U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

29–829 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

HEARING ON WORKER–MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: 

EXAMINING THE NEED TO MODERNIZE 

FEDERAL LABOR LAW 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH, 

EMPLOYMENT, LABOR, AND PENSIONS 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION 

AND THE WORKFORCE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 26, 2018 

Serial No. 115–42 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: www.govinfo.gov 

or 

Committee address: http://edworkforce.house.gov 

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COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE 

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina, Chairwoman 

Joe Wilson, South Carolina 

Duncan Hunter, California 

David P. Roe, Tennessee 

Glenn ‘‘GT’’ Thompson, Pennsylvania 

Tim Walberg, Michigan 

Brett Guthrie, Kentucky 

Todd Rokita, Indiana 

Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania 

Luke Messer, Indiana 

Bradley Byrne, Alabama 

David Brat, Virginia 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Elise Stefanik, New York 

Rick W. Allen, Georgia 

Jason Lewis, Minnesota 

Francis Rooney, Florida 

Tom Garrett, Jr., Virginia 

Lloyd K. Smucker, Pennsylvania 

A. Drew Ferguson, IV, Georgia 

Ron Estes, Kansas 

Karen Handel, Georgia 

Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, Virginia 

Ranking Member 

Susan A. Davis, California 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Joe Courtney, Connecticut 

Marcia L. Fudge, Ohio 

Jared Polis, Colorado 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, 

Northern Mariana Islands 

Frederica S. Wilson, Florida 

Suzanne Bonamici, Oregon 

Mark Takano, California 

Alma S. Adams, North Carolina 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Donald Norcross, New Jersey 

Lisa Blunt Rochester, Delaware 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire 

Adriano Espaillat, New York 

Brandon Renz, Staff Director 

Denise Forte, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EMPLOYMENT, LABOR, AND PENSIONS 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan, Chairman 

Joe Wilson, South Carolina 

David P. Roe, Tennessee 

Todd Rokita, Indiana 

Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania 

Rick W. Allen, Georgia 

Jason Lewis, Minnesota 

Francis Rooney, Florida 

Lloyd K. Smucker, Pennsylvania 

A. Drew Ferguson, IV, Georgia 

Ron Estes, Kansas 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, 

Northern Mariana Islands 

Ranking Member 

Frederica S. Wilson, Florida 

Donald Norcross, New Jersey 

Lisa Blunt Rochester, Delaware 

Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire 

Adriano Espaillat, New York 

Joe Courtney, Connecticut 

Marcia L. Fudge, Ohio 

Suzanne Bonamici, Oregon 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 26, 2018 .............................................................................. 1 

Statement of Members: 

Sablan, Hon. Gregorio Kilili Camacho, Ranking Member, a Representative in Congress from the Northern Mariana Islands ............................... 4 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 33 

Walberg, Hon. Tim, Chairman, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, 

Labor, and Pensions ..................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 2 

Statement of Witnesses: 

Bowman, Mr. Terry, CEO, Autoworker, Ypsilanti, MI ................................. 68 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 70 

Jackson, Mr. Tommy, Long Haul Auto-Transport Driver, Hermiston, OR . 43 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 45 

Lofaso, Dr. Anne M., Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law, West Virginia 

University College of Law, Morgantown, WV ............................................ 50 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 53 

Marculewicz, Mr. Stefan J., Shareholder, Lettler Mendelson P.C., Washington, DC ..................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 38 

Additional Submissions: 

Rooney, Hon. Francis, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Florida: 

Report: Worker Centers: Union Front Groups and the Law ................. 124 

Mr. Sablan: 

Letter dated February 9, 2018, from the National Labor Relations 

Board (NLRB) ........................................................................................ 7 

Letter dated March 20, 2018, from the National Labor Relations 

Board (NLRB) ........................................................................................ 14 

Article: Dysfunction and Infighting Cripple Labor Agency ................... 26 

Scott, Hon. Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Virginia: 

Letter dated February 23, 2018, from Mr. Scott .................................... 85 

Letter dated February 21, 2018, from the National Labor Relations 

Board (NLRB) ........................................................................................ 87 

Letter dated March 27, 2018, from the National Labor Relations 

Board (NLRB) ........................................................................................ 104 

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HEARING ON WORKER–MANAGEMENT 

RELATIONS: EXAMINING THE NEED 

TO MODERNIZE FEDERAL LABOR LAW 

Thursday, April 26, 2018 

House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, 

Committee on Education and the Workforce, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in Room 

2175 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim Walberg [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Walberg, Wilson of South Carolina, 

Roe, Allen, Lewis, Rooney, Smucker, Foxx; Sablan, Norcross, SheaPorter, Espaillat, Courtney, Bonamici, and Scott. 

Staff Present: Courtney Butcher, Director of Member Services 

and Coalitions; Michael Comer, Press Secretary; Rob Green, Director of Workforce Policy; Callie Harman, Professional Staff Member; 

Nancy Locke, Chief Clerk; Geoffrey MacLeay, Professional Staff 

Member; John Martin, Workforce Policy Counsel; Kelley McNabb, 

Communications Director; James Mullen, Director of Information 

Technology; Krisann Pearce, General Counsel; Benjamin Ridder, 

Legislative Assistant; Molly McLaughlin Salmi, Deputy Director of 

Workforce Policy; Olivia Voslow, Legislative Assistant; Joseph 

Wheeler, Professional Staff Member; Lauren Williams, Professional 

Staff Member; and Michael Woeste, Deputy Press Secretary; 

Tylease Alli, Minority Clerk/Intern and Fellow Coordinator; Kyle 

deCant, Minority Labor Policy Counsel; Andre Lindsay, Minority 

Staff Assistant; Kevin McDermott, Minority Senior Labor Policy 

Advisor; Richard Miller, Minority Director of Labor Policy; 

Veronique Pluvoise, Minority Staff Director; and Kimberly Toots, 

Minority Labor Policy Fellow. 

Chairman WALBERG. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee 

on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions will come to order. 

Good morning, and welcome to today’s Subcommittee hearing. I 

would like to thank our panel of witnesses and our members for 

joining today’s important discussion. 

Today, we will examine the need to modernize certain federal 

workplace laws, including updates to policies within the National 

Labor Relations Act to strengthen the rights of workers to make 

free and informed decisions about whether they want to join or remain associated with a union. 

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We will also look at issues surrounding worker centers, and 

whether they are complying with relevant statues under the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, LMRDA, and if not, 

what updates need to be made in order to ensure transparency and 

accountability. 

Worker centers were designed to be a resource in low-income 

communities. However, current ambiguities in the law have allowed them to engage in direct negotiations with employers on behalf of employees. The insufficient reporting standards currently in 

place limit the amount of information available to the Department 

of Labor and the public on just how many of these organizations 

currently exist and the types of activities they engage in with employers and employees. 

Enacted in 1935—that is before I was born; I want you to know 

that. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman WALBERG. I would ask my colleagues to help me out 

on that one. Long before, okay. 

The NLRA guarantees most private-sector employees the right to 

organize and bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their choosing, or to simply refrain from such activities. While this remains the mission of the NLRA, the law is showing its age. Many of the law’s key provisions have not been updated 

since 1947, and it may be time to revisit the law to meet the needs 

of our 21st century workforce. 

Additionally, the National Labor Relations Board, created 

through the NLRA, was designed to act as a neutral arbitrator to 

ensure a level playing field between employers and union leaders, 

but that hasn’t been the case in recent years. But more importantly, the NLRA and NLRB were designed to protect the right of 

workers to make fully informed decisions about whether they want 

to join a union. 

In this hearing we will also explore how union dues are being 

used for political activities that may not align with the beliefs of 

its members. We will further examine situations where employees 

are not afforded the protection of the secret ballot. Congress has an 

obligation to examine how laws can be modernized in order to restore and uphold the rights of all of its workers. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on how we can ensure freedom of choice, restore balance and fairness, and help create an environment where workers and businesses can thrive. 

[The statement of Chairman Walberg follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Tim Walberg, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions 

Good morning, and welcome to today’s subcommittee hearing. I would like to 

thank our panel of witnesses and our members for joining today’s important discussion. 

Today we will examine the need to modernize certain federal workplace laws, including updates to policies within the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to 

strengthen the rights of workers to make free and informed decisions about whether 

they want to join or remain associated with a union. 

We will also look at issues surrounding worker centers, and whether they are 

complying with relevant statues under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and if not, what updates need to be made in order to ensure 

transparency and accountability. 

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Worker centers were designed to be a resource in low-income communities; however, current ambiguities in the law have allowed them to engage in direct negotiations with employers of behalf of employees. The insufficient reporting standards 

currently in place limit the amount of information available to the Department of 

Labor and the public on just how many of these organizations currently exist and 

the types of activities they engage in with employers and employees. 

Enacted in 1935, the NLRA guarantees most private sector employees the right 

to organize and bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of 

their choosing, or to simply refrain from such activities. While this remains the mission of the NLRA, the law is showing its age. Many of the law’s key provisions 

have not been updated since 1947, and it may be time to revisit the law to meet 

the needs of our 21st century workforce. 

Additionally, the National Labor Relations Board—created through the NLRA— 

was designed to act as a neutral arbitrator to ensure a level playing field between 

employers and union leaders, but that hasn’t been the case in recent years. But 

more importantly, the NLRA and NLRB were designed to protect the right of workers to make fully informed decisions about whether they want to join a union 

In this hearing, we will also explore how union dues are being used for political 

activities that may not align with the beliefs of its members. We will further examine situations where employees are not afforded the protection of the secret ballot. 

Congress has an obligation to examine how laws can be modernized in order to 

restore and uphold the rights of all workers. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on how we can ensure freedom of 

choice, restore balance and fairness, and help create an environment where workers 

and businesses can thrive. 

Chairman WALBERG. Before I yield to Ranking Member Sablan 

for his opening remarks, I want to yield first to Chairwoman Foxx. 

Mrs. FOXX. Thank you, Chairman Walberg. I want to take just 

a moment to honor and to thank Molly Salmi during what will be 

her last hearing here with us at the Education and Workforce Committee. 

Molly began her congressional career as a staff assistant on the 

Committee in the 100th Congress. And for those of you who don’t 

know, we are in the 115th right now. For the past 16 years, she 

has been deputy director of workforce development. Next week, she 

will close out nearly three decades of service here. 

Eight Committee chairs, Republican and Democrats, have had 

the benefit of Molly’s guidance, direction, and honest feedback. 

Here at the Committee, as all the members know, our policy staff 

is split between the education issues and the workforce issues. 

Molly may be the longest-serving member of the Committee’s workforce staff, but she has the heart of an educator. 

Many years ago, Molly established herself as mentor to young 

staff members who have gone on to have some remarkable careers. 

She took the time to really invest in her colleagues. And those of 

us sitting here on this dais have been the beneficiaries of that effort. 

As an educator myself, I can tell you that Molly makes that kind 

of one-on-one teaching look easy. It isn’t always easy, but she has 

truly set a standard, and she is leaving a legacy. 

Molly, on behalf of all the members of this committee, thank you. 

Thank you for understanding and demonstrating what servant 

leadership can look like, and thank you for giving us so many 

years. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Will the gentlelady yield? 

Mrs. FOXX. I will yield after I make one more quick comment, 

and that is we want to wish you a happy birthday on Monday. 

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I yield. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chair, I want to recognize the hard work of Molly Salmi, too, 

for 29 years of dedicated service to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. As it has been pointed out, she joined us 

as staff assistant and advanced over the years to serve as deputy 

director of workforce policy. She has been an informed advisor, a 

consummate professional, and has earned the trust and respect of 

all of the members and staff of this committee. That is no small 

feat in a time when politics in our society has become so polarized. 

So, on behalf of the members of the Committee and staff on this 

side of the aisle, I want to thank her for her public service and 

wish her the best of luck in her future endeavors, and let her know 

that she will be missed. 

Thank you. And, Madam Chair, I appreciate the birthday greetings. Thank you. 

Mrs. FOXX. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the Chairwoman and the Ranking 

Member. And happy birthday as well. 

I first met Molly when I came here as a freshman on this committee back in 2007, and then had the great fortune to have her 

work me into a subcommittee chairmanship of Workforce Protections. And I have had the privilege since then to work with her in 

this subcommittee, as well. 

I have always, Molly, seen you as one who was a stable force, not 

ruffled in any way, shape, or form, honest on the issues, and directing us in the best way possible. The only lack of integrity I have 

seen in you is saying that you have been here 30 years. I can’t believe that. You have worn it well. And some of us haven’t been so 

successful in doing that, but you have. 

You have been a kind force, you have understood all of the material needed, and you have made it much easier for us in working 

through difficult issues in the workforce area, and working, in 

many cases, in a bipartisan fashion to come up with solutions and 

ways to move forward. 

We wish you all the best. We know the reasons that you are leaving are of the highest priorities, and shows your commitment to do 

what is necessary to complete any task that you are given well. 

God bless you, and we wish you all the best. 

And now I yield to the Ranking Member for his opening remarks 

for today. 

Mr. SABLAN. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

also join you, Chairwoman Foxx and Ranking Member Scott. 

Molly, thank you very much for your service. And God bless you 

and godspeed on your—on wishing you every success in life. Thank 

you. I know you started here when you were less than 10 years old. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. The National Labor Relations Act protects, by law, the right of workers to 

form unions in order to rectify the inequality of bargaining power 

between employees and employers. However, the NLRA fails to enforce workers’ rights with meaningful remedies. There are no civil 

penalties when employers violate workers’ rights under the Act. 

Employers understand they can retaliate against workers for engaging in union activity with limited consequences. Often times the 

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sole sanction is that the employer is ordered to post a notice stating it violated the law, or years later award back pay minus any 

interim earnings. 

Lacking a meaningful deterrent, there has been an intensification of aggressive, anti-union campaigns which, in turn, has contributed to the decline of union membership. This has exacerbated 

incoming inequality and contributed to wage stagnation for those 

in the middle, while serving as a boon for those in the top 10 percent. 

Post chart, please? 

[Chart] 

Mr. SABLAN. Thank you. As you can see from the chart, as union 

membership has decreased from 27.1 percent to 11.1 percent between 1973 and 2015, the share of income going to the top 10 percent has increased over that same time, from 31.9 percent to 47.8 

percent. Over the past four decades, wages for working people have 

stagnated. 

When union memberships hovered around 30 percent between 

the end of World War II and 1973—that was when Mr. Walberg 

was born, I think—wages grew over 90 percent. However, as union 

membership decreased all the way down to 10.7 percent in 2017, 

wages have only grown by 12.3 percent, adjusting for inflation. 

Safeguarding the right to join a union and negotiate for better 

wages and conditions is critical to reversing income inequality, 

growing the middle class, and making sure workers receive their 

fair share of the wealth that they create. 

To address the need to modernize labor law, my Democratic colleagues and I have cosponsored legislation that would do exactly 

that: H.R. 4548, the WAGE Act, protects the right to join a union 

by providing prompt and fair remedies to deter unfair labor practices. 

The WAGE Act would authorize meaningful sanctions for those 

who break the law. It prevents workers from being mis-classified 

and denied their legal recourse. It facilitates disparate resolution 

procedures to enable employers and unions to conclude a first contract if workers choose to join a union. 

I would be remiss if I did not note the mismanagement and conflicts of interest that have affected decision-making at the National 

Labor Relations Board over the past six months. The board’s mission under the NLRA is to protect workers’ rights and promote collective bargaining. 

For example, prior to serving on the board, member William 

Emanuel was a law partner at Littler Mendelson, one of the largest 

management-side firms in the country. The firm represented a 

party in the Browning-Ferris joint employer case, which is currently before the D.C. Circuit. 

Member Emanuel voted to overturn Browning-Ferris in a case 

called Hy-Brand. Emanuel then voted to direct the general counsel 

to move the D.C. Circuit to remand Browning-Ferris back to the 

board. 

The NLRB’s inspector general investigated and concluded that 

Member Emanuel violated his ethics pledge. The board’s ethics official agreed. By voting when he should have recused himself, EmanCEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

6 

uel undermined the due process rights of workers in both the 

Browning-Ferris and the Hy-Brand cases. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record 

the NLRB inspector general’s notification of ‘‘a serious and flagrant 

problem and/or deficiency,’’ dated February 9th, and the report 

dated March 20. 

I also ask for unanimous consent to enter into the record an 

April 18th Politico article titled ‘‘Dysfunction and Infighting Cripple Labor Agency.’’ 

Chairman WALBERG. Without objection, and hearing none, it will 

be entered. 

[The information follows:] 

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 

Washington, D.C. 20570 

The Honorable Lamar Alexander 

Chairman 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 

Pensions 

U.S. Senate 

428 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Patty Murray 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 

Pensions 

U.S. Senate 

428 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Chairman 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

U.S. Senate 

340 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC, 20510 

The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

U.S. Senate 

340 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Members of Congress: 

February 15,2018 

The Honorable Virginia Foxx 

Chairwoman 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

2176 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Robert C. "Bobby" Scott 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

210 I Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Trey Gowdy 

Chairman 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

2157 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Elijah Cummings 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 

2471 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Board is in receipt of the Inspector General's FebruarY 9, 2018, memorandum reporting the existence of"a 

Serious and Flagrant Problem and/or Deficiency in the Board's Administration of its Deliberative Process and the 

National Labor Relations Act with Respect to the Deliberation of a Particular Matter." We are evaluating the 

Inspector General's findings, considering appropriate actions related to Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 
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365 NLRB No. 156 (2017), and reviewing current procedures for highlighting and addressing recusal issues with 

the assistance of the Board's Designated Agency Ethics Official. 

Sincerely, 

Marvin E. Kaplan 

Chairman 
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

National Labor Relations Board 

Office of Inspector General 

Memorandum 

February 9, 2018 

To: Chairman Marvin E. Kaplan 

Member Lauren McFerran 

Member Mark Gaston Pearce 

From: David P. Be~ !J>.;f Inspector Ge~ £A- /1 

Subject: Notification of a Serious and Flagrant Problem and/or Deficiency in the Board's 

Administration of its Deliberative Process and the National Labor 

Relations Act with Respect to the Deliberation of a Particular Matter 

I have determined that there is a serious and flagrant problem and/or deficiency in the 

Board's administration of its deliberative process and the National Labor Relations Act with 

respect to the deliberation of a particular matter involving specific parties. In accordance with 

section 5( d) of the Inspector General Act, as amended, I am immediately providing this report to 

the Board. Section 5(d) requires that within seven calendar days of the date of this report, the 

Board shall transmit it to National Labor Relations Board's Congressional oversight committees, 

together with any report by the Board containing any comments that the Board deems 

appropriate. 

Issue 

During the course of investigating OIG-I-541, a matter involving the President's ethics 

pledge found in Executive Order 13770, it was necessary to determine if the Board's decision in 

Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd, 365 NLRB No. 156 (Hy-Brand), is the same "particular 

matter" as the "particular matter" in Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. d/b/a BFI 

Newby Island Recyclery, 362 NLRB No 186 (Browning-Ferris or BF[). The necessity arises 

because Leadpoint, a party in Browning-Ferris, is represented by Member Emanuel's former law 

firm. 

Executive Order 13770, the President's ethics pledge, prohibits an appointee from 

participating in a "particular matter involving specific parties" when the appointee's former 

employer or client is a party or represents a party .. The ethics pledge defines ·;p~icular matter 

involving specific parties" as having the same definition found in 5 C.F.R. 2641.20I(h)(J). That 

regulation is part of the regulatory guidance regarding post-employment restrictions found in 18 

U.S. C. § 207. The pertinent part of the definition is as follows: 
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Particular Matter involving a specific party or parties ... include[ s J any 

investigation, application, request for a ruling or determination, rulemaking, 

contract, controversy, claim, charge, accusation, arrest or judicial or other 

proceedings, ... only those particular matters that involve a specific party or 

parties fall within the prohibition ... Such a matter typically includes a specific 

proceeding.affecting the legal rights of the parties or an isolatable transaction or 

related set of transactions between identified parties, such as a specific contract, 

grant, license, product approval application, enforcement action, administrative 

adjudication, or court case. 

The U.S. Office of Government Ethics provided guidance for the determination of 

whether two proceedings are in fact the same "particular matter:" 

The same particular matter may continue in another form or in part. In 

determining whether two particular matters are the same, the agency should 

.consider the extent to which the matters involve the same basic. facts, related 

issues, the same or related parties, time elapsed, the same confidential 

information, and the continuing existence of an important Federal interest. 

This guidance is also found in 5 C.F.R. 2641.20l(h)(S) and is used by the courts in 

analyzing facts when determining if 18 U.S.C. § 207 was violated. See United States v. 

Montemayor, 2017 WL 2493906 (U.S. District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division). 

Analysis 

Using the guidance provided by the U.S. Office of Government Ethics and the courts, I 

determined that, given the totality of the circumstances, the fly-Brand and Browning-Ferris 

matters are the sai:ne "particular matter involving specific parties." 

Although the two cases started out as two distinct and separate mattei:s, the manner in 

which the former Chairman marshaled fly-Brand through the Board's deliberative process 

effectively resulted in a consolidation of the two matters into one "particular matter involving 

specific parties." In short, the practical effect of the Hy-Brand deliberative process was a "do 

over" for the Browning-Ferris parties. 

On October 18, 2017, the former Chairman sent an email message with an attached 

majority decision draft to the Members who joined in the decision stating the following: 1 

The attachment is a "heads-up" majority opinion in Hy-Brand- the joint-employer case; 

When reviewing the draft keep in mind, without focusing on the wording, what the draft 

accomplishes- restoring the joint-employer law to what existed prior to Browning-Ferris 

- this is not meant to diminish their role in relation to the draft; 

1 The email text is deliberative information. I am including a sununarization of the text because I determined that it 

is essential to show how the consolidation of the deliberative process occwred at the inception of the Hy-Brand 

deliberations and the tone that was set 

2 
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The draft mostly includes the "verbatim" language in the joint dissent in BrowningFerris; 

There was great difficulty in producing the a consensus draft [dissent], and individual 

tinkering made it worse; 

The attached majority draft- just like the Browning-Ferris dissent- is clearly an 

imperfect compromise; 

It may be tempting to suggest a few or massive improvements, but please resist and 

circulate the draft with very few minor changes; and 

If they want to spend more time in the next 30 days considering some adjustments, that 

could be done after the dissenters respond. 

The wholesale incorporation of the dissent in Browning-Ferris into the Hy-Brand 

majority decision consolidated the two cases into the same "particular matter involving specific 

parties." The dissent in Browning-Ferris resulted from the Board's deliberative process 

following the adjudication of the facts and determination of law at the Regional level and the 

submission of briefs by the parties, including Member Emanuel's former law firm, and amici 

providing legal arguments for the Board's consideration. Because of the level of the 

incorporation of the Browning-Ferris dissent into what became the Board's decision in HyBrand, it is now impossible to separate the two deliberative processes. Rather, the Board's 

deliberation in Hy-Brand, for all intents and purposes, was a continuation of the Board's 

deliberative process in Browning-Ferris. 

Because of this level of consolidation and the fact that the Browning-Ferris parties were 

engaged in an enforcement proceeding, the deliberations of the fly-Brand case involved and 

affected the legal rights of the parties of Browning-Ferris. This is illustrated by the majority 

decision's factual analysis and application of the Jaw found at pages 18 and 19 of the Hy-Brand 

decision that included the following statements: 

The evidence relied on by the Browning-Ferris majority amonnted to a collection of 

general contract terms and business practices common to most contracting entities ... , 

plus a few actions by BFI that had some routine impact on Leadpoint employees; 

Browning-Ferris effected a sweeping change in the law without any substantive 

discussion of significant adverse consequences raised by the parties and amici in the case; 

The Browning-Ferris majority nevertheless attempted to distinguish the facts of 

Browning-Ferris based on an "apparent requirement ofBFI approval over ... pay 

increases" for the supplier employer's employees; 

The expansive nature of the Browning-Ferris test was demonstrated by the evidence the 

Browning-Ferris majority relied on to find joint-employer status in that case, which 

involved a "cost-plus" arrangement common in user-supplier contracts [followed by a list 

of nine factual statements regarding the Browning-Ferris parties]; and 
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[T]he Regional Director correctly decided under then-extant law that it was not enough to 

show BFI was the joint employer ofLeadpoint's employees. 

When analysis at pages 18 and 19 of the By-Brand decision is paired with the statement 

"we overrule Browning-Ferris and return to the principles governing joint-employer status that 

existed prior to that decision" at page 2, it is apparent that the majority considered the facts and 

arguments of the Browning-Ferris parties and amici and used those facts and arguments to 

reissue a Browning-Ferris majority decision that stated a new outcome for the parties of 

Browning-Ferris under the re-established principles governing joint-employer .status. 

Additionally, there is no. material discussion of the By-Brand matter in the part of the decision 

that overrules Browning-Ferris. For all intents and purposes, By-Brand was merely the vehicle 

to continue the deliberations of Browning-Ferris. 

After the Board issued the decision, the majority Members immediately directed the 

General. Counsel to request that the circuit court remand the Browning-Ferris case. The 

direction was later rescinded after the Board was informed that the General Counsel had an 

ethical obligation to notify the court that the Browning-Ferris decision was overruled by ByBrand. Thereafter, the court did in fact remand the case and then denied a motion for 

reconsideration of the remand. Now that the Browning-Ferris matter has been remanded to the 

Board, there is literally no reason for further deliberations before issuing a decision because the 

law is settled and a determination of the law to facts for the Browning-Ferris parties was 

established in the By-Brand decision. Alternatively, if the court had not granted the request for 

remand, the General Counsel would have been precluded from taking a position before the court 

in the Browning~ Ferris enforcement preceding that was contrary to By-Brand decision. 

The Hy-Brand majority decision also acknowledges that the two deliberative processes 

are consolidated. In response to the dissent's criticism of not seeking amicus briefmg, the 

majority included the following: 

Additionally, the issue we decided today was the subject of amicus briefing when 

the Board decided Browning-Ferris. 

That sentence was ilicluded to specifically address the issue of whether the prior 

deliberative material was available to the majority Members who were not Members when the 

Browning-Ferris decision was issued. This was necessary because the By• Brand parties did not 

seek to overturn Browning-Ferris, a further illustration that the Board was in fact not deciding 

By-Brand on the merits of that case, but was continuing. the deliberative proceedings of the 

Browning-Ferris decision. 

Because the By-Brand deliberation was a contiliuation of the Browning-Ferris 

deliberative proceedings and involved the application of the Browning-Ferris facts to the law for 

the Browning-Ferris parties, Member Emanuel should have been recused from participation in 

deliberations leading to the decision to overturn Browning-Ferris. This determination is limited 

to very specific;: facts as to what actually occurred ili the deliberative process of By-Brand, and it 

is the totality of those specific facts that drives the decision. 

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Our determination that the Hy-Brand and Browning-Ferris matters are the same 

"particular matter involving specific parties" for the purpose of Executive Order 13770 is not a 

determination that Member Emanuel engaged in misconduct.2 The issue of whether misconduct 

occurred involves a number of considerations, and the resolution of those issues is not 

appropriate in this type of notification. 

Effect 

Member Emanuel's participation in the By-Brand/Browning-Ferris matter when he 

otherwise should have been recused exposes a serious and flagrant problem and/or deficiency in 

the Board's administration ofits deliberative process and the National Labor Relations Act with 

respect to the deliberation of a particular matter that should be immediately brought to the 

attention of Congress and addressed by the Board. 

In order to maintain industrial peace, the Board's decisions must be issued in a marmer 

consistent with due process that ensures that those engaged in interstate commerce can rely upon 

them. In part, that reliance is obtained when the Members perform their duties in a marmer that 

is free of conflicts of interest or the appearance of such, and is accomplished in accordance with 

all of the Government's ethics requirements. When the Board falls short of that standard, the 

whole of the Board's deliberative process is called into question. 

Corrective Action 

To remedy the serious and flagrant problem and/or deficiency in the Board's 

administration of its deliberative process and the National Labor Relations Act with respect to 

the deliberation of a particular matter, I recommend the following corrective action: 

Member Emanuel's participation in the Hy-Brand decision, when he otherwise should 

have been recused as outlined above, calls into question the validity of that decision and 

the confidence that the Board is performing its statutory duties. I recommend that the 

Board consult with the Designated Agency Ethics Official to determine the appropriate 

action to take to resolve that issue and restore confidence in the Board's deliberative 

process; and 

Member Emanuel's participation in the Hy-Brand decision demonstrates that the Board's 

current practice of highlighting and addressing recusal issues should be reviewed to 

determine if it is adequate to protect the Board's deliberative process from actual 

conflicts of interest and the appearance of such. I recommend that the Board consult with 

the Designated Agency Ethics Official to conduct that review and resolve any issues. 

2 In reaching that determination we have taken into account Member Emanuel's response to a 

Congressional inquiry that is related to his participation in the Hy-Brand decision and other 

written matters that he provided to the Office of Inspector General. We have also cons1.1lted with 

the Board's Designated Agency Ethics Official. 

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

National Labor Relations Board 

Office of Inspector General 

Memorandum 

March 20, 2018 

To: Board 

From: David Berry rIP-~ Inspector General / 

Subject: Report of Investigation- OIG-1-541 

This memorandum addresses an investigation conducted by the Office oflnspector 

General (OIG) involving Member William Emanuel (subject). The case was initiated after the 

OIG received information through its Hotline regarding the subject's participation in the Board's 

voting on whether to direct the General Counsel to seek remand of Browning-Ferris Industries of 

California, Inc. d/b/a BFI Newby Island Recyclery, 362 NLRB No 186 (Browning-Ferris or BFI) 

from a circuit court. That information supported an allegation that the subject violated the 

President's ethics pledge found in Executive Order 13770 in that a Browning-Ferris party was 

represented by the subject's former law firm. 

During the course of the investigation, we determined that there were additional issues 

that warranted our investigative efforts. Those issues included whether the subject's 

participation in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. !56 (Hy-Brand) 

deliberations was in violation of the President's ethics pledge; whether the subject made false 

statements in response to a Congressional inquiry and in a memorandum to the OIG; and 

whether the subject violated certain provisions of the Standards of Ethical Conduct for 

Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards). 

Our investigative efforts substantiated that the subject violated the President's ethics 

pledge. W c did not substantiate the allegations that the subject knowingly provided false 

information in response to the Congressional inquiry or to the OIG or that he violated certain 

provisions of the Standards. 

This report, with the attached investigative exhibits (IE), is provided for your review. 
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FACTS 

Background 

Normally, cases are assigned to a Member's staff by the Executive Secretary's office. 

The staff that is assigned to the case is known as the "originating" staff. The staff for the other 

Members on the panel are known as the "outside" representatives. Following assignment, the 

case moves to Stage I. During Stage I, the staff holds a "Presub" with the Member. That term is 

shorthand phrase for a meeting with the Member and the staff to discuss the case and determine 

the Member's vote. Once a majority is reached, the case is moved to Stage II. In Stage II, the 

originating staff drafts a decision. When the draft decision is ready to be circulated, the case 

moves to Stage Ill. In Stage III, the outside representatives "screen" the draft. The "screen" is 

the review process by the outside representatives during which the staff makes recommendations 

to the Member regarding whether to respond to the draft with modifications or edits. Proposed 

modifications and any dissent are circulated during this stage. The case moves to the issuance 

stage once a draft decision, including any dissents or separate opinions, is approved or "noted 

off' by the Members. During the issuance process, the originating staff prepares a "conformed 

copy" of the draft. The conformed copy is a clean copy that incorporates any modifications and 

separate opinions. The conformed copy is then approved by a vote of the Member or "noted oft" 

by any Member who did not participate. For the Hy-Brand case, all the Members participated. 

Hy-Brand, Pledge, and Statements 

1. On July 10, 2014, Littler Mendelson, on behalf of its client Leadpoint Business Services 

(Leadpoint), submitted a reply brief to the Board in 32-RC-109684, arguing that the Regional 

Director was correct in his conclusion that Lead point was the sole employer rather than a jointemployer and that there was no reason to abandon the Board's longstanding joint-employer 

standards. (IE 1) 

2. On August 27, 2015, the Board issued the Browning-Ferris decision finding that Leadpoint 

and BFI Newby Island Recyclery were joint employers and established a new joint employer 

standard. (IE 2) 

3. On February 17, 2016, the NLRB initiated an enforcement proceeding, Court of Appeals 

Docket number 16-1063, against Leadpoint in the United States Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia. (IE 3) 

4. There is no record that Leadpoint made any effort to defend against the enforcement 

proceeding. (IE 3) 

5. On September 26, 2017, the subject was sworn in as a Member. (IE 4) 

6. On October 16, 2017, the subject participated in a "Presub" with his staff assigned to the HyBrand case. (IE 5) 

2 
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7. On October !8, 2017, the former Chairman sent an email message with a draft majority 

opinion for the Hy-Brand case to the subject, and other individuals, stating the following: 

(Appendix) 

The attachment is a "heads-up" majority opinion in Hy-Brand- the joint-employer case; 

When reviewing the draft keep in mind, without focusing on the wording, what the draft 

accomplishes restoring the joint-employer law to what existed prior to Browning-Ferris 

-this is not meant to diminish their role in relation to the draft; 

The draft mostly includes the "verbatim" language in the joint dissent in BrowningFerris; 

There was great difficulty in producing a consensus draft [dissent], and individual 

tinkering made it worse; 

The attached majority draft- just like the Browning-Ferris dissent- is clearly an 

imperfect compromise; 

It may be tempting to suggest a few or massive improvements, but please resist and 

circulate the draft with very few minor changes; and 

If they want to spend more time in the next 30 days considering some adjustments, that 

could be done after the dissenters respond. 

8. On October !8, 20!7, at 3:04p.m., the subject's Deputy Chief Counsel sent an email message 

to the staff attorney and supervisory attorney assigned to the Hy-Brand case and copied the 

subject. The message had an attachment titled "Hy-Brand revised majority draft near-final.docx" 

and text that read: (IE 6) 

Given how short our turnaround time is, there is no need to do a formal (or even 

informal) screen of this, or to propose any stylistic or "discretionary"-type mods. 

But please let us know if anything jumps out at you as a problem. Gary, Bill, and 

I will also be taking a look. 

9. On October 18, 2017, at 6:08p.m., the former Chairman staff circulated an email message to 

the majority Members, and their staff, with two documents attached. One document was titled 

"Hy-Brand revised majority draft final to MK and WE (showing changes to near-final 

draft).docx and the other document "Hy-Brand revised majority draft final to MK and WE 

(clean).docx." (IE 7) 

10. On October 20, 2017, the draft decision was provided to the minority Members with the 

subject's vote "Approved." (IE 8) 

11. On December I, 2017, the former Chairman's staff circulated a majority response to the 

dissent. (IE 9) 
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12. On December 4, 2017, the subject's staff addressed an issue in a footnote. (IE 10) 

13. On December 11, 2017, the subject received an email message with a revised dissent and 

generally stated that he did not need to do anything. The message also stated that, under the 

former Chairman's timetable, any further response needed to be circulated by 2:00p.m. the next 

day and that the voting needed to be completed by 5:00p.m. (IE II) 

14. On December 12, 2017, at 1:55 p.m., the subject's Deputy ChiefCounse1 sent him an email 

message with an attachment titled "Hy-Brand final majority response to dissent.docx." (IE 12) 

15. On December 12,2017, the Board's case management system recorded the subject's vote as 

"Approved" in the Hy-Brand case for the Majority response. (IE 13) 

16. On December 14, 2017, the subject voted to approve the text of the proposal to direct the 

General Counsel to seek, among other things, the remand of the Browning-Ferris case from the 

circuit court. (IE 14) 

17. On December 14, 2017, the Board issued the Hy-Brand decision. (IE 15) 

18. On December 15, 2017, the Chief Counsel voted "approved'' for the subject on the remand 

direction to the General Counsel. (IE 15) 

19. On December 19, 2017, the subject voted to rescind the directive to the General Counsel. (IE 

16) 

20. On December 19, 2017, the General Counsel filed a motion requesting remand of Browning 

Ferris, including the enforcement application against Leadpoint, Court of Appeals Docket 

number 16-1063. (IE 18) 

21. The General Counsel's motion requesting remand was served on Littler Mendelson as the 

attorney for Lead point. (IE 18) 

22. The subject received a letter, dated December 21, 2017, from the Ranking Member and 

others members of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the Committee 

for Education and the Workforce asking questions related to the Hy-Brand decision and the 

remand of the Browning-Ferris case. The questions in the letter state that Littler Mendelson 

represents Leadpoint in the Browning-Ferris matter. (IE 19) 

23. In an email message, dated December 22, 2017, to his staff after he received the 

Congressional inquiry, the subject stated that Littler Mendelson did not represent a party in 

Browning-Ferris. In a response, dated December 28, 2017, the subject was told that Littler 

Mendelson did in fact represent Leadpoint, a Browning-Ferris party. (IE 20) 

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24. In an email message, dated December 30, 2017, the subject questioned whether Leadpoint 

was on his recusal list and whether the fly-Brand decision referred to Leadpoint or Littler 

Mendelson. (IE 20) 

25. On January 23, 2018, the subject was notified that he was the subject of an OIG investigation 

regarding his participation in the Browning-Ferris remand matter. (IE 21) 

26. On January 26, 2018, the subject provided the following responses to certain questions: (IE 

22 exhibit 5) 

3. Did you request to participate in fly-Brand? 

No. 1 was automatically assigned to the Hy-Brand case because the case had 

already been designated as a full Board case prior to my arrival. 

13. Please describe in full, and provide any document, including vote sheets, 

relating to your participation in the Board's decision to move to remand BFI to 

the Board. 

On December 15, I voted to direct the General Counsel to seek a remand of 

several Board decisions pending before the courts of appeals, including BFI. By 

unanimous vote of the Board members, that directive was rescinded on December 

19 .... At the same time, the Board recognized that the General Counsel, as an 

officer of the court, has an independent ethical duty to notify the court of recent 

Board decisions that bear on the cases pending before the courts, including BFI, 

and stated its expectation that the General Counsel would continue to perform that 

ethical duty .... 

At the time of these events, I was unaware that the Littler Mendelson firm 

represented Leadpoint Business Services, a party in the BFI case, when that case 

was previously pending before the Board. Littler Mendelson is a huge law firm of 

more than 1,000 lawyers, and I was involved in only a small fraction of the firm's 

practice. In any event, under Section IO(e) of the NLRA, the Board no longer had 

jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the record in the related D.C. Circuit 

cases on March 14,2015 (D.C. Cir. Case Nos. 16-1028, 16-1063, 16-1064). 

Leadpoint did not contest the Board's BFI decision in these proceedings before 

the D.C. Circuit, nor did Littler Mendelson enter an appearance with the court. 

[Remainder of answer relates to future actions.] 

27. On January 29, 2018, the subject submitted a written statement to the OIG that included, in 

part, the following: (IE 22 exhibit 6) 

Because the Browning Ferris case was not pending at the Board at the time I was 

sworn in as a Board member, it did not appear on the Board's comprehensive list 

of parties as to whose cases I am required to recuse myself; and therefore I was 
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not informed that my former firm had represented a party in the case several years 

earlier. Furthermore, I was not independently aware of the historical fact. My 

former firm is very large with multiple offices and approximately I ,000 lawyers, 

and I was involved in only a small part of the firm's practice. 

