Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

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https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Behind headlines, social media, and fear-mongering lies an ISIS 

threat not of ideology, but rather opportunity. ISIS is a maestro 

at maximizing political instability and discontent, parlaying them 

into new potential strongholds and followers. In this monograph, 

Namrata Goswami expertly unmasks this underground version of 

ISIS, and with it, uncovers vulnerabilities to previously untapped 

ISIS targets in Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Indonesia. This monograph provides a much needed fact-based perspective to explain 

the success of ISIS in both spreading its ideology and recruitment 

base. Drawing upon historical examples and parallels, the author 

describes a movement that is very strategic in its emphases. Even 

existing scholars in the region are apt to find new and invaluable 

insights on where sociological, cultural, and political variables of 

this region intersect with ISIS opportunity.

ISBN 978-1-941715-32-1

ISIS 2.0: South and Southeast Asia 

Opportunities and Vulnerabilities

Namrata Goswami 

with contributions from Robert A. Norton and Greg S. Weaver

JSOU Report 18-6

JSOU Report 18-6 ISIS 2.0: Opportunities and Vulnerabilities Goswami 

National Security Guard (NSG) commandos reenact a counterterrorism operation 

during their 33rd NSG Raising Day celebration on 16 October 2017 in Gurgaon, 

India. PHOTO BY RAJ K RAJ/HINDUSTAN TIMES/NEWSCOM
Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Senior Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University and the 

Center for Strategic Studies

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission 

is to prepare SOF to shape the future strategic environment by providing 

specialized joint professional military education, developing SOF-specific 

undergraduate and graduate level curriculum and by fostering special operations research, analysis and outreach in support of USSOCOM objectives. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) 

where efforts center upon the USSOCOM mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

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in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Elizabeth Sylvester, B.S., Journalism, JSOU Press Assistant Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Christopher Marsh, Ph.D., Political Science

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 18-6

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2018

ISIS 2.0: South and 

Southeast Asia 

Opportunities and 

Vulnerabilities

Namrata Goswami

with contributions from 

Robert A. Norton and Greg S. Weaver
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to 

the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) is currently accepting written works 

relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information, please 

contact the CSS Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your interest 

in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in September 2018.

ISBN 978-1-941715-32-1
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Countering Transregional Terrorism, JSOU Report 18-5, edited by Peter McCabe

The Enemy is Us: How Allied and U.S. Strategy in Yemen Contributes to AQAP’s 

Survival, JSOU Report 18-4, Norman Cigar

Complexity, Organizational Blinders, and the SOCOM Design Way, JSOU Report 18-3, 

David C. Ellis and Charles N. Black

Advancing SOF Cultural Engagement: The Malinowski Model for a Qualitative 

Approach, JSOU Report 18-2, Robert R. Greene Sands and Darby Arakelian

Growing SOLO: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities, 

JSOU Report 18-1, Troy White

Resistance Views: Tartu Resistance Seminar Essays on Unconventional Warfare and 

Small State Resistance, edited by Kevin D. Stringer and Glennis F. Napier

On the cover. Iraqi soldiers from the 40th Brigade conduct a night, live-fire exercise 

at the Besmaya Range Complex in Iraq, on 2 April 2018 as part of Combined Joint 

Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SPC ANTONIO 

LEWIS

Back cover. On 16 October 2017, National Security Guard (NSG) commandos reenacted a counterterrorism operation during their 33rd NSG Raising Day celebration at the Manesar campus in Gurgaon, India. The NSG, popularly known as the 

“Black Cats,” was formed in 1984 to combat terrorist activities, specifically to protect 

states against internal disturbances. PHOTO BY RAJ K RAJ/ HINDUSTAN TIMES/

NEWSCOM
v

Contents

From the Director ........................................................................vii

Foreword ......................................................................................ix

About the Authors .........................................................................xi

Acknowledgements ....................................................................xiii

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1. ISIS Ideology and Strategy: “There is no God 

but Allah”.................................................................................... 11

Chapter 2. Dynamics of Allegiance, Ideological Propaganda 

Tools, and Recruitment Patterns .................................................. 37

Chapter 3. Bangladesh and Burma: Will ISIS Spread 

Its Wings? ................................................................................... 49

Chapter 4. Questioning ISIS Ideology in India ............................. 65

Chapter 5. Resistance to ISIS Ideology and Recruitment 

in Indonesia ................................................................................ 79

Chapter 6. An Effective Response to ISIS ..................................... 93

Chapter 7. Conclusion .............................................................. 105

Acronym List ............................................................................ 113

Endnotes ................................................................................... 117

vii

From the Director 

The goal of good research is to find not what is, but what can be. 

ISIS 2.0—South and Southeast Asia Opportunities and Vulnerabilities by 

Namrata Goswami, Robert Norton, and Greg Weaver presents a startling 

wake-up call to the potential for further Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

expansion into the seemingly quiet confines of Bangladesh, Burma, India, 

and Indonesia. Through a research-driven approach to ISIS culture, recruitment, and narratives, the author reasons that current events in Syria and 

Iraq will almost inevitably spread to these countries. Drawing from detailed 

analyses obtained during in-person visits, interviews, and research on Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Indonesia, this monograph points to trends and 

insights most vital to the special operations community.

This unique look into the ISIS threat—most importantly how to identify 

and address it—stands as a must read for scholars and practitioners focused 

on South and Southeast Asia, and those searching for a better understanding 

of how and why transnational threat groups form and morph.

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Strategic Studies

ix

Foreword 

Behind headlines, social media, and fear-mongering lies an Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) threat not of ideology, but rather opportunity. 

This ISIS is a maestro at maximizing political instability and discontent, 

parlaying them into new potential strongholds and followers. 

In this monograph, Namrata Goswami expertly unmasks this underground version of ISIS, and with it, uncovers vulnerabilities to previously 

untapped ISIS targets in Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Indonesia. While 

these four states appear largely ignored by ISIS as potential areas for exploitation, the author expertly argues this oversight could afford the organization 

easy expansion into critical spaces within South and South East Asia.

Perhaps most importantly, this monograph provides a much needed factbased perspective to explain the success of ISIS in both spreading its ideology and recruitment base. Drawing upon historical examples and parallels, 

the author argues for a movement very strategic in its emphases, likewise 

targets it chooses to both attack and draw followers from. Along these lines, 

Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Indonesia emerge as the next potential stops 

for ISIS as it continues its quest for influence and legitimacy. Throughout, 

the authors deliberately link ISIS events and leadership in Syria and Iraq 

back to these four countries.

Equally significant, Goswami and colleagues break down economic and 

social nuances behind ISIS targets, specifically how these factors feed into 

improving its chances for success. In doing so, this discussion replaces the 

seeming mystique on ISIS methodology via emotion with tangible metrics 

and warning signs capable of signaling a vulnerability and/or likelihood of 

recruitment surge.

Related and unlike other works on ISIS, Goswami adopted a literal handson approach in assessing potential for ISIS intrusion into South and Southeast Asia. Her visits to these countries and familiarity with their populations 

and governance systems provide a much needed, candid perspective beyond 

known data and simple narrative assessment. Instead, discussions on the four 

countries highlight current discrepancies between different Muslim factions, 

significance of recent attacks toward future ones, and finally techniques ISIS 

is using to create rifts between Muslim and non-Muslim populations. It is 
x

this type of hands-on approach that will resonate with special operators and 

their communities. Included in this monograph is a vital chapter on narratives employed and the techniques behind them. This discussion is essential, 

as psychological operations are a core component in predicting future ISIS 

activities, notably recruitment segmentation.

Still, and with seemingly countless monographs and scholarly articles 

on this topic, why is this monograph any different? Simply put: it stands 

as perhaps the only one written for the special operations community. The 

author purposefully discusses potential ISIS threats in South and Southeast Asia noting United States Special Operations Command authorities 

and mission sets, and how and where core capabilities can create the greatest impact. Moreover—and recognizing both gray zone and transregional 

challenges for special operators—Goswami provides a strong argument for 

Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Indonesia as the key areas of emphasis for 

future counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts. Even existing 

scholars of the region are apt to find new and invaluable insights on where 

sociological, cultural, and political variables of this region intersect with 

ISIS opportunity.

Paul S. Lieber, Ph.D.

Resident Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic Studies 
xi

About the Authors 

Dr. Namrata Goswami is an independent strategic analyst and consultant 

on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, alternate futures, and great 

power politics. After earning her Ph.D. in international 

relations, she served for nearly a decade at India’s Ministry of Defense-sponsored think tank, the Institute for 

Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, working on 

ethnic conflicts in India’s Northeast and China-India 

border conflict. 

She is the author of three books, India’s National 

Security and Counter-Insurgency, Asia 2030 and Asia 

2030: The Unfolding Future. Her research and expertise 

generated opportunities for collaborations abroad, and she accepted visiting 

fellowships at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway; La Trobe University, 

Melbourne, Australia; and the University of Heidelberg, Germany. In 2012, she 

was selected to serve as a Jennings-Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States 

Institute of Peace, Washington D.C. where she studied India-China border 

issues. She was awarded a Fulbright-Nehru Senior Fellowship that same year. 

Shortly after establishing her own strategy and policy consultancy, she won 

the prestigious MINERVA Grant awarded by the Office of the U.S. Secretary 

of Defense to study great power competition in the gray zone of outer space. 

With expertise in international relations, ethnic conflicts, counterinsurgency, war-gaming, scenario building, and conflict resolution, she has been 

asked to consult for audiences as diverse as Wikistrat, United States Pacific 

Command, United States Special Operations Command, the Indian military, 

and the Indian government. She was the first representative from South Asia 

chosen to participate in the George C. Marshall European Center for Security 

Studies NATO Partnership for Peace Consortium ‘Emerging Security Challenges Working Group.’ She also received the Executive Leadership Certificate 

sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, National Defense 

University, and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Currently, she 

is working on two book projects, one on ethnic narratives, to be published 

by Oxford University Press, and the second on great power ambitions, to be 

published by Lexington Press, an imprint of Rowman and Littlefield.
xii

Dr. Robert A. Norton is a professor at Auburn University and currently 

serves as coordinator of National Security Initiatives in the Auburn 

University Open Source Intelligence Laboratory and Program Director of 

the Futures Laboratory—a collaborative effort between Auburn University, 

Auburn University at Montgomery, and Air University at Maxwell Air Force 

Base. A long-time consultant to multiple federal agencies and the Department of Defense, Dr. Norton’s research interests include public health/one 

health, intelligence analysis, chemical and biological weapons defense, medical and technical intelligence, military-related science and technology, biosecurity/biodefense, and veterinary infectious diseases. In August 2017, Dr. 

Norton received the prestigious Knowlton Award from the Military Corps 

Association for his support of the Military Intelligence Corps. 

Greg S. Weaver is an associate professor and sociology program director 

at Auburn University. He also serves as director and coordinator of 

criminal justice initiatives for the Auburn University Open Source Intelligence Laboratory. He is a graduate of Auburn University, the University 

of Central Florida, and the University of Nebraska. Research and teaching 

interests include cultural and structural factors related to lethal violence, 

domestic and international threat groups, and research methods—particularly as they relate to open source intelligence and analysis. He is a former 

probation officer with the Florida Department of Corrections and a current 

member of the reserve unit of the Sheriff’s Office in Alabama. He also serves 

as president of the Homicide Research Working Group.
xiii

Acknowledgements 

It gives me immense joy to offer my thanks and gratitude to my colleagues from Auburn University, Alabama, Robert (Bob) Norton and 

Greg Weaver, for their contributions to the project. Bob alerted me to the 

possibility of working on a JSOU project, and he and Greg have contributed 

an excellent chapter to the monograph. My heartfelt thanks go out to Pete 

McCabe, JSOU, for support in the initial stages of the monograph. To Paul S. 

Lieber, JSOU, who helped refine the work with his incisive suggestions and 

comments, expertly guiding the monograph to publication. A big thank you 

to the JSOU editorial team for an excellent job in editing this work.

Working on an issue dealing with violent conflict can be hard, especially 

while unpacking the various layers of narratives that exist in a conflict zone, 

with very real and devastating impacts, on peoples’ lives. In this regard, I 

always remain indebted to those whom I met during field work, for their 

insights, courage, and willingness to share with me their everyday experiences. Such interviews and conversations helped me form a more nuanced 

understanding of societies affected by insurgent/terrorist violence.

Ultimately, once the data is collected and the reading accomplished, writing is a solitary act. In that regard, a family’s generosity in granting time 

at your desk, is, I believe, the greatest gift they can offer an author. To that 

end, I remain deeply thankful to my family and the love and support they 

offered during this time.

1

Goswami: ISIS 2.0

Introduction 

The aim of terrorist groups is to create disorder within states by violent means for political ends. These end goals include local or transnational policy change, social control, or regime change. Terror groups like 

al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have demonstrated 

global aspirations and transnational reach 

across several continents in order to spread 

their ideologies and establish a sharia-based 

(Islamic religious legal system) governance. 

Terrorist groups use propaganda, social networks, psychological fear, and ethnic and 

religious linkages to spread roots and establish presence. For example, the 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a terrorist group that represented itself 

as fighting for Tamil causes in Sri Lanka, enjoyed diasporic support and 

presence outside of its country of operation. With the advent of the internet, 

the ability to establish a virtual presence and motivate terror attacks across 

the globe has increased manifold.1

 This aspect is amplified by the ability of 

ISIS to inspire attacks in Europe and the U.S., attract foreign fighters to its 

causes and spread its propaganda. For instance, the 2 December 2015 San 

Bernardino terror attacks that killed 14 people and wounded 22 were perpetrated by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik [the former a 

U.S. citizen, the latter a permanent resident]. Farook pledged allegiance to 

ISIS on behalf of both attackers on his Facebook page.2

With the defeat of ISIS in major cities and towns in Iraq and Syria by an 

international coalition, its attempt to spread to other countries is likely to 

intensify. ISIS plans to inspire lone wolf-type attacks to signal its capability 

to continue launching terrorist strikes. This aspect was highlighted in the 

31 October 2017 Manhattan terror attack. Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov, an 

Uzbekistan national living in the U.S. since 2010 deliberately drove a rented 

truck on the wrong side of the road killing eight people and injuring nearly 

a dozen. A note discovered in his truck claimed that his attack was ISIS 

inspired.3 In testimony to the House’s Homeland Security Task Force on 

“Denying Terrorist Entry into the United States,” Thomas Joscelyn, Senior 

Editor of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal, 

The aim of terrorist groups 

is to create disorder within 

states by violent means for 

political ends.
2

JSOU Report 18-6

specified that the fall of Mosul or Raqqa does not signify the end of ISIS; that 

it will continue to function as a guerilla group.4 The Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence indicated that even though ISIS was losing ground 

and resources, it “will likely have enough resources and fighters to sustain 

insurgency operations and plan terrorists [sic] attacks in the region and 

internationally going forward.”5

The stated end goal of ISIS is to establish a Dar-al-Islam (caliphate) where 

sharia laws apply.6 To this end, the group has established provinces around 

the globe, prominent being the Libyan and Khorasan Wilayats (Provinces). 

With the fall of Mosul and Raqqa, ISIS fighters will attempt to relocate to 

Tunisia, Niger, Somalia—countries that have seen some of the highest foreign fighter recruits to ISIS.7

 Specifically for this monograph, the critical 

puzzle is whether ISIS can extend its reach to Bangladesh, Burma, the Indian 

subcontinent, and Indonesia. The usage of al-Sham is interesting as it is 

meant to indicate ‘Greater Syria’ which has historically included modern 

Syria, Jordan, South Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel-Palestine.8 Basing their 

propaganda and their politics on the apocalyptic belief of end-times, ISIS 

portrays their idea of the caliphate as integral to human existence, and a 

space where the “Mahdi” or “messiah” will return to rescue humankind 

from sin. ISIS press releases and propaganda continuously remind its target 

audience that Allah (used as name of God in Islam) has chosen them (ISIS) 

alone, to rule and administer over true Muslims, and to purify and cleanse 

them of false faith.9

ISIS forwards the vision of a decisive battle in Dabiq, Syria, in which 

the ‘Western crusaders’ will be defeated resulting in triumph of the Global 

Islamic caliphate.10 This kind of belief system or ideology encourages perpetual wars, and genocidal tendencies, and anyone viewed by ISIS as kuffar 

(disbeliever) is an infidel, to be annihilated.11 The significance of an apocalyptic view for ISIS is vindicated by its desperate need to capture a strategically inconsequential town, Dabiq, Syria, represented as the sacred site of 

end-times in Islamic eschatology and finding mention in the Hadith (text 

containing the traditions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). The word 

al-sham also finds frequent mention in Islamic prophesies.12 This necessity 

to occupy Dabiq, given the emphasis ISIS places on apocalyptic literature, 

is that it provides the group with seeming legitimacy, which in turn draws 

resources and recruits. In a similar streak, ISIS justifies its destruction of historic sites in Palmyra, Syria as necessary for the apocalypse. This ranges from 
3

Goswami: ISIS 2.0

the destruction of the Temple of Bel to shrines of Muslim saints, something 

that ISIS views as anti-Islam. In carrying out these acts, ISIS aims to destroy 

earlier symbols of memory and history while at the same time creating and 

controlling their history by claiming strict adherence to Islamic scriptures. 

