may not have a relationship with. 

I read your testimony, Mr. Christie, and you keep referring to 

the office and I understand that, what you mean by that term, but 

in the end it is the individual United States attorney. It is not the 

office that makes that decision. 

Sure, U.S. attorneys, like I did when I was the states attorney, 

we always listen, but in the end it is going to be myself that makes 

that decision, and appearances, even if there is nothing improper, 

impact the confidence of the people in the system. 

So I know we have legislation pending, and I know it deals with 

guidelines, but I guess I would conclude by saying I would ask everyone on the panel why not have the court, as it should appropriately through the probation offices, and the courts appoint masters, not at $52 million. If it was $52 million, sign me up. I am 

ready to move for $52 million. 

But we have masters that take on these kind of tasks that can 

do them, that are people of great expertise time and time again to 

handle matters that are complex because this issue is, I think, has 

the potential to seriously erode confidence in terms of the administration of justice in this country if not reformed. And with that, I 

yield back. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Representing the Government Accountability Office (GAO), is Ms. Eileen Larence, Director for Justice Issues. As 

such, she manages congressional requests to assess various law enforcement and Department of Justice issues and has been at the 

GAO for some period of time. We have her and all of your statements that will be entered into the record, and we will allow you 

to proceed at this moment. Welcome to the Committee. 

9 

TESTIMONY OF EILEEN R. LARENCE, DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. LARENCE. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to discuss the preliminary results of 

our review of Justice’s use and oversight of deferred and non-prosecution agreements. 

Increasing use of these tools as alternatives to prosecuting companies for criminal conduct is both topical, given concerns about 

corporate behavior leading to the economic downturn, and controversial, as some question whether the tools let companies off the 

hook. They give prosecutors too much power. 

Their use also raises questions about balancing the tradeoffs of 

uniformity, consistency and transparency with prosecutor discretion and flexibility to address unique cases. 

Given these issues, we have work underway to answer four questions about these tools. First, what factors do justice prosecutors 

consider when deciding whether to use the tools and what company 

requirements or terms to impose? 

Second, how do the prosecutors oversee company compliance with 

these terms? Third, how do they select independent monitors, and 

fourth, what do companies think of monitor’s costs and responsibilities? 

I would now like to briefly summarize our preliminary answers 

to these questions. As for the first question on deciding whether to 

use these tools and what terms to include, justice prosecutors we 

interviewed consistently said they consider the nine principles of 

Federal prosecution of business organizations, especially how well 

the company is cooperating with investigators, what collateral consequences third parties, such as shareholders and employees might 

face with prosecution, and what remedial actions the company had 

already taken to fix its problem. 

Justice offices we contacted also consistently issued press releases about agreements reached or required that some be posted 

to Web sites promoting transparency. Justice offices were less consistent, however, in deciding which of the two tools to use and on 

labeling agreements as either a DPA or NPA, despite recent guidance calling for consistency so that justice can track their use and 

identify best practices. 

We in the Department are continuing to review whether further 

guidance on the documentation of and supervisory review over 

these decisions may be important. Most agreements we reviewed 

required monetary payments ranging from $30,000 to $615 million, 

and were based on sentencing guidelines as well as case specific 

factors. 

The agreements lasted from 3 months to 5 years, depending on 

the amount of time prosecutors believe the company would need to 

fix its problems. Most agreements also required companies to improve their ethics and compliance programs to prevent and deter 

criminal conduct, unless the companies were already doing so for 

their regulators, for example. 

While prosecutors stated that companies could appeal unfavorable terms to Justice, some companies were reluctant to do so for 

fear of retaliation. 

10 

Turning to the second question on ensuring compliance with 

agreements, in about half of the agreements we reviewed Justice 

required the company to pay for an independent monitor because 

the offices did not have the resources or expertise in-house. 

Almost all monitors had to provide written reports of their findings to Justice. For the other half of the agreements, Justice relied 

on regulators to ensure compliance or required companies to certify 

they complied, among other things. 

Addressing the third question about selecting monitors, Justice 

typically chose the monitor but gave companies the opportunity for 

input, although to varying degrees. Justice and companies generally relied on personal knowledge and colleagues’ recommendations to identify potential monitors with expertise. 

They did check for conflicts of interest, used an in-house committee to make a final decision, and coordinated with regulators if 

they already had monitors in place in order to avoid duplication 

and extra costs. 

Companies and prosecutors thought developing a national list of 

potential monitors to avoid favoritism could provide consistency 

and pre-screened, qualified candidates, as well as expedite selection. But others thought it might not provide the needed expertise 

and might result in more conflicts of interests, less company input 

and more favoritism if justice created the list. 

Recent Justice guidance begins to address some of these issues 

by requiring the use of selection committees and final monitor approval by the deputy attorney general among other things. We are 

recommending that prosecutors also document the process and reasons for monitor selection to avoid favoritism, and provide an audit 

trail for accountability and transparency, and Justice agreed with 

this recommendation. 

Finally, in terms of monitor fees and responsibilities, while a couple of companies said their fees were high, others thought they 

were customary and were more concerned that monitors did more 

work than necessary and beyond the scope of the agreement, driving up costs. 

Companies felt they had little leverage to fight these costs and 

so would like more help from Justice such as negotiating monitor 

responsibilities in the agreements, requiring upfront monitor work 

plans and budgets and periodically meeting with companies to discuss monitor activities. 

Mr. Chairman, we are continuing to work on a number of these 

issues, including the need for additional guidance or improvements 

and the role of courts in this process, and plan to issue a final report this fall. That concludes my statement. I would be happy to 

answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Larence follows:] 

11 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EILEEN R. LARENCE


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Mr. CONYERS. Thank you so much. We are now pleased to have 

the former U.S. attorney for the District of New Jersey who has for 

6 years had been the U.S. attorney for his state and has left his 

post as of December 1st, 2008. 

He has been an advisor of one of the 17 lawyers that advised 

former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and has had a long career of experience in the law, and we are very pleased that he 

could make time out of his schedule to be with us today. Mr. 

Christie, welcome. 


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TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. CHRISTIE, 

FORMER UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, DISTRICT OF NEW 

JERSEY 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very 

much to you for the invitation today, to the Members of the Committee. Thank you also for the flexibility that you showed in terms 

of the scheduling of this hearing, recognizing that I am in the middle of a campaign for governor of New Jersey. 

Your willingness to be able to be flexible regarding the scheduling has made it possible for me to prepare adequately and to be 

here to spend time with all of you today and answer your questions, and I appreciate it. 

A number of key points to make, without repeating some of the 

things that were already pointed out by the GAO, first and foremost, deferred prosecution agreements were utilized by my office 

during my tenure in the 7 years that I was United States attorney 

to achieve results of justice for the public. 

When wrongdoing was committed, people involved in corporations, both individuals who were charged and companies who were 

dealt with, needed to be dealt with firmly, directly and strongly to 

make sure that people understood that there were integrity in the 

system. 

Let us talk about how these agreements work. First and foremost, there is absolutely in the discussion of the monitors, zero— 

zero taxpayer dollars spent on these monitors. It is important to 

note because there seems to be some confusion on that so I want 

to be clear. 

Zero taxpayer dollars are spent on these monitors. They are all 

incurred, these costs, by the companies who were involved in the 

wrongdoing in order to reform the culture in that corporation. 

Secondly, in the case of the medical device prosecutions, there is 

already nearly a half a billion dollars in savings returned to the 

Federal Government. Let me be specific on how that was done. 

Four of the companies paid $311 million back to the Federal Government at the time of the settlement of this matter. 

In addition, in just the first year of these agreements, payments to consultant surgeons by these companies dropped by $150 million. Those costs were costs that were past directly onto the consumers and onto the Federal Government predominantly through 

the Medicare system, who was paying for these costs through the 

companies. So now, nearly half a billion dollars has been returned, 

and counting, to the government because of these agreements. 

Third, collateral consequences were mentioned by the GAO. I will 

tell you, I was a member of the Justice Department during the Arthur Andersen matter. Each one of the United States attorneys 

was affected significantly by the loss of nearly 75,000 jobs at Arthur Andersen, in a case that ultimately was reversed by the 

United States Supreme Court. The case was reversed, but those 

jobs were not reversed back into the American economy. 

The artificial hip and knee medical companies employ 47,000 

American citizens, providing innovation and products that improve 

the health of our country. Indictment of those companies would 

have—all of them whom are publicly traded—most certainly would 

have led to their debarment from the Medicare program, and since 

47 

two-thirds of all of those replacement surgeries are paid for by 

Medicare, this would have put those companies out of business, 

companies that controlled 94 percent of the market in artificial 

hips and knees in our country. 

Those collateral consequences, in my view, were absolutely something that needed to be avoided. In addition, it is an $80 billion industry and there was no harm done to the company’s shareholders 

during this entire time. In fact, during the time of the deferred 

prosecution agreements, three of these companies saw growth in 

their shareholder value instead of diminution. 

These products are vital to the health of our citizens—absolutely 

vital to the health of our citizens. And if they had been eliminated 

from the marketplace, 94 percent of these devices, this would have 

caused great harm—great harm to the people of our country who 

rely upon them. 

All of these monitors were proposed to the companies, interviewed by the companies and then accepted by the companies, and 

they were made clear by our office that they had the opportunity 

to object and if they did we would propose another monitor. 

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, we also have shown great transparency in 

this because at the time that these agreements were put into place, 

not only were they announced publicly, not only were the agreements put up on our Web site, not only were they required to be 

put up on the Web site of the companies, but also criminal complaints were filed, reviewed by a Federal judge, approved by a Federal judge along with approving the agreements, and all of that 

was placed into the public record. 

So there is transparency. There is no taxpayer dollars being 

spent. There is nearly half a billion dollars being returned to the 

Federal Government, Mr. Chairman, and so I look forward to a 

good conversation about this and to have the opportunity to talk 

to all of you about the great work that the office of the United 

States attorney for the district of New Jersey did on behalf of the 

American citizens on these and other prosecutions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christie follows:] 

48 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. CHRISTIE


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ATTACHMENT 


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Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, sir. We are now pleased to welcome 

from the Department of Justice, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division since March 

2009, Attorney Gary Grindler. 

He has been working on, and previously, on special matters in 

Governmental Investigations Practice Group in his former law firm 

of King and Spalding. Welcome this afternoon to our hearing, sir. 


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TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE GARY G. GRINDLER, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. GRINDLER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and to the Members of this Committee. I thank you for your invitation to address 

this Committee on this very important topic. 

I am privileged to serve the Department of Justice as a Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, and in my 

private practice in my past involvement with the Department, I 

have had the opportunity to observe the Department’s impressive 

efforts over the last several years to combat corporate fraud and 

other corporate malfeasance. 

Since 2002, the Department has obtained approximately 1,300 

corporate fraud convictions. This includes convictions of more than 

370 senior corporate officers. In addition, between 2004 and 2008, 

the Department has secured over 940 guilty verdicts or pleas from 

corporate defendants. 

During that same time, the Department resolved approximately 

80 corporate cases with the use of deferred prosecution agreements 

and non-prosecution agreements which comprises approximately 8 

percent of the total number of corporate criminal convictions during that period. 

In order for corporate enforcement efforts to be effective, Federal 

prosecutors must be permitted the discretion to fashion appropriate 

agreements with business organizations to resolve investigations 

and those decisions have to be made on the unique facts and circumstances of a particular case. 

The Department will continue to bring criminal charges against 

business organizations where the conduct is egregious, pervasive 

and systemic. At the same time, however, the Department recognizes that charging and convicting a corporation runs the risk of 

triggering significant negative consequences for innocent third parties who played no role in the criminal conduct, including employees, pensioners, shareholders and customers. 

These collateral consequences may be unjustified where the corporation has fully cooperated, disciplined the culpable individuals, 

implemented comprehensive compliance reforms and made restitution to all victims. These are issues that must be considered when 

determining whether to charge a business organization. 

Prosecutors may use a variety of tools other than an indictment 

and a prosecution to bring justice to the victims and to the public, 

and among those tools are DPAs, NPAs, and the use of independent monitors. 

The Department last year in the United States Attorneys’ Manual issued clear guidance on the principles that must be considered 

when evaluating the appropriate resolution of a corporate criminal 

investigation. 

The use of DPAs and NPAs and independent monitors, indeed, 

has increased over the last 5 years, and while they avoid the collateral consequences that I just described, the companies nevertheless 

will face serious consequences for their criminal violations. 

Typically, during the time period of a DPA and NPA, the corporation will be required to fulfill requirements, certain requirements, including the payment of restitution to victims, the payVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Feb 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\062509\50593.000 HJUD1 PsN: 50593
74 

ment of financial penalties, full cooperation by the business organizations which may enable additional prosecutions both of companies and individuals and the implementation of an effective compliance program. 

In appropriate cases, DPAs and NPAs may also require the retention of an independent compliance monitor. And last year, as 

you know, the Department issued guidelines regarding the selection and use of monitors that identified a series of principles to be 

followed in using these monitors in connection with these agreements. 

The guidelines are designed to ensure that well qualified independent monitors are selected, that the process is free from potential conflicts of interest and that the monitors focus on reducing the 

risk of a corporation’s future misconduct. 

The Department of Justice recognizes this Committee’s interest 

in the use of DPAs, NPAs and independent monitors. However, we 

do have serious concerns about the provisions contained in H.R. 

1947 entitled The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 

2009, and we do oppose this proposed legislation. 

This bill, if passed, will diminish the ability of Federal prosecutors to fully exercise their prosecutorial judgment and discretion 

which is a core prerogative of the executive branch. And I want to 

emphasize that the Department’s written guidance governing the 

principles that apply to prosecutive decisions that involve DPAs 

and NPAs were carefully developed with input from a number of 

people, and that we believe they adequately address the issues that 

are covered by the bill. 

Finally, requiring courts to approve a non-prosecution agreement 

before they can take effect raises separation of powers issues, and 

could impede and delay the government’s enforcement efforts 

against corporate fraud. 

The Department is committed to using all of the tools at its disposal to root out corporate fraud, and our experience has shown 

that DPAs and NPAs must be tailored to the specific needs of a 

particular case and provide sufficient flexibility to achieve real results. 

It is important that we preserve the ability of experienced prosecutors to balance all of these concerns and resolve the criminal 

matters in the best interest of the public and the victims. I would 

be pleased to answer any questions that the Committee may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grindler follows:] 

75 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY G. GRINDLER


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Mr. CONYERS. We thank you for your testimony. Chuck Rosenberg is a partner at Hogan & Hartson, has served as the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia and as the U.S. attorney 

for the Southern District of Texas. 

He has also served in several post-senior ones at the Department 

of Justice, as chief of staff to Deputy Attorney General Jim Comey, 

as counsel to Attorney General John Ashcroft and counsel to FBI 


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Director Bob Mueller. From 1994 to 2000 he was an assistant U.S. 

attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia. 

We welcome you here this afternoon, and we will listen carefully 

to your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHUCK ROSENBERG, 

FORMER UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, EASTERN DISTRICT 

OF VIRGINIA, HOGAN & HARTSON, LLP 

Mr. ROSENBERG. I was simply thanking the Committee for the 

invitation. It is a pleasure and an honor to be here today. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

I joined the Department of Justice out of law school. I went to 

law school because I wanted to be an assistant U.S. attorney and 

I should tell you that I consider it still the greatest professional 

privilege of my life including the opportunity to have served as U.S. 

attorney. 

I work with wonderful men and women of great integrity and 

dedication and intelligence. I miss it every day. These men and 

women of the Department struggle with how best to handle corporate crime. 