28. During the subject's confirmation process, in response to question 18 "Please provide a list 

of all cases decided by the NLRB and that are currently on appeal in which Littler Mendelson 

represents a party .... " of the Questions for the Record from the Ranking Member, Committee 

on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the subject provided a list that included on the first of 

fourteen pages the entry: (IE 22 exhibit 7) 

9/25/2015 32-CA-160759 Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., d/b/a 

BFI Newby Island Recyclery and FPR-11, LLC, d/ DC: DC Circuit 

29. In response to question 20 "Please confirm that you intend to recuse yourself for two years 

from all cases that come before the NLRB in which Littler Mendelson represents a party." of the 

Questions for the Record from the Ranking Member, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 

and Pensions, the subject provided the following response: (IE 22 exhibit 7) 

That is my understanding of the requirement. I will do whatever is required by 

law. 

30. In response to question 21 "Lead point Services, a party in the Board's Browning-Ferris case, 

is represented by Littler Mendelson. Will you recuse yourself for the required period from any 

action by the Board that involves Leadpoint Services?" of the Questions for the Record from the 

Ranking Member, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the subject provided 

the following response: (IE 22 exhibit 7) 

If recusal questions arise with regard to any particular matter, I will request the 

advice of the Board's ethics office. 

31. After being notified of the discrepancy between his response to the Questions for the Record, 

the Congressional Inquiry, and the statement provided to the OIG, the subject submitted a letter 

to the Members of Congress to clarify his earlier response. That clarification stated, in part, that 

when he initially responded, he did not recall that Littler Mendelson represented Leadpoint; he 

firmly did not believe that he was required to recuse himself from the vote to direct the General 

Counsel to seek remand of the Browning-Ferris case; and the Designated Agency Ethics Official 

(DAEO) informed him that he was not obligated to recuse himself. (IE 22 exhibit 12) 

32. The following is a summary of the information provided by the subject during an interview: 

(IE 22) 

a. When he responded to the Congressional inquiry questions, some 6 or 7 months after 

submitting the Questions for the Record, he did not have a recollection of the obscure fact that 

Littler Mendelson represented Leadpoint in the Browning-Ferris matter; (page 35) 

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b. He did not really answer question 21, indicating that he was not sure about the statement 

made in the question that Littler Mendelson represented Leadpoint and he did not believe that he 

was familiar with that fact at that time; (page 35) 

c. He avoided the question and simply said that if recusal questions arise with regard to any 

particular matter, he will request the advice of the Board's ethics office; (page 35) 

d. He did not want to go through the effort of tracking down whether the assertion in question 

21 that Littler Mendelson represented a party in Browning-Ferris was correct; (pages 35-36) 

e. He was aware that Browning-Ferris was a significant case and one of many reversals of 

precedent by the Obama Board, but he did not have any joint-employer cases after BrowningFerris was issued; (page 36 & 38) 

f. In response to the assertion that a reasonably competent attorney would recall that his firm 

represented a party in Browning-Ferris once that fact was made known to the attorney, he 

responded that in the confirmation process there are reams and reams of documents; huge forms 

one after another; and the Questions for the Record were just another form, and he did not focus 

on it or recall it; (pages 36-37) 

g. He has no motive to lie to Congress and he would not do so after leaving his law practice 

and moving to Washington, D.C., to engage in public service; (pages 39) 

h. He did not think of recusing himself from the Hy-Brand deliberations; (pages 42) 

i. The NLRB has a very elaborate recusal system, and if you are recused they do not assign 

the case to you; (pages 43) 

j. He does not look at every case that comes across his desk and wonder if he has to recuse 

himself; (page 44) 

k. The reason why no one told him that he was recused in Hy-Brand was because the 

Browning-Ferris case was before the circuit court and the Board did not have jurisdiction over it; 

(page 44) 

I. There was no reason for him to have a concern that Hy-Brandwas overturning BrowningFerris; (page 45) 

m. That he should be recused in Hy-Brand never entered his mind or anyone else's mind at 

the NLRB; (page 45) 

n. It is the Board's responsibility to identify recusal questions. (page 46) 

o. He did not agree that Littler Mendelson was representing Leadpoint in the Browning-Ferris 

case because Littler Mendelson had not made an appearance in circuit court litigation and 

Leadpoint had not participated in the Browning-Ferris case in the circuit court; (pages 47-49) 
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p. Prior to the Hy-Brand decision, they had gone through a number of other deliberations with 

the former Chairman and he did not think that he was going to be able to make a lot of writing 

style changes to the Hy-Brand decision; (page 60) 

q. There was some pushback from the career staff about using Hy-Brandto overrule 

Browning-Ferris, and he wondered about it but concluded that it was appropriate; (page 61) 

r. He did not feel any undue pressure to participate in cases, but he did feel pressure from the 

time constraints; (page 62) 

s. He agreed with the outcome of the Hy-Brand decision. (page 62) 

t. He did not seek any guidance from the DAEO prior to participating in the Hy-Brand 

decision, before voting in Hy-Brand, or when he participated in the direction to the General 

Counsel regarding the remand of Browning-Ferris from the circuit court. (pages 75-79) 

u. After he received the Congressional inquiry, he met with the DAEO and during that 

meeting she told him that she thought that he did not violate the pledge. He requested that 

determination in writing, but the DAEO did not provide a memorandum to him because she 

stated that the OIG did not want her to issue or put her determination in writing. (pages 79-80) 

ANALYSIS 

We determined that the subject did not intentionally provide false information in response 

to the Congressional oversight committees' request for information or to the OIG. While it is 

apparent that the subject's statements in response to the Congressional inquiry are inconsistent 

with the information he provided in response to Questions for the Record question 18 and the 

fact that the Ranking Member, in question 21, stated that Littler Mendelson represented a party 

in the Browning-Ferris matter, inconsistency alone is not sufficient to show that the subject 

intentionally lied. 

The subject's initial draft response to the Congressional inquiry and his reaction after 

being informed oft he discrepancy supports a finding that more likely than not the subject did not 

recall that fact when he submitted his response. The subject's email message that he sent after he 

received the Congressional inquiry shows what appears to be a genuine lack of recall of the fact 

that Littler Mendelson represented Lead point. Additionally, once the subject learns that fact, his 

reaction appears to be one of trying to determine if he should have known. Had the subject 

recalled the information regarding Littler Mendelson that he previously provided in his answers 

to the Questions for the Record, we would expect different responses in the email messages to 

his staff. 

The President's ethics pledge found in Executive Order 13770, January 28, 2017, Ethics 

Commitments by Executive Branch Appointees states: 
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As a condition, and in consideration, of my employment in the United States 

Government in an appointee position invested with the public trust, I commit 

myself to the following obligations, which I understand are binding on me and are 

enforceable under law: ... 

6. I will not for a period for 2 years from the date of my appointment participate 

in any particular matter involving specific parties that is directly and substantially 

related to my former employer or former clients, including regulations and 

contract. 

To "participate" means to participate in a manner that is both personal and substantial. 

EO 13770, section 2 paragraph (t). Those terms are defined in 5 C.F.R. 2641.20\(i): 

Participate is to take an action as an employee through decision, approval, 

disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation or other such 

action, or to purposefully forbear in order to affect the outcome of a matter; 

Personally means to participate directly, either as an individual or in combination 

with other persons; and 

Substantial means that the employee's involvement is of significance to the 

matter. 

A Member's participation in the Board's decision making process is participation that is 

both personal and substantial. As illustrated by the facts outlined above, the subject fully 

participated in reviewing the draft decision and the drafts of the direction to the General Counsel. 

The subject then voted "approved" on the decision itself, the direction to the General Counsel to 

ask that Browning-Ferris be remanded, and the Solicitor's direction that rescinded the direction 

to the General Counsel. 

As stated in our report to Congress, we determined that the Hy-Brand and BrowningFerris cases are the same particular matter involving specific parties for the purposes of the 

President's ethics pledge found in Executive Order 13770. In reaching that conclusion, we took 

into account the position of the subject as stated in a letter provided to the OIG by the subject's 

attorney. Providing a written position afforded the subject an opportunity to be heard on the 

issue without having to participate in a voluntary interview that could have been used against the 

subject in a criminal proceeding. We also considered the position of DAEO. Our report to 

Congress and the subject's letter are provided as an appendix to this report. 

"Directly and substantially related to my former employer or former clients" is defined, 

in part, as a matter that the appointee's former employer represents a party. EO 13770 sec. 2 (d). 

We disagree with the subject's argument that the Lcadpoint is not a party to the Browning-Ferris 

matter at the circuit court and that Littler Mendelson is not Leadpoint's representative. 

Leadpoint is in fact a party in the underlying Board litigation that resulted in the circuit court 

litigation and remained a "Respondent" in the circuit court litigation. That Leadpoint opted to 

not appear before the circuit court does not change its status as a party for purposes of the NLRB 

9 
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charge or the circuit court litigation. Additionally, Littler Mendelson itself, in July 2017, 

provided a list of cases pending before the circuit courts in which it represented a party. 

Browning-Ferris is on page one of that list. The Agency continued to serve Littler Mendelson 

throughout the circuit court proceedings. The motion for reconsideration filed by the General 

Counsel includes Court of Appeals Docket number 16-1063 that lists Lead point as the 

respondent a party. 

The subject did in fact have actual knowledge that Littler Mendelson was a representative 

of a party in the Browning-Ferris case. The subject's assertions that he did not directly answer 

the questions or that he was not sure that the facts asserted in the question were accurate does not 

negate the fact that the subject was notified in writing that Littler Mendelson represented 

Leadpoint in the Browning-Ferris case. The subject's statements during the interview regarding 

his thought process in answering the questions lack a level of credibility. Clearly the subject had 

to read question 21 because the answer he provided is not random. In other words, although his 

answer may be evasive it is not nonsensical. Additionally, if the subject was simply inserting a 

generic response to questions regarding his recusal obligations and future actions, we would 

expect the answers to questions 20 and 21 to identical. Given that they are not, it is apparent that 

the subject read the questions and made some distinction between the two. 

The subject also had actual knowledge that the decision in which he was participating 

was in fact the dissent from the Browning-Ferris case that was being reissued as a majority 

decision in Hy-Brand. The subject was provided that information in writing before he received 

the draft majority decision. Thereafter, the subject chose to participate in the Board's actions to 

reissue the Browning-Ferris dissent as a majority decision. 

The pledge obligates the subject to commit himself to not participate in particular matters 

involving the parties that are represented by Littler Mendelson. Because of that commitment, the 

subject is not afforded the privilege to ignore or forget in what cases Littler Mendelson 

represents parties. If the subject had an honest belief that question 21 contained a misstatement 

of fact, he should have addressed that issue either at the time he answered the questions or before 

he participated in a decision that overruled Browning-Ferris while it was pending an 

enforcement action in a circuit court. Having done neither, the subject was obligated to seek 

ethics advice from the DAEO prior to participating in the deliberations that were simply 

reissuing the Browning-Ferris dissent as a majority decision by a new Board. 

At various times, the subject has stated that the DAEO stated to him that his participation 

in the direction to the General Counsel to request remand of Browning-Ferris was not a pledge 

violation. The DAEO may provide advice to an employee who has questions about the 

application of the Standards. 5 C.F.R. 2635.107(b). An employee who then relies upon the 

DAEO's advice and acts in conformance with it may not be disciplined provided the employee 

made full disclosure of all of the relevant circumstances. Id. It is our understanding that this 

regulatory provision is applicable to the DAEO's advice regarding the President's pledge. There 

is no evidence and the subject is not asserting that he sought DAEO advice prior to any of his 

actions in Hy-Brand or the direction to the General Counsel. As such, the "safe harbor" 

provision is not applicable to the subject. 

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In performing her duties, the DAEO is required to seek the services of the OIG when 

appropriate, including the referral of matters to and the acceptance of matters from the OIG. 

See 5 U.S.C. 2638.203(12). The DAEO has no independent investigative authority. !fan OIG 

investigation substantiates misconduct, the DAEO then ensures that there is prompt and effective 

action taken to remedy the violation. See 5 U .S.C. 2638.203(9). It is our longstanding practice 

to request that the DAEO not engage in investigative activity or issue ethics guidance involving 

past conduct that the OJG is investigating until after we are able to provide the DAEO with 

factual information based upon our investigative efforts. This practice ensures that the DAEO 

does not interfere with our investigative efforts and that the DAEO is not inappropriately used by 

an employee as an advocate or representative. The DAEO is, however, not bound by any 

determinations that we make regarding the application of the facts to the Standards or the 

President's ethics pledge. It is our understanding that the DAEO is not in disagreement with our 

determination that a pledge violation occurred when the subject participated in the By-Brand 

deliberation that was then followed by the direction to the General Counsel to seek remand of 

Browning-Ferris. 

Extenuating or Mitigating Circumstances 

The subject was a Board Member for 20 days when he began his participation in the ByBrandPresub- the first step of the deliberative process. Within 4 days of that meeting, the 

majority decision was finalized and circulated to the minority Members. Although the subject 

stated that he agreed with the outcome of each of the decisions, he explained that he felt 

significant time related pressures to act on the decisions prior to the end of the former 

Chairman's term. The subject also stated that by the time the majority Members got to the ByBrand decision, he did not think that he could make significant editorial changes to the decision. 

While not exculpatory, the circumstances of the subject's failure to recall an important fact and 

the pressure to issue the cases may provide context in understanding why he acted in the ByBrand decision and the remand of the Browning-Ferris matter without seeking the DAEO advice 

when others might do otherwise. 

Other Matters Involving the Standards of Conduct 

During the investigation of the By-Brand/Browning-Ferris matter, we received a Hotline 

complaint alleging that Littler Mendelson provided the subject with a list of prior Board 

decisions that needed to be overturned and that the subject provided the list of cases to his staff: 

Our review of that compliant found that the subject assembled a list of issues and cases, but that 

there is no evidence that subject coordinated that list with Littler Mendelson. To the contrary, 

we determined that the source material for the list was provided to the subject by an NLRB 

employee who regularly provides research assistance. As such, we determined that the subject 

did not act in manner that violated the Standard~. 

We also observed that the subject responded to an invitation to attend a conference in a 

manner that appeared to be a solicitation of a gift related to the reimbursement of travel and 

conference expense. Prior to the 010 interview, the subject notified the conference organizer 

that he would not be attending the conference. In light of the fact that Members routinely have 

their expense paid by the conference organizers and the subject declined the invitation, we 

ll 
25 

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referred this issue to the DAEO to ensure that the subject receives additional ethics briefings 

regarding accepting invitations and attending conferences. 

12 
26 

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D)sfnnclilm i1lld mfightmg tnppk labor agt.>ncy- POLITICO 

VVt~rc~tt \E 

France State Dinner arrivals 

EMPLOYMENT & IMMIGRATION 

Dysfunction and infighting cripple labor agency 'This is like when Yugoslavia broke up.' 

MAGAZINETHE AGENDAPRO:_ 

file /I.'F!i4 26%20hcaring/Sab!an%20Statements/Dy~fhnction%20and%.20infighting%20cripple'%20!abor%20agency :;,20-%20POLIT1CO.htrnl[4/24/20 1 g 8:3!: 17 PMI 
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A federal agency that regulates labor unions is engaged in something close to civil war as political appointees, 

career bureaucrats and its inspector general battle one another. 

The agency is the National Labor Relations Board, created in 1935 to promote collective bargaining and 

adjudicate disputes between businesses and workers. An independent agency insulated - in theory -from 

partisan politics, the NLRB under President Donald Trump is consumed to the point of paralysis by fights over 

personnel policies, ethics rules and legal decisions that stem from ancient political disagreements over the 

proper balance of power between employers and workers. 

The in-fighting is bad news for workers who seek the NLRB's help to organize unions and increase corporate 

accountability for labor law violations- and also, paradoxically, bad news for employers who want to fight 

unionization and limit corporate liability by reversing pro-labor rulings issued under the Obama NLRB. 

"This is like when Yugoslavia broke up," said one employment lobbyist who spoke on the condition of 

anonymity. ''You're fighting over things that happened 10,000 years ago- you killed my ancestor so I'm going 

to kill you." 

At the center of the controversy, which has pitted civil servants against political appointees, conservatives 

against liberals and, on occasion, conservatives against other conservatives, are Peter Robb, the NLRB's hareknuckled general counsel, and board member William Emanuel, a controversial Trump appointee with deep 

ties to business. 

Robb outraged the NLRB's career staff in January by proposing a restructuring that would demote regional 

directors, whom the business lobby considers too pro-union. That prompted revolt from the NLRB's employee 

unions. "Peter Robb is considering measures to 'streamline' the NLRB that will only make it harder to remedy 

federal labor law violations," read a flyer that three New York union locals distributed at an event Robb 

attended in February. 

Nearly 400 NLRB employees followed up March 15 in a letter sent to members of Congress that said Rohb's 

changes "strike us as unlikely to generate cost savings for the agency. What they do seem likely to achieve is the 

frustration of our efforts to provide members of the public with high quality, thorough investigation." 

file·///Fii4 2ti%20hearing/Sablan%.20Statements/Dysfunction%20and%20infighting%20cripple%201abor%20agency%20-%20POLITICO.html[4/24f20l8 8:3!: 17 PM] 
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Dysfunction and in!!ghting cnpple labor agency · POLITICO 

Morning Shift newsletter 

Get the latest on employment and immigration" every weekday morning- in your inbox" 

By signing up you agree to receive email newsletters or alerts from POLITICO" You can unsubscribe at any time 

The second and more elaborate NLRB controversy concerns Emanuel's decision not to recuse himself in 

December from Ry-Brand Industrial Contractors, a pro-business ruling in which the NLRB's inspector general 

later concluded Emanuel had a conflict of interesL After the inspector general issued his report, the NLRB 

vacated the ruling. 

The two story lines crossed this month when Robb issued a legal opinion that said he "does not agree with the 

conclusions reached in the IG report," and accused three NLRB members of breaking the law. Robb faulted the 

members - including the Republican chairman - for vacating Hy-Brand without consulting Emanuel, and 

urged the board to reinstate Hy-Brand. It's highly unusual for an NLRB general counsel to criticize the board's 

judgment so harshly. The White House, signaling apparent agreement with Robb, replaced NLRB Chairman 

Marvin Kaplan last week with the just-confirmed board member John Ring. (Kaplan will remain as board 

member.) 

Meanwhile, the NLRB's inspector general, David Berry, is investigating a second NLRB member, Mark Pearce, 

who is one of the board's two Democrats. (By law, two of the NLRB's five board members are chosen by 

whichever party does not occupy the White House.) Berry is following on a complaint filed by the Competitive 

Enterprise Institute, a conservative nonprofit, based on a Wall Street Journal editorial that accused Pearce of 

alerting in advance attendees at an American Bar Association meeting in Puerto Rico that Hy-Brand would be 

vacated. Pearce did not answer a request for comment. 

Berry, in turn, stands accused by the National Right To Work Legal Defense Foundation, the legal arm of the 

anti-union National Right To Work Committee, of disclosing confidential board deliberations improperly in his 

report on Emanuel, and in a follow-up report issued one month later. The right-to-work group asked an 

umbrella group, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, to investigate. Berry did not 

answer a request for comment. 

"It's sort of like 'Game of Thrones,"' said Roger King, a friend of Emanuel's and senior labor and employment 

counsel for the HR Policy Association. 

Or maybe three-dimensional chess. The National Right to Work Committee is a natural ally to Emanuel, but, 

remarkably, it's come to regard Emanuel as a problem that must not be replicated in future NLRB nominations, 

lest pro-labor Democrats gain an upper hand through additional recusals. 

In its March newsletter, the group revealed that the Trump administration ignored its advice "not to choose. 

another management attorney who would have to recuse himself or herself potentially from vast numbers of 

cases involving clients of the attorney's former employer." That advice, the newsletter complained, "went 

file ///Fji4 26%20hearing/Sab!an%20Statements/Dysfunction%2Dand%20infighting%20cripple%20!abor%20agency%20·%20POL!TICO htm1[4/24/20! 8 8'31·17 PM] 
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Dysfunction and mfightmg cripple labor agency~ POLITICO 

unheeded" when Trump nominated Ring, a partner at the management-side law firm Morgan, Lewis and 

Boekius, "whose client list is even longer than Littler Mendelson's." The Senate confirmed Ring last week. 

"For the next year and a half," warned National Right To Work Committee vice president Matthew Leen in the 

newsletter, "two of the three NLRB members who aren't profoundly biased in favor of forced unionism may 

have to recuse themselves from multiple cases." 

Trump files for an extension on his taxes 

By LOUIS NELSON 

In effect, Leen was saying that the Trump administration was so blatantly anti-labor that it may he unable to 

fulfill its anti-labor objectives. 

It's hardly new for politicians to wrangle over the NLRB. In 2012, the board made headlines when President 

Barack Obama tested the limits of his executive power by bypassing Congress and granting three recess 

appointments to the NLRB even though the Senate was technically in session. Obama ended up losing in the 

Supreme Court. 

This time, though, partisan warfare has penetrated the agency itself. 

General counsel Robb sent senior agency staffers reeling after he announced in a Jan. 11 conference call that he 

wanted to consolidate the agency's 26 field offices into larger "districts" overseen by officials hand-picked by 

him. Under Robb's plan, regional directors would lose their classification as members of the Senior Executive 

Service- the civil service's highest rank- and be replaced by a new layer of officials who'd be answerable to 

Robb. 

The title "general counsel" makes Robb sound like a lawyer for NLRB management, but in fact it's arguably the 

agency's most powerful position. The NLRB general counsel is the agency's gatekeeper, a sort of prosecutor who 

brings cases before the board. The vast majority of NLRB cases are processed at the NLRB's 26 field offices and 

never reach the board. The field offices are staffed by career officials who don't typically agree with the promanagement outlook of Robb, to whom they report. 

In a letter to Robb shortly after the January conference call, the regional directors called his proposed changes 

"very major" and complained that they hadn't "heard an explanation of the benefits to be gained." They also 

warned that enacting such changes might prompt senior directors and managers to retire en masse a clear 

shot across the bow. 

In reply, another official from the general counsel's office proposed by email additional restrictions on the 

decision-making power of regional officials, such as requiring all cases go through headquarters for initial 

review. 

Robb declined to comment for this story and, according to a source familiar with his thinking, is upset that the 

controversy spilled into public view. 

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Dysfunction and infighting cnpple lahor agency· POUT ICO 

Marshall Babson, a former Democrat appointee to the NLRB, said that Robb's proposed changes risk making 

the NLRB less efficient. "If you're talking about injecting another level of review, that could slow things down," 

he said. 

,Jennifer Abruzzo, who was acting general counsel before Robb, agreed. "I think that's a mistake," she said. "I 

think the regional directors know what they're doing." 

Shifting rationales for the changes have intensified the career staffs suspicions about Robb's motives. At the 

March ABA meeting in Puerto Rico, Robb's deputy John Kyle said they were intended to bring the agency in 

line with the White House's proposed 9 percent budget cut for the agency. But the $1.3 trillion spending bill 

signed into law last month by President Donald Trump, H.R. 1625 (ns), rejected that cut and maintained 

funding at current levels. 

"It certainly undercuts the general counsel's rationale for restructuring," said Karen Cook, president of the 

NLRB Professional Association. "He will try to move forward with his plan, though, on the basis that he expects 

a severe cut to the 2019 budget." 

The budget picture grew more complex Tuesday when the White House budget office alerted NLRB that the 

agency should spend only $264 million of the $274 million it received in the spending hill, a 3.6 percent 

reduction. Such a rescission, were it to become permanent, wou1d require congressional approval under the 

1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. 

"I am unaware of a single instance in the past wherein the White House or OMB subjected the NLRB to the 

budget rescission process," said Marshall Babson, a former board member. 

Fevered though the Robb Revolt is, it hasn't yet engulfed members of the board itself. The same can't be said 

about the controversy surrounding Emanuel and his participation in the December Hy-Brand decision. 

Hy-Brand narrowed the circumstances under which a business could be classified a so-called joint employer, 

jointly liable for labor violations committed by its contractors or franchisees. It reversed an earlier ruling in 

Browning-Ferris Industries, a 2016 decision by the Obama NLRB that broadened the circumstances under 

which a business could be classified a joint employer. Fast-food chains like McDonald's were outraged by 

Browning-P"'erris because it put them on the hook for maltreatment of employees over whom they didn't 

necessarily maintain direct controL 

Hy-Brand was rushed out along with several other pro-management decisions shortly before a Republican 

NLRB member's term was about to end in December, leaving the board deadlocked, 2-2. The overturning of 

Browning-Ferris took many by surprise, because Hy-Brand wasn't a case that had much to do with the jointemployer issue. 

"It was a rush to judgment," said Wilma Liebman, a Democratic board member under Presidents Bill Clinton, 

George W. Bush and Obama. 

One week after the Hy-Brand ruling, congressional Democrats accused the NLRB of loading the dice by 

allowing Emanuel to participate. Emanuel's former law firm, Littler Mendelson, had represented a party in 

Browning-Ferris, noted a Dec. 21 letter to Emanuel from Senate HELP Committee ranking member Patty 

Murray (D-Wash.), House Education and the Workforce Committee ranking member Bobby Scott (D-Va.) and 

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others. In the letter, the six Democrats posed several questions to Emanuel about his participation in HyBrand. 

In his response, first reported by Pro Publica, Emanuel said he wasn't aware at the time of the ruling that his 

firm had been involved in Browning-Ferris, noting Littler's very long client list. Unfortunately for Emanuel, 

he'd already noted his firm's participation in Browning-Ferris on a questionnaire submitted during his 

confirmation hearing. Emanuel scrambled to revise his response, but the damage was done, and inspector 

general Berry opened an investigation. The first report, issued Feb. 9, was scathing, finding "a serious and 

flagrant problem and/or deficiency in the board's administration of its deliberative process." Emanuel, Berry 

concluded, should have recused himself from the decision to overturn the Ohama-era standard. 

The NLRB's other three board members, including Trump-nominated chairman Marvin Kaplan, were 

persuaded by Berry's reasoning and vacated Hy-Brand, waiting to act until after Emanuel departed for the ABA 

conference in Puerto Rico. Emanuel was stunned when a fellow attendee pulled up the ruling on a cellphone, 

according to a source who was present at the conference. 

"You should have seen the look on his face," this person said. "He had no knowledge of it in advance. He was 

totally !loored." 

Emanuel, who declined to comment for this story, hired Zuckerman Spaeder, a prominent white-collar law firm 

that previously represented former International Monetary Fund Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn. 

Ryan vows to do even more fundraising for GOP 

By RACHAEL BADE 

Emanuel's defenders insist he did nothing wrong because his firm wasn't directly involved in Hy-Brand. 

Zuckerman Spaeder Chairman Dwight Bostwick argued in a Jetter to Berry that he'd evaluated Emanuel under 

an unusually strict standard that "has the potential to bedevil and frustrate this agency for years to come" and 

"'weaponize' the ethics rules for purposes of improperly excluding presidential appointees from doing the jobs 

they were sworn to do." 

Bostwick also wrote that one month after the Hy-Brand decision, the NLRB's designated ethics official told 

Emanuel that she didn't believe Emanuel should have been required to recuse himself in that case. According to 

the letter, Emanuel asked for that opinion in writing, but the request was denied at the OIG's request. 

Emanuel's allies have cried foul, noting that former Democratic NLRB member Craig Becker participated in 

cases involving local chapters of the Service Employees International Union despite having previously been 

counsel to SEIU. In that instance, Berry raised no red !lags. Beeker declined to comment on the record. 

The con!lict-of-interest charge is "based on a house of cards and not a very strong one at that," said King, the 

attorney vdth the HR Policy Association. "We see a long-term game plan to destabilize and undermine the 

NLRB." 

In his second inspector general report on Emanuel, issued March 20, Berry concluded that Emanuel violated 

the Trump administration's ethics pledge, which states: "I will not for a period for two years from the date of 

my appointment participate in any particular matter involving specific parties that is directly and substantially 

fl!e:I//Fi/426%20hearing!Sab!an%20StatementsfDysfunction%20and'%20intighting%20cripp!e%20Jabor<'/o20agencyo/.;10-%20POLlT!CO.html[4/24/20 18 8:31:17 PM] 
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Dysfunction and mfightmg cripple labor agency· POLITICO 

related to my former employer or former clients." But in his letter to Berry, Bostwick said he "respectfully 

disagree[ d] ... with the determination the member Emanuel violated his presidential ethics pledge." 

Berry acquitted Emanuel of the most serious charge: lying to Congress about whether he was aware of a 

possible conflict of interest. But that did little to cool Congress' fury. After Berry issued the report, Sen. 

Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Rep. Keith Ellison (D-Minn.) called on Emanuel to resign, saying he "no 

longer has the credibility" to serve. 

CORRECTION: Due to an editing error, an earlier version of this story misstated a proposed reduction to the 

NLRB budget Also, an earlier version of this story misstated the new NLRB Chairman's first name and the name 

of the HR Policy Association 

This article tagged under: 

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file·/i/Fif4.26%20hearing!Sablano/o20Statemcnts/Dysfunction%20ando/<>20infighting%20cripplc%20labor%20agency%20-%i20POLJT!CO.htmlf4!2412018 8:31:17 PM! 
33 

Mr. SABLAN. Thank you. I am also concerned that the majority’s 

legislative proposals will sabotage workers’ rights to join together 

to improve wages and conditions. 

One proposal included in H.R. 2723, the misnamed ‘‘Employee 

Rights Act,’’ which this subcommittee heard in June, would prevent 

unions from effectively representing the workers by requiring unnecessary periodic re-certification elections, and would restrict 

union spending on advocacy and organizing, ignoring the union 

members already have the absolute right to opt out of allowing 

their dues to be spent on those purposes. 

Today the majority attacks worker centers, which are community-based, non-profit organizations of low-wage workers. They provide direct services and support such as legal assistance, English 

classes, and leadership development. They do not represent workers for collective bargaining purposes, and are not the exclusive 

representative of employees like unions are. 

Instead of recognizing the work of these not-for-profit organizations for assisting low-wage workers, the majority wants to handcuff this group by imposing burdensome reporting requirements designed for unions under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. The square peg of the LMRDA does not fit into the 

round hole of worker centers. 

Before I conclude I want to thank each of the witnesses for taking the time to prepare their testimony and appear here today. 

I also want to wish a happy birthday to Ranking Member Scott. 

I was going to sing him a song, but my staff paid me a dollar not 

to do so. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SABLAN. Thank you, and I yield back. 

[The statement of Mr. Sablan follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions 

Chairman Walberg, thank you for holding this hearing today. 

The National Labor Relations Act protects, by law the right of workers to form 

unions in order to rectify the inequality of bargaining power between employees and 

employers. 

However, the NLRA fails to enforce workers’ rights with meaningful remedies. 

There are no civil penalties when employers violate workers’ rights under the Act. 

Employers understand can retaliate against workers for engaging in union activity 

with limited consequences—oftentimes the sole sanction is that the employer is ordered to post a notice stating it violated the law or, years later, award backpay 

minus any interim earnings. 

Lacking a meaningful deterrent, there has been an intensification of aggressive 

anti-union campaigns, which, in turn, has contributed to the decline of union membership. This has exacerbated income inequality and contributed to wage stagnation 

for those in the middle, while serving as a boon for those in the top 10 percent. 

[post chart] 

As you can see from the chart, as union membership has decreased from 27.1 percent to 11.1 percent between 1973 and 2015, the share of income going to the top 

10 percent has increased over that same time from 31.9 percent to 47.8 percent. 

Over the past 4 decades, wages for working people have stagnated. When union 

membership hovered around 30 percent between the end of World War II and 1973, 

wages grew over 90 percent. However, as union membership decreased all the way 

down to 10.7 percent in 2017, wages have only grown by 12.3 percent, adjusting for 

inflation. 

Safeguarding the right to join a union and negotiate for better wages and conditions is critical to reversing income inequality, growing the middle class, and making sure workers receive their fair share of the wealth that they create. 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

34 

To address the need to modernize labor law, my Democratic colleagues and I have 

cosponsored legislation that would do exactly that. H.R. 4548, The WAGE Act, protects the right to join a union by providing prompt and fair remedies to deter unfair 

labor practices. 

The WAGE Act would authorize meaningful sanctions for those who break the 

law. It prevents workers from being misclassified and denied their legal recourse. 

It facilitates dispute-resolution procedures to enable employers and unions to conclude a first contract, if workers choose to join a union. 

I would be remiss if I did not note the mismanagement and conflicts of interest 

that have infected decision-making at the National Labor Relations Board over the 

past 6 months. The Board’s mission under the NLRA is to protect workers’ rights 

and promote collective bargaining. 

For example, prior to serving on the Board, Member William Emanuel was a law 

partner at Littler Mendelson one of the largest management-side firms in the country. The firm represented a party in the Browning Ferris joint employer case, which 

is currently before the D.C. Circuit. 

Member Emanuel voted to overturn Browning Ferris in a case called Hy-Brand. 

Emanuel then voted to direct the General Counsel to move the D.C. Circuit to remand Browning Ferris back to the Board. 

The NLRB’s Inspector General investigated and concluded that Member Emanuel 

violated his ethics pledge. The Board’s ethics official agreed. By voting when he 

should have recused himself, Emanuel undermined the due process rights of workers in both the Browning Ferris and Hy-Brand cases. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the NLRB Inspector General’s notification of ‘‘a serious and flagrant problem and/or deficiency’’ 

dated February 9, and the report dated March 20. I also ask for unanimous consent 

to enter into the record an April 18 Politico article titled ‘‘Dysfunction and Infighting Cripple Labor Agency’’. 

I am also concerned that the Majority’s legislative proposals will sabotage workers’ rights to join together to improve wages and conditions. 

One proposal, included in H.R. 2723, the misnamed ‘‘Employee Rights Act,’’ which 

this subcommittee heard in June, would prevent unions from effectively representing their workers by requiring unnecessary periodic re-certification elections 

and would restrict union spending on advocacy and organizing ignoring that union 

member already have the absolute right to opt out of allowing their dues to be spent 

on those purposes. 

Today, the majority attacks Worker Centers, which are community-based, nonprofit, organizations of low-wage workers. They provide direct services and support, 

such as legal assistance, English classes, and leadership development; they do not 

represent workers for collective bargaining purposes and are not the exclusive representatives of employees, like unions are. 

Instead of recognizing the work of these not-for-profit organizations for assisting 

low-wage workers, the Majority wants to handcuff these groups by imposing burdensome reporting requirements designed for unions under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. The square peg of the LMRDA does not fit into the 

round hole of worker centers. 

Before I conclude, I want to thank each of the witnesses for taking the time to 

prepare their testimony and appear here today. I also want to wish a happy birthday to Ranking Member Scott. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SABLAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WALBERG. Thank—I thank the gentleman, and I would pay you $2 to do it. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman WALBERG. Pursuant to Committee Rule 7(c), all members will be permitted to submit written statements to be included 

in the permanent hearing record. And without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 14 days to allow such statements 

and other extraneous material referenced during the hearing to be 

submitted for the official hearing record. 

And now it is my privilege to introduce the distinguished witnesses who have come to be here this morning. 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

35 

Mr. Stefan J. Marculewicz—I hope I got that right, or close—is 

a shareholder at Littler Mendelson, PC in Washington, D.C. Welcome. 

Mr. Tommy Jackson is a long-haul auto transport driver. If you 

came from Hermiston, Oregon, you are a long-haul witness today, 

as well. Thank you for being here. 

Dr. Anne Lofaso is the Arthur B. Hodges professor of law at the 

West Virginia University College of Law in Morgantown, West Virginia, and not new to this committee and the hearing process. 

Thank you for being here. 

Mr. Terry Bowman is an auto worker from Ypsilanti, Michigan. 

And Terry, just move a few miles, you could be in my district. Glad 

to have you here today. 

I will now ask our witnesses to raise your right hand to be sworn 

in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Chairman WALBERG. Thank you. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered all in the affirmative. 

Before I recognize you to provide your testimony, let me just 

briefly explain our lighting system. It is very simple. Like a traffic 

light, on green you have four minutes of testimony. When you see 

it turn yellow, you have another minute to end your statement. 

And when it is red, it is time to stop. Certainly finish your thought, 

but we will have opportunity to ask you questions, and we will 

have five minutes, each of us, to ask you questions, as well. And 

probably we will cover some of the things that you wanted to say 

anyway. 

We have your written testimony in a fuller format, as well, that 

will be part of the record. 

And so I recognize you now for your five minutes of testimony, 

Mr. Marculewicz. 

TESTIMONY OF STEFAN J. MARCULEWICZ, SHAREHOLDER, 

LITTLER MENDELSON P.C., WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Thank you, Chairman Walberg and Ranking 

Member Sablan, and the members of the Committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to offer this testimony here today. My name is Stefan Marculewicz. I am a shareholder at the law firm of Littler 

Mendelson, here in Washington. I am speaking to you today on my 

own behalf, not on behalf of my law firm or any of my law firm’s 

clients. 

The topic I am going to testify about today is worker centers. 

Labor unions, the primary advocates for worker rights in the 

United States, continue to experience a decline in membership. 

Perhaps, partially in response to that decline, labor unions have 

sought new ways to effectuate change in the workplace. 

One of the most prominent examples of that effort has been the 

development of organizations known as worker centers. Today, 

there are hundreds of these organizations. Their structure and 

composition vary. They go by very many different names. Typically, 

they are non-profit organizations that receive funding from foundations, grants—including government, membership fees and other 

donations, and some are funded by other labor organizations. 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

36 

These groups offer many different services to their members, including education, training, employment services, and legal advice. 

Increasingly, however, these organizations directly engage employers or groups of employers to effectuate change in the wages, 

hours, and terms and conditions of workers they claim to represent. 

When it comes to such direct engagement, these worker centers 

often act no differently than traditional labor organizations. 

In 2012, I conducted research on the subject of worker centers, 

and published the article ‘‘Labor Organizations by Another Name: 

The Worker Center Movement and its Evolution into Coverage 

under the NLRA and LMRDA’’ in Engage, the Federalist Society’s 

law and policy review. In that article, I described the growth of 

worker centers and their evolution into de facto labor organizations. The premise of my article was that, because of this evolution, 

worker centers should comply with the laws that regulate labor organizations. These laws include the NLRA and the LMRDA. I asserted that because the benefits of those laws ultimately flow to the 

workers these organizations claim to represent, there was no viable 

justification for them not to comply with the laws. 

In September 2013, I had the honor of testifying on this subject 

before this committee. In my testimony, I urged the Committee to 

have these organizations comply with the laws. Unfortunately, 

since that time, to my knowledge, worker centers continue to remain largely outside of coverage by these laws. 

Instead of conforming their behavior to the existing laws, however, advocates are pursuing what appears to be a parallel track. 