This trend of destroying memorabilia continues the Abbasid Caliphs’ actions 

of destroying the Umayyad Caliphs’ graves in 750 A.D. followed by Mongols 

destroying the architecture of the Abbasids in 1258 A.D.13

One can only speculate whether ISIS truly believes in their apocalyptic 

ideas or utilizes these ideas instrumentally to target audiences who believe 

in such mythology. Nevertheless, their propaganda refers to it endlessly. This 

aspect of the group was highlighted by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, Army General Martin Dempsey: “They can be contained, but not 

in perpetuity. This is an organization that has an apocalyptic, end-of-days 

strategic vision which will eventually have to be defeated.”14

Significantly, unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS succeeded in establishing a state over 

which it governed. Similar to a state, the ISIS caliphate is based on a taxation system that aims to draw resources and recruits from the population it 

governs, and runs its own education and banking systems.15 That state-based 

vision and expansion has now stalled due to a successful international coalition against ISIS. Over the last few years since its founding in July 2014, ISIS 

has lost territory in both Iraq and Syria. It has lost its grip on Mosul, Iraq, the 

site from where it declared its caliphate, and over Raqqa, its capital in Syria, 

which was captured by U.S.-backed forces in October 2017.16 With the loss 

of territory, its ability to turn out slick social media propaganda has taken a 

hit, and so has its finances.17 However, ISIS has continued to inspire suicide 

attacks as was witnessed in the Paris attacks in November 2015, and the Barcelona attacks in 2017. According to a CNN report, ISIS planned or inspired 

around 143 terror attacks in 29 countries worldwide since 2014 resulting in 

2,043 deaths.18 ISIS claimed responsibility for the London underground train 

station bombing that left 29 people injured on 15 September 2017 stating that 

it was “carried out by a detachment of the Islamic State.”19

While the U.S.-led international coalition has succeeded in eliminating 

several top ISIS leaders—to include its spokesperson Abu Muhammad alAdnani—the ideology of ISIS will continue to fester through its rank and 

file going underground and spreading online.20 There are no clear estimates 

of how many members ISIS still has given the discrepancy in the data on 

ISIS members at its peak in 2014. While Hisam al-Hashani, a Baghdad-based 
4

JSOU Report 18-6

security expert, claimed that ISIS had a total of 100,000 members at its peak,21

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates the number between 20,000 

and 31,000 in late 2014.22 Fuad Hussein, Chief of Staff to former Kurdish 

President Massoud Barzani, estimates its peak number is even higher, at 

200,000. ISIS ambitions to expand to Indonesia is examined in-depth in the 

monograph. Indonesia is an interesting case given the fact that ISIS aims 

to expand its presence to the largest Sunni Muslim country in the world. 

According to General Gatot Nurmantyo, Indonesia’s military chief, ISIS 

cells have infiltrated all provinces in Indonesia, and these sleeper cells could 

easily cross the border into the Philippines and Malaysia.23 There are concerns that Indonesia may be sliding into political intolerance, especially after 

the imprisonment of Jakarta’s former Christian Governor, Basuki Tjahaja 

Purnama, on a blasphemy charge.24 Another critical area for examination 

is whether existing terrorist groups in Indonesia will align with ISIS goals 

and work towards spreading its extremist ideology locally.25 Experts have 

flagged the steady increase in Salafist ideology within the government in 

Indonesia and growing anti-Shiite sentiments in the region.26 For instance, 

neighboring Malaysia has banned Shiite Islam.27 ISIS inspired groups like 

Katibah Nusantara, based in Malaysia, have members from Indonesia and 

Philippines. ISIS usage of local languages for propaganda, has been effective 

in spreading their ideas to its target audience.28

The stated objective of the 2014 U.S.-led international coalition against 

ISIS is to ‘degrade and destroy’ ISIS and its caliphate in Iraq and Syria.29 The 

68 member coalition worked with local partners to wrest territory from ISIS 

control, helped stabilize liberated areas in the post-ISIS phase, and limited 

the spread of ISIS globally with the help of information-based operations. 

These operations have included countering extremist recruitments, cutting 

off ISIS financing, and limiting the spread of the ISIS narrative to intended 

audiences.30 The coalition, along with the Iraqi army, have retaken Mosul, 

Iraq from ISIS, and have succeeded in liberating about 62 percent of territory from ISIS hold in Iraq and 30 percent in Syria. About $22.2 billion has 

been expended in these efforts.31 The coalition is concentrating on countermessaging, especially though the United Arab Emirates, UK, and U.S.-led 

Global Counter ISIS Coalition Communications Working Group. Messaging centers routinely counter and expose ISIS, as well as generate positive 

content online, which the audiences can access and contrast it with ISIS 

perspectives.32 Significantly, due to coalition efforts, ISIS-held territories in 
5

Goswami: ISIS 2.0

Iraq and Syria have been cut off from each other. The flow of foreign fighters 

to Iraq and Syria has declined, and thousands of ISIS fighters have died in 

battle.33 The critical concern here is the continuance of ungoverned spaces, 

both in Iraq and Syria, where ISIS may mingle in with local networks, and 

remerge at a later date.34

While the objective of wresting control of ISIS-held territory has been 

achieved,35 the ideology that the group unleashed has the potential to fester, 

and inspire radical groups elsewhere especially based on ISIS’s “remaining 

and expanding” goals.36 Moreover, literature on terrorism and insurgency 

suggests that terrorists and insurgent groups tend to go underground when 

weakened and resurface when they believe they have gathered enough capability and resources.37 The history of ISIS itself reveals such a pattern. In 

2007, the 80,000 strong ‘Sunni Awakening’ in Iraq fought against Al-Qaeda 

in Iraq (AQI) and successfully limited its influence. Al-Qaeda’s leaders like 

Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al Baghdadi were thought killed in 

2010 in a joint Iraqi-U.S. military operation.38 Among those who survived 

was Abu Bakr al Baghdadi who went on to lead ISIS after slipping into Syria 

and regrouping there.39 Interestingly, ISIS presents itself to its local target 

audiences in Iraq and Syria as representative of the repressed and disenfranchised Sunni population, as advocates for them offering them a less 

oppressive political state.40 Given the reality of sectarian divides in Syria 

and Iraq, such an idea will not disappear even if ISIS as a group is weakened. 

Moreover, ISIS has cleverly created a discourse to justify its defeat vis-à-vis 

the international coalition by couching it in ‘Us vs. crusaders’ terminology, and framing the coalition's counter-attack as a “war on Islam” per se.41

Moreover, its discourses are mostly aimed at portraying ISIS as the winning 

side, always on the move, always successful in what it does.42

It is in this context that this monograph examines ISIS stated goals, 

inspired by their vision to expand to the Indian subcontinent, Bangladesh, 

Burma, and Indonesia. Despite having three of the largest Muslim populations in the world, the recruitment rate to ISIS has been comparatively low 

from these countries, compared to countries like the UK, Germany, and 

France. For instance, India has registered cases against 75 individuals suspected to be involved with ISIS activities.43 Amongst them, about 23 Indians, 

mostly from the state of Kerala, have traveled to the caliphate in Iraq and 

Syria.44 Around 30 Bangladeshis have joined ISIS,45 and about 700 have been 

recruited from Indonesia.46 What is missing from these low numbers are the 
6

JSOU Report 18-6

number of sympathizers ISIS may have in these countries and the potential 

for clandestine expansion. 

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) deals with 

the threat of terrorism, both from the perspective of irregular warfare (IW) 

and counterterrorism (CT).47 Therefore, understanding the goals, ideology, 

recruitment strategies, and propaganda of ISIS, as well as its intentions to 

spread its networks to other regions of the world, falls directly within their 

mission set. Toward this end, conducting foreign internal defense (FID) provides direct and indirect support to foreign governments and their agencies 

to combat insurgency and terrorism, among other threats, and helps protect their societies from internal violence.48 In its operations in the Middle 

East, USSOCOM works alongside local governments and their militaries, 

including the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service and Kurdish forces, especially 

the People’s Protection Units. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are not 

only advising senior local officers, but also accompanying local forces on 

the frontline to advise them and increase their firepower.49 There are U.S. 

SOF members in advisor capacities in Iraq and Syria, roles where they work 

alongside local forces in the front against ISIS.50 There are also U.S. SOF in 

combat positions in Syria. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, as 

of December 2017, the U.S. had approximately 5,200 troops in Iraq and 2,000 

troops in Syria.51 Local commanders have the power to temporarily increase 

this number if conditions so demand.52

That said, with the loss of territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS fighters will 

likely attempt to carry out terror strikes and increase their presence outside 

of the caliphate. This amounts to the concept of ‘costly signaling,’ where 

terror groups aim to target civilians to communicate credibility and draw 

resources from their target audience.53 We have seen ISIS-inspired attacks in 

France, the UK, and the United States. This monograph examines the potential and capability of ISIS to expand beyond these efforts, and to establish a 

formal presence in countries like Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Indonesia. 

These countries were chosen for closer examination for two reasons. First, 

they were included in the group’s future expansionist goals. Second, they 

offer insights across South and Southeast Asia, the two regions with the 

largest Muslim population in the world. 

The study offers perspectives into the societal and political conditions 

within these four countries toward limiting the influence of extremist groups 

like ISIS. Similarly, this research outlines considerations for USSOCOM 
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to strengthen mechanisms that negate the impact and spread of extremist 

ideologies. The key research questions that this monograph examines are 

as follows:

Research Questions

1. What are the factors within Indonesia and India that make their 

Muslim populations immune to the ISIS ideology? 

2. Are these factors true with regard to countries like Bangladesh and 

Burma? 

3. Are political and social conditions in Indonesia and India different 

from countries with high ISIS recruitment like Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, 

France, and the UK? 

4. Despite having young Muslim populations, as well as high rates of 

unemployment and poverty, why has ISIS failed to spread rapidly in 

countries like India, Indonesia, and Burma? 

5. Is Bangladesh an outlier in terms of its growing intolerance toward 

secularism and free thought? 

Chapter 1 on “ISIS Ideology and Strategy” examines the role of ideology 

in expanding the rise of ISIS as a viable political group. It investigates the 

contours of that ideology, and explains its hold on ISIS leaders and cadres, 

as well as its role in gathering popular support. The chapter highlights the 

all-important variable of ‘legitimacy,’ usually critical for the spread of an 

insurgent/terrorist group’s worldview, especially with regard to its target 

population. Specifically, this chapter inspects the strategy adopted by ISIS to 

occupy territory and spread its ideology. In this, the chapter utilizes speeches 

by ISIS leaders, sympathizers, and cadres to formulate its arguments. Significantly, it identifies the dominant narratives that exist in areas occupied 

by ISIS, particularly amongst its target population, with whom ISIS leaders 

share ethnic kinship and strong pre-ISIS social networks.

Chapter 2, titled “Dynamics of Allegiance, Ideological Propaganda Tools, 

and Recruitment Patterns,” analyzes how ISIS institutes allegiances with its 

cadres and target populations. This chapter examines the role of ideological indoctrination, economic and social factors, promised future benefits of 

recruitment, participatory political organizational structures within ISIS, 
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and elements of coercive persuasion. Additionally, it details how ISIS allocates tasks to its members and evaluates role performance of its several substructures. Understanding the organizational framework of ISIS is critical. 

The chapter highlights how social connections, control mechanisms, living 

in similar circumstances, a shared vision of how things should be, elements 

of empowerment by being part of a group, and finally, fear and intimidation 

all play a role in establishing allegiance. Combined, these form the patterns 

of ISIS recruitment.

Chapter 3 on “Bangladesh and Burma: Will ISIS Spread Its Wings?” 

examines how far ISIS efforts to infiltrate the Muslim populations of Bangladesh and Burma have succeeded. Bangladesh, viewed as rapidly becoming a victim of ISIS propaganda and physical spread, has seen around 30 

ISIS recruits from a population of 148.6 million.54 In a Dabiq article titled 

“The Revival of Jihad in Bengal,” ISIS identified Bangladesh as its next base 

for operations. Some suspect a linkage between extremist groups within 

Bangladesh like Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), to ISIS, that may have the potential to spread the 

group's extremist ideology in the country. Neighboring Burma has drawn the 

attention of both ISIS and al-Qaeda for the manner in which the Rohingya 

Muslims have been mistreated within the country.55 There are concerns that 

the conditions prevalent in Burma vis-à-vis the Rohingya make it fertile 

ground for ISIS recruitment and spread.56 The chapter analyzes whether 

Bangladesh and Burma are at risk of becoming the next ISIS stronghold, 

given their rising intolerance toward secularism and free thought.

Chapter 4 details India, a Hindu majority country with the the second 

largest Muslim population in the world. The country has suffered from a history of Hindu-Muslim internal conflict, beginning with the partition of the 

country in 1947, to the 1992 demolition of the Babri mosque and 2002 riots 

in Gujarat. ISIS included India in its 2014 map for expansion. ISIS threatened 

that it will spread to India to avenge Kashmir, Gujarat, and the demolition 

of the 1992 mosque. More recently and in a May 2016 video message, ISIS 

mocked Indian Muslims for living in harmony with kuffar (non-believer) 

Hindus and called upon them to travel to the caliphate. Despite this history, 

the number of Indian Muslim youth traveling to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS 

pales in comparison to the high flows from Russia, France, the UK, and 

Germany.57 Chapter 4 on “Questioning ISIS Ideology in India” highlights 
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factors that have worked within the Indian political and social milieu to 

question and delegitimize groups like ISIS.

Surprisingly, Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, has 

seen the least number of recruits to ISIS, despite being included in the ISIS 

map for expansion of its hold.58 This country is therefore the focus of chapter 5. Indonesian ISIS leaders like Bachrumsyah Mennor Usman, Bahrun 

Naim, and Gigih Rahmat Dewa (in custody in Indonesia, as of the writing 

of this monograph), physically operated from Iraq and Syria through terror 

cells there. While this poses a security threat to Indonesia (given they can 

function with impunity from outside bases, draw local recruits, and attract 

resources), their hold on the Indonesian radical psyche is limited. Still, with 

pressure on ISIS to relinquish territory in Iraq and Syria, there are concerns 

that terror cells will spread to countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 

Philippines. To date, Muslim civil society groups in Indonesia have rejected 

ISIS ideology and limited its ideological spread. Chapter 5 examines the prevailing structural conditions in Indonesia that have worked against extremist 

groups like ISIS.

Drawing lessons from successful response structures to ISIS in countries 

like India and Indonesia, while at the same time being aware of the realistic limits of such lessons, chapter 6 identifies the most feasible, strategic 

responses by USSOCOM to extremists groups like ISIS. It also discusses ISIS 

efforts in the cyber domain in more depth before offering solutions. In doing 

so, the authors argue that ISIS ideology cannot be completely exterminated, 

and suggests focusing on how to make ISIS ideology unattractive to large 

pools of populations living in conditions that render them susceptible. 

This monograph will prove useful to USSOCOM as well as partner nations 

involved in the global fight against ISIS. The monograph highlights conditions in Bangladesh that may render it vulnerable to the growth of extremist 

ideologies. Understanding and identifying these aspects will help predict and 

avert such a scenario. The intolerance shown towards the Rohingya Muslim 

community in Burma renders them vulnerable to groups like ISIS and alQaeda, who project themselves as saviors of persecuted Muslims globally. 

