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GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: ASSESSING RISKS 

AND THE ROAD AHEAD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 15, 2009 

Serial No. 111–28 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas, Chairwoman 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

MICHAEL BELAND, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

JOSEPH VEALENCIS, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

and Infrastructure Protection ............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection ................................................... 5 

WITNESSES

Mr. Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office 

of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Mr. John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network 

Management, Transportation Security Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

Dr. Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

Ms. Martha King, Pilot: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 44 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 45 

Mr. Robert P. Olislagers, Executive Director, Centennial Airport: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 48 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 50 

Mr. Jeremy Rogalski, Investigative Reporter, KHOU–TV: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 54 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 55 

Mr. Mark Van Tine, President and Chief Executive Officer, Jeppessen, Incorporated: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 56 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 58 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Letter ..................................................................................................................... 3 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

and Infrastructure Protection: 

Letter From the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America ...... 24 

Letter ..................................................................................................................... 25 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Carlton I. 

Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the Inspector 

General, Department of Homeland Security ..................................................... 77 
Page

IV 

Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Mr. John 

Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network Management, Transportation Security Administration ................................................. 78 

Questions From Ranking Member Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Mr. 

John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network 

Management, Transportation Security Administration .................................... 79 

Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Dr. Charles 

R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................. 79 

Questions From Ranking Member Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Dr. 

Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 80 

Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Martha King, 

Pilot ....................................................................................................................... 80

Questions From Chairwoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Robert P. 

Olislagers, Executive Director, Centennial Airport ........................................... 81 
(1) 

GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: ASSESSING 

RISKS AND THE ROAD AHEAD 

Wednesday, July 15, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee 

[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, DeFazio, Norton, Kirkpatrick, Luja ́n, Massa, Titus, Dent, Lungren, Olson, and Austria. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to 

order. I am particularly pleased to be holding this hearing. I am 

pleased to acknowledge the presence of my Ranking Member, Mr. 

Dent, as well as Mr. Olson of Texas and Mr. Austria of Ohio. 

You know where I was going to put you? Hawaii. Would you like 

to be there now? Mr. Austria of Ohio, of course I know. Thank you, 

welcome. 

Likewise, Ms. Titus of Nevada and Mr. Massa, we are very delighted to have you here. 

He wants me to know, I know, Ohio. Thank you very much. 

I am pleased to hold this hearing, because this is a bipartisan 

effort. In one of our markups, I agreed with Mr. Olson of Texas 

that we should have this hearing. But interestingly enough, our 

committee has been working on these issues for quite a while. We 

frankly believe that, to secure this Nation in its entirety, the good 

fortune of the Homeland Security Committee is to be engaged in 

preventative medicine and to work diligently to overcome, if you 

will, some of the misconceptions. 

I also want to make note of the fact that we are pleased that, 

in the regulatory stage, as Mr. Sammon has indicated, the industry 

raised their voices and has had very substantial input. So, we look 

forward to making progress that does not diminish the high responsibility of securing the homeland; at the same time, however, 

being considerate of some important issues that have been raised. 

So, the subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on 

general aviation security, about risks and the road ahead. Our witnesses today will testify on security risks associated with general 

aviation and help Members assess TSA’s existing and proposed security programs for general aviation. It will also address how effectively relevant DHS components are working together to secure 

this important arena. 
2 

Today, we are here to discuss the critical issue of securing our 

general aviation system. We will consider the risks facing general 

aviation generally, whether a regulatory regime is required, whether we are doing enough to secure in-bound general aviation aircraft 

from being utilized to transport or deploy WMD, and we will hear 

perspective from non-governmental stakeholders. 

The general aviation industry is a vital component to our econ- omy, having an economic impact of $100 billion annually, supporting 1.3 billion—million—1.3 million jobs. This tracks, of course, 

the commitment of our President, who wants to either create new 

jobs or save jobs. 

General aviation encompasses aircraft of virtually every size that 

perform a wide variety of missions, from crop-dusting to large passenger charters. Further, international in-bound general aviation 

accounts for about 400 flights per day. Most, about 75 percent, are 

from Canada and Mexico, and the remainder is from a variety of 

countries. 

Last year, TSA released its Large Aircraft Security Program 

rulemaking for general aviation security. While I think it is imperative that the Federal Government look at risks and address them, 

it is clear that this rulemaking process did not take into account 

some serious concerns raised by stakeholders. One in particular, of 

course, dealt with poundage or tonnage of the particular aircraft 

and what level of security should be placed depending on the size 

of the plane—a reasonable proposition that I think we have heard, 

and we will assess and address. 

Led by Chairman Thompson, this committee expressed its concern with TSA’s Large Aircraft Security Program. Today, we will 

hear from TSA and industry about whether the process has been 

improved and what the final rule may look like. Under my leadership, the House recently approved H.R. 2200 with overwhelming 

support. The bill includes provisions to significantly improve stakeholder input into TSA programs and polices for general aviation. 

It is important for us to discuss the rule for general aviation security. But it is equally important for this hearing to also consider 

whether DHS as a whole is doing all that it should to secure general aviation. 

In his recent book, ‘‘The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power’’, the chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times, David Sanger, interviews Vayl Oxford, the former director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at DHS—in the book, Oxford considers the prospect 

of someone flying—and of course, just so that you know that we 

really read here, this book, I think, is quite good, to my Ranking 

Member—the prospect of someone flying a nuclear weapon into the 

United States on a private plane and then detonating it in the air 

over a major city. In the book, Oxford asserts: My worry is that you 

wouldn’t even have to land the jet. 

Accordingly, staff has been looking into this hypothetical to determine what the Department is doing to mitigate such a risk. Regrettably, TSA and the rest of DHS do not seem to have a harmonious approach to this problem. One of the issues that really begs 

for my consternation is the report by the Office of Inspector General that frankly, I believe, does an overwhelming disservice to the 
3 

* The information referred to has been retained in committee files. 

1Pub. L. 107–71, Sec 132. 

importance of homeland security and alerting people to the dangers 

or the vulnerabilities of an unsecure general aviation system. 

To be able to write in a summary, ‘‘We determine that general 

aviation presents only limited and mostly hypothetical threats to 

security,’’ is irresponsible. To make light of a civilian report on various general aviation airports that were penetrated is, I believe, 

both disrespectful and certainly not encompassing of the thorough 

work that I would like to see from our governmental agencies. 

Entities such as TSA assume that other components, like CBP, 

are taking measures that they are, in fact, not taking. Today, we 

will try to learn from DNDO about the risks posed by in-bound 

general aviation, how the Department is attempting to mitigate 

such risks, and what we in the Congress can do to help. I think 

today’s hearing will lay important markers about general aviation 

security and how DHS can more efficiently harness its resources. 

My subcommittee stands ready to provide DHS with the support it 

needs to keep the American people safe. 

Yes, I believe in partnership with the Ranking Member. We are 

concerned about the industry, the jobs, and ensuring that we can 

have a balanced approach to the security of general aviation. I welcome that input today. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, especially our 

second panel, for making the effort to come to Washington, to enlighten us on this issue. Without objection, I submit for inclusion 

at an appropriate place in the record two news stories authored by 

one of our witnesses, Jeremy Rogalski, examining general aviation 

airports in the Houston area,* and the letter sent by Chairman 

Thompson to TSA earlier this year regarding its large aircraft security program. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

LETTER SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 2, 2009. 

Mr. Erik Jensen, 

Assistant General Manager, Policy and Plans, Office of General Aviation, TSNM, 

TSA–28, U.S. Transportation Security Administration, 601 South 12th Street, 

Arlington, VA 22202–4220. 

DEAR MR. JENSEN: The purpose of this letter is to submit comments on the Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regarding the Large Aircraft Security Program, Other Aircraft Operator 

Security Program, and Airport Operator Security Program (Large Aircraft Security 

Program NPRM), which appeared in the Federal Register on October 30, 2008 

[TSA–2008–0021]. 

Based upon my concerns over the issues raised in the following discussion, I urge 

TSA to delay implementation of final rulemaking with regard to the Large Aircraft 

Security Program until the new TSA leadership has had an opportunity to review 

the NPRM and engage with Congress and industry stakeholders. 

Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) 

which requires a security program for charter aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or 

more and a report from TSA detailing measures which would be necessary to improve general aviation security.1 The 9/11 Commission expressed concerns regarding 

vulnerabilities in aviation security and found that ‘‘[M]ajor vulnerabilities still exist 
4 

2The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States. 3Pub. L. 110–53, Sec 1617. 

4 Certain large general aviation aircraft operators are already required to perform passenger 

watch list matching such as operators of private charter aircraft. Currently for these operators, 

TSA provides the No-Fly and Selectee lists to the operators. 

in cargo and general aviation security. These, together with inadequate screening 

and access controls, continue to present aviation security challenges.’’2

The Committee on Homeland Security has worked diligently to ensure that the 

recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission Report were passed into law. 

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act 

directed TSA to develop a risk-based threat and vulnerability assessment for general aviation airports, study the establishment of a grant program for general aviation security, and require international in-bound general aviation aircraft operators 

to submit advanced passenger information to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

before entering the United States.3

The Large Aircraft Security Program which would be established by the NPRM 

would require new security mandates for general aviation aircraft operators with 

aircraft of 12,500 pounds or greater. These mandates include conducting background 

and criminal history checks for flight crews, using a third-party watch list service 

provider to validate passengers against the Federal aviation watch lists, designating 

security coordinators at corporations and businesses operating the aircraft, and 

checking property on-board the aircraft for unauthorized persons and prohibited 

items. Although Congress has supported increased general aviation security protocols in the past, and will continue to do so, numerous concerns from industry stakeholders who would be impacted by the proposed protocols have been communicated 

to the committee. As such, the committee was pleased that TSA extended the initial 

comment period for the NPRM and conducted a series of five public meetings across 

the country to receive input from the general aviation community. 

While all of the concerns expressed by stakeholders have merit, several critical 

elements in the NPRM, in particular, appear to be problematic, infeasible, or overly 

burdensome to industry. The committee is also concerned that the formulation of 

the NPRM was not based on a threat and risk methodology process tailored to the 

general aviation environment. I encourage TSA to continue to work with stakeholders in crafting a sensible, risk-based approach to improving general aviation security and to do so in a timely fashion. 

The following comments outline the committee’s concerns with the NPRM. 

WATCH LIST MATCHING OF PASSENGERS

The NPRM establishes a process whereby third-party watch list service providers 

would conduct watch list matching for passengers on large general aviation aircraft. 

This use of a third-party vendor would shift the responsibility away from individual 

aircraft operators.4 The NPRM states that this is an interim step until the Secure 

Flight system is fully operational. However, this proposed interim step raises several concerns. First, Congress has directed TSA to assume the aviation watch list 

matching function and TSA has subsequently developed the Secure Flight program. 

There is a question as to whether the use of third-party service providers to perform 

this function, as provided in the NPRM, in general aviation on a short-term basis 

would undermine Congressional intent to have TSA administer watch list matching. 

Moreover, it seems that the use of third-party vendors would require the release of 

confidential watch list information to the private sector. Additionally, it appears 

that this policy would indirectly impose a fee on general aviation operators for a 

service that commercial airlines receive without a fee. Since Secure Flight should 

be operational at some point in 2009, TSA should consider integrating general aviation watch list matching procedures into the Secure Flight system so that stakeholders will not be tasked with implementing a separate, interim watch list matching process. 

In addition, the unspecified time requirements for conducting watch list matching 

in advance of a flight are of considerable concern to the general aviation industry. 

As you may know, the general aviation industry routinely performs unscheduled 

flights, often with very short notice. This kind of advance matching in the general 

aviation context could have adverse economic consequences on the general aviation 

community. Further, the proposed rule does not provide a protocol for general aviation aircraft operators if a prospective passenger is selected for secondary screening. 

Industry stakeholders should be involved in the development of a feasible protocol 

to address this scenario. 
5 

Finally, in addition to requiring the use of a third-party vendor for watch list 

matching services, the proposed rule would require general aircraft operators to contract with a third-party auditor to conduct biennial audits of watch list matching 

compliance. Not only does this requirement appear to be an additional unfunded 

mandate on aircraft operators, it would be a delegation of TSA’s Federal responsibility to protect aviation security to the private sector. TSA should work with stakeholders to develop a process with a less costly impact on the general aviation industry, exerts stringent security controls over the personal data of private individuals 

who undergo watch list matching and supports the Federal Government’s security 

interests in these sensitive areas. 

UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS AND ACCESSIBLE WEAPONS ON-BOARD LARGE AIRCRAFT

The NPRM tasks aircraft operators with adopting procedures to prevent passengers from carrying prohibited items onto the aircraft. While unauthorized weapons, explosives, incendiaries, and other destructive substances must be excluded 

from general aviation aircraft, this rule appears to apply a commercial passenger 

security checkpoint standard to general aviation. Given that general aviation aircraft are configured differently from commercial aircraft, with cargo hold access 

being generally available to passengers, the rules for prohibited items aboard general aviation aircraft should be tailored to a risk-based methodology and assessment 

specifically developed for general aviation aircraft and their passengers. This assessment should be completed before implementing inspection and seizure protocols that 

may not be feasible or warranted in a general aviation environment. Additionally, 

it should be noted that the risk assessment should include delineation between protocols for Part 91 operators who have greater knowledge and control over passengers and Part 135 operators who are available for hire and may have more limited knowledge of their passengers. 

The committee commends TSA for its efforts to strengthen vulnerabilities in general aviation as recommended and encouraged by the 9/11 Commission, and prescribed by statute. The committee has serious concerns, however, about several components in the NPRM as described above. Therefore, I urge TSA to postpone final 

implementation of general aviation security regulations until the new TSA leadership has had the opportunity to review the NPRM and engage in discussion with 

Congress and industry stakeholders. 

If you have further questions, please contact Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel of the 

Committee on Homeland Security. 

Sincerely, 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking 

Member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for an opening statement. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, for conducting this 

hearing. We certainly appreciate the courtesies you have extended 

on this issue. Also, before we begin, I would like to say thanks to 

all of you here today for participating. Our subcommittee has been 

very, very busy thus far this Congress. So, I was very pleased to 

see the Chair make time for this important hearing. 

As Ranking Member of this subcommittee, and as a Member of 

the committee on transportation and infrastructure’s subcommittee 

on aviation, I am deeply interested in general aviation and hope 

this hearing serves as an opportunity to inform others of the vital 

role general aviation plays in the United States. Although general 

aviation flights account for some 77 percent of all domestic flights 

in America, it is not well understood by most Americans. 

Supporters of general aviation come from all walks of life, not 

just corporate businesses who rely on these aircraft to meet client 

demands. In fact, some famous people like Harrison Ford and John 

Travolta are licensed pilots. Some less famous people, like my 

neighbor, Mark Kappas, fly corporate aviation. It is therefore truly 

unfortunate that recent events have painted all of general aviation 
6 

with the same brush as a symbol of wealth and excess. This is absolutely not the case. 

General aviation supports over a million American jobs and adds about $150 billion to the American economy. In 2005, general aviation supported businesses totaling over $11 billion just in Texas 

and another $6 billion in my home State of Pennsylvania. We have 

a proud tradition of general aviation in my State. 

Furthermore, while commercial airlines reach only about 350 

major metropolitan areas, there are some 19,000 air fields, air 

strips, and general aviation airports that reach the rest of the 

United States. If it is not scheduled commercial service or military 

flight, it is general aviation. While I recognize that general aviation 

is so very important to our small rural communities and towns, it 

also poses certain risks that may require some mitigation. 

For example, few aircraft have keys. Aircraft can move much 

faster than cars and thus give our response capabilities less time 

to react. Finally, it gets a little dicey trying to pull over a general 

aviation aircraft with an F–16. 

I also understand that Dr. Gallaway of the DNDO, the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office, has some concerns for the possibility that 

a terrorist might charter general aviation aircraft and use it as a 

mechanism for the delivery of a weapon of mass destruction, a very 

real concern. 

As I also sit on this committee’s intelligence subcommittee, I can 

say that I have never been briefed on such a plot, either real or 

hypothetical. Nevertheless, despite the exceptionally low probability of such an occurrence, as highlighted by the inspector general’s report—the exceptionally high consequence certainly merits 

further review. So, I look forward to Dr. Gallaway’s testimony on 

this subject. 

The threat of a terrorist attack through general aviation, of 

course, is a very real concern. I am pleased that the Chairwoman 

has shared with us David Sanger’s book. A lot of factors weigh in 

here—you know, the weight of the plane, international flights, and 

a lot of things we probably ought not discuss in an open session. 

But nevertheless, it is important that we talk about this issue and 

also understand, in some respects, it is a separate and distinct 

issue from the LASP program that we are going to get into here 

in a little bit. 

Certainly, while general aviation could potentially provide opportunities to allow unauthorized persons and materials into the sterile area of an airport or airfield, I have strong reservations about 

the Department’s attempt to address these potential vulnerabilities 

with a heavy-handed, one-sided approach. Of course, I am speaking 

of the Department’s Large Aircraft Security Program proposal released in October of last year. 

I am very interested in learning how the Department developed 

its initial LASP rulemaking, especially since it appears it summarily rejected any input by the general aviation stakeholders during the development of the proposed rule. At first blush, it appears 

the Department took everything it knew about risk-based asset allocation and performance-based standards and tossed it out the 

window. It checked the box in terms of consulting with relevant 

stakeholders and then went on its own way. This was a case of 
7 

Government heavy-handedness that I think that most of us do not 

embrace. 

However, since March, the TSA has reached out extensively to 

general aviation stakeholder groups in a very public and a very inclusive way. I understand that TSA may be close to drafting a new 

rulemaking for regulating the general aviation community—a rulemaking built on collaboration and not confrontation. I think this is 

absolutely the right approach. I want to thank Mr. Sammon publicly and right now for his leadership on this matter. I know he has 

taken this very seriously. I appreciate his help on this. 

Nevertheless, given the TSA’s history in this particular area, I 

thought it important to introduce H.R. 3093, the General Aviation 

Security Enhancement Act of 2009, a bipartisan piece of legislation 

that requires the TSA to undergo a negotiated rulemaking to establish new general aviation security regulations. 

Again, I would like to also specifically acknowledge Ed Perlmutter, our friend and former Member of the committee, Homeland 

Security Committee alumnus, for cosponsoring this legislation. 

So, Madame Chairwoman, we have a lot to cover today. But I 

would beg your indulgence as I yield the balance of my time to my 

good friend and fellow supporter of this general aviation issue, to 

Mr. Olson of Texas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. OLSON. Well, thank you. 

Hey, hit the microphone. It helps. Thank you, my colleague, Mr. 

Dent, for yielding your time. 

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman for agreeing to hold this important hearing. This issue is of great importance to the Houston 

area. I am glad to see this subcommittee take an interest in it. 

General aviation is a vital component of our national economy and contributes over $11 billion to the Texas economy. By rough 

count, the 22nd District of Texas is home to a dozen small airports 

that serve the general aviation community, including Sugar Land 

Regional, Pearland Regional, and Ellington Field. The security of 

those airports, aircraft, pilots, and passengers is a great concern of 

mine. 

However, I believe we must ensure that Congress and Government agencies do not go overboard in legislating or rulemaking in 

a way that would make it difficult for them to do business. I was 

pleased to see some good, common-sense provisions included in the 

TSA Authorization Act regarding general aviation, including an 

amendment I offered during the full committee mark-up prohibiting the outsourcing of the terrorist watch list to third-party contractors. 

I will explore this issue further during my time for questions and 

will be interested on hearing the panel’s thoughts on these issues. 

Thank you again, Madame Chairwoman, for agreeing to host this 

hearing. I look forward to working with the subcommittee on these 

important matters, today, and in the future. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. The gentleman has yielded back. 

Having consulted with the Ranking Member on the matter, the 

subcommittee will now view a video related to the issue being addressed at today’s hearing. 
8 

[Video played.] 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. As we begin, I think it is clear that we are 

looking at several issues. Mr. Sammon, I think, we’ve captured in 

some previous conversations. We are looking at vulnerabilities. 

Vulnerabilities represent not only the existence of the craft, the aircraft, but also perimeter. So, we cannot look cross-eyed at the holistic concept of general aviation. We must look at it for all of its elements. 

Let me indicate that, to those Members who have come in, I 

want to welcome you. Mr. Luja ́n, Ms. Kirkpatrick, Ms. Norton, and 

Mr. DeFazio, welcome to the committee. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that, under 

committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

I welcome our first panel of witnesses. Our first witness is 

Carlton Mann. Mr. Mann has served as the Department of Homeland Security’s assistant inspector general for inspections since 

2006. In that position, Mr. Mann provides the inspector general 

with a means to analyze programs quickly and evaluate operational efficiency and vulnerability across the spectrum of DHS 

components. Mr. Mann was previously a senior program analyst 

with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Office of Inspector General. 

Our second witness, John Sammon, is the assistant administrator for transportation sector network management. He leads a 

unified effort to protect and secure our Nation’s transportation systems. Mr. Sammon brings more than 25 years of transportation experience to his position, including management of customer networks for railroads, motor carriers, ocean carriers, petrochemical 

manufacturers, ports, and other public agencies. 

Our third witness is Dr. Charles Gallaway. He is the deputy director of DNDO. Dr. Gallaway joined DNDO as a career SES with 

32 years of service in the U.S. Government. 

Prior to joining DNDO, Dr. Gallaway served the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency as a director of the Chemical and Biological 

Technologies Directorate, responsible for transformational research 

and development to protect the warfighter from the threat posed by 

chemical and biological warfare agents. He has been involved with 

the development of a variety of close-in sensors to non-intrusively 

identify and characterize a nuclear weapon. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Mann. 

First of all, allow me to thank all of you for your public service. 

We look forward to hearing from you this afternoon. 

Mr. Mann. 

STATEMENT OF CARLTON I. MANN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR 

GENERAL FOR INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MANN. Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking 

Member and Members of the subcommittee. I am Carlton Mann, 

assistant inspector general for inspections, Office of the Inspector 

General at the Department of Homeland Security. I certainly thank 
9 

you for this opportunity to discuss our report, TSA’s Role in General Aviation Security. 

In early February 2007, a Houston-area television station broadcast a report that alleged that there were deficiencies in security 

at regional airports near the city, and that those deficiencies represented a serious homeland security threat. The broadcast was titled: ‘‘Is Houston a Sitting Duck For Terrorism?’’ The report described visits by reporters to some Houston area general aviation 

airports to test airport security. Three were mentioned specifically: 

Sugar Land Regional Airport, David Wayne Hooks Airport, and the 

Lone Star Executive Airport. 

Madame Chairwoman, you conveyed to us your concerns about 

the implications of this report and requested that we examine the 

issue. After meeting with you and your staff, we visited all three 

airports and a few general aviation facilities at other major metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. 

General aviation is commonly defined as all aircraft operations 

other than military and scheduled commercial passenger service. 

The vast majority of flight operations in the United States, approximately 230,000 aircraft, are engaged in general aviation. As the 

Ranking Member mentioned, there are approximately 19,000 airfields at which no scheduled commercial passenger operations normally occur—only general aviation. Even at commercial airports, 

there is usually some type of a general aviation operation. 

We began our inspection. We defined the objectives to align with 

the interest expressed in the situation near Houston and the implications of general aviation activities occurring near major cities. 

We also focused on DHS’s activities and responsibilities regarding 

general aviation. Our objectives were to identify TSA security requirements for general aviation airports and security measures 

taken, steps non-Federal stakeholders have taken to enhance security, and any incidents of concern with security at general aviation 

airports. 

Our team visited 11 airports, where we interviewed managers 

and security staff. At each site, we also met with the nearest TSA 

officials responsible for aviation security. We examined Government and public records, consulted with some industry stakeholders, and obtained information from TSA headquarters. 

We believe that the basic facts contained in the television report 

were accurate. However, we did not find those facts to be of significance from a homeland security perspective. For example, one of 

the incidents described the television crew driving up to a closed 

gate at Hooks Airport, ringing the callbox for admission and being 

admitted. The report stated: The gate slid open letting us past the 

barbed wire and onto the tarmac. No one asked us any questions. 

When we visited Hooks, we were told that that is exactly what 

is supposed to happen, since the system is not intended to interrogate visitors. Specifically, the purpose of the remote-controlled gate 

with the intercom is to ensure that the airfield personnel will be 

aware of any vehicle coming onto the field. From that point, the vehicle and its passengers can be monitored or questioned as necessary to maintain safe operations. 

The television report also described fencing at Sugar Land Airport that does not completely encircle the perimeter of the field. 
10 

Our inspectors examined that fence, as well as the unfenced property around the field, which borders a swamp and a prison. Managers at Sugar Land told us that the purpose for the fence is to 

direct normally occurring traffic off of the landscaped portions of 

the property onto the paved access passages. 

The airport property includes large unused acreage quite some 

distance from aircraft operations. Most important aspect of the facility’s security program, managers told us, involved maintaining 

control over the flight line area, not distant unused grass. 

The third incident in the report involved the television reporter 

entering Lone Star Executive Airport and walking close to a parked 

aircraft. The managers at all three airfields told us it is routine for 

people on foot to approach parked aircraft at public airfields. Unlike commercial aviation, where airport passengers are sequestered 

and led down a ramp onto a plane, in general aviation facilities, 

airfield personnel, maintenance teams, pilots, and their passengers 

might be near aircraft or on the flight line all day. 

The important security issues are: Is the aircraft under the control of its owner? Is the flight system locked or otherwise inoperable by others? Is the person who is approaching the aircraft being 

observed from a security post or control tower? Is any suspicious 

activity occurring near the aircraft? Is all aircraft movement coordinated with the control tower or with base operations? 

It is possible to steal an aircraft. We certainly don’t assert that 

a plane cannot be flown without its owner’s permission. However, 

aircraft thefts are extremely rare. An attempted theft would almost 

certainly be noticed. 

At each of the airfields we visited, we asked for information 

about any incidents of concern relating to general aviation facilities 

or aircraft. There were none. We also requested information from 

TSA about incidents reported at general aviation, through the General Aviation Hotline. Most of the incidents were characterized simply as suspicious activity, though a few were for property theft, 

vandalism, unlocked gates, or anonymous tips about narcotics 

smuggling. 

As indicated earlier, one of our objectives for this inspection was 

to identify measures taken by TSA to secure general aviation. A 

list of those measures is contained in our report. We did not evaluate the cost benefit issues relating to those measures or make any 

judgments about them. We determined that TSA, even while it actively pursued all its other mandates, has also paid significant attention to general aviation. 

When one of our inspections reveals an opportunity for improving 

a DHS program, we normally address a recommendation to the 

component head to rectify the condition. In this instance, we did 

not identify problems with TSA’s activities. We released the results 

of our inspection without making recommendations. 

Various Government industry studies have concluded that the 

risks associated with general aviation are relatively limited. Reports previously released by the General Accountability Office and 

the Congressional Research Service are consistent with this view. 

GAO concluded that the small size, lack of fuel capacity and minimal destructive power of most general aviation aircraft make them 
11 

unattractive to terrorists, and thereby reduce the possibility of 

threat associated with their misuse. 