For example, in at least one jurisdiction, New York City, the city 

council passed legislation allowing employees to make voluntary 

contributions to not-for-profit organizations of their choice through 

payroll deductions. This structure is very similar to the manner in 

which union dues are withheld from employee paychecks. 

In other situations, groups calling themselves global union federations that go by the names IndustriALL, UNI Global Unions, 

and BWI have become increasingly active in the United States on 

behalf of their U.S. member unions to further organizing efforts or 

create added leverage at the bargaining table. However, to my 

knowledge, none of these global union federations comply with the 

requirements of the LMRDA. 

Compliance with these laws would confer benefits upon the very 

workers these groups claim to represent. Unfortunately, it appears 

these groups are reluctant to define themselves as labor organizations because the NLRA and LMRDA are perceived as creating an 

impediment to worker centers’ activities. 

In addition, worker centers have not considered themselves to be 

limited by the NLRA restrictions on secondary picketing and protracted picketing for recognition. Such conduct is a common tool 

used by these groups to convey their message, but it would violate 

the NLRA if they considered themselves labor organizations. 

Without coverage under the NLRA and the LMRDA, these organizations can avoid accountability to the workers they claim to represent. Yet the laws that provide protections for workers vis-a-vis 

labor organizations that represent them were designed precisely to 

create that accountability. 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

37 

Moreover, these laws were also intended to protect worker selfchoice, and to ensure a balance between labor and management interests, and to ensure the free flow of commerce. 

The burden of compliance with those laws is not so significant 

when considered within the context of the benefits afforded to 

workers and the economy in general. 

The mission of many worker centers is often seen as being an important means of advocating on behalf of under-represented employees who do not have access to or knowledge of the legal mechanisms to protect their rights. However, no organization, no matter 

how laudable its mission, is above reproach. And through its passage of the laws that regulate labor organizations, Congress established safeguards to give workers a say in and understanding of 

the operations of the organizations that represent them. 

Compliance with the NLRA and the LMRDA serves not only as 

a protection for workers, but perhaps as a validator of the worker 

centers that claim to represent them. A goal of many worker centers is to ensure that employers of their members comply with the 

basic laws that offer protections to workers. It is not unreasonable 

to expect worker centers to do the same. 

Finally, I would like to point out that today, well into the second 

year of the Trump administration, the administrator position in 

charge of the Office of Labor Management Standards, or OLMS, 

which oversees compliance with the LMRDA, remains unfilled. And 

I would urge this committee to urge the administration to fill that 

position. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide this testimony. 

[The testimony of Mr. Marculewicz follows:] 

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38 

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Insert offset folio 27 here 29829.027

Testimony of Stefan Marculewicz Before 

The United States House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions 

April 26, 2018 

Chairman Walberg, ranking member Sablan, and members of the Committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony here today. My name is Stefan 

Marculewicz and I am a Shareholder at the law firm of Littler Mendelson here in 

Washington, DC. I am speaking to you today on my own behalf and not on behalf of 

my law firm or any firm client. 

The topic I am going to testify about today is worker centers. Labor unions, the 

primary advocates for workers' rights in the United States continue to experience a 

decline in membership. Perhaps partially in response to that decline, labor unions have 

sought new ways to effectuate change in the workplace. One of the most prominent 

examples of this effort has been the development of organizations known as worker 

centers. 

Today there are hundreds of these organizations. Their structure and 

composition vary. They go by many different names. Typically, they are non-profit 

organizations that receive funding from foundations, grants-including from 

government, membership fees and other donations. Some are funded by other labor 

organizations. 1 

These groups offer many different services to their members, including 

education, training, employment services and legal advice. Increasingly, however, 

' The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has published a number of important studies tracing the funding of 

these organizations. 
39 

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these organizations directly engage employers or groups of employers to effectuate 

change in the wages, hours and terms and conditions of workers they claim to 

represent. When it comes to such direct engagement, these worker centers often act 

no differently than traditional labor organizations. 

In 2012, I conducted research on the subject of worker centers, and published 

the article Labor Organizations by Another Name: The Worker Center Movement and 

its Evolution into Coverage under the NLRA and LMRDA in Engage the Federalist 

Society's law and policy review. In that article, I described the growth of worker 

centers, and their evolution into de facto labor organizations. The premise of my article 

was that because of this evolution, worker centers should comply with the laws that 

regulate labor organizations. These laws include the National Labor Relations Act (the 

NLRA) and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (the LMRDA). I 

asserted that because the benefits of those laws ultimately flow to the workers these 

organizations claim to represent, there was no viable justification for them not to 

comply with the laws. 

In September 2013, I had the honor of testifying on this subject before this 

Committee. In my testimony, I urged the Committee to seek to have these 

organizations comply with the laws. Unfortunately, since that time, to my knowledge, 

worker centers continue to remain largely outside of coverage by these laws. In 

addition, during these years, not only have worker centers continued to evolve, but 

other organizations have emerged that have similar objectives of effectuating change in 

the workplace. 
40 

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Insert offset folio 29 here 29829.029

Instead of conforming their behavior to the existing laws, however, their 

advocates are pursuing what appears to be a parallel track. For example, in at least 

one jurisdiction, New York City, the City Council passed legislation allowing employees 

to make voluntary contributions to not-for-profit organizations of their choice through 

payroll deductions. This structure is very similar to the manner in which union dues are 

withheld from employee paychecks. In other situations, groups calling themselves 

global union federations that go by the names IndustriALL, UNI Global Unions and BWI, 

have become increasingly active in the United States and on behalf of their U.S. 

member unions to further organizing efforts or create added leverage at the bargaining 

table. However, to my knowledge none of these global union federations comply with 

the requirements of the LMRDA. 

Compliance with these laws would confer benefits upon the very workers these 

groups claim to represent. Unfortunately, it appears these groups are reluctant to 

define themselves as labor organizations because the NLRA and the LMRDA are 

perceived as creating an impediment to worker centers' activities. In addition, worker 

centers have not considered themselves to be limited by the NLRA restrictions on 

secondary picketing and protracted picketing for recognition. Such conduct is a 

common tool used by these groups to convey their message, but it would violate the 

NLRA if they considered themselves labor organizations. 

Without coverage of the NLRA and LMRDA these organizations can avoid 

accountability to the workers they claim to represent. Yet, the laws that provide 

protections to workers vis a vis labor organizations that represent them were designed 
41 

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Insert offset folio 30 here 29829.030

precisely to create that accountability. Moreover, these laws were also intended to 

protect worker self-choice, to ensure a balance between labor and management 

interests, and to ensure the free flow of commerce. The burden of compliance with 

those laws is not so significant when considered within the context of the benefits 

afforded to workers and the economy in general. 

The mission of many worker centers is often seen as being an important means 

of advocating on behalf of underrepresented employees who do not have access to or 

knowledge of the legal mechanisms to protect their rights. However, no organization, 

no matter how laudable its mission, is above reproach, and through its passage of the 

laws that regulate labor organizations, Congress established safeguards to give workers 

a say in and understanding of the operations of the organizations that represent them. 

Compliance with the NLRA and LMRDA serves not only as a protection for workers, but 

perhaps as a validator of the worker centers that claim to represent them. 

A goal of many worker centers is to ensure that employers of their members 

comply with the basic laws that offer protections to workers. It is not unreasonable to 

expect worker centers to do the same. Ultimately, the benefits of the laws that govern 

labor organizations flow to the workers they represent, and, as such, there simply is no 

viable justification for worker centers not to comply with them. 

Finally, I would like to point out that today, well into the second year of the 

administration of President Trump, the Administrator position in charge of the Office of 

Labor Management Standards, or OLMS, which oversees compliance with the LMRDA 
42 

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Insert offset folio 31 here 29829.031

remains unfilled. I therefore ask the members of this Committee to urge the 

administration to fill the position as quickly as possible. 

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering any questions you may 

have. 
43 

Chairman WALBERG. Thank you for your testimony. 

Now, Mr. Jackson, I recognize you for five minutes. And this is 

a lot less challenging than traffic you deal with the drivers around 

you in your big rig. 

TESTIMONY OF TOMMY JACKSON, LONG HAUL AUTO– 

TRANSPORT DRIVER, HERMISTON, OREGON 

Mr. JACKSON. Chairman Walberg, members of the Committee, 

thank you for allowing me a few minutes to tell my story, one of 

which is ongoing. It is my hope this testimony will bring awareness 

to a flawed system. My story will show the need to change labor 

laws to benefit employees and not special interests. 

Today, we are here to talk about how we can improve our current 

labor system and ensure unions are accountable to the employees 

they say they represent. All of you have been voted by your constituents to represent them here. Every two years they decide how 

you are doing in an election. And if you satisfy them, you get to 

come back. I am asking that labor unions be held to the same 

standard by making them have re-certification elections. There 

should not be this ridiculous process that makes it nearly impossible to bring an election. It should be automatic, just like yours. 

It is further my hope that my testimony here today will call attention to the injustice that I and my co-workers are enduring at 

the hands of the National Labor Relations Board Region 19. 

My name is Tommy Jackson, and for 14 years I have been a 

truck driver for Selland Auto Transport. We specialize in moving 

new cars from the West Coast ports to market. 

On December 20, 2014, by a very narrow margin, the Teamsters 

were voted in to represent us. After a year-and-a-half, we became 

disillusioned with Teamsters and began the process to bring forward a decertification election. This is not an easy process, because 

it is against the law for the company to help us, and the Teamsters 

say it would be in violation of their constitution. 

Remember, as truck drivers, we don’t really congregate in any 

one place, and the National Labor Relations Board requires we 

have 30 percent minimum of my fellow drivers’ signatures as a 

showing of interest. Even still, we got the required signatures and 

filed for a decertification election on March 2, 2016. That was more 

than two years ago. 

The reasons for the delay, starting that very same day, March 

2, 2016, the Teamsters began filing unfair labor practices, or ULPs, 

commonly known as blocking charges. By filing these blocking 

charges, the Teamsters can delay an election indefinitely. This is 

contrary to a representational election, where the union is trying 

to represent an employee group. I think they call those ambush 

elections, as they take place, on average, 24 days after the petition 

is filed. 

It is like the National Labor Relations Board is set up to force 

unions onto employees, but not let the same employees get the 

unions out. Case in point, going back to the blocking charges, the 

National Labor Relations Board Region 19 has jurisdiction of our 

case. The director of that region, Ronald Hooks, continually allows 

the union to rehash old blocking charges or file new ones that have 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

44 

no merit. We have sent the region multiple letters, begging the National Labor Relations Board to give us our election. 

Chairman Walberg and Committee, did you know that as Region 

19 processes the blocking charges that they hear the union’s arguments and they hear from the company, however the region will 

not hear me, who is the actual petitioner for this de-certification, 

as the board says I am not a recognized party. Therefore, I have 

no standing, me the petitioner, the one that took the risk. 

Furthermore, these delays are allowing the union to wage a campaign designed to browbeat my company into submission. The 

Teamsters called a one-day strike on November 21, 2015 that in 

turn resulted in my company losing its largest contract in California, American Honda. I think it is the Teamsters’ goal at this 

point to put my company out of business. 

It is my understanding that this committee is considering legislation that requires unions to have re-certification elections. That 

would mean the unions would actually have to do their jobs and 

represent the real employees, instead of looking out for their own 

interests. And if they didn’t, we would simply vote them out. 

Considering the runaround my company and colleagues have endured, an automatic election sounds like the American way. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, Committee, for inviting me 

here to tell my story. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The testimony of Mr. Jackson follows:] 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

45 

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Insert offset folio 32 here 29829.032

Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions 

"Worker-Management Relations: Examining the Need to Modernize 

Federal Labor Law" 

April 26, 2018 

Testimony of Tommy Jackson 
46 

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Insert offset folio 33 here 29829.033

April 26, 2018 

Workforce Ed subcommittee HELP Chairman Tim Walberg 

Chairman Walberg members of the committee thank you for allowing me 

a few minutes to tell my story one of which is ongoing, it is my hope this 

testimony will bring awareness to a flawed system. My story will show 

the need to change labor laws to benefit employees and not special 

interests. Today we are here to talk about how we can improve our 

current labor system and insure union's are accountable to the 

employees they say they represent. All of you have been voted by your 

constituents to represent them here. Every two years they decide how 

you are doing in an election and if you satisfy them you come back. I am 

asking that labor unions be held to the same standard by making them 

have recertification elections. There should not be this ridiculous process 

that make it nearly impossible to bring an election. It should be 

automatic, like yours. It is further my hope that my testimony here today 
47 

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Insert offset folio 34 here 29829.034

will call attention to the injustice that I and my co-workers are enduring 

at the hands of the National Labor Relations Board Region 19. 

My name is Tommy Jackson and for the last 14 years I have been a truck 

driver for Seiland Auto Transport. We specialize in moving new cars from 

the west coast ports to market. On December 20, 2014 by a very narrow 

margin the Teamsters were voted in to represent us. After a year and a 

half we became disillusioned with Teamsters and began the process to 

bring forward a decertification election. This is not an easy process, 

because its against the law for the company help us and the Teamsters 

say we would be in violation of their constitution. 1 Remember as truck 

drivers we don't really congregate in one place and the National Labor 

Relations Board requires a 30% minimum of my fellow drivers signatures 

as a showing of interest. 

Even still we got the required signatures and filed for a decertification 

election on March 2, 2016. That was more than two years ago. The 

reasons for the delay, starting that very same day March 2, 2016 the 

Teamster's began filing Unfair Labor Practices or ULP commonly known as 

"Blocking Charges. By filing these blocking charges the Teamster's can 

1 Teamsters Constitution 
48 

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Insert offset folio 35 here 29829.035

delay an election indefinitely. Which is contrary to a representational 

election where a union is trying to represent an employee group. I think 

they call those Ambush Elections as they take place on average 24 days 

after the petition is filed. It's like the National Labor Relation Board is set 

up to force unions onto employees, but not to let the same employees 

get the unions out. 

Case in point going back to the blocking charges the National Labor 

Relations Board Region 19 has jurisdiction of our case. The Director of 

that region Ronald Hooks continually allows the union to rehash old 

blocking charges or file new ones that have no merit. We have sent the 

region multiple letters begging the National Labor Relations Board to give 

us our election.2 

Chairman Walberg and committee members did you know that as Region 

19 processes the Blocking Charges that they hear the unions arguments 

and they hear from the company. However, the region will not hear me 

who is the actual petitioner for this decertification as the board says I am 

not a recognized party therefore, I have no standing, me the petitioner, 

the one that took the risk. 

Furthermore, these delays are allowing the union to wage a campaign 

2 Region 19 Letter 
49 

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Insert offset folio 36 here 29829.036

designed to browbeat my company into submission. The Teamsters 

called a one day strike on November 21, 2016, that in turn resulted in my 

company losing it largest contract in California, Honda. I think it is the 

Teamsters goal to put my company out of business. 

It is my understanding that this committee is considering legislation that 

requires unions to have recertification elections. That would mean that 

unions would actually have to do their jobs and represent the real 

employees instead of looking out for their own interests. Because if they 

don't we would simply vote them out. Considering the runaround my 

company and colleagues have endured an automatic election sounds like 

the American way to me. 

Thank you again to the committee for inviting me here to tell my story. 

look forward to answering any questions you may have. 
50 

Mrs. FOXX. [Presiding] Thank you very much, Mr. Jackson. 

Now, Dr. Lofaso, you are recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF ANNE M. LOFASO, ARTHUR B. HODGES PROFESSOR OF LAW, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF 

LAW, MORGANTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA 

Dr. LOFASO. Good morning, Chairman Walberg, who I don’t see 

right now, Ranking Member Sablan, and distinguished members of 

the Subcommittee. My name is Anne Marie Lofaso. I am a law professor at West Virginia University, where I have taught labor and 

employment law for over 11 years, and serve as the director of the 

labor and employment law certificate program. I am also a former 

senior attorney at the National Labor Relations Board, where I 

served for 10 years in the Appellate and Supreme Court Branch. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding worker-management relations, examining the need to modernize federal labor law. 

I am testifying on behalf of myself, and not as part of these or any 

other institution with which I have been, may be, or will be affiliated. 

The National Labor Relations Act has not been meaningfully 

modernized since just after World War II. The last significant 

amendments, Taft-Hartley, have the eventual effect of substantially reducing union bargaining power and density, thus resulting 

in the type of imbalance that precipitated the 74th U.S. Congress 

to enact the NLRA in the first place. 

That congress understood that organized labor was necessary to 

check the coercive power of organized capital, and believed that 

protecting the fundamental rights of workers to band together for 

mutual aid or protection would diminish the causes of labor disputes, burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce. 

Taft-Hartley’s legacy, then, has been to amplify the imbalance of 

power between labor and management, augment economic inequality among workers, undermine the American middle class, and to 

sow the seeds of labor unrest and working class resentment. I 

therefore agree that the NLRB needs to be modernized. 

What is needed is the type of modernization established by the 

WAGE Act. The purpose of the WAGE Act is to strengthen unions 

so that they bolster the middle class, which will facilitate economic 

growth from the middle outward. The WAGE Act purports to do 

this in the following five ways. 

First, the WAGE Act requires employers to post notices of workers’ NLRA rights. Publishing laws increases transparency, which 

creates, maintains, and builds the inner morality of the law. Moreover, it helps to educate and create an informed citizenry, a prerequisite for a strong democracy that can withstand foreign challenges to our political system. 

Second, the WAGE Act strengthens the NLRA’s weak enforcement mechanisms by penalizing those who violate federal law. 

Third, and relatedly, the WAGE Act strengthens remedies for 

workers who are retaliated against for exercising their Section 7 

rights. 

Fourth, the WAGE Act expands coverage of the NLRA. The bill 

prevents employers from mis-classifying their employees as superCEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

51 

visors or independent contractors, and prevents workers from being 

denied back pay because of their immigration status. 

Fifth, the WAGE Act streamlines the process for workers to organize a union and negotiate a first contract, a proposal first endorsed by the Republican NLRB general counsel Rom Meisburg. 

By contrast, recent legislative proposals such as the inaptly 

named Employee Rights Act are headed in the wrong direction. 

These legislative measures, introduced in the name of workers’ 

rights, would in reality continue the backward trend of squeezing 

the middle class. Together and separately, these bills craft eight 

steps toward destroying workplace democracy. 

One, the bills block employee access to information about the 

benefits of unionization. 

Two, they create anti-democratic voting measures cloaked in the 

language of democracy. 

Three, they eliminate the longest-standing and most basic way 

for workers to form unions by card check, while inventing creative 

ways for employers to bust unions. 

Four, the bills delay union certification. 

Five, they gerrymander voting districts by trying to compel the 

board to add employees who do not wish union representation to 

petition for bargaining units to create a majority non-union block. 

Six, they augment penalties for unions but not employers that 

violate the NLRA, notwithstanding the fact that unions are much 

less likely to violate the Act than are employers. 

Seven, they drain union treasuries. 

Eight, the bill grants non-union members control over unions. 

And nine, they create one-sided criminal penalties for unions, but 

not for managers or replacement workers to engage in or threaten 

violence. 

Finally, attacks on worker centers are erroneous and misplaced. 

Worker centers are community-based non-profit organizations that 

provide various services to low-wage workers in the communities 

they serve. Many but not all of these organizations center around 

immigrant groups who work in low-wage jobs, thus shaping the 

types of services offered. Such services include English language 

classes, job readiness training and occupation safety training to 

community members, assistance applying for unemployment benefits or filing a claim for unpaid wages, or help opening bank accounts or obtaining loans. 

Worker centers are not labor organizations under the NLRA, or 

the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Moreover, 

their growth is a symptom of diminished imbalanced bargaining 

power possessed by workers. 

In conclusion, the NLRA, a federal law that has not been significantly updated in over 70 years, is in desperate need of modernization. Legislative and administrative change is especially pressing 

because the imbalance of power created by Taft-Hartley has planted the seed that eventually deepened economic inequality, shrunk 

the middle class, and left many working-class people angry. 

As the 74th U.S. Congress well understood, that anger will predictably surface in various forms of labor and political unrest. Witness the swath of teacher strikes that swept our nation in recent 

months that started in my home state, West Virginia. 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

52 

I urge members of this Congress to reach across the aisle and 

work together on our nation’s problems. Focus on people, rather 

than party loyalty. Focus on solutions, rather than ideology. Assume the best in one another, and we will keep our nation great. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide this testimony. 

[The testimony of Dr. Lofaso follows:] 

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53 

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Written Testimony of 

Anne Marie Lofaso 

Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law 

West Virginia University College of Law 

Before the U.S. House Committee on 

Education and the Workforce 

Subcommittee on 

Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

Hearing on 

Worker-Management Relations: 

Examining the Need to Modernize Federal Labor Law 

April 26, 2018 
54 

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Introduction 

Good Morning, Chairman Walberg, Ranking Member Sablan, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee. My name is Anne Marie Lofaso. I am the Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law at 

West Virginia University College of Law, where I have taught labor and employment law for 11 

Y, years and serve as the Director of the Labor and Employment Law Certificate Program. I am 

also a former Senior Attorney of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), where I served for 

ten years in the Appellate and Supreme Court Branch. Relevant to my testimony, I have a doctorate 

in jurisprudence and comparative labor law from Oxford, a law degree from the University of 

Pennsylvania, and a bachelor's degree in modern Anglo-American history and science from 

Harvard University. Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding Worker-Management 

Relations: Examining the Need to Modernize Federal Labor Law. I am testifying on behalf of 

myself and not as part of these or any other institution with which I have been, may be, or will be 

affiliated. 

Overview 

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the primary U.S. labor law at the federal level 

to regulate private-sector labor relations, has not been significantly modernized since just after 

World War II. The last significant amendments, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 

popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 1 have had the effect of significantly reducing union 

bargaining power and density, thus resulting in the type of imbalance that precipitated the Seventyfourth U.S. Congress to enact the NLRA. This effect, in turn, has amplified the imbalance of power 

between labor and management, augmented economic inequality among workers, and undermined 

the American middle class. I, therefore, agree that the NLRA needs to be modernized. But recent 

legislative proposals, such as the inaptly named Employee Rights Act, arc headed in the wrong 

direction. What is needed is the type of modernization established by the Workplace Action for a 

Growing Economy Act of2017 (Wage Act). Finally, attacks on Worker Centers are erroneous and 

misplaced. Worker Centers are not labor organizations under either the NLRA or LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Moreover, their growth is a symptom of 

diminished and imbalanced bargaining power possessed by workers. A diminished middle class 

is both a symptom and cause of greater economic inequality. 

A. Congress Passed the Wagner Act to Equalize the Balance of Power Between 

Business and Employees by Encouraging the Practice and Procedure of 

Collective Bargaining 

As part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the Seventy-fourth United States 

Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 in 1935, when the United States was 

amid the Great Depression. It was a time when business had failed us and when government saved 

us. The purpose of the Wagner Act, as it was popularly known, was to balance the power between 

workers and business. The great men of the Seventy-fourth U.S. Congress understood that 

organized labor was necessary to check the coercive power of organized capital. And indeed, it 

1 29 U.S.C. ~~ 141-197, 80 H.R. 3020, Pub. L. 80--IOl, 61 Stat. 136. enacted June 23. 1947. 

2 29 U.S.C. ~ 151 et seq. 
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was believed that protecting the fundamental right of workers to band together for mutual aid or 

protection would "diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and 

foreign commerce." 

In the meantime, the United States and the world faced an even greater existential crisis. 

Fascist dictatorships, particularly Nazi Germany, sparked a second world war in the span of a 

generation. Unions were indisputably instrumental in winning that war. As Congress warranted, 

"by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise 

by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of 

their own choosing, tor the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment 

or other mutual aid or protection, "3 unions advanced industrial peace and domestic peace by 

extension. Peace in turn promoted commerce by removing labor unrest as both a symptom and 

cause of economic inequality. Our country banded together in political, economic, social, and 

military unity to win the single greatest threat to our existence. Unions and their members 

contributed to this effort on the home front not only by manufacturing weapons and other items 

needed on the war front, 4 but also by maintaining and strengthening the domestic and economic 

peace and resolve through a no-strike pledge by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the 

Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). In consideration for that pledge, President Roosevelt, 

by Executive Order, created the National War Labor Board,S which in turn provided for quasi 

compulsory arbitration for resolving industrial disputes. 

The system worked-well. We mobilized for war, lifted ourselves out of the Great 

Depression, and created a prosperous middle class, which held all the hopes for our future. That 

future was bui It on a solid foundation of good jobs and a college or vocational education for all -

not only for those privileged few who could pay for such luxuries. Americans began to view jobs 

and education together with social security, disability, and health care as necessities- not luxuries. 

B. Congress Enacted Taft-Hartley In a Misguided Attempt to Reset the Balance 

of Power 

1. Overview: The Post-War Balance of Power Between Labor and 

Management 

The Eightieth Congress came to elected power at this watershed moment. Rather than 

understanding that hope remained in that Pandora's box of technological achievement, members 

of the Eightieth Congress sought to turn back time as if they could return what they viewed as the 

excesses of progress, while maintaining what they viewed as progress. For them, progress was 

measured purely in the growth of bottom-line corporate profits rather than broadly shared social 

and economic opportunity. 

3 29 U.S.C. § 151. 

4 The relationship among national security, organized labor, and government regulation oflabor relations was reviewed in law 

journals during World War II. See. e.g., Ralph S. Rice, The Wagner Act: It's Legislative History and It's Relation to National 

Defense. 8 OHIO ST. L. J. 17 (Dec. 1941) ("But the nation is now at war. In preparation for defense efforts during the past months. 

the impact of employer-employee relationships upon the public welfare has been more and more keenly called to the attention of 

all the people by recent labor disputes affecting the production of materials vital to the national defense program.''). 

5 Executive Order 90 17-Establishing the National War Labor Board, dated January 12, 1942. 
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Twelve years after passage of the Wagner Act and a world war later, in 1947, at the 

commencement of the Cold War, the Eightieth U.S. Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act. My 

predecessor, West Virginia University Labor Law Professor, Guy Otto Farmer, writing shortly 

after Taft-Hartley went into effect but before he was appointed as a Republican Board member 

under the Eisenhower administration, described the Eightieth Congress's legislative efforts as 

maintaining "a proper balance of power between conflicting interests." Farmer added: 

[D]emocracy consists of the interplay and clash of opposing forces, each attempting to gain 

dominance on an economic, social or political plane .... It is perfectly natural and normal 

that there should be differences between capital and labor since the one is interested in 

high profits and the other in high wages; but it is dangerously false to assume that their 

differences are irreconcilable. The area of conflict is in fact small and these two groups 

have more interests in common than in conflict, the chief one being a mutual interest in 

maintaining volume production of goods and thus insuring plenty and prosperity for all ... 

. Nevertheless, the conflict does exist on a short-run basis and it is wise to recognize it. We 

have seen it manifested from time to time in strikes and work stoppages and in other kinds 

of industrial strife. And the conflict is one which the public cannot afford to view with 

indifference .... In the clash betvveen capital and labor, the public has too much at stake 

to view the scene as an isolated sports spectacle. We cannot afford to permit either of these 

powerful opponents to be utterly defeated and carried from the ring. They are the twin 

economic supports of our democratic society. Without both of them, real democracy cannot 

exist.6 

In this article, Farmer made the following prediction: "[T]he real test of [Taft-Hartley]," 

that which "will determine whether its enactment was good or bad for our democratic system" is 

what impact it will have on "the balance of power in labor relations."7 Building up one, only to 

destroy the other, was not a productive option. Although the article defends Taft-Hartley as 

necessary to restoring balance of power to labor-management relations, I submit to you today that, 

whether the members of the Eightieth U.S. Congress, Guy Farmer, and others correctly believed 

that reform was needed to tinker with the balance of power between capital and labor, Taft-Hartley 

and its legislative and adjudicatory progeny ultimately stripped unions of so much power as to 

marginalize the vital role they played in building a strong middle class necessary for economic 

growth and prosperity. Taft-Hartley fails Guy Farmer's test. 

2. Taft-Hartley Tipped the Balance of Power in Favor of Business Thus 

Leaving the Middle Class Weak and Angry and Creating Great 

Inequality That Has the Effect of Destabilizing Our Democracy and 

Our Economy 

Taft-Hartley tipped the balance of power toward business primarily by effectuating three 

main changes: by narrowing the NLRA's coverage, by narrowing the definition of what conduct 

constitutes protected concerted activity.8 As a threshold matter, Taft-Hartley added two broad 

"Guy Farmer. The Taft-Hartley Act and the Balance of Power in Labor Relations, 51 W.VA. L. Q. 141, 142-43 (1949). 

7 Fanner. supra n. 6, at 141. 

'To be sure. Taft-Hartley made some important improvements: It created the office of the General Counsel, 29 U.S.C. § !53( d); 

and obliged unions to bargain collectively with management. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3), a duty already imposed on employers via the 

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exemptions to the definition of employee9 supervisorto and independent contractortt - which 

significantly narrowed those working-class people who possess labor rights, thereby punching a 

gaping hole in the NLRA's protective cover.t 2 Taft-Hartley also removed powerful economic 

weapons from the union's arsenal. Most prominently, it prohibited secondary activity, making it 

unlawful for a union that has a primary dispute with a company, Employer P, to pressure a thirdparty neutral, Employer N, to stop doing business with Employer P. 13 For example, a newspaper 

union involved in a labor dispute with a newspaper might find it highly effective to picket a 

papermill thereby discouraging it from selling raw paper to the newspaper. Stripped of its power 

to engage in most secondary activity, a union is limited to publicizing its dispute or putting direct 

pressure on its own employer. Those weapons have proven ineffective in counterbalancing the 

coercive power of big business. Finally, notwithstanding the proviso to Sections 8(a)(3), ta which 

allows union-security agreements, Taft-Hartley added Section 14(b), ts allowing states to legislate 

the question whether private-sector employees who are represented by a union, which by law has 

a duty offair representation t

6 to all whom it represents, may refuse to pay all dues, even those dues 

that support the union's representative, grievance-arbitration, and contract administration 

functions. Those states that opt to regulate that question are called right-to-work states.t 7 

These and other changes, individually and collectively, have weakened unions. This is true 

both logically and empirically. First, as a matter of internal logic, these legislative moves would 

predictably weaken unions as institutional players sufficiently strong to balance the power wielded 

by business in an advanced capitalist society. If Congress removes a wide band of working class 

people from the NLRA's coverage and thus removes those individuals as potential union members, 

Wagner Act. 29 U.S.C. § t58(a)(5). But at its core. Taft-Hartley gutted union power to effectuate social change for ordinary 

working-class people. 

'29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 

'" 29 U.S.C. § t52(11). 

11 In recognizing the independent contractor exemptionj Taft-Hartley overturned two Supreme Court cases. See NLRB v. Hearst 

Pubrns, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1994) (holding that newsboys were employees under the NLRA, despite contentions that they arc 

independent contractors and should be excepted); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 487-91 (1947) (holding that 

minor foremen, who were responsible for quantity and quality production control in a mass-production industry, were employees 

under the NLRA, notwithstanding contentions that these workers were either employers within the meaning of the NLRA or so 

closely aligned vvith the employer's interests that it was undesirable to consider them statutory employees). The definition of 

independent contractor under the NLRA is currently synonymous with the Restatement definition. 

12 See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Employee, 5 F.I.U. L REv. 495 (2010). 

"29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). 

14 29U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 

l5 29 u.s.c. § 164(b). 

"Ford Motor Co. v. Hutlinan, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (extending the duty of fair representation to the NLRA. and explaining that 

the union "s "statutory obligation to represent all members of an appropriate unit requires them to make an honest effort to serve 

the interest of all ... without hostility to any."); accord Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. t7t (1967) (holding that union conduct that is 

·'arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith" violates the duty of fair representation). The duty of fair representation was originally 

created in the context of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §!51 et seq. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 

U.S. 192 (1944) (striking down under the RLA a seniority system that discriminated against black workers. explaining that the 

RLA implicitly "imposes on the bargaining agent . , . the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it on behalf of all those 

for whom it acts without hostile discrimination against them," while, at the same time, "the statutory representative ... is (not] 

barred from making contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some members of the craft represented"). 

11 A good explanation of these concepts can be found at Ronald Turner, "kfembership" Ob!;gations Under NLRA Section 8(a)(3): 

A Proposal for Statutory Change, t7 HoFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 323 (2000). 
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shrinks the conduct that the NLRA protects, and limits the extent to which unions can raise money 

for even its core purposes- organizing, bargaining, and contract administration- then it stands to 

reason that unions would fail and the middle class would collapse. 

Empirically, union density in the private sector was down to 6.5% as of20 I i 8 from a high 

of about 35% in 1954. 19 Since 1954, shortly after enacting Taft-Hartley, union membership in both 

absolute terms and by density began to decrease. During this same time, the middle class shrunk, 

and our manufacturing industry has all but left a complete vacuum in the United States. This 

vacuum is potentially a national security issue- a question that is not the subject of today' shearing 

but does warrant future attention. 

Moreover, since the 1950s, the United States economy has shifted from an industrial 

manufacturing economy, to a service-based economy, to a knowledge-based economy. The 

workplace itself has shifted from the factory to, in many cases, a virtual workplace. The workplace 

is certainly more fragmented and less hierarchical as well. The economy has shifted from one of 

relatively high union density, especially in certain industries, to one of single-digit union density 

in the private sector. The middle class continues to shrink. US test scores continue to shift 

downward compared with many other advanced capitalist countries.20 Health outcomes are low 

(and more expensive) when compared with our peer countries21 and more tellingly health 

disparities within the United States continue to widen.22 

C. Any Changes in Labor-Management Relations Law Should Have Two GoalsTo Restore the Balance of Power and To Modernize the Law 

1. Legal Measures That Achieve These Goals 

a. NLRB's Election Rules23 

HI See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS 2017, data relea<;ed January 19, 2018, available at 

http:.://\\ ;vw. bls. QO\· /nc\\ s. rei ease/un io n2. nrO .ht m. 

19 To be more precise, "[a]s a percent of nonagricultural employment, union membership peaked at 35.4% in 1945. As a percent of 

wage and salary employment and a percent of total employment, union membership peaked in 1954 at 34.8% and 28.3o/o, 

respectively.'' See GERALD MAYER, G. UNION MEMBERSHJP TRENDS lN THE UNITED STATES. WASHINGTON, DC: CONGRESSIONAL 

RESEARCH SERVICEI2 (2004). 

20 See Drew DeSilver, US. Students' Academic Achievement Still Lags that of Their Peers in Afany Other Countries, Feb, 15, 2017, 

http://www.peWTesearch.org/fact-tankJ2017/02/15/u-s-studcnts-intemationally-math-sciencef. 

21 See Karen Davis, KristofStremikis, David Squires, and Cathy Schoen, Afirror, Mirror on the Wall. 20/4 Update: How the U.S. 

f!ealthcare Syslem Compares International~v, THE CoM~ONWEAL TH FUI'\D, June 2014, 

l!.lli2:,'.'\\"\\W.common''cnlthfund.,lrg.'pl1b!icationslfund-rcports:'"~t)l-l- junhnirnlr-mitTOr (ranking the U.S. last (11 111) in healthcare 

performance as compared with the U.K. Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Germany, the Netherland, New Zealand, Non.vay, France, 

and Canada, using metrics that included quality of care, access to care, efficiency, equity, and healthy living). 

22 See, e.g., Joachim 0. Hero, Alan M. Zaslavsky, and Robert J. Blendon, The United States Leads Other Nations In Differences 

By Income In Perceptions Of Health And Health Care, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS, June 2016, 

.b!tp::: ·/\\ \\\\ .hcalthamlirs-<1ri! ... doi.'!"u1 L I 0, 1377,hhhafC20 17.0000. 

23 These points are nearly verbatim to the points I made at the Public Meeting on Proposed Election Rule Changes, held at the 

National Lahor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington. D.C., on July 18, 2011. 

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The NLRB Election Rules achieve the goal of empowering workers primarily by 

modernizing the election procedures. They modernize outdated rules and make them more 

readable; make government run more efficiently by liberalizing information and by addressing the 

main problem of delay, while still allowing ample time for full debate; and deliver better service 

to the public. These amendments strengthen the secret-ballot election process, a process that the 

Chamber of Commerce itself has fought to maintain. 

First, these amendments modernize the election rules by permitting the electronic filing 

and transmission of documents. These changes are consistent with the efforts of other tribunals to 

modernize their own rules, such as the Electronic Case Filing initiative of the federal courts. The 

Board's efforts to make the rules more readable are also consistent with the efforts of other 

tribunals, such as the federal courts' Restyling Project, an effort to rewrite all federal rules in plain 

English. 

Second, these amendments also make government more efficient in two ways. First, they 

liberalize information available to all parties, thus making government more transparent. The basic 

requirement for an efficient process is greater initial information. The amendments require parties 

to release information readily within their control no later than the pre-election hearing. 

Information such as the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses of employees 

is information that is well within an employer's control. This, too, is consistent with the recent 

developments of mandatory initial disclosure under the federal rules. 

Similarly, the amendments require the parties to submit position statements no later than 

the pre-election hearing. To make it easier for the parties to comply with this requirement, the 

Board has offered the assistance of its Hearing Officer. This amendment provides a mechanism 

for quickly identifying the issues. This, too, is consistent with the trend in federal pleading 

requirements, especially after Iqbal v. Ashcroft24 The purpose of raising issues in the early stages 

is to resolve issues as quickly as possible so that non-meritorious issues do not go any further, 

which would result in lost resources. These requirements do not favor either party. Instead, they 

make the first steps in the process clear and more efficient. 

These amendments also make government run more efficiently by streamlining election 

procedures. The amendments eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic delay, thereby diminishing 

opportunities for unscrupulous parties to take advantage of systemic delay. By eliminating preelection voter eligibility challenges that are unlikely to affect the election and pre-election request 

for review; by giving the Board the discretion to deny post-election rulings thereby allowing the 

Regional Director to make a prompt final decision; and by consolidating review of the Regional 

Director's rulings through a single, post-election request, the Board's efforts are, once again, 

consistent with the federal rules under which litigants get only one pre-answer motion. 

Third, these amendments deliver better service to the public, not only by modernizing the 

system and making it run more efficiently, but also by creating uniformity, which leads to 

predictability. Predictability is always good for business. Uniform standards also leave less room 

for unscrupulous parties to game the system. 

24 574 F.3d 820 (2009). See also Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2005). 
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Opponents ofthe rule inaccurately contend that the rules cut off debate. These amendments 

deal only with the time between the election petition and the election itself. Employers and unions 

have ample time to make their views known during this period as well as prior to the filing of an 

election petition. Indeed, many employers now show, as part of their first-day orientation, short 

films claiming that unions are unnecessary. {{some employers are truly concerned with full debate, 

I suggest that they give unions access to their property and debate the pros and cons of 

unionization. 

b. The Workplace Action for a Growing Economy Act of2017 (WAGE Act) 

The purpose of the WAGE Act is to strengthen unions so that they bolster the middle class, 

which will facility economic growth from the middle outward. The Wage Act purports to do this 

in the following five ways. 