It is therefore pertinent to ensure that such structural conditions are not 

sustained and relief to their plight is offered by an international coalition of 

countries and the United Nations. Countries like India and Indonesia offer 

valuable insights on how radical ideas can be weeded out through a participatory democratic process. However, the rise in Hindu nationalism in India 
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and Salafi influence in Indonesia should be kept in focus while highlighting 

what has worked in both countries to keep ISIS influence and recruitment to 

small numbers. The critical need of the hour is to ensure that ISIS does not 

go underground and then reemerge in regions, other than Iraq and Syria. 
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Chapter 1. ISIS Ideology and Strategy: 

“There is no God but Allah”59

ISIS has emerged as one of the dominant terrorist groups originating in 

the Middle East. Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS took over vast swaths of land in 

Iraq and Syria, declared a caliphate, and lured thousands of recruits to its 

cause. In a map published in July 2014, ISIS declared that it is not simply an 

organization like al-Qaeda, but a state, with all the attributes that come with 

it—government, people, territory, and sovereignty.60 By declaring an Islamic 

state, ISIS sent the message that this state is not limited to Iraq and Syria, but 

will spread its presence to North Africa (the Maghreb), Libya, Egypt, Yemen, 

Andalusia (Spain), Cameroon, Somalia, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and 

Xinjiang province in China, as well as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, 

and other Gulf states. ISIS also declared its intentions to spread to South, 

Central, and Southeast Asia.61 The significant departure of ISIS—from alQaeda’s operational ideational ethos—is its desire to physically spread. AlQaeda’s focus is to spread its ideas and influence other terror groups. And 

in that, al-Qaeda has succeeded.62 After all, ISIS is a successor to AQI, led 

by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian. How al-Zarqawi broke off from 

Osama bin Laden, possibly over differences about al-Zarqawi’s brutal tactics 

of beheadings and extreme violence against Shias, or that AQI was an arm 

of al-Qaeda, is only speculation, but it is a fact that the two groups shared 

the same vision of a global Muslim ummah (Islamic community).

Significantly, al-Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s and met 

with bin Laden, although they had differences over operational tactics and 

goals.63 Al-Qaeda was focused on the far enemy—the U.S.—while al-Zarqawi 

was focused on the near enemy—namely, Jordan and Israel, as well as the 

Shias. Despite these differences, bin Laden financed al-Zarqawi’s training 

camp in Afghanistan. After the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan post-9/11, alZarqawi traveled via Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Kurdish territory to arrive 

in Iraq. In 2003, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fall of the Saddam 

Hussein regime, al-Zarqawi succeeded in taking advantage of the resultant chaos, and took center stage in fighting against the U.S. occupation 

under the organizational name of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ)—alJihad, or The Party of Monotheism and Jihad (JHJ). JTJ, led by al-Zarqawi, 
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attacked non-combatants and aid workers in Iraq. The group also strategically targeted Shias in Iraq to create the conditions of a sectarian conflict.64

In October 2004, perhaps motivated by the advantages of aligning itself to 

a well-established terror group with a reputation, JTJ gave allegiance, or 

bay’ah, to al-Qaeda and renamed itself Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad alRafidayn Zarqawi, known as AQI.65 However, AQI’s extreme tactics were 

criticized by al-Qaeda, and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, sent a letter to 

al-Zarqawi cautioning him against such tactics of deliberately targeting civilians. In the letter, al-Zawahiri was careful not to alienate al-Zarqawi, offering 

him lavish praise on his success in Iraq, which the former believed was the 

core gem in the fight for Islam. Al-Zawahiri went on to argue that:

It has always been my belief that the victory of Islam will never take 

place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet 

in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, 

and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq; however, the 

center would be in the Levant and Egypt.66

In the letter, al-Zawahiri states that al-Zarqawi is blessed to have the fortune and privilege denied to many fellow Muslim mujahideen, that allows 

him to wage jihad at the heart of the Islamic world. Al-Zawahiri, while 

denouncing apostates and infidels, expressed great concern with al-Zarqawi’s 

tactics and extreme acts of violence against them. Al-Zawahiri stressed the 

significance of popular support and cautioned against using extreme puritanical measure in the field to judge how people behave. He believed that 

without popular support across the sectarian divide, to include Shias, it 

was impossible to defeat the Americans or outsiders. The Muslim masses, 

if fearful of AQI, would automatically gravitate to the national government 

set up by foreigners. He stated that AQI should learn to appease the masses 

and create conditions for their participation in its activities, including governance.67 Al-Zawahiri was in favor of establishing an emirate, and not a 

caliphate immediately. He devised a stage-by-stage plan of what AQI should 

do, from expelling the Americans from Iraq to establishing an Islamic state 

that is supported by all Muslim masses (he did not specify that the state 

should be only Sunni-based).

Yet, a close reading of al-Zawahiri’s letter reveals much more than simply 

concern with al-Zarqawi’s tactics, as is most often offered up by mainstream 

media.68 The letter reveals al-Zawahiri’s desire to plan for a post-American 
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withdrawal scenario in Iraq. He envisioned establishing a sharia-based emirate, or Islamic state, in Iraq. Hence, while there are those who believe that 

al-Qaeda did not support the establishment of a caliphate until the Muslim 

masses were ready, al-Zawahiri believed that establishing an Islamic authority or caliphate was critical, and that it would allow them to seize the initiative when the Americans left Iraq. With popular support based on consensus 

and loyalty, it was bound to succeed. Al-Zawahiri cautioned against breaking 

up the ummah, or Islamic nation, simply because someone did not belong to 

the pure sect. Small mistakes and heresies, he argued, are forgivable in the 

face of the larger goal—establishment of the caliphate. Al-Zawahiri warned 

against attacks on the Shia or their places of worship.

The context of Iraq was dramatically changed with the sudden ascendency of Shias to prominent positions in the government and military in 

the post-Saddam era, bolstered by the divisive policies of Nouri al-Maliki, 

the Shia prime minister of Iraq from 2006 to 2014.69 Al-Maliki is accused 

of planting the seeds for the ISIS takeover of major cities in Iraq, due to the 

alienation felt by the Sunni population during the period he was in power. 

Al-Maliki played an instrumental role in bringing together the Sunni tribes 

of Iraq under the ‘Sunni Awakening’ that nearly defeated AQI between 2007 

and 2010. However, once the American forces withdrew from Iraq at the 

end of 2011, al-Maliki turned against Sunni politicians in his own cabinet. 

Thousands of innocent Sunnis were arrested, creating a backlash and general 

alienation. Protests against these arrests drew tens of thousands of people in 

Ramadi, Mosul, Fallujah, Samarra, and Kirkuk. Subsequently, al-Maliki’s 

heavy-handed response to the protests sowed the seeds of extremism, which 

continued to grow fast.70 In retrospect, given the divisive conditions created 

by his government, the quick takeover of Fallujah and Mosul by ISIS is easy 

to understand. As al-Zawahiri had so distinctly warned AQI not to do, the 

Iraqi government under al-Maliki lost popular support.71

Origins of ISIS

The origins of ISIS trace back to al-Zarqawi, when he floated the idea of 

establishing an Islamic state in 2002. Appearing in several videos, including 

ones of brutal beheadings that drew the attention of millions, al-Zarqawi 

argued that the goal of AQI is to ultimately establish an Islamic state based 

on sharia law.72 He took advantage of the fame thrust upon him when Colin 
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Powell identified him as the eminent reason to attack Saddam Hussein in a 

speech to the United Nations (UN) Security Council while building a case for 

the U.S. invasion into Iraq.73 When a bounty of $25 million was offered for 

information on al-Zarqawi’s whereabouts, it elevated his status in the world 

of competitive terrorism, as the bounty was equal to the reward offered for 

information on Osama bin Laden. Reputation-building aside, al-Zarqawi, 

who long had been motivated to establish a political identity in which religion played an important part, suddenly found himself capable of drawing 

resources and recruits to establish his own organization.74 As mentioned 

earlier, he set up the JTJ, which took advantage of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 

2003 to establish its roots. From 2002 to 2004, al-Zarqawi engineered bombings across Iraq, aimed at the U.S. forces and Iraqi Shias. Iraq descended 

into sectarian civil war when al-Zarqawi bombed the shrine of Imam Ali in 

Najaf, which killed one of the Shia’s most revered imams, (Muslim leaders), 

Ayatullah Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim.75 It was the killing of al-Hakim 

by al-Zarqawi that led al-Zawahiri to admonish him in a letter, where he 

bemoaned, “Has any Islamic state in history ever tried that? And why kill 

ordinary Shia considering that they are forgiven because of their ignorance? 

And what loss will befall us if we did not attack the Shia?”76 However, on the 

day of the bombing in 2003, suspicion ranged from al-Qaeda, to the ultraconservative and orthodox Sunni Wahhabis to Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of 

the Shia militia known as Jaish-e-Mahdi, known to have a deep hatred of the 

American presence in Iraq. Sadr’s militia tried to coerce Grand Ayatullah 

Ali al-Sistani, supreme religious leader of Iraqi Shi’ites, to leave the country 

due to his support for the American plans for Iraq’s future.

The Iraqis could not believe that a fellow Iraqi, whether a Shia or Sunni, 

could wreak such havoc on a local mosque, no matter how severe their differences.77 It turns out that their gut instinct was right, because the man who 

carried out these bombings was not an Iraqi, but a Jordanian (al-Zarqawi), 

who had several fellow Jordanians within his fold in Iraq.78 At the time of 

these bombings al-Zarqawi acted independently; he pledged his allegiance 

to al-Qaeda in October 2004.79 For its part, al-Qaeda was looking to expand 

its own network in Iraq and the Levant, and thus overlooked al-Zarqawi’s 

extreme tactics and accepted his allegiance. According to al-Qaeda’s security chief Saif al-`Adl’s letter to Jordanian journalist Fuad Husayn, during 

the original 1999 meeting between al-Zarqawi and bin Laden, al-`Adl acted 

as a negotiator, working to arrive at some settlement between them despite 
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their differences. Al-Zarqawi did not pledge his allegiance to al-Qaeda at 

that time. Bin Laden later dismissed al-`Adl’s letter as false, and this aspect 

is highlighted by Brian Fishman, who argues that al-Qaeda agreed to fund 

al-Zarqawi’s camp in Herat, Afghanistan, as a result of the growing strife in 

jihadi circles, and not because of al-`Adl’s mediation.80 While Fishman presents bin Laden’s annoyance with al-`Adl’s suggestion that a deal was negotiated, he does not question the motives behind bin Laden’s desire to discredit 

al-`Adl’s version. Since bin Laden goes to great pains to discredit him, it may 

be possible that al-`Adl got certain facts wrong, such as the presence of alZawahiri at the meeting when he was not a member of al-Qaeda (al-Zawahiri 

signed a merger agreement with bin Laden in 2001). Nevertheless, history 

does not address81 why bin Laden agreed to finance al-Zarqawi despite him 

withholding his allegiance. Several factors could have influenced bin Laden’s 

decision, including fears of being subverted by influential figures like chief 

architect of al-Qaeda's strategy and one of the leaders who worked with bin 

Laden in Afghanistan in the 1990s82—Abu Musab al-Suri, or by growing 

counterintelligence on al-Qaeda's activities, yet it does not obviate the fact 

that he helped al-Zarqawi set up shop. Nor does it explain why al-Zarqawi 

finally gave his allegiance to al-Qaeda and created AQI.

After al-Zarqawi’s death in June 2006 during an American air strike,83

AQI announced Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a.k.a. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, an 

Egpytian, as its leader. His foreign origin drew criticism from AQI members. 

Al-Masri, in order to stifle the criticism, declared the establishment of an 

Islamic state to bring divergent jihadi forces together. In April 2010, al-Masri 

and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the shadowy top leader of this Islamic state, 

were thought killed.84 It was during this time that the Sunni Awakening, 

comprised of several Sunni tribes, and Iraqi and American forces decapitated AQI.85 The period between 2006 and 2010 was one of the toughest for 

al-Qaeda, with depleted resources, and a lack of leadership directives. The 

death of Osama bin Laden dealt them an additional blow.

It is in this situation of depletion, and defeat that the embers of ISIS 

began to glow. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was in the American-run Camp Bucca 

prison in Iraq in 2004 when the environment in the country was replete 

with daily bomb attacks.86 Upon release in December 2004, al-Baghdadi 

and several fellow prisoners went underground and crossed over to Syria, 

where civil unrest was increasing against its leader, Bashar al-Assad. Some 

former ISIS members credit the group’s rise to power to the period in Camp 
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Bucca, when al-Baghdadi formed the strategy and connections that served 

him well later.87 After U.S. troops left Iraq in 2011, the divisions between 

Shia and Sunni communities in Iraq offered the perfect conditions for alBaghdadi, who by then had joined AQI. By 2013, Baghdadi made preparations to strike inside Iraq from Syria, where AQI had regrouped. There 

are allegations that the Syrian military intelligence helped set up meetings 

between disenfranchised Iraqi Baath Party members, jihadists, and AQI 

members.88 The hand of Syrian Sunnis in Iraq’s insurgency in turn angered 

Prime Minister al-Maliki, and could have influenced his decision to remove 

Sunnis from his cabinet, fomenting even more sectarian strife. For instance, 

Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, a major Sunni Dulaimi tribal leader from Anbar 

province, Iraq, was ousted from Baghdad for criticizing Iran’s Shia supreme 

leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Included in this group of influential Sunni 

politicians are former deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, and former 

Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.89 Another former deputy prime minister 

from the Saddam Hussein era, and a Chaldean Catholic and Baathist party 

member, Tariq Aziz, stated that the exit of American troops would land Iraq 

in the hands of wolves (al-Maliki).90 It was the fear that al-Maliki was creating 

a Shia autocracy, ironically similar to Saddam Hussein’s Sunni autocracy, that 

resulted in Sunni tribes in Iraq looking toward the Sunni insurgents in Syria.

Sheikh Majid Dulaimi, the foremost chief of the Dulaimi tribe, stated that:

The Americans promised that Iraq would be a beacon of democracy 

in the Middle East, that it would flourish. But it has been totally the 

opposite. All we have are car bombs, suicide vests, ugly sectarianism 

and after all that, Iranian occupation.91

When the Americans left in 2011, peaceful Sunni protests against alMaliki were met with disproportionate force by government forces, resulting 

in several deaths. During those years (2011 to 2014), incidents like the brutal 

arrest of Sunni parliamentarian Waleed Jassem al-Alwani, a.k.a. Abu Ahmad 

al-Alwani, further inflamed sectarian feuds. Violence erupted in Fallujah and 

Ramadi, and al-Maliki sent in the army to quell protests. Forty-four Sunni 

members of parliament resigned. Sunni security forces abandoned their 

posts in protest. By the time al-Maliki called back the troops to rectify his 

mistake, ISIS, still a splinter group of al-Qaeda then, was already rolling in 

from Syria.92 It was in this environment of power struggles including Sunni 

anger at being sidelined despite helping in the fight against AQI, al-Maliki’s 
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deliberate sectarian feud, and the old Sunni desire to be head of the pack that 

proved ripe for the entry of al-Baghdadi from Syria in 2014. Since the 18th 

century, the Sunnis had dominated the power structure in Iraq. After the 

American invasion, the Shias became the power brokers for the first time, 

in the process sidelining the Sunnis.

Strategic Dimensions of ISIS

It was in this scenario of sectarian violence that the al-Baghdadi-led ISIS 

entered. With growing civil war in Syria, the border between Syria and 

Iraq disappeared. Border crossings between Aleppo, Syria, and Anbar, 

Iraq, occurred without the need for passports and visas. Major portions of 

the Sunni population of Iraq—feeling a sense of siege under the rule of alMaliki—welcomed ISIS, and the security forces in Sunni-dominated cities 

like Mosul, Fallujah, and Ramadi offered 

little resistance. Within a matter of weeks, 

Mosul was taken over by ISIS and the Iraqi 

army fled, leaving all their weaponry behind. 

Other Sunni cities fell to ISIS, as well. This 

brings us back to the idea that al-Zawahiri 

spoke about in his letter to al-Zarqawi—popular support. Without Sunni popular support, the Iraqi army did not stand a chance 

in cities like Mosul, Kirkuk, Tikrit, Ramadi, 

and Fallujah. Emboldened by the civil unrest 

in Syria, as well as other parts of the Middle 

East and North Africa, like Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, ISIS advanced unchallenged. It was in Syria that AQI, and then ISIS, regrouped and rebranded 

after the losses they suffered during the Sunni Awakening. It was from there 

the onslaught on Iraq ensued.

In light of this background and history, six dimensions of ISIS strategy 

stand out as remarkable. There could be many other dimensions,93 but for 

brevity and specificity, this chapter highlights the following six dimensions: 

territory, politics, ideology, legitimacy, dynamics of allegiance and recruitment, 

and timing. The strategic dimension of territory includes an examination 

of the declaration of an Islamic state and its organizing principles within a 

territory. It describes the sanctity given to territory and the call by ISIS to all 

Major portions of the 

Sunni population of 

Iraq—feeling a sense of 

siege under the rule of 

al-Maliki—welcomed ISIS, 

and the security forces in 

Sunni-dominated cities 

like Mosul, Fallujah, and 

Ramadi offered little resistance. 
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Muslims to travel to this territory to give their allegiance to al-Baghdadi. The 

second strategic dimension of politics examines the power structures within 

ISIS and offers insights into its structure. The third strategic dimension, 

ideology, explains the belief system of ISIS, especially its usage of religious 

texts to justify its existence. This section examines the influence of Salafism and the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia on ISIS. The fourth strategic 

dimension of legitimacy highlights the legitimization process undertaken 

by ISIS in announcing al Baghdadi as the Caliph. In this, the ancestral links 

to the prophet and direct quotations from the Qur’an are utilized. To create 

legitimacy for the state ISIS established a parallel governance mechanism to 

include taxation, education, and social welfare. The fifth strategic dimension 

examines the dynamics of allegiance and recruitment to ISIS. Three issues 

are highlighted: giving bay’ah or allegiance, the use of sectarianism as a tool 

for recruitment, and finally, the usage of the idea of ummah to spread their 

links. The final strategic dimension is timing. ISIS came at a time when the 

Middle East was suffering from several crises of legitimacy due to the Arab 

Spring. With regimes falling in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, radical groups filled 

up the vacuum and ISIS took advantage.