The Congressional Research Service reported that typical general 

aviation aircraft are too light to use as a platform for conventional 

explosives. Moreover, heightened vigilance among airport operators 

and pilots would make it difficult to load the necessary quantity of 

explosives without detection. The report concluded that, as a platform for conventional explosives, the threat posed by light general 

aviation aircraft is relatively small compared to the threat posed by 

trucks. 

We are aware that our report may be used by those who are arguing either for or against a particular piece of regulation. We 

don’t believe that our report is extensive enough to support such 

a debate. One of the most frequently quoted sentences from our report is, ‘‘General aviation presents only limited and mostly hypothetical threats to security.’’ We believe this to be true. More importantly, it is consistent with the threat information we reviewed. 

We have been forthcoming about the scope of our field work and 

about the goals that we established for this inspection. We had no 

bureaucratic inclination to dismiss the concerns expressed by the 

KHOU broadcast. A cynic can always wonder whether the DHS inspector general report would go easy or whitewash a DHS program. 

But DHS managers will tell you otherwise. 

Madame Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I 

would be happy to answer questions that you or the subcommittee 

have. 

[The statement of Mr. Mann follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARLTON I. MANN

JULY 15, 2009 

Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Dent, and Members of 

the subcommittee. I am Carlton Mann, Assistant Inspector General (AIG) for Inspections for the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our recent report TSA’s 

Role in General Aviation Security. 

BACKGROUND

In early February 2007, a Houston-area television station broadcast a report that 

alleged there were deficiencies in security at regional airports near the city, and 

that those deficiencies represented a serious homeland security threat. The broadcast was titled ‘‘Is Houston a Sitting Duck For Terrorism?’’ 

The report described visits by reporters to some of the area’s general aviation airports to test airport security. Three were mentioned specifically: Sugar Land Regional Airport in the town of Sugar Land, about 25 miles southwest of Houston; 

David Wayne Hooks Airport in Spring, 30 miles northwest of the city; and Lone 

Star Executive Airport in Conroe, 45 miles to the north. 

Madame Chairwoman, you conveyed to us your concerns about the implications 

of this report and requested we examine the issue as it pertains to the Department 

of Homeland Security. After meeting with you and your staff, we undertook field 

visits to all three airports and to a few other general aviation facilities near other 

major metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. 

OUR REVIEW

General aviation is commonly defined as all aircraft operations other than military and scheduled commercial passenger traffic. The vast majority of flight operations in the United States, approximately 230,000 aircraft, are engaged in general 

aviation. There are approximately 20,000 airfields and helipads at which no scheduled commercial passenger operations normally occur—only general aviation. Even 

at commercial airports, there is usually some type of a general aviation operation. 
12 

As is normal in our evaluation process, before we began, we defined our inspection 

objectives to align with the interest expressed in the situation near Houston, and 

the implications of general aviation activities occurring near major cities. We also 

focused, as we must, on DHS activities and responsibilities. This is significant because most aspects of aircrew, aircraft, and airfield operations are overseen by the 

Federal Aviation Administration within the Department of Transportation. 

Our team visited ten airports and interviewed managers and security staff. At 

each site, we also met with the nearest Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) officials responsible for aviation security. We examined Government and public records, consulted with some industry stakeholders, and obtained information 

from TSA headquarters. 

It would not have been practical for our office to perform any kind of comprehensive assessment of the entire industry. Our objectives for this inspection were to 

identify TSA security requirements for general aviation airports, threats to general 

aviation, measures taken to secure general aviation, steps non-Federal stakeholders 

have taken to enhance the security of general aviation, and any ‘‘incidents of concern’’ with security at general aviation airports. 

OUR FINDINGS

We believe that the basic facts contained in the television report were accurate. 

However, we did not conclude that those facts were of significance from a homeland 

security perspective. 

For example, one of the incidents described the television crew driving up to a 

closed gate at David Wayne Hooks Airfield, ringing the callbox for admission, and 

being admitted. The report stated: ‘‘A loud buzzing occurred and the gate slid open 

letting us past the barb wire and onto the tarmac. No one asked us any questions.’’ 

When our team visited Hooks, we were told that this is exactly what is supposed 

to happen. The purpose of the remote-controlled gate with the intercom is to ensure 

that airfield personnel will be aware of any vehicle coming onto that section of the 

field. From that point on, the vehicle and its passengers can be monitored or questioned as necessary to maintain safe operations. The system is not intended to provide an opportunity to interrogate the visitor, merely to establish oversight and control. 

The television report also described fencing at Sugar Land Regional Airport that 

does not completely encircle the perimeter of the field. Our inspectors examined this 

fence, and also the unfenced areas of the property, which border a prison and a 

swamp. Managers at Sugar Land told us that the purpose of the fencing is to direct 

normally occurring pedestrian and vehicle traffic off the landscaped portions of the 

property facing the main road and onto the paved passages intended for their access. The airport property includes large unused acreage quite some distance from 

aircraft operations. The most important aspects of the facility’s security program, 

managers told us, involved maintaining control over the flight line area, not distant 

unused grass. Any fence, they added, could easily be scaled by an intruder. And 

whatever threat an intruder would pose on the perimeter of the property is no 

greater than the threat the same person would pose if he or she was 10 feet further 

away but on the other side of a fence. 

The third and final incident in the report involved the television reporter entering 

Lone Star Executive Airport and walking close to a parked aircraft. As managers 

at all three airfields told us, it is not uncommon for people on foot to approach 

parked aircraft at a public airfield. Unlike commercial aviation, where airport passengers are sequestered and then led down a ramp and onto the plane, at general 

aviation facilities individuals walk directly to the aircraft. An aircraft owner, who 

is frequently the pilot, usually does not wear a uniform and their passengers do not 

have tickets. Airfield personnel, maintenance teams, and pilots and their passengers 

might be near the flight line all day. We were told that security did not involve separating aircraft from people. The greater and more important security issues are: 

• Is the aircraft under the control of its owner? 

• Is its flight system (not necessarily its door) locked or otherwise inoperable by 

others? 

• Is the person who is approaching the aircraft being observed from a security 

post or control tower? 

• Is any suspicious activity occurring near the aircraft? 

• Is all aircraft movement coordinated with the control tower or with base operations? 

It is possible, of course, to steal an aircraft. We do not assert that no one can fly 

a plane without the owner’s permission. It is, however, extremely rare, and almost 

certain to be noticed. 
13 

Our review also examined the several cases in which aircraft have for one reason 

or another struck buildings. We are of course forever mindful of the horrible events 

of September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, in most cases when an aircraft impacts a 

building, the damage to the building and its occupants has been limited. 

At each of the airfields we visited, we asked for information about any incidents 

of concern relating to general aviation facilities or aircraft. There were none. We 

also requested information from TSA about incidents reported to the General Aviation Hotline. TSA gave us detailed year-by-year lists, which showed that the number 

of reports had declined since 2004 (the first year for which we collected data) and 

that in 2007, the last full year before our fieldwork, the total was 66 reports, Nation-wide. Most of these were characterized simply as ‘‘suspicious activity,’’ though 

a few were for property theft, vandalism, unlocked gates, or an anonymous tip about 

narcotics smuggling. 

WHAT HAS DHS BEEN DOING?

As I indicated earlier, one of our objectives for this inspection was to identify TSA 

security requirements for general aviation airports, and to identify measures taken 

by TSA to secure general aviation. A list of those measures is contained in our report. We did not evaluate cost-benefit issues relating to those measures or make any 

judgments about them. 

We determined that TSA, even while it actively pursued all its other mandates, 

had also paid significant attention to general aviation. This was true both in the 

Office for Transportation Sector Network Management and in the Office of Intelligence. 

When one of our inspections reveals deficiencies or inefficiencies in a DHS program we normally address a recommendation to the component head to rectify the 

condition. In this instance, we did not identify problems with TSA’s activities and 

we therefore released the results of our inspection without making recommendations 

to TSA. 

RISK AND THREAT

Various Government and industry studies have concluded that the risks associated with general aviation are relatively limited. Reports previously released by the 

General Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 

are consistent with this view. In a November 2004 review, GAO concluded that ‘‘the 

small size, lack of fuel capacity, and minimal destructive power of most general 

aviation aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists, and thereby, reduce the possibility of threat associated with their misuse.’’ GAO recommended that TSA develop a plan for implementing a risk management approach to strengthen general 

aviation security, and that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) establish a 

documented process to review and revalidate flight restrictions. TSA and FAA generally concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 

In January 2008, the Congressional Research Service reported that typical general aviation aircraft are too light to use as a platform for conventional explosives. 

Moreover, heightened vigilance among airport operators and pilots would make it 

difficult to load the necessary quantity of explosives without detection. The report 

concluded that as a platform for conventional explosives, the threat posed by light 

general aviation aircraft is relatively small compared to the threat posed by trucks. 

In March 2008, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) report, General Aviation Security, noted that GAO had observed that although nuclear power 

facilities were not designed specifically to withstand a terrorist aviation attack, they 

are among the most hardened industrial facilities in the United States, as they were 

designed to withstand tornadoes, hurricanes, fires, floods, and earthquakes. The 

study concluded that most general aviation aircraft could not penetrate the concrete 

containment vessel of a nuclear power plant, release radiation through an explosion, 

or otherwise severely damage nuclear power plants. 

We reviewed details of several well-publicized incidents involving general aviation 

accidents involving municipal areas—the Tampa and New York City incidents we 

mentioned in our report, and a third incident we did not include involving an ultralight aircraft in Germany. None of these incidents had consequences of national security significance—in the New York City and Tampa cases there was damage to, 

but no fatalities within, the buildings. The German case seems to have been a suicide. 

Many risk scenarios describe the hypothetical delivery of a destructive device to 

a population center. For such a purpose, a large truck is probably a superior vehicle. 

Aircraft in flight are highly visible by large audiences, and most airspace particu-
14 

larly airspace near major metropolitan areas is well monitored by civil and military 

authorities. 

An intelligence analyst at TSA explained the distinction that is usually made between risk and threat. Risk is sometimes defined as the intent and the capability 

of the hostile actor; threat is the vulnerability of the target and the consequence 

if the attack succeeds. If it is easier to steal a small private plane than a commercial 

airliner, there is a general aviation risk. If a small private plane cannot do much 

damage on impact, there is not a general aviation threat. 

CONCLUSION

We are aware that the results of our report may be used by those involved in arguing for or against some particular piece of regulation. We do not believe that our 

report is extensive enough support such a debate. On the Internet, one of the mostfrequently quoted sentences from our report: ‘‘... general aviation presents only 

limited and mostly hypothetical threats to security.’’ We believe this to be true, and 

more importantly, it is consistent with threat information we reviewed. 

At the same time, we acknowledge the limited scope of our work on this inspection. In an informal communication we received from TSA after sharing our draft 

with them, they pointed out to us that all of our airport visits were arranged in advance, that we made no independent efforts to verify security measures, and that 

we visited very few sites. This is true. Our inspection techniques were tailored to 

the objectives of our review, not to an exhaustive evaluation of the general aviation 

industry. 

Madame Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to 

answer any questions that you or the subcommittee Members may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Sammon to summarize his statement for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. SAMMON. Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman Jackson 

Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear here to discuss general 

aviation security. Today, I would like to discuss TSA’s engagement 

with key industry stakeholders to develop appropriate security 

measures that minimize general aviation risk and our process 

going forward. 

General aviation includes all operations outside of scheduled 

commercial air carrier flights and military operations. More than 

600,000 pilots, 200,000 aircraft and 19,000 airports and landing facilities are included in general aviation. General aviation aircraft 

range in size from Cessnas to privately owned jumbo jets, such as 

Boeing 747s. 

The vast majority of the general aviation community is responsible and concerned about security. Much of the input we received 

during our industry discussion reflects best practice security procedures. We would like to thank the industry representatives who 

have contributed considerable time and effort to provide valuable 

input to this process. 

There has been long-standing Federal regulation of parts of general aviation security. For-hire passengers and crew on general 

aviation aircraft greater than 12,500 pounds have been vetted for 

many years. International passengers and crew are vetted prior to 

departure overseas. The airspace over the national Capitol region 

is permanently restricted to general aviation. There are temporary 

airspace restrictions over Presidential travel locations, major sport-
15 

ing events and special events, such as national political party conventions or G8 summits, for example. 

There is no specific threat in GA, although there have been past 

incidents involving the use of GA aircraft. Yet, as with other transportation modes, where there is no specific threat, but there is risk, 

such as toxic chemicals transported by rail in urban areas, or hazardous trucking, TSA takes prudent measures to minimize potential vulnerabilities and having those vulnerabilities exploited in 

high-consequence situations. 

The risk for domestic general aviation is in the potential consequence of a large aircraft being used as a weapon, as in 9/11, or 

to introduce dangerous articles into the air side of commercial airports. In order to reduce GA vulnerabilities, TSA began a rulemaking process in 2008. The TSA rulemaking process is working 

as designed. 

TSA proposed a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in October 2008, 

held five public hearings throughout the United States, received 

thousands of public comments and extended the public comment 

period through February 2009. The day following the close of the 

public comment period, TSA invited general aviation stakeholders 

and other interested partners to workshops held in April, May, and 

June. 

Industry groups included were the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 

Association, the National Business Aviation Association, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the National Air Transportation Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association, the 

American Association of Airport Executives, the Airport Council 

International, the National Association of State Aviation Officials, 

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and specific operators, such as the 

Gulf Stream Corporation, Limited Brands, NetJets, Flexjets, Centennial Airport, White Plains Airport and Flight Safety among others. 

At these workshops, which I personally led, general aviation security issues were discussed at length. As a result of this valuable 

input from stakeholders, TSA is developing appropriate protocols to 

restrict the ability for terrorists to pilot large aircraft, purchase or 

lease large aircraft, steal large GA aircraft, overtake control of 

large GA aircraft, or bring dangerous articles into the air side of 

a commercial airport on a GA aircraft. 

These protocols reflect many best-of-industry security practices 

used by corporations world-wide. We expect that the measures developed from the industry workshop comments will be incorporated 

into a revised NPRM, which will be available for public comment 

in coming months. We will continue our dialogue with the industry 

until the regulatory process is reopened for general public comment. 

Our new general manager for aviation, Brian Delauter, brings 

extensive general aviation and commercial aviation experience with 

him to craft this next edition of the NPRM. 

In summary, we recognize there is general aviation risk. Through 

close stakeholder collaboration, we are developing a series of sensible security measures to minimize risk. We expect to release 

those measures for public comment in the upcoming months. 

Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any questions. 
16 

[The statement of Mr. Sammon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN SAMMON

JULY 15, 2009 

Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear today to discuss 

the security of general aviation (GA), a vital part of our Nation’s aviation system, 

an important economic engine, and an essential link to larger communities for many 

small communities. As always, we appreciate the subcommittee’s support as we continue to explore optimal security measures for this industry. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are committed to ensuring that GA is appropriately protected 

from exploitation by terrorists and other security risks while ensuring the free flow 

of commerce. Following specific directions from Congress, we already have instituted 

a few targeted security measures tailored to the risk posed by certain GA operations. Our approach to the task of addressing GA security mirrors our approach 

to our overall mission of securing the Nation’s transportation systems—we begin by 

assessing the risks and then we work closely with our stakeholders to fashion programs to address those risks. 

General aviation encompasses diverse aircraft, airports, facilities, operators, and 

operations. GA operators and their aircraft include recreational pilots, corporations 

that operate business jets for executive and employee use, and companies that lease 

small and large aircraft to individuals and corporations or manage aircraft on their 

behalf. Nation-wide, there are more than 19,000 GA facilities (including helipads) 

at some of our largest commercial airports, at small exclusively GA airports in remote areas, and at airports of all sizes in between. Aircraft that are used in GA 

include, among others, small aircraft with minimal payload capacity, business jets, 

and jets often used by commercial airlines, such as the Boeing 747. 

Added to this structural diversity is a diversity of risk facing the industry. The 

level of risk does not necessarily correlate to the size or sophistication of a given 

aircraft or airport. As a result, general aviation presents unique challenges that preclude a ‘‘one size fits all’’ security program. Prevailing circumstances and risks— 

vulnerabilities, threats, and potential consequences—all factor into the formulation 

of our security approach. Accordingly, each of the elements of TSA’s security agenda—whether initiated by TSA or specifically directed by Congress—has been or is 

being developed to address a specific risk associated with the GA system—its aircraft, airports, facilities, operators, and its operations. 

DHS’S CURRENT GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY RULES AND PROGRAMS

Currently, there is a range of security measures protecting GA operations. Some 

take the form of guidance that airports or airport operators may voluntarily implement, while other requirements are implemented pursuant to mandatory regulations and security directives. All are intended to meet the dual goals of protecting 

GA from terrorism and other security risks without unduly impacting the free flow 

of commerce. The following represent some of the major security initiatives. 

Restricted Air Space Over the Nation’s Capital.—Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a rule defining the restricted airspace 

over the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area and established rules for all pilots operating aircraft to or from any of the three Maryland GA airports located closest to 

the National Capital Region (College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield and Hyde Executive Field, known as the ‘‘Maryland Three Airports’’). This rule established regulatory requirements for operating aircraft within the defined areas, known as the 

Special Flight Rules Area and the Flight Restricted Zone. 

Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR).—TFRs are employed to mitigate the threat 

of an airborne attack against key assets and critical infrastructure on the ground; 

they affect the general aviation community by prohibiting flight in areas of concern, 

for example, near sporting arenas for major events such as the Super Bowl. TSA 

evaluates requests for security-related TFRs based on several criteria, including specific and credible threat and intelligence information, the number of people in attendance at a particular venue, and the number of allocated defense assets. Additionally, the FAA-issued Notices to Airmen prohibiting many general aviation aircraft from operating within a specified distance above ground level of any stadium 

with a seating capacity of 30,000 or more people where major sporting events are 

being held, or of the Disney theme parks in California and Florida, have been made 

permanent by Congress, pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, 

Pub. L. 108–199. 
17 

Additionally, the United States Secret Service in coordination with FAA, TSA, and 

the Department of Defense establish restricted airspace for specified Presidential 

and Vice Presidential movements, the United Nations General Assembly, as well as 

National Special Security Events such as the G–20 Summit and Democratic and Republican National Conventions. 

DCA Access Standard Security Program (DASSP).—Recognizing the need to normalize GA commerce while continuing to protect the National Capital Region, Congress directed DHS to develop a security plan to permit general aviation aircraft to 

resume operations into and out of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 

(DCA), where GA operations had been prohibited after 9/11. In coordination with 

other DHS agencies, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Defense, TSA issued a rule, effective August 18, 2005, requiring TSA inspection of 

crews, passengers, property, and aircraft; TSA identification checks of passengers; 

submission of passenger and crew information 24 hours in advance of the flight; Security Threat Assessments (STAs) for all passengers; fingerprint-based criminal history records checks (CHRCs) for flight crew; and armed security officers on board 

each flight. On average, 20 flights per month into and out of DCA utilize this program. 

Twelve-Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP).—TSA currently requires aircraft operators that are air carriers or commercial operators with a maximum certificated take-off weight (MTOW) of more than 12,500 pounds (5,670 kg) to implement the TFSSP, which establishes mandatory vetting procedures of crew and passengers against the FBI Terrorist Screening Center’s No-Fly and Selectee Lists. 

Private Charter Standard Security Program (PCSSP).—The PCSSP is similar to 

the TFSSP, but for aircraft operators using aircraft with a MTOW of greater than 

100,309.3 pounds (45,500 kg) or with a seating configuration of 61 or more, adds 

a requirement to physically screen passengers and their accessible property. 

Maryland Three Airports.—The Maryland Three Airports program was originally 

instituted by the FAA in order to reopen these airports, which, like DCA, had been 

closed to operations after the 9/11 attacks. The program was transferred to TSA in 

February 2005. In addition to defining the restricted airspace and establishing rules 

for all pilots using the Maryland Three airports (discussed above), the rule provides 

that in order to be approved to fly into or serve as a security coordinator for any 

of these airports an individual is required to submit certain information and successfully complete a STA. 

General Aviation Airport Vulnerability Assessment Tool.—Section 44901(k) of title 

49, as amended by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

of 2007, Pub. L. 110–53, requires TSA to develop and implement a standardized 

threat and vulnerability assessment program for GA airports, to evaluate the feasibility of a program to provide grants to GA airport operators to upgrade security, 

and to establish such a program, if feasible. The assessment tool contemplated by 

this provision is currently under review by the Office of Management and Budget. 

When released, this program will assist our stakeholders in performing self-assessments to determine their security needs. Their planners will be able to identify security needs and seek funding from appropriate sources. 

Automatic Detection and Processing Terminal (ADAPT).—The ADAPT system was 

developed by FAA to allow real-time vetting of air traffic operating in the National 

Airspace System (NAS) and neighboring airspace, in order to distinguish between 

legitimate flights and those that might pose a security risk to the United States. 

TSA identified the need to prevent the misuse of aircraft as weapons against critical 

infrastructure and to provide senior leadership with a common real-time picture of 

aviation activities in the NAS. TSA requires a single integrated solution that can 

incorporate all segments of aviation, with a primary focus on GA, and potential expansion to other modes of transportation. 

ADAPT is particularly important to the GA community. By providing advance 

warning of potential threats within the NAS and allowing the monitoring of GA security anomalies before they arrive in the United States, ADAPT assists in mitigating two critical risks specific to GA: The use of GA aircraft as a kinetic weapon 

and the use of GA aircraft as a conveyance to transport dangerous materials (including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons) or malevolent people. 

Electronic Advance Passenger Information System (eAPIS).—U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) issued a final rule, effective May 2009, that requires more 

detailed information about GA aircraft arriving and departing the United States 

and persons on-board. As part of a comprehensive effort to strengthen GA security, 

the rule expands existing regulations governing these aircraft. Pilots must submit 

the following information 1 hour prior to departure for flights arriving into or departing from the United States: Departure information; arrival information; infor-
18 

mation identifying the aircraft; and complete passenger and crew manifest data, 

identifying who is aboard the aircraft. 

DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and TSA.—DNDO has led an effort to identify key vulnerabilities and threats associated with weapons of mass destruction, specifically with regard to radioactive and nuclear items. DNDO, together 

with CBP and TSA, is working to facilitate international general aviation operations, while enhancing security for these operations and for the Nation as a whole. 

In April 2007, then-Secretary Chertoff directed CBP and DNDO to implement full 

radiological and nuclear scanning of all arriving international general aviation aircraft. DHS achieved this goal at the end of 2007. Today, all international general 

aviation aircraft are scanned upon arrival in the United States by CBP officers 

using handheld Radiation Isotope Identification Devices (RIIDs). Earlier last year, 

DNDO and CBP also conducted a testing program at Andrews Air Force Base to 

identify improved operating procedures using these handheld detectors and to determine requirements for improved next-generation technologies. These measures are 

part of a much larger initiative to create a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 

to protect our country from radiological and nuclear threats whether they come by 

land, air, or sea. 

PUBLIC, CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IS THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE REGULATION

A critical aspect of TSA’s regulatory approach is the process-oriented nature of devising mandatory security measures. DHS believes it is important to consult with 

stakeholders to better inform the Department about the feasibility, benefits, and 

costs of these security options. 

The Large Aircraft Security Program Proposed Rulemaking.—As risk associated 

with air carriers and commercial operators has been reduced or mitigated, terrorists 

may view general aviation aircraft as more vulnerable and thus attractive targets. 

If hijacked and used as a missile, many of these aircraft would be capable of inflicting significant damage. In June 2006 TSA initiated a rulemaking process to address 

the risk associated with large GA aircraft. The Large Aircraft Security Program 

(LASP) demonstrates our on-going commitment to government/stakeholder consultation. After engaging in outreach to the GA community, on October 30, 2008, TSA 

published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) seeking comments on the proposed LASP. This NPRM marked the beginning of the process established by the 

Administrative Procedure Act for engaging the stakeholder community and the public at large in formulating new regulatory requirements. 

TSA extended the formal comment period for the NPRM by 60 days from December 29, 2008, to February 27, 2009, to further facilitate industry input and encourage additional comments. During that time, TSA also conducted five public meetings 

throughout the country to solicit input from the GA community and other members 

of the public. 

In the process of evaluating over 7,000 written comments received, TSA also actively engaged industry stakeholders and entities indirectly affected by the NPRM 

in comment sessions to discuss key issues of concerns raised during the formal comment period and public meetings. These comment sessions have featured positive 

discussions focused on developing a security solution tailored to GA and have provided TSA with additional insight on potential alternative solutions that may be 

more feasible for industry to implement, while still maintaining an effective level 

of security. 

TSA appreciates the participation of the many stakeholders who have contributed 

to this process, including the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), the 

National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), the National Air Transportation 

Association (NATA), the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), the 

Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), the National Association of State Aviation Officials (NASAO), the 

Airports Council International (ACI), and other valued stakeholders. TSA and DHS 

are now determining the path forward, based upon the feedback received from industry and the public. There will be additional opportunities for stakeholders and 

interested members of the public to review and comment on any modified proposal. 

Security Directives (SD) 1542–04–08F and –08G.—The productive interplay between TSA and the stakeholder community also is exemplified in the issuance and 

amendment of security directives (SD). Congress provided TSA authority to implement security measures without prior notice or opportunity for comment when 

deemed necessary to protect the transportation system. SDs are issued in response 

to emergent situations and may be amended to adjust requirements to evolving circumstances. The authority to issue SDs is not new—it had been exercised routinely 

by FAA for decades prior to the creation of TSA. 
19 

Whenever possible, TSA engages in a collaborative process with stakeholders 

when formulating these directives. The recent issuance of SDs relating to Security 

Threat Assessments and credentialing of individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of airports is illustrative. In the course of preparing the SDs, TSA consulted with key stakeholders, made changes in response to their feedback, and conducted several conference calls afterward to ensure they understood the contents of 

the revised directives. TSA also extended the deadlines to give airports significant 

time to comply. 

The SDs, issued in December 2008 and June 2009, apply to Federalized commercial airports with full TSA security programs in accordance with 49 CFR Part 1542. 

The SDs improve identification/work authorization verification procedures and expand biographic information collected for processing STAs to improve turn-around 

time and redress procedures. The SDs also establish minimum audit procedures for 

identification media and require identification media for unescorted access to areas 

of the airport for which identification was not previously required. Although the SDs 

do not apply directly to GA operations, they do affect GA pilots who use these regulated airports. 

It is important to note that the need for these SDs followed several special emphasis inspections of airports across the country during which TSA found an unacceptable level of compliance with existing credentialing programs. Even with effective 

stakeholder outreach in the preparation of SD 1542–04–08–0F, some in the GA community later raised concerns about potential impacts on GA pilots. TSA responded 

to those concerns, on May 28, 2009, by issuing a revision, SD 1542–04–08G, that 

clarifies certain issues in SD–08F. The most significant for the GA community is 

a clarification that transient pilots need not obtain an ID at each airport they visit, 

only at their home airports. 

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT VALIDATES OUR APPROACH TO GA SECURITY

We are pleased that the DHS Inspector General’s (IG) May 2009 assessment of 

TSA’s role in GA security concluded that TSA’s risk reduction regime has been appropriate. We do not disagree with the report’s assessment of the level of threat to 

GA airports; we would emphasize that risk is composed of more than specific threats 

and it is our obligation to address the other risk components: vulnerability and consequence. We must address the risk associated with larger GA aircraft. We are 

gratified that the IG recognizes the effectiveness of our measured, collaborative approach toward further regulation of this industry. The IG’s report reflected TSA’s 

current efforts to promulgate new GA security regulations through the Large Aircraft Security Program rulemaking process. 

MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF SECURING THE GA SYSTEM

While we have made progress in meeting the challenges of securing the GA system, we continue to consult with stakeholders to improve our efforts. Our goal remains clear: Protecting GA from terrorist and other security risks while advancing 

the free flow of commerce. The GA security programs currently in place have diligently endeavored to meet those dual objectives. Our success is dependent in large 

part upon the collaborative relationships we maintain with stakeholders, which will 

continue as we consider new regulations. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to address the security of this important 

sector of our aviation system. I will be happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you very much for your testimony. 

Dr. Gallaway, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. GALLAWAY, ACTING DIRECTOR, 

DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

As acting director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the 

Department of Homeland Security, I would like to thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss the work we are doing with regards to 

general aviation. I would also like to thank the committee for its 
20 

support of DNDO’s mission to reduce the risk of radiological and 

nuclear terrorism to the Nation. 

DNDO was established to improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or 

transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation and to further enhance this capability over time. To that end, 

our work is guided by the development of a global nuclear detection 

architecture or GNDA. 

DNDO has developed a time-phased, multi-layered, defense-indepth GNDA that is predicated on the understanding that no single layer of defense can detect all rad/nuc threats. For this reason, 

the GNDA provides multiple detection and interdiction opportunities overseas, at our borders, and within the United States to effectively increase the overall probability of system success. 

My testimony today is focused on DNDO’s efforts to address one 

aspect of the GNDA—international general aviation. While no current known terrorist threat exists that pinpoints general aviation 

as a vehicle for a specific plot, DNDO’s initial architecture study 

highlighted several exploitable gaps that exist in the current rad/ 

nuc detection architecture, including the use of GA aircraft to move 

or deliver rad/nuc weapons. 

GA may be an attractive alternative for an adversary to exploit, 

because it offers speed, physical control of the weapon, and the relative lack of inspection, detection, and regulation. 

For in-bound international general aviation, DNDO is working 

closely with CBP to facilitate detection and interdiction of illicit 

rad/nuc weapons or materials entering the United States through 

international general aviation. By the end of 2007, CBP was using 

handheld radiation detectors to scan all international general aviation aircraft upon arrival in the United States. Once these detection processes were established, we worked with CBP to characterize the current radiological scanning capability and identify 

methods to improve effectiveness by enhancing equipment and 

operational techniques at Andrews Air Force Base. 

Beyond scanning of international general aviation arrivals in the 

United States, we are working with our partners to address some 

of the unique challenges of detection and interdiction of international general aviation. Unlike the other pathways, once an aircraft is in transit, opportunities for determining the contents of the 

aircraft or the intent of the operators are extremely limited. Challenges include the general aviation direct-to-target scenario, which 

describes the ability of an aircraft to deliver a weapon directly from 

overseas, non-stop to a target within the United States. 

Further analysis of the GA pathway led to consideration of a concept for gateway airports to provide rad/nuc scanning of all inbound international GA aircraft. International gateway airports are 

airports outside the United States where GA aircraft would be 

scanned for the presence of rad/nuc material before they enter the 

United States. 

We are exploring the option that rad/nuc scanning could be done 

concurrently with other required U.S. entry screening and inspection activities at these gateway airports. This option would allow 

international general aviation aircraft to proceed to any destination 

within United States, rather than having to stop at a CBP air port 
21 

of entry and might allow for increased efficiency and reduced costs 

to GA operators. 

To minimize flight deviations for international GA traffic originating from Canada and Mexico, our proposed concept would pair 

the international gateway airports with a complementary network 

of domestic gateway airports. Domestic gateway airports would be 

current CBP air ports of entry within the United States, near 

southern and northern borders, but located away from densely populated urban centers. 

I would like to point out that this gateway airport concept is still 

under development. Our gateway airport concept would require 

international and domestic participation and address mainly those 

aircraft that are compliant with the system. 

To effectively secure the GA pathways, there must also be a capability to detect and interdict any noncompliant aircraft. With our 

Federal partners, we are exploring ways to increase air domain 

awareness and use available information to quickly and accurately 

determine if an aircraft present a threat. 

In conclusion, this on-going analysis of general aviation is part 

of DNDO’s work to enhance the global nuclear detection architecture and to evaluate programs to effectively fill gaps in our national capability. We will continue to work with our Government 

and aviation community partners to improve the Nation’s ability to 

detect radiological and nuclear threats. DHS will balance maintaining the flexibility and mobility of general aviation and the needs 

to sufficiently protect the Nation from nuclear terrorism. 

Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any 

questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Gallaway follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. GALLAWAY

JULY 15, 2009 

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. As Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), I would 

like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the work we are doing with regard 

to general aviation (GA). I would also like to thank the committee for its support 

of DNDO’s mission to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear terrorism to the 

Nation. 

DNDO was established to improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time. 

To that end, our work is guided by our development of a global nuclear detection 

architecture (GNDA). DNDO has developed a time-phased, multi-layered, defensein-depth GNDA that is predicated on the understanding that no single layer of defense can detect all radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) threats. For this reason, the 

GNDA provides multiple detection and interdiction opportunities overseas, at our 

borders, and within the United States to effectively increase the overall probability 

of system success. DNDO has worked with intra- and inter-agency partners to develop time-phased strategies and plans for improving the probability of detecting 

and interdicting nuclear threats. DNDO will continue to enhance the GNDA over 

time by developing better detection technologies, working with our operational partners to improve concepts of operations (CONOPs), enabling real-time reporting of 

detection events, and supporting effective response to real threats. 

My testimony today will focus on DNDO’s efforts to address one aspect of the 

GNDA—international GA. Specifically, I will speak about our on-going work to secure the international GA threat pathway. 
22 

GENERAL AVIATION PATHWAY STUDIES

The United States border is the first layer within the GNDA where the United 

States has full control over detection and interdiction. For this reason, considerable 

effort and resources have been placed at this layer to provide robust radiological and 

nuclear detection capabilities, particularly at ports of entry (POEs). While no current, known terrorist threat exists that pinpoints general aviation as a vehicle for 

a specific plot, DNDO’s initial architecture study highlighted several exploitable 

gaps that existed in the current rad/nuc detection architecture, including the use of 

GA aircraft to move or deliver rad/nuc weapons. Further, the study concluded that 

GA was an attractive option for adversary exploitation because it offered a number 

of operational advantages—including speed, control of the weapon, and the relative 

lack of inspection, detection, and regulation—when compared to scheduled passenger and cargo operations. 

Initiatives for GA security include several interrelated activities that are considerably broader in scope than radiation detection. DNDO has approached the solution 

to the GA threat through a four-phase series of architecture studies: 

In Phase I DNDO developed an end-to-end architecture and identified gaps by 

various pathways, including the use of GA as a pathway for the movement and delivery of weapons. The Air Pathways Phase II study explored measures to mitigate 

the vulnerabilities presented by GA and concluded that the most difficult scenario 

to counter was the use of GA aircraft delivering a weapon from outside the borders 

of the United States directly to a target. The study identified that once a weaponcarrying aircraft is airborne, detection and interdiction of rad/nuc threats are unlikely. A primary Phase II recommendation was to consider a concept that would 

provide for screening of all international GA aircraft for nuclear weapons prior to 

takeoff for a flight into the United States. The Phase III study followed with specific 

recommendations: (1) Pre-departure screening of most GA aircraft entering the 

United States, and (2) requiring all near-border GA traffic to land only at a small 

number of specific GA airfields in the United States for screening. The Phase III 

study established an architecture, a CONOPS and rough order of magnitude (ROM) 

cost estimates for establishing and operating a system of foreign and domestic airfields that could perform rad/nuc screening for in-bound international GA traffic. 

Phase III recommendations were subsequently followed up with variants that included screening at U.S. airfields and screening at U.S.-Canadian airfields. Phase 

IV seeks to expand the GA work and address additional elements within civil aviation. 

INTERNATIONAL GENERAL AVIATION

DNDO is working closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to facilitate detection and interdiction of illicit rad/nuc weapons or materials entering the 

United States via the international GA pathway. For rad/nuc detection with regard 

to international GA arrivals, CBP uses handheld Radiation Isotope Identification 

Devices (RIIDs). By the end of 2007, CBP was scanning all international GA aircraft 

upon arrival in the United States. Once these detection processes were established, 

we worked with CBP to characterize the current radiological scanning capability 

and identify methods to improve effectiveness by enhancing equipment and operational techniques. In Spring 2008, DNDO, in partnership with CBP, began testing 

detection equipment in the GA environment and in controlled laboratory tests using 

next generation human portable devices. Focusing on international GA applications, 

the testing was conducted at Andrews Air Force Base (AFB) in March–June 2008. 

Five test sessions were conducted at Andrews AFB to baseline the performance of 

currently-deployed systems for scanning of small, medium, and large international 

GA aircraft, to determine if any CBP operational procedure changes are necessary 

and to evaluate performance of other human-portable scanning equipment. Test results validated the effectiveness of the current technologies for use during a majority of State-side scanning operations. These test results will be used to guide subsequent research and development efforts, including improvements to identification 

capabilities of current technologies through the use of alternate systems that are 

being assessed through our Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS) 

program. The evaluation of operational systems also resulted in recommendations 

to enhance scanning Standard Operating Procedures for this type of rad/nuc detection. 

Scanning of international GA arrivals in the United States is one step towards 

mitigating the rad/nuc threat, but the international GA pathway presents other 

unique challenges that we are working with our partners to address. Unlike other 

pathways, once an aircraft is in transit, opportunities for determining the contents 

of the aircraft or the intention of the operators are extremely limited. Challenges 
23 

include the GA ‘‘direct-to-target’’ scenario, which describes the ability of a GA aircraft to deliver a weapon directly from overseas, non-stop to a target in the United 

States. GA aircraft originating from overseas and flying to a target would enable 

an adversary to bypass the multiple detection and interdiction opportunities that 

are part of a defense-in-depth architecture. To effectively secure the GA pathways 

there must be a capability to detect any non-compliant aircraft (aircraft that do not 

submit a flight plan or otherwise attempt to enter the country illegally and aircraft 

that divert from their legal flight plans) and options to mitigate the threat. 

GATEWAY AIRPORTS

Additionally, the Gateway Airports concept was developed as a way to defend 

against the international GA threat. Gateway Airports are airports at which GA aircraft are screened for the presence of rad/nuc material: (a) Before they enter the 

United States, or (b) before they approach major population centers or high-value 

targets. International Gateways are airports outside the contiguous United States. 

Some international GA aircraft flights may originate from International Gateways 

and others may choose to pass through them for rad/nuc screening en route to the 

United States. In either case, rad/nuc screening is accomplished as the last act prior 

to takeoff for the flight into the United States. We recommend exploring the option 

that all other U.S. entry screening and inspection activity (e.g., Customs, Agriculture, and Health) be conducted concurrently with rad/nuc screening at the PreClearance Gateway. This option would allow international GA aircraft to proceed 

onward to any destination in the United States, rather than having to stop at a 

CBP Aerial Port of Entry (APOE) and might allow for increased efficiency and reduced costs to GA operators. In fact, the Gateway Airport system might be presented as a convenience for GA operators—as part of a ‘‘one-stop’’ service that would 

consolidate disparate activities and provide for more efficient flight operations. 

The United States already operates border preclearance facilities at a number of 

ports and airports in foreign countries. They are staffed and operated by CBP officers. Travelers pass through Immigration and Customs, Public Health, and Department of Agriculture inspections before boarding their aircraft, ship, or train. This 

process is intended to streamline border procedures, to reduce congestion at ports 

of entry, and to facilitate travel between the preclearance location and some U.S. 

airports that may not be equipped to handle international travelers. Preclearance 

exists at most major Canadian airports, providing convenience to travelers from 

those cities to the Unites States. Arrangements also exist with some airports in Bermuda, Aruba, and at two airports in Ireland. The proposed Gateway Airport plans 

could leverage some of these existing foreign pre-clearance sites and would require 

some additional locations for rad/nuc detection. Based upon the priorities identified 

in the GNDA, DHS, and the Department of State are working to increase international awareness and participation in our general aviation pre-clearance programs. 

In order to properly serve international GA traffic with minimal flight deviations, 

our proposed plan would pair the international Gateways with a complementary 

network of Domestic Gateway airports, to serve short flights originating from Canada and Mexico. Domestic Gateways would be current CBP APOEs spaced around 

the U.S. southern and northern borders. These would be inside the United States 

but at least 100 miles away from major urban areas designated by the 2006 Urban 

Area Security Initiative (UASI). The 100-mile standoff range is arbitrary, but it provides increased reaction time for identification and interception of non-complying 

aircraft when compared to the 30-mile distance commonly used for the largest temporary flight restricted (TFR) areas. 

I would like to note that while the Gateway Airport concept is a proposal for rad/ 

nuc detection for international GA, it is only a piece of the viable solution. The Gateway Airports plan as proposed would require international and domestic participation and addresses mainly those aircraft that are compliant with the system. We 

are still faced with the challenge of identifying and dealing with noncompliant aircraft. With our partners, we are exploring options to increase air domain awareness 

and use available information to quickly and accurately determine if aircraft present 

a threat. This on-going analysis of GA is part of DNDO’s work to enhance the 

GNDA and ascertain appropriate programs to effectively fill gaps. 

PATH FORWARD

In the near term, we will work with partners and stakeholders to support programs to produce widespread awareness of rad/nuc scenarios at airports of all sizes 

across the United States. Detection capabilities will become more available at air 

POEs with improved detection capability over current assets. Initial deployments of 
24 

rad/nuc detection technology for GA outside the United States will begin the process 

of scanning international GA traffic and introduce the concept of gateway airports, 

beyond what already is in place. 

The long-term structure of the GA architecture will expand to include a network 

of gateway airports, including overseas pre-clearance airports. GA traffic will be 

tracked more closely, providing increased air domain awareness and an enhanced 

ability to interdict rad/nuc materials or devices. The end result will be integrated 

security programs that provide a high degree of protection against GA transport of 

radiological/nuclear materials, including direct-to-target scenarios. 

CONCLUSION

DNDO will continue to work with TSA, CBP, and other partners and stakeholders 

within and beyond DHS to improve the Nation’s ability to detect radiological and 

nuclear threats at our ports and borders. DHS intends to balance facilitating the 

flexibility and mobility of general aviation and the need to sufficiently scan in-bound 

flights for radiological or nuclear threats. 

I welcome and appreciate the committee’s active engagement with this program, 

and look forward to continuing our cooperation as we move forward together. Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and Members of the subcommittee, I 

thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer any questions that you 

may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Again, let me thank all the witnesses for their 

testimony. I would remind each Member that he or she will be recognized for 5 minutes to question the panel. I will now recognize 

myself for 5 minutes. 

Let me thank you, Mr. Sammon. As I proceed with my questions, 

let me, first of all, ask unanimous consent to introduce into the 

record letter dated June 18, 2009 addressed to John from the 

Chamber of Commerce, United States of America, that in part 

thanks you once again. Your keen understanding of the vital role 

that the private sector plays in securing our homeland is evident 

to all. Much is appreciated by the Chamber and its members. 

But it really recounts your meeting with them and reflecting on 

the insight necessary. I would ask unanimous consent to submit 

that in the record. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

LETTER FROM THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SUBMITTED BY CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Washington, DC, June 18, 2009. 

MR. JOHN SAMMON, 

Assistant Administrator, Transport Security Administration, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, 601 S. 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598. 

DEAR JOHN: Thank you for meeting with Ann Beauchesne, Kevin Schmiegel, and 

me last month. The Chamber is looking forward to working with you and your team 

on a wide array of homeland security issues over the coming months. 

I appreciate you updating us on the issues surrounding the Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP). As you know, the LASP is an important issue for the Chamber, and your comments have assured me that the Chamber’s voice, and the voice 

of its members, is being heard. Ann told me that your stakeholders’ meeting this 

week was very productive, and that all of the points that we agreed during our 

meeting were well-received. We look forward to seeing the details of the next Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking and are hopeful that things continue to move in the right 

direction. 

Thank you once again for your time. Your keen understanding of the vital role 

that the private sector plays in securing our homeland is evident to all—and much 

appreciated by the U.S. Chamber and its members. I look forward to working together and please call if I can be of help. 

Best wishes! 

Sincerely, 

TOM. 
25 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I also introduce into the record a letter that 

comes from an organization of general aviation representatives 

dated April 15, 2009. Each of them have signed it to indicate their 

appreciation for your coordinating an April 6 meeting. 

[The information follows:] 

LETTER SUBMITTED BY CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE

APRIL 15, 2009. 

Mr. John Sammon, 

Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network Management, Transportation Security Administration, East Building, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, 

VA 22202-4220. 

DEAR MR. SAMMON: We would like to thank you for coordinating the April 6 meeting with representatives from the general aviation industry to discuss the proposed 

rulemaking on the Large Aircraft Security Program. This collaborative effort between the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the general aviation 

industry clearly demonstrates how common ground can be achieved when addressing America’s aviation security needs. 

As we prepare for our next meeting on May 6, 2009, we ask that TSA provide 

us with its summary of the April 6 meeting discussion within the next week. Providing this summary in a timely manner will allow representatives from the general 

aviation industry to better prepare for the May 6 meeting so that we may continue 

this productive effort. 

Continued dialogue on this important issue is critical to a successful resolution. 

We also encourage you to utilize this collaborative process on other critical security 

issues affecting the general aviation industry. 

Thank you again for your commitment and support to address the general aviation industry’s concern on this important rulemaking. 

Sincerely, 

CRAIG SPENCE, 

Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association. 

CHRISTOPHER BIDWELL, 

Vice President—Security and Facilitation, Airports Council International—North 

America. 

CARTER MORRIS, 

Senior Vice President, Trans. Security Policy, American Association of Airport 

Executives. 

DOUG MACNAIR, 

Vice President, Government Relations, Experimental Aircraft Association. 

JENS HENNIG, 

Vice President of Operations, General Aviation Manufacturers Association. 

ERIC R. BYER, 

Vice President, Government & Industry Affairs, National Air Transportation 

Association. 

HENRY M. OGRODZINSKI, 

President and CEO, National Association of State Aviation Officials. 

DOUG CARR, 

Vice President, National Business Aviation Association. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I assume now we can go forward unshackled 

by any thought that the Congress and/or the administration has 

any interest in undermining the 1.3 million jobs and not recognizing the vital economic role and the important role that general 

aviation plays. 

My first logistical question to you is when do you foresee moving 

forward on the next step of rulemaking, having proceeded in the 

initial rulemaking? I consider this fine reading that you gave me, 

the old rules. What will we expect with the new rules? When will 

that proceed? 

Mr. SAMMON. We have a very firm outline of where we want to 

proceed from the workshops. We expect to begin writing that next 
26 

week. We expect to sit down with folks in TSA and begin putting 

that to pen. The subject matter and the content, I think, we are 

fairly clear on. We expect to start—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you begin next week. 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You are also aware of the inspector general’s 

report that was dated May 2009. 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You are also aware of the language that indicates, in a cavalier manner, that general aviation has nothing to 

worry about, and it is insignificant. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. SAMMON. Not—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In terms of its vulnerabilities. 

Mr. SAMMON. I believe the report indicated there was no threat. 

We don’t believe there is a specific threat. But we believe there are 

vulnerabilities, as was mentioned in the film, and you have mentioned, particularly larger aircraft have no keys. They need to be 

secured, among other things. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me just suggest for our memory there 

was no perceived threat with commercial airlines driving into the 

World Towers on 9/11. 

Mr. SAMMON. Correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, can I ask you the question again? Is perceived threat the basis upon which we make a report that, in essence, deadens our ears, deadens our sensitivities to being more secure or being more responsible about security in general aviation? 

Mr. SAMMON. We agree that threat is one part of risk. We think 

there is a risk for general aviation. The vulnerabilities must be addressed. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you very much. 

Mr. Mann, there is no doubt that we respect the public service 

that the IG’s office has given. 

Mr. MANN. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But for the life of me, I am not sure why there 

couldn’t have been a broader understanding of the question as relates to Houston, which is only an example. I am hoping that we 

could have looked at that as an example of the question of general 

aviation security. 

The statement that Houston is not a sitting duck—and might I 

just say, again, this is generic for any city that has general aviation—because I guess you focused only on the framework of the 

question. Because as Dr. Gallaway has indicated, the potential of 

some aircraft coming in with radioactive materials and coming into 

general aviation, that poses a threat. 

If, for example, a general aviation aircraft took off and had untoward intentions, are you suggesting that it is an impossible 

thought to have the vulnerability of our refineries being the eye of 

the storm? Did you not look at that, which is part of the question— 

certainly should have been part of the question that should have 

been answered in this IG report? 

Mr. MANN. It is a good question. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. To me, it looks as if you made complete light 

of some very real and serious issues. I am just appalled. 
27 

Mr. MANN. Well, I can assure you, Madame Chairwoman, that 

we did not make light of the very serious issues that you have indicated. Certainly none of us can forget the horrible events of 9/11/ 

2001. I think you make a very good point with regard to perception. There was not a perceived threat at that time either. 

But I think that a lot of general aviation depends on how risk 

is defined. If it is easier to steal a small airplane, then there is certainly a risk in general aviation. However, if the damage that a 

small airplane can do by running into a building or running into 

a chemical plant is minimal, then we have to consider whether or 

not there is a serious threat. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The only question I would say to you, Mr. 

Mann, is I am not sure if you are doing a risk analysis in this report, or the IG’s office is just speculating; because again, I emphasize that no one would have speculated on 9/10 that there would 

be terrorists that manipulate their documents, that would have 

been trained to fly a plane and not land, that will have taken a 

major commercial aircraft and gone into the towers. 

Our job at homeland security is to be preventative. Your report 

kills any intention or effort by anyone to believe, well, we should 

be a little careful here; because you mention that, in a general 

statement, is there a concern? Absolutely not. I don’t understand 

how you made a report without expanding it to perceive potential 

threats, so that we could at least have a framework to work from. 

Let me just quickly, and I will finish with you and move to the 

next question. That will be my last question. The perimeter issue 

is an issue. You made a point of suggesting that someone entering 

on the grounds was not a problem. And certainly coming back after 

the fact, all of the potential heads of these aviation airports, general aviation airports, were on notice. So their answers certainly 

were going to be ones that you wanted to hear. 

But, from my perspective, the entrance onto the grounds was 

similar to the terrorists getting on the airplane. So, I don’t know 

why that is not a potential vulnerability or threat, because it could 

have been someone wanting to do something untoward. The first 

act could have left a bomb on site. Maybe it would have done nothing but blow up a number of unoccupied airplanes, but it would 

have been an action. 

Why wasn’t the intrusion on the perimeter something of concern? 

Mr. MANN. Well, Madame Chairwoman, we can speculate on numerous possibilities of things that could have happened. Yes, it 

could have been a vulnerability, or it could have been a very serious incident if an individual enters onto an airport unchallenged. 

I mean, it is—that undeniable. 

But the mere fact that we have not had an incident of significant 

proportions certainly doesn’t mean that we won’t have one. But it 

doesn’t appear that there is a clear threat for that sort of activity 

to happen. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right, Mr. Mann. It seems as if, in conclusion, that probably further assessment might have shown that 

there were vulnerabilities. I thank you for your testimony. 

Let me just quickly ask Dr. Gallaway, you quickly indicate something that I think is very, very important in your testimony. That 

is the seeming coordination necessary with DNDO on this potential 
28 

radioactive/nuclear component. I want to know how we can help 

you. 

It seems as if there is not the coordination. TSA, CBP, DNDO 

do not appear to be working cohesively for the potential of a large 

aircraft, general aviation, coming from overseas, equipped to create 

havoc with nuclear materials. How can we be of help, Dr. 

Gallaway? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Ma’am, we work as a result of our global nuclear 

detection architecture, working across the spectrum of opportunities to mitigate the risk. Many of our resources in the past have 

gone into containerized cargo. We are scanning 98 percent of the 

cargo coming into the United States every day, for example. 

We, as a Nation, have started turning our attention to these 

other pathways. But we have not done it as aggressively as we 

probably should to try to mitigate the threat across the board. 

I think we are working quite well with CBP and TSA. It is a 

matter of the amount of resources that are available. So right 

now—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you need more funding? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think you have just answered how we can 

be of help. We will pursue that with you. 

Let me now recognize the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. OLSON. Well, thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I appreciate 

the time to ask the witnesses some questions. 

I am going to start out with you, Mr. Mann. You know, your report says that TSA is using a threat-based approach to assess some 

of the things we saw in the report from KHOU. I don’t want to confuse some of the large aircraft with the general aviation aircraft. 

As we remember the attacks of September 11, those were large 

passenger liners loaded with over 20,000 pounds of aviation fuel at 

the time they hit those buildings. Now, as we know, one of the factors that brought those buildings down was that excessive fuel 

burning and heating the steel that ultimately resulted in the collapse. 

So, I am concerned that we are confusing some of the threats 

from a large aircraft with threats from a small aircraft, like a 

Cessna 182, which holds 92 gallons of aviation fuel. So I just wanted to give you the opportunity to explain some of the differences 

in your study between the threat assessment from a large aircraft, 

as opposed to the threat assessment from a small general aviation 

aircraft. 

Mr. MANN. Well, as we mentioned small general aviation aircraft 

makes up the majority of the fleet. Larger 747s are privately 

owned. 747s are larger airplanes, have a, in our experience, what 

we are able to determine, are secured differently, most always in 

hangars. They are not just generally available; would certainly require a higher level of expertise, not only to gain access to the 

plane, but be able to move it, navigate it, take off, do all the things 

that it would take in order to use that aircraft as a weapon of mass 

destruction. 

So, quite honestly, sir, the bulk of our concern was with regard 

to smaller aircraft, less than 12,500 pounds. As the GAO, the CRS 
29 

and as we have indicated, they do not appear to have a significant 

threat to homeland security. 

Mr. OLSON. Yes, sir. Thanks for the answer. Very different 

threat, largely because of the size of the aircraft—— 

Mr. MANN. Yes. 

Mr. OLSON. Mr. Sammon, I would just like to also ask you about 

the public comment period. The LASP ended in February. Your office has engaged with the stakeholders, who had serious concerns 

with the mandate in the Notice of Public Rulemaking. I want to 

commend you for the effort you have undertaken to hear their concerns. I just wanted to let you know that I am pleased today to 

hear you are going to put out an NPRM. Is this going to be a new 

NRPM or a revised NRPM? 

Mr. SAMMON. Our attorneys are looking at the best vehicle. It 

may be easier to take where we are going from and start from a 

clean sheet of paper. The attorneys are wrestling with that right 

now. But they will work out the specifics of that shortly. 

Mr. OLSON. Okay. We will get out of the business if the attorneys 

are wrestling with it. Don’t want to get involved in that. Anyway, 

my final question for you, Mr. Sammon, is just how are DHS and 

TSA going to deal with the terrorist watch list and its possible outsourcing in future, large aircraft security program rules? 