First, the WAGE Act requires employers to post notices of workers' rights under the 

NLRA. As I discussed in a previously published White Paper,25 publishing laws increases 

transparency, which creates, maintains, and builds the "inner morality of the law."26 Moreover, it 

helps to educate and create an informed citizenry, a prerequisite for a strong democracy that is able 

to withstand foreign challenges to our political system.27 

Second, the WAGE Act strengthens the NLRA's weak enforcement mechanisms by 

penalizing those who violate federal labor law. The bill guarantees penalties equal to twice the 

amount of an employee's backpay, plus fines up to $50,000, for each violation resulting in 

discharge or serious economic harm. 

Third and relatedly, the WAGE Act strengthens remedies for workers who are retaliated 

against for exercising their NLRA Section 7 rights. The bill compels the Board to petition the 

district court to grant an injunction for temporary reinstatement while that worker's case is 

pending. The bill also brings NLRB orders in line with the orders of other federal agencies by 

making them self-enforcing. And the brings the NLRA in line with other civil rights laws by 

granting workers the right to seek private relief in federal court. 

Fourth, theW AGE Act expands coverage ofthe NLRA. The bill prevents employers from 

misclassifying their employees as supervisors or independent contractors, and prevents workers 

from being denied backpay because of their immigration status. The bill also makes the employer 

25 See Anne Marie Lofa~o, We Are in This Together: The Rule of Law, the Commerce Clause, and the Enhancement of Liberty 

Through .!vfutua[ Aid, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY, TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: A 

PROGRF~')S!VE BLUEPRINT FOR THE SECOND TERM (Jan. 2013), b~~&cs!mv.org/sitcs/dci~HIIt!iiks/Lofns:o -

We i\n· in th!.., rogdhecpdf: 

26 The idea of the inner morality of !aw comes from Lon Fuller's eight canons of law- characteristics features oflaws developed 

in a well-functioning democracy. They are: generality, publicity, clarity, consistency, feasibility, constancy, prospectivity, and 

congruence. See Lofaso, supra n. 25, at 12 (citing Lo~ L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY OF LAw 33-39 (revised ed. 1964) and David 

Luban, The !lute of Law and Human Dignity: !leexamining Fuller's Canons. 2 HAGUEJ. RULE L. 29,31 (2010)). 

27 See id. 
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jointly and severally liable respecting violations affecting temporary or subcontracted employees 

acting within the employer's usual course of business. 

Fifth, the WAGE Act streamlines the process for workers to organize a union and negotiate 

a first contract a proposal first endorsed by the Republican NLRB General Counsel Ron 

Mcisburg. The bill authorizes the Board to issue a bargaining order when an employer's unlawful 

conduct prevents a fair representation election and if a majority of workers have designated the 

union as their representative in writing.28 For newly certified unions, the bill facilitates mediation 

and arbitration procedures to help parties reach a first contract. 

c. Repeal or the Modify the Supervisory and Independent Contractor 

Exemptions 

As discussed above, the supervisory and independent contractor exemptions have deprived 

countless working-class men and women of their labor rights. Yet, these worker classifications do 

not account for the modern workplace. Industrial America was hierarchical. The modern 

workplace is more diverse. It often has a flatter organizational structure in which workers 

collaborate in groups rather than taking responsible direction from superiors. This collaborative 

atmosphere is at the heart of American innovation, creativity, and ingenuity. But that organization, 

while often deeply egalitarian, does not readily fit into the hierarchical organizational structure 

assumed by the NLRA. Rather than removing the labor rights of increasingly more workers, which 

these exemptions do, relaxing these exemptions achieves the twin goals of restoring workers' labor 

rights and modernization. 

d. Apply the NLRA to the Fragmented Workplace 

When Congress passed the Wagner Act, the workplace was concrete. It looked like a 

factory or a plant or a store or a hospital. The modern workplace might still resemble a factor or a 

store. But it might also resemble a telecommunication work station or a virtual workplace. In many 

cases, it is unclear who the employer even is. In legal terms, this is a duty-holder problem. 

Members of Congress state that they want to extend labor rights to workers, but by definition, a 

right implies a legal duty imposed on a person who owes something- usually protection of that 

right-to the rights' holder. It is important for policymakers, which include members of Congress 

and the Board, to think through the nuances of this duty-holder problem rather than throwing up 

their hands merely because the problem is difficult to untangle. A prime example of this problem 

can be seen in the joint-employer/franchise context, where some have argued that a franchisor who 

controls terms and conditions of employment arc not employers because the franchisee also 

controls some of those terms. 29 

e. Repeal or Modify Section 8(b)(4) 

28 This is currently the law as interpreted by the NLRB with the endorsement of the United States Supreme Court See NLRB v. 

Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 

'"See Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors. Ltd. and Brandt Construction Co., 365 NLRB No. 156 (2017) (fly-Brand I) (overruling 

Browning-Ferris Industries ofCa/ifornia, Inc. d/b/a BFI Newby Island Re<:vciery (Browning-Ferris), 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015)). 

But see Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., (vacating fly-Brand I considering the Board's Designated Agency Ethics Official 

detennination that Member Emanuel should have been disqualified from participating in the proceeding) (Feb. 26, 2018). 

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Section 8(b)(4) severely limits a union's ability to bring so-called neutral employers into 

the union's labor dispute, thus removing one the most powerful arrows from the union quiver. But 

more importantly, Section 8(b)(4) severely restricts employee speech and expressive conduct. 

Imagine you are a mammal rights activist who is disturbed that tuna fishers' purse-seine bycatch 

of dolphins has resulted in the deaths of over six million dolphins. Your most effective method of 

communicating that message is by refusing to purchase tuna caught using the purse-seine method 

where dolphins and tuna swim together. This is a secondary boycott. Government action meant to 

outlaw its citizens from engaging in this secondary boycott would have grave first amendment 

consequences. Yet those very same values are at stake under Section 8(b )( 4)' s prohibition of 

secondary boycotts.3° Congress should be more sensitive to these values and consider relaxing 

speech restrictions on employees - whether that speech is pro-union, antiunion, probusiness, 

antibusiness, or whatever the content of that speech.31 

2. Legislative Attempts That Would Fail To Achieve These Goals 

In the recent past, three legislative measures have been introduced in the name of workers' 

rights but which would, in reality, continue the backward trend of squeezing the middle class. 32 

Together and separately, these bills craft eight steps toward destroying workplace democracy.33 

One, the bills block employee access to information about the benefits of unionization. Two, they 

create anti-democratic voting measures cloaked in the language of democracy. Three, they 

eliminate the longest-standing and most basic way for workers to form unions- by card checkwhile inventing creative ways for employers to bust unions. Four, the bills delay union 

certification. Five, they gerrymander voting districts by trying to compel the Board to add 

employees, who do not wish union representation, to petitioned-for bargaining units to create a 

majority non-union block. Six, they augment penalties for unions (but not employers) that violate 

the NLRA, notwithstanding the fact the unions are much less likely to violate the Act than are 

employers. Seven, they drain union treasuries. Eight, the bills grant nonunion members control 

over unions. Nine, they create one-sided criminal penalties for unions, but not for managers or 

replacement workers, to engage in or threaten violence. Below I highlight some of these issues. 

a. Employee Rights Act (H.R. 2723) 

J(l Professor Jack Getman makes the very same point in his article, Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went 

Wrong; Can We Fix fl?, 45 B. C. L REv. 125. 140 (2003). 

31 See Edward DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) 

(concluding that a union secondary appeals to customers through handbills that "pressed the benefits of unionism to the community 

and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and the standard of living of the populace," were a type of constitutionally 

protected political speech). 

32 See Legislative Refonns to the National Labor Relations Act: H.R. 2776, "Workforce Democracy and Fairness Act," H.R. 2775, 

"Employee Privacy Protection Act," H.R. 2723, "Employee Rights Act," !15th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jun. 14, 2017). 

33 For an in~depth analysis of these steps, see Testimony of Guerino J. Calemine, III, General Counsel, Communications Workers 

of America Before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Health, Labor, Employment, and Pensions Legislative 

Hearing on aR. 2776, 2775, and 2723, June 14, 2017, testimony available at h1m.1f..s.lcmocmtscdn-orh. f(m;c.hou::,c.eov /imo/incdia/d(lC{ · alcm inc%20"1 \::stimonv .pdf . 

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H.R. 2723, if passed, would take four prominent steps backwards in recent efforts to 

augment workers' labor rights and efforts to modernize rules governing the workplace. First, the 

bill would interfere with employees' rights of self-determination by restructuring workplace 

representation procedures making it difficult to secure representation-the hard-in approachwhile simultaneously making it easy to destabilize the union-employee relationship. It would 

prohibit employers from voluntarily recognizing a union based on a majority showing of employee 

support on properly authenticated authorization cards. This anti-democratic move would thereby 

reverse the historically grounded and longest-standing practice of employees for determining their 

representatives by card check. The bill would also modifY the way votes are counted in union 

elections by counting non-voters as "no" votes, contrary to how ballots are typically counted in 

U.S. elections, in which the majority of those who vote prevails. 34 Because failure to vote counts 

as a no-vote, detractors of this provision call this - stuffing the voting box with no votes. 

Decertification ballot counts, by contrast, would remain American style. The bill would also 

require recertification elections under certain circumstances, thereby further destabilizing the 

representative relationship. 

It is worth pausing on the contrasting approaches that the bill takes to certification and 

decertification procedures. It eliminates card check (and mail ballots) and voluntary recognition. 

For certification votes, it reverses American-style vote counting for union certification thereby 

converting a failure to vote into a vote against the union. By contrast, the 

recertification/decertification vote would require American-style majority of votes cast. While it 

does not place term limits on unions, it does convert American-style democracy -terms based 

primarily (though not exclusively) on a contract bar of up to three years - into a parliamentary 

style vote of no-confidence. The bill would thus require recertification elections every time there 

is turnover or change affecting more than 50 percent of the bargaining unit, thereby presuming that 

turnover indicates lack of support. This turnover trigger has no correlation with employee choice 

-the recertification vote is triggered whether or not a single employee actually wants the vote of 

no confidence. 

Second, H.R. 2723 would abolish the modest steps that the NLRB made toward 

modernizing its election procedures in ways which obstruct workplace democracy. The bill both 

reinserts needless delay into the election procedures at several stages and limits contact 

information to home addresses. If Congress were serious about making government more efficient 

and modernizing government processes, surely it would not build redundancy into government 

procedures (which waste taxpayer money and delay the vindication of statutory rights) or interfere 

with modern forms of communication. 

Third, H.R. 2723 would interfere with the union's internal procedures necessary to preserve 

self-determination primarily by allowing employees who choose not to become union members to 

vote on collective-bargaining agreements bargained by the union and to vote on strikes called by 

the union. The government is thus dictating to an organization that it must allow those who choose 

not to become members and who choose not to pay for that organization's service to have a voice 

34 To put into focus the baselessness of the democratic~deficit problem that this mea...;;ure is supposed to resolve, consider this. Not 

one member of Congress received the majority of votes of those he or she represents. Indeed, the current U.S. President did not 

even receive the majority of those who voted in the election. And this problem with the electoral college is neither unique nor rare. 

If Congress is concerned about democratic deficits, surely it would resolve these significantly more impactfut problems. 

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in how that organization is managed. This would be akin to requiring Republicans to give 

Democrats a say in the Republican platform, simply because the Republican candidate, if 

successful, would also represent the Democrats in his or her district. 

Fourth, H.R. 2723 would change Becl25 objectors from opt-out to opt-in. In a post-Citizens 

Unitecf6 world, in in which money is speech, this measure is designed to weaken unions as a 

counterweight to corporate power and speech. If balance is desired, then this measure must be 

debated in light of Citizens United and in light of the question whether shareholders should also 

be granted opt-out options. 

It is worth clarifying some myths that tend to misinform the discussion of Beck fees. The 

law already prohibits compelled union membership and union shops. No one is required to join a 

union or pay union dues. In right-to-work states, a nonmember bargaining-unit employee does not 

have to pay any union fees, even though the union must represent that employee under the duty of 

fair representation doctrine. In all other states (commonly known as fair-share states), a 

nonmember bargaining-unit employee is required to pay only an agency fee- that portion of the 

union fee that covers the costs of representing him but has the right to object to any portion of that 

fee paying lor anything not "germane" to the union's duties as bargaining agent. Under the 

Employee Rights Act, however, a union member already paying dues would be required to give 

annual consent after 35 days written notice each year- for the union to use any portion of that 

member's dues for anything other than union organizing, collective bargaining, or contract 

administration. Accordingly, this provision does not create a "Right Not to Subsidize Union NonRepresentational Activities," as the bill suggests. Moreover, while current law allows agency fee 

objectors to make a "continuing objection" that does not have to be renewed each year and 

permanently restricts his fees from being used for anything non-germane to collective bargaining, 

the ERA bill prohibits the correlative automatic renewal of a member's consent for the union to 

use his dues for non-germane activities?7 

b. Workplace Democracy and Fairness Act (H.R. 2776) 

As with H.R. 2723, the Workplace Democracy and Fairness Act primarily attacks those 

advances that the Board made to modernize and streamline election procedures vis-a-vis its April 

2015 election procedures. H.R. 2276 would impose certain requirements throughout the election 

process that will unduly complicate and delay the process. For example, the bill requires the NLRB 

to wait at least two weeks before holding any pre-election hearing. 

c. Employee Privacy Protection Act (H.R. 2775) 

35 See Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (holding that, under a union security agreement, unions 

are authorized by statute to collect from non-members only those fees and dues necessary to perform its duties as a collective 

bargaining representative). 

36 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 

37 The analysis of Beck and related issues summarizes the more sophisticated analysis provided in Testimony of Guerino J. 

Calemine, HI) General Counsel, Communications Workers of America Before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee 

on Health, Labor, 14,2017, testimony available 

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Once again, H.R. 2775 targets the NLRB's April 2015 election procedures by placing 

obstacles between workers and union representatives' communications prior to a representation 

election. In contrast with the Board's current rules, which require employers to provide available 

telephone numbers and e-mail addresses within two business days, H.R. 2775 would limit and 

delay that information. It particular, H.R. 2775 would allow employers to provide only one form 

of employee contact information, and would not require employers to provide this information 

until seven days after the NLRB rules on the appropriate bargaining unit. 

3. The Attack on Worker Centers Is Baseless Because They Are Not Labor Unions 

and Do Not Engage in Collective Bargaining 

Worker Centers are community-based nonprofit organizations that provide various 

services to low-wage workers in the communities they serve. 38 Many, but not all, of these 

organizations center around immigrant groups who work in low-wage jobs, thus shaping the type 

of services offered.39 Such services include providing English-language classes, job-readiness 

training, and occupation-safety training to community members, assistance applying for 

unemployment benefits or filing a claim for unpaid wages, or help opening bank accounts or 

obtaining loans. It is universally understood by members of both major political parties and labor 

law experts that worker centers are not labor unions. 40 

Worker centers are not labor organizations under either the NLRA or Labor-Management 

Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). The NLRA defines a "labor organization" as "any 

organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which 

employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 

employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or 

conditions of work."41 The NLRB has clarified that the definition of "labor organization" is not 

limited to labor unions.42 Board cases often turn on whether the organization "deal[s] with 

employers." The Board has explained that "'dealing' ... ordinarily entails a pattern or practice in 

which a group of employees, over time, makes proposals to management [and] management 

responds to those proposals by acceptance or rejection .... [I]fthere are only isolated instances in 

311 See generally JANICE fiNE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREA...\1 2 (Economic Policy 

Institute 2006 ). 

JEJ Compare Cas a Latina, bl!Jr ·. t::a.sa·latina.or:dabouHts, and Latino Worker Safety Center, hap~::/\\ W\\Jatinoworkcr.or:.r/ with The 

National Black Worker Center Project, h!IPs:,'/nmiona!black\York~JTcn1~r~.~m:!.:'a!Ti!ink.::;:. 

40 Neither the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or the Department of Labor (DOL) has ever found a worker center to be 

covered by those laws. The question whether worker centers are labor organizations first presented during the Bush Administration. 

In cases involving the Restaurant Opportunity Center of New York (http::/ro~unitcd.org/), a worker center that has aggressively 

advocated for workers in the restaurant industry, shining much light on tip theft the Bush Administration concluded that ROC was 

not a labor organization covered by either the NLRA or the LMRDA. See Memorandum from Barry l Kearney, Associate C'teneral 

Counsel, Division of Advice, NLRB, to Celeste Mattina, Regional Director, Region 2, NLRB, regarding Restaurant Opportunities 

Center of New York, Case Nos. 2-CP-1067, 2-CB-20643, 2-CP-1071, 2-CB-20705, 2-CB-20787, 2006 WL 5054727,2006 NLRB 

GCM LEXIS 52 (Nov. Chris Opfer and Jasmine Ye Han. Worker Centers May Get Closer Look Under Trump, 

BLOOMBERGNEWS, Jan. 16, 

41 29 U.S. C. § 152(5). 

42 See Electromation, Inc .. 309 NLRB 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1!48 (7th Cir. 1994). 

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which the group makes ad hoc proposals to management followed by a management response of 

acceptance or rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing."43 

While Board cases discussing the statutory definition of"labor organization" often arise in 

the context of a Section 8(a)(2)44 violation, the NLRB has provided guidance in the worker center 

context, in a case where the NLRB General Counsel declined to issue a complaint against the 

Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY), on the basis that ROC-NY was not a 

labor organization.45 The General Counsel acknowledged that "the parties' discussions stretched 

over a period of time," but ultimately concluded that, "[a]lthough stretching over a period oftime, 

the parties' dealings were limited to a single context or a single issue resolving ROCNY's 

attempts to enforce employment laws," so ROC-NY was not a labor organization for purposes of 

theNLRA. 

As relevant for most worker centers, the LMRDA definition of"labor organization" is narrower 

than the NLRA definition. The LMRDA defines a labor organization as 

a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce and includes any 

organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, 

association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the 

purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor 

disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any 

conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is 

subordinate to a national or international labor organization, other than a State or local 

central body. 46 

On top of the "dealing with" requirement, the LMRDA includes the additional requirement that 

the labor organization be "engaged in an industry affecting commerce." That phrase is separately 

defined to include, as relevant to worker centers, a labor organization that "is the certified 

representative of employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 

or the Railway Labor Act, as amended; or[] although not certified, is ... recognized or acting as 

the representative of employees of an employer or employers engaged in an industry affecting 

commerce[.]"47 This language indicates that only an organization that acts or seeks to act as a 

bargaining representative within the meaning of the NLRA or the RLA - i.e., as an exclusive 

representative- is a labor organization within the meaning of the LMRDA. 48 

43 See E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 NLRB 893, 894 (1993). 

<t-1 29 U.S.C. § l58(a){2) (making it unlawful fOr an employer "to dominate or interfere with the fonnatlon or administration of any 

labor organi::ation or contribute financial or other support to it ... ")(emphasis added). 

45 See Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York, supra 11. 39. 

46 29\J.S.C. ~ 402(i) (emphasis added). 

47 29\J.S.C. ~ 402(j). 

4

s As explained, supra n. 39~ OLMS has never found a worker center to be a labor organization covered by the LMRDA. During 

the George W. Bush Administration, OLMS twice concluded that the Restaurant Opportunities Center was not an LMRDA-covered 

labor organization. 
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In short, worker centers are not recognized as the exclusive representatives of the people 

they serve, do not "deal with" or engage in collective bargaining with employers, and do not 

represent employees on an ongoing basis in relation to their employer and thus are not covered by 

either the NLRA or the LMRDA.49 While worker centers often advocate or assist workers on a 

variety of issues, some of which include workplace issues, they help with discrete issues with a 

variety of employers on a variety of topics. That assistance, therefore, never rises to the "pattern 

or practice" necessary for showing that the Worker Center is "dealing with" the employer within 

the meaning of the statute. 

Conclusion 

The NLRA, a federal labor law that has not been significantly updated in over seventy 

years, is in desperate need of modernization. Legislative and administrative change is especially 

pressing because the imbalance of power created by Taft-Hartley has served only to deepen 

economic inequality, shrink the middle class, and leave many working-class people angry. As 

members ofthe Seventy-fourth U.S. Congress well understood, that angry will predictably surface 

in various forms oflabor and political unrest. Witness the swath of teachers strikes that have swept 

our nation in recent months. I urge members of this Congress to reach across the aisle and work 

together on our nation's problems. Focus on people rather than party loyalty. Focus on solutions 

rather than ideology. Assume the best in one another and we will keep our nation great. 

'"29 U.S.C. 9 !59( a); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 29 U.S.C. Section J. 

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68 

Chairman WALBERG. [Presiding] Thank you, Dr. Lofaso. 

And now I recognize Mr. Bowman for your five minutes of testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF TERRY BOWMAN, AUTOWORKER, YPSILANTI, 

MICHIGAN 

Mr. BOWMAN. Chairman Walberg, Ranking Member Sablan, and 

members of this committee, thank you for allowing me to testify 

today to discuss the plight of individual workers in the U.S. who 

are represented by a union, both voluntarily and those forced into 

it. 

We are speaking today on an issue that is very close to my heart: 

common-sense labor reform. My name is Terry Bowman, and I 

have worked for Ford Motor Company as an hourly employee for 

over 21 years, 19 of which I was a full, dues-paying UAW member. 

In 2015, I was able to exercise Michigan’s workplace freedom law, 

and I withdrew my UAW membership. Today, however, I am still 

forced to accept the UAW representation. 

Unfortunately, unions are still stuck in a 1930s business model 

with compulsion as its core principle. Necessary labor reforms are 

required to bring unionism into the 21st century. 

Unlike many union executives, I believe granting union-represented workers additional rights, freedoms, and protections is always a good thing. And two labor reforms I would like to briefly 

discuss today are worker political protections and the guarantee to 

a secret ballot election. 

Now, let’s look at political protection. Unions represent workers 

on all sides of the political spectrum. We all know that. However, 

we also know that the vast majority of political spending by unions 

benefits one party, causing a forced speech situation. Why should 

any worker simply wanting to earn a living and provide for their 

family be forced to fund any political or social speech or activity 

that they disagree with? 

What workers need is to require unions to receive opt-in provisions and permission from each worker before they can use his or 

her union dues for purposes other than collective bargaining. 

Private-sector unions reported on their government LM–2 forms 

that they spent over $1.7 billion on politics for the 2016 election 

cycle. This does not include public-sector unions, so the actual figure is actually much higher. 

In addition, unions may spend much more than reported, due to 

inconsistencies in how they classify political or social activity. Categories such as education or community involvement may hide additional political activity, and of course grants and donations will 

also reflect political and social spending that may insult many 

union workers. 

Currently, labor law allows unions to deduct money for political 

spending from an employee’s paycheck without obtaining prior approval. Only by initiating an often burdensome procedure or by resigning from a union can employees guarantee that their money 

will not support political agendas they disagree with. The process 

tends to be overly complicated, and rife with intimidation and fear: 

something I know about from personal experience. By simply requiring that union members opt in, rather than having to pursue 

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69 

a refund of dues or to opt out, employee rights will be better protected. 

And let’s look at secret ballot elections. The very thought that 

we, as union workers, have to fight to make an argument for a secret ballot election is both outrageous and embarrassing. How could 

anyone ever deny a worker their right to privacy? This proposal is 

crucial to protecting a worker’s right to vote their conscience without threatening and intimidating pressure from anyone, either a 

paid union organizer or an employer. 

Currently, unions can bypass secret ballot elections by persuading workers to sign card check agreements authorizing union 

representation. They then can pressure companies to accept that 

card check recognition, skipping a secret ballot election all together. Considering many workers may be confused about what 

those cards really represent, I believe it is time to assure workers 

forced into any union election that their privacy will be protected 

by guaranteeing a secret ballot election. 

Luckily, H.R. 2723, the Employee Rights Act, would address 

these concerns and more. Among eight pro-worker reforms, the 

Employee Rights Act would require secret ballot union elections, 

guaranteeing every employee’s right to a private vote. 

The ERA would also require union officials to obtain opt-in approval from their members before spending their dues money on 

political advocacy. This would protect workers’ paychecks from unapproved political spending. This legislation seems almost written 

by union workers for the benefit of union workers. 

I ask that you stand with me and my fellow union workers and 

support long-needed labor reform that will ensure our rights, freedoms, and protections, and will grant unions the tools necessary to 

shed their worn-out business model and meet us all here in the 

21st century. Thank you. 

[The testimony of Mr. Bowman follows:] 

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Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions 

Hearing Date: April261h, 2018 

"Worker-Management Relations: Examining the Need to Modernize 

Federal Labor Law" 

Written Testimony 

By 

Terry Bowman 

Ford-UAWWorker from Ypsilanti, Michigan 
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Summary 

The issue discussed today is one of monumental importance for the 7.6 million private-sector 

workers in the US that are members of unions'. I am here today because of my desire to do 

what is best for union workers. I work with them side-by-side every day, and for over 21 years 

have cared about what happens to them and their families. I am here to testify on behalf of 

workers; not on behalf of corporate unionism. The two are very different and distinct from each 

other. Sometimes what benefits a union as a company, does not mean it benefits workers, and 

frequently can come at the detriment of worker freedoms and rights. 

I will make the case why labor reforms are needed, and recommend how members of both 

parties can comfortably pass common-sense legislation that could have been written by union 

workers for union workers. A bill called the Employee Rights Act (HR 2723). 

I was raised in a blue-collar, union household. My father grew up in LaFallotte, Tennessee, and 

after a stint in the US Army, migrated to Michigan in the 50's. With only an a•h grade education, 

he worked hard at menial jobs until finally landing a job with Ford Motor Company. His sister 

and brother both worked for Ford in different plants, and he retired in the early 90's. 

Why his story matters is that he never had an opportunity to vote if he wanted to join a union. 

My father as well as his siblings were forced, as a condition of their employment, to accept the 

UAW as their collective bargaining agent. This was well over 50 years ago. 

When I hired into Ford in 1996 and continuing to this day, I also have never been offered the 

opportunity to vote if I wanted union representation or not. I am forced to accept it. Even 

though Michigan is a Right to Work state, and I exercised those rights, freedoms, and 

protections in 2015, I remain forced to accept union representation from a corporation -the 

United Auto Workers- that I detest. If I want to continue an employee/employer relationship 

with Ford Motor Company, I must give up my 1•• amendment right of Freedom of Association (or 

conversely, to NOT associate). I am a 2nd generation union auto worker forced to accept a 

union I never wanted. Periodic recertification elections would allow all union workers the ability 

to vote on their own representation. 

So in 2009, I decided that millions of union workers like me needed someone to stand up and 

speak for them- even in the face of a hostile and threatening union atmosphere. I am prounion; but in the context of what unions were created to do, not what they have become. 

Unions today are so closely tied to a political party that they have lost all sense of what they are 

supposed to be, and instead have become the funding and grassroots arm of their favorite 

political party. Protections are needed to ensure workers are not funding speech they disagree 

with. 

My fight for worker rights started almost a decade ago when my union incorrectly used a 

theological argument to make a political statement against the Republican Party. The article in 

our union newsletter claimed that Jesus was basically a socialist, and that he would approve of 

1 https://www.bls.gov/news.re!ease/union2,toc.htm 
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what is now known as Obamacare. The article was critical of Republicans as if the party was on 

the wrong side of God. 

I was attending a Christian College and Seminary at the time and knew the theological 

argument was wrong - hurtful, insensitive, and insultingly wrong. I knew at that time that I had 

to start defending workers against the abuses of the very unions that claim to have their best 

interest at heart. In most circumstances, unions are entrenched for generations without fear, 

concern, or pressure to do a good job for the workers. This entrenchment also means that 

unions can spend dues money however they feel necessary, and support both political and 

social agendas with a workers dues money without getting prior approval. 

Congress has granted Labor Unions extraordinary powers over individual worker rights, allowing 

them to become entrenched in companies without ever giving the workers a chance to vote if 

they want representation. That fact negatively affects union responsiveness to member 

concerns, and allows absolute power over workers in a collective bargaining unit (cba). 

Lord Acton once said: 

"Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely" 

In comparison, consider this: The members of this committee are representatives of your 

respective districts, but your citizens are granted the ability to vote every 2 years whether they 

want you to represent them. Perhaps as elected officials, you would enjoy not ever having to 

run for re-election. But I believe you would all agree that periodic elections are necessary to 

establish the wishes of your constituency. 

Workers should be able to expect no less. Union workers, simply wanting to pursue their 

happiness by getting a job, do not have that ability. They are forced, as a condition of 

employment, to accept union representation. Common sense labor reform can grant voting 

rights to workers while giving unions tools necessary to move into the 21st century. 

For the sake of union survivability, I ask that you consider common-sense labor reform. HR 

2723 includes eight key provisions that benefit workers. Three of which (Secret Ballot Elections, 

Political Protection, and Recertification Elections) are discussed in this testimony. 

Unlike what some may say, updating labor law to reflect the 21st century is not anti-union. 

Granting workers additional rights, freedoms and protections is always first and foremost, proworker. If any reform is beneficial to workers but is disliked by union executives, you must 

question the sincerity of those officials. Periodic recertification elections are crucial to regaining 

the trust between workers and their union leadership. Political Protection for workers removes 

potential violations of the 1st amendment, and Secret Ballot Elections ensures workers are 

voting their true intentions. 

Recent union corruption cases in the national media, and big losses in organizing drives show 

that trust between many workers and union officials are at an all-time low. 

If you are pro-union, you must be willing to consider necessary steps to ensure unions grow and 

succeed in the 21st century. Union officials are either unable or unwilling to do it themselves. 

Whether it is engaging in and spending dues on partisan politics, pushing a divisive social 

agenda, wanting to avoid a secret ballot election, or changing their business plan to succeed, 

union executives remain stalwart against modern, necessary change. 
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Simply put, unions exist in a 1930's business model and show no signs of shifting to protect 

their longevity. When entrenched in a business model that has force and compulsion at its core, 

union officials unfortunately will fight to keep their absolute power instead of competing in a 

modern organizing model. 

That decision will spell the doom of the US Labor movement. 

The latest data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the private sector 2017 Union 

Membership Rate of 6.5% continues in historically low territory2. Obviously to any non-biased 

observer, change is necessary for unionism in America. Union officials do not want to see 

change. After all; they currently have a pretty easy deal. Workers, however, are different, and 

they want their unions held accountable. Strengthening unions for the 21 '' century will take 

some work- but easy decisions when you have the facts before you. 

The Problem 

Let's take a look at three issues that desperately need labor reform in order to protect the rights, 

freedoms, and protections of union workers across the country: Secret Ballot Elections, 

Recertification Elections, and Union political spending. 

Issue #1 - Secret Ballot Elections v Card Check 

Current NLRB procedure allows for union officials to organize a "Card Check" campaign, where 

they physically walk up to a worker and ask that worker to sign a card affirming that they want 

union representation. If the organizers are successful at getting 50% +1 of the bargaining unit 

to sign a card, they can then go to the employer and skip a secret ballot election. 

Union organizers will claim that an NLRB sanctioned election may be "coercive" and only having 

the ability to sign a card in front of a union organizer does the worker have the ability to choose 

freely. 3 

This whole notion of Card Check is frightening for workers in a collective bargaining unit that is 

being organized. Outside of the "insiders" who are actively working with union organizers, Card 

Check is daunting and intimidating, leading to fearful confrontations between a worker and an 

organizer. Most workers simply want to do their job and go home to their families. Card check 

throws an unwanted physical confrontation into their work day that can cause unwanted stress. 

As a worker surrounded by a union atmosphere, I can testify that the idea of a card check 

campaign would leave even me with worry and fright. Just imagine a union organizer 

approaching you at work, as you walk out the door to the parking lot, or even knocking at the 

door at your home. Even if the organizer does not use coercive speech or intimidation tactics, 

the psychological pressure on a worker is enough to force a rash and/or an ill-informed decision. 

Only the sanctioned and peaceful privacy of an NLRB secret ballot election can ensure that the 

voter is voting his/her conscience. 

2 https:l/www.b!s.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm 

3 https:llwww.heritage.org/jobs-and-!abor/report/how-union-card-checks-block~workers-free-choice 
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NLRB rules allow many more privileges to union organizers, and many more restrictions on 

employers during a union election. Union organizers are not held to the same restrictions that 

employers must follow when speaking to workers. In fact, union organizers can literally promise 

the moon to workers without any fear of reprisal from the NLRB. The union has a strong, 

financial desire for an outcome that favors the union's bottom-line. Thus enormous pressure is 

applied for the union to win that election, and that pressure trickles-down to organizers who are 

the "boots on the ground." 

Stories abound in the media of both intimidation and false statements by union organizers of 

what authorization cards really are and what they represent. 4 

But even former union organizers testifying in front of this very committee have admitted the 

same. Jen Jason, a former Unite-here union organizer testified in front of this very committee 

on February 8, 20075 and said: 

"We rarely showed workers what an actual union contract looked like because we knew that it wouldn't necessarily 

reflect what a worker would want to see. We were trained to avoid topics such as dues increases, strike histories, etc. 

and to constantly move the worker back to what the organizer identified as his or her "issues" during the first part of 

the house call. " 

Clearly, Card Check can negatively influence, subvert, and circumvent a workers true voting 

wishes. 

But we have an answer. A solution that is so obvious that this argument should never be 

necessary. Any organizing drive should be required to have a secret ballot election. Workers 

will feel no intimidation, no fear for voting against the union, or conversely; no fear for voting for 

the union. By communicating to workers beforehand that no one will ever know how they voted, 

workers will be free to express their will- and not the will of a towering presence in front of them 

holding forth a card. 

lssue#2 - Union Recertification Elections 

In my summary testimony, I told my family history in Southeast Michigan and our migration from 

the Tennessee area during the 1950's. My father, along with 2 of his siblings moved to 

Michigan because of the promise of a better life. While my father ultimately landed a job at Ford 

Motor Company at the plant in Monroe, Mi., his sister ended up at the Ford Rawsonville Plant 

(which happens to be where I currently work) in Ypsilanti, Mi., and his brother at the Ford plant 

in Sandusky, Oh. In addition I have another uncle who worked for Ford at the Dearborn Rouge 

facility. 

My family has a long and loyal history with Ford Motor Company. We have all benefited greatly 

and have raised our families for four generations now in Southeast Michigan. 

None of us however have ever once been afforded the opportunity to vote if we wanted to be 

unionized. We were all forced to accept a grandfathered union that has been entrenched in the 

auto industry since most of us were even born. 

4 https://www.redstate.com/diary/laborunionreport/2012/02/24/seiu-organizing-tactics-include-intimidation-and-lying-to-workerscompany-alleges/ 

5 https:/lwww.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/how-union-card-checks-block-workers-free-choice 
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But it's not just my family that can make that claim. Millions of union workers can claim that they 

also never had the opportunity to vote in a union election. Like us, they were forced to accept 

union representation as a condition of employment, even when many of them have moral 

objections against it. 

Shockingly, a 2016 study shows just how widespread this is.6 94% of union workers in the 

country never had an opportunity to vote for a union. In the study, James Sherk from the 

Heritage Foundation points out that: "The preamble to the NLRA declares its goal as "protecting 

the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 

representatives of their own choosing." Yet most union workers never designated a 

representative of their own choosing since the union already existed long before they were 

hired. 

The chart7 below shows the study's findings: 

Only 6 Percent of Workers 

Voted for Their Union 

SMILUON Wor~('t',I('Jl'f!>l'11tf.'il 

bV\l'liOn~ 

Unions are existing based on votes from people who lived generations ago, not based on the 

current workforce. 

Unions will claim that workers should be forced to pay for their services, because they benefit 

from their hard work- but it is work that is forced upon the workers in the first place. Even in 

Right to Work states where workers can withdraw their union membership and stop paying 

dues, they are still forced to accept union representation because of the union voluntarily 

negotiating to be the exclusive representation agent of all workers in a bargaining unit. 

6 https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/unelected-representatives-94-percent-union-members-never-voted-union 

7 1bid. 
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While union officials will shamefully call any worker withdrawing their membership a "free-rider" 

or even "free-loader," the conveniently forget to admit that they force those workers to accept 

their representation, thus the worker has no other option if they want to stay employed and 

provide for their family. They are actually a "forced-rider." 

Outside of the UAW, other unions have also been rooted in their individual industries as long or 

even longer. Generations of American families are born, live, and die as the entrenched union 

continues collecting dues. Millions of workers are forced into union representation based on the 

votes of people they have never known. 

In addition to their dependent nature, there are additional problems with unions never having to 

fear being removed. One of which is the fact that without competition, or the worry of being 

removed, unions have no incentive to work hard and do a good job for their workers. 

Politicians rely on the votes from their constituents, which encourages them to do a good job. 

Regular elections help keep politicians honest and answerable to the ones they represent. 

Unions on the other hand have no worries, no concern that there are any consequences to 

doing a poor job. 

Critics will argue that there are steps in place for workers to remove an unsatisfactory union. 

While legally true, the reality is that it is extraordinarily difficult to remove a union from a 

workplace. Worker's interested in starting a decertification drive will face threats, intimidation by 

union officials as well as other workers, and have his/her own dues money used to fight against 

it. 

Considering unions collect billions of dollars every year in union dues, spending millions of 

workers dues money to squash any uprising is a small investment for a union. 

Because of a union's absolute power and entrenchment in a workplace, union workers are 

simply at an extreme disadvantage to ever getting rid of a non-performing union. It is almost as 

if the National Labor Relations Act was written in 1935 to strip all rights from individual workers 

in favor of privileges granted to the union itself. 

Once again, the answer to this issue should be self-explanatory. Since unions never have to 

justify their existence to the workforce, a regular recertification is critical to protecting worker 

rights. This action would serve to: 

1. Hold union executives answerable and accountable to the membership 

2. Guarantee a responsible and engaged union 

3. Empower workers to choose other options 

4. Inject free-market principles into a 1930's compulsory business model 

5. Increase trust between workers and union officials 

6. Allow the possibility of an outside, more worker-centric union to make their "pitch." 

7. Secret ballot recertification elections will help ease anxiety, stress, and ensure that a 

worker's true feelings on any union representation is protected 

In the end, union recertification is one of the most worker-friendly labor reforms that I or any 

other union represented worker could ask for. An argument against recertification is an 

argument against worker rights in favor of union privilege. 
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Issue #3- Using dues for Political Spending/Opt-out 

Unions spend money on politics. All the time. Most of that spending that is collected from 

workers is spent on an agenda that many of those workers either find disagreeable, insulting, 

and in many cases, abhorrent. 

Unions will claim it is against the law for them to use union dues on politics, but that is a 

misinterpretation at best. While true that unions cannot take union dues and give directly to a 

candidate's campaign funds, union still engage in political and social activity daily. 

Currently, labor law allows unions to deduct money for supporting political campaigns from an 

employee's paycheck without obtaining prior approval. Only by following the often onerous 

procedure to demand a refund of partial dues or by resigning from a union can employees 

guarantee that their money will not support candidates or a political party. The process is often 

overly complicated and rife with intimidation. By requiring that union members opt-in rather than 

having to pursue a refund of dues, employee rights will be better protected. 8 

Let's first look at the staggering amounts that unions claim they spend on politics, and then look 

at the real story. 