Territory

One of the most significant and critical measures that ISIS leader al-Baghdadi 

undertook in July 2014 was the establishment of an Islamic state—the goal 

of several jihadi terrorist groups including al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well 

as civilian political organizations like the Dawa party, of which former Iraqi 

prime minister al-Maliki was a member.94 ISIS is perhaps the first terror 

group that declared the establishment of the Islamic state (caliphate). On 30 

June 2014, its spokesperson at the time, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, declared 

al-Baghdadi as the caliph (leader of all Muslims), stating: 

The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes 

null by the expansion of the caliph’s authority and the arrival of its 

troops to their areas ... Listen to your caliph and obey him. Support your state, which grows every day ... The Shura [Council] of 

the Islamic State met and discussed this issue [of the caliphate] ... 

the Islamic State decided to establish an Islamic caliphate and to 

designate a caliph for the state of the Muslims.95
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In its official document, ISIS hailed al-Baghdadi as the descendent of the 

prophet, the sheikh, and the fighter, and called upon all Muslims to give their 

allegiance to this self-proclaimed caliph. Calling upon the Muslim ummah, 

ISIS declared that all associations connected to God, and any shrines, imams, 

and grave worship are kuffar, and that the flag of tawhid (monotheism) 

covers the land from Aleppo, Syria, to Diyala, Iraq. In this ISIS-ruled territory, jizyah (a tax imposed on non-Muslims), sharia law, and penalties are 

imposed, and zakat (an obligatory income tax) must be paid. Within this 

territory, courts were established to adjudicate disputes, and classes were 

started in mosques for children. ISIS stated that, within this territory, there 

also would be a community-based zakat called the wajib kifa’i—the dream 

of a khilāfah (caliphate), which ISIS termed “the abandoned obligation of the 

era.” They then quote Allah’s words from the Qur’an, “Indeed, I will make 

upon the earth a khalīfah”,96 and Imam al-Qurtubī:

This verse is a fundamental basis for the appointment of a leader and 

khalīfah (caliph) who is listened to and obeyed so that the ummah 

is united by him and his orders are carried out. There is no dispute 

over this matter between the ummah nor between the scholars, 

except for what has been reported from al-Asamm [the meaning 

of his name is ‘the deaf man’], for his deafness prevented him from 

hearing the Sharia.97

Great significance is accorded to these verses, which are then elaborated 

upon by ISIS:

In light of the fact that the Islamic State has no shar’ī constraint 

or excuse that can justify delaying or neglecting the establishment of the khilāfah such that it would not be sinful, the Islamic 

State—represented by ahlul-halli-wal-‘aqd (its people of authority), 

consisting of its senior figures, leaders, and the shūrā council—

resolved to announce the establishment of the Islamic khilāfah, 

the appointment of a khalīfah for the Muslims, and the pledge of 

allegiance to the shaykh (sheikh), the mujāhid, the scholar who 

practices what he preaches, the worshipper, the leader, the warrior, 

the reviver, descendent from the family of the Prophet, the slave of 

Allah, Ibrāhīm Ibn ‘Awwād Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Muhammad 

al-Badrī al-Hāshimī al-Husaynī al-Qurashī by lineage, as-Sāmurrā’ī 
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by birth and upbringing, al-Baghdādī by residence and scholarship. 

And he has accepted the bay’ah. Thus, he is the imam and khalīfah 

for the Muslims everywhere.98

Consequently, ISIS asserts that it is the obligation of all Muslims to pledge 

their allegiance to al-Baghdadi.99 Using the declaration of the caliphate and 

the territory it held, ISIS called upon all Muslims to rush to the caliphate to 

exalt themselves, live well, feel honored and esteemed, and live as masters 

with dignity. Ideas like nationalism, democracy, and secularism are termed 

garbage, as they are ideas advocated by the West, and Muslims should only 

aspire to original creed of the caliphate. The official announcement states 

that once all arrive as part of the ummah, the east and west would submit 

to them as part of the caliphate. ISIS also asserts that this is a promise given 

by none other than Allah, and hence will be fulfilled.

Quoting from verses of the scriptures so that it resonates with Muslims 

who read their announcement, ISIS calls upon every Muslim to travel to the 

territory they hold. The group justifies its call to all Muslims using Allah’s 

words. ISIS claims that no Muslim could find a legal excuse to deny support 

to them and that Allah will be pleased if they give their allegiance. ISIS goes 

on to assert that it’s a state for all Muslims (notwithstanding their brutal 

killings of Shias), then cleverly states that once the caliphate is established, 

all other jihadi groups, including al-Qaeda, should put down their arms 

and give wala’ (loyalty) to the khilāfah. ISIS unilaterally provides itself with 

the authority to assert that Allah inspired them to declare the caliphate the 

moment they established control over territory. Anticipating criticism from 

jihadi circles on this unilateral declaration of the caliphate, the announcement asserts that ISIS had no one to consult with who was superior, and they 

would be the rallying point for unifying the ummah. This was a direct affront 

to al-Qaeda, who previously stated that the caliphate cannot be established 

until the time there is no disunity among Muslims. ISIS goes on to state that 

declaring a state took precedence over creating unity and consulting with 

other groups—a process that would have been endless—as “the issue is too 

urgent.”100 Moreover, to those who question ISIS authority, Allah is brought 

in as the final arbitrator:

And if they tell you, “We do not accept your authority”. Then say 

to them, “We had the ability to establish the khilāfah, by the grace 
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of Allah, so it became an obligation for us to do so. Therefore, we 

hastened in adherence to the command of Allah (the Exalted): ‘It 

is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and 

His Messenger have decided a matter, that they should [thereafter] 

have any choice about their affair’ [Al-Ahzāb: 36].101

Interestingly, despite the Taliban occupying territory in Afghanistan 

known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Taliban leader Mullah Omar 

never declared himself as representing a caliphate. Al-Qaeda, in its online 

publication Al Nafir (call to arms), renewed its pledge of allegiance to Mullah 

Omar as the emir of the believers on 20 July 2014,102 thereby challenging alBaghdadi’s announcement of the caliphate in late June of that same year. 

Al-Baghdadi demanded all jihadi groups and Muslims pledge their loyalty 

to him, given he was the Khalifah (caliph). Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, 

stated that the caliphate was yet to come, and viewed the ISIS declaration as 

an attempt to usurp its power.103

Politics

This brings us to the second dimension of ISIS: its politics. ISIS is a political 

organization with a clear differentiation of power based on hierarchy. While 

it may use religion or religious texts to guide its actions, or as part of its 

propaganda, the group is, in effect, a political 

organization that claims to represent the Sunni 

sect. Being an offshoot of AQI, which targeted 

Shias, al-Baghdadi therefore cannot lay claim 

to the allegiance of all Muslims. ISIS breezily 

casts aside Shias as not true Muslims, or as 

kuffar, but not every Muslim views al-Baghdadi or ISIS as representing them or their faith, 

or believes that the unilateral move of ISIS to 

declare a caliphate has any legitimacy beyond 

its own circles.104 Thereby, the title of Caliph, and the caliphate (region under 

control of the Caliph) are mostly self-styled declarations. In this scenario, 

the politics of ISIS becomes paramount.

So, who are these men and what are their politics? Their hold on territory 

and quick victories in Iraq propelled them into the limelight, unlike al-Qaeda 

While it [ISIS] may use 

religion or religious texts 

to guide its actions, or 

as part of its propaganda, the group is, in 

effect, a political organization that claims to 

represent the Sunni sect.
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who achieved international recognition by indirect attacks on civilians—

most notoriously the 9/11 attacks. 

At the top of the chain is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri, a.k.a. alBaghdadi, who claims to have descended from Prophet Muhammad’s tribe, 

the Qurayshi.105 He claims to have a Ph.D. in Qur’anic studies from the 

Saddam University for Islamic Studies in Baghdad, thereby manipulating the 

politics of the acquisition of Islamic knowledge to his advantage. His noble 

tribe lineage, intellectual prowess, and ‘invisible Sheikh’ persona all help in 

creating a mystic image of his personality and thus drawing young recruits 

to ISIS. This was evident in his sole video appearance in June 2014 to declare 

the caliphate. Since then, al-Baghdadi has not appeared in any ISIS videos, 

and has kept an invisible profile, unlike his predecessor, al-Zarqawi, who 

appeared in several videos, some without a mask, which ultimately got him 

killed. In his earlier years, al-Baghdadi joined the Muslim Brotherhood, and 

in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, he formed the insurgent 

group, Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah (Army of the People of the Sunnah 

and Communal Solidarity).106

Amongst his closest aides are Sunnis, again utilizing the politics of sectbased representation. His former closest aide, Taha Sobhi Falaha, a.k.a. Abu 

Muhammad al-Adnani, the chief strategist and voice of ISIS who was killed 

in August 2016,107 was a Sunni from Binnish, Syria. Al-Adnani was instrumental in creating the beheading videos of Westerners, and in appealing to 

“lone wolves” in the West to carry out terror attacks.108 In this, he formed 

and led a group called Emni, that was responsible for internal policing as 

well as exporting terror abroad. Members of this group were organized in 

small units by language and nationality. Al-Adnani had formerly given his 

allegiance to AQI under al-Zarqawi, but went on to challenge al-Qaeda after 

al-Zarqawi’s death. Emni was behind the Brussels and Paris terror attacks 

planned through a structure of foreign recruits to ISIS. Emni members have 

slipped into Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Germany, Spain, Lebanon, 

Tunisia, and Austria to carry out attacks.109

Al-Adnani was the first ISIS leader to clearly assert the change of ISIS 

from a terrorist organization to a governing body with territory. This politics of governing is critical, as it creates citizenry, the ruler and the ruled 

dynamics, law enforcement, health and educational services, as well as social 

networks and loyalty tiers. ISIS, in its heyday, boasted a 30,000-member 

strong army, unlike al-Qaeda, who had a few hundred at any given time.110
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So, having an army and a bureaucracy, including other public services, serves 

the polity that ISIS established, and creates a history for its sympathizers.

Abu Ayman al-Iraqi was another major ISIS leader, third in terms of rank 

after al-Baghdadi. Al-Iraqi’s main political goal was to create a narrative that 

was anti-American and anti-Shia, since he viewed the Shia as supporting 

the American presence in the Middle East. In a telephone conversation in 

Antakya, Turkey, with a Syrian rebel commander, al-Iraqi argued that:

The West has understood the game. They won’t send anyone whose 

name is William or Benjamin. They’ll send people named Ahmed 

and Mohamed and Abdullah ... The American soldier is expensive, 

so they will use people from among us—and this is the truth of the 

battle, they will use you—in the fight against us.111

This conversation is important, as it portrays how ISIS leaders create 

the “us versus them” narrative, and how outsiders play on local sentiments 

for their selfish benefits. Significantly, al-Iraqi was a colonel in the Iraqi air 

defense intelligence during Saddam Hussein’s regime. Therefore, he came 

to ISIS with prior military training in conventional army tactics and operations.112 Al-Iraqi belonged to the largest tribe in Iraq’s Anbar province, the 

Dulaimi tribe, and hence his social network there was strong. This meant 

he had already established deep-seated social connections due to this tribal 

connection, as well as his time as a colonel in Saddam’s military. Al-Iraqi 

was in charge of day-to-day military planning for ISIS, and led the group in 

the Latakia province of Syria.

Fadel Abdullah al-Hiyali, a.k.a. Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, was the deputy 

leader of ISIS and was killed in a U.S. air strike in December 2014.113 Interestingly, similar to al-Iraqi, al-Turkmani served in Saddam Hussein’s army 

as a lieutenant colonel, and was part of the special forces and army intelligence units. He joined AQI in 2003, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and rose 

through the ranks to become al-Zarqawi’s deputy. Al-Turkmani came from 

the northern Iraqi town of Tal Afar, populated by Sunni Iraqi Turkmen.

Al-Alwani is a senior military commander for ISIS who also was an officer 

in Saddam Hussein’s military. Those existing contacts and similar military 

backgrounds gave both al-Turkmani and al-Alwani the pre-ISIS networks 

that served them well as members of ISIS.

Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Shakhilar al-Qaduli, a.k.a. Abu Ali al-Anbari 

and Hajji Iman, was in charge of intelligence gathering for ISIS. Believed to 
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be killed on 25 March 2016 in Deir Ezzor, Syria, he once was thought to be 

a physics teacher, then a major general in Saddam Hussein’s army, although 

these reports may be incorrect. He was closely connected to jihadi terrorism 

since the 1980s. In 2003, he established the Jihad Squads to resist the American presence in Iraq. He gave several lectures that identified Sunnis supporting the American presence as infidels, decried democratic institutions based 

on foreign ideas alien to Islam, and was against the separation of powers in 

the form of laws, constitutions, etc. He also identified the Yazidis as infidels. 

ISIS doctrine denounces man-made laws and institutions (termed “tawaghit” 

in his speeches). Al-Anbari held that the only hope for all Muslims is to travel 

to ISIS-held territory to be cleansed of their past sins.114

A former sergeant in the Georgian military intelligence, Omar al-Shishani—his real name is Tarkhan Batirashvili—hailed from Pankisi Gorge, 

near the Chechen-Georgian border. He participated as a noncommissioned 

officer in the Georgian armed forces during the Russo-Georgian war in 

2008. After being discharged from the military, he was jailed on illegal gun 

charges. Upon his release, he made his way to Syria where he joined ISIS and 

rose through the ranks. He wielded authority over Aleppo, Raqqa, Latakia, 

and northern Idlib provinces in Syria, and appeared in several ISIS propaganda videos. He is believed to have died after a U.S. air strike in Syria in 

March 2016.115 With his death, ISIS suffered the loss of who they thought of 

as their defense minister.

When analyzing the rank and portfolios of the ISIS leadership structure, 

it is striking that there is an equal emphasis on military and political matters. Besides military ranks, ISIS has a minister of general management, a 

minister of prisoners, minister of general security, minister of finance, minister of foreign fighters and suicide bombers, a minister of social services, 

as well as governors for the provinces of Iraq and Syria it has governed. For 

instance, there have been separate governors for Baghdad, Kirkuk, Anbar, 

Raqqa, Aleppo, etc.116 ISIS politics is a Sunni-inspired politics, where those 

that are relevant are mostly Iraqi Sunnis, including Sunni brethren from 

across borders. Least understood is the draw ISIS holds for several former 

officers and soldiers from Saddam Hussein’s military, which was disbanded 

after the U.S. invasion. With the establishment of the Islamic state and its 

army, these officers found a platform to express and use their knowledge 

and training, and retrieve their lost military-based identities, important in 

social status and meaning in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
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In reality, most of the Saddam-era Baathist military officers should be at 

odds with the religious zeal of ISIS given the Baathist secular creed and focus 

on Arab nationalism. Yet, finding common ground vis-à-vis their hatred 

for the Iraqi Shia and the American invasion, ex-Baathist military officers 

revive their sense of importance again within the ISIS military hierarchy. 

ISIS, by establishing a state, offers these men an opportunity to utilize their 

conventional military skills, their staff college training, and their military 

leadership skills.