Corporate crime presents a very difficult dilemma. How do you 

punish corporate criminal behavior without harming innocent third 

parties? One solution tool that we found, that works and works 

well, has worked well for a long time, are deferred prosecution 

agreements. I have just three points to make about them. I am 

going to be brief, and then I am going to be quiet. 

First, prosecutors need to strike a balance between doing too 

much and doing too little. We struggle with that all the time. We 

want crime to be punished, obviously. We need specific and general 

deterrents for the bad actors, but we also need a level playing field 

for the vast majority, vast majority of corporations that do it by the 

book. 

The collateral consequences of prosecuting a corporation, Mr. 

Grindler alluded to that, even the bad corporate actor that does not 

play by all the rules can devastate individual lives, and we have 

seen that, employees, shareholders and so on, who had absolutely 

no role in the corporate criminal wrongdoing and no ability to prevent it. 

Also, in highly regulated industries, a prosecution can mean the 

debarment of a corporation and therefore its demise. In some cases 

that is appropriate. In many cases it is not. So point one, we need 

a balanced approach. 

Point two, we got one. We have a balanced approach. The Department has a very sensible approach in place. I have been with 

the Department—I had been with the Department for a very long 

time. I know what that approach is, and I think they have it right. 

So I guess it is not very interesting for me to show up here and 

tell you that the system is not broken, but actually, I am not very 

interesting, and that is why I am here, to tell you that the system 

is not broken. 

DOJ has struck the right balance, has the right safeguards in 

place and handles deferred prosecution agreements, including the 

appointment of corporate monitors in a thoughtful, careful and 

proper manner. There are two key documents here. I respectfully 

90 

refer the Committee to both, although I am sure you are quite familiar with them. 

The first is the March 2008 guidance by then Acting Deputy Attorney General Craig Morford, like me also a career guy in the Department of Justice, regarding DPAs and the selection of corporate 

monitors. 

The second key document articulates the current Justice Department principles in place right now regarding the prosecution of 

business organizations, found at Title 9, Chapter 9-28 of the U.S. 

Attorneys’ Manual. A lot of very smart and experienced prosecutors 

spent a lot of time constructing this guidance. I think they got it 

right. It is not broken. It doesn’t need tinkering. 

Third point, and final point, there are a couple of proposals floating around, split the oversight of deferred prosecution agreements 

and the selection of corporate monitors in the hands of the Federal 

judiciary. 

I completely understand the impulse. I spent a lot of time in 

front of Federal judges and, by and large, they are terrific. They 

are very, very good at what they do. So we are tempted to tap into 

their experience and independence to imbue DPAs with the same 

integrity associated with all the other proceedings in Federal court. 

Here though, I believe, that the participation of the judiciary 

would be a mistake. Deciding who and how to prosecute, or whether to prosecute at all, is a core executive function. Judges do many, 

many things well, no dispute, but there are a bunch of things that 

judges should not do, and acting as prosecutors is one of them. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here today. It is a 

privilege. I am pleased to answers questions of the Committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenberg follows:] 

91 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHUCK ROSENBERG


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Mr. CONYERS. We are very glad you are part of our panel. I am 

now pleased to call on Professor Vikramaditya Khanna of the University Michigan Law School faculty and before that the Boston 

University School of Law faculty, and he has been visiting faculty—a fellow at the—no, he has been at Harvard Law School, a 


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senior research fellow at Columbia Law School and a visiting scholar at Stanford Law School. 

And this is not to indicate that he can’t stay in more than one 

place for any length of time. We are very impressed by your career. 

His areas of research and teaching include corporate law, securities 

fraud and regulation, corporate crime, corporate and managerial liability, and corporate governance in emerging markets. 

And so we have your prepared statement and we will now listen 

to you to conclude this panel, sir. Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF VIKRAMAADITYA S. KHANNA, PROFESSOR OF 

LAW, THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you and good afternoon Chairman Conyers, 

Chairman Cohen and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here today to testify. 

I will primarily focus my comments on the growth and functioning of corporate monitors as part of corporate deferred and nonprosecution agreements. In particular, I would like to address three 

issues today in my testimony. 

First, when is it desirable to impose a corporate monitor on a 

firm as part of the DPA? My response is essentially that in instances where the potential cash fines that we can impose on a corporation seem unlikely for whatever reason to obtain the level of 

deterrence we desire, we should consider the use of a corporate 

monitor. 

This helps to ensure that monitors are only appointed when they 

are socially desirable, and helps to reduce concerns that a monitor 

is a way to avoid imposing serious sanctions on the firm. 

Second, if a corporate monitor is to be used, then what steps 

should be taken to reduce the concerns associated with the appointing of such monitors? 

My response is that we should try to encourage the growth of a 

market, of sorts, for monitor services, because that will not only enhance the accountability and the transparency of the monitor, but 

also provide a strong competitive impetus for good performance. 

This will help reduce concerns both about the selection process and 

about the compensation levels, as well as potentially enhancing 

performance. 

Third, what steps, in addition to those proposed in the recent 

House bills and the Department of Justice memo may be worth exploring to enhance the functioning of corporate monitors? 

My response here is that I applaud the efforts, both taken in the 

House and by the Department of Justice, as important steps in this 

area. These reforms are broadly consistent with my analysis on corporate monitors as I suggest in my written testimony. In addition 

to these steps, however, I would suggest some further steps that 

might help to enhance the functioning of corporate monitors. 

In particular, first, explicit discussion by the Department of Justice when deciding to go forward with a corporate monitor about 

why a cash fine or other sanction would not suffice for deterrence, 

and why a monitor with frequent ongoing contact with the firm 

would be a desirable thing to have on the facts of this case? 

Second, some oversight on monitor compensation might indeed 

be desirable, but the pure flat fee being suggested in the House 

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bill, should be adopted very cautiously. Instead, I might suggest judicial review triggered by perhaps the fees crossing some hourly 

threshold that makes us wonder a little bit about their size. 

In addition, maybe open competitive bidding for the position of 

a monitor, or maybe even an alternative, such as multiple flat fees 

that might apply at different levels depending on the kind of expertise you are expecting from the monitor. 

For example, in certain monitoring instances, to address the concerns of the firm may require a great deal more skill and investment of time than, say, in others, and having a flat fee for both 

might be somewhat troublesome in terms of being able to generate 

the kind of expertise you might want. You wouldn’t necessarily 

want to pay your neurosurgeon the same amount as you pay your 

primary care physician. 

Third, the groups of people who are qualified to act as monitors, 

I think, should be expanded to include, of course, not only former 

enforcement officials, but also attorneys with substantial litigation 

experience and others who have experience in compliance matters. 

Sometimes, compliance issues, particularly, in the area of financial and securities fraud, don’t necessarily require tremendous litigation experience as much as experience with looking through financial statements and knowing where the skeletons might be buried. 

Fourth, in terms of arranging for some degree of judicial oversight, I think that can be useful, but perhaps in limited doses. For 

some of the concerns already raised by members of the panel, but 

also because of the notion that judicial oversight is a precious thing 

to have. We should use it where we think it is most important, perhaps when the DPA is being finalized rather than ongoing oversight, unless some triggering event occurs that might merit greater 

interest for the judge. 

Finally, in terms of public disclosure of monitor’s reports, so far, 

the approach seems to be that monitor’s reports would be disclosed, 

to the government, the Department of Justice, and potentially to 

the court. 

But I would suggest that maybe public disclosure should be 

something we should consider as a norm with the power of the 

court and the Department to redact out information that might be 

troublesome or potentially competitively problematic for firms. 

This will help both in terms of the ability to inform victims of 

potential wrongdoing of the potential harm they may suffer, and 

that would help to reduce, maybe the harm they suffer, as well as 

potentially informing other companies about steps they can take to 

avoid future wrongdoing in similar industries or in similar contexts. 

With that, I will end my testimony. I will be happy to elaborate 

on any of these matters. Thank you again for inviting me to testify 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Khanna follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA


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Mr. CONYERS. Thank you so much, Professor Khanna, and I 

thank all five of you, lady and gentlemen. And I want to observe, 

before I turn to Chairman Steve Cohen, I can’t help but wonder— 

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any relation or any possibility to non-corporate prospectively criminal cases, because, we are here looking at one thing? 

There are those, and it has not been articulated, that want to 

end this system. There are others that think it is working fairly 

well, perfectly okay, and then there is another school that would 

like to modify it. 

And so I turn now to the Chairman of this Committee to begin 

inquiry. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Christie, you mentioned that the defendants had an opportunity to turn down monitors. Did Zimmer turn down Mr. Ashcroft? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No. In fact, sir, let me give you a complete answer 

to that. 

Mr. COHEN. That is the complete answer. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, no, it is not sir. It really isn’t because I think 

it is important for you to know, that Zimmer first came to our office 

to suggest that the one thing they wanted to make sure they had 

in a monitor, since they were a company from Warsaw, Indiana 

and in the Midwest, what they did not want a large New York law 

firm. They did not want a large northeastern law firm. They said 

they wanted someone with Midwestern sensibilities. 

We then sent them Mr. Ashcroft’s name, who, I think everyone 

is aware, is from the Midwest, and they had an opportunity to 

interview him, and were told that if they had an objection they 

should come back and express it. 

When they came back, counsel for Zimmer and their CEO said, 

‘‘We are thrilled. We think we got the best monitor.’’ 

Mr. COHEN. Did any other entity in the medical devices lawsuit 

turn down the monitor? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No sir, they did not. 

Mr. COHEN. They didn’t. Has any monitor that you have recommended been turned down by the defendant? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. In the instances of, in terms of other deferred 

prosecution agreements, the operation of the selection of the monitors worked differently, and options were not given in those instances. I would—— 

Mr. COHEN. So it was—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. Relate to you why. It was different. 

Mr. COHEN. So let me ask you this then. You can then tell me 

then, based on your testimony that nobody ever objected to the 

monitor. In your testimony you said, ‘‘All the defendants could turn 

them down,’’ but in reality nobody turned them down. Is that right? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, they all agreed after interviews—— 

Mr. COHEN. They all agreed. 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. They all agreed after interviews with 

their monitors and the opportunity to meet with them—— 

Mr. COHEN. Right. 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. They all agreed. 

Mr. COHEN. The answer is, they all agreed. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. The bottom line is you made them an offer they 

couldn’t refuse. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I don’t agree with that sir. 

Mr. COHEN. That is what happened, sir, I believe. 

115 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, sir, I don’t—you were not—— 

Mr. COHEN. That is the problem. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Excuse me, sir. You were not in the room. Let me 

answer the question. You were not in the room—— 

Mr. COHEN. I have got the microphone, sir. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, you have said that I gave them an offer you 

couldn’t refuse—— 

Mr. COHEN. That is right. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. First of all, it is an ethnically insensitive comment 

by you, first of all, to an Italian-American. And secondly—— 

Mr. COHEN. I had no idea you were Italian—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. And secondly sir, let me finish. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Christie, I have no idea and I—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. Secondly sir—— 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. That you are suggesting—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. You were not in the room when the 

negotiations took place, sir, and I was. And these folks came back 

and were not under duress. They came back and said that they appreciated the monitors that were selected, and they accepted the 

monitors they were selected. 

Mr. COHEN. Right. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. And I don’t appreciate, unfortunately sir, the implication that you make in the question. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, the facts speak for themselves. Nobody turned 

one down. In your testimony, you made the point to say they could 

turn them down, like this is a very open-ended process—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. And it was. 

Mr. COHEN. The fact is, none of them turned them down, because 

they couldn’t afford to because, otherwise—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. The fact is—— 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. They were about to be prosecuted. Stop, 

Mr. Christie. Otherwise, they were going to be prosecuted. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No. That is not the case. 

Mr. COHEN. You had them in a situation. You offered them a 

deal that they couldn’t refuse. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No. You are wrong sir. The fact of the matter is, 

that they didn’t turn them down because the career prosecutors in 

my office who prosecuted this case, along with my executive staff, 

along with our ethics officer and myself, took great time, and great 

care to analyze the facts inside each company, to analyze the monitors that were suggested, to make sure that both their experience 

and their approach would be compatible with the companies that 

we had been investigating for 3 years—— 

Mr. COHEN. All right, that is why. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. The alternative answer, Mr. Cohen, to your question is, not because they thought they were under duress, but because the Department of Justice, through the United States attorneys’ office for the district of New Jersey, did their job by putting 

proper monitors in place for each company. 

Mr. COHEN. Did you or anyone in the New Jersey U.S. Attorneys’ 

Office ever send any e-mails about fee negotiations? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, there were e-mails that were sent to me regarding Zimmer that I responded to during the time they were negotiating fees with the Ashcroft Group. 

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Mr. COHEN. And Zimmer objected. They thought the fees were outrageous. They were supposed to pay $750,000 up front to Mr. 

Ashcroft and his two other senior executives just as a retainer fee. 

Is that accurate? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I was not the least bit shocked, sir, to receive emails from high priced lawyers arguing over fees. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. Over the defendants. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, it was not, sir. The e-mails were from the defendant’s counsel—— 

Mr. COHEN. Right. And they were—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. Who, by the way, was being paid 

handsomely by the hour to argue as he had been arguing with us 

for the last 4 months before the agreements were executed in order 

to get the best deal that he possibly could for his client. 

He is a partner at Fulbright & Jaworski, an incredibly competent 

health care lawyer who argued vehemently and got great concessions from our office for his client. He then raised issues regarding 

the fees proposed by the Ashcroft Group, and I told him in my emails to him to go back—and I also told the Ashcroft Group—to go 

back and resolve whatever differences they had regarding fees 

without intervention by the office. 

If they could not I would have intervened and within a week’s 

time, after I sent them back to begin negotiating again, they had 

agreed to fees. 

Mr. COHEN. On October 17, 2007, did Attorney Rick Robinson 

say, ‘‘The parties have reached an impasse on certain key issues,’’ 

the first issue being a flat fee provision? And did you refuse to intervene when they had reached an impasse, Mr. Christie? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Mr. Cohen, he sent me that e-mail, and I am looking for them now, he sent me that e-mail and when you read the 

totality of the e-mail I think you come to the conclusion that there 

wasn’t an impasse that was reached. 

And I instructed him back to go and try to resolve it as I did instruct the Ashcroft Group to go back and attempt to resolve it in 

good faith. If the United States attorney gets involved in every dispute between their monitors and the companies they are monitoring, the United States attorney would have no time to do anything else in his office but litigate those disputes. Within 1 week 

after the sending of that e-mail, they came to an agreement on fees 

by compromising with each other. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, I don’t—I am not sure if the attorneys for Zimmer would agree with that, but nevertheless let me go to the—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Well, he was no longer the attorney after this, Mr. 

Cullen. So I don’t know which attorneys you are talking about. 

Mr. COHEN. Let me go to the Bristol-Myers Squibb situation. 

Why did you not suggest that it would be wrong for a contribution 

at—the chair to be endowed at the school that you attended? We 

in the public life have to be beyond Caesar’s life, too. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir, and I suggest to you that neither you nor 

I have cornered the market on that. So let me be very clear with 

you about what you are saying. 

Mr. COHEN. It is an admission on your part—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, it is not an admission on my part, sir. Let me 

tell you exactly how it happened. Bristol-Myers Squibb was repVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Feb 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\062509\50593.000 HJUD1 PsN: 50593
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resented by Mary Jo White, the former United States attorney for 

the southern district of New York and one of the most respected 

prosecutors and private practice attorneys in this Nation. 

It was in fact the suggestion of counsel for Bristol-Myers Squibb 

that one of the things they wanted to do in order to ensure an ethical culture in their company was to endow a chair at a New Jersey 

law school on ethics. 