Mr. SAMMON. Through our discussions in the workshop, when 

the rule was originally proposed, Secure Flight, which you may be 

aware of, was quite some far off in the distance. Secure Flight is 

now a reality. We started with a number of carriers. So a variant 

to Secure Flight is something called eSecure Flight, which would 

be available directly to the operators. We do not envision using 

third-party auditors or third-party watch list services. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much. I appreciate my time. I yield 

back my time, Madame Chairwoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Olson, thank you so very much. It is a delight to recognize the gentleman from Ohio, who is a pilot. I hope 

will continue his oversight of this regulatory process. His input 

early on, I believe, helped this committee and the Chairman look 

to TSA for their visions as relates to the aircraft and a distinctive 

weights of the aircraft. So I thank you very much. 

Mr. Massa is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MASSA. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I will be—for me 

to offer a correction. But my constituents in New York would hold 

me accountable should I—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You let me get away with that twice. I am 

sorry. 

Mr. MASSA. Yes, ma’am. Out of respect. But in self-defense, I 

must—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You must defend yourself. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. MASSA. It is the proud heritage of western New York that 

brings me here today. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. There might be some connection. I am not 

sure if there is a border. But I will proudly say that this gentleman 

is from New York. 

Mr. MASSA. Thank you. I do hail from one of the cradles of general aviation, the home of Glenn Curtiss, the home of Schweizer 
30 

Aircraft Corporation. So, I come at this, not only from personal experience, but also from a very strong interest in seeing general 

aviation in all of its categories flourish in this country. 

A couple specific questions if I may. I would ask the appropriate 

witness to comment. I saw in the beginning of the rulemaking process, the potential of embarking air marshals on corporate aviation 

jets. Is that still a provision that is under consideration? 

Mr. SAMMON. No. It originally was in there really under exigent 

or extreme circumstances that the administrator would do that. 

But it is not envisioned that you would have air marshals flying 

on general aviation planes, no. 

Mr. MASSA. Well, I commend TSA for removing that provision, 

and that I believe that most individuals who use corporate aviation 

are the CEOs of some of our most important companies who probably have a good idea of who is supposed to be on the airplane with 

them. I envision that they would be able to identify any interlopers 

with relative speed and ease. 

I also would like to comment for the record that I recognize general aviation embodies a wide swath of flying aircraft. In fact, by 

the rules discussed today here, also in company up to our largest 

aircraft, if they are non-scheduled commercial aircraft, including 

passenger and cargo-carrying Boeing 747s. So, it is very important 

to get the rules right on this as far as access to those aircraft. 

I also agree with the gentleman from Texas that a Cessna 152/ 

182, a King Air or Queen Air, does not possess the same kinetic 

energy threats as those larger multi-engine commercial jets. As a 

pilot, I understand very clearly, and I believe here in the audience 

today we have a representative from a company who has done its 

very best to take a large number of dollars out of my back pocket, 

Jefferson, Incorporated, without whom general aviation would suffer greatly. 

But, as a community of pilots that adds a great deal, not only 

to the transportation, but just to the outright fun of flying, I really 

would like to be very deeply involved in ensuring we get this right. 

It is very, very important that we do not overpenalize general aviation and act in a heavy-handed draconian manner that will destroy 

a large industry that brings so much to this country. I would like 

your comment on how we are going to balance that please. 

Mr. SAMMON. Good. We, again, have had lengthy discussions. 

The meetings we had lasted up to 8 hours. In those months, it 

wasn’t an hour meeting coming in and brushing things off. They 

were significant dialogue back and forth. I have briefed Joe 

Lombardo, the president of Gulfstream in Savannah 2 or 3 weeks 

ago, and understanding where we are. 

Craig Fuller, I attribute Craig Fuller’s leadership to the process 

in terms of where we have gotten and how far we have come along. 

So we have, in addition to Tom Donohue in the Chamber of Commerce, we have engaged folks, outlined what we see coming out of 

the process. I think that they are comfortable we are hitting the 

right way. 

I would be happy to offer a brief to you, or any Members of the 

subcommittee, on the details of what we are thinking right now. 

Also, any of the studies we have that support where we are going. 

I would be happy to do that. 
31 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I would like to also add one comment—that one 

of the things that makes general aviation so appealing from a corporate point of view is the access and speed of transportation of 

those executives, where time definitively is money. So, I hope that, 

as we move forward, we do not place irrational or unnecessary barriers to that very essence that makes those aircraft such an important part of American business. 

Mr. SAMMON. Again, that is why we have made specific—in addition to other folks, the folks from Gulfstream, obviously, that is 

what they do. That is their business. That is what they are selling 

is speed and flexibility. We wanted to make sure that they were 

aware. Also the folks from Gulfstream offered us quite a bit in 

terms of securing aircraft, simply, easily, inexpensively, but securely. We appreciate their input. 

They attended our working sessions. So, I think that, if you look 

at the folks whose ultimate—the end of chain, we have got to sell 

these things for that particular purpose, I think we have had very 

good dialogue with them. I think if you called Mr. Lombardo, you 

would find out where we are. 

Mr. MASSA. Well, thank you very much for your attention to this. 

I look forward to being available to you in any manner possible to 

be of assistance. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want to thank the gentleman of New York, 

Mr. Massa, for his questioning and his insight into these areas. 

I am now pleased to recognize the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman. I 

sometimes wonder what is the greater threat to general aviation, 

over-regulation or comments out of the White House condemning 

executive jet service and private aircraft. Hopefully, we are getting 

away from that sort of thing. That is an industry that the United 

States is involved in. When we condemn it, we create an atmosphere in which we lose jobs. 

I am also reminded, when I hear some of the questions asked of 

Mr. Sammon and Mr. Mann, that you two are sort of in a damnedif-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don’t situation. 

I have noticed some of the comments that have been coming out 

lately about the CIA, an agency of the Federal Government that 

appears to have done a pretty good job in keeping us from being 

attacked by terrorists. As a result, CIA employees get threatened 

with prosecution. They get threatened with investigation. 

Sometimes I just have to shake my head, because we haven’t had 

an attack on U.S. soil since 9/11. It hasn’t happened by accident. 

So I would actually like to take my hat off to those of you in the 

Federal Government, in the Executive Branch, who have been 

doing a good job of attempting to ensure that we don’t have another attack. 

Having said that, obviously I, as others, am concerned about the 

risk as it exists with respect to general aviation. 

So, Mr. Sammon, I would like to ask you this question. Have we 

moved away from the risk-based approach? Have we moved away 

from the layered defense approach that we have embarked on with 

respect to the Department of Homeland Security in all other areas, 
32 

particularly other areas of aviation, as we have tried to deal with 

the potential threat in the area of general aviation? 

Mr. SAMMON. No. I think if you look at risk, obviously, many people have had the conversation. But we look at risk in terms from 

DHS’s perspective is made of three parts: The threat, the vulnerability, and the consequence. As we focused our discussion, in my 

oral testimony, it said that there is not a specific intel-based threat 

on general aviation. 

But, in terms of the vulnerability of unsecure aircraft and other 

issues that we talked about, and the consequence that a large GA 

aircraft could cause, we need to address those two other portions 

of risk. So, just as other areas where we don’t have specific threats, 

but we do take prudent measures that are reasonable, sensible to 

reduce the risk, that is our responsibility to do that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. What I hear from some of my constituents who 

are private aircraft owners or operators, particularly those in the 

agricultural industry, and some in the business industry, what 

they are concerned about is this. They say, look, we may get up in 

the morning and not know where we are going to fly that day. We 

may not know who is on our plane until we make a decision a halfhour ahead of time. 

For legitimate business reasons, particularly in the area of agriculture, where you have got large expanses of property, or for example, farmland in California and farmland in Arizona, maybe 

farmland in Nevada, their concern is—and I would ask you if it is 

justified or not—that the Department, in its effort to try and respond to the legitimate issues that we have talked about here, may 

impose obligations on them that don’t make sense from their perspective. 

Can you give me an idea of how you deal with that issue, because they have been worried about, gee, do we have to give prior 

notice of who we have on board? Do we know who is going to be 

on our plane 12 hours from now? I may not know that. 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. That was one of the subjects of considerable 

discussion during our workshops. I think we have worked out with 

the industry associations reasonable protocols from the group. I 

have reviewed these personally with most of the folks who participated in the workshops in terms of how we deal with that and how 

to pilot and command the discretions they have or wouldn’t have 

to do address some of the issues you are concerned about. 

I think when we publish these—and again, I would be happy to 

brief you separately—I think you will see that they seem reasonable. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Dr. Gallaway, I would just like to ask you about 

the gateway airport situation, can you give us a little more detail 

on how that is shaping up, and how you see that as an effective 

means of dealing with this issue that you brought up? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Right now, it is still in a conceptual phase. We 

are working out the details, because there are a lot of different options that we can work. Of course, the amount of money that is 

spent to implement those options can vary considerably. 

But ultimately, we are trying to balance the inconvenience to the 

flying public or to the general aviation public with increasing the 

security. So costs will ultimately be a large driver in whatever solu-
33 

tions start gelling. Then we would take it to the aviation community to see how they would—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Cost to the aviation community, cost to the individual operator, or cost to the Government? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. We are looking at costs across the board, because 

it would increase the cost, depending on which of these solutions 

we are talking about, it could potentially increase the cost to the 

operator as well as the Government. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the gentleman for his question. 

My pleasure to recognize Ms. Norton of the District of Columbia 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Madame Chairwoman, I can’t thank you enough for 

putting the focus on the Homeland Security Committee on general 

aviation. For the first time, I think, most of the work on general 

aviation has been done in the aviation subcommittee. It is very 

frustrating, particularly considering we are talking about a major 

industry, 50 percent of all aviation in the United States. 

I listened to all of you for evidence of the risk analysis that you 

say—I agree is the way to approach this has been done. I thought 

it was a disgrace to contrast what we saw, which is virtually none 

of what I would take to be the appropriate guidance that you would 

want to give, regardless of vulnerability in Houston with what can 

only be described as nuclear overregulation. 

Here, in the Nation’s capitol, it is shameful. It makes us, what 

is it, 8 or 9 years after 9/11 look like we haven’t even learned how 

to protect our own Nation’s capitol, New York airports, New York— 

far greater risk and consequences analysis. Density, if you are looking to do damage there—— 

Shortly after 9/11, they did the right thing. Major commercial 

center, general aviation was up, up and going. Let us contrast that 

to the District of Columbia where, for example, we get what even 

looks to be arbitrary actions—South Capitol Street Heliport, deliberately kept open for 2 years. It is a heliport now—2 years after 

9/11, abruptly shut down, no explanation to the public or anybody 

else, including this committee. 

General aviation in the District of Columbia, you, Mr. Sammon, 

lay out the shameful picture. You have destroyed the entire industry in the Nation’s capitol. You have 240 you say. Our information 

is 200 flights per year. 

Guess what, sir? It was 2,000. You just wiped it out in the Nation’s capitol. Indeed, you, TSA, wouldn’t even open national or 

general aviation in this airport until the chair of the Transportation Infrastructure Committee, when I was in the minority, said 

that he was going to hold the agency in contempt. 

Then you opened it in a way that was in the face—it was a kind 

of in-your-face opening, because you said, okay. You can fly into the 

Nation’s capitol. But you have got to do a security threat assessment for all passengers coming in, including fingerprints and criminal histories. Don’t mind it for the flight crew, of course; but all the 

passengers. 
34 

Guess what? Those air marshals, you have got to have them on 

every flight. That means that you opened it all right with a destroyed industry that still can’t come into your Nation’s capitol. 

I am trying to reconcile how you have treated civil aviation here 

with the testimony of Mr. Mann, the assistant IG. Now, here is 

what he said—and he says the GAO and CRS agree. The small size 

lack of fuel capacity and minimal destructive power of most general 

aviation aircraft make them unattractive for terrorists and thereby 

reduce the possibility of threat associated with their misuse. 

A light use of a—that too light an aircraft to use for conventional 

explosives, Mr. Gallaway. Let me just ask you point blank, because 

this gets to be very tiresome, given the resistance of an agency that 

is supposed to know how to keep us safe and open at the same 

time. 

We understand there is already a plan to open general aviation 

at national airports. Is there a plan? When do you intend to issue 

it, so that general aviation is available here the way it is in New 

York City and every other part of the United States? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. In terms of the national capitol region and the 

airspace, TSA does not control the airspace security. We are one 

member of an airspace working group, including the Department of 

Defense, the FAA—— 

Ms. NORTON. I asked you a point-blank question. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. We don’t have a—— 

Ms. NORTON. Is there a plan? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. There isn’t. There is not a plan. 

Ms. NORTON. We were told in a hearing that there was a hearing 

of the Aviation Subcommittee. Now, you say there is no plan. Has 

there ever been a plan? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I don’t know—— 

Ms. NORTON. Do you intend to do a plan? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I don’t have a plan. I think that—— 

Ms. NORTON. So, you believe that it is justifiable to essentially 

close down general aviation and a major commercial and government center of the United States—what is it? How many years 

after 9/11, when you believe that is acceptable and that that is necessary? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I think if we get our rule out and in the in 

force—— 

Ms. NORTON. Will the rule make it possible? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. I think it will be helpful with the other members 

who control the airspace—— 

Ms. NORTON. We are the stakeholders, our people who use—— 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Yes, we agree. 

Ms. NORTON [continuing]. The—who in fact have used general 

aviation services in the Nation’s capitol and are the people who 

own helicopter services—— 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON [continuing]. Who routinely flew into Merseley 

among the stakeholders with whom you are meeting? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Yes. Again, I think when the rule comes out and 

talks about plane size and other issues associated with that, I 

think that discussion becomes easier to have with the members of 

the people who control the overall—— 
35 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Sammon, we are going to demand equality 

with New York. You have not, in this testimony, nor has anyone 

from the Department ever made the case that is more necessary to 

reduce general aviation here than it is in New York City, where 

your own assessments show the risks, the threats, and the consequences to be far greater than in the Nation’s capitol. 

Therefore, that is what I am looking for—that, and nothing less. 

You can tell that to the other people at the table that you are trying to point the finger at as the reason; because that is what we 

want here, equal treatment. 

Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the gentle lady from the District 

of Columbia. Frankly, let me say to the gentle lady that she has 

this Chairwoman’s support for the issue of general aviation in 

Washington, DC, so that we recognize that the balanced perspective that I utilize is that what we do have should be secure. But 

it does not mean that we cannot look in an open-minded manner 

at how we can restore general aviation in this area. 

So, Mr. Sammon, I knew you are just one part of it. This committee will take up the issue. We would like you gentlemen to remain. We understand the challenges. But we have votes. We will 

then recess, and we will restart this panel, so that Mr. Dent, the 

Ranking Member, will be able to pose questions to the panel. We 

thank you very much for your time and courtesy. The committee 

stands at recess. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. This hearing will be resumed; thank you for 

your patience. It is my pleasure to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Ranking Member from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. 

Thank you to the panel for sticking around here. I apologize for 

the interruption. 

Mr. Sammon, thanks for being here too, and also for your work 

on this issue, and also for meeting me separately from this meeting. 

Why do you think that, in hindsight, TSA issued such a broad 

sweeping rule that, in the opinion of many was pretty far off the 

mark with respect to the LASP program? 

Mr. SAMMON. I think the approach there was just to bring something back down once you get the comments, rather than trying to 

broaden if you find out you have missed the mark somewhere. So, 

it was probably more broadly based. I think where we are going, 

as we have discussed, is a much more narrow focus based upon 

considerable industry input. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. Did you guys consult with any stakeholders prior to the release of the original NPRM? 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. In fact, Administrator Hawley on numerous 

occasion had meetings with stakeholders and attempted to come to 

some process. But, he had met personally, as I did, and other staff 

met, with stakeholders beforehand. 

Mr. DENT. How does TSA document any consultations with outside groups or industry groups or stakeholders, while developing a 

potential rule? 
36 

Mr. SAMMON. The documentation of those meetings, I would have 

to check and get back to you and let you know. On the working sessions, we have documented them. I think they are being cleared to 

be put on a public format. 

Mr. DENT. Also, and finally, in your written testimony, you mentioned the automatic detention and processing terminal, or 

ADAPT—— 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. 

Mr. DENT [continuing]. As a system designed to mitigate the use 

of a GA aircraft as a conveyance to transport dangerous persons, 

materials in the country. How does that work? How does it distinguish between a scheduled legitimate flight and a flight that may 

be deviating from its flight path? 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. ADAPT is a program developed by FAA. They 

track tail numbers. Essentially ADAPT is just a—if you think 

about it as a data management system. So, with that tail number, 

for instance, if the particular aircraft is part of the security plan, 

and ADAPT recognizes that. If people who do not have security 

plans and are applying to come into the country, for instance, apply 

for waivers, if they have a waiver, ADAPT will recognize that. If 

they don’t, ADAPT will recognize the aircraft, highlight it to FAA 

and ground-stop at that aircraft. 

We have had a considerable number of aircraft, say from Venezuela, to have come up without a waiver is ground-stopped in Ft. 

Lauderdale, stopped. But essentially, what kind of information that 

you want to tag onto that particular tail number, ADAPT is simply 

a—that is what it does. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Dr. Gallaway, thank you too for being here as well. I have been 

out to the DNDO facilities out there in Nevada and I got quite an 

education out there. As you know, DNDO’s responsible for developing a global nuclear detection architecture predicated on the understanding that ‘‘no single layer of defense can detect all radiological and nuclear threats.’’ 

How does the radiation, nuclear detection on general aviation 

aircraft play into DNDO’s global nuclear detection architecture? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. We look at all the pathways coming into the 

United States in the border layer. We look at the maritime coming 

across land and also air. So, we looked at the entire aviation pathway and found, obviously, a variety of flights that come into the 

country. So, we are trying to work across the board. 

Our analysis, however, shows that international general aviation 

is particularly attractive, because it allows somebody a lot of autonomy. They can maintain control of the weapon, because they can 

travel with it if they chose. The speed, obviously, is attractive. But 

then finally, that they could fly it, in fact, directly to the target 

without ever encountering officials here in the United States. 

Mr. DENT. My next question is this. I understand that concern. 

Do you agree with the TSA and the inspector general’s conclusion 

that general aviation provides a possible method for terrorist attack. But it is not a probable method for an attack. Do you agree 

with that contention? 
37 

Mr. GALLAWAY. We have no specific intelligence information that 

suggests that this is a threat vector, that the adversary is pursuing. 

Mr. DENT. How would DNDO, working with TSA and CBP, address this high-consequence, but low-probability, method of attack? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. We would work with both those agencies. But 

CBP would probably be the more natural one that we would have 

overseas pre-clearance airports, where we would go out and do radiation scanning of the aircraft to assure that there is not a nuclear device on board the aircraft before it departs foreign soil. 

Then, we would have confidence that, as it enters U.S. airspace, 

that it is okay. 

Mr. DENT. Can I ask one more question? 

I am sorry. Mr. Sammon, one other series of little questions here. 

In your testimony you mentioned that a critical aspect of TSA’s 

regulatory approach is the process-oriented nature of devising mandatory security measures. By process-oriented nature, are you referring to the rulemaking process? 

Mr. SAMMON. I am sorry, the process-oriented nature is what—— 

Mr. DENT. Yes. 

Mr. SAMMON. I think—— 

Mr. DENT. Are you referring to the rulemaking process when you 

say that? 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. 

Mr. DENT. Okay. If so, then why does the TSA have literally dozens of security directives issued without any opportunity for public 

notice or comment? 

Mr. SAMMON. I think there were two security directives which 

were issues recently: One called 8F, another 8G. The regulated parties in both cases, the directly regulated parties, were the airports. 

8F was designed specifically to address vulnerabilities for people 

with unescorted access in commercial airports. They do not apply 

to general aviation airports. 

We consulted specifically with both AAAE and ACI, the two 

major airport associations who also brought airports in to comment 

both on the security directive. As we got closer to the deadlines, we 

also consulted with other affected stakeholders. But you must also 

be aware that the other people who were affected by this would be 

Coca-Cola vendors, plant maintainers, anybody who is wandering 

around airports, with unescorted access, who has not been issued 

an airport clearing security badge. 

So, there is a wide variety of folks that we—most of our consultation was with the regulated party and the airports. 

Mr. DENT. Finally, what is the process for issuing these security 

directives? Are they ever reviewed to identify if an actual rulemaking would be possible? 

Mr. SAMMON. In the case when the security directive, particularly the 8F, was issued because of security vulnerabilities that 

were identified by ICE and other parties at O’Hare, where parties 

were using unauthorized badges. Illegal people were basically taking badges out of a box, using those as their airport credentials. We 

wanted to move forward as expeditiously as possible to close that 

vulnerability. Rulemaking would have taken us much longer. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 
38 

Thank you for your indulgence. I yield back. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Dent. Before I 

move to the next panel, I have just a few questions that I wanted 

to make sure that we were clear, and that I had a full understanding. 

Mr. Sammon, as we go forward in the rulemaking process, I am 

going to ask you and your team—and I know that your team is 

being rebuilt as it moves forward under this new administration— 

to keep this committee, this Chairwoman and the full committee 

apprised of the progress of the rulemaking. In fact, as Chairwoman 

of this subcommittee, I would like to have, along with the staff, 

specific briefings as you make your way through this process. 

The other question is, as you watched the video—and I do agree 

with much of the comments that have been made by my colleagues. 

Particularly Mr. Lungren, I think, made some points about farmers 

and the question of a manifest, and some of the challenges in general aviation, when you ask for the preciseness of a manifest and 

a time frame. 

I might add that I also recognize that general aviation has much 

different topography, when we talk about where small planes may 

land. Coming from Texas, they may land on an airstrip on a farm. 

But my question to you is, in the view that you have just been 

able to look at, we do have reasonable need to be concerned about 

perimeter invasion or entry. Let me not use the term invasion as 

much as perimeter entry. 

Will you look at that in your rulemaking? Particularly as it relates, as we discussed previously, Teterboro, I believe, in New Jersey, in a congested area, and the airports in Houston; because 

there was a clear, if you will, violation of the perimeter—an unID’d, uninvited, nonrelevant, meaning that the person had no purpose, and I won’t even call them a visitor—got on the grounds with 

no bar or no security check whatsoever. 

So, that is a problem, is it not? If you could turn your mic on, 

so I could hear you. I think that is a problem, is it not? 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. In May, in 2004, we issued a series of security 

guidelines. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right, I understand that. 

Mr. SAMMON. The guidelines, for instance, at airports as you 

were speaking of would include fencing, hangar security, CCTV, intrusion detection, access controls, lighting, personal ID and so on, 

so forth. Our struggle there has been to issue those as a mandate 

without a funding source. 

That has been the thing we have been struggling with is—in 

terms of we are—the assessment of vulnerabilities, the riskiness of 

the airport, the grass strip, for instance, compared to Teterboro. 

The requirements are clearly laid out. 

But the question is, if we issue a rule, how will it be paid for? 

We don’t know that yet. That is our new struggle. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, we have established that there is a 

threat. We established that there is a vulnerability. I think we established on this record that 9/11 was not predicted, per se. I assume there were many security experts that probably have written 

or wrote articles pre-9/11 saying America’s vulnerable. But it had 

not reached the American psyche, or unfortunately the policy mak-
39 

ers, many of whom are here today, including myself if you will, on 

this whole question of terrorism. 

So, we now have a different look at terrorism. We know that we 

may not all be able to predict what might happen. Even though we 

have not had a terrorist act on our soil, which we are very grateful 

for, the combination of the Executive and Congress working together to ensure that not happen, we cannot predict the future. 

So, my point to you would be that we want to work with you. 

There needs to be a balance in the struggle that you have. Frankly, 

I believe there can be a balance. Teterboro, there can be established parameters and regulations that would be very helpful. I believe in Houston, there can be a balance. Although smaller airports, 

but as you noted in the video, large airplanes seemingly were 

housed there. 

So, I want to pose the question—and I would like to work on the 

response with you—that we look at perimeter security as it relates 

to risk-based analysis, small and large, but also as it relates to just 

the penetration and vulnerability aspects of it; because you can 

have a small airport with large aircraft that is, in essence, housed 

there. Can we work on this issue? Do you see the necessity of ensuring perimeter security? 

Mr. SAMMON. I would be happy to come up and sit down with 

staff and with you to discuss this and discuss the procedures that 

are in place; and then discuss how we would go forward, particularly if it were made part of a rule and without the funding. I think 

that is really the issue. I would be—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I understand. 

Mr. SAMMON [continuing]. Happy to spend as much as time as 

possible. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You see the need for perimeter security. 

Mr. SAMMON. It is in part of our guidelines. We just have no 

means. It is just the resource to make it happen. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Mann, let me just raise this one question 

with you. I would appreciate it if you convey this to the IG, Mr. 

Skinner. I do believe that you worked in good faith. But I do believe you did a disservice in the summary and the conclusions that 

came about. 

I assume you responded to what was an interesting and provocative headline as to whether or not Houston was a sitting duck. I 

don’t believe the answer needed to be as provocative—no, it is not 

a sitting duck. Do you have any scientific evidence that, if a small 

plane was either loaded or non-loaded, and penetrated one of our 

refineries, one of the tanks in our refineries, one of the areas that 

are holding chemicals, that there wouldn’t be a potential catastrophic event? 

Mr. MANN. Well, there is certainly the potential for that. But—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me have you answer the question. A small 

plane could cause damage in a catastrophic event. Could it not? 

Mr. MANN. It could. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It could. So even if you want to hang your hat 

on the question of risk and whether it ever happens, again I emphasize to you that I am not trying to, in essence, cry fire in a 

crowded theater. I am not trying to re-elevate the horror of 9/11. 

We all went through that. Those in New York most of all. 
40 

But I am trying to capture the unpredictability of terrorism. 

Therefore, the concern I have with the IG’s report is that you gave 

no credence to the unpredictability of terrorism. You gave you credence to the particular area that you are in. You have just heard 

me say that I supported Ms. Norton. I am not against general aviation. I frankly believe it should be open here in this region, and we 

should find ways to secure it. 

But then, in Houston, it is just laissez-faire. It is okay. You seem 

to not look at the region that we were in. Those airports were minutes away from our refinery corridor, with all kinds of potential. 

We have had catastrophic incidences, and that we are not, in essence—it didn’t take a major loss of life. But we had loss of life, 

15 at one particular incident. That was, of course, an accident that 

occurred. But it has great potential. 

So, my simple question is do you concede the point that, even if 

it is a question of how you assess the risk, that a small plane in 

the region that we are speaking of could cause major damage? 

Mr. MANN. I think that is correct, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And could cause loss of life. 

Mr. MANN. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If it was not an accident, meaning some unfortunate pilot that lost their way, but in fact someone who intended 

to do so, the perimeter entry that you witnessed by video, and the 

easy access to airplanes, could contribute to that. 

Mr. MANN. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. I want to thank you for that. 

Let me just go to Dr. Gallaway. I think, Dr. Gallaway, that people are not understanding—I shouldn’t say understanding—but 

capturing the essence of what you are saying; because I think it is 

major. You really focused us on international general aviation. 

Many times, those are large planes. It could be that they could be 

carrying radioactive material. They are unscreened overseas. Is 

that my understanding? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you have come here today. Let me just 

read into the record again your testimony that says: We recommend exploring the option that all other U.S. entry screening 

and inspection activity, i.e., customs, agriculture, and health, be 

conducted concurrently for radioactive nuclear screening at the preclearance gateway. 