These former Baath party members and military officers are well versed 

in Iraqi politics and landscape, and proved their mettle for ISIS. They were 

instrumental in the quick and rapid advancement of ISIS from Syria into 

Iraq in 2014. Former Saddam Hussein military officers—especially with 

regard to security, military planning, and finance—staff most critical ranks 

within ISIS. This coming together of ISIS and former Baath party members 

is a means for the latter to adapt and keep themselves relevant to present-day 

Iraq, where they find their influence shrinking under a Shia-led government 

in Baghdad. A sudden loss of stature and privilege must have resulted in 

an identity crisis, and they now see ISIS as a means to getting their respect 

back. Given the Baath party cannot be represented in Iraqi politics and is 

banned by the Iraqi Constitution, the rise of ISIS came at a time when they 

felt cast aside and were in need of money to survive. While not all cooperated 

with ISIS, many did, the most prominent being the Army of the Men of the 

Naqshbandi Order. With the fall of Mosul to ISIS in 2014, several Baathist 

mid-ranking ex-military officers joined ISIS. Given their military training 

experience, the Baathist officers improved the group’s firepower and tactical 

movements further. ISIS boasts that Saddam’s nephew, Ayman Sabawi, and 

Saddam’s cousin, Raad Hassan, are amongst its members.117

The politics of ISIS are based on a pragmatic understanding of Iraq and 

Syria, and include ethnic elements that cater to Sunni social networks and 

political groupings. This creates a sense of brotherhood that can extend itself 

to establishing structures that augment governance, the acquisition of power 

and influence, and long-term investment in the cause of perpetuating an 

Islamic caliphate. Given the stress on a caliphate based on Qur’anic legitimacy, it is useful to hinge the next section on understanding ISIS ideology.
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Ideology

Without a doubt, in order to understand ISIS and its political ambition to 

represent Muslims, it is pertinent to understand the ideologies that inform 

the group’s thinking and goals. Foremost amongst the influences appears to 

be the fact that the group’s name, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, appeals 

to some, if not all, Muslims. Its press releases documenting its historical, 

religious, and political influences, as well as the early Islamic caliphate, are 

close to Muslim thinking and Islam.

In the expression of its intent, ISIS is not hesitant to use brutal means 

like beheading or burning, as is seen in the burning death of Jordanian pilot 

Muadh al-Kasasbeh. Ideologically, ISIS clerics described that incident as a 

reciprocal measure in response to the burning of Muslim villages in drone 

attacks or air strikes. Yet, the brutal tactics of ISIS create the urgent need to 

understand the religious ideology that influences the group.118

Self-styled as representative of true Muslim believers the world over, ISIS 

interprets waging jihad against apostles and infidels as its primary goal. So, 

instead of a distant enemy like the West, which al-Qaeda focuses on, ISIS 

aims at purging Muslim societies in Middle East and Asia of unbelievers, 

including Shias, Alawites, and Yazidis. The book Management of Savagery 

by Abu Bakr Naji is believed to have informed their preferred choices for 

violence. Naji argues that jihad consists of brutal, sporadic violence that fills 

a power vacuum left by retreating Western armies. Drawing lessons from 

Saladin al-Ayubi and the Battle of Hatim, in which Muslims won a victory 

against the Christian crusaders, Naji writes that small bands of families 

waged jihad, which was then organized by Saladin into an organic whole, 

thereby creating a cumulative effect. Moreover, there was a strategic effect 

of timing, which is elaborated on later, in this chapter. Most ISIS justifications of violence are drawn from religious texts, which creates a dilemma for 

Islamic clerics. Given that examples of beheading existed in earlier Islamic 

theology and were used by the first caliph, Abu Bakr, who supported immolation and beheadings, it is not that easy for moderate Islamic clerics to 

designate ISIS as un-Islamic.119 ISIS, clever in argumentation and deliberately 

drawing from historical examples, thus creates a legitimacy for itself by 

locating itself within Islamic theological traditions.

Amongst the theological traditions that influence ISIS are Salafism and 

the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia. Salafism, by itself, is nonpolitical, 
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though it does advocate the ‘purification of the creed,’120 an idea ISIS supports. Salafism emulates the Prophet Muhammad and his first followers, 

al-salaf al-salih (pious forefathers), who usually had facial hair and believed 

that sharia law should be imposed. However, most Salafists are not jihadist, 

who are but a minority of them. While they shun politics, during the socalled Arab Spring, Salafists saw a golden opportunity to spread their ideas 

once the dictators fell. The basic motivation was that sharia could be imposed 

once they took over the politics.121 Salafists, unlike Islamists, concentrate on 

cleansing Islam of such sects as Shiism, Sufism, etc., unilaterally asserting 

that they represent the true Islam. Their Islam is that which was practiced by 

Muhammad and his three generations of followers until the 9th century and 

was based on hadiths.122 Everything in Islam after that is seen as un-Islamic, 

including nation-states, democracies, secularism, and political parties.123

As a result, ISIS, with its rejection of borders and nation-states, and its 

purging of the Shia, is viewed as a true embodiment of the Salafi tradition. Its 

adoption of core Islamic texts to inform its ideology and politics legitimizes 

its politics to its supporters.

However, there is another movement that might have had an influence on 

ISIS. The Sahwa movement, or al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening), 

which mixes Saudi Wahhabism with the politics of the Muslim Brotherhood, 

has had a major impact on public discourse in the Middle East. Sahwa is 

loyal to the Saudi state, while critical of it, but its version of protests and 

religious ideas has been picked up by ISIS, especially pertaining to Wahhabism. ISIS is most influenced by the idea of Takfirism, the practice of one 

Muslim declaring another Muslim an infidel or apostate, which results in excommunication. Foremost in this is how ISIS deliberately targets Muslims, 

especially those who deviate from its puritanical interpretation of Islam. 

Perhaps playing into societal fissures already existing in places like Iraq 

and Syria, its primary areas of operation, ISIS fuels these sectarian divides 

to draw in radicalized recruits who find this extreme in-group/out-group 

dichotomy attractive.

This is an aspect that needs to be internalized in any counter-strategy to 

limit the group’s influence and hold. While ISIS may believe that playing into 

sectarian divides based on local knowledge is its strength, it could end up 

being its Achilles’ heel. ISIS markets itself as the true representative of Islam, 

based on Wahhabism, which is based on extreme literalism. The Wahhabi 

clerics decry tomb worship of saints, including Sufism, which they view as 
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deviating from pure Islamic practices that are based on monotheism. The 

two concepts of Wahhabism that has been faithfully adopted by ISIS are wala 

wal bara (loyalty and disavowal)124 and tawhid. It is this Wahhabi creed of 

the oneness of God, which calls upon Muslims to reject fellow Muslims who 

deviate from this practice, and demonstrates extreme hatred and rejection 

of all polytheists. It is this idea of rejection, and creating a sphere where 

pure Islam persists, which motivates ISIS toward political statehood. This, 

in turn, leads to the idea of waging jihad to establish a caliphate, based on 

Islamic nationalism, drawn from the Sahwa movement.125

Amongst the clerics that have most influenced ISIS ideology are Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Musab al-Suri, who called 

for a caliphate in Iraq and encouraged small groups to carry out acts of 

terror in Europe. Al-Suri’s 2005 book, Da’wat al-muqawama al-Islamiyya 

al-'alamiyya (The Global Islamic Resistance), diverges from Naji’s 2004 book, 

The Management of Savagery. Naji’s book argues that the West, faced with 

a war of attrition with groups like ISIS, would reveal its true face, which is 

prejudiced and brutal, and create the conditions for its own demise by relying 

on brute force and militarization. Suri’s book focuses on how Muslims have 

been victimized across centuries. Both adhere to Wahhabism, and stress the 

importance of armed rebellion. Both also stress the critical importance of 

the establishment of a caliphate for the protection of the interest of all true 

Muslims.126 This narrow and extremely constricted definition of who is a 

Muslim render most outside of Wahhabi-dominated areas susceptible to ISIS 

violence and purges. This assertion by ISIS that it is the true representative 

of Muslims—that it represents what it calls authentic Islam—brings in the 

notion of legitimacy.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is defined as “the belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the 

right to govern,” and that, “when shared by many individuals, legitimacy 

produces distinctive collective effects in society, including making collective social order more efficient, more consensual, and perhaps more just.”127

Legitimacy can be determined by three R’s: Representativeness, Responsibility, and Reach. Does ISIS qualify? Who does it represent, and was it 

elected by the people over which it chooses to govern, or was it self-styled? 

Is it responsible for governance and state-building? And, what is its reach? 
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

Does its influence extend beyond areas where it exercises physical control? 

Does it employ normative and material incentives to justify its rule and 

broaden its reach?

As far as representativeness is concerned, ISIS is mostly a self-styled 

caliphate. It was not established by receiving the consent of those who 

resided in the areas it controls, but by an imposition declared by al-Baghdadi, 

who connected his legitimacy as caliph to his Quraysh ancestry (the direct 

descendants of the Prophet), as well as his intellectual mastery of Islamic 

scriptures. As previously mentioned, ISIS asserts in an official pronouncement that Allah promised to make a caliphate, and that promise is the basis 

for the appointment of a caliph who unites the ummah and whose orders 

should be carried out by them.128 The basis for al-Baghdadi’s legitimacy lay 

in ISIS Shura Council’s announcement of him as Caliph for all Muslims. 

Moreover, the Council asserts that given his Qurashi ancestry as a direct 

descendant of Prophet Muhammad, al-Baghdadi assumes the role of ‘Imam’ 

and ‘Khalifah’ for all Muslims.129

ISIS claims that the state it established is per the consensus and blessings 

of its Shura Council, who draw their legitimacy from their adherence to 

the pure Islam that ISIS propagates. In terms of actual representation, ISIS 

represents mostly Sunnis, especially those that give bay’ah, or allegiance. 

As stated in their pronouncement, “Ahlus-Sunnah [the Sunnis] are masters 

and are esteemed. The people of bid’ah [heresy] are humiliated. The hudūd

[sharia penalties] are implemented.”130 However, this representation cannot 

be strictly codified as consensual, as its hold on power and territory is based 

on coercion and religious imposition. Hence, there is hardly any room for 

debate for those who may disagree. Moreover, ISIS asserts that all Muslims 

everywhere are obligated to offer allegiance to al-Baghdadi, and that with 

the establishment of the caliphate, the legal basis for every other form of 

organization becomes null and void.

In the contest between secularism and Islamism, ISIS draws its legitimacy 

from Islamism, especially tawhid, in this case, Wahhabi Islam. Wahhabi 

Islam is the guiding force that informs all aspects of life for ISIS, including 

the state and its politics. The state that ISIS desires draws from the medieval 

version of Islam, including apocalyptic literature. ISIS packages its legitimacy within a strictly religious framework, asserting that its leaders have 

the power of Allah behind them.131 In its official document, titled “This Is the 

Promise of Allah,” the group asserts: “Allah has promised those who have 
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believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them 

succession [to authority] upon the earth.”132 ISIS attempts to draw parallels 

to the Abbasid caliphate of Mesopotamia (now Iraq), whose early years were 

governed by extreme brutality, but where intellectual and creative activities 

grew exponentially once they established their reign. For instance, under 

the Sunni Abbasid caliphate in Iraq free thinkers flourished, even daring 

to raise questions with regard to the Qur’an, sponsored by Caliph Rashid’s 

House of Wisdom.133 Math and medicinal knowledge were encouraged. AlBaghdadi claims similar linkages to the Abbasids, who drew their legitimacy 

from being descendants of the Prophet Muhammad’s uncle, al-Abbas,134 of 

the Hashemite clan of the Quraysh tribe from Mecca. ISIS, however, with its 

insistence on monotheism, is unlike the Abbasids who encouraged a diversity 

of thought, including poring over Indian books on math and Greek, Roman, 

and Persian philosophy texts, especially those by Caliph Harun-al-Rashid.135

This ancestral aspect is pertinent to understanding the legitimization 

process utilized by ISIS. Usually, Western interpretations of legitimacy are 

drawn from political legitimacy based on consent, beneficial consequences 

grounded in public approval, and democratic approval.136 If we locate ISIS 

within that matrix, it does not enjoy any legitimacy. This misses the crucial 

link of the Islamic legitimization process and the context within which it 

is unfolding, as stated above: legitimacy drawn from direct quotations of 

the Qur’an, supplemented with linkages to the prophet’s ancestry, as well as 

connections drawn to the golden age of the Abbasid caliphate. While we may 

despair and critique ISIS for drawing false or unilateral linkages, there is an 

audience that buys into that one-sided narrative. In this endeavor though, 

young men longing to enjoy a return of the great golden years of the Abbasids 

through the rule of ISIS, may be in for a shock, as is revealed by many who 

have managed to return after being lured by ISIS propaganda.

In an effort to claim responsibility, ISIS has undertaken governance 

efforts, including setting up a tax system, an education system, a military 

complex, a bureaucracy, and social works. For the purposes of a state, ISIS 

possessed territory, people, declared sovereign control, and established a 

caliph (ruler). It captured a huge arsenal of American weapons left behind by 

retreating Iraqi army soldiers, and succeeded in earning revenues by selling 

crude oil to the tune of $50 million a month.137 Most of this oil makes its way 

to the black market, selling at $10 to $35 a barrel. ISIS took control of some 

of Syria’s and Iraq’s oil refineries: Homs, Syria, and Kirkuk, Irbil, and Baiji, 
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Iraq.138 ISIS supplies electricity and water, and runs internal law enforcement for business owners for $20 for two months.139 A list of the financial 

assets of ISIS can be found in a report by its finance ministry, the Diwan 

al-Rakaaez.140 ISIS projects its social responsibility to its target population by 

running schools, hospitals, social welfare efforts, housing, law enforcement, 

the judiciary (based on sharia), and providing salaries. ISIS issues birth certificates, runs a vaccination campaign, and provides education that includes 

math and religious texts.141 It has a special ministry dealing with war victims 

and martyrs and their families. It picks up garbage, manages traffic, and its 

territory is divided into wilayats or provinces, each run by a governor.

Through the social media campaigns and propaganda, ISIS expands its 

reach to millions across the world.142 Amongst the terrorist groups, ISIS has 

proved the most efficient when it comes to utilizing the internet for propaganda, attracting resources and recruits, as well as spreading its ideology 

to its target audiences. Its Al Hayat Media Center in Mosul develops apps, 

such as Fajr al-Bashaer or “Dawn of Good Tidings,” which enable users to 

receive news on ISIS activities and operations in Iraq and Syria. It also has 

online magazines like Dabiq and Islamic State (IS) Report, showcasing ISIS 

education efforts, ideology, and social works in sleek designs.143 The group 

even ran an online store selling T-shirts and hoodies. Online reports, press 

releases, and magazines are simultaneously published in English, Turkish, 

Dutch, French, German, Indonesian, and Russian.144 ISIS videos on beheadings, square-based justice, and military training are always played to the 

background musical recitation of Qur’anic verses to cleverly provide these 

brutal actions with religious sanction and legitimacy. This includes videos 

like the Flames of War,

145 as well as ones made specifically for a Western 

audience, like The Chosen Few of Different Lands, in which a Canadian ISIS 

fighter, Andre Poulin, is seen making a pitch for young Western Muslim 

youths to join ISIS. Poulin, identified as a martyr by ISIS, asserted that his 

life in Canada was good, but he still decided to join ISIS—a clever strategy on 

the part of ISIS to counter analyses coming from the West that most Western young men and women join ISIS because they are either unemployed or 

unhappy in their Western surroundings.146

While recent targeted counterinsurgency (COIN) and CT operations in 

Mosul have limited the social media reach of ISIS, especially since the death 

of several of its social media leaders, the change in its internet strategy and 

its success in drawing recruits should be subject to in-depth analysis, as these 
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aspects could be adopted by other terrorist organizations. This draws us to 

the critical aspect of the ‘dynamics of allegiance and recruitment pattern’ 

within ISIS.

Dynamics of Allegiance and Recruitment

The issue of allegiance as a recruitment tool for ISIS falls under three categories. First is bay’ah, or allegiance, to al-Baghdadi as the caliph and ISIS as the 

caliphate. This category is locally, regionally, and internationally attractive 

for drawing potential recruits. The second category is sectarianism, mostly 

drawing upon the Sunni communities across the Middle East, and mostly 

preferring Sunni Arabs in leadership positions. The third category draws 

on the idea of the Muslim ummah as ISIS attempts to expand into regions 

including Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. This broad categorization aims to take advantage of Muslim recruits from countries like India, 

Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, the U.S., Canada, 

Germany, France, etc., to wage jihad in distant lands outside of the caliphate.

Giving allegiance to al-Baghdadi is mandatory once a person or group 

joins ISIS. Moreover, ISIS projects al-Baghdadi as instrumental in bringing 

in the day of honor and dignity, thereby raising Muslims across the world 

from their humiliations and freeing them from being ruled by the ‘vilest 

of rulers.’ Al-Baghdadi, as the caliph, unites the ummah and obligates all 

true believers to offer their allegiance to him. Given his qualities, including 

scholarship, wisdom, sanction of elders, and last but not least, his Quraysh 

descent, al-Baghdadi creates a dynamic of allegiance that is ordained by 

religious authority. This aspect is discussed in detail in the third issue of 

Dabiq, subtitled “A Call to Hijrah,” where ISIS calls upon all Muslims to 

move to Iraq and Syria (the caliphate) in a journey similar to that of Prophet 

Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE.147

The second category involves an appeal to all Sunnis (Ahlus-Sunnah) to 

unite and fight against the bid’ah (heretics), which includes Shias, Alawites, 

and Sufis. The core of ISIS support across Iraq and Syria is drawn from Sunni 

tribes, who saw their influence decrease after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 

regime, as well as his Baath Party members and armed officers who lost 

power post-2003.148 ISIS utilized these Sunni anxieties under Shia governance 

in Iraq, by making center-stage the fight against what it termed the heretics 

(Shias).149
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The final category is an attempt by ISIS to go beyond the Middle East and 

fulfill ambitions to expand their influence to other parts of the world through 

the idea of the ummah. In July 2014, ISIS published a map outlining its plans 

for the next five years in which it aimed to spread to India, Bangladesh, 

Burma, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, among others. For 

instance, in its online magazine, Dabiq, ISIS asserts that “sharia alone will 

rule Africa,”150 criticizes al-Qaeda in Waziristan, Pakistan, and pledges to 

expand to Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Bangladesh, India.