I told them if that was their idea that was fine, and they were 

to handle it. They came back and told me that their—Rutgers Law 

School in New Jersey all ready had an endowed chair in ethics by 

the Prudential Corporation and they were then going to move to 

Seton Hall to have discussions with them. 

I was not involved in those discussions. It was not my idea. It 

was not my initiative. It was the idea, initiative and suggestion of 

the Bristol-Myers Squibb Corporation and they still today participate in twice annual seminars on corporate ethics run by Seton 

Hall Law School, financed by Bristol-Myers Squibb. 

It was not my idea, it was not my suggestion, I did not suggest 

Seton Hall. I did not suggest this whole idea. It was suggested by 

Mary Jo White and management of Bristol-Myers Squibb. It was 

their decision, sir, not mine. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, if I can only respond. I would submit 

to you, sir, that even though the suggestion might have been by the 

defendant, who may not have been made an offer they couldn’t 

refuse, but that it was the position of a U.S. attorney to rise above 

that and to understand the appearance of impropriety, and to 

refuse it and to say, ‘‘I suggest you pick Princeton or Montclair 

State—’’ 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Well, sir, if Princeton had a law school I am sure 

they might have looked at them. If Montclair State had a law 

school—— 

Mr. COHEN. They have a business school. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, they do not. This was to be done—this was 

their idea. There are two law schools in the state of New Jersey, 

sir, Rutgers and Seton Hall. Rutgers already had a corporate chair 

for corporate ethics funded by the Prudential Corporation. That is 

what moved Bristol-Myers Squibb to go to Seton Hall. 

Your implication that there is something inappropriate about a 

corporate citizen deciding that they wanted to endow a chair in the 

study of corporate ethics given the corporate climate in this country 

is surprising to me. 

What the public needs to know is that it was not my idea, it was 

not my initiative, and it was something that they asked for in the 

agreement. It was a concession we made to them as part of their 

overall agreement. It was not an offer I made, rather it was an 

offer they made, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman 

from Iowa, Steve King, acting Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, who has removed his glasses again. 

Mr. KING. And I had agreed with Mr. Delahunt, but I thank the 

Chairman for recognizing me, and it sounded as I listened to the 

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gard to the subject that is before us, deferred prosecution agreements. 

And there is a significant amount of disagreement and the clash 

that has just taken place between Mr. Cohen and Mr. Christie, and 

so I would like to direct my attention to that and ask Mr. Christie 

if you are aware where the genesis of this allegation about the endowment might have originated? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, there was no discussion of this at the time. 

When the agreement was made it was made public. Allegations of 

this came up much, much later on in a much more political context. 

Mr. KING. And I accept that and I suspect that, and I just reiterate that this is turning into a political issue, and hopefully we 

could examine the issue in front of us and still let the public know, 

Mr. Chairman, about the political components of this. 

And it got my attention as I listened to Mr. Cohen’s opening remarks, when he made this allegation about the endowment at 

Seton Hall, and so it occurred to me instantly that when he said 

that Members of Congress wouldn’t do something like that. No, 

Members of Congress instead just simply offer earmarks for their 

endowments. 

And I can think of some in my district there are Harkin Grants. 

My junior senator—he has his name clearly over these things. 

Those are endowments that go into the educational institutions all 

over the country with the name Harkin Grant on them. There are 

buildings named after living members of the United States Senate, 

and we try not to do that for living members of the House of Representatives. 

But I would ask the panel is anyone aware—first I would ask 

Mr. Christie, could you name the five businesses that were the subject of the agreement? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. On the medical devices, sir? 

Mr. KING. Yes. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Okay, the five companies were the Zimmer Corporation, the DePuy Corporation, which is a subsidiary of Johnson 

& Johnson, the Smith & Nephew Corporation, the Stryker Corporation which is out of Kalamazoo, Michigan and the Biomet Corporation which is also out of Indiana. 

Mr. KING. Okay, I thank you. And is there anyone on the panel 

that is aware of any earmarks that have been provided to these 

companies that are the subject of our testimony today? None at all? 

Well then into the record I would suggest that I am reading what 

we understand to be a press release that lays out a case that there 

is an $800,000 earmark for Smith & Nephew for developing a new 

trauma hemostat surgical tool. 

Do you have any knowledge of that anyone on the Committee? 

And apparently no one on the Committee does, and I would ask 

unanimous consent to introduce at the appropriate time, the original press release that identifies this earmark to this company 

called Smith & Nephew by the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 

Cohen, an $800,000 earmark. 

Mr. CONYERS. Without objection, does the gentleman object? 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t know what—I just heard my name which I 

was reviewing some material to prepare for the second round, and 

I heard my name or reference to me. 

119 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, let me do this. If we have agreement with 

both of the Steves on the Committee, let me reserve that, and I will 

examine it and make a comment about it later in terms of putting 

it into this record. 

Mr. KING. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. And I thank the Chairman for his indulgence and we 

will produce the original documents and we will have that deliberation at that another time. I make this point because it is easy to 

point fingers. It is easy to make allegations. It is much more difficult to make a cogent case against deferred prosecution agreements. 

No one on this panel has made a case against them. They have 

raised the issue about unintended consequences. And so I would 

then, rather than go down the list of things I would like to see reiterated here by the witnesses, and the record is relatively replete, 

but I am reflecting upon a part of Mr. Christie’s written testimony 

that I didn’t hear in his oral presentation about the difficulty of 

reaching this agreement with five companies simultaneously. 

And the language that jumps off the page when I read the written testimony is, ‘‘Negotiating these agreements was akin to landing five airplanes on the same runway at the same time.’’ I would 

ask Mr. Christie if he would speak to the difficulty of this agreement. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Thank you, sir. This was a 41⁄2-month long negotiation with some of the best lawyers, corporate health care lawyers 

in America. This is an $80 billion industry, the medical device sensors, an $80 billion industry that has significant resources to hire 

outside counsel in order to be adversarial, as they need to be with 

our office. 

We engaged in a 41⁄2-month long negotiation, and understand 

these are competitive companies. They are competing with each 

other every day. They were willing to agree to reforms but only if 

everyone was going to play by the same set of rules going forward. 

So imagine now, you have five of the biggest law firms in America who each get a chance to make comments on a 30, 40 plus page 

long agreement that will govern the conduct of their client going 

forward for the next number of years. 

We went through nearly a dozen drafts of that agreement which 

meant 60 copies of it because each was times five, with different 

negotiation requests. These were incredibly contentious negotiations that literally, sir, were not resolved until 9 a.m. on the morning that we announced these agreements at 11 a.m., is when the 

last issues were resolved. 

And all five of the companies kept calling in to me to say, ‘‘Is everybody agreeing to exactly the same thing? Is everybody doing 

exact—because if they are not, I am not signing.’’ So literally it was 

akin to trying to land five jets on the same runway at the same 

time without them crashing. 

The reform that they achieved in my view was extraordinary. In 

the first year after this agreement, payments to surgeon consultants by these companies dropped by $150 million. There were more 

than 1,000 fewer consultants at the end of the first year of this 

agreement than there had been when we entered the agreement. 

120 

Imagine, they were still functioning, still being profitable, with 

1,000 less consultants. 

Those reforms were achieved as well as a transparency that has 

been discussed in this country for a long time with medical device 

and pharmaceutical companies. This agreement required that each 

and every one of those companies post on their Web site and update quarterly the names of all the surgeons they were making 

consulting payments to, where those surgeons were located and 

how much they were paid. 

So a citizen in your district, sir, if they were considering an artificial hip or knee replacement and their doctor recommended a device from a particular company, they could go on the Web site and 

see if that doctor was in fact being paid by that company so they 

could judge whether their advice was objective or not. 

This is an area of transparency that now was, as you can see in 

my written testimony, replicated in the pharmaceutical industry 

after we instituted these changes in the medical device industry. 

Those are the kind of things we were negotiating. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Christie. And in conclusion if, with 

some deference from the Chair, I would like to just summarize this 

that I have not been able to get two opposing attorneys to agree 

on anything. The only way I can get them to agree is if they are 

paid by the same client. 

And the difficulty of bringing this together over massive dollars—an $80 billion industry and 94 to 95 percent of the industry 

controlled by these five entities depending on whether it is written 

or oral testimony, but that is a huge number. 

And saving the public $450 million at least, $150 million of that 

from the costs of these services and saving 47,000 jobs seems to me 

to be an extraordinary accomplishment, and I cannot for the life of 

me divine why you would be in the public eye unless it would be 

for adulation. 

And so I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, with that disagreement 

that we are discussing that at the end of this hearing we could 

take that issue up, and I would suspend it until that time, and I 

would yield back the balance of my time, and I thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Are you referring to your attempt to put something into the record? 

Mr. KING. Yes. Yes, I am. 

Mr. CONYERS. I would like to ask you to reflect on withholding 

that from the record because I would like to notify all of our Committee Members that the five companies, Zimmer and four other 

medical device companies, that agreements can be examined on our 

own Web site judiciary.house.gov. And I think that would go a long 

way and I would appreciate your cooperation to that respect. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I am not suggesting to introduce an 

agreement into the record. I am just asking unanimous consent to 

introduce Mr. Cohen’s press release into the record. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. I would take that under advisement. Let me ask 

our Ranking Subcommittee Member, Trent Franks of Arizona, who 

has returned, if he would care to make his opening statement now, 

or would he like to reserve it until a later point in time? 

121 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, if you would afford me that courtesy 

I would appreciate it. 

Mr. COYERS. Would you? All right. By unanimous consent I 

would ask that the gentleman be allowed to make his opening 

statement at this point in time, and he is recognized for that purpose. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I certainly appreciate the courtesy 

here. I apologize. I was out trying to save the world and the 

vote—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Again. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. We don’t know whether I was successful 

yet. The vote will be taken a little bit later, but thank you very, 

very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I obviously would welcome the witnesses, and it 

sounds like you have all done a wonderful job here today, and I 

particularly want to express my welcome to one of our colleagues 

from New Jersey, a distinguished former U.S. attorney from the 

district of New Jersey. 

In the wake of the Enron scandal in 2001, our corporate landscape changed dramatically. One of those changes, really, is what 

has led us to today’s hearing. Arthur Andersen, Enron’s accounting 

firm, was swept into scandal by allegations of accounting improprieties, and it was indicted, prosecuted and convicted in the southern 

district of Texas. 

As a result, it had to surrender its accounting license, effectively 

destroying the business. Seventy-five thousand jobs were lost. Innocent people had held virtually all of them. The Supreme Court later 

unanimously overturned Arthur Andersen’s conviction; I know that 

has been part of the record thus far, the damage, however, was irreparable. 

Arthur Andersen and its jobs never came back from the damage 

inflicted by the trial court proceeding. As a result, the Department 

of Justice took a long, hard look at whether or not there was a better way to pursue wrongdoing by companies without prosecuting 

companies out of business and innocent jobholders out of jobs. 

This decision was to begin using deferred prosecution agreements 

more frequently to avoid needless damage to the economy while 

still policing and correcting wrongdoing. One the great success stories following that change, of course, occurred in New Jersey under 

U.S. Attorney Chris Christie. 

Mr. Christie and his office, uncovered a major kickback scheme, 

a scandal, involving doctors in all five major U.S. manufacturers of 

hip and knee replacements. The problem, Mr. Chairman, was huge. 

These companies represented almost 95 percent of the U.S. market. 

In 2000 alone, more than 700,000 hip and knee replacements 

were performed in the United States of America. Medicare paid 

more than two-thirds of those procedures. The five companies employed 47,000 people in the United States. If prosecuted and convicted, they would have been debarred from the Medicare program. 

The U.S. industry would have simply imploded. It would have 

been Arthur Andersen all over again, but with this time, and with 

the entire—and, of course, in this case it would have the entire 

U.S. sector. And it was critical the Department clean up this scandal, but it was equally critical that the Department not destroy 

122 

10,000 jobs and wreck an important part of our economy and our 

health care system. 

Chris Christie met both of those needs, obtaining deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements with all five firms, a very 

challenging achievement. Under the terms of the agreements, the 

companies lived under the intense scrutiny of corporate monitors 

and the threat of prosecution until their acts were cleaned up. 

They struck 5-year corporate integrity agreements with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. They repaid $311 million to the United States. They stopped $150 million in shady payments to doctors in the first year. These agreements worked, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The companies cleaned up their acts, jobs were preserved, a U.S. 

industry was saved, and nearly half a billion dollars was restored 

to the public at no cost to the taxpayers because the companies 

themselves paid for the corporate monitors that were crucial to 

these results. 

Chris Christie deserves, in my judgment, a medal for his achievements like these, and so do other U.S. Attorneys who obtained 

similar results. Our hearing today should therefore focus on how 

the Department can replicate, and if possible, improve on this kind 

of success. 

The Obama administration, evidently, concurs because its Justice 

Department substantially replicated Mr. Christie’s terms in the 

WellCare agreement recently negotiated by the U.S. attorney for 

the middle District of Florida, and we will hear more from that Department if we haven’t already today. 

In January 2008, The New York Times and New Jersey democrats tried to kick up a controversy over the hiring of former Attorney General John Ashcroft as the corporate monitor for Zimmer, 

the most powerful company subject to Mr. Christie’s agreements. 

Critics and partisans overlooked that it was Zimmer and the 

other corporations subject to an agreement, not Mr. Christie that 

selected General Ashcroft and all of the other monitors. They overlooked that the companies, not Mr. Christie and the taxpayers, had 

hired General Ashcroft and the other monitors and negotiated and 

paid all fees and costs for the monitors. Taxpayers did not pay anything for those monitors. 

And they overlooked that General Ashcroft was immensely qualified for the job of serving as the monitor for Zimmer. Testimony at 

our hearing last spring laid this controversy to rest until the press 

and New Jersey democrats recently attempted to stir it up again, 

but the monitors for Mr. Christie’s agreement did a terrific job in 

the New Jersey case. 

I take hope from these clear results from the caption of our hearing today and from the composition of our expert witnesses on the 

panel today, that today’s hearing will not go down the dead-end 

road trodden by some democrats and New Jersey press. 

I also have confidence that our Committee and Subcommittee 

Chairman will appreciate the effectiveness of the New Jersey 

agreements in rectifying the underlying wrongdoing while saving 

workers’ jobs. 

Because of Mr. Christie’s good work, Mr. Chairman, and because 

these companies complied with agreements Mr. Christie negotiated, 

123 

those jobs are still in existence today, and I thank the Chairman 

for especially going beyond the call of duty to allow me this opportunity to go ahead and give my statement. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, it is my pleasure, and I apologize to our 

other Chairman, Bill Delahunt, who has postponed or is trying to 

rearrange his other activity. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONYERS. With pleasure I call upon—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, I understand that we will have several 

rounds, so I have to go and introduce a foreign dignitary, but at 

least I will be here for the first round. You know, I want to tell 

you, Mr. Christie, until today I did not realize that you were a candidate for governor. So I want you to understand that, you know, 

I am a very, you know, ardent democrat, but I want you to be very 

clear, I had no idea you were a candidate. 

But I think your case does illustrate the problems. Having that 

power invested in the U.S. attorney and after serving in that office 

to develop a political ambition, then one begins to attract, and you 

will discover this I am sure during the course of your campaign, 

a certain scrutiny. 

And that reflects on what I said earlier about the issues of confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system. I am not impugning any of your motives or what you did during the course of 

this particular case, but what I am suggesting is the authority 

ought to be moved from prosecutor’s offices—I disagree with Mr. 

Rosenberg—to the judiciary. 

We wouldn’t be having these hearings today. You wouldn’t be 

questioned about whether you, you know, sought to have Mr. 