What you are saying is that you would like to have a scheme, 

a structure in place, that would put in place the international general aviation structure that would screen for potential radioactive 

or nuclear material, that is not at this point happening, and therefore making them a potential deadly target heading towards the 

United States, if that was their destination. 

Mr. GALLAWAY. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Did I understand you to say that you are 

working on such a structure, and funding would be the asset that 

you would need to carry through with this? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. We are still in the planning phase for this. I will 

call it more that it is a sophisticated concept at this point. But 

there would be a lot of things to actually require to implement this. 

Funding would certainly be the backbone for it. But we would have 
41 

to negotiate with our international partners. We would have to figure out, in fact, how to set up the gateway airports and the scanning processes, and then to operationalize all those. So, it would be 

a challenge, but a doable challenge. 

The other component of that problem would be to deal with the 

aircraft that come across on relatively short flights from Canada 

and Mexico, that we would set up airports along the U.S. border, 

but away from population centers, where they could land safety in 

the United States and then be scanned once they are on the 

ground. But the key to that is keep them away from population 

centers. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think maybe we could work with this 

proposal and utilize pilot programs initially to see how this structure would work? 

Mr. GALLAWAY. Yes. In fact, customs and border protection has 

gateway airports in Aruba, Canada, and Bermuda, and which we 

are trying to negotiate the rights overseas with the foreign countries to allow us to do rad/nuc screening. I think we are doing pretty well in those negotiations. Then we would implement them as 

pilot programs. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I think most Americans would be grateful, Dr. Gallaway, for your work. I would think most Americans 

wouldn’t be aware of the potential threat of rad/nuclear materials 

coming in on an international general aviation flight. Again, we are 

not attempting to create hysteria. But we are attempting to be good 

stewards of the American people and their need of security. 

I would like to ensure that we have an opportunity to be briefed 

as you move forward. Particularly, I would like to get a status report on the cooperative efforts that you are attempting with our 

neighbors. I would also like to hear on the progress we are making 

with our extended neighbors, and that is our allies and friends and 

various countries that are, of course, in Europe and other parts of 

the world, because our general aviation flights come from all over 

the world, which leaves us vulnerable to any precipitous incident 

that might occur. 

So, I would appreciate that. I would appreciate us engaging on 

this concept of beginning with a pilot program. As you have indicated, funding is not the only part of your need. We need to have 

an effective structure. I think it is both insightful and needed. I 

will look forward to meeting with you as you make progress on this 

particular effort. 

I would like to thank the witnesses and appreciate, again, very 

much, your—— 

Ms. NORTON. Madame Chairwoman, Madame Chairwoman, could 

I say a word? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Oh, I am sorry. I didn’t see you come in. 

Let me yield for a moment to the gentle lady from the District 

of Columbia, which I have already gone on record saying that I 

support her proposition with respect to the District of Columbia 

and general aviation. The gentle lady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. I appreciate your support, Madame Chairwoman. I 

particularly appreciate this hearing, because it has given us a 

study in contrast without evidence that has been an underlying 
42 

risk/consequences analysis. Everyone knew, particularly after 

9/11—but they would know in any case—that New York was a particularly vulnerable jurisdiction to planes of every kind, yes, even 

of course general aviation with its skyscrapers, with its enormous, 

indeed, its magnificently unique density. 

Indeed, Department of Homeland Security knows it, because it 

places New York City as the highest-risk jurisdiction in the United 

States. Yet, the Homeland Security Department, it tells us it isn’t 

us, it is the Secret Service, approved within days of 9/11 general 

security aviation in the Big Apple. You know, they did a risk and 

consequences analysis of the kind they gave lip service to here, 

when it came to Houston and to the District of Columbia. 

Now, as a result of this hearing, Madame Chairwoman, I must 

say I believe that Houston is more vulnerable than the Nation’s 

capitol. We don’t have any manufacturing facilities, nuclear facilities, fuel storage facilities anywhere close to the Nation’s capitol. 

There is plenty of perimeter control here. In Houston, I saw no evidence, either of perimeter control, or of control by TSA in the air. 

Yet, if I am a terrorist, and all I have got is a small plane, I am 

not likely to try the Nation’s capitol. For one thing, we got the Air 

Force, as all of you know, who since 9/11 we have seen go in the 

air if they see anybody who even looks like they are penetrating 

the airspace of the Nation’s capitol—false alarms, but all of us were 

put out in the street several times. 

There is no question that the only thing that you have not given 

sufficient attention to is commercial aviation in a country that 

prides itself on keeping commerce in place. 

Frankly, we have had to—in this city, Madame Chairwoman— 

beat Federal officials around the head and shoulders, just to keep 

the city open until finally people understood that this is the United 

States. This is America. We are capable of protecting our country. 

I wanted to say to all three of you gentlemen, it is a matter of 

some embarrassment to me that we created a whole Department 

of Homeland Security, and you all haven’t figured out how to get 

ordinary commerce into the Nation’s capitol. It is not only the Nation’s capitol, it serves one of the real growth regions of the country. So, it is a matter of embarrassment. It should be a matter of 

shame to you. 

Even without general aviation up in the air, you have had precautions here of the kind we don’t have in New York and the kind 

we don’t have in Houston. I think you have got to get your cities 

straight. I think an appropriate risk analysis must be done here in 

the Nation’s capitol. 

There are all kinds of layers. I didn’t see any in that film. I 

haven’t heard you speak in any layers. So, while I would agree 

with you that, on any Nation-wide risk analysis, general aviation 

doesn’t come up very high, but a particularized risk analysis needs 

to be done. 

It looks like you have done it only for the Nation’s capitol. You 

got it all wrong—all wrong. You have never been able to justify 

what you have done here. But I haven’t seen comparable attention 

paid to jurisdictions near nuclear facilities, near fuel storage facilities. It does seem to me you have got some work to be done. 
43 

By the way, I still think general aviation does not pose a major 

threat, even to those jurisdictions. But this testimony today, Madame Chairwoman, has convinced me that no risk analysis, major 

area of the country by major area of the country, has been done; 

and that they are dealing with Nation-wide assessment that I 

think you and I would agree with. I think we are entitled to more 

than that, given vast differences. 

Sometimes they don’t have the same population. But terrorists 

are smart enough to know that we have guarded places like New 

York and the District of Columbia and have a lot of chatter going 

on there. They may be smart enough to look for places where if you 

just do a big blow-out, and where maybe you want to take extra 

precautions there, instead of spending all your time looking at the 

navel of the Nation’s capitol and stopping all general aviation for 

all intents and purposes here. 

Shame on you. That has simply got to be corrected. You have got 

to get all the players at the table and show that you know how to 

meet your dual responsibility to, in fact, keep this Nation safe and 

to keep us economically and commercially strong at the same time. 

You have got two missions, not one. 

Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We thank the gentle lady. 

I think, gentlemen, you have just recognized the great interest 

of this issue of general aviation probably more so than you might 

have expected. I think we have had an opportunity to strike a balance in recognizing that general aviation is valuable. But it has its 

vulnerabilities. 

Maybe we now need to look across the Nation, Mr. Sammon, as 

you look at your regulations. Of course, the issue of the District of 

Columbia is more than you and a major policy decision, which we, 

as Members of Congress, will join with the congresswoman. 

But as you look at this issue of general aviation and the regulations, I think there is merit to looking at perimeter security, looking at where airports are located. Certainly you have already 

worked with the industry as relates to manifests, protection of vehicles, size of vehicles. We are making progress. But I want to be 

able to see a holistic approach to this issue. 

As I indicated, I want to thank Mr. Mann, Mr. Sammon, and Dr. 

Gallaway. There being no further questions for this first panel, I 

would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. The Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for you. We ask that you respond to them expeditiously in writing. 

We now welcome our second panel to the witness table. 

I welcome our second panel of witnesses. Our first witness is 

Martha King. Since the early 1970s, Ms. King and her husband, 

John, have been teaching pilots. Their company, King Schools, operates out of a dedicated complex in San Diego, California, that includes a television and software production facility. For more than 

34 years, King Schools has delivered millions of videotapes, CD– 

ROMs, DVDs and on-line courses to pilots and mechanics. 

Ms. King is the first and only woman to hold every category and 

class of FAA rating on her pilot’s certificate, as well as every flight 

and ground instructor certificate offered by the FAA. 
44 

Our second witness is Mr. Olislagers, who is the executive director of Centennial Airport in Denver, Colorado, one of the busiest 

general aviation airports in the United States, and among the 30 

busiest U.S. airports of any kind. 

Our third witness is Mr. Jeremy Rogalski. He is an investigative 

reporter for KHOU–TV, the CBS affiliate in Houston. In February 

2007, he aired a report exposing security lapses at three general 

aviation airports in the greater Houston area. Specifically KHOU– 

TV acquired entry to those facilities and, in many cases, the aircraft doors were wide open, and nobody questioned KHOU–TV’s activities. This important reporting helped to galvanize a national 

conversation of general aviation security and was among the reasons for the IG report we discussed during our first panel. 

Our fourth witness is Mr. Mark Van Tine. Mr. Van Tine is the 

president and chief executive officer of Jeppessen. Jeppessen is a 

subsidiary of the Boeing Company. He has spent his career working in a variety of different areas within Jeppessen’s businesses, including flight operations, customer service, charting, and information technology. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statement shall be inserted 

in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his or her 

statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Ms. King. 

Ms. King, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MARTHA KING, PILOT 

Ms. KING. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, 

Members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. It is a privilege to 

be here before you today. My name is Martha King. I am co-owner 

of King Schools, a family-owned business located in San Diego, 

California. Our company produces DVD and Web-based training 

courses for pilots. 

Nearly half the pilots in America, who learned to fly in the last 

30 years, have taken one of our courses. In addition to being type 

rated in our small company airplane, as Chairwoman Jackson Lee 

indicated, I also hold every category and class of FAA rating on my 

pilot and instructor certificates. 

My husband and I wouldn’t have been able to build our business 

without the use of a general aviation business aircraft. Our airplane is critical to the survival of our company and to the customers we serve. 

For example, King Schools provides the computer-based pilot 

training materials for some 300 flight schools throughout the 

United States that are Cessna pilot centers. These small independent businesses are located on small airports at some distance 

from airports served by the airlines. We visit these flight schools 

regularly to give marketing and business development talks to 

their owners and employees. We bring along software engineers 

and technical support staff to solve our customers’ computer issues. 

Because of our relationship with these Cessna pilot centers, we 

visit often with Cessna Aircraft Company in Wichita, Kansas. By 

using our company airplane, we can take eight members of our 

small management team from San Diego to Wichita in the morning 

and return to San Diego that same night. The airplane helps us 

turn travel time into work time and limits our employees’ time out 
45 

of the office. This productivity just wouldn’t be possible using the 

airlines. 

You don’t often hear about companies like King Schools when 

you hear discussions about business aviation. But for every large 

company that operates a business airplane, there are eight or nine 

companies, just like mine—small and medium-sized companies that 

provide jobs and bring commerce to communities across the United 

States. 

I want to thank you for having me here today as part of your 

hearing to discuss the Large Aircraft Security proposal or LASP, as 

put forward by the Transportation Security Administration. From 

an overall perspective, the proposal does not recognize the significant differences between commercial airline operations and noncommercial operations which do not carry members of the general 

public. 

The primary difference is that we general aviation operators 

know personally everyone on our aircraft. As a GA operator, I am 

concerned about several provisions in the proposal. I would like to 

briefly mention three of them. 

A first concern is the prohibition of more than 80 items from 

being carried on board. This plan would dramatically restrict the 

productivity of many businesses. Some wouldn’t be able to carry 

their own necessary equipment or their own products. 

A second major concern is the proposal to establish a third-party 

compliance audit program. Some business airplane operators have 

told me this proposal would actually decrease security, since businesses would now be required to reveal internal security procedures to outside parties. I am also concerned with the requirement 

to constantly vet our passengers against a no-fly list that, at times, 

has proven to be inaccurate or incomplete. We know our passengers. They are our employees and our customers. 

I believe that general aviation security would be best enhanced 

by the TSA establishing a rulemaking committee to address the 

questions and concerns raised by industry and the public on the 

LASP. This type of forum, often used by the FAA and other Government agencies, has proven benefits. 

Since the events of 9/11, the general aviation community has 

been very proactive in developing and implementing a large number of workable and effective security measures. What general 

aviation operators seek, and America needs, are measures that do 

not represent a needless sacrifice in liberty without a benefit to society. 

The freedom of movement of private citizens has always been one 

of our great American ideals. We are confident that we can ensure 

security without sacrificing that ideal. 

Thank you, and I am happy to address any questions you may 

have. 

[The statement of Ms. King follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARTHA KING

JULY 15, 2009 

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, Members of the subcommittee, 

good afternoon. This is the first time I have testified before a Congressional subcommittee and it is a privilege to be here before you today. 
46 

My name is Martha King, and I am co-owner and co-chairman along with my husband John—of King Schools, Inc. which is a family-owned business located in San 

Diego, CA. Our company produces CD–ROM, DVD and web-based training courses 

for pilots in training. I say with some pride that it has been estimated that nearly 

every pilot has taken one of our courses during their flying career. We launched our 

pilot training business out of our home more than 30 years ago. 

In addition to being type rated in our company airplane, a Dassault Falcon 10, 

I also hold every category and class of FAA rating on my pilot and instructor certificates. I regularly fly everything from jet and piston airplanes and helicopters to 

weight-shift trikes and powered parachutes. I also pilot blimps from time to time. 

Since 1996, King Schools has been a member of the National Business Aviation 

Association (NBAA). I am pleased to appear today on behalf of the Association 

which represents over 8,000 diverse companies with only one thing in common— 

they all depend on general aviation aircraft to help them address some of their business travel challenges. 

My husband and I would not have been able to build our business, or conduct our 

now world-wide small business enterprise, without the use of a general aviation airplane for business. Our plane is critical to the survival of our company and the customers we serve. 

For example, King Schools provides the computer-based pilot training materials 

for some 300 flight schools throughout the United States that serve as Cessna Pilot 

Centers. These small independent businesses prefer to be located on small general 

aviation airports at some distance from airports served by the airlines, because that 

is the best location to conduct flight training. We visit these flight schools regularly 

in order to give marketing and business development talks to the flight school owners and employees, and occasionally take software engineers and technical support 

staff to solve our customers’ computer and networking issues. 

As an additional example, because of our relationship with these approximately 

300 Cessna Pilot Centers we have the need to visit often with the Cessna Aircraft 

Company in Wichita, Kansas. By using our company airplane, we can take eight 

members of our small management team from San Diego to Wichita in the morning, 

and return our staff to San Diego that same night. In a small company like ours, 

it is important that we minimize the duration of time our management team is out 

of the office. The airplane helps us turn travel time into work time and limit our 

employees’ time out of the office. This productivity would not be possible using the 

airlines. 

My story is a familiar one—every Member of this subcommittee has businesses 

in your State with a story similar to ours. 

You don’t often hear about companies like King Schools when you hear discussions about business aviation. People tend to exclusively focus on large companies 

when in reality large companies represent only a small portion of business aviation 

operators. For every large company that operates a business airplane, there are 8 

or 9 companies like mine—small and mid-size companies that provide jobs and bring 

commerce to communities all across the United States. 

I know that you invited me to be here today to talk not only about the benefits 

of business aviation, but also about the important issue of general aviation security 

and the pending TSA rulemaking known as the Large Aircraft Security Program or 

‘‘LASP.’’ My long experience as a businesswoman, aviator, and flight instructor gives 

me additional insight into some of the challenges general aviation faces in today’s 

economic, political, and regulatory environment. So I am pleased to have the opportunity to be with you today to be part of this discussion on general aviation security. 

Let me be clear. The general aviation community is committed to the security of 

our national transportation system. We want to be a partner with the Federal Government on reasonable, workable, and effective regulations that simultaneously ensure security and facilitate general aviation operations. 

Since the events of 9/11, NBAA and indeed the entire general aviation community 

has been very proactive in enhancing security by developing and implementing a 

large number of workable and effective security measures. We have worked closely 

with several Government agencies including the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and this partnership 

approach has produced tangible results. The security measures we have implemented include an AOPA Airport Watch program, the monitoring of aircraft financing transactions, a new requirement for government-issued, tamper-proof photo-IDs 

for pilots, and guidelines for security at general aviation airports. In addition, 5 

years ago, NBAA members in the NY area voluntarily initiated a pilot program to 

design a security program specifically for operations in that area. 

We believed that these collaborative efforts would set the foundation for a reasonable and effective Large Aircraft Security Program, which we all understood the 
47 

TSA to be developing. Unfortunately, that turned out not to be the case. The community was not only disappointed but alarmed when TSA issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) known as the ‘‘Large Aircraft Security Program’’ (LASP) 

in October, 2008. Their proposed rule clearly reflected a lack of basic understanding 

of general aviation. 

Let me give you two clear examples: First, it appeared to ‘‘cut-and-paste’’ security 

measures specifically designed for commercial operations onto non-commercial general aviation operations. The proposed rule did not demonstrate even a basic understanding of the vast differences between commercial operations, and non-commercial 

general aviation operations which, among other things, do not carry unknown members of the public. The failure to understand and recognize these fundamental differences can lead to absurd results. For example can you imagine a company that 

makes tools not being able to take the tools they make on the plane they own? Secondly, the Large Aircraft Security Program as it has been proposed would apply to 

very small airplanes—airplanes that are one-twentieth the size of the smallest airplane used in the 9/11 attacks. 

I do want to point to one area of agreement—for over 2 years, the TSA has repeatedly indicated that pilot identification has been the agency’s primary focus in the 

development of a general aviation security protocol. NBAA members recognize the 

value and endorse the concept of pilot background checks. We stand ready to work 

with TSA to further define and implement this proposal. 

As a general aviation operator, I am most concerned about several of the proposed 

mandates contained in the current LASP proposal. These include: • The proposal to include a list of more than 80 ‘‘prohibited items’’ which could 

no longer be carried on-board GA aircraft. Many of these items are routinely 

carried aboard because they are central to the business needs of the operator. 

As I mentioned before it makes little sense for a company sending a team of 

employees to fix a problem with a customer’s assembly line to be unable to access their tools during a flight—or a company to not be able to use their own 

products during flight as they prepare for a sales presentation. • The LASP would also require owners/operators of some airplanes to develop 

procedures to carry a Federal air marshal when told to do so by the TSA. Here 

again, this proposal shows a lack of understanding of the general aviation community since every business operator knows who is on-board their aircraft at 

all times. • The proposed LASP rule proposes to establish an external third-party audit program to measure compliance with the rule. We believe that ‘‘contracting out’’ 

such security functions to oversee the application of TSA’s No-Fly and Selectee 

list and to conduct compliance audits is contrary to our national homeland security goals. • The requirement to constantly vet our passengers against a no-fly list that at 

times has proven to be inaccurate or incomplete. We know our passengers. They 

are our employees and our customers. 

In response to the proposed LASP rulemaking, the TSA received over 7,000 public 

comments including a letter from Committee Chairman Thompson as well as other 

letters from many House and Senate Members expressing concern with the proposal. 

Following release of the LASP NPRM and in recognition that the TSA proposal 

was seriously flawed and needed to be modified, NBAA joined with other general 

aviation associations in requesting that the TSA establish a rule-making committee 

to address questions and concerns raised by industry and the public on the LASP. 

We greatly appreciate the support which we received from Members of Congress 

for such a working group. We continue to believe that this type of forum—often used 

by the FAA and other Government agencies—would be beneficial for the development of the LASP, and we hope that the TSA will consider the proven benefits of 

utilizing the ‘‘rulemaking committee’’ mechanism going forward. 

As the subcommittee is aware, the TSA also held a series of listening meetings 

across the United States to receive additional public testimony from hundreds of 

other concerned parties. 

My husband John attended the TSA listening session in Burbank, CA last January, and provided comments for the record. I believe his comments on our commitment to aviation security are shared by the general aviation community at large 

when he stated that: 

‘‘My wife and I operate an airplane that weighs more than 12,500 pounds—still it 

weighs less than 10% of the weight of a Boeing 737. When applied to private operators like us, these proposed regulations are pointless. You asked earlier about what 

security procedures are in place. Our airplane is located at a secondary airport, but 

it is fenced and gated and has 24-hour security. The airplane is in a locked hangar. 
48 

The airplane itself is locked and the steering system is disabled. But what is more 

important, we already have in place the best security system possible—we personally know every one of our passengers. And we are not going to allow an unknown 

person into our airplane, even at the point of a gun. You see, we have all learned 

from 9/11 that the days of complying with hijackers, and living through the experience, are over.’’ 

We appreciate that TSA made those additional forums available for the public to 

ask questions and express concerns with the LASP proposal. Following those meetings, the TSA and the general aviation stakeholders have held three additional listening sessions to further discuss our outstanding concerns with the current proposed LASP rule. These meetings were insightful, deliberative, and valuable to both 

industry and I believe the TSA. I’m encouraged by reports of the progress made 

since February and by Mr. Sammon’s comments today. 

It is regrettable that these types of open exchanges didn’t occur prior to the release of the LASP as I believe that the proposal would have looked significantly different. I am hopeful that TSA’s commitment to releasing a revised LASP proposal 

for another round of public comment shows renewed commitment to developing a 

reasonable, effective, and implementable security program. 

I’m looking forward to reviewing TSA’s revised proposal as part of the next public 

comment period and hopefully we’ll all see a more rational approach to general aviation security. Adoption of TSA’s current LASP proposal would most surely create 

significant economic and operational burdens for general aviation operators and to 

many American businesses—like mine—that rely on general aviation aircraft to 

support their businesses and the economic base that is so vital in today’s difficult 

economic environment. 

I would also like to express our congratulations and appreciation to the Members 

of the Homeland Security Committee for your hard work and efforts in crafting HR 

2200, the TSA Authorization bill. We are pleased that this important legislation creates an Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) for aviation stakeholders and 

a ‘‘General Aviation Working Group’’ within the ASAC to give the GA community 

a forum to formulate recommendations on GA security proposals for TSA consideration. 

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, in closing, I want to reiterate the general aviation community’s commitment to ensuring that we continue to operate in a secure environment. We were pleased that the recent Department of Homeland Security report by 

the Office of the Inspector General—which you requested—effectively summarized 

the current state of general aviation security. It reports that general aviation ‘‘presents only limited and mostly hypothetical threats to security’’ and, that actions 

taken by GA airports and operators are ‘‘positive and effective.’’ We are especially 

mindful of the responsibility that we as a community have to maintain and improve 

those efforts. 

I also want to express my appreciation and that of all the members of the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), to you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, 

Ranking Member Dent and the Members of House Homeland Security Committee 

for your on-going support for general aviation. You have been most helpful in working with us on the LASP and other issues of concern to general aviation. 

Please be assured that the general aviation community is committed to working 

in partnership with this subcommittee, the Congress and the administration in developing and supporting reasonable and effective aviation security measures. 

The freedom of movement of private citizens has always been one of our great 

American ideals. We are confident that we can ensure security without sacrificing 

that ideal. 

I look forward to responding to any questions you might have. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Ms. King. We appreciate your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Olislagers to summarize his statement for 

5 minutes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. OLISLAGERS, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, CENTENNIAL AIRPORT 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking 

Member and Members of the committee. My name is Robert 

Olislagers, and I am executive director at Centennial Airport, 

which is located in the metropolitan area of Denver. I wish to 
49 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here today regarding the general aviation security program, as well as the Large 

Aircraft Security Program. 

Before I begin my testimony, I would like to thank the committee 

and the committee Members for your continued support on this 

issue. The provisions in H.R. 2200 could foster the kind of cooperative relationship that we are seeking with TSA. We also appreciate 

the security grant program as part of H.R. 2200. It is equally important and very much appreciated. 

I would also like to thank Mr. Sammon for his personally leading 

the stakeholder meetings following the closure comment period of 

the NPRM. His open and pragmatic approach certainly was refreshing. We hope that that will carry forward in the revised 

NPRM when issued. 

By way of background, I served on the working group of the 

Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which drafted the Security 

Guidelines for General Aviation Airports. I have also managed 

General Aviation airports for the last 25 years. At present, I manage one of the busiest GA airports in the country. I also studied 

national and international security at the Air War College and at 

Harvard University. 

I believe that progress has been made with respect to general 

aviation airport security, including the recommendation that the 

TSA reconvene the working group to update the Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports. It appears that that suggestion 

is resonating with the TSA. 

That said, while the industry does not question that potential 

threats exist, I remain concerned with the over-emphasis on the 

threat and the threat posed by general aviation aircraft. I am also 

concerned about associated program costs, irrespective of the state 

of the current economy, as well as the erosion of civil liberties. 

Specifically, the NPRM-stated reason for the proposed rule contradicts TSA’s own intelligence evaluation and conclusions. The 

TSA states that the reason for the NPRM is that the TSA is aware 

that, as vulnerabilities within the air carrier and commercial industry are reduced, GA operations become more attractive targets. 

However, this is in direct contradiction with the assessment by the 

TSA Office of Intelligence and the recent 2009 report by the IG 

makes the same finding. 

Another point I would like to make is that the NPRM constitutes, in our opinion, an unfunded mandate pursuant to the Unfunded Mandate Act of 1995. Just at Centennial Airport alone, we 

estimate the law enforcement cost—nothing else, just the law enforcement cost—to run between $300,000 at the very low end, up 

to $1.3 million per year. That would amount to a current operating 

level somewhere around $60 to $80 per landing or takeoff for each 

aircraft coming into Centennial Airport. It basically amounts to 

double taxation. 

The NPRM ignores privacy laws and private property rights. We 

are very concerned, and this is one of the more complex aspects of 

the NPRM. But it touches on both conflicts with other laws as well 

as Federalism issues. I am not an attorney. However, extensive 

case law suggests that citizens enjoy extraordinary legal protections related to private property, privacy rights, as well as due 
50 

process. For this reason, we recommend that the privately owned 

aircraft be exempt, and that the NPRM focus only on publicly operated aircraft for the most stringent initiatives. 

The NPRM also may inadvertently force some airports that are 

unable to comply with the NPRM as proposed to violate Federal 

Aviation Administration grant assurances, and also be in noncompliance with Federal commerce law relating to interstate access, possibly resulting in becoming ineligible for airport improvement program funding or becoming subject to other punitive actions. 

The NPRM also proposes an aircraft weight threshold not supported by the facts. The proposed weight threshold of 12,500 

pounds is at least 50 percent below TSA’s own classified throw 

weight analysis and well below the industry recommended weight 

thresholds. Industry recommends that the threshold be at least 

100,000 pounds or more. I can go into greater detail if you would 

like. 

In conclusion, regarding the NPRM, we do not question that potential threats exist, but these must be weighed against mitigations already in place, including voluntary as well as mandatory, 

the threat to national security, and their likely probability. If the 

TSA is indeed serious about taking a more pragmatic approach to 

managing who flies the aircraft, who is on-board the aircraft and 

what is on-board the aircraft—as Administrator Sammon said, a 

more aircraft-centric approach—then the industry sees no need for 

costly airport security measures that do not demonstrably improve 

security. 

However, the effectiveness of a layered approach to security compels general aviation airports to play a value-added role in security. 