Have these three categories of allegiance worked to draw recruits to ISIS? 

While recruitment from different regions has varied, around 27,000 to 30,000 

foreign fighters have traveled to the caliphate, attracted by both religious 

aspirations and the draw of money.151 ISIS is a well-resourced terrorist group, 

with an annual budget of $2 billion.152 Its soldiers draw a salary and are compensated with housing and other benefits. For example, engineers working 

in the oil fields during the time when ISIS held territory earned anywhere 

between $250 and $1,200 a day, depending on their skills. The online recruiting of women is organized under platforms like Al-Khansa’a,

153 named after 

a devout poetess who lived in the Prophet’s times, and who, after losing her 

four sons in battle against Persia, stated that she was proud to be the mother 

of martyrs.154 As of December 2015, Tunisia sent the largest number of foreign 

fighters (6,000), followed by Saudi Arabia (2,500), Russia (2,400), Turkey 

(2,100), Jordan (2,000), France (1,700), the UK (760), and Germany (760).155

Significantly, recent data has emerged that indicates that Trinidad has now 

become fertile ground for ISIS recruitment, with Trinidadian citizen Abu 

Sa’d at-Trinidadi being the face of it, and about 125 Trinidadians joining ISIS. 

The growth of the Salafi influence on the island could increase the attraction 

to ISIS.156 ISIS also has drawn recruits from North America, including the 

U.S. (100)157 and Canada (150). In understanding the dynamics of allegiance 

and recruitment across the three categories, it becomes clear that all three 

categories have a cumulative effect on ISIS expansion of its ideology and 

bonding fostered by religion. In this, context and time is of paramount significance in terms of both the ISIS strategy and an operational game plan.

Timing

Timing is vital for strategic success. ISIS arrived at a time in 2014 when 

Iraq was suffering from a crisis of sectarian divides between the Shia-led 
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JSOU Report 18-6

government in Baghdad and the Sunni majority in the provinces. The Arab 

Spring had weakened Middle East states and enabled extremist groups to 

rise against the dictatorships in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Tunisia. Nearby, 

Jordan and Saudi Arabia tightened civilian control for fear of similar uprisings. In Syria in particular, in the name of the Arab Spring, terror groups 

like al-Nusra (a sub-group of al-Qaeda) were getting funds to fight Bashar 

al-Assad. AQI, with its leader killed in Iraq in 2006, was regrouping and 

consolidating in rebel-held territory in Syria, where al-Assad’s forces had 

little say or were looking away. With the disintegration of Arab regimes in 

Libya, Egypt, and Syria, radical Islamist groups filled power vacuums—not 

the moderate groups hoped for by the West. Moreover, the fear of instability that the Arab Spring brought, due to people demanding more freedoms, 

motivated regimes like those in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to use cash incentives to try to buy off their citizens for fear that political Islam might take 

root in post-Arab Spring regimes.

ISIS entered Iraq at a time when the Americans exited. This left a power 

vacuum and incapacitated the Iraqi army, which was made up of Sunni 

personnel, stationed in Sunni cities like Mosul and Kirkuk, and who, having 

suffered under al-Maliki, were afraid of fighting ISIS as a Sunni-based group. 

ISIS quickly turned Mosul into its headquarters in Iraq and the place from 

which al-Baghdadi announced his caliphate. In Syria, the rebel forces had, 

at that time, driven the Syrian government forces out of places like Raqqa 

and Aleppo, which in turn fell to ISIS. The simultaneous impact of popular 

uprisings, lawlessness, weakened regimes, and sectarian divides, galvanized 

ISIS to declare its state and offer stability and a sense of purpose in an otherwise chaotic landscape.

The question that arises in this context is: why study and understand 

these six strategic dimensions from the standpoint of USSOCOM or for the 

larger purpose of an effective long-term counter-extremism operation, to 

include COIN and CT? The answer was provided by Major General Michael 

Nagata, former commander of Special Operations Command Central, who 

stated that in order to defeat groups like ISIS, one must attack the ideas that 

propagate their version of reality. But, in order to be successful in that mission, ISIS ideology and attraction has to be understood to highlight both 

its strengths and its weaknesses. “We do not understand the movement, 

and until we do, we are not going to defeat it. We have not defeated the 

idea. We do not even understand the idea,”158 he said in December 2014. 
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Most importantly, he went on to state that, “I want to engage in a long-term 

conversation to understand a commonly held view of the psychological, 

emotional and cultural power of IS,” expressing concern that ISIS evokes a 

magnetic charm for young Muslim men from a particular section of society, 

looking for a banner to rally around.159

U.S. efforts to arm the Syrian rebels against al-Assad, al-Nusra, and ISIS—

at a cost of $500 million—did not result in the success commanders and 

planners had envisioned.160 Rebel fighters were required to fight in Syria on 

behalf of U.S. CT efforts, especially when al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate 

in Syria, attacked them. The complexity of fighting three different foes on 

the same battlefield could have been asking for too much from the Syrian 

military graduates that were part of U.S. military’s training program. Most 

of them proved inadequate in the context of motivated, religiously inspired, 

and locally trained groups like ISIS and al-Nusra. Critically, the Americanbacked rebel groups, like the Syrian Revolutionaries Front, ended up fighting 

multiple fronts: al-Assad’s forces, ISIS, and al-Nusra. The task proved arduous, given that al-Assad’s forces targeted the rebel forces, weakening them, 

before they then had to fight off ISIS.161 

The complexity of the cultural, social, and political conditions in Syria 

and Iraq create risks and obstacles that hinder operational clarity. For one, 

when AQI chief al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006, no one predicted that within 

a span of eight years a group like ISIS would occupy land and establish an 

extremist state in Iraq and Syria. For another, the sectarian divides and inclination to support a fundamentalist form of Islam amongst large population 

swathes indicate that such groups will continue to fester.162 We know that 

ISIS aims to spread its sectarian ideology to Muslim-majority countries like 

Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, as well as to the 

large Muslim population in India. Yet, in the last three years since that goal 

was articulated, the spread of ISIS ideology has not overtaken civil discourse 

in these countries, and Muslim organizations within them have boldly 

declared ISIS a terror group. The structural, political, social, and cultural 

conditions that have been historically rooted in countries like Indonesia, 

India, and Malaysia have created a safety net against ISIS ideology. Perhaps 

Iraq and Syria lack that broad-based, representative, political, and religious 

structure that could create a similar safety net. Following chapters in the 

monograph will deal substantially with the cases of Bangladesh, Burma, 

India, and Indonesia, highlighting the limitations of the group's ideological 
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JSOU Report 18-6

appeal and reach, and why they will remain territorially limited, despite an 

illusion of global appeal.

Significantly, ISIS is not the first terrorist/insurgent group to run a government by claiming territory. Parallel governments have been set up by 

insurgent groups in India like the Nagas and the Naxalites; in Burma by the 

Kachins, Karens, Was, and Shans; in the Philippines by the Moro National 

Liberation Front (MNLF); in Colombia by the Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia (FARC); and in Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam. There are several more examples of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) 

occupying territory and running a parallel, illicit economy, similar to ISIS. 

Usually, these are spaces where the writ of the 

state is weak and access is difficult. ISIS gained 

prominence in this regard because it successfully occupied major cities in Iraq and Syria, 

and engaged in conventional battles with state 

forces. Hence, the modus operandi of ISIS on the 

battlefield is a departure from the past, where NSAGs usually used unconventional battle tactics and guerilla warfare. However, there is the danger 

of ISIS resorting to unconventional tactics (terror strikes across the world) 

once it loses ground in Syria and Iraq, for two main purposes: to keep the 

movement alive and visible, and to draw in recruits and financial resources. 

We have to account for “ISIS diaspora”163 in future plans for combating violent extremism.

ISIS is not the first terrorist/insurgent group 

to run a government 

by claiming territory.
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

Chapter 2. Dynamics of Allegiance, 

Ideological Propaganda Tools, and 

Recruitment Patterns 

One of the primary tasks assigned to USSOCOM is to mitigate and 

minimize the impact of extremist groups like ISIS,164 not only in the 

Middle East, but across regions like Asia and Africa.165 This task is accomplished with the help of partner nations including Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, 

Jordan, Morocco, Somalia, Cameroon, and Nigeria, amongst others,166 where 

ISIS is present and/or aims to expand.167 In April 2016, then U.S. President 

Barack Obama announced the deployment of 250 U.S. SOF to Syria to augment the existing 300 in the battle against ISIS, with a focus on training 

and providing critical support to local forces fighting ISIS.168 The Syrian 

Democratic Forces, a U.S.-backed coalition, welcomed the infusion of U.S. 

SOF with spokesperson Talal Silo stating that, “Any support they offer is 

positive but we hope there will be greater support.”169 U.S. SOF continue to 

play a simultaneous, major role in the fight against ISIS in Iraq, with on-theground advising and assisting of Iraqi forces.170

In the fight against ISIS, Syrian Arab volunteers have an advantage, as 

the areas of conflict are largely inhabited by Arab populations. This ethnic 

linkage makes it easier to not only carry out ground attacks against ISIS, but 

also gather intelligence. However, this concept of Syrian Arab volunteers has 

not been lost on ISIS. As mentioned in chapter 1, al-Iraqi said as much to a 

rebel commander in a telephone call between the two.171

Hence, as Sun Tzu stated centuries ago, the enemy is always thinking, 

adapting, and evolving, and “supreme importance in war is to attack the 

enemy’s strategy.”172 In the fight against ISIS, it is critical to understand the 

logic driving the group, which is opposite to the logic driving the forces fighting it. On the one hand, the logic of the group's strategy is to utilize a mixture 

of ideology, religious authenticity, social networks based on ethnicity and 

sect, political legitimacy, anger, and fear to realize two potentially distinct 

goals: perpetuate their ideas, and perpetuate their presence (a defeat in Raqqa 

does not mean a defeat of the apocalyptic idea).173 On the other hand, the 

logic of the forces fighting ISIS is that this is solely a terrorist organization 
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lacking popular support, and as a result, cannot sustain itself over the long 

haul in the face of the multiple specialized forces fighting it.174

Yet, a puzzle that confronts the U.S. is the skill ISIS has attracting allegiances from across the world, coupled with the rapid rate of recruitment 

that it registered in the years following its 2014 formation.175 This is a puzzle 

worth deconstructing with questions begging answers below.

• Who are these men and women who are attracted to ISIS? 

• What are the reasons for this attraction? 

• Is it purely materialistic, or religious, or a combination of both? 

• Are there region-wide variations across the globe in the patterns of 

allegiances and recruitment to ISIS? 

• And, if there are, do these region-wide variations matter to the U.S. 

SOF mission? 

Amongst a population of more than 1.8 billion Muslims worldwide,176

why is it that only between 27,000 and 31,000 have actually traveled to the 

caliphate, and why have more traveled from some regions than others?177 It is 

important to remember that per ISIS ideological pronouncements examined 

in the previous chapter, the declaration of the caliphate obligates all true 

Muslims to travel to it and give allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Yet, a majority of 

Muslims, including the Sunni Muslims revered by ISIS, scoff at the idea of 

the ISIS caliphate—millions have stayed away and refused to recognize it.178

Keeping in mind the U.S. SOF mission of combating violent extremism, especially groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda in its regional variations, this 

chapter analyzes how ISIS institutes allegiances with its cadres and target 

populations. In this, the role of ideological indoctrination, economic and 

social factors, promised future benefits of recruitment, participatory political 

organizational structures within ISIS, and elements of coercive persuasion 

are specifically examined. In terms of allegiance, the chapter highlights 

how social connections (shared living in similar circumstances), bonding 

(elements of empowerment by being part of a group), a shared vision of how 

things should be in Muslim societies, and finally, fear and intimidation combine to play a role in establishing allegiance to ISIS. Based on these elements, 

the chapter then investigates the pattern of recruitment to ISIS.

Understanding the elements that go into allegiance to ISIS and social 

networking, both real and virtual, as well as its capability to draw in future 

recruits, equips USSOCOM with the knowledge to break the cycle of violence 
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

that penetrates societies in Iraq and Syria.179 While it is not easy to completely 

destroy groups like ISIS and the religion-based ideas that they project (there 

is always another radical group ready to replace it, as well as a receptive 

audience), it is pertinent that the social structures that enable such groups 

to flourish are encouraged to change and adapt.180 Examples of similar, if not 

identical, cases of violent groups adapting to changed circumstances include 

FARC, who agreed to join a peace process with the Colombian government in 

2016;181 and the Nagas in India who signed a peace agreement with the Indian 

government in 2015, nearly 97 years after they formed a resistance group.182

Unlike ISIS, insurgent groups like the MNLF in the Philippines utilize 

local ethnic and religious bonding, social networks, and local causes to draw 

in recruits and finances.183 ISIS, however, focuses its rationale globally, asserting that it is the caliphate that Muslims aspire to experience in their lifetime. 

ISIS unilaterally demands a pledge of allegiance for the simple fact that they 

are the self-styled, religiously ordained caliphate, following in the tradition 

of the Prophet Muhammad and the first two caliphs who followed him.

Dynamics of Allegiance

As mentioned previously, the dynamics of allegiance can be separated into 

the three categories highlighted in the previous chapter. First is the concept 

of bay’ah, or allegiance, to al-Baghdadi as the caliph and ISIS as the caliphate. As mentioned, this category is locally, regionally, and internationally 

attractive in drawing potential recruits. The second category is sectarianism, 

which mostly draws upon the Sunni communities across the Middle East, 

and means mostly preferring Sunni Arabs in leadership positions. The third 

category utilizes the idea of the Muslim ummah in an effort to expand into 

regions in Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America, taking advantage of 

Muslim recruits from countries like India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, the U.S., Canada, Germany, France, etc., to wage 

jihad in distant lands outside of the caliphate.

Besides these three overarching categories, there are three subcategories 

of allegiance. First is the concept of “brothers all,” which sells the idea that 

once allegiance is given to al-Baghdadi, every Muslim is a brother, shares 

hopes, sacrifices, and joys, and can receive redemption. The second subcategory is forming regional alliances with other terror groups, alliances 

permeated on the overarching idea that al-Baghdadi is the supreme leader. 
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JSOU Report 18-6

The final subcategory is the offering of incentives to men who join, including money, female slaves,184 and stature within a close-knit group. Any or 

all can lure in recruits.185

Brothers All

In the discourse that ISIS projects, the notion that members are brothers 

under Allah is extremely powerful. This kind of social bonding can be a 

powerful draw when one lives in a conflict zone where insecurity prevails, or 

in conditions in host or home societies where one feels marginalized and/or a 

sense of imagined or real racism.186 For example, ISIS recruits from Western 

Europe with preexisting criminal records had done jail time before they left 

for Syria, sentences they often portrayed as racial targeting.187 These individuals included the mastermind of the Paris attacks, Belgian national Abdelhamid Abaaoud and his fellow Belgian co-conspirators, Samy Amimour, and 

Salah and Brahim Abdeslam.188 It is often believed that it is in these jails that 

they start getting radicalized or turn to radical Islam.189 Moreover, the turn to 

radical Islam is often found in children born of immigrant Muslim parents. 

More often than not, they do not reflect the gratitude felt by their parents 

for getting an opportunity to migrate to better lives in the West, which the 

parents perceive as improving not only their financial condition but also 

their stature back home amongst kith and kin. Second-generation Muslims 

(born in the West) often find themselves in circumstances that do not reflect 

the advantages of their peers, whose forefathers are Western. While their 

national identity is either European or North American, they do not feel 

accepted or validated, and continue to be 

viewed as immigrants because of racism or 

Islamophobia, which are prevalent in these 

societies.190 This renders them susceptible 

to the Salafi version of Islam and to groups 

like ISIS. As a representation of revolt, they 

form purposeful identities both against 

their parents’ attitude of gratitude in circumstances where they may have themselves faced racial discrimination, and as a religious platform through which 

to broadcast their aggressive identities. ISIS plays into this psyche perfectly 

Second-generation Muslims 

(born in the West) often 

find themselves in circumstances that do not reflect 

the advantages of their 

peers, whose forefathers are 

Western. 
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by indicating that, within the caliphate, all true Muslims humiliated in the 

West will have their dignity and self-worth restored.