Ashcroft, you know, made the monitor in this particular case. You 

know, there are appearances, and I think you would agree with 

me—well, I will ask you a question. Appearances in terms of conflict of interest are important, do you agree with that? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Actual conflicts are most important and appearances are also important, sir, yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. But I, you know, you could be a democrat up in Massachusetts and I am sure—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. That is not likely, but I guess anything could happen. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Anything can happen. Anything is possible. I 

mean the reality is $52 million is a lot of money. $52 million to the 

former Attorney General whom you work for—did you work during—did you serve—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I was proud to serve for 3 years under General 

Ashcroft. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is fine. So what is the public going to say? 

The public is going to say $52 million for what? For what? For one 

single case. And I am not suggesting you did anything improper, 

but appearances are important. Now, if the court was the—clearly, 

a separate and independent branch of government appointed any 

monitor, whether it be the former attorney general or whomever, 

these questions would not occur. 

124 

I wouldn’t be asking you, nor would anyone else, whether you 

had any—did you display favoritism? I have no idea. Did you appoint Attorney General Ashcroft? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. As I said in my written testimony, sir, it was part 

of a process that we went through in our office—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. And that involved the lead prosecutors who investigated the matter. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. My executive staff, but I would like to finish—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure. 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. Because I think a point you made before is apt, and I don’t want to back off from that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. At the of the day, sir, we discuss that as an office, 

we put enormous amount of time into it, but in the end the buck 

stops with me in terms of my recommendation to the company. 

And so I took all the input that I got from all of my career prosecutors, career members at the Department of Justice, fine people, 

and we picked the five best people we thought to recommend to 

these companies. 

These companies interviewed those people and came back and 

told us that they were acceptable to them. And in fact, in the case 

of Zimmer, and I don’t remember if you were in the room were not 

when I said this so I want to repeat it. Zimmer came back and 

said, ‘‘We believe we got the best monitor in General Ashcroft, ‘‘ 

after they had interviewed him. So—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. In other words, was the former attorney general 

one of five that you referred? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. 

Five—oh, in other words you recommended former Attorney General Ashcroft to Zimmer. Is that an accurate statement? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. Now, having said that, and I am not questioning his talent, his abilities, but here we are. Let’s think of the 

people of New Jersey, the people in Massachusetts that might be 

interested in these kind of issues. 

Here you are, and I am sure there was no actual conflict of interest, appointing a former attorney general who did testify here, and 

I have a vague memory as to his appearance, and then it surfaces 

later that the fee was $52 million. That is a lot of money. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, first of all—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you agree it is a lot of money? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I don’t know where you get the number from, first 

of all, because I do not know how much his total fees were. That 

comes from an estimate, from a range of estimates, that is the high 

end of the range of estimates—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. What is the low? What is the low? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I think the low end was in the $20’s somewhere. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. So somewhere between $20 and $50 million. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Right, and in March of 2008 The New York Times 

reviewed this—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. 

125 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. And they put together a group of experts and they said, The New York Times said that ‘‘outside lawyers who have reviewed Mr. Ashcroft’s fee structure said it was not 

out of line for this work.’’ 

And so, while I don’t know what the exact fees turned out to be 

because those were between Zimmer and the Ashcroft Group, The 

New York Times looked at in March of 2008 and said that outside 

experts they consulted said that the Ashcroft fee structure was not 

out of line, nor did the Zimmer folks. 

Not only did they enter the agreement with Mr. Ashcroft, but it 

is important to note, they then voluntarily retained the Ashcroft 

Group to do other matters inside the company that they were concerned about might have raised issues of violations of law, and they 

paid them additional fees for that in order to make sure that they 

were doing these things the right way. That was the company’s 

choice. The company didn’t have to do that. They must have 

thought it was reasonable, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, but at the same time, let us be very practical, and we all understand the real world. You send the recommendation over. The recommendation is the former attorney 

general. One can imagine the conversation within Zimmer. Listen, 

the U.S. attorney sends him over and he served under the former 

attorney general. I am not saying this is in your thinking, but let 

me tell you, if I was counsel at that table I would say this could 

work for us. 

That counsel doesn’t have an obligation to the American public, 

doesn’t have an obligation to the Department of Justice, but to 

make the best decision for the interests of that client. 

Let me tell you, if I was attorney for Zimmer and a recommendation came from you that the former attorney general under whom 

you served you can bet that I would have said, ‘‘He is our guy, 

bingo.’’ That would have been my advice. I am not asking you for 

an opinion. I go back to what I said earlier about appearances. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Well, I wish you had been there, sir, because if you 

had have been there I suspect, given that attitude, we would have 

had a lot less arguing with Zimmer and the counsel than we actually did because, as I detailed earlier for Mr. King, we had months 

and months of contentious negotiation with one of the largest law 

firms in America, Fulbright & Jaworski, and one of their top partners and a slew of associates who argued over every word of every 

line that ultimately wound up in those agreements—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But that was—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. Argued—no, sir, let me just finish— 

who argued also with us over every aspect of enforcement as we 

moved forward. And so—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But that was the agreement, Mr. Christie. I am 

talking about the appointment of the monitor. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Part of the agreement, sir. It was all part of the 

agreement. The agreement to go with the monitor was part—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand, but the—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. But it was, sir, the monitor was appointed as part of the agreement before the agreement was signed. 

It was something that we gave them the opportunity to do before 

they agreed to the resolution in order to make it part of the overall 

126 

negotiation. And so it was just one of the many issues that they 

argued over. It was just one of many issues—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But Mr. Christie, but the reality is that was a 

non-contentious piece of the agreement. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. It turned out to be that way, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because it was an agreement because you sent 

over the recommendation. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I mean you can talk. Was there a contention? 

Was there a debate—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No. There was—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Between your office and—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. Contentious—there was contentious 

argument about a lot of things. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. No. Mr. Christie, you have got to understand, we 

have rules here. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I understand. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. The time is my rule. I am asking you a question, 

and I am asking it respectfully. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. And I am trying to answer it. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Fine. And what I am asking you is, was there 

any contention on the issue of Mr. Ashcroft serving as the monitor? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. There turned out not to be—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. In the context of all the other contentious nature. I don’t know why the lawyer decided to argue about 

something that might have been in paragraph 34 versus the appointment of General Ashcroft. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right, but my point is that wasn’t even a debate 

and it goes back to—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I don’t know if it wasn’t a debate. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, it wasn’t contentious. You just admitted it 

was. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. It was not a debate between me and Zimmer. I 

don’t know what kind of debate happened inside Zimmer. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, let me tell you, I mean, I am just hypothecating. I don’t know but I would have said, let’s get Christie’s guy. 

I mean, that is me. I am not suggesting that was your motive, but 

what I am suggesting is it really creates a problem with an appearance. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, I—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I disagree with you, sir and I—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I can understand that you can disagree with 

me. And you know, I respect that we can disagree, but what I am 

saying is that I would prefer, and you heard my opening observations, about having the authority of appointment in the court, not 

in the prosecutor. 

You can create internal procedures and internal vetting, et 

cetera, but in terms of the perception of the public, the public is 

now hearing this term 52 million, maybe it is 30 million. We don’t 

even know. I mean, that is rather interesting. We don’t know, and 

yet there is an agreement that somehow precludes the American 

public, the people in New Jersey, from knowing what the cost was. 

127 

Mr. CONYERS. Before the—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield back. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. If I could just answer that last part of it, Mr. 

Chairman, with your indulgence, is just to say this, that what we 

achieved in doing this and what the public does know about this 

is that no taxpayer money was spent on any of these monitors, not 

a nickel of taxpayer money was spent on these monitors. 

The monitors were paid for by the companies that were engaged 

in wrongdoing that was defrauding the American public. That 

nearly half a billion dollars to date and counting has been saved 

because of these agreements, and transparency has been brought 

to this process. And so that is what the public does know about 

this. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, if I can, because I do want to respond, and I hear what the gentleman is saying. I think we all 

want to see positive results. What I am suggesting to you is there 

is another method that is far superior than vesting the authority 

in the executive without any check of balance. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. And sir, and I agree. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would you just give me a little time? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I will let you go on. I am sorry. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. No, I wasn’t. I mean I hear things about saving 

jobs. Of course, everybody—we don’t want collateral damage 

whether it is war or peace, okay? And the reality is, I don’t really 

think that in an indictment and then a pre-trial diversion subject 

to an agreement would in any way threaten those jobs. 

You make the point that jobs were saved. You know, I daresay 

okay, that we don’t know whether those jobs were saved or if there 

would have even been any risk to those jobs if we proceeded differently. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. The history tells us, sir. History tells us after the 

Arthur Andersen debacle that jobs were lost. And secondly—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But you know—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Secondly—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Christie, I am going to continue to because, 

you know, I am up here and you are there and the game is here 

that I get to have the last word, right? So I mean—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I understand, sir, but a charging document was 

filed. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. A charging document is not an indictment. You 

know, you can go out and seek an indictment and demonstrate to 

the American people that we are serious about deterrence, and that 

every—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. We did, sir—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. No, you didn’t. 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. Because the Federal judge signed off 

on a criminal complaint. An independent Federal judge signed off 

on a criminal complaint that was filed with—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Then it is not—on prosecution. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, it is. And then the judge signs an order deferring prosecution based upon her review of the agreement and only 

the process—— 

128 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And if there is a violation of the, and if there is 

a violation of the—I guess what I would do is suggest that the 

court, if there is an indictment, through its probation officer in its 

capacity to appoint masters could do it for a lot less than $52 million or $25 million. You know, we both are practitioners of the law. 

We know these kinds of cases. I have never heard—— 

Mr. CONYERS. The time of the gentleman may have expired and 

the Chair wishes to observe that during his inquiry, Trent Franks 

and I have been talking about the importance of the ability to obtain some transparency about the nature of the work product that 

came out of the relationship between the former attorney general 

and the five medical device companies. 

And to that we will ask our staffs to do an inquiry into that 

which may hopefully throw further light upon this subject. Does 

the gentleman agree? 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I am always for transparency. I 

would respectfully submit that any of the negative intonations cast 

on Mr. Christie today seem to be totally without any evidence and 

seem to be sort of a manufactured effort, but I will try to deal with 

that when we get to questions, but I certainly support transparency. 

Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman and I call upon the distinguished Member of the Committee from North Carolina, Howard 

Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to have you panelists with us today. Mr. Christie, in my opening statement I gave 

some background on deferred prosecution. I wanted to make it 

clear that you don’t hold the patent on deferred prosecution. You 

didn’t invent it. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, sir, I did not. 

Mr. COBLE. And I think it has served us well. You mentioned the 

half billion dollar return. Elaborate very briefly, if you will, Mr. 

Christie, on the 47,000 jobs. I didn’t follow that. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sure. Yes, sir. These companies employ 47,000 

people in the United States. If in fact we had indicted these companies, they would have most certainly been debarred from the Medicare program, and two-thirds of all of these hip and knee replacements are paid for by the Medicare system. It would have put 

these folks out of business and those jobs would have been lost. 

Mr. COBLE. I didn’t tie that together. Mr. Rosenberg, you said 

you were not interesting. I found your testimony very interesting. 

You and Mr. Grindler have indicated you have some concerns 

about H.R. 1947. Give us some hypothetical cases where the impediments to effective law enforcement might come into play if enacted. 

Mr. ROSENBERG. Certainly, Congressman. My objection, my concern was general in nature, and Mr. Grindler might be able to 

speak more to the specifics, but I have always believed that prosecutors who work the case, who know the case, know the history 

and have a broad base of experience, perhaps even prosecuting 

cases in that industry, bring the best knowledge to bear to the 

problem. 

And so it is not that judges aren’t smart. They are very smart, 

and they do a wonderful job judging. But now we are asking them 

129 

to do something that they really shouldn’t be doing which is making prosecution decisions. 

A deferred prosecution agreement is essentially an agreement 

not to charge a company. Sometimes complaints are filed, as Mr. 

Christie described, sometimes they are not. If they are and the 

company meets all of the terms, they can be dismissed. 

But that is a very important prosecutive, excuse me, prosecutorial function, and I just don’t think our judges, as good as they 

are, should be doing that, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Grindler, do you concur with that? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I do, Congressman. I would add that your inquiry 

about some examples. One aspect of this bill would require a nonprosecution agreement to be filed with the court. Now, a non-prosecution agreement, which is different than a DPA, does not involve 

the filing of criminal charges. 

It is a decision really not to prosecute with any filing with a 

court, so if you have to file with the court to get approval of a nonprosecution agreement that is the core discretionary function of the 

prosecutors. 

Mr. COBLE. Yes, I understand that. 

Mr. GRINDLER. And if you have to then educate a court on all of 

the details of a criminal investigation and have the court then look 

at the nine principles that are being applied and how, then that 

will delay matters. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you both for that. 

Ms. Larence is it? 

Ms. LARENCE. Larence. 

Mr. COBLE. Ms. Larence, there has been talk about a gubernatorial race to the north of here and timing the release of the 

GAO’s report later this year in order to avoid actual or apparent 

attempt to perhaps the gubernatorial election in New Jersey. Do 

you intend to comply with the constraints such as those described 

in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual for the announcement of politically 

charged or fraud cases prior to that election? 

Ms. LARENCE. Mr. Coble, in order for the companies and monitors to participate in our review, with the Subcommittee’s approval, we entered into confidentiality agreements with all of the 

companies and monitors, so our report will not discuss individual 

cases or companies. We won’t be reporting information that you can 

use to identify individual companies or monitors. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that. 

Mr. Chairman, as I always try to do with you, I try to yield back 

before that red light illuminates, and I see my record is intact 

today. 

Mr. CONYERS. That is just for today. We don’t know about the 

rest of the week or the month of July either. 

Mr. COBLE. I repeat, I yield back. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

being with us. 

Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman very much. We turn now 

to the gentleman from North Carolina who is a Chair of the Subcommittee in the Finance Committee and a veteran Member of this 

Committee, Mel Watt, for inquiry. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to yield briefly 

to the gentlelady from California, who has a time urgency here. 

130 

Ms. LOFGREN. I appreciate that. Yes, I have to go to the White 

House for the immigration meeting and I am very interested in 

this. I do have questions but I will be unable to ask them if I am 

going to make the meeting. 

So I did want to offer my apologies and perhaps I can submit my 

questions in writing, and I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the questions and 

answers, responses that Mr. Conyer, the Chair of the Subcommittee and part of the questions and responses that Mr. 

Delahunt got, and I think they point up a real problem here. 

I don’t much care about Mr. Christie or his political ambitions 

or his history here. I am really more interested in the public policy 

implications here which he seems to be tone deaf to. There is an 

appearance of impropriety, whether there is impropriety or not. 

And the appearance of impropriety sometimes is more powerful 

to the public than actual impropriety. And when I read that somebody offered to do this job for $3 million, and somebody was paid 

$52 million for doing it, that goes beyond the appearance of impropriety. It goes to somebody having paid for that. 

And you can protest to me all you want that the taxpayers didn’t 

pay for it, but if somebody paid $52 million for a service, it got 

passed along to taxpayers or customers in some way. That having 

been said, I really want to focus on the policy implications and 

really everybody seems to have an opinion about this that is sitting 

here other than the first witness and the last witness, so I am 

going to go to the last witness and maybe I can get some policy 

things out on the table. 

It seems to me, I guess I am old fashioned, that most of what 

we are talking about here in this corporate area is distinct from 

what you are talking about in the individual area. 

When I hear people talking about who is going to be the monitor, 

I guess nobody on the private side, the individual side, gets to negotiate who is going to provide the monitor that keeps them in 

their house if they are home-confined. Who is going to be the prison warden? Who is going to be the probation officer? 