For this reason, we reiterate the recommendation that TSA reinstate the working group and update the Security Guidelines for 

General Aviation Airports in lieu of the airport security requirements proposed in the NPRM. 

This concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you very much for 

your time. 

[The statement of Mr. Olislagers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. OLISLAGERS

JULY 15, 2009 

Good afternoon, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and Members of the 

committee, my name is Robert Olislagers and I am Executive Director of Centennial 

Airport, located in the Denver metropolitan area. I wish to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today regarding General Aviation Security. 

Before I begin my testimony, I would like to thank the committee and committee 

Members for your continued interest in this issue. As many of you have pointed out 

over the past several months, the lack of collaboration with general aviation airports 

and the general aviation industry has brought us to this point. As was illustrated 

very clearly, effective security requires TSA and industry to work closely together 

toward common goals. The provisions you have constructed as part of H.R. 2200 to 

establish stakeholder working groups to address general aviation security and other 

important security issues could foster the kind of cooperative approach that was initially missing as TSA developed the NPRM. Your efforts to create a general aviation 

security grant program as part of H.R. 2200 is equally important and much appreciated. 

I would also like to express my appreciation to TSA Assistant Administrator John 

Sammon for personally leading several stakeholder meetings following the conclusion of the NPRM public comment period. I participated in two of the three meet-
51 

1Large Aircraft Security Program, Other Aircraft Operator Security Program, and Airport Operator Program, Federal Register TSA Docket 2008–0021. P. 145 2 Civil Aviation Threat Assessment. Transportation Security Administration, Office of Intelligence. December 30, 2008 (U/FOUO), Appendix A, P. 2. 3TSA’s Role in General Aviation Security. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General. OIG–09–69, May 2009. P. 28, 29. 4For example, the TSA is just now in the process of reviewing data of vulnerability assessments at 100 GA airports through a pilot program. 5 It should be noted that former DHS Secretary Chertoff often spoke about ‘‘measurable programs’’ and therefore this standard should apply to this DHS/TSA-crafted NPRM. 

ings and his open and pragmatic approach was particularly refreshing. The general 

aviation industry, including the airport community, look forward to seeing this pragmatism carried forward in the much-anticipated reissue of the NPRM. 

By way of background, I served on the Working Group of the Aviation Security 

Advisory Committee (‘‘ASAC’’) and assisted the TSA in drafting the ‘‘Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports’’. I have managed General Aviation (‘‘GA’’) airports for 25 years and at present, I manage one of the largest and busiest GA Reliever airports in the United States. I also studied national and international security at the Air War College and Harvard University, and I am a published author 

on the subject of GA airport security. I served as the Principal Investigator for the 

only GA security research grant ever issued by the TSA and previously chaired two 

aviation security research projects on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences, 

Transportation Research Board. I currently chair the General Aviation Security 

Working Group for the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE). 

I believe that progress has been made with respect to general aviation airport security, including the recommendation that the TSA reconvene the ASAC Working 

Group and update the Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports in lieu of 

the NPRM recommendations related to airports—a suggestion that appears to resonate with TSA. However, while the industry does not question that potential threats 

exist, I remain concerned with the over-emphasis on ‘‘the threat’’, and the threat 

posed by general aviation aircraft. I am also concerned about associated program 

costs, irrespective of the state of the current economy, as well as the erosion of civil 

liberties. Specifically; 

(1) The NPRM stated Reason For The Proposed Rule (145) contradicts TSA’s 

own intelligence evaluation and conclusions; 

(i) Specifically, on page 181, the TSA states that the reason for the NPRM 

is that; the ‘‘TSA is aware that, as vulnerabilities within the air carrier and 

commercial aviation industry are reduced, GA operations become more attractive targets.’’1 However, this is in direct contradiction with an assessment by 

the TSA Office of Intelligence (‘‘OI’’), which concluded that there is little evidence that terrorists have turned their attention to general aviation in the 

United States.2 The recent May 2009 report by the Department of Homeland 

Security, Inspector General makes the same finding.3

(ii) General aviation is an asymmetric business and unlike commercial airlines with very predictable time schedules and routines, general aviation behavior is random and too unpredictable for terrorists to conduct training exercises that lead to well-planned attacks with a high degree of success. 

(iii) Unlike the commercial aviation sector, the vast majority of pilots and passengers flying on general aviation aircraft are known to aircraft and airport 

operators. Therefore, the focus should be on the small number of unknown 

travelers, including any unusual situations, transactions, or behavior. 

(2) The NPRM proposes to make mandatory what is already in place without 

demonstrating the efficacy [or lack thereof] of the existing combination of mandatory and voluntary initiatives, including a cost benefit analysis; 

(i) Specifically, the NPRM suggests that the GA industry is mostly unregulated, and that this presents a risk (145). We know in fact that GA is highly 

regulated, including security. I will not repeat all the mandatory and voluntary security initiatives that have been implemented since 9/11; however, 

it appears that the TSA issued this NPRM without a comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the GA industry that takes into account the effectiveness of all mandatory and voluntary initiatives implemented to date.4 We believe therefore that it is premature to conclude that this proposal is in fact, 

needed. 

(ii) Ancillary, the TSA did not provide a cost/benefit analysis in the NPRM 

that justifies the cost of implementing the NPRM against the efficacy of the 

existing mandatory and voluntary initiatives.5

(3) The NPRM constitutes an Unfunded Mandate pursuant to the Unfunded 

Mandate Act of 1995 (182); 
52 

(i) Specifically, the TSA estimates that it will cost affected GA airports $5.5 

million over 10 years, while estimating its own costs to implement the program at $136.6 million. 

(ii) In spite of having access to data at all U.S. reliever airports, TSA relied 

instead on very general data to conduct its fiscal impact analysis. The results 

are not only deeply flawed but even the TSA questions its own data in the 

NPRM (174, 175) Even more troubling is the fact that the TSA did not verify 

its data against even one airport. For this reason, AAAE conducted a survey 

of member airports and 45 (or 18%) of the 273 Reliever Airports responded. 

The resulting data confirmed that the TSA substantially underestimated 

NPRM implementation costs while overestimating airport revenues and, the 

TSA completely omitted Law Enforcement Officer (‘‘LEO’’) costs. • 24% of Reliever Airports (‘‘RA’’) that operate 24/7 have full time staff on hand, 

therefore, • 64% of RAs report having to add staff to meet ASC requirements. 

Individual cost analyses are on file with AAAE for TSA’s review but below are 

some of the findings of the survey: • 72% of airports reported ASC training costs to be no more than $5,000; • 28% of airports reported ASC training costs to be more than $10,000, with most 

of the larger airports reporting costs in excess of $20,000, including Centennial 

Airport. 

But this is only part of the story: 

(iii) The TSA completely omitted from the NPRM cost analysis what every 

airport reported would be the largest cost center, which is Law Enforcement 

Officer (LEO) training and deployment. One-third of airports surveyed indicated having to enter into a reimbursement agreement with local law enforcement and another 24% are uncertain of whether they have to negotiate such 

agreements. Most Alaska airports and many of the larger Reliever Airports 

reported estimated annual LEO costs in excess of $200,000 and smaller Reliever Airports estimated costs between $50,000 and $100,000. Centennial 

Airport for example handles some 130,000 itinerant operations per year with 

aircraft weighing more than 12,500 lbs. Assuming half are departures with 

20% deadheading, the airport would have to accommodate an average of 142 

aircraft per day, operating from four separate Fixed Base Operators (‘‘FBO’’) 

The timely emplaning of GA passengers is the bane of existence for GA and 

with multiple departures from multiple locations, we would need multiple 

LEOs in order to satisfy customer throughput. We are just one example. All 

told, • 60% of airports estimated the annual NPRM cost at more than $40,000, with 

the larger airports report costs over $200,000. Centennial Airport estimates 

costs at more than $300,000 at a minimum and as high as $1.3 million per year 

depending on traffic volume. 

• 88% of airports told AAAE that they would pass the cost on to aircraft operators; 

• 22% of RAs may have to consider giving up RA status or ban large aircraft; and, 

• 15% of RAs will either close or consider closing if they cannot meet the NPRM; 

(iv) The TSA also grossly overestimated revenues earned by airports, with 

only the very largest of airports reaching or exceeding the estimate cited in 

the NPRM. Most Reliever Airports, however, report less than $500,000 in annual revenues, a significant discrepancy from the $3.8 million NPRM estimate. 

(v) Finally, for the record, unlike the commercial air carrier sector, TSA does 

not propose to reimburse any costs to GA airport operators to implement the 

NPRM, nor will TSA provide screeners or other logistics support. 

(4) The NPRM ignores privacy laws and private property rights (181, 183); this 

is one of the more complex aspects of the NPRM and touches both on conflicts 

with other laws and Federalism issues. I am not an attorney; however, extensive case law suggests that citizens enjoy extraordinary legal protections related 

to private property and privacy rights. For this reason, we recommend that privately owned aircraft be exempt and that the NPRM focus only on publicly operated aircraft for the most stringent initiatives: 

(i) Specifically, the Fourth Amendment guarantees ‘‘the right of the people to 

be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects’’, which includes vehicles and aircraft. Private aircraft do not operate with the benefit of a ‘‘Contract of Carriage’’ as is the case with commercial air carriers, and passengers 

on private aircraft therefore do not waive any rights as such. Warrantless 

searches are not automatic with respect to private aircraft; however, although 

there is no case law at this time that would deny or uphold the right of law 
53 

6 Although the TSA throw weight analysis remains classified, TSA nevertheless concluded that 

a threshold weight of 25,000 lbs was more appropriate, acknowledging that the lightest of aircraft do not have the kinetic energy to cause much damage. However, TSA also concluded that 

10,000 gallons of fuel (approx. 1,500 lbs of fuel) had sufficient kinetic energy to cause significant 

damage. Applying both thresholds it would appear that a higher weight threshold is warranted. 

In a national security assessment I prepared for the TSA, I concluded that a throw weight 

threshold of 100,000 lbs was more appropriate. 

enforcement to conduct warrantless searches involving private aircraft without probable cause, the issue nevertheless requires substantial justification. 

While the United States Constitution does not use the word ‘‘privacy,’’ our courts 

have identified the interests of Americans in their individual privacy as flowing 

from a number of constitutional provisions. Most importantly, the Fourth Amendment protects Americans from ‘‘unreasonable search and seizure’’ by the Government of their ‘‘persons, homes, and effects,’’ including many types of personal information. To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit entirely Government 

collection and use of individuals’ protected information. It does, however, require 

that any such intrusion be justified by a valid governmental interest in having and 

using the collected information, that such collection only be as intrusive as necessary to accomplish the Government’s legitimate interest, and that the information 

be handled, protected, used, and destroyed reasonably. 

Historically, constitutional justification for intrusive airport security measures, 

notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement has rested in significant degree on the so-called ‘‘special needs’’ exception. Beginning in the 1970s, 

our courts recognized the need for warrantless searches and seizures at commercial 

airports in the wake of a wave of aircraft hijackings. However, courts were only willing to recognize such an exception—and permit new warrantless searches and seizures at airports—based on evidence of a real and substantial threat to human life, 

public safety, and U.S. national security and foreign relations. Even after September 

11, 2001, our courts have consistently held that, for the ‘‘special needs’’ exception 

to apply, in addition to other conditions being met, there must be some showing of 

a distinct or definite threat, although, for air threats, specific intelligence concerning 

a threat to any particular flight is not necessary for generalized security measures. 

Further, to pass constitutional muster under the ‘‘special needs’’ exception, a security program must intrude on Americans’ privacy and civil liberties interests to the 

minimal extent necessary to protect against the threat and the program must be 

expected to be effective. In other words, the Government’s interest in preventing the 

potential harm, and the reasonable expectation of effectiveness of the proposed 

measures must be balanced against the intrusion on Americans’ privacy and liberty 

likely to result. 

In light of these requirements for ‘‘special needs’’-justified searches and seizures, 

the lack of a valid threat assessment and seemingly little consideration of relevant 

privacy and civil liberties interest, balance, or effectiveness in the NPRM, is troubling. 

(5) The NPRM may inadvertently force some airports to violate Federal law 

(181); 

(i) Specifically, the NPRM may force GA airports unable to comply with the 

NPRM to violate Federal Aviation Administration Grant Assurances and be 

in non-compliance with Federal commerce law relating to Interstate access, 

possibly resulting in becoming ineligible for AIP funding or becoming subject 

to other punitive actions. 

(6) The NPRM proposes an aircraft weight threshold not supported by the facts; 

(i) Specifically, the proposed weight threshold of 12,500 lbs is at least 50% 

below TSA’s own classified throw weight analysis and well below industry 

recommended weight thresholds.6 Industry has concluded that 100,000 lbs is 

more appropriate. 

IN CONCLUSION (REGARDING THE NPRM)

Many individuals and entities have provided separate verbal and written responses that provide greater detail than was possible here today. That said, I believe that it has been demonstrated that this NPRM as written, is seriously flawed 

because of the numerous discrepancies noted in this response. It is flawed not only 

by virtue of the fact that the NPRM contained an overwhelming 44 unresolved questions posed by the TSA; its use of highly questionable data, faulty and incomplete 

financial analyses without the benefit of verification, is very disturbing. Most disturbing is the fact that the NPRM appears to contradict TSA’s own intelligence assessment, which, coupled with the lack of sound threat assessment in view of existing security mandates and initiatives, makes this NPRM a leap of faith rather than 
54 

a well-executed plan to improve security. We do not question that potential threats 

exist, but these must be weighed against mitigations already in place; the threat 

to national security; and, their likely probability. 

If the TSA is indeed serious about taking a more pragmatic approach to managing 

who flies the aircraft; who is on-board the aircraft; and, what is on-board the aircraft, the industry sees no need for costly airport security measures that do not demonstrably improve security. However, the effectiveness of a ‘‘layered approach’’ to 

security compels general aviation airports to play a value added role in security. For 

this reason, we reiterate the recommendation that TSA reinstate the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group and update the Security Guidelines for 

General Aviation Airports in lieu of the airport security requirements proposed in 

the NPRM. 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS REGARDING SECURITY DIRECTIVE 08G

The general aviation industry continues to have concerns with the use of Security 

Directives (‘‘SDs’’) for the purpose of issuing new rules. The recent release of SD 

08G and the numerous questions it has raised within the general aviation community is a case in point. Specifically, the SD has raised a host of issues concerning 

the potential need for multiple badges, the treatment of pilots who fly into regulated 

airports for after-hours fueling, and the like. While TSA is said to be addressing 

some of the concerns raised by the general aviation community, there remains a 

startling lack of communication and collaboration concerning the implementation of 

this SD. 

Beyond the specifics of this particular SD, there is a broader policy question regarding the use of Security Directives as a means of implementing policy by TSA. 

Through the utilization of SDs, TSA can effectively bypass collaborative efforts and 

limit the ability of industry to comment on such changes. As our experience with 

the Large Aircraft Security Program NPRM has illustrated so vividly, effective policy and results are best achieved when TSA and industry work together toward common goals. 

This concludes my prepared remarks. 

Thank you for your time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Olislagers, we do thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Rogalski to summarize his statement for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JEREMY ROGALSKI, INVESTIGATIVE 

REPORTER, KHOU–TV 

Mr. ROGALSKI. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, for the opportunity to discuss our investigative report which aired in February 

2007. KHOU–TV’s initial approach was quite simple: Go to general 

aviation airports and see if you can get in. If so, how far in could 

you get? As you have seen, the result was some GA airports were 

practically wide open to someone potentially stealing an executivesized jet, taking off, and turning it into a lethal weapon. 

Acting on a tip from inside the aviation industry, KHOU–TV investigative photojournalist, Keith Tomshe, and I visited three GA 

airports in the Houston area. Using undercover cameras, we captured how easy it was to gain access into these facilities and to aircraft with doors left wide open—aircraft, I should mention, with 

auxiliary power units plugged in; aircraft with unobstructed pathways to the tarmac and the runway. 

At one airport, we walked right through an unlocked door and 

walked right up to an unlocked executive jet. At another, we 

parked just yards away from a regional commercial jet and walked 

right up to it—no fences, no security, no questions. At another, it 

had a security gate and call box. But both proved seemingly worthless on our visits, as evidenced by Photojournalist Tomshe’s comments to gain access. 
55 

Can you open her up for me? I am here to see the plane. I was 

here last week. In both cases, the gate opened, and we were next 

to a hangar and those aircraft with doors wide open. 

But KHOU–TV also uncovered the one thing that no one seemed 

to want to talk about in Houston, and that the DHS Office of Inspector General failed to address as well in its recent study. That 

is our area is a target-rich environment that potentially makes us 

particularly vulnerable for a particular type of terrorism. 

Why crash a plane into a building when the Houston area, the 

Houston ship channel to be specific, is littered with million-gallon 

containers of toxic chemicals right next to a vulnerable population 

center—containers that chemical plant engineers say could easily 

be ruptured by a small jet, a jet under 12,500 pounds; containers 

that often are no more than a half-inch thick; containers that, in 

the words of one veteran chemical engineer, would ‘‘tear like tin 

foil from the kinetic energy alone, irrespective of fuel or weight-carrying capacity.’’ 

In fact, we discovered deadly chlorine gas, a certain type of nerve 

gas and many other dangerous chemicals stored all around Houston. To quote a 2004 Homeland Security Council study, that study 

showed at least 17,000 people could die in such a strike from the 

ensuing toxic vapor cloud. 

Also, as we stated in our report, Mohamed Atta, the purported 

ringleader of the 9/11 hijackings had been considering a similar 

sort of attack for years. We have attached a verbatim transcript of 

our original report as well as a follow-up report we did 3 weeks 

later in 2007. 

In that, I should mention, a corporate tenant at one of the airports we featured was quickly in the process of taking action—installing $100,000 in security upgrades, including a barbed wire 

chain link fence, cameras, infrared and motion sensors. In that follow-up report, I should add, then-DHS secretary, Michael Chertoff, 

promised to ‘‘turn up the temperature on the general aviation industry.’’ 

Thank you for your time. I will be happy to answer any questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Rogalski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEREMY ROGALSKI

JULY 15, 2009 

Madame Chairwoman and Members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigative report, ‘‘Airport Insecurity’’ which first aired February 2, 2007. 

KHOU–TV discovered while commercial airports all over the country had been 

forced to make millions of dollars in security upgrades since 9/11, smaller general 

aviation airports remained unchanged. In fact, we found they were practically wide 

open to someone stealing a corporate to mid-size jet, lifting off, and turning it into 

a weapon. 

Acting on a tip from inside the aviation industry, KHOU–TV Investigative Photographer Keith Tomshe and I visited three general aviation airports in the Houston 

area. Using undercover cameras, we captured how easy it was to gain access into 

these facilities and to aircraft with doors left wide open and an unobstructed pathway to the tarmac. 

At Hooks Airport in Northwest Harris County, we walked right through an unlocked door and into a hangar containing an unlocked executive jet. At Lone Star 

Executive Airport, about an hour north of Houston, we parked just yards away from 

a regional commercial jet and walked right up to it—no doors, no fences, no secu-
56 

* Attachments have been retained in committee files. 

rity, no questions. At Sugarland Regional Airport southwest of the city, it had a security gate and call box. But both proved worthless on our visits, as evidenced by 

our comments to gain access: 

First visit: ‘‘Can you open ’er up?’’ (Gate Opens). 

Second visit: ‘‘I’m here to see the plane I was here last week’’ (Gate Opens). 

In addition, we consulted with numerous security experts so as to ascertain was 

this scenario a real threat? Indeed terrorism experts, a former Inspector General for 

the FAA, structural engineers, industrial chemists, and others all confirmed that in 

these situations, one could indeed take these planes and do effective terrorism with 

them. 

Part of the reason for that was something else KHOU–TV uncovered: That our 

area was a target-rich environment that made us ‘‘a sitting duck’’ for a particular 

kind of terrorism. Why crash a plane into a building when the Houston area is littered with million-gallon containers of toxic chemicals right next to a vulnerable 

population center? In fact, we found deadly chlorine, a certain type of nerve gas, 

and many other dangerous fluids stored all around Houston, and uncovered a Government study showing at least 17,000 people could die in such a strike. Again, we 

confirmed with chemical plant security experts that nearly all such plants were vulnerable to a plane crash attack. We also interviewed structural engineers specializing in these types of plants, who agreed that a general aviation plane could easily 

pierce and explode one of the many huge containers lining the Houston Ship Channel. Finally we also brought in one of the leading national experts on such scenarios, 

Dr. Jay P. Boris of the Naval Research Laboratory, to examine our local landscape. 

Using computer-modeling programs to assess the possibilities and outcomes of an 

attack in our city, Boris concluded such an attack would be ‘‘far worse than 9/11.’’ 

And one more thing: Mohammad Atta, the self-proclaimed ringleader of 9/11, and 

his cohorts had been considering a similar sort of attack in the years leading up 

to that tragic day. Various news reports, security reports, and counter-terrorism experts we consulted confirmed this. 

Attached is the verbatim transcript of our February 2, 2007 report as well as a 

follow-up report which aired February 22, 2007.* In that, Wing Aviation, a corporate 

tenant at Lone Star Executive Airport, was in the process of installing $100,000 in 

security upgrades. Additionally, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff promised to ‘‘turn 

up the temperature’’ on the general aviation industry. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Rogalski, thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Van Tine to summarize his statement for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. Van Tine. 

STATEMENT OF MARK VAN TINE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, JEPPESSEN, INCORPORATED 

Mr. VAN TINE. Thank you. Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ms. Norton, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, my name is Mark 

Van Tine. I am president and chief executive officer of Jeppessen 

and chairman of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association 

for 2009. 

Jeppessen is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Boeing Company 

and is based in Englewood, Colorado. For more than 75 years, my 

company has provided navigation charts, electronic databases, and 

other information services to general aviation and commercial airlines around the world. We serve more than 1 million pilots globally. I am also an active general aviation pilot. 

That said, I appear here today primarily in my capacity as the 

current chairman of GAMA. General aviation is an important contributor to the U.S. economy, supporting over 1.2 million jobs, and 

providing more than $150 billion in economic activity annually. 

In 2008, general aviation generated over $5.9 billion in exports 

of domestically manufactured airplanes. We are one of the few 
57 

manufacturing industries that still provides a significant trade surplus for the United States. 

Madame Chairwoman, I appreciate you for convening this hearing and to discuss general aviation security issues. GAMA has long 

been an advocate for general aviation security to be based on risk 

analysis, measuring threats, vulnerability, and consequences. 

When higher risks are identified, the appropriate countermeasures 

and security postures absolutely should be deployed in order to 

mitigate those risks. 

Since the events of 9/11, the general aviation community has 

worked diligently to increase security and raise the awareness of 

potential threats to the aviation system. A number of voluntary 

and regulatory initiatives have been put in place by both Government and industry, which have substantially increased aviation security. I included a list of these numerous initiatives in my written 

testimony. 

These initiatives have been implemented to help prevent terrorists from using a general aviation airplane to attack the United 

States. It is in this light that we should review the development 

of the TSA’s Large Aircraft Security Program. 

When TSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for last October, it generated a groundswell of negative reaction from the general aviation community, as well as from many Members of Congress; because, as it was written, it was unnecessarily burdensome, 

impractical, and did not reflect an adequate understanding of general aviation operations. 

I want to be very clear. The general aviation community does not 

oppose enhancing security. Rather, it believes the NPRM, as proposed, needs to be reworked with adequate input from stakeholders. We want to help the TSA develop a program that mitigates legitimate security risks by facilitating general aviation pilots 

and passengers to exercise their freedom to fly. 

We have made good progress. During two industry working 

group sessions in April and May, we were able to agree with TSA 

on a framework for the LASP rule. Assistant Administrator John 

Sammon has committed to building upon what the TSA has 

learned from these two sessions and to issue a second NPRM. We 

commend the hard work that Mr. Sammon and the staff within the 

general aviation office has put into reworking the NPRM and their 

willingness to consider our views. 

We also appreciate the strong support we received from Members 

of Congress, who have recognized our concerns and urged TSA to 

develop a more practical and effective approach. In particular, I 

want to thank Congressman Dent and Congressman Olson for introducing H.R. 3093, the General Aviation Security Enhancement 

Act of 2009, which would ensure stakeholder participation in the 

development of LASP. 

Madame Chairwoman, I would like you to know that GAMA is 

very concerned about TSA’s liberal use of security directives to implement new requirements on operators that are not subject to the 

rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. 

For instance, TSA has issued a security directive mandating an expansion of security credential requirements for tens of thousands 

of pilots, employees at airports and aviation manufacturing facili-
58 

1General Aviation Contribution to the U.S. Economy, Merge Global 2006. 

2 2008 General Aviation Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook, GAMA 2009. 

3TSA Information Publication A–001, May 2004. 

ties without prior input from these constituents or due process protection under APA. 

We recognize and we respect TSA’s authority to issue security directives. However, we do not believe that TSA should use security 

directives to make policy, unless there is a compelling and immediate national security risk that warrants it. 

In closing, Madame Chairwoman, I wish to thank you for providing me the opportunity to appear and testify today on these important issues. I must say I feel strongly that if TSA, industry, and 

the Congress continues to work together on general aviation security issues, we will put in place a security system that is safe and 

effective, yet does not inhibit the freedom people enjoy today to privately use general aviation aircraft. 

Thank you again for allowing me to be here. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Van Tine follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK VAN TINE

JULY 15, 2009 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee; my name is Mark Van Tine and I am the president and chief executive officer of Jeppesen and the chairman of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) for 2009. Jeppesen is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Boeing 

Company and is based in Englewood, Colorado. For more than 75 years, Jeppesen 

has provided navigation charts, electronic databases, and other information solutions to general aviation and commercial airlines around the world. I appear here 

today in my capacity as the current chairman of GAMA. 

As the committee knows, general aviation (GA) is an essential part of our transportation system that is especially critical for individuals and businesses people 

needing to travel and move goods quickly and efficiently in today’s just-in-time environment. GA is also an important contributor to the U.S. economy, supporting over 

1.2 million jobs, providing $150 billion 1 in economic activity annually and, in 2008, 

generating over $5.9 billion 2 in exports of domestically manufactured airplanes. We 

are one of the few remaining manufacturing industries that still provide a significant trade surplus for the United States. 

GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY

GAMA has long advocated for general aviation security to be based on risk analysis—measuring threat, vulnerability, and consequences. When higher risks are 

identified, appropriate countermeasures and security postures should be deployed in 

order to mitigate those risks. We also believe that this risk analysis should consider 

the security risks inherent with other modes of transportation. 

Since the events of September 11, 2001 the general aviation community has 

worked diligently to increase security and awareness of potential threats to the 

aviation system. Numerous voluntary and regulatory initiatives have been put into 

place by both Government and industry that have substantially increased security. 

For instance: 

• The TSA has published Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports that 

outline best practices for enhancing security at GA airports.3

• The Twelve-Five Standards Security Program requires that commercial operators of general aviation airplanes weighing more than 12,500 pounds establish 

a formal security program which is overseen by the TSA. 

• The TSA has established a hotline for the general aviation community to report 

suspicious activity and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) is actively promoting an airport watch program for the community. 
59 

4 Additional background about the AFSP is located at https://www.flightschoolcandidates.gov. 5 College Park Airport, Washington Executive/Hyde Field, and Potomac Airfield. 