The National Institute for Labor Relations Research (NILRR) reports that for the 2016 Election 

Cycle, unions stated on their federal LM-2 reports that they spent over $1.7 billion in politics. 9 

The figures above (as noted by the NILRR), do not reflect spending by unions that exclusively 

"represent" state and local government employees which are not covered by United States 

Department of Labor (USDOL) disclosures reports. Therefore these numbers exclude most of 

the state and municipal employee unions. 10 

But it doesn't just stop at a union's self-policing and reporting on political spending. Much of a 

union's political activity is not reported because union executives will call that activity something 

ambiguous or classify it something else entirely. "Education" or "organizing activity" have been 

used in the past, as well as "gifts, grants, or donations," which will include donations to flagrantly 

progressive, left-wing organizations that many workers would find extremely offensive (Planned 

Parenthood, for example). 

8 http://employeerlghtsact.com/ 

9 http://www.nilrr .org/2017/04/17 /2016-electionwcycle~big~labor-exceeds-1 ~ 7 -billion*political-spending/ 

10 Ibid. 
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Most union workers would have no problem paying for quality representation and for collective 

bargaining services. However unions spend, donate, and gift such large payments to advocacy 

groups that many workers would be shocked to discover what their money is used for. With the 

rise of common internet access many workers are now able to find the truth. 

But it doesn't end there. 

All across America, union halls become political billboards with campaign signs, and yet none of 

the expenses of those union halls (taxes, utilities, salaries of workers) are ever considered of a 

"political" nature. Anytime a union hall places a campaign sign in their yard, the property and 

building become a political tool. None of those expenses are ever recorded as political. 

Many newsletters to workers include stories that demonize the Republican Party and praise the 

Democrat Party. However if the newsletter in not printed for the sole-purpose of a political 

mailing, the expenses are rarely- if ever- recorded as political. They may be deemed 

"educational." 

Many unions may encourage voter registration, but not publicly disclose any preference for 

candidates so the entire activity will be considered "community involvement" However most -if 

not all -of that activity only takes place in heavily Democrat areas. 

Many unions are involved in 'Worker Centers" and supporting non-unionized workers to fight 

politicians for political issues. Much of that activity is not recorded as political, but as ambiguous 

"organizing expenses." 

In 2018, the question no longer is if unions spend a lot of money on politics- both reported and 

unreported. Yes; of course they do, we all know it The real question is if workers who disagree 

with a unions political and social activity are being protected from forced speech? Are their 1 '' 

amendment rights to not associate with a group being protected? 

That, is where we must focus on, and that is what we must attain in any civilized society. 

A critical way to protect workers from forced political contributions is to simply ask them first if 

they would like their money involved, before they are forced to fund it 

The default position for any worker in a union shop should be that they do not have to fund any 

ideological, political, or social activity the union engages in. Unions should be required to 

receive an "Opt-in" for the political spending, as opposed to the current, and burdensome "Optout" that unions require. 

Knox v. SEIU 

In 2012, the US Supreme Court heard a case entitled Knox v. SEIU The case stemmed from a 

California case where the public-sector SEIU was charging non-members an additional fee than 

their agency fees already proposed by a previous Hudson Notice (the required document 

informing non-members how much the union anticipated on non-essential spending (politics)). 

Knox claimed that the SEIU could not force any agency-fee payer to pay additional fees based 

on an anticipated increase in political spending. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found in favor of 

Knox. 

While the case is based on public-sector unions, the Majority Opinion written by Supreme Court 

Justice Alito bears significant study for our hearing. 
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On page 9 of the majority opinion, Justice Alita builds his opinion by stating: 11 

The First Amendment protects "the decision of both what to say and what not to say" (emphasis deleted)). And the 

ability of like-minded individuals to associate for the purpose of expressing commonly held views may not be 

curtailed. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 623 (1984) ("Freedom of association . .. plainly 

presupposes a freedom not to associate'} 

Justice Alita makes the clear claim that just because someone is forced as a condition of 

employment to join a union, they are not forced to associate with the speech of the group. 

On page 11 of the opinion, Alita continues to make his argument that forcing an employee to 

"Opt-out" of political spending creates a "boon" for the union, and one that places a "burden" on 

the union represented worker: 

Similarly, requiring objecting nonmembers to opt out of paying the nonchargeable portion of union dues-as opposed 

to exempting them from making such payments unless they opt in-represents a remarkable boon for unions. Courts 

"do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 

Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U S. 666, 682 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once it is recognized, 

as our cases have, that a nonmember cannot be forced to fund a union's political or ideological activities, what is the 

justification for putting the burden on the nonmember to opt out of making such a payment? 

Once again, Alita clearly differentiates the Opt-in versus the Opt-out scenario, and seems to be 

leaning in favor of an Opt-in program for unions. 

On page 13, Alita refers to a previous case, making the claim that constitutional rights in these 

matters lie not with unions, and instead their power to collect fees is authorized by "legislative 

grace." 

As we noted in Davenport, "unions have no constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees." 551 U 

S., at 185. A union's "collection of fees from nonmembers is authorized by an act of legislative grace," 

On page 20, Alita acknowledges that what the union calls "chargeable expenses" is so 

"expansive" that you can't rely on it: 

First, the SEIU's understanding of the breadth of chargeable expenses is so expansive that it is hard to place much 

reliance on its statistics. In its brief, the SE/U argues broadly that all funds spent on "lobbying ... the electorate" are 

chargeable. See id., at 51. But "lobbying. the electorate" is nothing but another term for supporting political causes 

and candidates, and we have never held that the First Amendment permits a union to compel nonmembers to 

support such political activities. 

In the above scenario, the union did not believe that lobbying was considered political, and 

hence not a reportable expense. This is why workers can never be assured that the dues they 

are paying are not political. 

On page 21, Alito explains that unions have no constitutional rights: 

Thus, if unconsenting nonmembers pay too much, their First Amendment rights are infringed. On the other hand, if 

unconsenting nonmembers pay less than their proportionate share, no constitutional right of the union is violated 

because the union has no constitutional right to receive any payment from these employees. 

Again, I must make it clear that we are talking about the public-sector and about agency-fee 

members, but Alita's words give us a clear direction of how to proceed. 

" https:l!www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1121 c4d6.pdf 
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On page 21 & 22, Alito gets to the heart of the matter: 

As we have noted, by allowing unions to collect any fees from nonmembers and by permitting unions to use opt-out 

rather than opt-in schemes when annual dues are billed, our cases have substantially impinged upon the First 

Amendment rights of nonmembers. 

When taking the entire majority opinion of Knox v. SEIU and applying the same principles 

discussed here, it is clear that: 

1. Workers have the Freedom of Association- and the Freedom to Not Associate 

2. A unions ability to collect dues is not a right, but granted through "legislative grace," 

while a worker's 1st amendment rights can be impinged in an "Opt out" situation 

3. Unions employing an "Opt-out" procedure for their reported political spending (which 

does not cover all political spending) is a boon for the union and a burden for the worker 

4. Even the Supreme Court realized that union officials were not reporting all political 

activity as such 

5. Opt-out programs rather than Opt-in for political spending creates a substantial 

impingement upon the 1•' amendment rights of workers. 

The Solution 

As someone who has traveled around the country speaking and fighting for 21 81 century labor 

reforms, I became aware in 2013 of a proposed piece of legislation that has grabbed hold of 

both my heart and my mind. It is called the Employee Rights Act (HR 2723). 

The ERA fixes the issues above and helps bring unions closer to the 21st century. It empowers 

workers with additional rights, freedoms, and protections that can never be logically claimed as 

"anti-union." The passage of this piece of legislation will return some of a union worker's power 

that a labor union has fed from since the day they hired in. The passage of this piece of 

legislation will give both workers and unions the tools necessary for a mutually trustworthy and 

lengthy relationship into the future. 

Common sense labor reform guaranteeing Secret Ballot elections, periodic recertification 

elections, and political protection from forced speech will always be a positive, necessary step 

to achieving labor peace between the rank-and-file, and union officials. 

Conclusion 

Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, unions were given broad powers 

that stripped individual workers of their rights in favor of union privilege (or as Justice AI ito called 

it, "Legislative Grace"). Some corrections have been made in decades past, but additional labor 

reforms are needed to protect workers and ensure union longevity and success in the 21st 

century. 

Unions have changed in the wrong direction not updated correctly with the times. I consider 

myself to be pro-union, but in the context of what unions were created to do, not what they have 

become. Many unions today seem to be more interested in furthering their political and social 

causes than in their created purpose of representing workers. 
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For a long time, union workers like me have looked for protections from the abuses of the very 

unions pledged to protect us. We know and understand that the unions unwilling to change into 

a 21'" century business model will fade away over the next few decades. They cannot continue 

their archaic operations based in compulsion and force. Workers are wise and more media 

savvy than ever before, and able to find out the truth of union intolerance. 

Passage of common sense labor reform goes a long way to protecting workers while also 

providing the tools necessary for unions to continue far into the future. 

As a union worker who will be affected by this legislation, I ask you to consider labor reform 

legislation like the Employee Rights Act whether you are a Republican or Democrat. 

Thank you for hearing my testimony today. 

Terry Bowman 

April26'h, 2018 
82 

Chairman WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Bowman, and thanks to 

each of the panel for your testimony and spending time with us. 

And now I recognize the chairwoman of the full Committee, Dr. 

Foxx from North Carolina. 

Mrs. FOXX. Thank you again, Chairman Walberg. 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, or LMRDA, requires labor unions to disclose certain financial information. Often unionized workers are unaware of the 

financial dealings of their union without the important disclosures 

required under the LMRDA. 

If organizations known as worker centers are allowed to ignore 

the requirements of the LMRDA, could this create a situation 

where worker centers take advantage of workers? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Thank you, Chairwoman Foxx, for that very 

interesting question. I think it is—the LMRDA offers organizational accountability for members of labor organizations. Organizational accountability comes in the form of the worker bill of rights, 

which gives workers the right to—certain rights vis-a-vis the labor 

organizations that represent them. 

It also gives workers the right to have access to financial information related to how the labor organization is spending its money. 

And I think, as commented by Mr. Bowman in his testimony, political contributions and things of that nature are certainly of interest 

to some members, including Mr. Bowman, and I think that is a 

very critical thing for—that the LMRDA offers. 

I also would submit that there is organizational accountability. 

And I think when you come to the concept of worker centers, if a 

worker center is going to evolve into a role where it in fact seeks 

to engage an employer over wages, hours, and terms and conditions 

of employment, then those workers, those members, should have 

some say in that. And that is the democratic principle—those are 

the democratic principles that were established by the LMRDA, 

meaning that labor organizations must have elected officials, just 

as the National Labor Relations Act offers a democratic institution 

to enable workers to decide, by majority vote, whether or not they 

wish to have a labor organization serve as their exclusive representative. 

So it is beyond the financial accountability. I think it is—a critical component of this is if a worker center is going to engage an 

employer and serve in a role as an advocate for workers in a workplace as it relates to a particular employer, then that organizational accountability is critical. 

Mrs. FOXX. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Jackson, thank you for telling us your story. As you explained, when the two parties involved arguing before the NLRB 

are the employer and the union, you and your fellow employees are 

not even considered a party. Do you believe the National Labor Relations Act gives employees enough of a voice in this process? And 

in your experience, are most employees aware of their right to decertify under the National Labor Relations Act? 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Chairman Foxx, or Committee Member 

Foxx, I am sorry—a little nervous. 

The NLRA, I don’t believe, is—it is—in our workplace it is more 

geared towards unionization, or becoming union members, or union 

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83 

protectionism, not so much my choice for—not having to join, not 

having to support or removing myself as a union member. 

So no, I think it needs to go farther, it needs to be more clear, 

it needs to be more balanced. 

Mrs. FOXX. Thank you very much. And please don’t be nervous 

with us. 

Mr. Bowman, you spoke about the importance of having secret 

ballot elections for union recognition, instead of a card check campaign. It is my understanding card check campaigns can only be 

carried out if an employer agrees to it. Do you think this creates 

an incentive where an employer and union can decide to agree to 

a deal over card check recognition at the expense of employees? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, that is interesting, isn’t it? Because I—as 

workers, we would never know the actual case of what goes on behind closed doors. And, in my opinion, I think it is an example of 

why there should never be a case in a union organizing election 

why workers do not have a secret ballot election. We don’t know. 

Perhaps it is honest, perhaps it is dishonest. We will never have 

any idea, one way or the other. 

What I do know is, in my 21 years, I have never had the opportunity to vote in a union election, and so I don’t have that personal 

experience. But having the ability regardless of the situation to always have a secret ballot election almost seems germane to humanity. It seems a right that every worker should have, no matter the 

situation involved. 

Mrs. FOXX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentlelady, and now I recognize 

the gentleman from Virginia, the ranking member of the full Committee, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, there is an important issue that is not being addressed at 

this hearing today, and that is the conflict of interest of the National Labor Relations Board. It is not on the agenda today, although I have asked for a hearing. 

On February the 15th, the inspector general for the NLRB issued 

a seven-day letter which reported a serious and flagrant problem 

and/or deficiency in the board’s administration of its deliberative 

process in the National Labor Relations Act with respect to deliberations of a particular matter. That matter was NLRB board 

member William Emanuel’s participation in the Hy-Brand decision, 

which overruled the board’s joint employment decision in Browning-Ferris. 

Mr. Emanuel’s former law firm represented one of the parties in 

Browning-Ferris, and the IG’s letter concluded that the Hy-Brand 

and Browning-Ferris are the same ‘‘particular matter involving 

specific parties,’’ which implicated a conflict of interest. 

On February 21st an NLRB ethics official also agreed with the 

IG’s opinion in these two matters, and in that memo she wrote, 

‘‘Pages 21–48 from the dissent in Browning-Ferris are reproduced 

almost word-for-word on pages 3–30 of the Hy-Brand majority decision. Thus, 27 of the 35 pages that constitute the decision of HyBrand majority were essentially lifted, with little or no modification, directly from the Browning-Ferris dissent.’’ 

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84 

This cut-and-paste job was an effort to use an unrelated matter 

to overturn a joint employer precedent, was rushed, it appears, because the former chairman’s term was expired—was expiring, and 

he wanted to ensure his earlier dissent became the majority opinion. 

Mr. Chairman, I wrote the Chair requesting a hearing with the 

inspector general and board members to explore what went wrong 

and how to correct it. I have received no reply. So, Mr. Chairman, 

I would ask whether you would commit to holding a hearing on 

this matter in the foreseeable future, and I will yield. 

Chairman WALBERG. I appreciate the request, and we will take 

it under advisement and consider that and get back with you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert my 

letter of February 23rd to the Chair and the NLRB’s ethics official’s memos of February 21st and March 27th of this year into the 

record. 

Chairman WALBERG. Without objection, and hearing none, it will 

be inserted. 

[The information follows:] 

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COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION 

AND THE WORKFORCE 

U,S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

2H6 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6100 

February 23, 2018 

The Honorable Virginia Foxx 

Chairwoman 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

2176 Raybum House Office Building 

Washington,D,C, 20515 

Dear Chairwoman Foxx: 

I write to request a hearing before the House Education and the Workforce Committee regarding 

the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) Inspector General's seven-day letter sent to the 

Committee leadership notifying us of"a serious and flagrant problem and/or deficiency in the 

Board's administration of its deliberative process and the National Labor Relations Act with 

respect to the deliberation of a particular matter,"1 The Inspector General's seven-day letter 

concems whether Board Member William Emanuel should have recused himself from 

participating in fly-Brand Industrial Contractors ("Hy-Brancf'),Z which overruled the Board's 

previous decision in Browning Ferris Industries ("BFF'). 3 The BFI decision concemed the 

question of whether Browning Ferris Industries, which operated a municipal recycling facility, 

was a joint employer of the employees it hired through the subcontractor Leadpoint Business 

Services. Member Emanuel's fonner law finn, Littler Mendelson P.C., represents Leadpoint 

Business Services, one of the parties in the BFI case. 

As you know, per House Rule X, our Committee has jurisdiction over "labor generally"4 and 

Rule 2 of the Committee on Education and the Workforce specifically outlines our jurisdiction 

over "(a]ll matters dealing with relationships between employers and employees, including but 

not limited to the National Labor Relations Act."5 Furthermore, the Committee's adopted 

' Section 5(d) of the Inspector General Act provides: "Each Inspector General shall report immediately to the head 

of the establishment involved whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant 

problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of such establislunent. 

The head of the establishment shall transmit any such report to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of 

Congress within seven calendar days, together with a report by the head of the establishment containing any 

comments such head deems appropriate,'' 2 365 NLRB No. !56 (2017). 3 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015). 4 Rules of the House of Representatives for the I 15'h Congress, 

https: 1'rulcs,house. govlsitesirepublicans,rules.housc.govitilesl I 1 5/PDFIHouse-Rules-115 .pdf 

' Rules of the Committee on Education and the Workforce for the 115'" Congress, 

httJ2;<:1~\Y,~v,gpg ,gQyifcimi pkgiC P R T -U 5HPR T24 ;58 l/.mitZC!'B.UJ2l!!' RT24~~p.dJ 
86 

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The Honorable Virginia Foxx 

February 23, 2018 

Page 2 

oversight and investigative plan for the 115'11 Congress explicitly states that we will "conduct 

oversight and investigations, as appropriate, to ensure employee and employer rights under the 

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are protected and applied consistently and without bias."6 

ln the description of its oversight plan, the Committee states it will provide "particular scmtiny 

to the Board's ... decisions affecting joint-employer standards ... under the NLRA."7 

In his letter to the oversight committees, the Inspector General found the deliberations in HyBrand to be so intertwined with those of BFI that they constituted the same proceeding8 Member 

Emanuel's panicipation was therefore subject to the President's ethics pledge in Executive Order 

13770, which prevents him from participating in a case where Littler Mendelson represents a 

party. Because Hy-Brand and BFI are now tainted by Member Emanuel's conflict of interest, the 

Inspector General found that ''the whole of the Board's deliberative process is called into 

question" and that Member Emanuel's participation in Hy-Brrmd "calls into question the validity 

of that decision." 

The Inspector General's findings to date are especially disturbing for an agency designed to be a 

neutral adjudicator. Committee Democrats have inquired into the basis for Member Emanuel's 

participation in Hy-Brand, but responses to date have been unsatisfactory. To that end, I 

respectfully ask that you schedule a hearing to secure answers and steps the NLRB has taken in 

light of the Inspector General's findings of this "serious and Hagrant problem and/or deficiency," 

and what steps the Board will take to restore the public's confidence. 

Madame Chair, it is extremely rare for an Inspector General to issue a seven-day letter. The last 

time the NLRB's Inspector General issued one was in 1999, and few have been issued by other 

agencies' Inspectors General. A Committee hearing with the Inspector General and Members of 

the Board is necessary for Congress to explore what has gone wrong and how to correct it 

Sincerely, 

Ranking Member 

''Oversight and Investigation Plan of the Committee on Education and the Workforce, adopted January 24, 2017, 

transmitted to the Committee on and Government Reform, 

'Citing Executive Order 13770, the Inspector General concluded that f(l'-Brand and BFI constitute the "same 

'particular matter involving specific parties.'" fn supporting this finding. the Inspector Genera! detailed how the 

consolidation of f(v-Brand into l!Ff "occurred at the inception of the lfy,lJrand deliberations," how the f(y-Brand 

decision extensively relied on the facts in BFI that were not before the Board in !ly-/3rand, and how the l~v-Brand 

even "acknowledge[ d) that the two deliberative processes are consolidated." 
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TO: 

FROM: 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

National Labor Relations Board 

Memorandum 

Chairman Kaplan 

Member Pearce 

Member McFerran 

Lori Ketcham 

Associate General Counsel, Ethics 

Designated Agency Ethics Official 

Jamal M. Allen 

Special Ethics Counsel 

Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official 

SURJECT: Recommended Action Plan Respecting the Board's Adjudication ofHy-Brand Industrial 

Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 (2017) 

DATE: February 21,2018 

This memo is in response to the Inspector General's (!G) recommendation for corrective 

action with respect to the issues raised in the IG Report dated February 9, 2018 regarding alleged 

deficiencies in the Board's administration of its deliberative process in a particular matter. 1 The 

IG found that, due to the manner in which the Board majority adjudicated Hy-Brand Industrial 

Contractors. Ltd., 365 NLRB No. l 56 (20 17), it had effectively become the same "particular 

matter involving specific parties1

' as Browning-Ferris Industries of California Inc. d/b/a BFI 

Newby Island Recyclery, 362 NLRB No. 186 (20 15). Based on the totality of the specific facts 

described in his report, the IG determined that Member Emanuel violated Par. 6 of the Trump 

Ethics Pledge (Ethics Pledge) which prohibits him from participating in any "particular matter 

involving specific parties that is directly and substantially related to my former employer or 

former clients," because his former law firm, Littler Mendelson, P.C., represents a party in 

Browning-Ferris. Thus, the IG concluded that Member Emanuel "should have been recused 

1 The subject line of the IG Report is as fOllows: "'Notification of a Serious and Flagrant Problem and/or Deficiency 

in the Board's Administration of its Deliberative Process and the National Labor Relations Act with Respect to the 

Deliberation of a Particular Matter." On February 15, 2018, the Board forwarded a copy of the IG Report to 

Congress with a cover letter stating that it is "evaluating the Inspector General's findings, considering appropriate 

actions related to Hy~Brand Industrial Contractors Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 (2017), and reviewing current 

procedures for highlighting and addressing recusa! issues with the assistance of the Board's Designated Agency 

Ethics Official." 
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from participation in deliberations leading to the decision to overtt1111 Browning-Ferris." (IG at 

4). 

To address this problem, the IG recommended the following corrective action: 

Member Emanuel's pa11icipation in the Hy-Brand decision, when he otherwise 

should have been recused as outlined above, calls into question the validity of that 

decision and the confidence that the Board is performing its statutory duties. I 

recommend that the Board consult with the Designated Agency Ethics Official to 

detetmine the appropriate action to take to resolve that issue and restore 

confidence in the Board's deliberative process: and 

Member Emanuel's patticipation in the Hv-Br(ll/d decision demonstrates that the 

Board's cmrent practice of highlighting and addressing recusal issues should be 

reviewed to detennine if it is adequate to protect the Board's deliberative process 

tiom actual cont1icts of interest and the appearance of such. I recommend that the 

Board consult with the Designated Agency Ethics Official to conduct that review 

and resolve any issues. (IG at 5). 

2 
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Procedural History of Browning Ferris 

The case 01~ginated with the Board's processing of a representation petition filed in 

Region 32 by the Sanitmy Tmck Drivers and Helpers Local 350, h1temational Brotherhood of 

Teamsters (the Union) seeking to represent a llllit of approxinllltely 120 workers at a recycling 

facility operated by Browuing-Fenis Industries of Califomia (BFI).' l11e petitioned-for 

employees were provided by Leadpoint Business Services (Leadpoint), a supplier employer, to 

BFI, the user employer. The Union alleged that BFI and Leadpoint were joint employers for the 

petitioned-tor employees. Both Leadpoint and BFI argued that Leadpoint was the sole employer. 

Relevant here, Leadpoint was represented by Littler Mendelson, Member Emanuel's f01mer 

finn. 

4 Case No. 32-RC-109684 was filed on July 22. 2013. 

3 
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The Region issued a Decision and Direction of Election (DDE) on August 16. 2013 

finding that "Leadpoint [is] the sole employer of the employees in question at BFI's Facility and 

that [the Union's J arguments for joint employer status between BFI and Leadpoint are 

tmconvincing." Id. at pg. 19. Subsequently. on September 3. 2013. the Union filed a Request for 

Review of the DDE alleging that the Region misapplied the existing Board precedent, and in the 

altemative. that the Board should reconsider the standard for detennining joint employer status. 

Littler. on behalf of Leadpoint. filed an Opposition to the Request for Review on September I 0. 

2013 stating that the DDE cotTectly concluded that Leadpoin! was the sole employer. On Aptil 

30. 2014. the Board granted the Union's Request for Review.' Thereafter, on May 12. 2014. the 

Board issued a Notice and Invitation to File Briefs soliciting comments from the pa11ies. and 

interested amici. respecting the following: (1) "whether tmder the Board's current joint-employer 

standard" Leadpoint was the "sole employer of the petitioned-for employees" in the mlit; (2) 

whether the "Board [should] adhere to its existing joint-employer standard or adopt a new 

standard" and: (3) "if the Board adopts a new standard for detenllining joint-employer status. 

what should that standard be." 

Numerous panies tiled amici briefs in response to the Board's invitation. Littler filed 

briefs on June 26 and July I 0, 2014 arguing that Leadpoint alone was the employer of the 

employees and that the Board did not need to revisit its fonnula for determining joint employer 

status. Tile Board issued its Decision and Order in Browning-Fenis on August 27. 2015. in 

which it held that Leadpoint and BFI were joint employers under the Act. In reaching this 

decision. the Board majority in Browning-Fenis adopted a new joint employer standard that no 

longer required a showing that a putative joint employer actually exercised direct and immediate 

control over workers • terms and conditions of employment, but that the mere existence of 

reserved joint control would suffice. TI1en-Member Miscimarra and then-Member Jolmson 

authored a 29-page dissent to the majority opinion. Consistent with the position advocated in the 

briefs filed by Littler, the Browning-Fenis dissent argued that BFI and Leadpoint 

eullJHJvers and that the Board should not have altered its standard. 

A Board-conducted election was held on September 4. 2015 and a majority of the 

employees voted in favor of unionization. As a result. on September 14, 2015, the Union was 

cet1ifled as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees. 6 After the 

issuance of the cet1itication. BFI and Leadpoint refhsed to recognize the Union. Based on their 

refusal to bargain. the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge, and Region 32 subsequently 

issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing alleging that BFI and Leadpoiut violated Section 

5 In granting the Uniou's Request fOr ReYiew. the Board proYided notice of its intent to "'issue a subsequent notice 

establishing a schedule for the filing of briefs on· review and inviting ami ens briefs, to afford the patties and 

interested aullci the opporttullty to address issues raised in this case.'' 

6 The certificate of representation that issued in tllis case cet1ified the Union as the exclusive-collective bargaining 

representative of the following Utlit of employees: .. All full time and regular pat1-time employees employed by FRPII. LLC. d!b/af Leadpoint Business Services and Bro\\1Ung-Ferris Industries of Califonua. Inc .. d!bla Newby Island 

Recydery. joint employers. at the facility located at 160 I Dixon Lauding Rd .. Milpitas California: excluding 

employees cmTently covered by collecti\·e bargaining agreements. office clerical employees. guards. and supervisors 

as defined in the Act ... 

4 
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8(a)(5). Upon the filing of BPI's Answer admitting its refusal to bargain, and claiming 

the Board improperly certified the Union, the General Counsel moved for summary judgment 

consistent with the processing of a standard test of certification case. Following BPI's and 

Leadpoint's respective responses to an order to show cause, the Board granted summary 

judgment and found BFI and Leadpoint violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to 

recognize and bargain with the Union. 7 On January 20, 2016, BFI, through its legal 

representatives at the law firm of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of 

Appeals to review the Board's Order. Immediately thereafter the Board filed a cross-application 

for enforcement of its Decision and Order8 The case remained pending before the D.C. Circuit 

until late December of last year when it was remanded to the Board immediately following the 

Board's decision in Hy-Brand (see discussion below). 

Procedural History ofHy-Brand 

In Hy-Brand, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Robert Ringler found that Respondents 

Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, LTD and Brandt Construction, Co. violated Section 8(a)(l), as 

single employers and joint employers, b~ unlawfully discharging seven employees because they 

engaged in protected concerted activity. On January 9, 2017, the Respondents filed exceptions 

to the ALJD. Relevant here, one of the exceptions filed by the Respondents alleged that the ALJ 

erred in concluding that the Respondents "are single and joint employers, and are jointly and 

severally liable for the discharges." On January 23, 2017, the General Counsel filed crossexceptions to the ALJD. Neither the Respondents, nor the General Counsel, requested in their 

respective exceptions and supporting briefs that the Board re-consider its standard for 

determining joint employer status. 

As detailed in the lG Report, on October 18, 2017, then-Chairman Miscimarra, who was 

approaching the end of his term of office on December 16, 2017, sent an email message to thenMember Kaplan and Member Emanuel respecting Hy-Brand. The IG's summary of the 

correspondence states that Miscimarra's email included an attached decision 

for 

7 The Board's decision in the test of certification case is reported at 363 NLRB No. 95 (2016). 

g Leadpoint did not answer the Board's application for enforcement and no attorney filed a notice of appearance on 

Leadpoint's behalf. Consequently, Littler did not make an appearance on behalf of Leadpoint in the proceedings 

before the D.C. Circuit. 

9 Specifically, the ALJ found that the employees had engaged in a concerted work stoppage that constituted 

protected, concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act. 

5 
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Tite Board ultimately issued a 3-2 Decision and Order in Hy-Brand on December 14, 

2017. Titen-Chainnan Miscimana, then-Member Kaplan and Member Emanuel, the Hy-Brand 

majority, concluded that the pm1ies were in fact joint-employers; however, the decision went 

fimher and ovenuled the joint employer standard in Brownino:-Fenis. 10 A simple review of the 

Bom·d's respective decisions in Browning-Ferris and Hy-Brand illustrates the conclusion in the 

IG Report that the Board majmity simply made a "wholesale incorporation of the dissent in 

Browning-Penis into the Hv-Brand majotity decision." Id. at pg. 3. Specifically, the dissent in 

Browning-Penis appears on pages 21-50 of that Bom·d decision. The majority decision in fix: 

Brand is on pages 1-35 of that case. Pages 21-48 from the dissent in Browning-FetTis are 

reproduced. ahnost word-for-word, with minor non-substantive modifications, on pages 3-30 of 

the Hy-Brand majority decision. Thus. 27 out of the 35 pages that constitute the decision of the 

Hy-Brand majority were essentially lifted, with little or no modification, directly from 

Browning-Ferris. To illustrate the con11nonality between the Browning-Penis dissent and the 

Hy-Brand majmity opinion. we have included with this report a series of attachn1ents. 

Attaclunent "A" consists of the hem1 of the Browning-FetTis dissent authored by then-Member 

Miscimana and then-Member Jolmson. Attachment "B" consists of the majority decision in HvBrand authored by then-Chainuan Miscimana, then-Member Kaplan and Member Emanuel. 

Finally. Attachment "C" is the Hy-Brand majority's analysis of the specific facts and issues in 

Hv-Brand. A simple side-by-side comparison of Attaclunent "A'' to Attachment "B" reveals 

that. other thm1 inset1ing a few nonsubstantive revisions, the substantive analysis m1d arguments 

are exactly same. While the Hy-Brand majority incorporated 27 pages from the Browning-Penis 

dissent. which was focused on the facts presented and issues raised in that case, the majority 

devoted only tlvo paragraphs of its analysis to the specific facts and legal issues presented in fix: 

Brand, as evidenced by Attachment "C." 

Board Votes to Remand Browning-Ferris to the NLRB 

Also relevmlt to the tmique fact pattem here, Browning-Ferns, the lead case on the joint 

employer standm·d, was still a "live case" that was D.C. Circuit at the time 

a 

motton m reqnestmg the comt remand Browning-Fenis back to the Board. 

In snppot1 of remanding the case, the General Counsel noted that as a result of Hy-Brand, the 

10 "[W]e overrule Browning-Ferris." Hy-Brand. 365 NLRB No. !56. pg. 2 (2017). 

6 
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Board has "overruled its Browning-Ferris decision" and thus the remand of Browning-Ferris was 

warranted " so that the Board may reconsider the case in light of its current precedent established 

in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017)." By an order 

dated December 22, 2017, the D.C. Circuit granted the Agency's request. 11 

Charging Parties in Hy-Brand File a Motion with the Board for Reconsideration, Recusal, 

and to Strike 

On January II, 2018, the Charging Parties in Hy-Brand filed a Motion for 

Reconsideration with the Board. In addition to making substantive arguments about the standard 

for joint employer status, the Charging Parties set forth their objections to "the Board's use of the 

Respondent's affirmed unfair labor practice as a vehicle to overturn Browning-Ferris." (p. l ). 

The Charging Parties contend that if the Board had made the parties and the public aware that it 

was considering reversing significant precedent, it would have had the opportunity to move to 

recuse Member Emanuel due to his "clear conflict of interest in BFJ." (p. 2). Specifically, the 

Charging Parties assert that the decision in Hy-Brand "is no different than if Member Emanuel 

had directly participated in BFI where his former firm represents a party," and therefore, the 

government ethics rules bar him from participating in Hy-Brand's purported overruling of BFI as 

well as in any reconsideration of the case. (p. 12). According to the Charging Parties, Hy-Brand 

is "not a case where the Board simply disagrees with the legal standard applied in an earlier 

case" because the Hy-Brand decision "extensively discusses the facts in BY! and applies the law 

to those facts." (p. 13). The Motion requests that the Board reconsider the case; Member 

Emanuel recuse himself from participating in the reconsideration; the Board affirm the AU's 

decision on single-employer grounds; and the Board strike the reference to an analysis of joint 

employer status "as improper due to Member Emanuel's participation and as unnecessary dicta." 

The Ethics Pledge 

Executive Order 13770 requires any "covered appointee" to sign an Ethics Pledge that 

contains several commitments. An appointee who signs the Pledge can only participate in a 

matter that falls within the Pledge's restrictions by seeking a waiver from the President. 

Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the Pledge, Member Emanuel has agreed that he "will not for a period 

of2 years from the date of my appointment participate in any particular matter involving specific 

parties that is directly and substantially related to my former employer or former clients, 

including regulations and contracts." This paragraph, read together with the definitions of 

"former employer," "former client," and "directly and substantially related" set forth in 

Executive Order 13 770, prohibits his participation in a "particular matter involving specific 

11 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit's order states the following: "Upon consideration of the motion of the National 

Labor Relations Board for remand of the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of new Board precedent, it is 

ORDERED that the motion be granted and the case be remanded to the Board for further consideration in light of 

the Board's recent decision in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017)." On 

January 4, 2018. the Teamsters Union filed an Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Remanding Case to 

National Labor Relations Board requesting that the D.C. Circuit reconsider remanding the case. On February 2, 

2018, the D.C. Circuit denied the Intervenor's motion. 

7 
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parties" in which his former employer or his own former clients are a party or the representative 

of a party. 

~···~·l!l••••l!lll!l•ll!l'IGuidance issued by OGE explains that the 

prohibition on participation in matters involving former employers and former clients is intended 

to address those situations where a federal employee's "lingering affinity and mixed loyalties" 

could compromise his or her impartiality. See OGE, D0-09-011, pg. 5 (March 26, 2009). 12 The 

specific concern captured by the Pledge is that a reasonable person with knowledge of the 

relevant facts would be likely to question an appointee's impartiality in cases involving their 

former employer and/or their former clients upon leaving private practice and entering 

government service. In other words, a reasonable person would question the integrity of an 

agency's programs and operations if an appointee were to participate in maters encompassed by 

Par. 6 of the Pledge. For these reasons, the Pledge creates a "cooling off period" during which 

an appointee agrees to not participate in matters involving a former employer and/or former 

clients he provision 

has some overlap with the impartiality regulations in 5 C.F.R. Sec. 2635.502 of the Standards of 

Conduct that identify conflicts that arise when a person with whom an employee has a "covered 

relationship" is or represents a party to a matter. The Pledge extends the one-year recusal period 

in the Standards of Conduct to two years when the covered relationship involves a former 

employer or a former client. 

Although the above-cited definitions from the Executive Order appear to narrow the 

scope of Paragraph 6 and create a bright-line rule, we have learned in conversations with the 

Office of Government Ethics (OGE) that this provision in fact leaves room for interpretation by 

an individual agency, and that a violation may occur in a less straightforward scenario when the 

policies that underlie the provision have been implicated. 13 

Under the Ethics Pledge, Member Emanuel may not participate in Browning-Ferris, 

because Littler represents Leadpoint and there is an appearance concern that he cannot be a 

neutral adjudicator because of loyalty to his former employer. However, the decision that he 

adopted in Hv-Brand was taken wholesale from the dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris, and is 

thus based on internal Board deliberations in a case where Littler represented a party and 

submitted briefs. Further, because of the wholesale adoption of that opinion, Member Emanuel 

not only changed the joint employer standard to that which had been advanced by Littler, but 

included text from the pre-existing opinion applying that standard to the facts of BrowningFerris. Further, he then participated in a vote to ask the court to remand Browning-Ferris to the 

Board. 14 It is reasonable to conclude that by using Hy-Brand as a vehicle to affect a case from 

12 This guidance was issued to assist in interpreting the corresponding provision of the Obama Ethics Pledge, and 

states on its face that it is applicable to the Trump Ethics Pledge as well. 

14 We recognize that Littler did not file a notice of appearance before Jhe D.C. Circuit, and that the Board's vote to 

instruct the General Counsel to move the court to remand the case ultimately became "harmless error" because of 

the way the events unfolded. However, we rely on this conduct as part of the series of events that determines the 

context for the events at issue here. 

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which he was reclL~ed (Browning-FeiTis). the concems that lmderlie the Pledge were implicated 

as Member Emanuel was evaluating and incorporating. to a large degree. deliberative 

infonnation from a case in which he was reclL~ed. 

We have looked to the APA and due process cases conceming the appearance of bias to 

support our reconunended case-related remedy. 

9 
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- ~------ ------~ -- - ---- --

()g - y gn . - y y 

independent detemlination as to whether a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant 

facts would be likely to question the employee's imprutiality in the matter." 

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TO: 

FROM: 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

National Labor Relations Board 

Memorandum 

Dwight Bostwick, Zuckerman Spacder LLP 

Attorney for Board Member Bill Emanuel 

Lori Ketcham 

Associate General Counsel, Ethics 

Designated Agency Ethics Official 

SUBJECT: Finding of Trump Ethics Pledge Violation Respecting the Board's Adjudication offu::: 

DATE: 

Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. !56 (20 17) 

March 27,2018 

This memo explains my determination, consistent with that of the NLRB's Inspector 

General (!G), that Board member Bill Emanuel's participation in the manner in which the Board 

majority adjudicated Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. !56 (2017), violated 

Paragraph 6 of the Trump Ethics Pledge (Ethics Pledge). 1 My determination in this matter is 

based on the totality of the circumstances presented, including that the majority decision in fu::: 

Brand is based on a wholesale incorporation of the dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris, which 

resulted from the Board's deliberations in a case in which Member Emanuel's former firm 

represented a party and filed briefs on the issue of the joint employer standard. In order to 

illustrate that the ethics concerns here are based on the totality of the unique facts presented, I 

will start by examining in depth the procedural history of both Browning-Ferris and Hy-Brand. 