So obviously there are two different standards here that are very 

troubling to me, and the interplay here between what the U.S. attorneys here are doing and the private individual or class action 

litigation on the civil side, comes into this discussion very heavily 

from a public policy perspective. 

The question I want to ask, professor, is the extent to which in 

these corporate settings the use of deferred prosecutions or nonprosecution agreements with monitors has grown contemporaneously with the time in which the rights of individual private attorneys’ general have been lessened and lessened and lessened so 

that individual attorneys general can play some of these roles that 

these gentlemen sitting to your right have been playing? 

Is there some correlation that you are aware of or am I missing 

something here? 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Congressman Watt. It is not an area 

that I have specifically studied, but it is certainly something of a 

trend to see more deferred prosecution agreements in the corporate 

context. I think one of the motivating factors for that is of course 

131 

the concern about collateral damage to other entities or other 

groups of people like employees and so forth. 

Mr. WATT. Well I mean do you perceive it as the prosecutor’s role 

to be monitoring, spending a bunch of time entering into agreements about matters that are quasi criminal versus civil, or I mean 

I am missing something here. 

Mr. KHANNA. The entire area of corporate liability as it is divided 

between criminal and civil has substantial amount of overlap, so I 

think you are correct to note that a lot of what appears to be going 

on might be something that could be seen in the civil side, too. 

Mr. WATT. So is there an obligation under any of these regs that 

have been written up, Mr. Rosenberg? Mr. Grindler, I think you 

are in charge of the regulations that implement this. Do you share 

any of this information with private attorneys general so that people can be compensated who have been wronged? 

Is there any obligation on your part to share this information 

that you are gathering at taxpayer expense with people have been 

wronged on the civil side? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I am not sure, Congressman Watt, that I fully understand the question. 

Mr. WATT. You don’t understand the concept of private attorneys 

general and this interplay with U.S. attorneys and, you know, you 

don’t understand the interplay between what is civil and what is 

criminal? 

Mr. GRINDLER. No, no, I do, Congressman. I mean on the civil 

side, for example, in the False Claims Act area individuals through 

private counsel can bring actions in the name of the United States 

in order to deal with frauds upon the United States. 

So in that instance those lawyers are involved—— 

Mr. WATT. But weren’t there some individuals other than the 

United States wronged in this criminal process in Bristol-Myers, in 

Zimmer, in all of these things? Where did the individuals come into 

this or have we given over all of our individual prerogatives in the 

civil context to U.S. attorneys to handle and negotiate monitoring 

agreements and pay $52 million to people to do what appears to 

me to be a civil function? Am I missing something? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Well, let me try to respond. First in terms of victims of a crime, there are obligations that the Department of Justice has to comply with even in the context of a deferred prosecution agreement to address the needs of the victims and the losses 

of the victims, and because with the deferred prosecution agreement there is actually the filing of a charge with a court, those responsibilities are triggered so—— 

Mr. WATT. But no transparency about what your findings are? 

Didn’t you make a determination that this person has engaged in 

some criminal conduct and some civil fraud? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Typically, Congressman, with a deferred prosecution agreement what is filed with the court includes a statement 

of facts which is a public record of findings of facts that are typically admitted to by the corporation, which is in the public record. 

And it could, if it formed the basis or would allow a private litigation, that would be a source of factual information in which an 

individual could then review the facts, retain counsel and bring litigation against the company. Parallel to that is the Department of 

132 

Justice dealing with the responsibility to get restitution to the victims which is also part of what has to be addressed—— 

Mr. WATT. Who got restitution in the Bristol-Myers case? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Congressman Watt, I am not familiar with the 

case. I wasn’t here at the time. 

Mr. WATT. All right. My time has expired. This is very frustrating because I think this is a failure to recognize the interplay 

between the U.S. attorneys’ responsibility to the public and the responsibility to individual claimants. 

And I think we have erred way on the side of criminalizing 

things that could be more appropriately handled if we quit beating 

up on the civil litigation system and making it sound like everybody who files a lawsuit is filing a frivolous lawsuit. It sounded to me like $52 million was paid out to anybody to do 

anything is a frivolous waste of taxpayer money to me, especially 

when we have the e-mails that suggested the same services could 

have been provided for $3 million. Go figure. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COHEN. [Presiding.] Thank you, sir. 

Recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for 5 minutes? 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous 

consent to have entered in the record a press release from your office dated October 17, 2008, indicating that you obtained an earmark in the amount of $800,000 for one of the five companies involved in these deferred prosecution matters. 

Mr. COHEN. There won’t be unanimous consent because Mr. 

Chairman Conyers thought that the Committee Members should be 

more civil to each other and—— 

Mr. FORBES. Then Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. Didn’t want to set a precedent. I don’t 

feel comfortable ruling on it because Mr. Conyers took a different 

position than me. I am proud of the earmark, but Mr. Conyers 

thought for the Committee’s sake that it shouldn’t be entered. 

Therefore, there will not be unanimous consent. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, then I move to have entered into the 

record a press release from the Chairman of the Subcommittee 

holding this hearing today indicating that he obtained an $800,000 

earmark for one of the firms involved in the deferred compensation—— 

Mr. COHEN. You are recognized for questioning, sir. You are out 

of order. 

Mr. FORBES. I appeal the ruling of the Chair. 

Mr. Chairman, if you would like for me to address it I will. Mr. 

Delahunt talked earlier today about it—— 

Mr. COHEN. You know, Mr. Forbes, if you would please refrain 

for a moment. You know, I am the Chairman of this Subcommittee. 

I am proud of my earmark. I hope you will enter all of the earmarks I get from my district. 

This is so extraneous and illogical that it makes no difference, 

and I am happy to have it entered into the record and I hope you 

will enter all the other earmarks that I have received for my district. Thank you, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

133 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED INTO THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE J. RANDY FORBES, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Mr. COHEN. And now that it has been entered into the record, 

you can proceed with your questioning. You have—— 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. Three minutes and 17 seconds. 

Mr. FORBES. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I can do it in that time. 


T1.eps
134 

Mr. Christie, I don’t need a lot of time up here because we have 

got witnesses here to testify and unfortunately we oftentimes do 

more testifying than they do. You were a U.S. attorney during all 

these procedures that you are asked to testify about today. Is that 

true? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And as such when you do these deferred prosecution 

agreements, do you have guidelines that you have to go by in filing 

those? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Was one of those guidelines issued by the current 

Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Holder—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir, it was the Holder Memo. It was issued 

before I was in the Department in 1999. It was expanded upon by 

Deputy Attorney General Thompson. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, you don’t get to write the legislation to guide 

these deferred prosecution agreements. You have to go by the 

guidelines, memos that you are given. And did you comply with all 

of those and—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. FORBES. And in addition to that, one of the things in the 

agreement that apparently the judge looks at, it talks about a monitor. Is there any language in there about the competency of the 

monitor or any language at all that would give some guidance as 

to the qualifications or the ability of the monitor that might be in 

those agreements? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, I don’t remember whether those were in the 

agreements or not as I am sitting here today. I haven’t reviewed 

those agreements in a while. 

Mr. FORBES. The agreement though in totality would be viewed 

by a judge? Is that correct? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir, both the criminal complaint and the 

agreement have to be reviewed and approved by a Federal judge 

before deferring the prosecution. 

Mr. FORBES. And in that review when you look at it, and there 

has been a lot of talk about Mr. Ashcroft, was he part of a larger 

firm? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. He is a part of a larger firm, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Any idea about how many attorneys they had in 

there? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I know that at any one time they had about 40 different people working on this matter. 

Mr. FORBES. And Mr. Ashcroft has, just the record that we have 

been given, was a state auditor. Is that correct? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And he was also state attorney general. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, he was, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. He was also the governor of the state. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. He was also a senator. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. He was also attorney general of the United States. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, he was, sir. 

135 

Mr. FORBES. Anybody ever question his competence to do this 

job? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay, anything that you haven’t had time to respond to because we have cut you off that you would like to do at 

this time? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, all I would say is this, that we talk about, Mr. 

Delahunt and I were talking about the role of the judiciary in all 

of this, I wanted to just make two points really clear. First, one 

that you just raised which is a Federal judge is involved in all this. 

The criminal complaint and the deferred prosecution agreement 

is presented to a Federal judge for their approval before the agreement can be finalized because only a Federal judge can, in fact, 

enter that order that allows the criminal complaint to be deferred 

for prosecution until the conclusion of the agreement. 

Then at the conclusion of the agreement, we sit down with the 

Federal judge to review and request the dismissal of the criminal 

complaint if in fact the company has complied with all the terms 

of the agreement. Only that Federal judge can ultimately sign that 

dismissal. 

And lastly in terms of judicial involvement in these selection 

processes, I just happen to agree with the attorneys general in the 

Bush administration 41, in the Clinton administration, in Bush 43 

administration and in the Obama administration, all of whom believe that these, with proper guidelines, that these decisions are 

best placed in the hands of the prosecutors who are prosecuting the 

case because they know these companies and the cases best. 

So I agree with all of those attorneys general who have looked 

at this and the great people inside the Justice Department who 

have looked at this over four different Administrations and have 

concluded this is the best way to go. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Christie. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Sherman of California, you are recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have got so many conflicts of 

interest and so little time. 

Professor, you put forward the idea that we shouldn’t prosecute 

corporations because there is ‘‘collateral damage.’’ I would point out 

that we prosecute husbands and fathers and wives, and their children are the collateral damage, and we have—creating a society 

where the big corporations are allowed to do anything they want 

as long as they are willing to pay big fees to the big, established 

law firms. 

Mr. Christie, the Committee is aware of five, rather seven, of the 

monitors that were appointed under your tenure, Ashcroft, Kelley, 

Lacy, Sampson, Stern, Yang and Carley. Are there any others? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Now turning to the Zimmer situation, you put forward the idea that, ‘‘Oh, we are going to lose 47,000 jobs if you 

prosecute.’’ The fact is there is money to be paid for the devices 

they make. If you had prosecuted they would have sold their assets 

to legitimate managements that hadn’t committed fraud. 

Instead you left those factories, those employees and most importantly the consumers of those products at the whim of a manageVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Feb 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\062509\50593.000 HJUD1 PsN: 50593
136 

ment that you had determined had committed fraud. You may not 

agree with that, but you will at least agree that the Zimmer factories and the Zimmer Company, rather, deserved monitoring and 

needed monitoring, and yet you deliberately created a circumstance 

where there was an enormous conflict of interest. 

Let me point it out. If you are running a bar you have got to look 

at the local cop on the beat who is going to make sure that you 

not a nuisance to the community. You are monitored by that cop. 

If you gave that cop a couple of hundred bucks worth of a few 

drinks over a couple of weeks that would be a conflict of interest. 

Ashcroft not only got tens of millions of dollars of fees from Zimmer, but they were free under your agreement to hire him for tens 

of millions of dollars. There was no limit. Was there any limit on 

the total amount of money that Zimmer could give to the Ashcroft 

and his law firm under your agreement? 

And why are we upset if a cop takes a few hundred bucks in free 

drinks from a bar, but Ashcroft’s firm is not only able to charge its 

full fee for tens of millions of dollars, but provide unlimited additional services for unlimited additional amounts of money? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Because I don’t believe, sir, that the analogy is an 

apt one. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Is there any limit to the amount that Zimmer 

could pay Ashcroft? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I do not know because I didn’t see the agreement 

between Zimmer and Ashcroft. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well they are free to enter into as many agreements as they want to for Ashcroft to provide whatever services at 

whatever amount—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, sir, not under the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Under the deferred prosecution agreement, sir, 

you bragged that Ashcroft’s firm was retained to provide additional 

services—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. That all were part of what needed to be done to 

make sure they complied with Federal law. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No, well, you bragged that Zimmer voluntarily retained Ashcroft for services outside—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. That is not what I said, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Is there anything in the deferred prosecution agreement that prevents Zimmer from retaining the Ashcroft 

firm to provide a variety of services? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, sir. There is nothing that prevents them from 

doing a whole bunch of things. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. A whole bunch of things, tens of millions 

of dollars, and then you are going to rely on that firm to protect 

my constituents from fraud that has already occurred and might 

occur again while the monitor is getting unlimited tens of millions 

of dollars. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir, because what the record shows is that 

over the first year of this agreement across those five companies 

that consulting fees were reduced by $150 million and that more 

than 1,000 consultants were, excuse me, were fired by those companies. 

137 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am going to reclaim my time. I have so many 

questions. What process did you have to make sure that minority 

and women owned business were eligible for these lucrative monitoring contracts? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. There is no—the process that was put into place 

was for all of us to be able to do that and in fact one of the monitors in the hip and knee case was a minority woman. So you had 

a formal process. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What process did you have to invite people you 

didn’t know to apply for these monitoring jobs or were these lucrative contracts limited to people that you and your staff had a relationship with? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. These contracts were limited to people who were 

qualified for the job—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Oh, but what about somebody—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE [continuing]. And we picked the five best qualified 

people that we could find to do this job. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Did you invite people you didn’t know, who might 

be smarter than the people you do know, to apply? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, there is no process within the Department of 

Justice—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. So you did not create a—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Excuse me, sir. There was no process within the 

Department of Justice to do that, and it is not my position to set 

up guidelines for the Department of Justice. It is the job of main 

Justice, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Sir, how many of the seven monitors involved 

have helped you with your election campaign? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, I have gotten no help from people in my election campaign, with the exception, with the exception of former 

Federal judge, Herbert Stern, who is not involved in the agreements that we are talking about today. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And his law firm and their partners and spouses 

have not donated to your campaign, and Mr. Ashcroft has not endorsed you for governor? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Mr. Ashcroft has not endorsed me for governor, no, 

sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And none of the other monitors have provided any 

assistance? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I said with the exception of former Federal judge, 

Herbert Stern. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Now—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to let you know 

that as I said to you in the letter that I sent to you, I had to depart 

at 1:30 today because of pressing business that I have back in New 

Jersey. I have been here since 11 o’clock and available and so I 

don’t want to cut anybody off, but I need to go and catch a train, 

sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Then, sir, I would like you to answer for the 

record whether you think there was a perception of a quid pro quo 

when you retained Mr. Kelley and gave him a lucrative contract 

when just 2 years prior he had declined to prosecute your brother, 

even though your brother was on a list of people involved in tradVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Feb 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\062509\50593.000 HJUD1 PsN: 50593
138 

ing and those both above him and below him were subject to prosecution. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. No, sir, because my brother committed no wrongdoing and was found not to have committed any wrongdoing, both 

by the southern district of New York and the SEC. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for the opportunity to testify. 

Mr. FRANKS. Would it be possible for 5 more minutes? 

Mr. COHEN. The Ranking Member would like to ask—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Just 5 minutes? I will cut it as quick as I know you 

are—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. I will try. I will try. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me just first ask Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Rosenberg, 

I understand that you have looked over this agreement. Was there 

anything that was inappropriate or illegal about this agreement? 

Mr. ROSENBERG. Mr. Franks, I have not looked over that agreement. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. I am misinformed. 

Mr. ROSENBERG. But no, not to my knowledge. 

Mr. FRANKS. Not to your knowledge. 

Mr. ROSENBERG. I don’t believe anything was inappropriate. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Mr. Christie, let me just ask you this, if 

you had failed to accomplish what you did, isn’t it possible that 

there would be five lengthy lawsuits that would still be going on 

today? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. I was just doing a little calculation. Even if 

the $52 million is correct, the high end, and neither of us knows 

that, from my calculations of 47,000 jobs that comes out to about 

$1,100 per job that you saved and the taxpayers never paid for a 

penny of it. 