6TSA’s Role in General Aviation Security, OIG–09–69, May 2009. 

• Non-U.S. citizens seeking flight training are subject to background checks 

through the Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP).4 Flight school employees are 

also required to undergo security awareness training per 49 CFR 1522.23(d) to 

be able to identify potential risks. • GAMA has, in conjunction with the Department of Treasury, published ‘‘Guidelines for Establishing Anti-Money Laundering Procedures and Practices Related 

to the Purchase of a General Aviation Aircraft’’ to assist in identification of suspicious transactions in accordance with the USA PATRIOT Act. • Foreign airplanes flying into the United States are subject to specific security 

procedures from both the TSA and Customs and Border Protection and are actively monitored by the TSA when operating into, within, or out of United 

States airspace. • Domestic aircraft are subject to the requirements of the Electronic Advanced 

Passenger Information System when crossing into the United States from an 

overseas location. • General aviation aircraft are subject to specific airspace requirements within 

the Washington Air Defense Identification Zone and its more restrictive Flight 

Restricted Zone (FRZ) including restrictions at three Maryland Airports 5 where 

pilots are subject to additional background check and procedural requirements. 

General aviation operators who wish to fly into Ronald Reagan National Airport 

are required to comply with the DCA Access Standard Security Program. 

All of these initiatives have been put into place to help prevent a terrorist from 

using a general aviation airplane to attack the United States. At the same time, we 

would like to draw the attention of the committee to the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Office of the Inspector General’s 6 May, 2009 report which concludes that 

‘‘general aviation presents only limited and mostly hypothetical threats to security’’ 

and that ‘‘the steps general aviation airport owners and managers have taken to enhance security are positive and effective.’’ We appreciate the recognition by the IG 

and believe we have been a positive, proactive partner in addressing legitimate security threats. 

THE LARGE AIRCRAFT SECURITY PROGRAM (LASP)

The Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) has received significant attention 

from the general aviation community and Members of Congress since published as 

a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in October 2008. The general aviation 

community does not oppose enhancing security; rather it believes that the NPRM 

proposed by the TSA was unnecessarily burdensome and did not reflect an adequate 

understanding of general aviation operations. 

For instance, under the NPRM, an individual who wishes to fly his or her own 

plane would have to pay a third-party contractor to undergo a background check before every flight. Not only is this needlessly redundant from a security standpoint, 

it could also substantially increase the cost of flying a plane. The proposed use of 

private contractors also raises important questions about privacy and protection of 

personal information and the ability of TSA to oversee this program. It is these 

types of concerns that generated a groundswell of negative reaction from general 

aviation operators across the country. 

INDUSTRY VIEW

The LASP proposal is the first time that TSA has attempted to regulate private 

travel. We believe strongly that the TSA should take pains to recognize this and 

ensure that LASP does not infringe on the ability of general aviation pilots and passengers to exercise their freedom to fly. 

In this regard, GAMA believes that any final rule should recognize that passengers who board general aviation aircraft are known to the operator and crew, 

and are made up of employees, guests, family members, and clients who typically 

have close ties to the operator of the aircraft. Unlike commercial operations, passengers in this context are not ‘‘revenue service passengers’’ and warrant a uniquely 

different consideration from a security vulnerability context. In assessing risk, the 

general aviation ‘‘passenger,’’ an individual known to the pilot, represents an inherent and significant risk reduction which should be recognized and accounted for by 

the TSA as it finishes drafting a final rule for LASP. 

Indeed, as a point of reference, the preamble to Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) NPRM ‘‘Security Related Considerations in the Design and Operation of 
60 

7FAA NPRM RIN 2120–AI66, Docket No. FAA–2006–26722; Notice No. 06–19. 

8 John Sammon, Associate Administrator for Transportation Security Network Management 

(TSNM). 

Transport Category Aircraft 14 CFR Parts 25 and 121’’ (i.e. above 12,500 pounds 

in scheduled commercial operations) the FAA states: 

‘‘Generally, airplanes in private use carry heads of state, business leaders, and ordinary citizens. In contrast to commercial passenger airplanes, access to airplanes in 

private use is limited to specific individuals, names, the owner and guests. For this 

reasons, these airplanes typically are not targets of onboard terrorists. [We] believe 

that applying the proposed requirements to airplanes in private use would not provide significant improvements in security.’’7

GAMA believes this basic philosophy should be the guiding principle throughout 

the development of the LASP and for any future regulations proposed for general 

aviation. 

STEPS TAKEN TO ADDRESS CONCERNS IN LASP

Over the past 8 months, our industry has raised concerns with the LASP and actively engaged with the TSA to help develop a program that appropriately balances 

legitimate security risks with the right of citizens to fly their own airplanes. 

GA manufacturers have testified at the five public hearings hosted by the TSA 

and GAMA submitted a formal position paper that was among 7,000 comments to 

the docket during the public comment period. We have also provided TSA officials 

with opportunities to visit general aviation manufacturers to see the types of aircraft that would be subject to the LASP. 

We have made good progress. During two industry working group session in April 

and May set up by the Transportation Security Network Management (TSNM) office 

we were able to agree on a framework for the LASP rule. Assistant Administrator 

John Sammon 8 has committed to build upon what the TSA has learned from these 

two sessions and issue a second NPRM that incorporates suggestions from stakeholders. 

The framework we have identified in our sessions with the TSA includes: 

• The establishment of a ‘‘trusted pilot’’ system that would require pilots to meet 

certain requirements before operating their aircraft if that aircraft falls within 

the TSA-defined scope of LASP. 

• The trusted pilot would be responsible for conducting key security functions for 

flights including identity verification of known passengers and an established 

process for subjecting unknown individuals to vetting through eSecure flight. 

• The establishment of a sensible restricted items list that takes the place of the 

prohibited items list originally proposed by the TSA. 

We commend the hard work that Mr. Sammon and the staff within the General 

Aviation Office has put in to reworking the NPRM and their willingness to consider 

our views. We also appreciate the strong support we have received from Members 

of Congress who have recognized our concerns and urged TSA to develop a more 

practical and effective approach. In particular, I want to thank Congressman Dent 

and Congressman Olson for introducing H.R. 3093, the General Aviation Security 

Enhancement Act of 2009, which would ensure stakeholder participation in the development of the LASP. 

TSA’S USE OF SECURITY DIRECTIVES

The general aviation industry is very concerned about the TSA’s liberal use of Security Directives to implement new requirements on operators that are not subject 

to the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. 

The general aviation community strongly supports a risk-based, threat vulnerability approach to securing our national transportation system. However, we have 

seen the TSA repeatedly use Security Directive to vastly expand existing security 

requirements without consideration of the implementation challenges, operational 

impacts, and economic burdens these mandates impose on the aviation industry. 

Our most recent experience involves the expansion of security credentialing requirements to tens of thousands of pilots and employees at airports and aviation manufacturer facilities without any input from these constituencies or due process protections under the APA. 

GAMA strongly supported an amendment that was offered by Representative 

John Mica to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Authorization Act 

(H.R. 2200), which would require TSA to initiate a rulemaking process for Security 

Directives 6 months after implementation. Representative Mica’s amendment pro-
61 

vided appropriate discretion to TSA to waive the rulemaking process in the event 

of an emergency situation. 

We supported the Mica amendment because it struck the right balance between 

national security and due process. We recognize and respect TSA’s authority to issue 

Security Directives. However, we do not believe that TSA should use Security Directives to make policy unless there is a compelling and immediate national security 

risk that warrants it. 

This is an issue of great concern to the general aviation community and we urge 

Congress to include the Mica amendment in the final TSA reauthorization bill. 

CONCLUSION

In closing, Madame Chairwoman, thank you for your leadership on these issues 

and for inviting me to testify before the subcommittee. I feel strongly that if TSA, 

industry, and Congress continue to work together on general aviation security issues 

we will put in place an effective security system that does not inhibit the freedom 

people enjoy today to privately use general aviation aircraft. 

Thank you and I would be glad to answer any questions that you may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank all of the witnesses for their testimony. I would like to remind each Member that he or she will 

have 5 minutes to question the panel. I now recognize myself for 

questions. I would like to also add just an additional welcome to 

all of the Members who have come and have been effective in contributing to our deliberations. 

I am hopeful that, in your opportunity to listen to the earlier testimony, and as stakeholders, many of you, that you have had a 

positive response to this committee’s personal, or this committee’s 

inquiry, about March 2009, to TSA, to ensure that the industry 

would have ample opportunity to engage. 

So I do want to pose a general question to all of you. I respect 

the different perspectives in which you have come. That is to answer the question whether or not you think, overall, whether security has improved at general aviation airports. Again, some will be 

speculating. Some will be based upon what you have heard. 

But I think the second question is even more important. That is, 

do you feel that security regulations are necessary for general aviation? 

Let me start with Ms. King. 

Ms. KING. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee. In my personal 

observation around the airport, I find very noticeable increases in 

general aviation security in awareness of all of the people at the 

local—base operators, the people that sell gas and provide services; 

and an awareness of who is around the airports checking out the 

cars as they are let through the gate. 

One of the things that some people may not be aware of is that 

many of the security procedure that are enacted are not obvious, 

deliberately so, because the point of having good security is that 

some of it is obvious to stop the casual person. Some of it is less 

obvious. 

One of the points I would make is that, in our own aircraft, when 

we go on a transient basis to another airport, the first thing we do 

after we land, and the last thing, is to disable the steering on the 

aircraft for security. Also, it allows the operators there to tow the 

aircraft if they need to move it to allow for space. 

But, the steering is disabled. It is not obvious that it is disabled. 

The last thing we do before we leave is to enable it again. We may 

have the door open while we are loading luggage. But the airplane 
62 

is still not stealable, if you will, because it is not steerable until 

we are back there permanently and ready to leave. 

So, many of the security procedures that have been put in place 

are not obvious to someone who is not knowledgeable. The security 

measures will vary depending on the model of the aircraft. That is 

just an example regarding our particular aircraft. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Same question, just go right across and answer the question. 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I think general aviation security, the awareness since September 11 has been 

raised significantly. As a result, I believe that general security at 

general aviation airports has increased. 

Should it be regulated? We believe that there is already a number of regulations in place, including the 12–5 Rule, large charters. 

So, going beyond that, with respect to the large aircraft security 

program, we believe that he industry has done an outstanding job 

regulating itself. I was part of the drafting of the guidelines for 

general aviation airport security. We believe at this point that that 

is sufficient. 

We are asking the TSA that working group is reconvened, so that 

we can take another look at it. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Rogalski. 

Mr. ROGALSKI. Since our report aired, Madame Chairwoman, we 

know two of the three airports we featured made voluntary security enhancements. As we mentioned Lone Star Executive in Montgomery County, north of Houston, a corporate tenant there made 

$100,000 in security upgrades. I spoke with the airport director as 

of yesterday. He informs me that an interior security fence has 

been installed, and a contract has been awarded to install a perimeter fence as well. That interior security fence has six locked gates. 

At Sugar Land Regional Airport, a spokesman there tells me 90 

percent of their small planes have been moved into a fully fencedin area with locked gates accessible by authorized key card holders. 

So, in terms of the three airports we featured, we know two of the 

three have made those security upgrades. We have not received 

comment from the third airport, Hooks Airport. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We know that you are not an aviation expert. 

But would you then suggest that regulations with oversight would 

be a responsible act? 

Mr. ROGALSKI. Respectfully, ma’am, as a news reporter, it is neither appropriate nor germane for me to offer an opinion. I can only 

report on the facts, shine a mirror up to those in the industry and 

those in your seats and let you decide the appropriate course of action. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is a fair enough response. We will take 

from what you reported as an offering of what you perceive to be 

facts. We will make our own decisions. 

Mr. Van Tine, your response. 

Mr. VAN TINE. Madame Chairwoman, if you look at the response 

since 9/11, a lot of organizations, such as Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association; the National Business Aircraft Association; 

GAMA, who I am representing today; and the Airport Operators 

and all the general aviation organizations that represent the industry, I think it is clear that security is improved as a result of these 
63 

different programs that have been put in place and the actions that 

they take. 

Improving security will be a never-ending goal and activity in 

our industry, in our world, as we go forward, which is why we must 

work closely with FAA and TSA to look at those practical risks. 

Risk mitigation comes from very accurate risk assessments. As an 

industry, we will take action to close and mitigate those risks 

where we can. 

At the same time, it is easy to come up with a myriad of scenarios that make it very difficult for us to make it 100 percent safe. 

So, as an industry and organizations industry, we are committed 

to work with the Government to find ways to make it practical, and 

yet allow the free commerce and use of aircraft the way that we 

have for almost 100 years. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will come back. I will come back to you on 

my line of inquiry, Mr. Van Tine. I thank you for your answers. 

I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Dent, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. 

For Mr. Olislagers, Mr. Rogalski’s investigative report pointed 

out that he and a colleague were able to gain access to an airport, 

and that one had a substantial gap in the fence around the perimeter. You contend in your written statement that ‘‘the industry sees 

no need for costly airport security measures that do not demonstrably improve security.’’ Is it fair to say that you see airplanes, 

as opposed to airports, as the proper focus of additional security? 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Thank you. The security of general aviation airports is layered. I prided myself, when I first started to get into the 

flying business, when I was a little boy, just being very interested 

in aircraft, being able to walk onto an airport. The thing that people decry today is that all these airports are now shut down, and 

fathers can’t take their kids out to the airport, you know, see the 

airplanes anymore. 

I think that is a very sad state in the industry. In fact, at Centennial Airport, which is one of the busiest general aviation airports in the United States, we continue to encourage folks to be 

able to get to their aircraft and even visitors to be able to get to 

the aircraft. 

With respect to security of airplanes, there is a complex series 

of things that happen in order to perpetrate anything with an airplane. It is just not simply of being able to access an aircraft, but 

being able to access a hangar, maybe, do something in that hangar. 

Most of our clients are known to our industry. We have lease 

agreements with them. We know who they are. They have been 

vetted properly. So we feel that the current regulations are sufficient. In fact, as Mr. Sammon had suggested, there should be a 

more aircraft-centric approach to security rather than an airportcentered approach. 

Mr. DENT. So you think it should be more aircraft- as opposed 

to airport-centric. 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DENT. Do you believe that fencing around an airport’s entire 

perimeter will have any substantial effect on general aviation security? 
64 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. No, sir. Just like locks on doors, they are for 

honest people only. 

Mr. DENT. So what do you say to Mr. Rogalski, then, regarding 

his finding about the general aviation airports’ vulnerabilities in 

the Houston area? 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. You know, reporters have come on-board at 

Centennial Airport on the ramp. That is just one part. I don’t believe that that is necessarily a breach of security, grabbing the airplane, loading it perhaps with explosives, turning it into an IED. 

A lot of other things have to happen. We take a layered approach 

to security, simply getting on an airfield is very simple. 

Mr. DENT. Sure. Thank you. 

Mr. Van Tine, thank you too for being here. You mentioned that 

expanding existing security requirements will involve implementation challenges, operational impacts, and economic burdens on the 

aviation industry. Could you please elaborate on that statement? In 

particular, what is the nature, extent, and severity of the side effects to increased security requirements? 

Mr. VAN TINE. Well again, we focus on the safe use of aircraft, 

but the efficient use of those aircraft. So, for example, when we 

look at the DNDO requirements and the suggestions they have for 

having gateway airports, which would require an additional stop 

for aircraft coming into the United States, it takes away the utilitarian benefit of the airplane as a time machine and a time—support the efficient use. We would put airplanes into locations, 100 

nautical miles away from major metropolitan areas, unfortunately 

put some into the airports that don’t have the facilities or the infrastructure to support these kind of aircraft. 

So, it is situations like that that we are concerned about. 

Mr. DENT. Will expanding existing security requirements exacerbate the already intense economic challenges businesses face every 

day, do you think? 

Mr. VAN TINE. It certainly will. 

Mr. DENT. Finally, I have a minute left. 

To Ms. King, thank you for being here as well. I have to tell you, 

you know, when this issue first hit, many pilots have contacted me, 

but none more forcefully than my neighbor, you know, who actually, at 11 o’clock at night, came over and on the kitchen table laid 

it all out for me and said, my goodness, what are you doing? 

What is happening here in Washington to our industry? You are 

going to make it very difficult for us to fly and for me to maintain 

my job in corporate aviation. So he really made the point not very 

delicately. But he made it just the same. 

Could you please elaborate on and describe the differences between commercial and general aviation operations? Why do you 

think they are so different? 

Ms. KING. Well, in a commercial operation, you are basically taking an airline operation or even a charter for hire. You are basically taking anyone who walks up with money. You don’t know 

them. You don’t know who they really are necessarily. You don’t 

know what they really want. 

In an operation like ours, we are a small company. We have 

about 50 employees. The people we carry on our airplane, and what 

most general aviation business aircraft carry, are their employees 
65 

and their customers, all of whom have been known to them for a 

significant period of time. In my case, my husband and I are also 

the pilots. 

Pilots are already vested with great responsibility for the safety 

and the airworthiness of their aircraft, and also really for the security; because when we take any person onto our aircraft, we are not 

like someone standing at a metal detector in the terminal. When 

we make the decision that we are going to take that person on the 

aircraft, we are betting our lives on the fact that we know those 

people well enough that nothing is going to happen; that we know 

our employees, we know our customers. We are in the airplane all 

together. 

Mr. DENT. You are not picking up any hitchhikers. I understand. 

Ms. KING. We are not picking up any hitchhikers. 

Mr. DENT. I am going to yield back my time and just thank all 

of you for being here and just say I felt very encouraged about Mr. 

Sammon’s comments today. What he told me in my office the other 

day, I feel very encouraged. I am looking forward to something 

positive occurring on this issue. 

Thanks, I yield back. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

The Chairwoman will now recognize other Members for questions 

they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our committee rules and practice, I will recognize Members who were 

present at the start of the hearing based on seniority on the subcommittee, alternating between Majority and Minority. Those 

Members coming in later will be recognized in order of their arrival. 

Before I yield to the distinguished gentle lady from Washington, 

DC, I just want to make sure Mr. Van Tine is aware of the legislation that I offered, Transportation Security Legislation H.R. 2200, 

that really laid the groundwork for improving stakeholder input 

into security policy decisions made by TSA. 

I think it is important to note that, if we are to have the structure that you are speaking of, we really need to be careful about 

discussing security-sensitive information in a public rulemaking 

process. We need to be careful in restricting the administration’s 

ability to issue security directives that address an imminent threat. 

I think we struck the right kind of balance in H.R. 2200. But we 

did give you some additional rights. I just wanted to make sure 

that was on the record. We will have an opportunity to discuss this 

shortly. 

But let me yield to the gentle lady, Ms. Norton, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Madame Chairwoman. Your work and the 

work of this committee is why they are at the table at all. 

The Chairwoman has constantly discussed balance, because I believe she, as well as I, have been on this committee since 9/11. We 

lived through the worst of it. So, the last thing we want to do is 

to go throw out the baby with the bathwater. 

But the subcommittee and committee have been very, very critical of lack of balance and of failure to do—in fact, we had to, over 

and over again, compel homeland security to understand that risk 

and consequences and threat is what it is all about, as opposed to, 
66 

you know, close the joint down, meaning the United States of 

America. 

Ms. King, I want to congratulate you on your accomplishments 

as a pilot and the work of your company. I am particularly interested in getting any real-time experience you may have. For example, have you flown into DCA or, in general aviation aircraft, into 

the Nation’s capitol since 9/11? 

Ms. KING. Since 9/11, no, not in general aviation aircraft, because I am not allowed to. 

Ms. NORTON. Why are you not allowed to, as one of the most experienced pilots in the country? 

Ms. KING. Because there are extremely difficult-to-meet rules 

about gateway airports and criminal background checks and air 

marshals on-board the aircraft that, frankly, take the flexibility 

and the efficiency out of using a general aviation aircraft for transportation. We do still, on occasion, come to the D.C. area. But at 

this point, our airports of choice are either Manassas or Frederick, 

Maryland. 

Ms. NORTON. So, they have made it, even with the so-called open 

general aviation here, impossible, economically impossible—— 

Ms. KING. Economically impossible. 

Ms. NORTON [continuing]. For you to come that—— 

Ms. KING. Technically possible, but economically not. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes. Of course, notwithstanding your experience, 

the reduction in general aviation here means that you reflect what 

is happening throughout the industry. 

Could I ask all of you—thank you, Mr. Rogalski, for your work. 

But could I ask those in the industry to say to me, I know you 

are getting good cooperation. We heard from Mr. Sammon. I want 

you to know, you are getting that cooperation, because this committee has insisted upon it. This is not the goodness of their heart. 

So, this committee needs to know, are the relevant representatives of helicopter, small aircraft companies, and pilots at the table 

as we speak? 

Mr. VAN TINE. So, I will answer the question from our perspective, and the answer is yes. They are there. The fact that there 

were 7,000 responses and input back to the NPRM. Again, we appreciate Mr. Sammon and the work that TSA is doing to allow that 

process to happen. We need to continue to do it. They are being 

represented and being heard now. That is important. We still have 

a lot of work to do. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Olislagers, do you agree with that? 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Yes, I do agree with that. Certainly, I have 

been able to represent a lot of the general aviation airports in particular, the reliever airports, on behalf of the American Association 

of Airport Executives, as well as airports and pilots in the State of 

Colorado. We have seen great representation at all levels, as well 

as my own airport, where we have 700 based aircraft, again from 

the very large aircraft to the very small aircraft. We appreciate—— 

Ms. NORTON. So, I ask all of you, what about your ability to fly 

into other airports using general aviation aircraft? Are you able to 

fly? Ms. King indicated something very close to the Nation’s capitol. 

Do these other airports have gateways, entrances with air marshals, things—— 
67 

Ms. KING. No, they do not. They make—— 

Ms. NORTON. How about New York City? 

Ms. KING. We go into Teterboro. We have been into Newark. We 

go into Macarthur on Long Island. We go into White Plains. They, 

of course, have appropriate security on the airfield and the operators that provide services. 

Ms. NORTON. But no Gateway, no—— 

Ms. KING. No gateway, no air marshals, no criminal background 

checks. 

Ms. NORTON. Right there in the Big Apple with all those skyscrapers, you were able to fly into New York City. 

Ms. KING. Absolutely. They are very welcoming. 

Ms. NORTON. That is the experience, I take it, of all of you. The 

problem is one peculiar to here. But you have been able, at least, 

to get in and out. I mean, get in and out of Houston. But it looks 

like nobody is watching where they should be. 

We learned that, of course, it is prohibitive to come into the Nation’s capitol, even though the capitol, if you add to the capitol the 

surrounding region, you have one of the engines of the American 

economy. What is then, finally, the impact nationally on the industry, whether you are looking at it from the pilot’s point of view or 

from the point of view of the manufacturers? 

I am trying to find out the industry—the result of the apparent, 

until you all got at the table, application across the board with very 

little distinction between commercial and general aviation. How is 

the industry—— 

Ms. KING. From a pilot training point of view, the regulations 

and particularly the prospect of more additional regulations that 

were considered when they were proposed to be very onerous with 

very little benefit, has been very discouraging to people who might 

otherwise have been interested in taking up pilot training. So it 

has been very detrimental to the growth of the industry. It has 

been detrimental to the growth of the pilot population. Pilot training, at the basic level, is of course where eventually our airline pilots come from. 

Ms. NORTON. Okay. So, nobody wants to be a pilot anymore, because you can’t get in the air. 

Mr. Olislagers, you are the industry. Does anybody want to make 

these planes anymore? 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. I am actually part of the airport industry. Certainly for us, since 9/11, things have changed considerably, because 

we do operate these airports. I can tell you, you know, there are 

about 19,000 different landing facilities on the general aviation 

side of the house. You have seen one airport, you have seen one 

airport. 

So, it has been very difficult having personally been involved 

with the working group, writing the guidelines for general aviation 

security to really get a template going that covers all of the airports. I think the most important thing that we have been able to 

do, working with AOPA and then VAA and other organizations is 

just raise the bar on awareness. Frankly, that has been the best 

security measure that we have been able to take. 

That goes for Centennial Airport as well as some of the small 

grass fields. It is just be aware of your surroundings. I think that 
68 

goes to the same as you are, you know, walking in a parking lot 

these days or any other threat environment. 

Ms. NORTON. Finally, Mr. Van Tine. 

Mr. VAN TINE. Well, these security programs have added overhead to the industry clearly, and one that we have accepted. To 

your question about whether we want to build airplanes or not, we 

are also challenged by the economic times that are in front of us. 

The optics that have come from Washington and from other such 

areas as through the use of, just particularly business aircraft. 

Certainly the misunderstanding that those situations have created, and how the airplane really is a general aviation airplane is 

an important tool of our economy, an important tool to commerce 

and to the businesses that use it. It is not just CEOs that use airplanes. In fact, some 85 percent of business aircraft operations do 

not contain, in the back of the airplane, the CEO or executive management, but are used for middle management, are used for transportation of parts, materials, and for the conduct of commerce. 

So we are an industry that has entrenched in many different directions. This is one. But again, one that we recognize our obligation and need to support that continued enhancement in security 

in a practical way that works on both sides of this issue. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentle lady for her constructive 

questioning. 

Now, I would like to recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Olson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman. 

I appreciate the second panel. You guys are thinking it out, 

learning a little bit about congressional procedure. I know it has 

been a long day for you. Thank you for giving us your time and expertise today. 

I want to briefly talk about, again, the Large Aircraft Security 

Program. Mr. Olislagers—and I apologize if I mispronounced that. 

But can you generally describe what has been required of you as 

executive director of a general aviation airport, at least how the 

LASP would have affected you as it was proposed originally; and 

how some of the changes are going to affect you? 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Thank you for your question. You know, prior 

to the NPRM being issued, we had a robust security program in 

place already. We had a lot of high-income individuals at the airport who bring in their own security. So, we kind of follow that 

line. 

At the same time, we are also host to a lot of small aircraft. 

Folks that come on the airfield with their grandkids and so on, 

want to have an open environment as well. So we try to strike the 

balance. As Ms. Norton mentioned earlier, we have always tried to 

strike that balance. 

With the NPRM, our greatest cost, which actually the TSA completely omitted from its cost-benefit analysis, were the law enforcement officer requirements that this would have imposed on general 

aviation airports at Centennial Airport. 

We estimated, at the very low end, about $300,000 for that. The 

normal operating level at the high end, $1.3 million in additional 
69 

costs. That represents about 20 percent of my operating budget, 

which is not very large. We run a fairly lean operation on a 24/7 

basis. So, that would have been a very significant hit to us. 

We had indicated, as many other airports did when we did a poll 

through the American Association of Airport Executives, that all 

these other airports would, in fact, pass those costs on to the aircraft operators. In our case, anywhere between $60 to $80 per landing or takeoff, very significant. 

There are a host of other issues that come with it. But that was 

certainly the most significant one. 

Mr. OLSON. It sounds like you are happy, then, with the progress 

that has been made on the Large Aircraft Security Program. 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Yes, sir. I have actually participated with two 

of the three stakeholder meetings that took place following the closure of the comment period. Mr. Sammon has been very pragmatic 

in his approach. We certainly look forward to seeing that reflected 

in the revised NPRM, thanks to you. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you. 