In the UK, Muslim converts have shown a desire to join ISIS. This 

includes Siddhartha Dhar, a.k.a. Saiful Islam or Abu Rumaysah, who was 

born a Hindu, but converted to Islam in his teens. He was arrested in the UK 

on charges of supporting terrorism, and when out on bail in 2014, escaped 

to Syria with his family. He was part of the al-Muhajiroun network, and 

expressed his radical views openly. When ISIS established the caliphate, 

Dhar stated, “The caliphate [a state governed in accordance with Islamic law, 

or sharia] is a dream for all Muslims worldwide ... Now that we have this 

caliphate I think you’ll see many Muslims globally seeing it as an opportunity for the Qur’an to be realized.”191 Significantly, between 2001 and 2010, 

new converts to Islam formed 31 percent of British jihadists.192 It is pertinent 

to note that most were homegrown terrorists and attended a higher education institution. Yet, with their perceived home circumstances,193 the desire 

to live in, and perpetuate, a sharia-based system and the ‘brotherhood’ logic 

based on Islam appealed to them.

If one looks at the data, out of a population of 4.7 million French Muslims, 1,700 of Muslim French nationals joined ISIS as of May 2015.194 Out of 

4.7 million German Muslims, 760 joined ISIS as of May 2015.195 In the UK, 

with a population of 3 million Muslims, 760 joined ISIS by that same date.196

Most who joined were radicalized by online discussions and their need to 

belong to something purposeful and far more radical than their own Muslim 

communities where the majority shunned ISIS.197 It is important to note that 

for most ISIS recruits, Islam is not simply a religion, but a socio-political 

system. Hence, the ISIS caliphate, run on sharia law and where sovereignty 

is with Allah, appeals to them. It offers young men a sense of purpose and 

redemption, especially those in their teens who are suspect at home for their 

views and possibly have been convicted of crimes and terror acts. The offer 

of dignity from ISIS, in these circumstances, can have a liberating effect. 

Moreover, the lives of the Prophet Muhammad and the two caliphs who 

succeeded him were plagued by violent battles in the quest to establish Islam. 

ISIS deliberately projects to their targeted audience that they are simply 

following that path, until sharia law is imposed, everywhere Muslims live. 

ISIS documents assert that for the sacrifices made to impose the caliphate 

worldwide, salvation will be gained in heaven. Muslim converts, especially 

in the West, lack the magnetic pull of an ISIS brotherhood and emotional 
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rewards within their own societies.198 Hence, ISIS statements, like the one 

quoted in the last chapter about the establishment of the caliphate and pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi, resonate with them.

Regional Alliances

ISIS asserts that once the caliphate is established, it becomes the religious 

obligation of all Islamic groups to offer their allegiance to it, as mandated by 

the Qur’an. Anyone failing to do so is working against Allah’s wishes.199 One 

of the major terrorist groups to give allegiance is Boko Haram from Nigeria. 

Its leader, Abu Bakr Shekau, pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi, stating:

[W]e announce our allegiance to the Caliph of the Muslims ... and 

will hear and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity, in hardship 

and ease ... We call on Muslims everywhere to pledge allegiance 

to the Caliph and support him, as obedience to Allah and as their 

application of the absent duty of the era.200

The allegiance given by Boko Haram assumes significance as it is the 

first major terror group, outside of the Middle East, to do so. Significantly, 

though, after Shekau pledged his allegiance, ISIS replaced him in August 2016 

with Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of Boko Haram founder Muhammad 

Yusuf. This could be due to ideological rifts, as well as the fact that Shekau’s 

appetite for extreme violence went overboard, even for a hard core extremist 

group like ISIS. His attacks on mosques and Muslim-owned civic facilities 

turned the ranks against him.201 ISIS realized that it was best to replace 

the impulsive Shekau with someone they could easily direct from Iraq and 

Syria.202 Shekau, for his part, could have been motivated to declare allegiance 

to ISIS to increase his own influence within a fractious rank, efforts which 

then backfired on him.

Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, Egypt’s most active and visible terror group, 

pledged its allegiance to ISIS in November 2014, stating: “In accordance with 

the teachings of the Prophet, we announce our allegiance to the caliphate, 

and call on Muslims everywhere to do the same.”203 After declaring allegiance, it changed its name to the Sinai Province (SP). Operating mainly in 

North Sinai, it aims to spread to other parts of Egypt including Cairo and 

Giza. The group’s presence could destabilize the border between Egypt and 

Israel, especially since terror attacks have struck Sheikh Zuweid, not far 
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

from the border.204 The Egyptian military alleges that SP is procuring arms 

from the Gaza Strip.205 With ISIS collaboration, SP has repeatedly attacked 

Egypt’s security services, as well as civilians. Critically, the allegiance to ISIS 

offered the group territory in Iraq and Syria to train and establish expertise, 

especially for terror attacks and online propaganda. SP’s online presence 

is apparent with several propaganda videos aimed at Egyptian audiences 

including the Muslim Brotherhood. SP claimed responsibility for downing 

Russian Kogalymavia Metrojet flight 9268, killing all of its 224 passengers 

and crew in October 2015.206

Despite the pledges by Boko Haram and SP, ISIS has failed to secure 

allegiances from other major terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda and its 

affiliates in Arabia, the Maghreb, and the Indian subcontinent,207 or Ansar alsharia in Libya, or its allies in the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. 

Neither has ISIS secured any allegiance from the Taliban, either in Afghanistan or Pakistan.208 Terror factions with stated allegiances in Algeria, Libya, 

and Saudi Arabia are unknown entities or have little influence, though their 

allegiances serve the purposes of al-Baghdadi to claim that ISIS is expanding its sway in these regions. Some ex-leaders from the Taliban209 have given 

their allegiance, but that is more symbolic than substantial given they have 

little influence within their original group.

In response to the declaration of the ISIS caliphate, al-Qaeda leader alZawahiri quickly announced the establishment of al-Qaeda in the Indian 

Subcontinent (AQIS) on 3 September 2014.210 This Pakistan-based al-Qaeda 

affiliate would be responsible for activities in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 

and Burma. The timing and al-Zawahiri’s pledge that AQIS will expand 

an Islamic caliphate to these areas is a direct response to ISIS expansion. 

However, a declaration amounts to nothing if the Muslim populations in 

these countries reject these efforts, as has been the case in Indonesia, India, 

Bangladesh, and Burma.

For the success of the U.S. SOF mission in the fight against ISIS, besides 

lethal firepower, gaining an understanding of these Islamic concepts, as 

well as patterns of allegiance, is vital for spotting those susceptible to the 

packaged and advertised concepts of ISIS. More importantly, in tracing the 

patterns of allegiance, vital intelligence for mission success is captured.
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Personal and Community-Based Incentives for Recruitment

ISIS recruitment is aided by several incentives, namely ideological and religious ones: a shared linear sense of anger at some of the conditions affecting 

Muslims worldwide, the impact of 9/11, a lack of purpose and meaning in 

their current lives, and the fear of siege in a situation where poor intelligence 

leads to overt generalizations about Muslim communities. All these factors 

can lead to recruitment, especially from the pool of Muslim youths living in 

the West.211 Most of the recruits from Europe and North America fall within 

the 15 to 25 age group—an age when young men and/or women are looking 

for meaning and are easily manipulated by someone older. ISIS projects to 

these youths that it understands their lack of social bonding in their physical world, and that they turn to the internet for it instead. How do online 

ISIS recruiters know that these young men or women are vulnerable or susceptible to recruitment? By the very fact that they are visiting recruitment 

sites, not just once out of genuine curiosity, but time and again to engage 

in online conversations. Then, in their conversations with potential recruits, ISIS recruiters let 

them watch one-sided videos of discrimination 

or violence against fellow Muslims in Palestine, 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Videos of the 

Abu Ghraib prison scandal of intentional torture and sexual abuse of Iraqi detainees by U.S. 

military and intelligence personnel were passed 

around for potential recruits to watch.212 This can 

impact a young mind, whose logic and reasoning power may be limited compared to someone 

much older, or who may be unable to fathom that 

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took responsibility for the prison 

abuse and that several investigations into the scandal were conducted by the 

U.S. Army.213 Videos of similar torture or beheadings by terror groups—for 

instance, the gruesome killings of Nicholas Berg, Daniel Pearl, and James 

Foley—are then labeled as justified as they were conducted in the name 

of Allah and are compared to stories of Prophet Muhammad engaged in 

similar acts.

It is important to realize that recruits join ISIS for different reasons. For 

instance, the largest number of foreign recruits are from Russia and the 

Most of the recruits 

from Europe and 

North America fall 

within the 15 to 25 

age group—an age 

when young men and/

or women are looking 

for meaning and are 

easily manipulated by 

someone older.
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

Middle East, including Tunisia (6,000), Saudi Arabia (2,500), Russia (2,400), 

Turkey (2,100), and Jordan (2,000).214 If one analyzes the reasons, besides 

monetary incentives, the reward of several wives and slaves could be a powerful draw for men.215 The lure of possessing female slaves was expressed in 

an ISIS video, where viewers could see ISIS members discussing the price 

of each woman.216 Some of the other reasons include human emotions like 

longing for purpose, adventure, friendship.217

Besides, most ISIS recruits from the Middle East believe that their own 

countries are not faithfully replicating the sharia laws laid down in the 

Qur’an or following the hadith literally, especially as laid down by Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. Thus, they gravitate toward the packaged and 

advertised concepts of ISIS. For those coming from the former Soviet Republics (4,700), the reasons range from the draw of monetary incentives, to 

already existing criminality, as well as a desire to live under sharia.218 The 

sense of alienation that Muslim youths may perceive and feel in the West may 

not be felt by youths from Central Asian nations such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—all Muslim-majority 

states. Yet, given online recruiting and targeted propaganda by ISIS, some of 

these youths may feel compelled to join ISIS for its promise of redemption, 

as well as revenge for the perceived wrongs done to Muslims worldwide. 

In this, the concept of ummah plays a role, especially to those who are not 

deeply rooted in their own societies and are looking for bonding and a sense 

of adventure.

For youths from the West being recruited into ISIS, three factors play a 

major role. First is the perception that Western societies never accept them 

as fully their own, and will always view their identity as British Muslims or 

American Muslims with suspicion. So, their loyalty to the UK—or the United 

States—is suspect. Being born British or American does not automatically 

result in full acceptance. The second factor is that their families and communities, within which these youths feel a sense of alienation, fail to notice 

the signs, especially when young Muslim men and women suddenly turn 

more religious and start wearing signs of their growing religiosity. Usually, 

when their sons or daughters are found guilty of plotting or carrying out 

a terror attack, parents despair, stating that he or she was just a juvenile. 

Part of the youths’ radicalization can also inadvertently happen within the 

family, especially when parents may debate or discuss issues like racism and 

minority treatment in the West. Youths listening in on their parents may 
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feel compelled to do something, especially those who face discrimination 

in their own social settings such as their school. However, when they find 

that their parents or their mosques refuse to engage in topics like jihad and 

discourage them in their growing radicalized views, they turn to the only 

source available—the internet—and work out their own, usually extremist, 

brand of Islam.219

Once these youths from several regions join ISIS, they go through physical training and indoctrination, and the brotherhood bond is augmented, 

inspiring them to carry out more violence—all justified in the name of Allah. 

Even the rape of slaves is justified and legitimized by ISIS as being sanctioned 

in the Qur’an. This offers redemption and legitimization.

ISIS divides men into different regional groups by their ethnicity. For 

example, the group's Russian-language media center, Furat Media, distributes propaganda that utilizes voices from the region to draw in more recruits. 

In an ISIS video, Abu Amin, a 60-year-old native of Osh, Kyrgyzstan, indicates that he and his family traveled to the caliphate to seek redemption. He 

goes on to state in his native Uzbek language that the caliphate is a peaceful 

place to raise one’s children. Similarly, Marat Maulenov, speaking in his 

native Kazakh language, calls upon Kazakh families to travel to the caliphate.220 Given conditions of corruption, and minority persecution in Central 

Asia, ISIS propaganda videos prioritize social justice within the caliphate, 

especially appealing to those who suffer from unemployment and poverty.

Family values may have a special appeal, although it has not been 

appealing enough to the 66 million Muslims who live in Central Asia. 

The data below reflects ISIS recruitment from the region during its peak 

years between 2014-2015. Accessing recruitment patterns during the peak 

years of an insurgency/terrorism, helps establish a credible picture of its 

appeal to potential recruits. Azerbaijan, with a population of 9.8 million 

in 2015,221 saw about 200 join ISIS.222 Kazakhstan, with a population of 17.4 

million in 2015,223 saw 300 join ISIS.224 Kyrgyzstan, with a population of 

5.72 million in 2015,225 saw 500 join ISIS.226 Tajikistan, with a population of 

8.2 million in 2015,227 saw 386 join ISIS.228 Uzbekistan, with a population of 

29.2 million in 2015,229 saw 500 join ISIS.230 While the recruitment to ISIS 

appears to be high from Central Asia, it is useful to comprehend that millions have rejected ISIS, and even though sympathetic to Wahhabi Islam, 

at least do not view the caliphate as legitimate. 
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Similarly, ISIS has established a Khorasan group, which launched its first 

attack on India on 9 March 2017, bombing a train in the state of Madhya 

Pradesh. This India-based ISIS group consisted of nine members, mostly 

from Lucknow and Kanpur in India, but were alleged to have been directed 

by an ISIS operative in Syria.231 The states of Kerala and Assam are viewed 

as targets of ISIS recruitment.232 ISIS released a video in 2016 that featured 

an Indian Muslim ISIS recruit who pledged to expand the caliphate to India 

and liberate its Muslim population.233

The presence of ISIS, its propaganda, the hysteria surrounding foreign 

recruits into ISIS, and the multiple terror attacks orchestrated by ‘lone 

wolves’ who have pledged their allegiance to or were directed by ISIS234 give 

the impression that the group is spreading like cancer. Putting the recruitment pattern in perspective, however, millions of Muslims continue to live 

their lives in lands described as kuffar by ISIS. ISIS is unable to reach generations beyond the 30s and 40s for the most part. This is despite the group’s 

claim that a true Muslim’s obligation is to either travel to the caliphate or 

to join it virtually:

The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, 

becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah’s authority and arrival 

of its troops to their areas ... Listen to your khalīfah and obey him. 

Support your state, which grows every day.235

Moreover, despite the claim by ISIS that its goal is to establish a global 

caliphate, most of its top leaders are local (Iraqis) or confined to Syrians and 

Jordanians. There is resistance within ISIS to giving decision-making power 

to foreign members. They can be utilized for propaganda in their respective 

regions to draw in recruits or carry out virtual terror, but they cannot be 

seen amongst the top ISIS executive or Shura Council. For instance, AQI, the 

precursor to ISIS, faced stiff resistance from local Iraqis unhappy with the 

growing number of foreign fighters, including al-Zarqawi, who was a Jordanian. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who became AQI leader after al-Zarqawi’s 

death, issued a statement in 2007 that foreign fighters in AQI numbered 

only 200.236

As mentioned earlier, USSOCOM core activities include CT, COIN, and 

FID. FID includes protection “against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 

terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability, and 

legitimacy.”237 U.S. SOF also are tasked with military information support 
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operations (MISO), which includes “conveying selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s 

objectives.”238 To further this goal, it is critical for U.S. SOF to understand the 

dynamics of allegiance to ISIS, as well as the group’s recruitment patterns.

The key questions that are explored in the forthcoming chapters are: 

what are the limits of ISIS ideology, and why have some of the major Muslim 

countries seen such low levels of ISIS recruitment despite efforts by ISIS to 

engage with them? As of 2010, there were 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, 

with a combined population of 257 million in the Middle East.239 Indonesia 

has the largest Muslim population with 209.1 million, followed by India and 

Pakistan, with 176.2 million and 167.4 million, respectively.240 Bangladesh 

has 148.6 million Muslims, and Malaysia has a population of 19.3 million 

Muslims. Yet, recruitment to ISIS from these countries has been low according to official accounts.241 The following chapters will unpack the reasons, 

as well as offer a futuristic perspective on whether, despite its limits today, 

ISIS ideology will spread, and if so, what realistically can be done to limit 

its influence.
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Chapter 3. Bangladesh and Burma: Will 

ISIS Spread Its Wings? 

Bangladesh and Burma are strategically two of the most significant 

countries in South and Southeast Asia. They share a nearly 170-mile 

border.242 One issue that affects both countries is the Rohingya conflict, 

which spans the Bangladesh-Burma border. The Rohingya are an ethnic 

minority in Burma, and are believed to be descendants of Arab traders. 