And when I compare that to the stimulus $780 billion, that 

should give us approximately 711 million jobs for America and 

might I just ask you as just a personal request, please do not consult with the Obama administration because if they figure out how 

you are able to save this many jobs at so little they might get reelected. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. So with that, I wish you the best. I think you have 

done a fantastic job here today and I am sorry that you were subjected to some of the insinuations, but you have done a great job 

and I might endorse you for governor. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Christie, what time is your train? 

Mr. CHRISTIE. My train is a little bit before 2:00, sir, and I have 

to go. 

Mr. COHEN. You are not going to make a 2 o’clock, so—— 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Well, sir, I am—— 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Johnson, you are recognized. 

Mr. CHRISTIE. Sir, I am going. I said I had to leave at 1:30 and 

I will. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Johnson, you are recognized for your questions. 

Mr. KING. The agreement was—— 

Mr. COHEN. Five minutes. 

139 

Mr. KING. There was an agreement with the gentleman, Mr. 

Chairman. Is that not correct, an agreement at 1:30? 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Johnson, you are recognized. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I am not going to have any questions—— 

Mr. KING. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. For Mr. Christie. 

Mr. KING. Parliamentary inquiry. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I will not have any questions for Mr. Christie. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. King, what is your parliamentary inquiry? 

Mr. KING. Parliamentary inquiry, I would ask if you would respond. Was there an agreement with Mr. Christie that he would 

leave at 1:30 and why would you resist that? 

Mr. COHEN. I didn’t. I asked Mr. Johnson for his time. There is 

four panelists with information he wasn’t going to ask Mr. Christie. 

I hope you are satisfied. Mr. Johnson, continue. 

Mr. KING. I am unsatisfied. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you and what I think we have done is turn 

this into a partisan matter and it is really not. This is a situation 

involving prosecutorial discretion with respect to how to dispose of 

a case that is in the best interest of the public. 

And I would cite to you the case of T.I., done in the northern district of Atlanta, and T.I. was charged formally indicted actually, for 

some firearms offenses, and as a consequence there were plea negotiations between his lawyers and also the U.S. Attorney Nahmias. 

And as a result of those negotiations an agreement was reached, 

and the agreement provided for T.I. to be able to do something that 

was very important for young people who listen to him. And so I 

thought that was—I wanted to commend first of all the U.S attorney for the northern district for having the courage to do that, because we are talking about blue collar crime right there. 

Now, white-collar crime should get a similar analysis by prosecutors and so I have no problem with that basic tool. I will say, however, that I appreciate Mr. Bill Pascrell, who is from the great state 

of New Jersey, as well as my friend Mr. Frank Pallone also from 

New Jersey and their motives have been very sincere. 

And I want to ask you all whether or not you have any problems 

with let us see, H.R., what is that, Mr. Pascrell, H.R.—your bill, 

H.R. 1947, which has been introduced by Mr. Pascrell and also has 

a number of co-sponsors. 

And you all didn’t ask me if I wanted to sign it as an original 

co-sponsor, but I certainly would have signed on, and I believe I am 

signed on now, as a matter of fact, as a co-sponsor, so I wish to 

commend you and I want to ask you, starting with you, ma’am, do 

you have any problems with H.R. 1947 is it? Mr. Pascrell’s bill? 

Ms. LARENCE. We don’t take positions—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. And the way I want you to answer this question 

yes or no, each one of the panelists. And then, depending on the 

response, I will ask for a follow up. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. LARENCE. Mr. Johnson, GAO doesn’t endorse particular legislation—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. 

Ms. LARENCE [continuing]. But we might have information on 

particular provisions in the bill that would be helpful. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, thank you. 

140 

Mr. GRINDLER. Congressman, yes, the Department of Justice 

does have some serious concerns with a number of the provisions 

of the bill. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How about you, Mr. Rosenberg? 

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you support it? 

Mr. ROSENBERG. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, and how about you, Mr. Khanna? 

Mr. KHANNA. I support a number of provisions but I have some 

concerns with some. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay, and let me ask this question. Are these deferred prosecution agreements and also the agreements not to 

charge, non-prosecution agreements, in other words should there 

not be—I don’t think you all are saying there should not be guidelines. I think what you are saying is you would like to see some 

tweaking of this bill so that it could pass. Is that correct? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Congressman, the Department of Justice opposes 

this legislation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, the legislation simply calls for guidelines to 

be established that directs the attorney general to issue public 

written guidelines for deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 

agreements within 90 days of the enactment date. Do you have a 

problem with that, Mr. Grindler, is it? I am sorry—— 

Mr. GRINDLER. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. My eyes are going bad. Do you have 

a problem with that? 

Mr. GRINDLER. If I may explain—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes or no first, before you explain. Do you have 

a problem with H.R. 1947, which directs the attorney general to 

issue public written guidelines for deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements within 90 days of the date of enactment? 

I mean, who could have a problem with that? 

Mr. GRINDLER. In the context of the entire bill, yes, I do, Congressman. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Well, let me ask you but that particular 

stipulation you have no problems with, correct? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Some of the paragraphs under the guideline provision we do have problems with. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. 

Mr. GRINDLER. If you are talking about guidelines as a separate 

piece of legislation—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. You have said that repeatedly. I am trying to pin 

you down. It also directs the attorney general to establish rules for 

the selection of independent monitors. Who could be in disagreement with that and why? 

It also provides that a national list of possible monitors from 

which the Justice Department must appoint an independent monitor, and must establish a fee schedule for compensation of independent monitors and their support staff. I mean, what could be 

wrong with that? I have no idea. Nobody will answer the questions. 

The bill also sets out certain restrictions relating to deferred 

prosecution and non-prosecution agreements and it provides for judicial oversight of such agreements. It doesn’t take any prosecutorial discretion away. 

141 

Although I might add that we have done just that with our Federal court judges by limiting their discretion on certain things like 

imposing sentencing guidelines and also mandatory minimums, 

which have resulted in a lot of low level folks in the drug business 

being incarcerated for long periods of time like 20, 30 years, those 

kinds of things. 

We have taken away our discretion of our Federal judges and I 

certainly am opposed to those kinds of schemes which treat everybody the same way. I just don’t understand why anybody would be 

opposed to H.R. 1947, and with that I will yield back. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

I believe Mr. Scott is next. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Larence, generally 

speaking, do the U.S. attorneys’ offices have the expertise to handle 

these kinds of contracts? 

Ms. LARENCE. What they reported to us is oftentimes they will 

choose an independent monitor because they don’t have either the 

resources or the technical expertise for that particular industry. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, in contracting with a monitor, I mean normally 

if you are building a courthouse or something like that there would 

be a fair process including public request for proposals. 

There would be a process to select and oversee a multimillion 

dollar contract and does the U.S. attorneys’ office have that kind 

of expertise to draft and oversee and select an appropriate person 

to be awarded the contract. 

Ms. LARENCE. What is interesting that we have found in our review is that different U.S. attorney offices have different practices. 

One office actually did go through a competitive bidding process to 

identify candidates and open up opportunities. 

Other offices have the companies themselves go through a nomination process, and the companies are allowed to bring monitor 

nominations to the Department of Justice. In other cases the Department of Justice presents the monitor and the company pretty 

much has a yes or no decision at that point. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is that Department of Justice or U.S. attorneys’ office. 

Ms. LARENCE. Individual U.S. attorneys’ offices. 

Mr. SCOTT. And this could be a sole source contract? 

Ms. LARENCE. I am not sure I have an answer to that one, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me ask Mr. Grindler, I mean according to 

this contract—I mean on an hourly rate that seems excessive, is 

there a limit to how much a monitor can make on these contracts 

before somebody has committed a crime? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Congressman, I think the limit stems from what 

is agreed upon between the government and the defendant as to 

the scope of what the monitor should do, and under the memorandum issued by the Deputy Attorney General in 2008, the scope 

should be limited to whether the company is complying with the 

agreement, and whether it has instituted a compliance program in 

sufficient internal controls to ensure that there is not criminal conduct going forward. 

But the contract—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, no, I mean—— 

142 

Mr. GRINDLER [continuing]. Between the company and the monitor, they actually are the ones that do the negotiating of the contract between those two entities. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, does the company have—in this case it just appeared that the escrow firm had been picked, and the company was 

kind of stuck with them, and the rate in the e-mail traffic there 

seemed to be some question about what the hourly rate was. Do 

you know what the hourly rate was that Mr. Ashcroft was getting? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Congressman, I do not. 

Mr. SCOTT. Does anybody know what the hourly rate was? Could 

it be calculated? Was he guaranteed a certain amount? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Congressman, I just don’t know. 

Mr. SCOTT. E-mail traffic suggests at least $1,000 an hour. Is 

that what monitors are suppose to be making? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Congressman, under this memorandum from the 

Deputy Attorney General the decision as to who the monitor should 

be is no longer with a United States attorney or the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division in the context of a DPA 

or an NPA. 

It now rests ultimately with the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General, and the memorandum issued by Mr. Morford in 2008 

states explicitly that the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division or any other division, and the United States attorneys 

do not have approval or veto authority with respect to a recommendation for a lot of them. 

Mr. SCOTT. And why was that change made? 

Mr. GRINDLER. That was in March 2008. 

Mr. SCOTT. Why was it made? 

Mr. GRINDLER. My understanding, I was not with the Department of Justice when this discussion began, but my understanding 

from conversations I have had actually with David Nahmias, was 

that this process began in 2005 in the summer, and to look at monitor relationships and to look at best practices and try to develop 

guidance. 

And that there were meetings within the Department of Justice 

with U.S. attorneys and with the criminal division to discuss it, 

and that there was a meeting with outside counsel, private lawyers 

to get their input. And then yes, at the end of 2007 because of interest by Congress, and the public, that process was escalated and 

the memorandum was issued in March of 2008. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what was so upsetting about this contract that 

caused the change to be made? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Congressman, I just can’t speak about that. I 

have been able to talk to David Nahmias who is still the United 

States attorney in Atlanta, but I have not, you know, communicated with people who are no longer with the Department about 

that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is there kind of a general kind of range that monitors 

should cost? I mean because this contract cost us $50 some million? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I don’t know the details of the contract. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you know what other monitors generally make in 

other situations? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I do not. In the two instances and they are still 

under review where there is a monitor possibility, we have made 

143 

specific inquiries of the monitor about the financial arrangements 

and whether or not the subject corporation is satisfied with it and 

whether that been addressed. 

And certainly under this memorandum from the deputy attorney 

general it encourages companies that come and talk about issues 

that may arise in the context of both the monitors and the deferred 

prosecution agreements. 

Mr. SCOTT. But before this was picked the U.S. attorney, local 

U.S. attorney, had pretty much carte blanche authority to pick 

whoever he wanted and award essentially unlimited fees. 

Mr. GRINDLER. My only response, Congressman, is that before 

March of 2008, the United States attorneys throughout this country would have had the authority within the cases brought in those 

jurisdictions to make decisions about how to resolve criminal cases. 

Mr. SCOTT. And we have—because of what has happened the 

way they used that authority we had to change the process is that 

right? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Again, the process was already under review 

prior to the events that gave rise to expediting the issuance of the 

memorandum, based on what I was told. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, you weren’t there, so I mean they had—anybody looking at the situation knows that something is wrong when 

local U.S. attorneys’ sole source of $50 million contract for someone 

who has political connections. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GRINDLER. Okay. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Grindler this might have been where he was 

going. You are at the Justice Department now, and as I understand 

it, now, you can confirm or not confirm, there was internal guidance since this time in the Justice Department that prohibits the 

type of extraordinary restitution that was imposed in the BristolMyers Squibb agreement because of actual or perceived conflict of 

interest or other ethical considerations emanating from such a provision. Is that not true? Are you aware of those changes? 

Mr. GRINDLER. What I am aware of, Mr. Chairman, is that in 

May of 2008, a provision was added to the United States Attorneys’ 

Manual that said that, ‘‘With respect to plea agreements DPAs and 

NPAs that they should not include terms requiring a defendant to 

pay funds to a charitable educational community or other organization or individual that is not a victim of the crime or is not providing services to redress the harm caused by the defendant’s 

criminal conduct.’’ That was put into the United States Attorneys’ 

Manual in May of 2008. 

Mr. COHEN. And do you know of any situation, other than that 

of Mr. Christie and his alma mater, Seton Hall, where this occurred? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I don’t, but I was not with the Department of Justice then. 

Mr. COHEN. Right, I know you weren’t. You weren’t, you know, 

with Davy Crockett at the Alamo, but you know they all died. So 

let me ask you this—do you know of any situation in the Department of Justice where somebody had such an agreement, other 

than Mr. Christie where he gave was part of this deferred prosecution and somebody gave money to his law school. 

144 

Mr. GRINDLER. I don’t think so, Congressman. 

Mr. COHEN. In that type of arrangement or that type of settlement would be not permitted any longer is that right? 

Mr. GRINDLER. That is correct unless the law school is somehow 

providing services that redress the harm caused by the criminal 

conduct. 

Mr. COHEN. So if the law school was doing knee-jerk reaction in 

this, you know, type of thing there was some kind of bodily deal, 

medical device work, that would be one thing, but there weren’t. 

Mr. GRINDLER. I mean I have no knowledge of that. I would add, 

Mr. Chairman, that there are also statutes and regulations that 

address the requirement of disqualification in circumstances in 

which there is personal or political relationship. 

Mr. COHEN. And would you explain what those are, those came 

about after Mr. Christie’s situation with Seton Hall, is that correct? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I don’t think they did. I think they were—— 

Mr. COHEN. Before that? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I am not sure about that, Mr. Chairman, but I 

think they were already in place at the time. 

Mr. COHEN. They were in place, and what are those policies? 

Mr. GRINDLER. One of the provisions, and by the way these are 

provisions that, in terms of the current process as a result of the 

Deputy Attorney General’s memorandum, when monitorships are 

reviewed there is explicit reference to the need to have an ethics 

official within the group of people, the Committee that has to review the decisions on those monitors. 

But one provision is 45 CFR Section 45.2, it is titled Disqualification from Personal or Political Relationship, and it says basically 

that, ‘‘No employee shall participate in a criminal investigation or 

prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with any 

person or organization which he knows has a specific and substantial interest that would be directly affected by the outcome of the 

investigation or prosecution.’’ 

And then there is a provision relating to personal relationship, 

which is somewhat more subjective because it can extend to 

friends, but it really gets back to—— 

Mr. COHEN. Wouldn’t Mr. Christie’s selection of his former employer, Attorney General Ashcroft, for this lucrative monitoring 

contract be a direct violation of that Federal rule that is what is 

considered a special—what is the word of art—special relationship 

or is that not accurate? Wouldn’t that be such? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I just don’t know enough about the situation to 

be able to respond to you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, the important, the ‘‘shall not participate in the 

matter unless he has informed the agency, received authorization 

of the agency designee, employs a covered relationship with any 

person for whom the employee has within the last year served as 

officer, director, trustee, general, partner, agent, attorney, consultant, accountant or employee. 

In this situation Mr. Christie was an employee of Mr. Ashcroft. 

Therefore, he is covered in your policy under b(1)(iii) as a covered 

relationship, and under the guidelines in affect at the time that 

was improper. 

145 

Mr. GRINDLER. Mr. Chairman, I just don’t have sufficient information about that matter to be able to come to a conclusion. 

Mr. COHEN. Assuming those facts are true, that was he was his 

previous employer, would that not be in a hypothetical come within 

a covered relationship? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I would just have to look at it in the context of 

the language of it. I just don’t know enough about it. 