1

The IG issued a report on February 9, 2018 titled ''Notification of a Serious and Flagrant Problem and/or 

Deficiency in the Board"s Administration of its Deliberative Process and the National Labor Relations Act with 

Respect to the Deliberation of a Pa11iculur Matter." The IO found that, due to the manner in which the Roard 

majority adjudicated Hy-Brand, it had effectively become the same ''particular matter involving specific parties" as 

I3rowning~Fcrris Industries of California lnc. d/b/a BFI Newby lsland Recyclcrv, 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015). On 

February 15, 2018, the Board forwarded a copy of the IG Report to Congress with a cover Jetter stating that it is 

"evaluating the Inspector General's findings, considering appropriate actions related to Hy-Brand Industrial 

Contractors Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 (2017), and reviewing current procedures for highlighting and addressing 

recusa! issues with the assistance of the Board's Designated Agency Ethics Official." 
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Relevant Facts 

1. Procedural History of Browning-Ferris 

Browning-Ferris originated with the Board's processing of a representation petition filed 

in Region 32 by the Sanitary Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 350, International Brotherhood of 

Teamsters (the Union) seeking to represent a unit of approximately 120 workers at a recycling 

facility operated by Browning-Ferris Industries of California (BFI).2 The petitioned-for 

employees were provided by Leadpoint Business Services (Leadpoint), a supplier employer, to 

BFI, the user employer. The Union alleged that BFI and Leadpoint were joint employers for the 

petitioned-for employees. Both Lead point and BFI argued that Lead point was the sole employer 

of those employees. Relevant here, Leadpoint was represented by the law firm Littler 

Mendelson (Littler), Member Emanuel's former employer, in the representation proceedings in 

Region 32 and in subsequent proceedings before the Board. 

The Region issued a Decision and Direction of Election (ODE) on August 16, 2013, 

finding that "Leadpoint [is] the sole employer of the employees in question at BFI's Facility and 

that [the Union's] arguments for joint employer status between BFI and Leadpoint are 

unconvincing." lQ.,_ at pg. 19. Subsequently, on September 3, 2013, the Union filed a Request for 

Review of the DOE alleging that the Region misapplied the existing Board precedent, and in the 

alternative, that the Board should reconsider the standard for determining joint employer status. 

Littler, on behalf of Lead point, filed an Opposition to the Request for Review on September I 0, 

2013, stating that the ODE correctly concluded that Leadpoint was the sole employer. On April 

30, 2014, the Board granted the Union's Request for Review.3 Thereafter, on May 12, 2014, the 

Board issued a Notice and Invitation to File Briefs soliciting comments from the parties, and 

interested amici, respecting the following: (I) "whether under the Board's current joint-employer 

standard" Leadpoint was the "sole employer of the petitioned-for employees" in the unit; (2) 

whether the "Board [should] adhere to its existing joint-employer standard or adopt a new 

standard" and; (3) "if the Board adopts a new standard for determining joint-employer status, 

what should that standard be." 

Numerous parties filed amici briefs in response to the Board's invitation. Littler filed its 

briefs as Lcadpoint's counsel on June 26 and July 10,2014, arguing that Leadpoint alone was the 

employer of the employees and that the Board did not need to revisit its formula for determining 

joint employer status. The Board issued its Decision on Review and Direction in BrowningFerris on August 27, 2015, in which it held that Leadpoint and BFI were joint employers under 

the Act. In reaching this decision, the Board majority in Browning-Ferris adopted a new joint 

employer standard that no longer required a showing that a putative joint employer actually 

exercised direct and immediate control over workers' terms and conditions of employment, but 

that the mere existence of reserved joint control would suffice. Then-Member Miscimarra and 

2 Case No. 32-RC-109684 was filed on July 22, 2013. 

3 In granting the Union's Request for Review, the Board provided notice of its intent to "issue a subsequent notice 

establishing a schedule for the filing of briefs on review and inviting amicus briefs, to afford the parties and 

interested amici the opportunity to address issues raised in this case.'' 

2 
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then-Member Johnson authored a 29-page dissent to the majority opinion. Consistent with the 

position advocated in the briefs filed by Littler, the Browning-Ferris dissent argued that BFI and 

Leadpoint are not joint employers and that the Board should not have altered its joint employer 

standard. 

A Board-conducted election was held on September 4, 2015, and a majority of the 

employees voted in favor of unionization. As a result, on September 14, 2015, the Union was 

certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees. 4 After the 

issuance of the certification, BFI and Lead point refused to recognize the Union. Based on their 

refusal to bargain, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge, and Region 32 subsequently 

issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing alleging that BFI and Leadpoint had violated Section 

8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Upon the filing ofBFI's Answer admitting 

its refusal to bargain and claiming the Board improperly certified the Union, the General Counsel 

moved for summary judgment consistent with the processing of a standard 

test of certification case. Following BFI's and Leadpoint's respective responses to an order to 

show cause, the Board issued a Decision and Order granting summary judgment and found BFI 

and Lead point had violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with 

the Union.5 On January 20, 2016, BFl, through its legal representatives at the law firm of 

Seyfarth Shaw LLP, petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to review the Board's Decision 

and Order, and immediately thereafter the Board filed a cross-application for enforcement.6 The 

test of certification case remained pending before the D.C. Circuit until late December 2017, 

when it was remanded to the Board immediately following the Board's issuance of its decision in 

Hy-Brand (see discussion below). 

2. Procedural History of Hy-Brand 

In Hy-Brand, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Respondents Hy-Brand 

Industrial Contractors, LTD and Brandt Construction, Co. (Respondents) violated Section 8(a)(l) 

of the NLRA, as single employers and joint employers, by unlawfully discharging seven 

employees because they engaged in protected concerted activity. The Respondents filed 

exceptions to the ALJ Decision (ALJD). One of the exceptions alleged that the ALJ erred in 

concluding that the Respondents "are single and joint employers, and are jointly and severally 

liable for the discharges." On January 23, 2017, the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions to 

the ALJD. Neither the Respondents, nor the General Counsel, requested in their respective 

exceptions and supporting briefs that the Board re-consider its standard for determining joint 

employer status. 

4 The certificate of representation that issued in this case certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining 

representative of the following unit of employees: "All full time and regular part-time employees employed by FRPIl, LLC. d/b/a/ Leadpoint Business Services and Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., d/b/a Newby Island 

Recyclery, joint employers, at the facility located at l60I Dixon Landing Rd., Milpitas California; excluding 

employees currently covered by collective bargaining agreements, office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors 

as deli ned in the Act. .. 

5 The Board's decision in the test of certification case is reported at 363 NLRB No. 95 (2016). 

6 Leadpoint did not answer the Board's application for enforcement and no attorney filed a notice of appearance on 

Leadpoint's behalf. Consequently, Littler did not make an appearance on behalf of Leadpoint in the proceedings 

before the D.C. Circuit. 

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As detailed in the IG Report, on October 18, 2017, as the end of his term approached, 

then-Chairman Miscimarra sent an email message to Member Emanuel and then-Member 

Kaplan respecting Hy-Brand, but discussing information pertaining to the Board's internal 

deliberations in the adjudication of Browning-Ferris. 

On December 14, 2017, the Board issued a 3-2 Decision and Order in Hy-Brand, finding 

that the parties were joint employers. In addition, the Hy-Brand majority, which consisted of 

Member Emanuel, then-Chairman Miscimarra, and then-Member Kaplan, overruled the joint 

employer standard that had been established in Browning-Ferris, returning to the pre-existing 

standard advocated by Littler and by the dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris.7 The Board in 

Hy-Brand had not solicited amici briefs on the issue. However, the Hy-Brand majority indicated 

that its decision was in fact responsive to the briefing, including amici briefing, associated with 

Browning-Ferris. Thus, the Hy-Brand majority wrote, "Additionally, the issue we decide today 

was the subject of amicus briefing when the Board decided Browning-Ferris." 365 NLRB No. 

l 56, slip op. at 33. 

Further, a review of the Board's respective decisions in Browning-Ferris and Hy-Brand 

demonstrates that the Browning-Ferris dissent was used by the Board majority in its Hy-Brand 

decision. Specifically, the dissent in Browning-Ferris appears on pages 21-50 of that Board 

decision. Pages 21-48 from the dissent in Browning-Ferris are reproduced, almost word-forword, on pages 3-30 of the Hy-Brand majority decision. Thus, 27 out of the 35 pages that 

constitute the decision of the Hy-Brand majority were essentially lifted, with little or no 

modification, directly from the Browning-Ferris dissent. The majority opinion in Hy-Brand 

contains an analysis of the relevant facts in Browning-Ferris concerning the joint employer status 

of Leadpoint and BFI, and in this analysis, the Hy-Brand majority utilizes the pre-BrowningFerris standard that it reinstated in Hy-Brand. 365 NLRB No. 156, slip op. at 18-19. 

Specifically, the Board majority in Hy-Brand reached the following conclusion based on 

language that it incorporated from the Browning-Ferris dissent: "That is all there was, and the 

Regional Director correctly decided under then-extant law that it was not enough to show BFI 

was the joint employer of Leadpoint's employees." 365 NLRB No. 156, slip op. at 19. The .!::!Y: 

Brand majority devoted two paragraphs of its analysis to analyzing the alleged joint-employer 

status of Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, LTD and Brandt Construction, Co., the Respondents 

in the Hy-Brand case. 365 NLRB No. 156, slip op. at 30-3 l. 

3. Browning-Ferris is Remanded to the NLRB 

Also relevant to the unique fact pattern here, when Hy-Brand issued, Browning-Ferris, 

which had been the Board's lead case on the joint employer standard, was still a "live case" that 

was pending before the D.C. Circuit. After voting with the Hy-Brand majority to overrule the 

joint employer standard set forth in Browning-Ferris, Member Emanuel then participated in an 

effort to direct the General Counsel to seek remand of several Board decisions pending in federal 

courts, including Browning-Ferris. 8 

7 "(W]e overrule Browning-Ferris.'' Hy-Brand, 365 NLRB No. 156, slip op. at 2. 

8 After further consideration of the issue, the Board unanimously agreed to rescind its directive to the General 

Counsel. Thereaf\er. on December 19,2017, the General Counsel tiled a motion in the D.C. Circuit requesting that 

the court remand flrowning-Ferris back to the Board. By an order dated December 22, 2017, the D.C. Circuit 

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4. Charging Parties in Hy-Brand File a Motion with the Board for Reconsideration, 

Recusal, and to Strike 

On January II, 2018, the Charging Parties in Hy-Brand filed a Motion for 

ReconsideratiOn with the Board. In addition to making substantive arguments about the standard 

for joint employer status, the Charging Parties set forth their objections to "the Board's use of the 

Respondent's affirmed unfair labor practice as a vehicle to overturn Browning-Ferris." Mot. For 

Recons., p. I. The Charging Parties contend that if the Board had made the parties and the 

public aware that it was considering reversing significant precedent, it would have had the 

opportunity to move to recuse Member Emanuel due to his "clear conflict of interest in BFI." !d. 

at 2. Specifically, the Charging Parties assert that the decision in Hy-Brand "is no different than 

if Member Emanuel had directly participated in BFI where his former firm represents a party," 

and therefore, the government ethics rules bar him from participating in Hy-Brand 's purported 

overruling of BFI as well as in any reconsideration of the case. !d. at 12. According to the 

Charging Parties, Hy-Brand is "not a case where the Board simply disagrees with the legal 

standard applied in an earlier case" because the Hy-Brand decision "extensively discusses the 

facts in BFI and applies the law to those facts." ld. at 13. The Motion requests that the Board 

reconsider the case; Member Emanuel recuse himself from participating in the reconsideration; 

the Board affirm the AU's Decision on single-employer grounds; and the Board strike the 

reference to an analysis of joint employer status "as improper due to Member Emanuel's 

participation and as unnecessary dicta."9 

On January 25, 2018, the Respondents filed an Opposition to Charging Parties' Motion 

for Reconsideration, Recusal, and to Strike the Board's Decision (Opposition). In its Opposition, 

the Respondents contend that the Charging Parties' Motion fails to meet the requirements of 

§ 102.48(d)(l) 10 because the "Charging Parties have made no showing of either extraordinary 

circumstances or material error requiring reconsideration." Opp'n to Mot. For Recons., 2. 

Moreover, the Respondents assert that because "BFI was cited by the AU as the basis for his 

decision on the joint employer issuc" ... "it was entirely proper for the Board to return to the wellgranted the Agency's request. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit's order states the following: "Upon consideration of the 

motion of the National Labor Relations Board for remand of the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of new 

Board precedent, it is ORDERED that the motion be granted and the case be remanded to the Board for further 

consideration in light of the Board's recent decision in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd., 365 NLRB No. 156 

(Dec. 14, 2017)." On January 4, 2018, the Teamsters Union tiled an Intervenor's Motion tor Reconsideration of 

Order Remanding Case to National Labor Relations Board requesting that the D.C. Circuit reconsider its decision 

remanding the case. On February 2, 2018, the D.C. Circuit denied the Intervenor's motion. 

"On January 25, the NLRB's General Counsel filed a response taking no position on the Charging Parties' motion. 

10 Section 102.48(d)(l) of the Board's Rules and Regulations states the following: "A party to a proceeding betcwe 

the Uoard may, because of extraordinary circumstances. move for reconsideration, rehearing. or reopening of the 

record after the Board decision or order. A motion for reconsideration shall state \Vith particularity the material error 

claimed and with respect to any linding of material tact shall specify the page of the record relied on. A motion firr 

rehearing shall sped(y the error alleged to require a hearing de novo and the prt:iudice to the movant alleged to 

result from such error. A motion to reopen the record shall state brie!ly the additional evidence sought to be 

adduced. why it was not presented previously, and that. if adduced and credited. it would require a different result. 

Only newly discovered evidence. evidence which has become available only since the close of the hearing. or 

evidence which the Board believes should have been taken at the hearing will be taken at any further hearing.'' 

5 
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know[n] standard" in Hy-Brand. !d. at 3. The Opposition also asserts that Member Emanuel 

"had no duty to recuse himself" as he never "represented the Charging Parties or Respondents." 

.!.\:l at 4. In support, Respondents contend that the Charging Parties are stating a higher recusal 

standard than that applied by former Member Becker in addressing various recusal motions in 

SEIU, Local l22RN, 355 NLRB 234, 246 (2010). Specifically, Respondents note that "Member 

Becker's determination to recuse himself was based on his work for particular clients" and 

''Member Becker's interpretation of judicial standards and ethical rules equally apply to Member 

Emanuel." Opp'n to Mot. For Recons., ld. at 5. The Respondents also maintain that the Motion 

for Reconsideration should be denied because the Charging Parties are simply using it as a 

"vehicle to procure a second bite at the apple with the undisguised desire that the former 

Chairman's departure from the Board will now allow the dissent to become the majority 

opinion." Id. at I. 

Analysis under the Ethics Pledge 

Executive Order 13 770 (Executive Order) requires any "covered appointee" to sign an 

Ethics Pledge (Pledge) that contains several commitments. An appointee who signs the Pledge 

can only participate in a matter that falls within the Pledge's restrictions by seeking a waiver 

from the President. Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the Pledge, Member Emanuel has agreed that he 

"will not for a period of 2 years from the date of my appointment participate in any particular 

matter involving specific parties that is directly and substantially related to my former employer 

or former clients, including regulations and contracts." This paragraph, read together with the 

definitions of "former employer," "former client," and "directly and substantially related" set 

forth in Executive Order 13770, prohibits his participation in a "particular matter involving 

specific parties" in which his former employer or his own former clients are a party or the 

representative of a party. 

Guidance issued by the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) explains that the prohibition 

in Paragraph 6 is intended to address those situations where a federal employee's "lingering 

affinity and mixed loyalties" to a former employer and/or former clients could compromise his or 

her impartiality. Sec OGE, D0-09-011, pg. 5 (Ethics Pledge: Revolving Door Ban -- All 

Appointees Entering Government) (March 26, 2009). 11 The specific concern captured by the 

Pledge is that a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts would be likely to 

question an appointee's impartiality, upon leaving private practice and entering government 

service, in cases in which their former employers or former clients are parties or the 

representatives of parties. In other words, a reasonable person would question the integrity of an 

agency's programs and operations if an appointee were to participate in matters encompassed by 

Paragraph 6 of the Pledge. For these reasons, the Pledge creates a two-year "cooling off period" 

during which an appointee agrees to not participate in matters in which a former employer and/or 

former clients are parties or representatives. The provision has some overlap with the 

impartiality regulations in 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 of the Standards of Ethical Conduct for 

Employees of the Executive Branch (Standards of Ethical Conduct) that identifY conflicts which 

arise when a person with whom an employee has a "covered relationship" is or represents a party 

11 D0-09-11 was issued to assist in interpreting the corresponding provision of the Obama Ethics Pledge (Par. 2), 

and states on its face that its substantive legal interpretations pertaining to that provision are applicable to the Trump 

Ethics Pledge as welL Accord LA-17-03 (Guidance on Executive Order 13770) (March 20, 2017). 

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to a matter. The Pledge extends the one-year recusal period in the Standards of Ethical Conduct 

to two years when the covered relationship involves a former employer or a former client. 12 See 

D0-09-011, pp. 5-6, which explains the relationship between the Pledge provision and the 

impartiality provisions in the Standards of Ethical Conduct. 

Although the above-cited definitions from the Executive Order appear to create a brightline rule in Paragraph 6, I have learned in conversations with OGE that this provision in fact 

leaves room for interpretation by an individual agency. Thus, the policies that underlie the 

provision may come into play when the totality of the circumstances demonstrate participation in 

a matter involving a representation by a former employer, even if this representation is not 

readily apparent. In this case, the initial assignment of Hy-Brand to Member Emanuel did not 

cause concern under relevant ethics rules or statutes. As to the Pledge, Member Emanuel's own 

former clients were not parties, and Littler did not represent a party to the matter. However, as 

the case progressed, the adjudication of Hy-Brand became intertwined with the adjudication of 

Browning-Ferris, a live case in which Littler represents Leadpoint. Under the totality of the 

unique circumstances that were present, for purposes of the Pledge, Member Emanuel 

participated in a case that essentially involved the representation of a party by Littler. For this 

reason, I have concluded that his conduct constituted a Pledge violation. 13 

Under Paragraph 6 of the Ethics Pledge, Member Emanuel is recused from participating 

in Browning-Ferris because Littler represents Leadpoint; this prohibition reflects an appearance 

concern that for two years from the date of his appointment, he cannot be a neutral adjudicator in 

cases in which Littler represents a party because of his loyalty to his former employer. The 

ethics concern arises because Member Emanuel, as a member of the Hy-Brand majority, 

overturned the Browning-Ferris standard in a majority decision that incorporated, wholesale, the 

dissent in Browning-Ferris. The dissent in Browning-Ferris was based on the Board's 

deliberations in a case where Littler represented a par7 and submitted briefs to the Board, on 

behalf of that party, regarding the joint employer issue.' Specifically, as explained earlier in this 

memo, a significant portion of the Hy-Brand majority opinion consists of 27 pages from the 

Browning-Ferris dissent, which goes far beyond simply commenting upon, describing, or 

addressing relevant Board precedent. Thus, Member Emanuel effectively stepped in the shoes of 

the Browning-Ferris dissenting Members. Moreover, because the majority transported the entire 

substantive analysis from the dissent in Browning-Ferris into the Hy-Brand majority decision, 

the resulting majority decision discusses the facts of Browning-Ferris and even incorporates 

preexisting text that applies the reinstated standard to those facts. This commonality is 

significant, and stands in contrast to the fact that the Hy-Brand majority devoted only two 

paragraphs of its analysis to determining whether By-Brand Industrial Contractors and Brandt 

Construction are joint employers. It is reasonable to conclude that the concerns that underlie the 

Pledge were implicated as Member Emanuel was evaluating and incorporating, to a large degree, 

12 5 CFR § 2635.502(b)(4) states that an employee has a covered relationship with "[a]ny person for whom the 

employee has, within the last year, served as officer. director, trustee, general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, 

contractor or employee," 

13 My determination is based on the authority given to me as the NLRB's DAEO at 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a) and (c). 

14 Further. then-Chairman Miscimarra disclosed to Member Emanuel internal deliberative information regarding the 

adjudication of Browning-Ferris. 

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a dissenting opinion that was based on deliberations in a case in which Littler represented a party 

and filed briefs, and from which he was ethically recused. Further, the dissenting opinion in 

Browning-Ferris, which became the majority opinion in Hy-Brand, was consistent with the 

position advanced by Littler. This conduct could be perceived by a reasonable person as 

inconsistent with the Supreme Court's instruction that NLRB adjudications should be based on a 

"thoughtful and discriminating evaluation of the facts." N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 

656, 660 (1949). 

In assessing the relevant facts, I also note that none of the parties in Hy-Brand requested 

that the Board reconsider the joint employer standard. Nor did the Board solicit amici briefs on 

that issue as it had done in Browning-Ferris. However, the Hy-Brand majority indicated that the 

decision was in fact responsive to the briefing, including amici briefing, associated with 

Browning-Ferris when it wrote the following: "Additionally, the issue we decide today was the 

subject of briefing when the Board decided Browning-Ferris." 365 NLRB No. 156, slip op. at 

33. This fact underscores the commonality and overlap in the way that the two cases were 

adjudicated. Finally, after Hy-Brand issued, Member Emanuel participated in an effort to 

remand the open Browning-Ferris test of certification case back to the Board to be adjudicated 

under the new joint employer standard, which was consistent with the position advocated by his 

former firm, Littler, in Browning-Ferris. 15 

I want to emphasize that I have not concluded that Member Emanuel acted in bad faith in 

the adjudication ofHy-Brand. Rather, under the totality of the circumstances, he participated in 

the adjudication of a case in a manner which incorporated the adjudication of Browning-Ferris a 

case in which his former employer represented a party. This conduct, under the Pledge, would 

cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts to question his impartiality 

because of concerns about "lingering affinity and mixed loyalties" to Littler that would make 

him predisposed to accept and adopt a position consistent with that of his former employer 

(OGE, D0-09-011, p. 5). Cf. Amos Treat & Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 306 F.2d 260, 263 

(D.C. Cir. 1962) ("As the Supreme Court has said in other contexts: 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal 

is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the 

trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of 

unfairness."') For these reasons, I believe that Member Emanuel's participation in the 

adjudication of Hy-Brand, including the wholesale incorporation of the dissenting opinion in 

Browning-Ferris, which resulted from the Board's deliberations in a still pending case in which 

Littler represented a party and took the same position on the issue of the joint employer standard 

that Member Emanuel ultimately endorsed, violated the Ethics Pledge. 

15 I recognize that Littler did not file a notice of appearance before the D.C. Circuit, and that the Board's vote to 

instruct the General Counsel to move the court to remand the case ultimately was rescinded. However, I rely on this 

conduct as part of the series of events that determines the context for the events at issue here. 

8 
112 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Professor Lofaso, in your testimony, you state that in a post-Citizens United world, money is speech and legislation affirming—requiring affirmative annual authorization for the use of union dues 

for non-representative activities is designed to weaken unions. 

Could you state whether or not the—we should—whether or not 

corporate shareholders should have a comparable right to opt out 

of their dividends and profits being spent on politics supporting 

views and candidates that a shareholder may disagree with? 

Dr. LOFASO. Yes, thank you. I agree with that statement. I think 

that what is important here is, as I always talk to my—tell my students, there are many coercive sources of power in our country. 

And the most coercive, of course, is the government. And business 

is the second-most. Unions are way down. They are—obviously, all 

institutions have some sort of coercive power. 

So if we are—if we agree that businesses have enormous influence over—and coercion over employees in that they can obviously 

take away your job, et cetera, then it seems to me that, if we are 

going to have this discussion, it is important to have the discussion 

in light of both corporations and unions. And so I feel that there 

must be a different motivation by just focusing on unions. 

So I would urge this committee to actually—if they are going to 

do legislation on this—to think about legislation in terms of many 

different types of institutions, but most importantly corporations, 

which are the single most coercive source of power outside the government. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Mr. Bowman, do you agree with that? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Actually, I am very interested in hearing— 

Chairman WALBERG. Your microphone. Your microphone, please. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BOWMAN. I am very interested in hearing Dr. Lofaso admit 

that unions are coercive sources of power. It is—I am glad— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, so are corporations and— 

Mr. BOWMAN. But corporations offer products that people can 

purchase or not purchase. So I— 

Mr. SCOTT. So a shareholder who disagrees with the political 

views of the corporation can have their profits diverted to the opponent, to people that are actually opposed. 

Let me ask you another question. Do you get to vote on union 

leadership, as a union member? 

Mr. BOWMAN. I am—withdrew my union membership. 

Mr. SCOTT. As a— 

Mr. BOWMAN. I am not offered any—I cannot vote on any representation. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do union members vote on union officers? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Local offices, not national offices, no. Not on our 

UAW president, no. But on a local level, yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. So you get— 

Chairman WALBERG. The gentleman’s time is expired. I now recognize myself for my five minutes of questioning. 

Mr. Marculewicz, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce just released 

a very thorough report on worker centers. It notes that under previous administrations the Labor Department’s Office of Labor Management Standards has been hesitant to regulate certain worker 

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centers because of outdated guidance on the definition of a labor 

organization under LMRDA. Specifically referenced are guidance 

letters from 2008 and 2013. 

Do you have any thoughts on how the current administration 

should address the matter? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Thank you, Chairman. I want to reference 

some of the remarks of Ranking Member Sablan about these worker centers and sort of the definition of these worker centers. They 

have historically been organizations that promoted education, engaged with workers on a wide variety of different things, but rarely 

ever engaged directly with employers. 

Back 10 years ago, perhaps, when the Department of Labor 

issued the letter, the 2008 letter, that may have been a set of circumstances that existed at the time. But those organizations have 

evolved dramatically in the last 10 years. We have seen lots of activity by different types of organizations. They have re-emerged. So 

I would submit, first and foremost, that those worker centers have 

evolved from the historic sort of traditional model that was described by Ranking Member Sablan into more activist organizations that pursue direct engagement with employers. 

Number two, looking at both of those interpretations, they were 

exceedingly narrow readings of the statute, number one. And they 

were also inconsistent with the OLMS guidance that had been previously published related to that. And I would submit that the 

OLMS today—assuming we get an administrator to implement policy—the OLMS today should take a look at this, take a look at 

these organizations within the context of today and the way they 

have acted over the course of the last several years, and make their 

determination based upon that. 

Chairman WALBERG. Thank you. 

Mr. Bowman, you spoke about unions using member dues for political purposes or other expenditures not related to collective bargaining. In your experience, are most workers aware of their right 

to opt out and exercise what is known as their Beck rights? 

Is there something that workers have a straightforward way of 

finding out about this in the workplace? 

Mr. BOWMAN. I would say, unfortunately, no, that is not the case. 

I worked for the UAW for 13 years until I did my own research and 

found out that there is such a thing as Beck rights, that there is 

an ability for me to be what would be called an agency fee payer. 

The problem is you have to resign your union membership first, 

in order to pay agency fees. And that process can become very intimidating and full of fear for general workers. 

The UAW used to have a solidarity magazine which was sent to 

everybody’s home that, by the way, was cover-to-cover political 

propaganda. But once a year, they would put a little box way down 

in the corner that may have mentioned the fact that you can resign 

your union membership and exercise your Beck rights. 

Since Michigan became a right-to-work state, that magazine no 

longer comes to our home. It is just offered online. So I do not believe that members have much ability at all to know what their 

rights are, as far as the Beck decision goes. 

Chairman WALBERG. Okay, thank you. 

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114 

Mr. Jackson, since you and your fellow employees began the certification effort, has the union made a compelling case to employees 

as to why it should be kept in place, or is the union simply hiding 

behind procedural delays? 

Mr. JACKSON. The union at this point has not sent us any correspondence, other than to try to compel us to believe our management are dictators, trying to, I believe, draw an emotional response 

so we would continue to support the union. But at this point, no, 

it has been four years since they started this process. 

Chairman WALBERG. Delay upon delay? 

Mr. JACKSON. Delay upon delay. And I believe their goal now is 

to just kill our company because of the timeframe. 

Chairman WALBERG. Thank you for your testimony. 

I yield back and now recognize the ranking member, my friend, 

Mr. Sablan. 

Mr. SABLAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. sir, I am not going to argue with you, because 

I will probably find—you represent management side clients, and 

I have never been a member of a union myself, but I have spoken 

to and seen the good that is done for workers. So we will agree to 

disagree. 

But Professor Lofaso, if I may ask, what are the penalties for unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act? And 

are they adequate to deter non-compliance? Could you please provide some examples? 

Dr. LOFASO. So the remedies for unfair labor practices under the 

National Labor Relations Act are twofold. There are cease-and-desist orders, and also any kind of affirmative order. So you would 

get remedies to cease and desist from your—whatever action you 

took, and then the—whatever the affirmative order is, depending 

on which violation it is. 

So, if you are under 8(a), which are the employer unfair labor 

practices—and there is five of them—it would be different types of 

things. Like an 8(a)1 might be a notice posting. For an 8(a)3 you 

might get back pay. For an 8(a)5 you might get a bargaining order. 

So the problem is that they are very ineffective. And so, many 

times an employer would make the business judgement that it 

makes more sense to violate the law, in terms of its bottom line, 

than to comply with the law. And so you see that we don’t have 

a very good enforcement mechanism. We see this often in international law, where you have no teeth. And so the—where there 

is right there needs to be a remedy. 

So it is the policy and practice of—it is the policy in the United 

States Congress—it is the policy of the United States to encourage 

the practice and procedure of collective bargaining, which means— 

and it has been called a fundamental right by the United States 

Supreme Court. Therefore, it should have remedies that would— 

Mr. SABLAN. Do you have an— 

Dr. LOFASO.—enforce—that are powerful. 

Mr. SABLAN. Do you have any examples? 

Dr. LOFASO. Yes. 

Mr. SABLAN. Could you share— 

Dr. LOFASO. Yes— 

Mr. SABLAN.—one or two— 

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115 

Dr. LOFASO. I think that you could have—you could do, like treble damages for, if someone is discriminated against, for their back 

pay. Injunctions. Right now the injunctions are mandatory for 

when a union does something, but they are not—they are permissive for when an employer does it. 

Mr. SABLAN. All right. 

Dr. LOFASO. So things like that. 

Mr. SABLAN. Okay. So should you—should worker centers be 

classified as labor organizations? And if not, why not? 

Dr. LOFASO. Well, no, because they don’t meet the definition of 

a labor organization. The board is fully equipped to look at—and 

is an expert in this, and can actually look and see whether they— 

if there is dealing with—the most important part of that definition 

is whether or not there is a bilateral mechanism, whether there is 

actual dealing with. 

What I heard today is some people complaining that some of 

these so-called worker centers are actually engaging one-on-one 

with employers. Well, if the—where there is actual dealing with, 

that would be a labor organization. Yet every single time this has 

come up, Republican or Democrat, experts have said these are not. 

So that is not really the issue. 

I think what is important is that these are actually—without 

using government funds, are actually helping low-income workers, 

and we should be grateful for that. 

Mr. SABLAN. Thank you. And so your testimony, Dr. Lofaso, also 

critiques a number of provisions of H.R. 2723, the so-called Employee Rights Act, such as eliminating voluntary recognition, requiring workers to affirmatively opt in to support union activities, 

and granting rights to non-members to vote in matters involving 

the internal governance of a union. 

What is the net effect of these proposals? And you have 45 minutes—seconds. 

Dr. LOFASO. The net effect is to weaken unions. And we don’t 

want to weaken unions. Unions are already weak. And we can 

see—it was your graph, but there is many, many other studies that 

show that, as we strengthen unions, we are strengthening the middle class. 

That is not to say that there aren’t certain—when there is an 

abuse, we can get rid of that abuse. And of course, there is going 

to be some—you know, there is stories, but there’s individual stories that they—people feel upset about their union. Of course that 

is going to happen. But we don’t make legislation just because— 

on the worst case scenario. 

I would say that what we need to do is strengthen our middle 

class. We need to strengthen the middle class. And one way to do 

that is we can strengthen unions, strengthen a voice of employees, 

which is another theme I am hearing today, and we can do that 

in many, many different ways. And I urge the—you guys to work 

together to figure out a solution that is non-ideological. 

Mr. SABLAN. Thank you, thank you. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. Now I recognize the 

gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Congressman Walberg and Congressman Sablan for their 

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116 

working together in a bipartisan manner to address the issues of 

worker-management relations. And we want to thank all of our 

witnesses here today. 

I am very grateful that in South Carolina we are a right-to-work 

state, leading to South Carolina being the nation’s leading exporter 

of cars: BMW, Mercedes, and soon, Volvo. South Carolina is also 

the leading manufacturer and exporter of tires in America, with 

Michelin of France, Bridgestone of Japan, Continental of Germany, 

GT of Singapore, and soon Wanli of China. 

Additionally, South Carolina knows the importance of free and 

fair representation elections, with the workers in Charleston at 

Boeing, ably led by manager Joan Robinson-Berry, rejecting unionization by a 73–27 vote last year. So we know how important the 

elections are, but the benefits of having real representation, and 

not forced. 

And that is why, Mr. Bowman, your presentation has been so 

meaningful. 

Last year, Congressman Francis Rooney, Congressman Bradley 

Byrne, and myself introduced H.R. 4327, the Current Employee 

Representation Act, which would allow workers to petition for union 

certification election when fewer than 50 percent of current employees were members of—during the last election. We note that 

businesses flourish and the economy grows when employees are 

empowered and unions are accountable for those who join the 

workforce. 

The union in your workplace has been there for many years, and 

very few current workers had the opportunity to vote for or against 

the union. Do you view the union as your representative, or is it 

more just another layer of bureaucracy in a big corporation? 

Mr. BOWMAN. It is very interesting. My father migrated to Michigan from LaFollette, Tennessee back in the fifties. So did his sister 

and brother. They all ended up working at Ford plants, and all 

forced UAW members. None of them ever had the opportunity to 

vote in a union election. In fact, most of the unions were in place, 

as Chairman Walberg mentioned earlier, before they were even 

born. 

It is very interesting that—why I cannot, in my 21 years, be able 

to vote for a union and be forced under union representation, not 

to be able to represent myself, is a union, in my opinion, trying to 

keep control over the entire collective bargaining unit. 

Unions can, under NLRB rules, under former Supreme Court 

cases, choose to do something called a members-only contract. But 

they choose to negotiate to be the exclusive representation agent. 

So yes, unions do that in order to keep the power all to themselves, 

and won’t allow me to represent myself, even though I have exercised my right-to-work law. 

They will call me names such as ‘‘freerider,’’ or ‘‘freeloader.’’ But 

the—since I am forced to still accept that union representation, I, 

in fact, am a forced rider for the union. So absolutely, I agree with 

your comment. 

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Well, and your real-life experience means a lot, and is so helpful. So thank you for being here. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Yes. 

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117 

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Additionally, Mr. Jackson, your 

testimony, you state that labor unions should be held to the same 

standard as elected officials, and should conduct re-certification 

elections. You mention the tedious process that you go through to 

bring about a de-certification. Even though you collected the required signatures and filed for de-certification more than two years 

ago, there has been no vote. 

Is there any sort of deadline as to when you and your employees 

will—fellow employees will have the ability to vote on the de-certification effort? Also, do you have an idea on how long this entire 

process will potentially take? 

Mr. JACKSON. The time period we were told—all the unfair labor 

practice acts that were filed would have to be gone or ruled upon 

before we would be allowed to vote. And that, every time we get 

close, the union either files new ones, repeats as appeals—it is just 

ongoing at this point, it never ends every time we get close. 

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. And additionally, you discussed 

the blocking charges filed by NLRB by the union against your employer, in your case, and how is this being addressed? And what 

is the time period, again, that you anticipate? 

Mr. JACKSON. I don’t believe we have a time period. My company 

is to the point where they will not fight them. It costs them money. 

So they are waiting. They are simply waiting for a ruling from the 

NLRB. And those are not forthcoming, either. It is just—the NLRB, 

I believe, is coddling the union, at least our Region 19 is coddling 

the union. It is— 

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Best wishes on your continued 

success creating jobs. Thank you. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. I recognize the 

gentlelady from Oregon, Ms. Bonamici. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. Thank you to our witnesses for being here. 

Mr. Jackson, I too am from Oregon. However, I grew up in Michigan. My grandfather spent many years working at Ford Motor 

Company, both before and after the UAW. And I assure you he— 

my grandfather has long passed away—but I assure you the working conditions were much better after the UAW came to Ford 

Motor Company. 

My home state of Oregon has actually been a leader in addressing a lot of barriers faced by working families. In fact, just recently 

workers at a Burgerville restaurant in Portland voted to unionize, 

and they established one of the first formally-recognized fast food 

unions in the country, and this was done in an election overseen 

by the NLRB. In fact, after the election the company issued a statement saying that the employees voted to unionize in the fair and 

free election overseen by the NLRB. 

And strengthening their collective voice and the rights of workers, especially in industries like fast food work, we know that many 

full-time workers still struggle to make ends meet. Their union advocacy is going to be an important voice and a way to help them 

through advocating for better working conditions, fairer wages, and 

good benefits. 

And I would hope that our Committee would be focused on growing the middle class, as we saw from Mr. Sablan’s information in 

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the opening statement, and that includes making sure that workers’ voices are protected and preserved in our evolving, changing 

workforce. 

But instead, we are discussing efforts that seem to reduce the 

collective power of workers and limit their ability to have a voice 

on the job. I wish we could go back to the drawing board and talk 

about how we can increase workers’ voices. 

And although many of the workers today would join a union if 

given the choice, many fear retaliation for supporting or engaging 

in organizing efforts. And according to a study from the Economic 

Policy Institute, companies threaten to close shop in 57 percent of 

union elections. They fire workers who are organizing in 34 percent 

of elections. They threaten to cut wages for workers in 47 percent 

of elections. And they use one-on-one supervisory meetings to intimidate and threaten workers in 54 percent of elections. 

Our state of Oregon has passed legislation banning the—those 

forced meetings. But—nationally. So Ms.—or, excuse me, Dr. 

Lofaso, given the staggering data, are there adequate protections 

in place to deter employees—employers from discriminating against 

or taking retaliatory action against employees for engaging in protected activities under the NLRB? Because I noted that in Oregon 

the company said this was a fair and free election. What are the 

most important reforms we need to modernize the labor laws to 

protect those workers who do engage in protected activity? 

Dr. LOFASO. Well, the—you are right. The stats are staggering, 

and I would really love to get—that is—I would love to get the information on that. 

We know that, given that—you said 50 percent of companies will 

threaten to close plant. This is actually extremely intimidating. 

You think—you heard some of the witnesses say they were—they 

are afraid of certain things, they are afraid to say that they are— 

that they want to leave the union. But think about it. Losing your 

job is much more coercive. And that—the reason is because the 

remedies are bad. 

And so there is no real teeth. And so what we need to do is, for 

these types of—I call it—they are called—I don’t call them this, but 

everyone—most people in the business call them TIPS. So threats, 

coercive interrogations, promises that are to—basically bribes, solicitation, other things—surveillance—what you need to do is really 

focus on those and say, okay, we are going to make these a priority 

and we are going to have them have more teeth, better remedies 

for these particular things. And I would definitely focus on those 

TIPS. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. And as Ranking Member Sablan 

noted, upholding the right of workers to form a union and—as I 

mentioned, we want there to be fair and free elections—is an important way to reduce income inequality. We know there are still 

a lot of working families who need help getting ahead. Unionized 

workers have had better access to paid holidays, paid sick leave, 

and retirement benefits. And additionally, the presence of a unionized workforce really helps raise the standards for wages and working conditions for all workers. 