Ms. King, same question for you, ma’am. 

Ms. KING. Most business aviation is in small companies like 

ours. We have about—as I say, about 50 people. The economic impact of the original proposal would have been very significant in 

terms of, not just directly, but considerable administrative obligations and reporting requirements. 

We are a small, lean company. It is very important to us to be 

efficient in order to be competitive. Every administrative burden 

and impact that we have to bear significantly decreases our competitiveness and our ability to operate profitably. The original proposal would have had substantial economic impact on us. 

Mr. OLSON. I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but it 

sounds like you are very happy with the progress that has been 

made since that original proposal. 

Ms. KING. I am personally not part of the stakeholders meetings 

as an individual business owner. The organizations that I belong 

to—MBAA and AOPA and EAA—have been involved, and they are 

happy with the progress being made. My feeling is that aviation security is very much like aviation safety. We do have, in aviation, 

the safest mode of transportation in the country. But that doesn’t 

mean that we sit back and say that is enough. We have done all 

we need to. 

Industry has partnered with the FAA and others on the issue of 

aviation safety to continually keep increasing and enhancing safety. That is what we look forward to doing with the TSA and with 

your committee and with the Government to partner with you, to 

continue to increase and enhance safety. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much. So, the answer to that is a 

great point about how it relates to safety, and how they are sort 

of analogous. I appreciate that. 

My final question is for you, Mr. Van Tine. I personally believe 

that flight and aviation is the perfect example of American innovation and ingenuity at its finest. I enjoyed your written testimony 

and how you talk about the freedom to fly, and how the LASP must 

not hinder that freedom. If you are not familiar with my background, I was a pilot in the Navy for 10 years; had those wings of 
70 

gold with P–3s. Taking off was the thing I enjoyed the most about 

it, going up to 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 feet, looking down at the 

world, looking at the ocean. 

I tried to fly a little bit after I got out of the Navy, flew a Cessna 

out of Winchester, Virginia here. But it became pretty obvious that 

the costs were going to be a little different than with the Navy who 

supplied all the fuel I needed to go flying. But I just can’t tell you 

how much I identify with that freedom to fly. Can you explain how 

the LASP may be detrimental to that freedom? 

Mr. VAN TINE. Well, I think one of the examples we talked about, 

that I heard in earlier testimony, had to do with ranchers using 

aircraft to move materials and move workers. This is under commerce. That the LASP rule, particularly as it talked about prohibitive items list, which really was a carry-over from the commercial 

side, would make it impossible for those folks to use that aircraft 

in rural areas. 

General aviation supports—when you look at the 19,000 airports, 

landing strips, heliports around the country, many, many of those 

are located in rural areas or areas not served by commercial aviation. This is a vital asset to, not just to our commerce, but for people being able to travel, to see family, for recreation purposes as 

well as for business. 

So, LASP, if you looked at an original submission by TSA, when 

you talk about the passenger watch list, people who get on our airplanes are known to us. If they are not known to us, we have systems now that, in working with TSA, I think we ought to find a 

way to make use of the eSecure system for the private sector, so 

we can vet those that may not be known to us, but yet come to us 

recommended by a friend or by somebody that also will be flying 

with us. 

So, this is an important part of our American heritage, certainly 

an important part of our commerce. So, again, practical rules that 

mitigate security risk, but allow us to use these airplanes as we 

have had for many, many decades is important to us. We are making progress with TSA. Certainly, there still are many things to do, 

though. 

Mr. OLSON. Good to hear. Again, we can’t ever lose the freedom 

to fly, in my personal opinion. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for your time, your patience 

and your expertise today. 

Thank you very much, Madame Chairwoman. I yield back the 

rest of my time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I look forward to us utilizing what I think has 

been very important. Before I conclude this hearing, Mr. Olson, you 

were able to fly. The rest of us want to fly. So, we are grateful for 

your comments about the freedom of flying. 

There is something I think we all agree with as Americans. This 

hearing is to promote safe and secure general aviation. You have 

heard from both sides of the aisle a commitment to general aviation. In fact, you have heard a rather vigorous statement by the 

gentle lady from the District of Columbia wanting to ensure that 

general aviation can come to Washington, DC. 

I do think it is important, as I ask these few questions of clarification, that we try to assess, again, the line of questioning of Mr. 
71 

Olson. I would like to hear it from the three industry representatives, just again—because we are moving forward. I hope that you 

will affirm that, because of this committee’s work, that we got the 

attention of TSA. You were in very important industry meetings. 

So, I know, Ms. King, that you were not in the meetings. But do 

you feel that we don’t have the next step of the written regulations? But have you gotten word back that TSA’s new procedures, 

with the stakeholders’ input, was a better procedure, was a better 

opportunity? 

Ms. KING. We participated in the TSA’s general public meeting 

hearings in Burbank, California. Ours was one of the 7,000 comments that went in regarding the original NPRM. We are very encouraged by the fact that the TSA is rewriting or reworking—I am 

not quite sure the procedure that they follow—that notice. 

The information that we are hearing through the associations 

that we belong to does indicate that they are paying attention to 

the stakeholders and recognizing that what they had done in the 

previous proposal was a cookie-cutter copy all of the commercial 

airline rules over. That they recognized that that is inappropriate. 

There are, of course, still issues to be worked out. But I understand that there are significant discussions underway. That is the 

extent of my knowledge. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You feel better about the process? 

Ms. KING. I do. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Olislagers, would you comment on this 

whole idea of your thought about vulnerabilities that need to be addressed? We would be interested in your perception of whether or 

not we can do that together. 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Certainly. First of all, I would like to thank this 

committee for continuing to raise the issue, because I think, without it, the TSA may not have come to the table necessarily to provide the perspective and some of the sit-downs that we have had 

with the TSA. So I want to thank you for your leadership on the 

committee and the Members. 

With respect to vulnerability assessments, TSA to date has not 

done any vulnerability assessments that I know within the general 

aviation industry. Obviously, we have done our own vulnerability 

assessments at Centennial Airport. We had the National Guard in. 

Also private sector, we did red team exercises. I think they are 

very important to understand for any infrastructure environment, 

any critical asset that should be done. 

My own assessment of the general aviation industry is such that 

we believe that there are a lot of other threats elsewhere that are 

far greater than the general aviation. I hope that those will get addressed as well. We are doing our part, at Centennial Airport. On 

behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives, I am assisting certainly my colleagues are all grappling with this issue. 

But, again, we appreciate all of your time in this as well. Thank 

you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Van Tine, thank you. 

Mr. Van Tine and Ms. King, I would like to ask this question. 

How much do you think general aviation can invest in security 

measures? 
72 

Mr. VAN TINE. Well, that is a difficult question to answer, because it depends on what those security measures need to be; 

which is again why we feel it is important that we team with TSA 

and really understand those risk assessments and then what are 

mitigating actions that will result from that. 

So, it is an industry that, you know, is highly regulated, and it 

is expensive. So, you know, clearly in this kind of economic environment, our tolerances are low, as are other industries. But, at 

the same time, this is an essential issue. We are going to do out 

part to find the right way, and the right balance between that security and the ability for the industry to operate. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think that is a cooperative expression of 

being willing to work with us on security and safety. In this instance, this is about security. 

Ms. King. 

Ms. KING. Obviously, security is important to everyone in general 

aviation, because it is part of our whole safety orientation. As pilots 

in general aviation operators, we are trained from the time we first 

start flying to focus on risk management and risk assessment and 

mitigating risk. The economic impact of the additional security 

measures, and again, as Mr. Van Tine remarks, it depends on what 

those measures are—maybe disproportionate depending on the size 

of the company. 

For a company our size or smaller, it could be—depending again 

on what security measures we are talking about—it could be a 

crushing economic impact issue that makes you reconsider whether 

you can afford to use a company airplane. That would be, in my 

opinion, a tragedy, because it would mean a considerable decrease 

in efficiency and competitiveness. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I appreciate that. I want to leave this hearing, 

so that we have the parameters that we can work with TSA in this 

committee. 

So, Mr. Olislagers, let me just suggest that there are all levels 

of suggested security procedures or implementation. Say, for example, an airport, a small airport, was asked to have signs, was asked 

to document their security procedures, have some sort of report, 

positive passenger cargo baggage—four passengers, four bags, or 

however many—the aircraft secured at night or in the daytime, 

community watch program in the contact list, and the contact list 

would be who do we reach in times of trouble. Is that onerous? 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Madame Chairwoman, that is not onerous. 

Those are all good business practices. Those are part of the best 

practices. During last summer, we hosted the Democratic National 

Convention. We also ramped up during that special event our security protocols. We stand down when we believe there are no specific 

threats. 

So, we take a layered approach to security. All the aforementioned items that you brought up, certainly, are part and parcel of 

a good best practices program. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can those of you who deal with airlines, the 

airports and airplanes, tell me the size plane by pounds—and I use 

tonnage at another point, but I will use pounds—12,000 to what, 

Ms. King, have you been engaged in or utilized in terms of aircraft? 
73 

Ms. KING. The airplane that we currently own weighs approximately 18,000 pounds. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Eighteen thousand, thank you. 

Mr. Olislagers. 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. The aircraft, we can effectively handle up to 

100,000 pounds, although we have had Boeing 737s up to about 

160,000 pounds. So we can handle those airplanes. 

Ms. KING. So, and you go down—what is the smallest? 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Probably J–3 Cub, a slow Piper Cub, you know, 

fabric wings, that sort of things. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Probably less than 5,000. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Less than 5,000. 

Mr. Van Tine. 

Mr. VAN TINE. Personally, I am flying aircraft that are 3,000 to 

4,000 pounds, since I have those very small. Although, again, my 

company works with 650 airlines in all segments of general aviation around the world. So my exposure comes from working with 

customers. But personally operating small, very small, light aircraft. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogalski, when you did this report, did you visit with or look 

at video or work that other reporters had done on this same topic? 

Mr. ROGALSKI. No, we didn’t, Madame Chairwoman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have any knowledge about whether or 

not any other incidences occurred in terms of just other locations? 

If you didn’t consult with them, do you know of any tapes or any 

other reports like this, not in Houston, but around? 

Mr. ROGALSKI. From a news perspective, one would think that 

would have been the objective of the inspector general reports. But 

when you make announced visits—as we sought comment from 

aviation security experts regarding that report, one of the 

takeaways that they got was that the OIG visits to these airports 

were announced. 

The proper analogy, according to this expert, was if you are a 

restaurant owner, and the Health Department is going to do a 

health inspection, and they call you ahead of time, by golly, you are 

going to have your kitchen spotless clean. Whether or not that 

holds true is, again, not my place to make a judgment. But no, I 

don’t know of any other incidents. But then, again, I think it is evidence from the OIG report that there was no attempt to gain entry 

unannounced, unplanned—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. My—— 

Mr. ROGALSKI [continuing]. To see if there was a larger issue, 

ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I can say that my staff did find other media 

outlets who had come across some of the same circumstances. I 

wouldn’t expect you were not made aware of them. But they existed. That was my question to the IG. 

Now, you raised a very good point, the announcement. But, more 

importantly, did they take the single question that happened to 

come from a single market trying to express a broader concern? Did 

they thoroughly look any more broader fashion, so that we could 

help all? This was not a Houston story. This was, in fact, an effort 
74 

to secure America better. That is what I took from the reporting 

that you were able to do. 

Let me compliment, as I conclude, so that you can understand 

the thrust of our efforts. You can view this as a compliment, even 

though it is a stark set of circumstances. 

Ms. King, I think, teaches pilots, or is it only that you have a 

craft that people are able to secure? Do you do training, pilot training? 

Ms. KING. We do. What we do is training pilots for the knowledge component. We don’t actually teach in the aircraft. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. But we all are aware, certainly, of the 

facts of 9/11 as relates to general aviation. We know that the terrorists found a general aviation facility. We know that they were 

being trained in all innocence. We understand that their source of 

exchange was U.S. cash. We also documented that they were 

trained in their rush to take off. 

It appears that they really were not interested in getting any 

training to land. It may have been differing levels of how they handled that. But we know that happened. 

So, my question or my comment is look how far we have come. 

Mr. Van Tine, do you think anyone is now, we hope, at least 

monitoring how they take cash. Would you say that is occurring? 

Would you say that general aviation is very suspicious of anyone 

who wants a hybrid training takeoff and have no way of getting 

down? 

Mr. VAN TINE. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you also surmise that there is a little 

bit more documentation on students that are coming into, you 

would suspect, any training facility to be trained? 

Mr. VAN TINE. Not just a little bit, but quite a bit. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I make the point, because although that was 

a set of circumstances that none of us could have ever imagined, 

look how far you have come. You have made very reasonable and 

rational decisions that really are about security. We applaud you 

for that. 

But we live in remorse, obviously, of that whole tragedy which 

had many different factors that contributed to it. That is why we 

are here today, to ensure that we take the next leap, having the 

industry as stakeholders, recognizing it is a vibrant and thriving 

industry, and as well, recognizing that the media reporters help us 

in an instructive manner, so that we have the documentation, the 

actual documentation, that can help us do better. That is what this 

hearing was about today. 

So, I simply wanted to make that point. Mr. Van Tine has answered for all of you. 

But if Ms. King, if you want to say that you believe you have 

made strides, I know you were in business in 2011—nine, excuse 

9/11, 2001, 9/11. Were you not? 

Ms. KING. Yes. Flight instructors throughout the country are taking security training and recurrent training on a regular basis. The 

points that you have talked about, Madame Chairwoman, about 

taking cash and students who want unusual kinds of training— 

those and other points are a very heavy focus of that training. So 

there is a very, very heightened awareness. 
75 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. 

Mr. Olislagers, do you want to comment? 

Mr. OLISLAGERS. Very briefly, I think since 9/11, just as passengers on a commercial flight will no longer accept a hijackers 

thought, you know, that they will still survive the end of the flight, 

we have seen changes in general aviation and, you know, become 

smarter. I think that awareness issue needs to continue to take 

place. 

As I have said before, overregulation is probably not the answer. 

We have a security program at Centennial Airport that is probably 

the simplest security program we have. We reward people who see 

anything that happens on the airport that is unusual. It is very 

successful. 

No high-tech cameras can do a better job than us being aware. 

That is really, I think, the focus, certainly from our general aviation, and would like to continue to pursue. So, less regulation and 

more awareness. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I thank you for that final word. I will 

just add back that it will be regulation with balance. I think that 

will be a fair approach to how we move on general aviation. 

Allow me to thank all of the witnesses who have now appeared. 

I want to make mention of the fact that I also thank the Members 

for their valuable questions and acknowledge the constructive manner in which the witnesses answered the questions. The Members 

of the subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses. We ask that you respond to them expeditiously in writing. 

Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

Thank you again for your patience. 

[Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(77) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS FOR CARLTON I. 

MANN, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPEC- TOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. Mr. Mann, the OIG report talks about your discussions with Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Intelligence, which takes the 

lead for developing threat assessments for aviation. Did you feel the office was adequately staffed and has all of the necessary resources to be able to make threat assessments concerning existing or emerging threats? 

Answer. We did not collect the information you have requested during the course 

of our review, which had a different focus. Nevertheless, in the interest of being as 

helpful as possible to the committee, we recently contacted TSA and asked them 

about resource sufficiency. They have informed us that the Office of Intelligence 

Threat Assessment Unit is staffed sufficiently and has the necessary resources to 

make threat evaluations concerning existing and emerging threats. 

Question 2. Mr. Mann, the OIG report states that the terrorist threat to general 

aviation is low due to the fact that most of the aircraft are too small to inflict great 

damage. What are your thoughts on large general aviation aircraft that could inflict 

damage? Do you have any comments about larger general aviation aircraft and the 

risk they pose? 

Answer. Aircraft operated by corporations for executive and other corporate employee travel, charter services, or private citizens who use business jets and large 

turbo-prop aircraft, as well as businesses such as Federal Express, which use aircraft that are equivalent to commercial airliners, do pose unique risks because of 

their size, payload capacity, and speed. As evidenced by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, large aircraft can cause catastrophic damage to structures. However, occurrences of misuse of general aviation aircraft in this category are practically nonexistent. According to the Aviation Crime Prevention Institute, thefts of 

all types of aircraft have declined since 2001, when 15 planes were stolen compared 

to five reports of aircraft thefts thus far in 2009. Of the five aircraft stolen this year, 

all were propeller-driven—four single-engine and one light twin-engine plane. To 

our knowledge, no jet aircraft have been reported stolen since 2005, when a man 

stole a Cessna Citation VII, belonging to a flight services company in Arkansas. The 

subsequent investigation into the theft of the Cessna revealed no terrorist activity 

or intent to cause harm. 

We believe charter services pose the most significant risk. Unlike corporate and 

private flights where the crew usually knows the passengers, the crew of charter 

flights might not have ‘‘first-hand’’ knowledge about those aboard the aircraft. However, TSA has enacted the Twelve-Five Security Program and the Private Charter 

Standard Security Program to deter the potential misuse of chartered flights. 

Twelve-Five Security Program requirements include passenger identification checks, 

fingerprint-based criminal history records checks for the flight crew, specific bomb 

and hijacking notification procedures and requirements, and the implementation of 

a TSA-approved operator security program. The Private Charter Standard Security 

Program requires operators of passenger charter flights using aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight greater 100,300 pounds, or with a passenger-seating configuration of 61 or more passengers, among many other requirements, must ensure that 

all passengers and accessible baggage are screened prior to boarding the aircraft. 

In addition, the Private Charter Standard Security Program prohibits passengers 

from boarding a chartered flight with weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices. 

It also requires the use of metal detectors and X-ray systems that meet TSA standards, to screen charter passengers. These operators must have a security program 

that establishes all the required security components for private charter operations. 

As is a matter of record based on our July 15, 2009 testimony, one of our objectives for the TSA’s Role in General Aviation inspection was to identify TSA security 
78 

requirements for general aviation airports, and to identify measures taken by TSA 

to secure general aviation. We determined that TSA, even while it actively pursued 

all its other mandates, had also paid significant attention to general aviation. This 

was true both in the Office for Transportation Sector Network Management and in 

the Office of Intelligence. Various Government and industry studies have concluded 

that the risks associated with general aviation are relatively limited. Reports previously released by the General Accountability Office and the Congressional Research Service are consistent with this view. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS FOR MR. JOHN

SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK MAN- AGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Question 1. Mr. Sammon, in your written testimony you discuss, to some extent, 

the collaboration between DNDO and CBP to mitigate risks associated with inbound general aviation aircraft. As TSA continues to develop its GA security policies 

with the LASP and other tools, what will be TSA’s role in the collaboration DNDO 

and CBP are currently undertaking? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. What is TSA’s overall strategy for addressing the security of general 

aviation airports? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. Since 2004, what actions has TSA taken to strengthen the security 

of the general aviation system? To what extent have these actions been developed 

in coordination with general aviation stakeholders? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. How does TSA plan to assess the effectiveness of its actions? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. What additional actions does TSA plan to take to further strengthen 

this area of aviation security? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6. What financial, technological, and operational challenges do TSA and 

its stakeholders face in securing the general aviation system? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7. What progress has TSA made in its efforts to conduct a systematic 

analysis of security vulnerabilities at general aviation airports Nation-wide? How 

has this progress been measured? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 8. To what extent were the general aviation security regulations issued 

in the last year based on the results of a systematic risk analysis? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 9. What steps has TSA taken to systematically and comprehensively obtain general aviation stakeholder input in developing the proposed regulations to 

enhance general aviation security? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 10. In the absence of a focused risk assessment for general aviation, is 

TSA justified in imposing a broad array of additional security regulations on the 

general aviation industry? What is the specific threat that these regulations seek 

to mitigate? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 11. Conversely, if general aviation represents a significant threat that 

justifies the proposed regulations, why has it taken TSA 6 years to develop and implement regulations to close these security gaps? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 12. What steps has TSA taken to systematically and comprehensively obtain general aviation stakeholder feedback on the quality of the agency’s risk communication efforts? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 13. What steps, if any, has TSA taken to identify and prioritize the need 

for security enhancements at general aviation airports? What is the estimated cost 

of the improvements needed to comply with the proposed regulations? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 14. What, if any, general aviation security enhancement has TSA funded 

to date? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 15. Has TSA developed any security requirements for domestic charters 

flights operated by foreign air carriers? 

If yes, which regulations are required to be met? 
79 

If no, has TSA made a determination that private charter operations in the 

United States conducted by foreign air carriers pose no significant security risk to 

aviation and national security? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 16. What is the likelihood of a nuclear attack occurring from a GA aircraft? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 17. What will be the financial costs of intensifying the security measures 

to GA aircrafts? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER CHARLES W. DENT OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR MR. JOHN SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK

MANAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Question 1. Which general aviation stakeholders did the TSA consult with prior 

to the release of its October 2008 Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) Notice 

of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), TSA–2008–0021? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. How did TSA document these consultations with outside industry 

groups or stakeholders while developing the LASP NPRM? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. Do you believe that the TSA’s use of open forums and workshops since 

April 2009 will result in a better, more risk-based rulemaking? If so, will TSA endeavor to, whenever possible, use much more inclusive, open, and transparent approaches in future rulemakings? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. Who does the Automatic Detection and Processing Terminal work? 

How does it distinguish between the scheduled, legitimate flight and a flight that 

may be deviating from its flight path? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. In 2007, then-Secretary Chertoff required CBP and DNDO to scan all 

arriving general aviation aircraft for radiation and nuclear signatures. Does the Department have any programs either deployed or scheduled to be deployed that would 

require general aviation aircraft inspections overseas vice once the aircraft has landed in the United States? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6. We’ve heard from the DNDO that these foreign in-bound general aviation flights are of particular concern to them. Do you agree with the DNDO as to 

the extent of the threat of these aircraft to the United States? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7. If TSA really believes, as you testified, ‘‘a critical aspect of TSA’s regulatory approach is the process-oriented nature of devising mandatory security measures,’’ why does the TSA have literally dozens of security directives issued without 

any opportunity for public notice or comment? What is the process for issuing these 

security directives? How often are security directives formally reviewed to identify 

if an actual rulemaking allowing for public comment would be possible? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS FOR DR. CHARLES

R. GALLAWAY, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DE- PARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. Dr. Gallaway, according to DNDO, what approach poses the greatest 

risk for radiological and nuclear terrorist attack from a foreign departure point? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. What are some of the advantages that terrorists might associate with 

GA aircraft when orchestrating a terrorist attack? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. How does the preclearance agreement structure currently utilized by 

CBP mitigate the risk of unknown in-bound GA aircraft? How could the program 

be strengthened? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. Can you tell us about the weapons that might be used to inflict a nuclear or radiological attack using a GA aircraft? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. Domestic general aviation air carriers have complained that Air Canada has a competitive advantage in its charter programs because it is not required 

to screen passengers and baggage like domestic carriers. Please explain the Air Can-
80 

ada issue. Do you feel this is a security vulnerability? If so, what steps is TSA taking to address it? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER CHARLES W. DENT OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR DR. CHARLES R. GALLAWAY, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OF- FICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. How is DNDO working with TSA and CBP to address the high consequence by low probability WMD attack utilizing a general aviation aircraft? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. What capabilities current deployed to the field exist for DHS inspectors to identify shielded radiological materials? What R&D projects are in the works 

to improve radiological detection capabilities that might be useful in the general 

aviation field? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS FOR MARTHA KING, PILOT

Question 1. Mrs. King, are some security programs being administered by TSA for 

general aviation more effective than others? Could you tell us what programs work 

well in general and which need improvement? For example, the Airport Watch hotline or the security program for large charters, how effective are these programs? 

Answer. General aviation aircraft represent a significant investment and commitment of time and effort for general aviation operators. It is in their interest to keep 

these valuable assets secure. The best approach TSA can take is to provide tools 

to assist operators in discharging this responsibility that the operators have recognized was theirs long before the creation of TSA. The Airport Watch Program is an 

excellent example of the kind of tools that are helpful and effective. Since I am not 

a charter operator, I am not in a position to judge the effectiveness of the security 

program for charter operators of large aircraft. 

Question 2. Mrs. King, do you think there are some situations in general aviation 

transportation where it would be beneficial to know the watch list status of a passenger or do you feel that, in all circumstances, general aviation passengers are 

known to pilots and crew? 

Answer. It is hard to image a case in which someone would present an unknown 

person to be carried on a private flight along with valued personnel, who are often 

conducting confidential discussions and work on-board. In any event, making the 

watch list available to a trusted pilot would provide one more security tool should 

a question ever arise. 

Question 3. Mrs. King, I would like your opinion on how vulnerable general aviation is to the insider threat—either flight crew or airport personnel. Do we currently 

have enough security protocols in place to mitigate this risk? 

Answer. Aircraft large enough to possibly be used as a weapon are owned by operators who consider the aircraft and the highly valued personnel they carry strategically important to the well-being of their business. These operators carefully vet all 

those who will come into contact with the airplane or its occupants. In every case 

these companies will have a security system in place that functions differently than, 

but often exceeds the effectiveness of, of airline security programs. It is highly improbable that Government regulation would improve this process. In many cases it 

is likely the specificity in the regulation and the disclosure of plans to outsiders 

would result in the unintended consequence of degradation in security. 

Question 4. Mrs. King, what is your opinion on the international in-bound threat? 

How can the Government work to address this vulnerability? 

Answer. This is a subject in which I am not an expert. Having said that, here 

is my opinion: 

My observation from the occasional international travel I have conducted with our 

aircraft is that the TSA and CBP processes in place at our borders and overseas 

effectively detect and deter those that would do harm to our country. We are subject 

to passenger and aircraft screening at ports of entry, including radio isotope scanning. And CBP now requires submission of the names of our passenger and aircraft 

information prior to departing from a foreign location for the United States. 

International access for general aviation is as important to the economy of our 

country as access for the commercial airlines. We must ensure commerce and transportation remain a easily accessible for all businesses and travelers. 

An aircraft large enough to be a threat on an international flight would represent 

a substantial investment, and would be a valuable resource to its owner. It would 

be carefully secured by an owner with legitimate intent. Additionally, an organiza-
81 

tion able to purchase such an aircraft to commit mayhem would have many avenues 

available that might be subject to less scrutiny and be much more effective than 

the use of an aircraft. The simplest answer of making every aircraft go through a 

portal and inspection abroad would have a disastrous effect on the use of general 

aviation aircraft for commerce and travel and on the economy of the United States. 

The best answer is international cooperation and intelligence that follows the 

money. 

The risk that a general aviation aircraft might be used to carry a nuclear weapon 

is limited by the fact that any nuclear weapon that a general aviation aircraft could 

carry would have to be produced through a sophisticated Government program. The 

best solution for that problem would be to focus efforts on tracking the results of 

those programs. For more information on this subject, see Physics for Future Presidents by Richard A. Muller. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS FOR ROBERT P. 

OLISLAGERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTENNIAL AIRPORT

Question 1. Mr. Olislagers, tell me about how the general aviation industry is 

faring in this recession and what impact you think changes in the number of flight 

operations has on revenue and security programs. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Mr. Olislagers, please tell us generally how involved State and local 

governments are with providing resources for security at general aviation airports? 

How has the recession impacted State and local grants or programs for general aviation? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. Mr. Olislagers, what is your opinion on the international in-bound 

threat? How can the Government work to address this vulnerability? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

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