Mr. COHEN. All right. Let me ask you this. In the wake of these 

monitor appointments, did the Department issue the Morford 

Memo which provides some guidance on monitor selection? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I am sorry? 

Mr. COHEN. The Morford Memo. 

Mr. GRINDLER. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. You are familiar with that? Was that a response to 

the situation in New Jersey? 

Mr. GRINDLER. My only knowledge of that comes from some conversations I have had because I wasn’t there, but I was told that 

the an effort began at the Department of Justice in the summer of 

2005 to begin to look at monitor relationships and develop best 

practices, and that meetings occurred both within the Department 

and in one instance with outside private counsel to begin to develop 

those best practices. 

And then at the end of 2007 there were inquiries from Congress, 

and there were also public concerns raised which expedited that 

process, and then the memorandum was issued in March of 2008. 

And again, that is what I have been told about it. I wasn’t at the 

Department at the time, so I wasn’t involved. 

Mr. COHEN. Okay. I want to just ask you this, there were five 

defendants in the medical devices cases, and one of them was from 

my district, and the world should know that I am an effective Congressman I got an earmark in my district, and I am pleased that 

the word is going out now, but that had nothing to do with this 

hearing. 

In fact that company said Mr. Christie was a reasonable guy. 

They spoke well of him. I had a good impression of him until today, 

and the fact is they did think that there should be some type of 

ombudsman, that there were times when their monitor went and 

did certain travels and went certain places and spent certain 

amounts of money on top flight hotels and first class airfare, et 

cetera, et cetera things like that, and they objected. 

Do you not think that there should be somebody looking in on 

that circumstance because they didn’t feel like they could say anything? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the corporation in the first instance, which is negotiating these agreements 

with the monitors, and I think some of those discussions can take 

place before decisions are made on monitors, that they in the first 

instance with the lawyers they have should attempt to put some 

restraints on what the costs are some appreciation of what it is 

from the Department of Justice’s point of view under the Morford 

Memo. 

We are encouraging companies to talk to us about these relationships and concerns that arise, and I would think that if concerns 

146 

arise in which a monitor was going beyond the scope of his or her 

charge as a monitor, then those issues should be brought to us. 

And we would be interested in having discussions about it because the Morford Memo itself recognizes the importance of looking 

at the cost and impact of monitorships on the company, both in 

terms of making the decision to have a monitor and in terms of 

what the scope of the monitor’s duty should be. 

Mr. COHEN. Anybody on this side have another round of questions? 

Mr. King of Iowa? 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really take the opportunity to thank all the witnesses and glad to have the chance to 

do so. I remarked to one or more of my colleagues at the conclusion 

of all of your testimony that the filter that you all went through 

to get here must have filtered out anybody that didn’t happen to 

have significant intelligence because all of your testimony to me 

seems to be very well informed and very measured and very accurate and precise. 

And I, but it is not that we don’t get good panels of witness here, 

but you certainly rank among the best we have seen. And I am 

struck by that unanimity, the view that you bring for the deferred 

prosecution agreements that are the subject of this. 

And as I recall, Mr. Grindler, you spoke I think in the most 

depth with regard to the unintended consequences that might 

come, although I don’t recall that this panel has examined those 

unintended consequences as deeply as you may prefer or as I may 

prefer, and I would ask if you could expand upon the unintended 

consequences? 

Mr. GRINDLER. Well, I mean it is always a difficult valuation 

when you are faced with a company that has engaged in criminal 

activity, but you do have to look beyond that and I think part of 

that stems from the fact that a corporation cannot be put into jail. 

So from a deterrent point of view I think that is one reason why 

the collateral consequences do come into play, so you see what the 

impact may be of going forward with a prosecution where you tend 

to get a guilty verdict. 

And that is, of course, on the employees, on the shareholders, on 

pensioners and even on the public. But having said that, if you 

have a corporation that is a recidivist, or where the criminal activity goes across the culture of the company and is systemic, then I 

think the pendulum typically would swing the other direction 

where a prosecution may be necessary. 

And so these are the sort of balancing act that we try to go 

through when we review what our choices are in prosecuting a corporation. 

Mr. KING. I thank you, Mr. Grindler, and I just would ask if you 

have any knowledge of any deferred prosecution agreement that 

would have put a limit on the amount that might be paid a consulting firm? 

Mr. GRINDLER. I don’t have a knowledge where there is a provision that says you are capped at a certain amount, but I started 

at the Department in March of this year so I am beginning to review proposals for deferred prosecution agreements, and so I don’t 

have a real base to—— 

147 

Mr. KING. If I could then defer that questioning to Mr. Khanna 

to respond? 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Congressman King. We have looked at 

almost about 30 deferred prosecution agreements and tried to get 

information about the pay. There doesn’t appear to be any explicit 

limit on the hourly rate that monitors might get paid. 

I think the sense—we have spoken to a few monitors, too—the 

sense is that they try to charge their normal hourly rate, whatever 

that might be, but there doesn’t appear to be any explicit limit on 

how much that might be per case. 

Mr. KING. And in your professional judgment would there be any 

motivation for a company to pay an additional amount so that 

might justify putting a cap on, or a limit on? 

Mr. KHANNA. Well, it is hard to imagine why a company would 

want to pay more. Of course, the—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. KING. I would yield. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the company wish to maintain a good rapport with the monitor, given the fact that—— 

Mr. KHANNA. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. If there was a violation of the agreement then the process would stop and the case would be brought 

in front of a judge. So in terms of leverage, to my good friend from 

Iowa, I would suggest that the alternative, in terms of payment to 

the monitor by the company, the company has zero leverage. 

Mr. KING. I reclaim my time. I appreciate the gentleman’s view 

on this and an opportunity to restate it. It just occurs to me that 

of the people I have hired, when I paid them what was agreed to 

in the contract that that has always been satisfactory, and I don’t 

remember ever feeling that urge to write an extra check to them 

if they were satisfied with the compensation for the services that 

they had rendered. 

I would also point out that there is such a thing as contract 

agreements, and I think we should adhere to them, even up to the 

point of allowing a witness to leave when the agreement is that the 

witness be allowed to leave. 

I would also point out that the gentleman from Massachusetts 

has stated that he supports prosecutorial discretion, and I think 

that has been explored to some extent here at least, and the question becomes how much discretion? 

But the important point is I think made by Mr. Rosenberg, that 

if we are going to accept some of the suggestions about turning 

that prosecutorial discretion over to the judiciary branch, we are 

asking judges to do jobs that overloads them and they may or may 

not be, however qualified they are to do the jobs they are assigned. 

So I appreciate the witnesses, the testimony, and some of the 

things that happened in this hearing today, but political lynchings 

are not among those things I appreciate. 

Mr. COHEN. One minute. 

Mr. KING. I yield back. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. Mr. Pallone and Mr. Pascrell would like 

to testify on the second panel before we go in for votes. We are supposed to go in for votes between 2:15 and 2:30. Well, I don’t have 

any questions for my two colleagues. 

148 

Could you have a quick question before the panel before we dismiss them? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I would like to point out that, you know, 

contracts should be respected, but the problem seems to be that 

within that contract there are no guidelines. There are no caps in 

terms of what compensation is. 

It is open-ended and clearly, at least from my perspective, any 

legal services or services that are rendered in the amount—let us 

just presume that that $52 million figure is accurate—I would say 

that would be hard to justify. 

But could I just offer you one hypothetical? If I were the United 

States attorney and I will pose this to the panel, and I came to you 

and I indicated that I had a relative, a close relative that was accused, only accused, of a certain crime and not in a formal sense 

but was a suspect, and a colleague, professional colleague, another 

district attorney or another prosecutor, declined to prosecute presumably on good solid reasons. 

If I came to you and I was working for you, Mr. Rosenberg or 

you in your capacity Mr. Grindler, and say, ‘‘I am considering appointing the individual prosecutor who declined to prosecute as a 

monitor in a particular matter that would generate sufficient revenue, what would your advice be to me? 

And again, I go back to my original comments about appearances 

and confidence of the people and the integrity of the system. 

Mr. GRINDLER. I think what I would do is consult with an ethics 

expert at the Department of Justice and get specific advice as to 

how I should proceed. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. 

Mr. Rosenberg? Now remember, this is a close relative—— 

Mr. ROSENBERG. I understand. 

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Who 2 years prior, the individual 

that I intend to appoint as a monitor, which may or may not generate millions of dollars of revenue, declined to prosecute, what 

would you do? 

Mr. ROSENBERG. I understand the hypothetical, sir. I have a little bit of difficulty separating it from the underlying situation from 

which I believe you are referring. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I don’t want to refer to anything. This is 

me coming to you. You are a district attorney, or you were. I am 

the current sitting state’s attorney up in Boston, and I had a close 

relative. You reviewed the case and made a decision not to prosecute, and now I am looking to you to become a special monitor 

whereby you have the potential to generate hundreds of thousands 

of dollars, if not millions. 

Mr. ROSENBERG. I agree with Mr. Grindler. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You would go to an ethics expert? Okay. 

Mr. ROSENBERG. I would. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. 

Professor Khanna? 

Mr. KHANNA. Certainly nothing wrong with going to an ethics expert. I would—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. On its face. 

Mr. KHANNA. I am sorry? 

149 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But I am just giving you this. You don’t have 

time to go to an ethics expert. 

Mr. KHANNA. Oh, Okay. Rarely do professors run out of time, but 

all right. I would be somewhat squeamish about agreeing—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You would have concern about appearances? 

Mr. KHANNA. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. If there is no other questions of the 

panel we thank each of the members of the panel and we excuse 

you, and thank you for your contributions, and there are some written questions from Ms. Lofgren that may be going to one of you, 

and if you would be kind enough to respond to them in writing 

they will be made part of the record. 

And Members of the Committee have 5 days to submit further 

questions to you which could be posed, and we would appreciate 

you responding to those in an expeditious manner. With that, the 

panel is dismissed. 

Without objection, the record will remain open for 5 legislative 

days for further additional material. Thank you. 

Thank you, sirs. Normally we come down and shake hands and 

all those things, but we are going to pass up all those typical congressional niceties because we have the congressional votes to come 

very soon, and they trump niceties, so the second panel? 

I am now pleased to introduce the witnesses for our second panel 

for today’s hearing. Our first witness will be Mr. William Pascrell, 

Jr., representing the 8th District of New Jersey, elected to Congress in November 2006. I think everybody knows about his record. 

He introduced H.R. 1927, Accountability and Deferred Prosecution 

Act of 2009 this past April 2. 

Congressman, would you please proceed with your testimony? 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE BILL PASCRELL, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be here today and 

thank the entire Committee and Ranking Member. We are here to 

eliminate deferred prosecutions. That was—no part of the bill says 

that. We are simply here to elevate their application. 

Every citizen in this esteemed Committee should understand 

how deferred prosecutions have become part of the justice system. 

As I study this issue, Mr. Chairman, I believe that deferred prosecutions are related to the larger issue of corporate prosecutions in 

the post-Enron era. What I have come to realize is that these 

agreements are actually even more relevant to the type of corporate malfeasance that cost millions of Americans their jobs. 

They are gone. Those jobs are gone. I do not know, the prior witness, what jobs he was talking about, that led our Nation to the 

brink of the greatest economic crisis since the Depression. Quite 

simply, corporate greed, collusion and illusion have become legion. 

The executive branch and the Congress have for the most part 

stood aside, witnessed a significant collapse of oversight, justice 

and professed American values. I would contend, after examining 

the volumes of evidence before us, that the sentinels at the gate, 

150 

a fair number of U.S. attorneys, have been handmaidens to the 

fleecing of our citizens. 

However, as we saw in the Zimmer case, older Americans were 

the ones who suffered the physical and mental consequences of 

bribery and fraud. We witnessed the bribery of physicians so that 

they would advocate for a specific prosthetics device, regardless of 

whether it was defective or not. Not one person before us today on 

the first panel talked about the victims. 

These perpetrators of Medicare fraud are the lowest of the low 

in my opinion, and yet, because they entered into a deferred prosecution these corporate criminals have never had to even admit 

guilt to the consumers they cheated, and thanks to Mr. Christie 

they never will. 

Mr. Chairman and the Members of this Committee, there has 

been an erosion of confidence, as Mr. Delahunt talked about earlier. Not only in the financial system but in the justice system 

which failed to bring the bad actors to justice. Pay a fine, avoid jail. 

Promise you will do better next time and no one gets prosecuted. 

The fine simply becomes the price of doing business. 

In fact, many corporations as part of their business brief, the 

captains of corporate America who did our Nation wrong, look to 

the very justice system that is supposed to protect citizens, to bail 

themselves out. We are here today seeking legislation to help right 

the ship of justice. 

This goes way beyond one conflict of interest concerning a $52 

million no-bid contract. Mr. Christie and Mr. Ashcroft should not 

flatter themselves. Our bill, the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, yes, Mr. Johnson, what could be wrong with that? 

Accountability. You are right. 

It simply brings accountability and transparency to this process 

for the first time. I want to literally show all of you just one example of why we need transparency on this issue. Here are the files 

of one monitor, Debra Wong Yang. These are files we obtained from 

the Senate Committee on the Aging, which held its own Medicare 

fraud investigation in the case in question. 

This bill, from DePuy Orthopaedics, sent to DePuy Orthopaedics, 

which had former U.S. attorney Debra Yang selected as its monitor, is about 200 pages long. I have read every page and it is so 

detailed that even documents—every time Ms. Yang had to charge 

a cab fare, which is standard billing practice for law firms. 

However, the bill sent to Zimmer, Incorporated by Ashcroft, the 

Ashcroft Group, which charged many millions more in expenses, 

does not include any information about the services provided. It 

gives us no information whatsoever. No billable hours, no reimbursable expenses. 

In fact, it is just on one page, a bill listing the total amount due. 

The bank information about where to wire the bank—I think that 

is fitting by the way—and nothing more. This is a ransom note not 

a billing statement. Please examine both of them. You come to your 

own conclusion about transparency. 

Mr. Cohen, it should come as no surprise that the executive 

branch will always prefer to alter its own procedures at its own 

pace, but as Members of Congress, I believe we have a solemn to 

151 

oversee these practices and take corrective action when it is called 

for. 

The Zimmer case merely highlights the lack of oversight of deferred prosecutions. In this case, there existed a clear outright conflict of interest as Mr. Christie set out to hire his former boss, Attorney General Ashcroft. 

We know of at least 120 different deferred prosecution agreements, and as the GAO pointed out, many of them were undertaken by Federal prosecutors who had the diligence to seek a transparent and fair process for entering into these agreements and selecting monitors. 

We are not just talking about the manager. We are not talking 

about a manager of a baseball team, and I happen to be playing 

on that baseball team, I am talking about the manager of justice 

in the United States of America who left his position and was hired 

by one of the fellows, one of the people on his team to do this job. 

Mr. Christie, and many of his acolytes, will trumpet the deferred 

prosecution system. They expand it as a fail-proof method to 

cleanse corporations. To them I need cite only one example, AIG, 

2004, 2006—two deferred prosecutions and it worked well, didn’t 

it? 

This former insurance giant, which is now synonymous with corporate greed and public deceit, received two deferred prosecution 

agreements and paid a monitor $20 million. For what? In accepting 

deferred prosecution, Mr. Greenberg, now disgraced, too late—the 

horse is out of the barn—said this. 

‘‘This comprehensive deal brings finality to the claims raised by 

the SEC and the Department of Justice. The role of an independent 

consultant complements our own transaction review processes. We 

welcome this enhancement,’’ he said. 