So we shouldn’t have unnecessary delays for workers to join or 

form a union. So Dr. Lofaso, your testimony mentioned how the 

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NLRB’s 2014 election rule removed many of the unnecessary delays 

that deprive workers of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. And last week I joined many members of this committee 

in submitting a comment to the NLRB making a similar argument. 

Can you discuss the implications of long election delays for workers who are seeking union representation, and the importance of 

the 2014 rule? 

Dr. LOFASO. Well, I think we heard that, actually, even in the 

testimony today. And indeed, under the new election rules, they actually drop blocking charges. So if we were to get rid of that, the 

election rules, it would actually—Mr. Jackson’s problem would be 

worse. 

So we want—we don’t want to have those delays. It is really important that—justice delayed is justice denied. So—and I have 

quoted the Magna Carta twice today, but justice delayed is justice 

denied. 

I will say one more thing, is that I would say that it is more 

forced democracy is what we are really doing here, is not—and that 

if there were—I would agree with the secret ballot election, if it 

were against Union A versus Union B. But if the choice is between 

a union and no union—and as you said, when there is a union, the 

working conditions are better. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentlelady, and I recognize the 

gentleman from the beautiful mountains of Tennessee, Dr. Roe. 

Mr. ROE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Molly, thank you for 

the nine-and-a-half years you worked with me on this committee. 

I appreciate all the help you have done, and your service to this 

committee. 

And just—the ranking member made a statement about political 

money being spent by corporations. If you are a shareholder, that 

is a simple solution; just sell the stock, and you get rid of it, or you 

don’t buy the product. And I am sure Mr. Jackson would love to 

have that same option, since he is two-plus years into trying to get 

a vote. 

Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding this meeting today, and—on 

our nation’s out-of-date labor laws, and the need to advance common-sense reforms to empower American workers. 

As the son of a union member, I am proud to be part of the discussion that is empowering employee protections and choice. As recently as 2009 data, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the National Labor Relations Board indicates about seven percent of 

unionized employees have ever voted for the union in their workplace. 

They deserve more—employees deserve more of a voice in their 

representation, and the ability to hold their leaders accountable. 

We should be advancing legislation such as H.R. 2723, Employee 

Rights Act, which contains common-sense protections, including secret ballot elections, giving the employees a voice on their union 

dues if they are used for political spending, and the ability to decide representation, free from threats. 

I put on a uniform and left this country over 40-something years 

ago in Southeast Asia to give every single person in this country 

the right to a secret ballot. Every member up here was elected by 

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120 

a secret ballot. And to show you how secret it is, my wife claims 

she votes for me, but I don’t know that for a fact, because it is a 

secret ballot. 

And I find it offensive when someone will stand up and say that 

these members right here, these men right here—and women -- 

don’t have a right to vote in a secret ballot. That is so American, 

it is what separates us from every other second-rate country in the 

world, is a secret ballot. And I think that is sacrosanct. 

And Mr. Bowman, I will start with you. Full disclosure, I own 

a Ford pickup. So the—it is a bedrock, and I would just like to have 

you comment again on that. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, I also own a Ford F150. And as I said, my 

father came from LaFollette, Tennessee, so I love your state. 

What specifically—subject do you want me to speak on? 

Mr. ROE. Just the secret ballot protections that you— 

Mr. BOWMAN. Again, I think it is interesting. It is outrageous 

and embarrassing that any worker has to fight for a secret-ballot 

election. 

As you had said in your comments, the Employee Rights Act 

would guarantee that for all workers. There is no situation that I 

can think of where a secret ballot election should be removed from 

any worker in any situation in any union organizing drive, period. 

There can be intimidation on both sides. There can be intimidation on the union-paid—on the paid union organizers side, there 

can be intimidation on the employer side. Nobody wants to go into 

a voting booth and have somebody know how they voted. That is 

an anathema to being an American. 

I think workers being told right from the beginning that you are 

going to have a secret ballot election, nobody is going to know how 

you vote—in fact, you can walk out of there and tell one person you 

voted one way, tell another person you voted another way. It 

doesn’t matter because your vote, your secret ballot vote, is what 

actually matters and what ultimately counts on that union organizing drive. 

So that is why I definitely support the Employee Rights Act. Mr. ROE. I agree with you. The last time—first time I got elected 

I found that at the election 100 percent of the people in my district 

voted for me—at least they—what they said, everybody did. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BOWMAN. Sure. 

Mr. ROE. Would you agree, Mr. Bowman, that if a union brings 

value to the workplace, that they have nothing to fear from an election? 

Mr. BOWMAN. They have nothing to fear. And personally, myself, 

I am pro-union, but in the context of what unions were created to 

do—unfortunately, not what they have become. 

So I don’t think there is anybody in this table—and I certainly 

don’t want to speak for anyone—that wants to ban unions. We just 

believe that unions need reform to bring them into the 21st century. And compulsion at its core, and forcing members in a card 

check campaign is definitely not something that I believe belongs 

in the 21st century. 

Mr. ROE. Mr. Jackson, very quickly. And Chairwoman Foxx 

scares me too, so you are okay with your— 

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[Laughter.] 

Mr. ROE. You mentioned that you and your employees are rarely 

in the same place, and was it difficult for you to collect the signatures for your de-certification process (sic). And I know you have 

mentioned several times about why you think it has taken so long, 

but, if you could, just hit that point quickly. 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. Thank you for your service, Mr. Roe. 

For us, hand-carrying the de-certification petition with us everywhere we go is extremely tedious, very time-consuming. Given that, 

once it is filed, why has that taken so long? Why are they allowed 

to hold this up? 

You know, when we voted for the union, that election happened 

like that. To undo that, we are still waiting. How come? 

Mr. ROE. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. And I was just notified by Chairwoman Foxx that she would like me to disassociate 

myself from your comments. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman WALBERG. I now recognize the gentleman from New 

Jersey, Harley rider and good guy, Mr. Norcross. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairman. And I thank the Ranking 

Member for putting this Committee today. 

And I have to agree with Dr. Roe. The mountains of Tennessee 

really are beautiful, and they produce many, many good people, including himself and my mother. 

So Mr. Bowman, you said that you were employed by the UAW 

for 13 years. When did they hire you? 

Mr. BOWMAN. I am not employed by the UAW. I am employed— 

Mr. NORCROSS. No, you said— 

Mr. BOWMAN.—by Ford Motor Company. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Well, that is—wait. So you did not work at all or 

ever for the UAW. 

Mr. BOWMAN. No, I never have. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Okay, thank you. Have you ever run for public 

office? 

Mr. BOWMAN. I did in 2014. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Oh, so you know what it is like to win or lose an 

election. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Based on secret ballot elections, yes. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So you know how and whether it is like to win 

an election or lose. What—did you win or lose? Just— 

Mr. BOWMAN. I lost the election. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Okay, sorry to hear that. Did you disclose all the 

money that was contributed to you? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Yes, you have to. I— 

Mr. NORCROSS. Oh, but the dark money, or what they are referring to by third parties, did you disclose that? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, since I ran— 

Mr. NORCROSS. Did you disclose that? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Absolutely. Since I ran in— 

Mr. NORCROSS. Hang on, I am asking a question. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Okay, okay. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Did you disclose money that was used on behalf 

of your campaign, all that money? Yes or no. 

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Mr. BOWMAN. Yes. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Did your opponent? 

Mr. BOWMAN. That I have no idea. 

Mr. NORCROSS. You don’t know if he filed any of the disclosures? 

Mr. BOWMAN. No. My opponent is in this House— 

Mr. NORCROSS. Well, thank you. I appreciate it. Please. 

So both sides, by law, are supposed to disclose. Correct? 

Mr. BOWMAN. True. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So let me switch just a little bit. 

Dr. Lofaso, when there is a campaign going on, the union obviously files their LM reports and many others they have to disclose. 

Is the same true for the employer side, that they have to disclose 

everything they use in fighting the election? 

Mr. BOWMAN. I— 

Dr. LOFASO. No. 

Mr. NORCROSS. I am asking her. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Oh, you are asking her. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So when you run for public office, you have to 

disclose both sides, but if it is a union election, only one side has 

to disclose. Is that accurate? 

Dr. LOFASO. Correct. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So, when there is a vacancy in the U.S. Senate, 

is there an appointment or an election that takes place, do you 

know? 

Dr. LOFASO. I believe it is usually an appointment, and then 

later on an election. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Oh. So they can be appointed without any election? 

Dr. LOFASO. Correct. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Okay, just wondering. That seems to happen a 

couple times. 

Mr.—hopefully I get this right—Marculewicz, if there is a language interpreter that is used by an employee who doesn’t speak 

English with their employer, are they considered part of a union? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. If there is a language interpreter? 

Mr. NORCROSS. Yes. 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. That is used— 

Mr. NORCROSS. By an employee to speak to their employer. 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ.—by an employee to speak with their employer? 

Mr. NORCROSS. Are they covered? Is that—an interpreter? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Covered by what? 

Mr. NORCROSS. The NLRA. 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. I—if they are an employee they would be, 

yes. 

Mr. NORCROSS. No. If an employee uses a language interpreter 

that might come from a worker center to help them communicate 

with their employer. 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. If they—if the—I am still not quite following 

your question. 

Mr. NORCROSS. If an employee who does not speak English wants 

to speak to their employer and uses a language interpreter that 

happened to come from a worker center, would they be covered 

under the NLRB? 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

123 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Well, under certain circumstances, they 

might. But if they were just in their capacity as an interpreter, 

they wouldn’t serve as a labor organization. 

Mr. NORCROSS. If they came from a worker center? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Including if they came from a worker center, 

Congressman. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Okay. So if there is a language interpreter that 

works in the court system for the same reason, would they be covered under the NLRB? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. In the court system? 

Mr. NORCROSS. Yes, criminal justice system. 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Actually— 

Mr. NORCROSS. It happens— 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Yes, they would be covered. If they were private-sector employees, they would be covered under the National 

Labor Relations Act, because they could organize and form a union. 

Mr. NORCROSS. I am not asking that. If they are working as a 

language interpreter for a person who does not speak English in 

our court system, and they came from a worker center, should they 

be covered by the NLRB? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. They would not be acting as a labor organization in that capacity. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So is that answer yes or no? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. The question doesn’t lend itself to a yes-orno answer, because an interpreter who is in the private sector 

could be covered—working for a worker center, that interpreter and 

other interpreters could form their own union as employees of that 

worker center. And they are covered under the— 

Mr. NORCROSS. Because they are working in their capacity as an 

interpreter for an individual, does that automatically qualify? I 

think your answer was no, because— 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. I don’t think it would, correct. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Okay. We are in the same place. So why should, 

in the event that they came from a worker center, all of a sudden, 

that switch their capacity? Because many of these worker centers, 

they use language interpreters each and every day. 

So I see my time has expired. I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentleman and a master from Florida, Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to have the 

U.S. Chamber’s report on worker centers submitted into the record, 

if I might. 

Chairman WALBERG. Without objection, hearing none, it will be. 

[The information follows:] 

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· Worker Centers 

Umon Front Groups and the UM 

Table of Contents 

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 2 

Background of the labor~Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ....................................... 2 

The Legal Framework of the LMRDA ................................................................................................ 4 

The Definition of a Labor Organization under the LMRDA ............................................................ s 

Flaws of OLMS's 2008 and 2013 Guidance Letters ..••.•••...•.•••....•..•..•..•..•......••........••.•..•...•...•..•...••• ? 

Issues Relating to "Employer" Under the LMRDA .••...•.•....•.••......•.••....••.....•.•••.......••..•.....••.....•.••.••. 9 

Application of the LMRDA to Worker Centers ............................................................................... 12 

Analysis of Specific Worker Centers under the LMRDA ............................................................... 13 

1. Retail Action Project ................................................................................................................. 13 

2. Organization United for Respect at Walmart and Making Change at Walmart .............. 14 

3. The Coalition of Immokalee Workers .................................................................................... 17 

4. Restaurant Opportunities Center and its Affi1iates ............................................................. 19 

5. Jobs With Justice ..................................................................................................................... 20 

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 22 
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1 

~ Wm'ker Centers 

£ Union Front Groups and the Lcm 

Introduction: 

The Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS) in the U.S. Department of Labor is the 

federal agency responsible for administering and enforcing most provisions of the LaborMonagement Reporting und Disclosure Act of 1959, as amended (LMRDA). The LMRDA was 

enacted by Congress to ensure basic standords of democracy and financial integrity in labor 

organizations representing, or purportedly representing, employees in private industry. The 

LMRDA promotes labor organization and !abor~management transparency through reporting 

and disclosure requirements for labor organizations and their officials, employers, labor 

relations consultants, and surety companies. 

In recent years, groups representing workers and their 

interests have evolved into organizations known as 

"worker centers." Worker centers have historicu!!y been 

non-profit organizntions that offer services to their 

members, including education, training, and advocacy for 

worker rights through research, communication, lobbying 

and organizing. Increasingly, however, worker centers 

have sought to directly engage specific employers or 

groups of employers to effectuate change in the 

workplace on behalf of workers they claim to represent 

When it comes to such direct engagement and dea!!ng 

with employers, many worker centers act no differently than traditional labor organizations. 

The LMRDA was enacted, in part, to ensure protection of certain minimum rights of employees 

vis-a-vis the labor organizations that represent them. The LMRDA contains significant 

protections for employees with respect to promotion of the principles of organizational 

democracy, access to basic Information, and promotion of a duty of fair representation. As 

worker centers have evolved over the years, many have assumed roles akin to those of a 

traditional labor organization, and as such should be accountable to the workers they claim 

to represent under the laws Congress passed to establish such accountability. However, few 

appear to have embraced the obligations of the LMRDA 

Background of the Labor-Management Reporting and 

Disclosure Act: 

In 1935, Congress passed the Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations Act 

CNLRA).1 The purpose of the statute was to promote freedom of association and collective 

bargaining. It did not regulate labor organizations. The absence of such regulation subjected 

the law to criticism, arising out of corruption and undemocratic actions exhibited by some 

labor organizations of the time. 

1 Pub. L. No. 74-198, <19 Stat 449·50 (1935). 

2 
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j 

; Worker Centers 

Union Front Groups and the Law ~ 

Concern about the power of labor organizations contributed to the introduction of the TaftHartley Act, which created a series of unfair la!Jor practices and other requif·ements designed 

to protect employees from the labor organizations that represented them. A goal of the 

legislation was to provide workers the same protections from labor organizations that the 

Wagner Act offered workers from employers. 2 "[T]he freedom of the individual workman 

should be protected from duress by the union us well as from duress by the emp!oyer."3 

The House echoed this sentiment. "[T]hc American workingman had been deprived of his 

dignity as an individual... cajoled, coerced, and intimidated ... in the name of the splendid aims 

set forth in Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act. His whole economic Bfe has been 

subject to unregulated monopolists.""' 

Fo!!owing passage of the Taft~Hartley Act, there remained public concern over the lack of 

oversight of labor organizations, which prompted the Senate Select Committee on Improper 

Activities in the Labor or Management Field, known as the 

McClellan Committee, to conduct hearings on the matter.5 

The inquiry and subsequent hearings revealed corruption, 

fraud and other inappropriate behavior by leJders of labor 

organizations at the expense of their membership.6 The 

McClellan Committee concluded that there was a need to 

require democratic procedures to hold leaders of labor 

organizations accountable to their members? This debate 

eventually resulted in passage of the Landrum~Griffin Act, 

more formal! known as the Labor-Management Reporting 

and Disclosure Act of 1959.s 

2 Senwte r~eport No 106 on S. 1120, Supplemental Views, reo,nted m 1 Legtslat•ve Hlstory of the Labor Man<Jgement Relatio'ls Act of 

1947ilt456 

3 ld 

4 House Report No. 245 on H.R. 3010 as mprlnted in llCGislative History of the Labor Managem<"nt Refat:ons Act of1947 at 295. 

5 The Labor Reform iaw. Bure0u of N0t1onal Affwrs: Wash•ngton, D.C. (1959) 

6 ld. 

8 29USC§§141-144, 167,172-187. 
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Worker Centers 

Union Front Groups and the Law 

The Legal Framework of the LMRDA: 

The LMRDA provides significant protections for the rights of employees wlth respect to the 

labor organizations that purport to represent them. The following is a summary of such 

protections: 

Title I of the LMRDA. referred to as the Worker Bin of Rights, addresses issues of 

organizational democracy and basic protections for workers. These include the following: 

equal rights and privileges for al! union members to nominate and elect leadership of their 

choosing, to attend meetings. and to participate in deliberations of the labor organization; the 

freedom of members to assemble and to express their views, arguments, or opinions to other 

members and during meetings of the labor organization; protection of members from 

increases in dues or initiation fees without majority approval; and the provision of due process 

protections for members in disciplinary mattersY Title I further requires labor organizations to 

retain copies of all collective bargaining agreements to which they are a party, and to make 

them available for review by any member or by any employee whose rights are affected by 

such agreements.10 Finally, the Bi!l of Rights gives members of labor organizations the right to 

pursue civil enforcement of the statute's protections in federal courtY 

Title II of the LMRDA requires labor organizations to 

disclose financial information about the organization, 

its officials, and employees.12 Title !I also requires 

labor organizations to have a constitution and by~ 

laws containing requirements for membership, 

regular meetings, censure and removal of officers, 

and provisions for how the organization's funds 

may be spent.H These provisions not only promote 

transparency to protect workers' rights to fair elections 

of officials, they also serve as a deterrent on misuse 

of an organization's funds.14 This, in turn, promotes 

memberships' knowledge of a labor organization's 

affairs so that they may exercise their voting and free 

speech rights.15 

Title !I also requires labor organizations to report this information to the Department of Labor 

through the submission of documents and completed disclosure forms, including the LM-1 

9 29U.S.C.§411(a)(l)-{5) 

10 29U.S.C.§412 

11 29U.S.C. §414 

12 29USC§§ 431-432. 

29USC§43l. 

4 

Nelson, S!owmg Umon Corruption, 8 Geo. Mason L Rev. 527, 551 (2000\ 

Marshall. Thf!' Right to Dcmocral!c Particrpat1on 17 Fordhom Urb. L. J. ot 197. 
129 

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Worker Centers 

Union Front Groups and the Law 

and LM-2.16 Those reports are available for review by the public through OLMS. Title H also 

grants members, but not the public, the rtght to inspect and verify records that support an 

organization's reports to the Department of LaborY 

Title !!I of the LMRDA limits a parent labor organization's ability to create a trusteeship over 

local or subordinate unions.18 

Title IV of the LMRDA requires regular secret ballot elections of officers at the national and 

local levels.19 

Title V of the LMRDA creates a fiduciary duty for officers and employees of a labor 

organization to the members regarding the organization's money and property.20 It requires 

officers to hold the labor organization's money solely for the benefit of the organization and 

to refrain from "holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with 

the interest of such organization." 21 

The Definition of a Labor Organization under the LMRDA: 

The strong protections of the LMRDA however, on!y 

become meaningful if groups purporting to represent 

workers are found to be labor organizations subject to 

the statute. The definition of a labor organization under 

the LMRDA appears in section 3(i) of the statute with 

clarifying examples in section 3(j)P 

Section 3(i) defines a labor organization as any 

organization, 

"engaged in an industry affecting commerce and includes any organization of any 

kind. any agency, or employee representation committee. group, association, or plan so 

engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or 

in part. of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates 

of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, genera! 

committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a 

national or international labor organization, other than a State or local central body."23 

29Cf'R§§401-404 

17 29 U.S.C.§431(c) 

18 ?9U.S.C.'ii461 

19 29U5.C.§481. 

20 29USC §501 

21 29USC§S01(a). 

22 29USC§402(1)Bnd (j). 

23 29 usc§ 402(1) 

5 
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1 Worker Centers 

Umon Front Groups and the Law 

Section 3(j) provides five examples of organizations that qualify as labor organizations, 

A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce if it: 

l is the certified representative of employees under the provisions of the National 

Labor Relations Act, as amended, or the RaHway Labor Act, as amended; or 

2. although not certified, is a national or international labor organization or a local labor 

organization recognized or acting as the representative of employees of an employer or 

employers engaged in an Industry affecting commerce: or 

3. has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary body which is representing or 

actively seeking to represent employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph 

(1) or (2); or 

4. has been chartered by a labor organization representing or actively seeking to 

represent employees within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local or 

subordinate body through which such employees may enjoy membership or become 

affiliated with such labor organization; or 

5. is a conference, general committee, joint or 

system board, or joint council, subordinate to a 

national or international labor organization, 

which includes a labor organization engaged in 

an industry affecting commerce within the 

meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of 

this subsection, other than a State or local 

central body.24 

The examples set forth in Section 3(j) are just that- examples. Section 3(j) is not intended to 

limit coverage of the LMRDA only to groups identical to the examples provided. Rather, it is 

intended to maximize coverage by ensuring that labor organizations cannot wriggle out from 

under the Act by claiming that they are not "engaged in em industry affecting commerce." ln 

fact, Courts have rejected attempts to use the 3(j) list to exclude entities from coverage under 

the LMRDA. 

Specifically, in Brennan v. United Mine Workers of America,25 the United States Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected an attempt by a labor organization to skirt 

coverage under the LMRDA merely because the form in which it existed was not included in 

one of the five enumerated examples set forth in Section 3(j). Finding the entity at issue in 

the case to be a labor organization subject to coverage under the LMRDA, the Court held that 

24 29 U5.C 402(!) 

475 F.2d 1293 (DC C:r. 1973) 

6 
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Sections 3(1) and 3(j) exist as a complement to one another because Congress intended for 

them to "increase the scope of the statute's reach and not restrlct it The Court went on to 

confirm that Congressional intent in passage of the LMRDA was "'to provide comprehensive 

coverage of labor organizations engaged in any degree in th"e representation of employees or 

administration of collective bargaining agreements"' irrespective of whot they are called,27 

lf an organization "represents its members in any 

manner regarding grievances, labor disputes, or terms 

or conditions of employment, the organization is 

subject to the Act regardless of any formal attributes ... 

or the extent of its representative activitles."2B 

The regulations promulgated under the LMRDA also 

The regufations promulgated 

under the LMRDA also 

confirm that the deflfutlon of 

a labor orgamzatwn 1s very 

broad. 

confirm that the definition of a labor organization is very broad. First, the LMRDA covers all 

organizations not expressly excluded, irrespective of what they are called and "irrespective 

of size or formal attributes."29 "To come within the quoted language in section 3(i) the 

organization must exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 

concerning grievances, etc. In determining whether a given organization exists wholly or 

partially for such purpose, consideration wi!l be given not only to formal documents ... but 

actual functions and practices of the organization as welL Thus, employee committees 

which regularly meet with management to discuss problems of mutual interest and handle 

grievances are 'labor organizations,' even though they have no formal organizational 

structure."30 

Flaws of OLMS's 2008 and 2013 Guidance Letters: 

The specific mention of "employee committees" is key because it contradicts guidance 

!etters published by OLMS in 2008 and 2013.31 In the 2008 letter, OLMS states that "a labor 

organization 'must also be engaged in an industry affecting commerce under sect!on 3(j) of 

the Act, 29 U.S.C. 402(j)."' l..lkewise. the 2013 letter (referring to the 2008 letter) states that the 

Restaurant Opportunities Center (ROC) could not be a labor organization because it "was not 

engaged in an industry affecting commerce under section 3(j) of the Act." Thus, both letters 

suggest that unless an organization comports with i)t least one of the examples in 3(j), it cannot 

be considered a labor organization. This interpretation is incorrect as a matter of law. 

28 Donovan v. National Tmnsient Div1ston, 7:>:6 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1984)(emphesis added)(ci:mg Brennan v. Umted Mme Workers. 475 

F.2d 1293, 1795 ·96 (D.C. C1r. 1973) and National Fducatwn Assn. 11. Marshall. 100 LRR,"1 2565 (D.D.C. 1979)) 

29 C. FR.§ <t513(a)(l). See also. Roddy v. United TriJnspor'tation Union, 479 F, Supp. 57, 60 (N.D. A1a.1979) 

30 29C.F.R.§4Snca)(2). 

Memo from Andrew Davis, Ja11uary 16, 2008: letter from Bcian Kennedy, Ass1stant Secretary OCIA, to Rep. John Khne, August 26. 

2013 

7 
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In fact, the example above from the LMRDA's implementing regulations regarding employee 

committees would simply make no sense if 3(j) were a limiting clause and only organizations 

meeting the examples therein could be considered labor organizations. Likewise, section 

030.622 of OLMS's Interpretive Manual states: "loosely formed employee committees, 

appointed by employers to present grievances to the employers, and neither having bylaws or 

offices, nor collecting dues, are 'labor organizations' under the Act."32 Again, this analysis of 

the LMRDA provided by OLMS itself would make no sense if the approach taken in the 2008 

and 2013 letters regarding 3(j) were correct Finally, there is the language of section 030,668 

of the interpretive manual, which states: "the definition of 'labor organization' and the 

examples of labor organizations deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce in 

section 3(j)(5) ... 

Thus, the language of the LMRDA and of its 

accompanying regulations as we!! as OLMS's own 

Interpretive Manual make it perfectly dear that an 

organization need not match the examples set forth in 

section 3(j) of the Act to be found a labor organization. 

tn add1t1on to the flawed 

interpretation of sect!on 

3(J), OLMS's 2008 and 2013 

letters rnclude other mcorrect 

interpretations of the statute. 

In addition to the flawed interpretation of section 3(j), OLMS's 2008 and 2013 letters include 

other incorrect interpretations of the statute. For example, the 2008 letter attaches weight 

to the fact that "there was no evidence of ROC being a signatory to a collective bargaining 

agreement (CBA) with an employer or ROC seeking to negotlate a CBA with any emptoyer."3&. 

However, the OLMS Interpretive Manual states; "the fact that [an organization] does not now 

have contracts with any employers does not place it outside the scope of the Act."3.5 In other 

words, having a CBA in place, or even having the lntent to enter a CBA (as opposed to other 

less forma! methods of "dealing with" an employer), ls not necessary for an organization to be 

covered under LMRDA. 

Likewise, the 2008 letter, in analyzing the meaning of "dealing with an employer," states: 

"the term refers to an interchange or transaction between two or more parties resulting in 

a mutuatly beneficial agreement. In the labor-management context this logically refers to 

collective bargainlng ... "36 Again, however, this analysis is contradicted by the language of the 

Interpretive Manual, both in section 030.611 referenced above and in section 030,610: "an 

organization in which employees participate need not actually deal with employers; only exist 

for the purpose ... 

32 OLMS lntNprf'tive> Manual, section 030.622. 

OLMS Interpretive Manual. section 030.668 (emphaSIS added\ 

34 Memo from Andrew Dav.s, January 16, 2008 

OLMS Interpretive Mcmual, secticn 030.611. 

36 Memo from Andrew Davis, January 16, 2008. 

OLMS lntcrpr<:>tive Manua!, section 030,610 
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The 2008 letter further states that "employers have not negotiated over [ROC's] demands, 

nor has ROC sought to negotiate over such demands."38 But whether formal negotiations 

have taken place is irrelevant under the statute, as the language of 030.610 mentioned above 

makes dear. To sum up, the 2008 letter simply gets it wrong: actual negotiations, let alone a 

forma! CBA, are not necessary to establish coverage under the Act. 

Finally, the 2008 Jetter includes an unusual and 

unwarranted definition of "participate." The letter 

states that ROC members "do not 'participate' in 

the governance or operations of the organization."39 

Th!s definition of "participate" as meaning the actual 

governance or steering of the operations of an 

organization is wholly lacking ln the statute. !n fact, 

''participate" is left undefined in the LMRDA. However, 

To sum up, the 2008 letter 

sJmply gets it wrong. actual 

negotiations, let alone a 

formal CSA, are not necessary 

to establish coverage under 

the Act. 

Webster's defines "participate" as "to take part" or "to have a part or a share in something," 

which is much broader than the definition in the 2008 1etter.40 The broader definition is 

consistent with the Interpretive Manual, which states: "The terms used in the Act are, generally 

speaking, defined broadly so as to provide the maximum coverage.""1 It is not dear why OLMS 

settled for such a restrictive definition of "participate" In its 2008 letteL 

The 2013 letter repeats the flawed interpretations of the 2008 letter. However, it makes an 

even stronger implication that an organization must meet one of the definitions of 3(j) to be 

found a labor organization. 

None of this is determinative of whether, at the time those letters were written, ROC was 

a labor organization. However, it should be abundantly clear that the analysis used to 

determine that ROC was not covered by the Act was deeply flawed. To ensure that other 

stakeholders do not rely on these letters in making their own determinations, the Department 

of Labor should issue clarifying guidance as soon as possible. 

Issues Relating to "Employer" Under the LMRDA: 

With respect to what constitutes an "employer," the LMRDA and its corresponding regulations 

make it very clear that the statute covers any "employer within the meaning of any law of the 

United States relating to the employment of nny employee."42 Such lows include the Fair 

Labor Standards Act, the Railway Labor Act, the Labor Management Relations Act and the 

Internal Revenue Code. This broad coverage includes employers that are in industries that 

may not be subject to federal laws that govern labor relations, For example, labor 

38 !d 

39 !d 

40 https://www.mernam-webstor.com/dlctlonary/particlpJt!J 

41 OLMS interpretive Manual, soction 020.005. 

42 29 USC§ 403(e); 20 CFR § 451.3(U)(3). 

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organizations that represent agricultural employees, which have no federally protected right 

to form such labor organizations and engage in collective bargaining, are covered by the 

LMRDA. 4 '· The same goes for labor organizations that represent employees in industries over 

wl1ich the National Labor Relations Board has declined to exercise jurisdiction, such the horse 

racing industry.44 

In determining whether an organization exists for the 

purpose in whole or part, of "d<;!allng with employers," 

the regulations promulgated under the LMRDA clte 

to Supreme Court interpretations of the phrase 

under the National Labor Relations Act. 4 ::. Although 

interpretations of the phrase under the National Labor 

The concept of "dealmg With 

employers" is far broader than 

collective bargammg m the 

traditional sense. 

Relations Act are not binding on the Department of Labor, they can be instructive in guiding 

compliance and offering certainty with respect to compliance with the Jaw. Under the NLRA, 

the phrase "dealing with employers" has been extensively analyzed. 

The concept of "dealing with employers" is far broader than collective bargaining in the 

traditional sense. When the Senate debated definitions in the original draft of the Wagner 

Act, the Secretary of Labor recommended "dea!lng with" be replaced with "bargaining 

co!1ective!y."46 That recommendation was rejected in favor of broader language."7 

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), the independent federal agency that 

administers the NLRA, has also developed a significant body of law surrounding this phrase. 

It has reached a similar conclusion that the phrase is very broad and goes well beyond mere 

collective bargaining. Much of the analysis arises within the context of employer dominated 

labor organizations or employee committees established by an employer for the purpose 

of engaging with management to address matters of employee interest, which is un!awful.48 

For example, where an organization makes recommendations to an employer regarding 

policies and employment actions, and the employer responds to the demand, the Board will 

find the "dealing with" requirement satisfied.49 in general, there should be more than a onetime communication with an employer over a discrete issue. 5° 

43 ?9 CFR45l.:':(0)(3) 

44 Steu1 v Mutuai C!erks Gurld of Massachusetts, Inc., 560 F.2d 486 (1st C<r- 10177). 

29 CF.R. § 4~1.3(a)(2), fn. £ (citmg National labor RelatiOns Board v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959)). 

NLRB 893 (1993); Keeler Brass Co., 

1,9 Keeler Brass Co., 317 NLRB 1110 (1995\ 

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A critical element in the analysis under the NLRA is whether or not there exists intent on the 

part of the organization to "deal with" the employer. In many cases the requisite intent is 

easy to find. Such cases often involve organizations established by an employer to facilitate 

employer-employee engagement. Within that context, intent is implicit in the fact that 

the employer created the organization for the purpose of dealing with it. The focus of the 

analysis therefore is on the manner of dealing, and the subject matter of those dealings, not 

the existence of intent. 

A different analysis must take place when the case involves independent organizations that the 

employer had no hand in creating, and with which the employer may not wish to deal at all. In 

those cases, care needs to be taken to fully understand the overall purpose of the organization 

to discern whether the organization possesses the requisite intent to deal with employers. 

In llght of the limited authority interpreting intent under the LMRDA, one must turn to 

interpretation of the NLRA for guidance. Under the NLRA, to determine whether a group 

possesses the requisite intent to deal with an employer, a thorough analysis ofthe overall 

purpose of the organization must occur. In undertaking such an analysis, several principles 

become evident 

First intent to deal with an employer can exist even if there is no dealing at a!!. 5

1 In 

other words, the NLRB has found groups of employees to meet the definition of a labor 

organization under the NLRA where they sought to "deal with" an employer but never 

managed do so. The mere making of demands, even if the demands amount to nothing, 

satisfies the requisite intent on the part of the organization to deal with an emp!oyerP 

Second, intent to deal with an employer may also be 

found even if demands made of an employer are not 

customarily associated with collective bargaining. For 

example the NLRB has found that refusing to work with 

an unpopular employee is evidence of intent to deal 

with because it amounts to "asserting a grievance and 

seeking to effect a change in their working conditions."53 

The mere makmg of demands, 

even 1f the demands amount 

to nothmg, sattsfJes the 

requ1s1te mtent on the part of 

the orgamzatlon to deal w1th an employer. 

Third, intent to deal with an employer must be evidenced by more than the mere pursuit of 

a broad social cause that does not target an employer to impact its wages, hours or terms 

and conditions of employmcnt.b4 However, the mere pursuit of a broad social cause does 

51 

52 Bctanccs Health Unit. 283 NLRB 369 {1987) 

53 Porto Mills, Inc .• 149 NLRB 1454, 1471 (1964). 

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not exempt an organization from compliance with the LMRDA if it engages in other conduct 

that evidences intent to deal with employers. It should be noted that many estab!lshed labor 

organizations pursue broad social causes. 

Application of the LMRDA to Worker Centers: 

The worker center, although not new, has evolved in the last decade. In the past, they were 

non-profit, community~based organizations that offered a variety of services to their members, 

including education, training, employment services and legal advice. They historically 

advocated for worker rights through research, communication, lobbying and community 

organizing, rather than through direct engagement with specific employers. In the early 1990s 

there were only a handful of known worker centers, but they now number in the hundreds. 

A recent trend has seen some of these organizations 

move away from their historical mission and toward the 

goa! of targeting specific employers for the purpose 

of effectuating change ln specific workplaces. These 

groups have also acted as surrogates of established 

labor organizations to advance the interests of those 

organizations. Those interests may include increased 

membership, effectuating change in the workplace, or 

There can be little doubt 

about the fact that a number 

of worker centers have the 

reqws1te mtent to deal w1th 

employers about wages, hours 

and terms and condtUons of 

employment. 

to gain recognition rights. At the same time, many convey the public impression that they are 

organic or grassroots groups created by workers. 

There can be little doubt about the fact that a number of worker centers have the requisite 

intent to deal with employers about wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. 

Assuming they meet the remaining elements of section 3(i), they would be labor organizations 

as that term is defined under the LMRDA. Recent studies of select worker centers reflect this 

fact A 2014 study by the United States Chamber of Commerce revealed that several prominent 

worker centers at the time were either sponsored by established labor organizations or 

independent entities that acted like labor organizations under the definition of 3(1).55 

The evolution of the worker center model over the past decade has created confusion about 

who these organizations are and on whose behalf they are acting. One of the fundamental 

purposes of the LMRDA is to promote transparency and organizational democracy within 

labor organizations. It is within the context of the confusion surrounding many of these 

organizations that the LMRDA offers an elegant and simple solution to provide clarity to the 

workers these organizations count as members and purport to represent, as well as to the 

public For that reason, OLMS should pay particular attention to worker centers and similar 

organizations that meet the definition of a labor organization under the LMRDA. 

55 

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Analysis of Specific Worker Centers under the LMRDA: 

The following is a list of several worker centers that are likely to meet the definition of a 

tabor organizations under the LMRDA. If so, they should comply with the law by structuring 

themselves as democratic institutions governed by officials elected by their members, and 

filing the requisite forms with OLMS. 

1. Retail Action Project 

The Retail Action Project ("RAP") was founded in 2005 as an organization of retail 

workers "dedicated to improving opportunities and workplace standards in the 

retail industry."56 In 2010, RAP expanded to a membership organization of retail 

workersY In addition to providing educational and advocacy services, RAP has been 

involved in a variety of campaigns targeting workers' rights at retailers in New York 

City. 53 As part of this process, RAP works with labor unions and other community 

advocacy organizations. 59 r=or instance, the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store 

Union ("RWDSU"), which is part of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union 

("UFCW''), lists RAP as an RWDSU campaign on its website.60 As an RWDSU campaign, 

RAP and this union work closely to target specific employers. 

In 2006, RAP accused a New York City clothing chain of violating state and federal 

minimum wage and overtime laws, fa1!ing to comply with New York's reporting pay 

requirements, and forcing stock employees to work in poor conditions. 61 RAP filed 

a lawsuit on behalf of employees. While filing litigation in and of itself would not be 

evidence of "dealing with" an employer, RAP used this lawsuit to convince the employer 

to enter a neutrality agreement with the RWDSU.61 RAP has also pursued other 

campaigns to pressure specific employers to increase wages and services to workers, 63 

56 SNl About. R0tad Action ProJect·. a1mdabl0 llt http·//nnadactionoroject.orq/about/ (last w;>ted Sept. 26, 2017) 

58 

60 See RWDSU's website at http://rwdsu.info/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) 

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: Worker Centers 

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Through these actions, RAP is acting as a labor organization within the LMRDA RAP is 

a membership organization in which employees participate and on whose behalf RAP 

seeks to deal with employers.64 RAP also appears to serve as an agent of the RWDSU 

by organizing workers und convincing employers to enter neutrality agreements with 

RWDSU.65 As such, RAP is a labor organization within the scope of the LMRDA and 

should comply with it 

2. Organization United for Respect at Walmart and Making Change at Walmart 

Some of the most active worker centers in recent years have been those focused 

on Walmart. They include the Organization United for Respect at Walmart ("OUR 

Walmart") and Making Change at Wa!mart ("MCAW"). Both OUR Wa!mart and MCAW 

are distinct from most worker centers because their efforts are aimed at a single entity 

instead of an industry or sector. 

As part of its ongoing campaigns against Wa!mart, the United Food and Commercia! 

Workers International Union ("UFCW") sought to change its approach toward the 

company by creating OUR Wa!mart and MCAW. In public statements, these groups 

claim to have organized thousands of hourly workers in dozens of Wa!mart stores 

across the United States.66 

MCAW is a campaign that has undertaken a self-described effort to change Walmart 

into a more responsible employer and to improve the lives of Walmart workers.67 

Membership in the MCAW is open to current or former hourly Walmart emp!oyees.6'1 It 

seeks to challenge the company's employment practices and expansion efforts69 and 

specifically highlights the following "issues"; 

• Claims that Wa!mart's jobs and wages allegedly keep communities "in poverty" and 

that "[m]inorities are disproportionately represented in low-paying positions at 

68 Sel;' Making Change at Walmart, available at http://changewalmart.org/ (last vis1tcd SEJpt. 26, 2017). 

69 http*h<>09'1"1mMt01'9">11PO>/ 

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Walmart."70 

• Claims that "VValmart's health care plans fail to cover hundreds of thousands of 

associates." 71 

• Claims that "[p]eople of co for are underrepresented in management jobs."72 

• Claims that "Wa!mart has a disturbing track record ot discrimination when it comes to 

women and mothers in the workp!ace."73 

• Claims that the company has taken "drastic steps to discourage its employees from 

exercising their right to organize and collectively bargain."74 

A separate organization, OUR Walmart, was also backed by the UFCW. The UFCW 

supplied organizers to OUR Wa!mart to recruit workers and is alleged to have paid 

members to engage in recruiting.l5 In 2015, OUR Walmart split into two factions. One . 

faction remained aligned with the UFCW and appears to have merged its operations 

with MCAW?6 The second faction, which was headed by Dan Schlademan, split from 

the UFCW and continued operations as "OUR Wa!mart."77 

Prior to its split, in June of 2011, a group of OUR Walmart members traveled to the 

company's headquarters and demanded to meet with Walmart's CEO and presented a 

Declaration of Respect to a member of senior management?8 Through its "Declaration 

of Respect," OUR Wa!mart seeks to have Walmart change wages, hours and terms and 

conditions of employment for employees?9 The changes sought include; 

• "Confidentiality in the Open Door and provide associates with a written resotut!on 

to issues that are brought up and always a!!ow associates to bring a co-worker as a 

witness;" 

• Wages of "at least $15 per hour and provide consistent, full-time schedules to all those 

that want them;" 

71 Sec Hcalthcdre, Makhg Change at Waimart. available at http)/chang<:>walmart org/tssues/healthcare/ (last vislted Sept. 24. 2017). 

72 See L.atmos, Makmg Change at Walmart, avai/abl<c at http://changewalmart.org/i5SlWS/Iatmos/ (last v:s1ted Sept_ 24, 2017) 

Sec Women, M<Jking Chm>ge at Walmart, available at http://changcwa!mart.org/issuE's/women/ (las: VISited Sept. 24, 2017). 

77 See, https.//www.united,;trespect.org/ (last VISited October 30, 2017). 

79 OUR Declaration of Respect, OUR WaJmart available at http"//www.unlted4respect.org/our __ declamtton_oCrespect (last visited 

Sept. 24, 2017) 

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80 ld. 

Worker Centers 

Union Front Groups and the Lmv 

* "Wages and benefits that ensure that no Associate has to rely on government 

assistance;" and 

• "Predictable and dependable" schedu!lng.80 

OUR Walmart has also engaged In work stoppages at Wa!mart stores, and other protest 

activities, including highly publicized Black Friday marches and rallies at company 

locations across the country. 81 OUR Wa!mart also claimed to have successfully 

demanded the discipllne and replacement of an unpopular supervisor.87 

Both OUR Walmart and MCAW meet the definition of a labor organization under the 

LMRDA. First, both constitute an "organization" of "employees" as those terms are 

defined under the LMRDA.'n OUR Wa!mart solicits money from members ~ and both 

organize events at which they promote their agenda. MCAW is actively recruiting 

workers to reach out to it and to let it know if the employee would "!ike to be involved 

in the campaign."8s Likewise, OUR Walmart holds itself out to be "a nationwide 

membership organization of current and former Walmart and retall associates coming 

together to stand up for change at Walmart"86 

It is clear that both OUR Wa!mart and MCAW possess the requisite intent to "deal with" 

Walmart as an employer. 

Regarding MCAW, the organization's self-described purpose is "to change Walmart 

into a more responsible employer and to improve the lives of Walmart workers."87 

Specifically, the MCAW web site contains a variety of demands the organization has 

made of Wa!mart that demonstrate an intent on the group's part to deal with the 

company. For example, MCAVV claims that Wa!mart engages in discriminatory practices 

by locking up certain merchandise because of crime.88 As the solution, ln a petition to 

the management at the Wa!mart Supercenters at issue, MCAW asks them to "institute 

meaningful changes to staffing and~security."89 In another request, MCAW asks 

Wa!mart to pay for the medical care of an associate by the name of Maria who allegedly 

83 Wa!mart has been t11e SUb)IXt of a nurnber of NL.RB cases <r1 WhiCh Associale coverage has been presumed. See e.g., Wa!-Mart 

Stores. Inc .. 352 NLRB 815 (2008) 

84 See https://www.united4resoect.org/donate (OUR Walmart): ilnd 

See http'//chongewalmart.org/acUon/do-you-work-at-walmart/ (last vis:ted October 30, 2017) 

86 Join OUR Walmart, OUR Walmart. avcu!able nt https://un.ted4respect.nationbuilder.c:om/)Oin Clast VISited Sept. 24, 2017) 

87 Sc,e About Us, Makmg Change At Walmart, http://changewalmart.org/about-us/ {last v1s1ted Sept. 24, 2017). 

88 See http.//changewalr:-lart.org/action/teH-walrnarHo-stop·this-d:scriminatory-pract!ce/ (last VISited October 30. 2017). 

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Jnjured herself at work.90 In still another, MCAW seeks to have Walmart reinstate laid off 

workersm and apologize to an associate who was terminated.'l 2 

With respect to OUR Walmart, its stated purpose is to convince Walmart's management 

to meet with 1t and address concerns regarding wages, hours and terms and conditions 

of employment at the company. 93 It tells the current and former members that: 

As a member of OUR Walmart, you help set the agenda for how we approach 

Walmart as an employer and work together to create opportunities to improve our 

work environment and our lives ..... With your membership, you wlll gain a voice ln our 

independent group of !ike-minded Associates as we work together to fix what is broken 

in our stores and shape our own destinies""" 

Whether successful or not, both MCAW and OUR Wa!mart possess the intent to engage 

Wa!mart. As such, they seek to engage the ''bilateral mechanism" necessary to meet 

the "deaHng with" element. It does not matter that Walmart may not have formally 

responded to their demands or will ever do so. 

Because both MCAW and OUR Wa!mart meet the definition of a labor organization 

under the LMRDA, both should fulfill their obligations under the statute. 

3. The Coalition of Immokalee Workers 

The Coalition of Immokalee Workers ("CIW") is a worker center organization based in 

Immokalee, Florida. It claims to be a "worker-based human rights organization" whose 

work encompasses three broad and overlapping spheres": (l) the Fair Food Program, 

under which the CIW conducts worker-to-worker education sessions, audits employers' 

compliance with the Fair Food Program, and charges a small Fair Food premium that 

tomato growers pass on to workers as a line-item bonus on their regular paychecks; (2) 

an anti-slavery campaign; and (3) a Campaign for Fair Food, which educates consumers 

on the issue of farm labor exptoitation. ~ 

90 See http//changew<Jimert.org/Clct>on/tell-wai'Ylart·to-pay-for-manas-med;ral-care/ (last v•~1ted on October 30, 2017) 

See http;f/changewalmart.org/actiOn/walmart-reinstate·lilid-off-wori<ers/ (last vi>1tcd on October 30. 2017), 

92 

93 

94 Join OUR Walmarl, OUR Walmart, available at rttps"//united4respect.natl0'1builder.com/1oin (last vistted sept. 24, 2017) 

95 See "About CIW", avatlable at http://www.riw-onlme.org/about/ (last v•siteO Sept 24, 2017) 

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>, " 

;, Worker Centers 

2 Union Front Groups ond the Law 

96 ld. 

It Is the C!W's Fair Food Program that satisfies the necessary elements of the test 

that defines the C!W as a labor organization under the LMRDA. The program seeks to 

improve working conditions for its members, including through Increased wages. In the 

past decade, according to CIW, it has engaged with many n0tional compomies, including 

Subway, Whole Foods, and Walmart.96 Signatories to the Fair Food Agreements pay a 

little extra per pound of tomatoes purchased, which is allegedly passed on to workers 

represented by CIW, and commit to purchase tomatoes solely from growers that abide 

by a Code of Conduct97 CIW regularly engages and deals with these employers, 

according to its website. While some might argue that engaging with employers like 

Subway, Whole Foods, and Wa!mart does not implicate coverage under the LMRDA 

because they do not employ the workers CIW purports to represent (farrnworkers), 

the OLMS Interpretive Manual is clear that the "'participating employees' referred to 

in section 3(i) of the Act need not necessarily be the employees of the employer with 

whom the labor organization deals, so long as they fa!! within the broad definition of 

'employee'" under the Act. 93 

The Code of Conduct contains many basic terms and conditions of employment one 

might find in a traditional collective bargaining agreement.99 !t provides that growers 

pay a "minimum fair wage," abide by state and federal wage and hour laws, instal! time 

docks, permit break periods, monitor worker health and safety, and provide written 

guidelines for employee advancement opportunities.100 The Code requires growers to 

grant ClW access to their facilities to perform training and orientation for employees, 

and creates an enforcement mechanism to ensure the employer complies with the 

Code.101 

Given the foregoing, there is little doubt CIW meets the elements of a statutory labor 

organization under the LMRDA CIW is a membership organization which consists of 

employees (agricultural employees in CIW's case)} 0 ? Additionally, one of C!W's stated 

purposes is to deal with employers through its Fair Food Program. As evidenced by the 

existence of Codes of Conduct, C!W intends to deal with employers over wages, hours 

and other terms and conditions of employment and maintains the contractual right to 

monitor working conditions.103 Because it is a labor organization under the LMRDA, 

ClW should comply with the requirements of the LMRDA. 

98 OLMS Interpretive tv.anual, sect1on 030.6021. 

101 /d. 

102 ld 

103/d. 

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;: Worker Centers 

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4. Restaurant Opportunities Center and its Affiliates 

The Restaurant Opportunities Center ("ROC") is a national worker center organization 

with affiliates in various cities throughout the United States.104 ROC and its affiliates 

offer a variety of services to workers, including: (1) research and policy advocacy, which 

include lobbying at the state ond federal !evels;105 (2) the High Road Initiative, which 

includes an organization of employers with ROC-approved employment practices;106 

and (3) a workplace justice campaign, in which ROC engages consumers to improve 

"wages and working conditions for people who work in the industry." 

ROC claims that it has organized over 25,000 workers and won more than $10 million 

in settlements of !awsuits.107 Through its efforts, ROC claims to have secured other 

benefits for workers at specific restaurants, such improvements in workplace policies, 

including grievance procedures, raises, sexual harassment and anti-discrimination 

policies, sick days, and job security.108 The agreements ROC claims to have negotiated 

since 2009 also cover these terms and conditions of employment, which are simi!Jr 

to those contained in a traditional collective bargaining agreement. At least some 

of them require employers to provide ROC written notice prior to terminating any 

employee, affording ROC the opportunity to investigate.1c9 The agreements also 

contain provisions that allow ROC to investigate and grieve a violation of the settlement 

agreement before it is turned over to arbitration.110 

In a 2010 interview, ROC's national policy coordinator, Jose Olivia, likened the worker 

center movement to the auto industry labor unions stating that "[b]efore people 

were unionized in the auto industry, it was dragging down the rest of manufacturing. 

Restaurants set the standards for the service industry. We're trying to create a culture 

of organizing there, to make restaurant jobs stable jobs."111 

104 See About Us. ROC Unlto?d, available at http'//rocun•tod.org/about-us/ (last v<sited Sept. 21\, 2017} 

See Our Work, ROC Un:tcd, ;;waJiable at http"//rocunited.org/our-work/ (last v;sited S1ept. 2<1, ;:>QC7). 

1061d 

107 See Our H1story. ROC Ur:1ted, http://rocunltod.orq/about-us/#our-h,story (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 

19 
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Worker Centers 

Union Front Groups and the Law 

Applying the LMRDA test, ROC and its affiliates are labor organizations subject 

to the provisions of the statute. First, ROC is an organization in which employees 

participate.112 Second, the successes ROC has promoted demonstrate that the group's 

purpose is to deal with employers.113 Given the foregoing, ROC is a labor organization 

within the LMRDA and should comply with the statute. 

5. Jobs With Justice 

Since its founding in 1987, Jobs With Justice has campaigned with the goals of 

building "power for working people ... and developing strategic alliances nationally and 

globally that strengthen the movement for workers' rights, economic justice, and our 

democracy."114 Employees can join Jobs With Justice by signing up to be part of their 

online activist network.m They can also donate money to the organization.116 

Employees who join Jobs With Justice commit to the organization's pledge to do the 

following actions at !east five times during the year: 

• Stand up for our rights as working people to a decent standard of living; 

• Support the rights of all workers to organize and bargain collectively; 

~ Fight for secure family-wage jobs in the face of corporate attacks on working people 

and our communities; 

• Organize individuals to take aggressive action to secure a better economic future; and, 

• Mobilize those already organized to join the fight for jobs with justice.111 

Additionally, Jobs With Justice has noted in its mission statement that "all workers should 

have collective bargaining rights, employment security and a decent standard of living 

within an economy that works for everyone" and claims to lead and incubate strategic 

campaigns to make concrete advancements in workers' l!ves.ns In furtherance of this 

mission, Jobs With Justice has taken steps to campaign for union representation on behalf 

of workers. Specifically, in 2008, after a 14-year campaign, Jo{?s With Justice helped the 

UFCW organize 5,500 workers at the world's largest pork processing plant. 

Jobs With Justice has also undertaken a number of campaigns on behalf of its 

members to make changes to working conditions at particular employers. A number of 

these efforts have been detailed in the group's annual reports. 

112 See About Us. ROC United, available at http://rocumted.org/about-us/ (last VISited SPpt. 26, 2017) 

113 

114 See Our History, Jobs W1th Just;c;e, available at f"ltlp //wwv,jwj.org/about-us/our-hlstory (last visiced Sept. 26, 2017). 

115 https'//actlonnetwork.org/forms/Join-our·online·activlst-network?&sourr.:e=NAT_W..JOmnavbutton. (last v<sited Nov. 6, 2017) 

116 https /lactlonnetwork.org/fundraisinq/support-)Obs-wlth-justlce?&source:-NAT _w ..JOinnavbutton (last vis;ted Nov. 6, 2017). 

117/d. 

118 See About Us. Jobs With Justice. available at http//www.Jwj.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) 

20 
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Worker Centers 

Umon Front Groups and the Law 

For example, in the group's 2014 Annual Report, lt detailed one claimed success, which 

involving making changes to working conditions at Walmart. Promoting its successes, 

Jobs With Justice wrote the following description: 

Given that 57 percent of the 1.3 million people who work at the nation's largest 

private employer are women, there is great opportunity to better women's lives by 

pressing Walmart to improve its labor practices. After two Walmart moms submitted a 

shareholders' resolution on the company's insufficient policies for pregnant associates 

in 2014, coupled with advocacy from Jobs With Justice, Walmart revised its policy by 

allowing reasonable work accommodations for any temporary disabilities caused by 

pregnancy. In coordination with Wa!mart moms, we supported know-your-rights public 

education efforts about this important first step. We also urged Wa!mart to not require 

pregnant associates to prove they are disabled ln order to be eligible for reasonable 

accommodations by mobilizing a dozen allies to sign a letter and thousands of our 

supporters to sign a petition.119 

Here, Jobs With Justice sought to change Walmart's workplace policies regarding 

pregnant associates, and claimed its efforts to be a success when that change was made. 

In its 2013 Annual Report, Jobs With Justice detailed its involvement in a dispute with 

another employer, Republic Services, in which the group claimed that it had advocated 

to protect the health and safety of the workers, and stopped employee benefit cuts. 

After a fire uncovered Republic Services' 40-year history of illegally dumping 

radioactive nuclear waste at its Westlake Landfill in Bridgeton, Missouri, Jobs with 

Justice responded by launching a campaign to ensure the company's remediation of 

the crisis would not cause ensuing damage to the environment and would protect 

the health and safety of workers and the community. By building a partnership with 

environmental groups and local labor allies, the campaign succeeded in keeping 

over 300,000 area residents safe while also simultaneously stopping employee 

benefits cutsY0 

Again, Jobs With Justice claimed that its activities on behalf of workers resulted in 

protection for workers and prevented the loss of employee benefits. 

Finally, in their 2012 Annual Report, Jobs With Justice touted the successes of their 

local chapters in making changes to working conditions at various employers the group 

had targeted. Of particular note are the efforts undertaken by Jobs With Justice on 

behalf of employees of AT&T. 

http·/jwww.JWJ,Org/wp-content/upload~/2013/11/Jwjannualrcport2014F _smal!.pdf (last v1s•ted Nov. 6, 2017). 

120 http://wwW.JWJ.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/jwjannualrepott2013fina11.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2017} 

21 
146 

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Worker Centers 

Umon Front Groups and the Lmr 

"Atlanta Jobs with Justice helped prevent hundreds of AT&T workers from 

layoffs. The coalition stood up to the telecommunications giant utilizing civil 

disobedience, nonviolent direct action, and occupation in collaboration with 

labor and allies. 121" 

Jobs With Justice also plays an active role in strike activities ln its attempts to engage 

employers. Members of Massachusetts Jobs With Justice attended an August nursing strike 

at Tufts Medical Center.m Jobs With Justice also called for a general strike as part of its 

International Women's Day events, encouraging women to work only 82 percent of the dayto reflect the 82 cents on the dollar that women make compared to men. Jobs With Justice 

organizer Gillian Mason said: "The ideals pretty simple: Withhold part of our labor that we 

aren't being paid for and see what it looks llke."113 

Moreover, Jobs With Justice has partnered with MCAW, which as discussed above, meets the 

definition of a labor organization under the LMRDA. lndeed, Jobs With Justice has said that it 

is "a core partner driving a comprehensive and historic campaign to push Wa!mart to reform 

its business practices and ensure wholesale changes across the retal! sector."174 

While Jobs With Justice engages in a wide variety of activities, a significant portion of their 

work is intended to make changes to working conditions at targeted employers. Not only has 

the group sought to make such changes, but it has been successful in numerous situations. 

Because it is an organization in which employees participate, and which, in part, seeks to deal 

with employers, it meets the definition of a labor organization under the LMRDA 

Conclusion: 

It is apparent that a number of worker centers have moved beyond the activities that once 

traditionally defined these organizations. Instead, they now regularly advocate for specific 

changes in wages and working conditions at specific employers. In so doing, they have crossed 

the line to become "labor organizations" under the LMRDA. 

The LMRDA was enacted to provide important protections for workers with regard to 

organizations that daim to speak on their behalf. As long as groups like those referenced in this 

paper are allowed to escape coverage of the Act, the LMRDA will full to live up to its purpose. 

!t ls up to the Department of Labor, and specifically OLMS, to ensure that this no longer occurs. 

http//www.jwj org/wp-content/uploads/2013/1:/2012-JW-ARAW._AI'nva\_R~eportpdf (last v•s1ted Nov. 6, 2017) 

122 Tufts: Daily, Tufts Univers•~Y. August :.?9, 2017. 

123 Boston Globcc. ·women Con5•0er Strike Goals." March 7. 2017. 

22 
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\ 

Worker Centers 

Umon D-oni Groups and the Law 

Notes: 

23 
148 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 115 here 29829.115

Worker Centers 

Uiuon Front Groups and the Law 

Notes: 

24 
149 

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150 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you. The SEIU has spent $90 million on 

worker centers. The UFCW has dumped millions of dollars into a 

retail worker center with nothing to show for it. The Coalition of 

Immokalee Workers regularly pickets, boycotts, and raises money, 

and even engages in secondary boycotts, which, as we know, are illegal under the NLRA. So how are they not a union? They walk 

and quack, but they are not a duck? 

I brought up these abusive and dishonest tactics of worker centers to Secretary Acosta, and will continue to work with him on 

this issue. So I would like to ask Mr. Marculewicz, what is the best 

way to ensure that the LMRDA is appropriately enforced, and 

should Congress amend the LMRDA to include these obviously 

union-like worker centers? 

Mr. MARCULEWICZ. Thank you, Congressman. I would say twofold. The most important piece is to get an administrator into the 

OLMS to enforce the laws and regulations that we currently have. 

The law—there are probably many ways that the LMRDA could 

be amended to modify different aspects of things and to further enhance the democratic aspects of labor organizations. But frankly, 

given the context of what we are dealing with today, enforcing the 

existing laws as they were written by Congress and as they were 

intended by Congress would go a very long way to dealing with organizations such as the ones that you mentioned. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Bowman, thank you for being here. Those are compelling stories, yours and Mr. Jackson’s, both. 

Today’s factory is not the same one that your father walked into 

in the fifties. Automation and a lot of things have changed. Are you 

aware that, according to the UAW constitution, article 31, you 

could and probably would be subject to a fine for trying to de-certify the existing union? 

Mr. BOWMAN. I am very well aware of union fines, and what can 

happen for a individual member to voice their opinion, voice their 

First Amendment right of free speech. So yes, I am very well aware 

of that possibility. 

I have not started an organizing drive to de-certify. But in many 

cases, just speaking of it and talking about it can make me subject 

to fines from the UAW. 

However, I resigned my union membership in 2015, so I am no 

longer a member of the UAW. 

Mr. ROONEY. So now you got your First Amendment rights back. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Some of them. I am still forced, under threat of 

being fired, to accept union representation that I may not want, because the union negotiated freely to be the exclusive representation 

agent of all employees in the collective bargaining agreement. So 

I am still forced to be represented by a union that I do not like. 

Mr. ROONEY. So you are not in a right-to-work state? 

Mr. BOWMAN. I am in a right-to-work state. I don’t pay union 

dues, and I am not—no longer a member of the UAW. But I am 

still forced to accept their representation— 

Mr. ROONEY. I got it, okay. 

Mr. BOWMAN.—on their contract, yes. 

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151 

Mr. ROONEY. So going back to the previous question, do you 

think that employees deserve to have First Amendment rights if 

they are in a union? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, I think that question is almost obvious in its 

answer. Of course I do. It is why I support the Employee Rights 

Act, which goes, I think, a long way into ensuring that union workers’ rights, freedoms, and protections continue and are protected in 

the long run, and it also gives unions tools to effectively go forward 

in the 21st century, instead of living in a 1930s business model. So 

yes, absolutely. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you very much. I yield. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. I recognize the 

gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much. 

So, Mr. Bowman, I have read your testimony and you work in 

a factory. So did I. I worked in a non-union factory and you worked 

in a union factory. And you said that your father worked in that 

factory. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Not that factory, but in a Ford factory, yes. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Ford, right. And that he retired in the early 

nineties. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Yes. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Did he retire with a pension? 

Mr. BOWMAN. He retired with a pension, yes. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Oh. Well, that is great, because my non-union 

factory did not offer that. 

Why did you go to Ford Motor? Were there any non-union factories that you might have felt more comfortable in? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Ford Motor Company is—it is almost genetically 

built into my family. I have— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. But there are other factories. 

Mr. BOWMAN.—family members all over the place in Ford factories. It is— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, but you chose a union factory. And I 

just want to ask— 

Mr. BOWMAN. I chose Ford Motor Company, not necessarily because it was a union factory. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Was it because of better pay? 

Mr. BOWMAN. The—when I went there, yes, it was better pay 

than what I was getting. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Did you have better benefits, like— 

Mr. BOWMAN. Not benefits, but better pay, yes. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. But did you have sick pay, and the things— 

Mr. BOWMAN. I had sick pay and vacation time all before that. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. You know, you are so fortunate, because I 

didn’t. And what else did that unionized factory give you, you 

think, that maybe I didn’t get? 

Mr. BOWMAN. I can’t guess, because I don’t know the situation, 

but— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Let me help. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Unions do negotiate benefits and— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So— 

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152 

Mr. BOWMAN.—I have no problem with unions collective bargaining. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. So better pay, better benefits, better retirement, and you went in there by choice. And then you said that 

you don’t actually have to pay for what unions bring. 

But just to give you an idea, since I know that you ran for office—and I have a couple of questions about that—did the United 

Auto Workers ever prohibit you from donating to a candidate of 

your choice, or did they ever prevent you from exercising your right 

to run for office? 

Mr. BOWMAN. No, but one thing the UAW did do is provide our 

union hall to gather ballot petition signatures for my opponent. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, let me just tell you that I know, though, 

something about that, being in a swing district. I have had the 

NRA and every other group against me, too. It is the nature of the 

business, and I am sure that you understand that. 

But this is why I think we need a union. A former colleague of 

mine, who is now sitting in the White House, met with 1,300 bankers and lobbyists recently and said—and I quote—‘‘If you are a lobbyist who never gave us money, I didn’t talk to you. If you are a 

lobbyist who gave us money, I might talk to you.’’ 

So if we don’t have the ability to give the middle class a tool to 

speak up and be heard in that kind of noise there, then what do 

you suggest we do? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, again, I support the Employee Rights Act, 

which gives additional workers additional rights, freedoms, and 

protections. How that can hurt the middle class is beyond me in 

logic. So I can’t comment beyond what I am saying here. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. So I assume that, like everybody else, 

you studied history in school. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Sure. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Right. So you know a lot about how the labor 

movement was born. 

Mr. BOWMAN. How—what? I am sorry? 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How the labor movement was born. 

Mr. BOWMAN. Sure. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. You know about the march of the children, 

right, trying to not work seven days. 

So when you are saying—I don’t think you do, but that is okay. 

There is a lot that happened to lead to a labor movement, and people gave their lives for it, and it wasn’t because they just felt like 

this would be a pretty cool thing to do. It was born out of a need, 

which I believe still exists. 

And I will tell you that when I worked in a factory, I remember 

a pregnant woman fainting on the line. They had sped up the line, 

there were many chemicals, it was a—we made auto parts, so— 

Mr. BOWMAN. Okay, sure. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. You know the smell of that, right? And she 

fainted. And so they came over and they said to her, ‘‘Go to the 

nurse, and on the way stop by and pick up your check, you are out 

of here.’’ No union. No way to go protect yourself and your paycheck. Nobody to stand up and say, you know, when you are sick, 

you don’t get fired right on the spot when you have been doing your 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

153 

job. That is why they need a union, and that is why people need 

an opportunity to come together to create a union. 

And I agree that we should never see coercion on any side at all, 

although I would argue that my former colleague used a form of 

coercion on those people, those lobbyists and those bankers, saying, 

‘‘If you want to be heard you better give money.’’ 

I don’t think—you wouldn’t—you don’t think that is good, right? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, again— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, do you think that is good or not, for 

them to— 

Mr. BOWMAN. I am not against unions in any way, shape, or 

form. I think unions should exist, and that is why we are here, to 

make sure that we update them for the 21st century and beyond. 

It is just the fact that the— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Actually, I— 

Mr. BOWMAN.—the Wagner Act and—is 83 years old, and— 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, so we won’t argue that. But I will just 

say that if you are not against union organizing, you sure have 

fooled us. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentlelady. Now I recognize the 

gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Allen. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for this 

hearing. Thank you for our panel. 

And Mr. Bowman. I was looking at the—your written statements 

that you said that—let’s see, I believe that the National Institute 

for Labor Relations Research reports in its 2016 election cycle it 

spent over 1.7 billion in politics. Can you explain how that was 

done? 

Mr. BOWMAN. No, I can’t explain how—specifically how every 

union spent their money on politics. It is just a total that the 

NILRR, the National Institute of Labor Relations Research, compiled from government reports that the unions supplied at the end 

of their year, when they have to report. 

Mr. ALLEN. But I also read where—that the unions can deduct 

this from your pay to make— 

Mr. BOWMAN. In many political spendings, absolutely. They 

can—they don’t need prior approval from any union members or 

anybody paying dues to—how they can—how they are supposed to 

use their dues in the long run. 

In other words, if a union member is upset with the way their 

union dues are used to support a political or social cause, they then 

have to resign their union membership, first of all, which can be 

very intimidating and full of fear—and again, that is something I 

have personal experience with—and then become what is called an 

agency fee payer, which is supposed to be a reflection of the true 

cost of what the union has to represent you in collective bargaining 

and grievance handling, and so forth. 

But the amount of money that unions spend on politics—for instance, donations to groups like Planned Parenthood—they do not 

need to get prior approval from a union worker before they do that. 

My thought is I think all union members should receive the opt in 

permission from the beginning to say, yes, I would like some of my 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

154 

union dues to go towards political causes and social causes, instead 

of having to do that often burdensome opt-out— 

Mr. ALLEN. Even if it conflicts with your faith or your values? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Absolutely. If it conflicts with anything. You know, 

you can make it a faith issue, you can make it just somebody who 

dislikes another organization, or for any reason they do not want 

to support a political or social cause that the union is spending 

money on. They should have the ability to opt in, instead of having 

to do that opt out, where their money is used first and then have 

to opt out for it afterwards. The Employee Rights Act provides that 

provision, where employees are given the opportunity to opt in for 

political and social spending from the beginning. 

Mr. ALLEN. All right. Quickly, we saw the chart of declining 

union membership. And of course, there are various arguments 

why that is occurring. It sounds like, from Mr. Bowman and Mr. 

Jackson, your testimony, that you got a real problem with the way 

the thing is organized and, obviously, with your leadership. 

I would like a comment from both of you. I mean don’t you elect 

your leadership in the union? And that leadership is supposed to 

represent you and your interests. And then, if you voice your interest, they are supposed to listen and respond. How does it work, 

say, with United Auto Workers? 

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, for the UAW we do not elect our nationallevel executives. 

Mr. ALLEN. How do they get that authority? 

Mr. BOWMAN. They get that authority through a convention, 

where representatives from each plant come and then represent 

and vote for union leadership. It usually comes from something 

called the Reuther caucus, which is already pretty much a pre-programmed idea of who is going to be president, even before the vote 

gets there. 

Mr. ALLEN. Okay. 

Mr. BOWMAN. So that is how it happens in the UAW. 

Mr. ALLEN. So do you think it would be more popular to change 

that to a—I mean, you know, an election process like the way we 

are elected, where you actually go out and you say, ‘‘Hey, I got new 

ideas, and I think I can help our workers, and’’— 

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, I—yes. For union executives on the national 

level—for union—or for UAW executives, I think a secret ballot 

election, again, should come to all workers— 

Mr. ALLEN. Right. 

Mr. BOWMAN.—and all the plants. 

Mr. ALLEN. You got 12 seconds, Mr. Jackson. How about your situation? 

Mr. JACKSON. We voted for representation and now we are trying 

to undo that. We didn’t actually vote for anyone specifically, it was 

as a collective group. 

Mr. ALLEN. I got you. Okay. All right. 

Thank you, I yield back. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

to the witnesses for being here today. 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

155 

I want to follow up on a point that Mr. Scott raised today regarding what really is a crisis at the NLRB, which is that we have a 

newly confirmed member who, again, was sanctioned by not just 

the inspector general, but the ethics office, in terms of participation 

in the Browning-Ferris decision. 

And again, this, I think, screams out for a hearing by this subcommittee, given the fact that not only was these findings made, 

this is not a settled matter. You know, Mr. Emanuel’s lawyer has 

communicated to Congress that he basically rejects the opinions of 

the ethics office and the inspector general, and continues to insist 

that he has the right to vote on matters that he handled, or his 

law firm handled, in—prior to his holding office. 

This is like having a member of Congress saying that they willfully refuse to accept a decision by the ethics office. I served on the 

Ethics Committee for two years, and we have various sanctions, in 

terms—and it was bipartisan. In fact, it is totally non-partisan, 

there is no majority on that committee. 

And to allow a state of affairs to continue to exist at the National 

Labor Relations Board—again, Dr. Lofaso, having been, you know, 

somebody who was proximate to the way the board operates, I 

mean, this is a real problem, in terms of just the functioning of the 

board. 

Dr. LOFASO. Yes. I want to limit my comments to saying that I 

don’t know about his specific situation. And so I am going to say 

it hypothetically. But let’s say everything you said is absolutely an 

accurate description of what is going on. 

The problem is that the people who will be—inspector general 

and the ethics officers, these are people that are—and people who 

work on these things are generally career employees who are not— 

they are not trying to be political. If anything, these—what they 

are trying to do is maintain the integrity of government, which is 

one of the most important things, to keep our faith in government, 

and the public faith in government. 

So it is very important that what we understand is that if you 

have an ethics decision that is disfavorable to an employee of that 

agency, you have to understand—is that in general they are looking for any way they can to say this was ethical. And so I would 

say that there is a lot of weight behind that. 

And that—for someone to then say I am not going to listen to 

that, I think creates, like, the equivalent of a constitutional crisis, 

but within the agency. So it is something I think that we have to 

take really seriously and try to understand. 

Now, of course, if there were really—if there really is something 

wrong, where the ethics people are going wild and saying this is 

wrong, then also you should get to know that, too. So a hearing 

would actually—could vindicate him. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. And again, a hearing, which, you know, I 

think is obvious for this subcommittee to hold, is really—as I said, 

it sort of screams out for it. 

As someone—I practiced law for 27 years before having the honor 

of representing Connecticut’s second district, you know, one of the 

things we did in our law firm, any time a new client was coming 

in is you kind of just ran the traps, in terms of making sure that 

there was no conflicts. 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

156 

I mean this stems beyond, you know, serving in a public agency 

like NLRB. I mean it is really sort of boilerplate rules that attorneys and—have to follow, as a matter of course, where you would 

be subject to ethics sanctions by the state grievance committee. 

Dr. LOFASO. Or the— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Also, Doctor, if I could just follow up real quick 

on it, we have heard a lot about card check, and somehow that this 

is sort of, you know, ramming over people’s rights. 

Again, this has been part of the law since 1935. The Supreme 

Court has actually had a number of cases where, you know, individuals like Mr. Bowman have challenged, you know, whether or 

not this somehow usurps people’s rights by providing an avenue of 

recognition that—you know, through the card check process. Every 

single instance the Supreme Court has upheld that provision of the 

law. Earl Warren, an appointee of Dwight Eisenhower, wrote one 

of those decisions. 

Again, just real quick, I mean, we are not talking about something that is really, you know, ever challenged as somehow depriving individual workers of their rights. Is that correct? 

Dr. LOFASO. That is correct. It is well developed in the jurisprudence. Gissel is the main Supreme Court case from 1969. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. 

I would like to again thank our witnesses for the time and attention that you have taken to be here, to travel here, to prepare your 

remarks, and to respond to our questions and concerns. I hope it 

has been a valuable experience for you, as I believe it has been for 

us. 

This isn’t a simple issue. We understood that when we established this hearing. We understand that this hearing isn’t the endall, but we thank you for being here and helping us. 

Now, I am delighted to recognize my Ranking Member for any 

closing comments he might have. 

Mr. SABLAN. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We obviously have different views on how to modernize labor law, but I appreciate very much your holding this hearing this morning, and I 

appreciate the time and effort put in by all of the witnesses. Thank 

you. 

We must do better by our workers. They are working harder and 

harder for less and less, and their hard-fought rights and protections in their workplaces are being chipped away. We need to protect their right to join a union, have that union collectively bargain 

on their behalf, and enjoy a safe workplace, free of unfair labor 

practices. 

And we need to fix the National Labor Relations Board. This is 

supposed to be an independent agency protecting workers’ rights 

and promoting collective bargaining. My colleagues and I have been 

performing our oversight due diligence, writing several letters 

there. The agency has to function free from the reported chaos and 

infighting, and function fairly to carry out their mission. 

I must, on a personal observation, note my agreement with— 

some agreement with Mr. Bowman. He noted that he doesn’t have 

a say in who is the president of, say, UAW. And I also—because 

I also say that I would like to think that our nation should come— 

has come to a point where the person who gets the most vote in 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

157 

a presidential election should be our president. And we just saw an 

experience where a person who wasn’t—our president is selected by 

the electoral college, and not by voters directly. So maybe Mr. Bowman and I have some kind of agreement on the concept. 

But Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. You have always been 

very kind and—of your time. And I yield the balance of my time. 

Chairman WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. And I am not going 

to take on the electoral college. We will leave that for some other 

committee. 

Mr. SABLAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman WALBERG. I kind of like it, and especially living in a 

rural area, I appreciate having a say. 

But I appreciate having a say today, and what each of our panelists have brought to the table. And the discussion we have had as 

a subcommittee, it is important to have. 

I am delighted that back in Michigan we are seeing ‘‘help wanted,’’ ‘‘hiring now’’ signs all over the place. It almost gives the feeling that it is an employees’ market right now. And being that is 

the case, we also see a lot of attention from employers on what it 

will take to provide incentive for employers to come and apply for 

those jobs (sic). 

Our challenge is to make sure that they are trained and ready 

for those jobs, as well. And so, for us to have a setting in place 

where employers and employees feel like they have a seat at the 

table and can experience all that is best that this great country has 

allowed to happen, and been an example for the rest of the world 

is so important right now. 

I am thankful that when—and my good friend flattered me by 

saying that I was born in 1973. You knew that wasn’t true. But 

in 1969, when I graduated from high school and went to work at 

U.S. Steel South Works, south side of Chicago, where one time my 

father had worked and helped organize unions, steel workers, and 

did it for the purposes to make sure that he would come home at 

night safe and sound with all of his faculties, all of his body parts, 

that there would be a level playing field for benefits, enhancements, good pay for good day’s work. I was glad that a lot of those 

things had taken place back in the forties and fifties, when my dad 

was there, and continued on as a union worker for most of his 

working career, until the latter days of his working career. 

It made it a better working place for me at U.S. Steel, as a repairman’s helper, as a third helper on the furnace, as a common 

laborer in the kitchen area, and as a—and please report this accurately—as a hooker in the scrap yard. Make that clear. And I appreciate the fact that there were unions that were doing that. 

But I also know that times have changed, and we have laws in 

place because of some of those efforts. We have workplace requirements because of those efforts. We also have plenty of examples 

that my dad would tell if he were alive today of how he felt that 

the union went too far, and caused problems for a workplace and 

a continuation of work place. 

And that is where I think we have to have that give-and-take 

and the ability for employees to determine their destiny, as well, 

and to vote whether they want to be part of a union or not. 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER

158 

My son is helping organize a union right now at a major communications organization because of some significant problems that 

developed in the changeover of ownership in this entity. And as I 

have talked with him, he said, ‘‘Dad, I never thought I would be 

a union man.’’ 

And I said, ‘‘Well, if it is for the right purpose, that is great. But 

make sure you do it for the right purpose, and don’t go beyond 

what is necessary to foster a workplace that works for all, and to 

have an employment—place of employment that continues on, as 

well.’’ 

So that is why we had the reason for this hearing. And I think 

there are discussions that need to continue. But in this country, we 

certainly should not feel any compulsion to take away rights of individuals to make decisions for themselves. And I think that is why 

we want to see it happen. 

So we will continue to look at this. We wish that we had better 

prospects in the Senate to do the same thing. But it is our purpose 

here in the House to make sure we look at all sides, and we make 

sure that Americans and America is served well. Having nothing 

else to be heard before this subcommittee, it is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ 

CEWDOCROOM with DISTILLER