Today, the records of AIG sets asunder the ruined dreams and 

hopes of so many Americans who literally had their planned futures taken away from them. I wonder how many of those lost their 

jobs and lifelong savings, would say that the deferred prosecution 

system did its job? 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for listening. I have more to say, but 

time is of the essence. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pascrell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL PASCRELL, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

I want to thank Full Committee Chairman Conyers and Subcommittee Chairman 

Cohen for allowing me to testify before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law on the issue of deferred prosecution agreements. My attention was 

first brought to this issue of deferred prosecution agreements in large part because 

of published reports regarding the actions taken by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 

New Jersey. It had been reported that U.S Attorney for the District of New Jersey, 

Christopher Christie had reached a $311 million settlement to end an investigation 

into kickbacks being made by leading manufacturers of knee and hip replacements. 

This settlement reportedly ended a two-year federal probe into allegations that 

these manufacturers paid surgeons millions of dollars to use and promote their knee 

and hip replacements, which would constitute a violation of Medicare fraud statutes. 

Within this agreement these manufacturers agreed to hire a federal monitor, selected by the U.S. Attorney, which would ensure they comply with the law and a 

strict set of reforms. However, I was initially concerned that there was little transparency within this provision of the agreement as it could allow the federal monitor 

to act with impunity while the manufacturers remain under the threat of prosecution. 

152 

Furthermore, this agreement raised questions about the discretion of the U.S. Attorney’s Office to select federal monitors. In this case, Mr. Christie selected Ashcroft 

Group Consulting Services, which according to reports stands to collect as much as 

$52 million in 18 months for its monitoring of Zimmer Holdings of Indiana. Apparently, these compensation agreements for federal monitors are almost never known 

publicly and were only released in this instance because they were disclosed in the 

SEC filings for Zimmer Holdings of Indiana. I was concerned that under the continued threat of prosecution, any party being investigated seemingly has little choice 

but to agree to the selection of these federal monitors and their exorbitant fees. 

Therein the selection of these federal monitors by Mr. Christie could give the impression of impropriety and political favoritism. 

I believe it is important that Mr. Christie has agreed to appear before the Subcommittee today. Mr. Christie is at the center of this investigation and has thus far 

failed to enlighten Members of Congress or the general public about the process by 

which he concluded deferred prosecution agreements. Furthermore, Mr. Christie has 

thus far failed to shed any light on his selection of federal monitors in this case. 

There are a number of indisputable facts in this case that raise very troubling 

questions, which remain unanswered. First and foremost is the fact is that Mr. 

Christie selected former Attorney General John Ashcroft, his own former superior, 

for a highly lucrative federal monitoring contract. In addition, there were four other 

medical device manufacturers given deferred prosecution agreements under this 

case. In every instance Mr. Christie selected former Justice Department associates 

to serve as federal monitors under highly lucrative monitoring contracts. This was 

seemingly done without any negotiation of fees or any consideration of selecting 

monitors with whom he was not closely associated with. These actions are all the 

more troubling in the light of testimony by representatives of Zimmer Holdings to 

the Senate Special Committee on Aging that Mr. Christie never presented the evidence he held against them and that he never forewarned them to the fact that he 

would be selecting Ashcroft Group as their monitor. This representative also made 

clear that Zimmer Holdings felt compelled to consent to this deferred prosecution 

agreement because they feared being taken off the Medicare providers list, which 

would have crippled their business. Therefore, Mr. Christie held all the leverage in 

this agreement and dictated the terms completely as he saw fit. 

In my mind, these monitoring agreements amount to no-bid federal contracts that 

are ripe for political considerations. In the end, Mr. Christie may defend himself by 

saying that he needed to select these monitors since he knew he could trust them. 

But, I must be clear when I say that the selection of close associates by a federal 

officer to take on highly lucrative contracts, which are not negotiated and in which 

outside contractors are not even considered, is the essence of political favoritism. 

As I delved deeper into this issue involving U.S. Attorney Christie and former Attorney General Ashcroft I came to the realization that this case of deferred prosecution agreements encompassed an even larger issue of corporate prosecutions in the 

post-Enron era. In researching the history, I discovered that the practice of deferred 

prosecution agreements was made legal through the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Public Law 93–619, codified at 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(2)), which first gave the attorney for 

the Government the right to have a period of delay during which prosecution is deferred pursuant to a written agreement with the defendant. In the beginning this 

remedy was rarely used by government prosecutors, except in small-scale drug cases 

involving diversion programs usually for marijuana-related offenses. However, the 

indictment and ensuing collapse of accounting giant Arthur Andersen in March 

2002 made clear to both prosecutors and defense attorneys the susceptibility large 

corporations have to federal prosecutions and the consequences that result. In response to the large number of federal prosecutions against corporations, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum, known as the ‘‘Thompson Memo’’ after Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, which, instructed federal prosecutors to explicitly consider ‘‘granting a corporation immunity or amnesty or pretrial diversion 

. . . in exchange for cooperation when a corporation’s timely cooperation appears to 

be necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be effective.’’ 

However, it has become clear in the years since the ‘Thompson Memo’ that federal 

prosecutors hold even greater power and discretion through deferred prosecution 

agreements since oversight of such agreements seemingly has not existed through 

the federal government or the judiciary. In fact, a study conducted by Lawrence D. 

Finder and Ryan D. McConnell found that the number of deferred prosecution 

agreements between the Department of Justice and corporations grew to thirty-five 

last year from just five in 2003, highlighting the explosive use of this hidden policy. 

It is my contention that the intent of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was never to 

the scope and breadth of deferred corporate prosecutions now being brought by fedVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Feb 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00156 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COMM\062509\50593.000 HJUD1 PsN: 50593
153 

eral prosecutors. It seems clear that the Department of Justice in recent years has 

consistently worked to shield this practice from oversight by Congress and the 

courts. 

I, along with my colleague Frank Pallone have introduced the Accountability in 

Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947. This legislation lays out four main 

principles, which I believe are key to bringing forth transparency and accountability 

in deferred prosecution agreements: 

1) Provides Real Guidelines on Deferred Prosecution Agreements—Requires the Attorney General to provide public written guidelines for deferred prosecution agreements and nonprosecution agreements in order to promote uniformity 

and to assist prosecutors and organizations as they negotiate and implement deferred prosecution agreements and nonprosecution agreements. 

2) Restores Judicial Oversight of Deferred Prosecution Agreements—Requires government prosecutors to file each and every deferred prosecution agreement in an appropriate United States district court, which must then approve the 

actual agreement between the parties. 

3) Takes the Selection of Federal Monitors Out of the Hands of U.S. Attorneys—Sets forth rules for an open, public, and competitive process for the selection 

of such monitors through the creation of a national list of organizations and individuals who have the expertise and specialized skills necessary to serve as independent 

monitors. 

4) Requires Full Disclosure of Deferred Prosecution Agreements—Requires the Attorney General to place the text of these agreements on the public 

website of the Department of Justice, together with all the terms and conditions of 

any agreement or understanding between an independent monitor appointed pursuant to that agreement and the organization monitored. 

I can not stress more strongly the need to pass this comprehensive legislation regarding deferred prosecution agreements. This practice has clearly been created by 

the Department of Justice to generate unmitigated power for federal prosecutors in 

pursuing corporations, as is highlighted by the actions of U.S. Attorney Christie in 

this case. Corporate prosecutions are of critical importance to our nation because of 

the money, resources and jobs that can be at stake. However, an even more essential concern has emerged through these deferred prosecution agreements and that 

is the lack of any checks and balances within the system. We are all well versed 

on the checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judiciary branches 

of government. However, within each of these branches also exists its own set of 

checks and balances necessary to avoid the concentration of power. As Members of 

this Committee know, within the judiciary branch these checks and balances involve 

the powers and responsibilities of the defense, the prosecution and the courts. However, within the deferred prosecution system power is almost entirely concentrated 

in the hands of federal prosecutors. For example, if an individual is charged with 

a crime and strikes a plea bargain with the prosecution then that plea must go before a judge who has the power to deny and in some cases to alter that agreement 

based on judicial discretion. However, when it comes to these deferred prosecution 

agreements that are struck between federal prosecutors and corporations it means 

that neither party ever sees the inside of a courtroom let alone has to put these 

agreements before a judge. 

No one here, including myself, is in a position of defending corrupt corporations 

or arguing against their full prosecution by the law. But the presumed innocence 

of defendants before trial and the balance between the prosecution and defense are 

hallmarks of our justice system. In this instance however, we are left with a deferred prosecution system that gives federal prosecutors unmitigated power to be 

judge, jury and sentencer. Truly, it was never the intent of our justice system to 

concentrate such power in the hands of any one individual or office. We must not 

allow deferred prosecution to become a form of deferred justice. 

Again, I want to thank Chairman Conyers and Chairman Cohen for allowing me 

to testify before this Subcommittee. I look forward to continued investigation of this 

critical issue and moving the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009 forward through this Committee 

Thank You. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

We have got 8 minutes until the next vote. Our next witness will 

be Congressman Pallone, 6th District, distinguished Member and 

messenger. You would like some time. 

154 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE FRANK PALLONE, JR., A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW 

JERSEY 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you and the 

Committee for holding this hearing and it is a very serious matter. 

I will try to be brief. You have my written testimony, which I will 

ask you to include in the record in its entirety. What led Congressman Pascrell and me to introduce legislation is because we saw all 

the inconsistencies and lack of proper oversight of monitors. 

And I believe that without a legislative fix, basically U.S. attorneys will continue to write their own rules, and that leads to a 

broad spectrum of practices, often bad practices from U.S. attorneys, dictating to the company who the monitor will be, how much 

they will charge, and all the other things that have come up today. 

The troubling thing is that Federal prosecutors have too much 

discretion in appointing these corporate monitors, allowing an 

unelected official unfettered leverage against companies and corporations who have potentially engaged in criminal behavior, invites the type of abuse our judicial system is designed to prevent. 

Now, I want to mention briefly, Congressman Pascrell and I 

went to a day at NYU Law School that was totally devoted to this 

issue, and the interesting thing about it was they were talking 

about all kinds of deferred prosecutions. There was no question 

that the poster child for abuse was Mr. Christie. 

The fact that he hired his former boss, Mr. Ashcroft in one case, 

that another former Federal judge who was retired was hired as a 

monitor in another case and then basically kicked back or sent 

thousands of dollars in election contributions to his campaign in 

the second case, and the third case with Seton Hall Law School 

that had nothing to do with the actual case in front of her with the 

deferred prosecution, was given an endowed professorship. 

These are the kinds of abuses if there is unfettered discretion. In 

other words someone just comes in and says, ‘‘Look, I can do whatever I want and I will do these kind of things unless there is some 

kind of limitations.’’ 

And if anybody tells you that somehow, you know, he wasn’t in 

charge of how much money was going out, I mean that e-mail that 

you saw between Zimmer Holdings, you know, and the Ashcroft 

case, where they were complaining to Christie and his assistant 

about how, you know, we are not getting paid enough, was a perfect example of what is going on; actually going back to the U.S. 

attorney and saying, ‘‘We are not getting paid enough and can you 

intercede here to try to resolve this so that ultimately we get paid 

more.’’ 

When Mr. Pascrell talked about the bills, this came up at the 

NYU conference that day, and it was just unbelievable how the one 

woman, Debra Yang, who was actually there, talked about how she 

had itemized her bills to justify the time and the billable hours 

that she put in. 

But in Ashcroft’s case he just submitted a memo and basically 

didn’t justify it at all. So I mean this is the problem that we are 

having. If you don’t step in and we don’t pass some kind of legislation, you are going to have these kinds of abuses continue, and I 

think they can only get worse if you have somebody as U.S. attorVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Feb 04, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00158 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COMM\062509\50593.000 HJUD1 PsN: 50593
155 

ney who feels that he can do whatever he wants in almost dictatorial fashion. 

Now, I am just going to end with this, Mr. Chairman, there is 

so many unanswered questions in the case of these cases that were 

handled by Christie and I just want to list some of them if I can, 

and then I will conclude. 

How much was John Ashcroft paid after you selected him as a 

monitor? Why did you fail to disclose how much Ashcroft and other 

monitors were paid? How did you decide to give Ashcroft the contract? Did you use any objective criteria, such as the bidding process? 

How many candidates did you have for the Ashcroft deal and for 

the other monitors? What were their names? What kinds of due 

diligence were performed on each candidate to avoid conflicts of interest? What types of billing records did you require of Mr. 

Ashcroft and the other monitors? What criteria is in place to determine if a monitor does the job right? 

Why do you believe there is no conflict of interest in granting 

David Kelley a monitoring contract after he decided not to prosecute your brother? Are you going to return the campaign contributions from John Inglesino? Are you going to return the contributions to Herb Stern? Why aren’t these forms of pay-to-play? What 

sets you apart from the other prosecutors who use competitive bids, 

judges and a written criteria to select monitors? 

When we were at NYU that day there were many other U.S. attorneys who actually use transparency, went to a judge to approve 

it, chose from a list of experts. Didn’t use their friends, didn’t give 

the money to their own alma mater, didn’t supervise, you know, 

how much money they were getting, as you saw in these e-mails. 

So the problem is if you don’t move on some sort of legislation 

like what we are proposing, yes, you will have good U.S. attorneys 

that use a transparent process that pick from a list of experts, that 

don’t hire their friends, but then you will have the Chris Christie’s 

who will do exactly the opposite because it is in their political interest to select their friends, make sure they get big fees and continue these unfettered practices. 

So all we are asking is that you consider this legislation. I know 

you are seriously considering it, because we are really concerned 

that without it there is no objectivity and there is a lot more potential for abuse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:] 

156 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK PALLONE, JR., 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY


FPJ-1.eps
157 


FPJ-2.eps
158 


FPJ-3.eps
159 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

There is a minute 56 to go, so if—I would like to adjourn the 

panel so that we can go vote. Mr. Franks, you have a question? I 

don’t know if we are going to come back to you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, We can defer coming back or 

just not come back at all, but I would like to say that, you know, 

there has been a lot of statements here made that Mr. Christie 

hired—this is just all nonsense and I am sorry that it has to be 

that way, but I suppose it would take us all day to try to correct 

all the nonsense that has been put forth here from these two New 

Jersey members, whom I respect, but I am sorry that there is always a witch hunt on this Committee. 

And with that—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. FRANKS [continuing]. If we are going to come back I would 

be glad to come back. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Pascrell? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Chairman? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Pallone and I set out on this journey a year 

and a half ago. This has nothing to do with politics. All we want 

is answers to questions and we put legislation before the Committee in good faith. We are ready to defend the legislation, particularly in terms of what you hear if you step back from the politics of the—you want transparency. 

I know, Mr. Franks, you have always talked about transparency. 

That is what we want, and we are willing to work with you on this 

legislation. This system is not working, I can assure you. Forget 

about us. You make the judgment. You look at the materials. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I move we now adjourn. 

Mr. COHEN. Move that we adjourn. I would like to thank the witnesses. Without objection, 5 days to write here. Adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. 

CHRISTIE, FORMER UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY


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*The Subcommittee had not received a response to their post-hearing questions prior to the 

printing of this hearing. 

POST-HEARING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE GARY G. GRINDLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE* 


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*The Subcommittee had not received a response to their questions prior to the printing of this 

hearing. 

POST-HEARING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE CHUCK ROSENBERG, 

FORMER UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, HOGAN & 

HARTSON, LLP* 


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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM VIKRAMADITYA S. KHANNA, 

PROFESSOR OF LAW, THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL


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LETTER FROM JOHN WESLEY HALL, PRESIDENT, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS


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LETTER FROM CYNTHIA HUJAR ORR, PRESIDENT, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS


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Æ 


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