Burma, however, views them as illegal immigrants and denies them any 

citizenship rights.243 There are about 1.4 million Rohingya in the Rakhine 

state of Burma and hundreds of thousands live in Bangladesh without any 

documentation. Interestingly, Burma’s Nobel Peace Prize winner and prodemocracy activist, Aung San Suu Kyi, and her political party, the National 

League for Democracy (NLD), have done little to salvage the situation of 

the Rohingya. Instead, she indicated that the violence in the Rakhine state 

against the Rohingya was because the Buddhists “are worried about the fact 

that they are shrinking as a Rakhine population percentage-wise.”244

In the 2015 Burma elections, NLD did not allow a single Muslim candidate. There are concerns that the poor conditions prevalent in Burma for 

the Rohingya Muslim community make it fertile ground for ISIS recruitment and propaganda. Malaysia’s CT chief, Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, cautioned that ISIS fighters may travel to Rakhine state to fight for the Rohingya 

cause.245 Nearly 500,000 Rohingya have fled Burma over the years and now 

reside in Bangladesh.246 In April 2017, Burma and Bangladesh agreed to begin 

talks to address the issue of 65,000 Rohingya that fled Rakhine state to escape 

the October 2016 violence and now reside in Bangladesh. The Rohingya issue 

is pertinent to this chapter, as it has been named by both ISIS and AQIS as 

the cause for which they will be fighting.

Bangladesh, viewed as rapidly becoming a target of ISIS propaganda and 

physical spread, has seen around 30 ISIS recruits from a population of 148.6 

million Muslims. In a Dabiq article titled “The Revival of Jihad in Bengal,”247

ISIS identified Bangladesh as its next base for operations. Extremist groups 

within Bangladesh, like JMB and ABT, are suspected of being linked to ISIS 

and have the potential to spread the ISIS extremist ideology in the country.248

Historically, Bangladesh declared itself a secular state in its constitution, yet 
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specified Islam as the state religion.249 In a 2011 amendment to the constitution, the Awami League (AL), who was in power at that time, emphasized the 

idea of secularism but at the same time retained Islam as the state religion 

thereby creating ambiguity and constitutional privilege for Islam vis-à-vis 

other religions.250 In March 2016, the Bangladesh High Court rejected a 28 

year old petition on removing Islam as a state religion. 

In recent years, Bangladesh has witnessed a rise in terror attacks against 

its liberal writers, Shias, and foreigners, including the killings of an Italian 

aid worker and a Japanese farm expert.251 ISIS has claimed responsibility for 

the terror attacks, especially against foreigners, whereas the Bangladeshi 

government asserts it is the work of local terror groups attaching themselves 

to ISIS to gain international visibility.

The U.S., in recent years, has increased its CT cooperation with both Bangladesh and Burma. In the fifth U.S.-Bangladesh partnership dialogue, held 

on 23 and 24 June 2016 in Washington, D.C., both countries committed to 

increasing CT cooperation and combating violent extremism (CVE). A joint 

statement identified the shared threat faced from ISIS and al-Qaeda, and it 

was announced that Bangladesh would participate in the U.S. Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, equipping both to respond to terror threats effectively.252 This aspect of CT and CVE is directly relevant to the USSOCOM 

mission, especially the goal of achieving a high level of proficiency with partner nations to address the issue of terrorism. Understanding the complexity 

of the ISIS threat faced by Bangladesh and Burma equips USSOCOM with 

increased knowledge of areas identified by ISIS as future regions for expansion. In addressing those goals, the main thrust of this chapter is to examine 

whether ISIS is likely to succeed in its claims for Bangladesh, and if there 

are pockets of population vulnerability, rendering them susceptible to ISIS 

propaganda. To spread its message, ISIS has utilized apps like Viber, We-chat 

and WhatsApp by forming group chat rooms, mostly taking advantage of 

encryption. This strategy proves effective given the popularity of group chats 

in Bangladesh and Burma. In November 2015, the Bangladesh government 

banned WhatsApp, Facebook messenger, and Viber, citing security reasons. 

However, most users defied the ban by using a proxy and a Virtual Private 

Network. Bangladesh lacks a skilled online regulatory or surveillance system 

thereby decreasing the effectiveness of such bans.253

U.S.-Burma relations lacked any diplomatic engagement for decades due 

to the military crackdown against democratic protests in 1988 and 1989.254
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In 1989, NLD leader Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest. In the 1990 

elections, the NLD won 392 of the 485 parliamentary seats, but the military 

refused to honor the results and instead arrested several NLD politicians. 

However, in 2011, Burma’s military introduced political reforms, and several 

military leaders moved into a civilian government, with General Then Sein 

becoming president. The new government held elections in 2015, and crafted 

a constitution. In November 2012, former U.S. President Barack Obama visited Burma, the first visit by a U.S. President. However, the situation within 

Burma remains fraught with ethnic minorities like Kachins, Karens, and 

Wa emphasizing that they are not fairly represented by NLD, and the ongoing Rohingya crisis.255 As mentioned earlier, the Rohingya are Muslim, and 

both ISIS and al-Qaeda have called the Rohingya their brothers and pledged 

to fight for them. This chapter examines how susceptible the Rohingya are 

to ISIS propaganda and recruitment. It is one thing for ISIS to declare a 

common cause with the Rohingya or for Burma’s military to claim that the 

Rohingya will join ISIS, but to prove that is the case, one has to factually 

indicate that Rohingya Muslims have indeed joined ISIS or been influenced 

by its brutal propaganda. Such an analysis is critical for USSOCOM to understand if disempowered Muslim communities are drawn to ISIS, and if not, 

then to determine the reasons for non-allegiance.

The Case of Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a democracy with Islam as the state religion.256 The majority of Bangladeshi Muslims are Sunnis, but there is a small minority of 

Shia and Ahmadi. Bangladesh has been affected by terror groups like the 

Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), established in 1992 with ties to al-Qaeda’s 

International Islamic Front. HuJI supports the goal of establishing an Islamic 

hukumat (rule) based on sharia law in Bangladesh, and is against secular 

intellectuals, ideals, and festivals in Bangladesh.257 In June 2014, Bangladesh 

sentenced to death HuJI leader Mufti Abdul Hannan for his role in a 2001 

terror attack that killed 10 people.258 In 2013 and 2014, in a series of attacks, 

secular bloggers Ahmed Rajib Haider, Ananta Bijoy Das, and Avijit Roy were 

hacked to death with machetes. In April 2016, two lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 

transgender (LGBT) activists, Xulhaz Mannan and Tanay Mojumdar, were 

hacked to death in Dhaka. On 1 July 2016, terrorists killed 22 people at the 

Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka, most of whom were foreigners.259 ABT, the 
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local Bangladeshi terror group with links to AQIS, claimed responsibility 

for these attacks.260 ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks, as well. In 

response to the ISIS claim, government officials in Bangladesh expressed 

skepticism, as they suspect that ISIS falsely claimed credit for terror attacks 

outside of Iraq and Syria to broadcast a larger presence than it actually 

has. Yet, some terror experts within Bangladesh believe that JMB has close 

ties to ISIS. The presence of two local terror groups, ABT and JMB, may 

result in a proxy fight between al-Qaeda and ISIS for primacy. Moreover, 

for smaller local terror groups, associating with either al-Qaeda or ISIS has 

the advantage of creating instant visibility, garnering international media 

attention, and creating the impression that they are more lethal than they 

actually are.261

ISIS Goals in Bangladesh

In its online magazine, Dabiq, ISIS specifically identified Bangladesh as part 

of its future area of expansion. Through Bangladesh, the terror group aims 

to expand into India and Burma. In an article titled “The Revival of Jihad 

in Bengal” on the group’s site, ISIS called upon local affiliated terror groups 

to target foreigners, establish sharia, and spread its cells throughout Bangladesh.262 This explains the killing of foreigners, including Italians, Japanese, 

an Indian, and an American, in the July 2016 bakery attack, and the killing 

of a Japanese farm expert and an Italian aid worker earlier. Tamim Ahmed 

Chowdhury, a Canadian of Bangladeshi origin, appeared to be the mastermind behind the bakery attack, and was directly getting advice from ISIS 

member Abu Terek Mohammad Tajuddin Kausar. Chowdhury (a.k.a. Abu 

Ibrahim al-Hanif), the declared head of ISIS in Bangladesh in the Dabiq

article. He was killed on 27 August 2016 by Bangladesh’s security forces.263

A lone terrorist blew himself up near Dhaka’s international airport on 24 

March 2017, in a week that witnessed similar attacks across the city. ISIS 

claimed responsibility for all the lone wolf attacks.264 This pattern of terrorist 

attacks in Bangladesh points to an ISIS goal of attacking minorities, as well 

as foreigners, to create local support from Sunni Muslim extremist groups 

with similar goals.265 As mentioned earlier, the location of Bangladesh gives 

ISIS an incentive to expand to Burma and eastern India, especially Assam.266
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Rising Intolerance?

The inclusion of Bangladesh in the expansion goals of ISIS offers insight 

into the growing intolerance in the society. The attacks on minorities and 

foreigners, with the Bangladesh government blaming local terror groups 

while ISIS claims responsibility, reveals a political chasm that may turn 

chaotic. For instance, the government of Sheikh Hasina and the ruling AL 

blame the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khalida 

Zia and her affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), for instigating the violence.267

Unlike Indonesia, which has encouraged Islamist parties to participate in 

elections, the AL government banned JI from participating in elections in 

2013. A number of JI leaders were consequently tried for their roles in the East 

Pakistan (now Bangladesh) genocide of 1971. On 11 May 2016, the founder 

of JI, Motiur Rahman Nizami, was hanged after the domestic International 

Crimes Tribunal, set up by the AL, found him guilty of creating a militia, 

the al-Badr group, which allegedly helped the Pakistani army find and kill 

pro-independence East Pakistani activists.268 Between 2013 and 2015, several 

of JI’s top leaders—Ghulam Azam, Mir Quasem Ali, Ali Ahsan Mohammad 

Mujahid, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, and 

Muhammad Kamaruzzaman—were found guilty of war crimes and most 

were executed.269 The opposition BNP, who aligned with JI in their political 

campaign, accused the AL of a political vendetta and described the trials 

as unjust.270 Into this scenario enters the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the 

student wing of JI. The main objective of the ICS is to change the education 

curriculum of Bangladesh to reflect Islamic teachings. ICS aims to establish 

an Afghan Taliban-like regime in Bangladesh. Similar to ISIS in ideology, the 

ICS rejects democracy and secularism.271 The ICS has been accused by the 

Bangladesh government of engineering the recent spate of violence against 

secular bloggers and foreigners, as well as the killing of Professor Rezaul 

Siddique, of Rajshahi University, in April 2016.272

Bangladesh has been affected by growing protests since the International 

Crimes Tribunal found the JI leaders guilty of genocide during the 1971 fight 

for independence. Each verdict has been met with huge protests, as well as 

a heavy-handed response by the Rapid Action Battalion and Border Guard 

Bangladesh, and about 150 protestors have died. Bangladesh’s government, 

however, insists that the protestors supporting JI, led by the Hefazat e-Islam 

(HeI) or Protectors of Islam, turned violent. The Human Rights Watch report 
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of August 2013 warned: “there is a significant risk that Bangladesh could 

descend into a vicious cycle of violence and lawlessness.”273

In May 2013, Islamist leaders gave the Bangladesh government a list of 84 

individuals, asking the government to take action against those individuals 

for their negative views on Islam and the Prophet expressed on social media. 

Amongst this Islamist movement in Bangladesh are AQIS, ISIS, and the HeI, 

which is supported by 25,000 madrassas (religious schools). HeI grew as a 

response against the secular Shahbag Movement, which supported the war 

crimes trials, especially against JI leaders. Most of the ensuing killings of 

artists, writers, professors, students, and foreigners have been claimed by 

local terror group ABT, who pledge allegiance to both AQIS and ISIS. Bangladesh, in this perspective, appears to be host for a contest between ISIS and 

AQIS meant to prove to local terror groups which of the two groups has the 

capability and resources to spread its hold into the country. After the 2013 

attacks on atheist and secular bloggers, all claimed by ABT, the 2015 attack on 

Bangladeshi-American writer Avijit Roy was claimed by AQIS. AQIS leader 

Maulana Asim Umar also claimed the killings of Mannan and LGBT activists, issuing the statement: “By the grace of Almighty Allah, the Mujahidin 

of Ansar-al-Islam (AQIS-Bangladesh branch) carried out these attacks.”274

Umar appeared in a 2 May 2015 video and claimed AQIS responsibility. The 

attack on Italian aid worker Cesare Tavella in September 2015 was the first 

attack claimed by ISIS. The pattern that emerged from this attack was different from earlier attacks claimed by AQIS. Instead of targeting local bloggers, artists, or writers, the first ISIS-inspired attack targeted a foreigner.275

As mentioned earlier, this was followed by the attack on a Japanese national 

and the bakery attacks.

The pattern of attacks reveals that both ISIS and AQIS view Bangladesh 

as potential ground for spreading terror. In the past, Bangladesh has been a 

conduit for illegal arms from Southeast Asia into India via the Chittagong 

area. Chittagong illegal weapons dealers serve as middlemen for weapons 

manufactured by Burma’s rebel United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Chinese 

small arms dealers—the consumers are usually rebel groups in northeast 

India as well as Islamist groups in Bangladesh.276 What is relevant from a U.S. 

SOF perspective is the transnational nature of terrorism, where networks 

are established across regions.277 Both ISIS and al-Qaeda aim to spread their 

roots into Bangladesh to create another front, in the way that al-Qaeda has 
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succeeded in creating al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQIS, and alQaeda in the Maghreb.

From a CT perspective, U.S. SOF, can gather and exchange intelligence 

with Bangladesh’s security agencies in order to gauge the potential for ISIS 

to spread into remote areas of Bangladesh, especially after losing territory in 

Iraq and Syria and the killing of ISIS Khorasan leader Sheikh Abdul Hasib on 

27 April 2017.278 Bangladesh may prove difficult ground for the quick spread 

ISIS is aiming for, due to a lack of ethnic linkage to the group's Arab Sunni 

leadership (Bengalis are not Arab), the strong presence of political parties 

that represent Muslims in Bangladesh’s state institutions, the presence of 

the country’s 260,000-strong professional armed forces including special 

forces, and their international exposure, especially through UN peacekeeping operations.279 Also, the presence of the Bangladeshi state, while weak in 

remote areas, is still visible. However, the ‘denial strategy’ adopted by the 

Bangladesh government with regard to the presence of ISIS in the country 

may not be smart in the long run or ensure that ISIS cannot penetrate Bangladesh by aligning itself with local terror groups.

It makes business sense for Bangladesh to deny the presence of ISIS given 

the country’s dependence on foreign investments to augment its local industries, especially the garment industry, which has single-handedly addressed 

poverty and raised employment. But, in the long run, a clear diagnosis of 

the problem will assist efforts to counter ISIS.280 Bangladesh needs foreign 

direct investment, and a bolstered ISIS presence can scare potential foreign 

investors. ISIS’s targeting of foreigners could be aimed at such an effect. 

Consequently, the Bangladesh government has to break the strategy of denial 

by classifying all ISIS claims about terror attacks as mere propaganda. Bangladesh’s Inspector General of Police, A.K.M. Shahidul Haque, asserted 

that the idea of ISIS’s presence in Bangladesh was without basis: “What 

we call militants are actually homegrown who might have been embodied 

with IS philosophy and ideology. But they don't have any link with the IS.”281

Facts from the July 2016 terror attack on the Holey Artisan Bakery clearly 

revealed the hand of ISIS. As the attack was ongoing and gunmen were 

holding hostages, ISIS published pictures of those killed inside the bakery 

on its propaganda website, Amaq al-Ekhbariyah. That exposed the close 

coordination between the gunmen and ISIS. Thus, a clear diagnosis of the 

problem would alert security agencies to break the linkages that ISIS aims 

to establish in Bangladesh.
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The Case of Burma

Burma is home to nearly 1.4 million Rohingya Muslims, especially in its 

western Rakhine state. Rohingya populations migrated to the Arakan region 

(now Rakhine state) of Burma in the 15th century. This migration was further emboldened during British rule in Burma (1824–1948), as it removed 

the Burma border with then unified Bengal as part of British India. Burma, 

however, refuses to recognize the Rohingya as one of the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups. Despite their presence in Burma for centuries, Rohingya 

are categorized as illegal Bengali immigrants, and a 1982 law stripped them 

of any Burma citizenship, rendering them stateless. The Burma government 

bans the Rohingya community from identifying themselves as Rohingya.282

Burma’s Buddhist population views the Rohingya as a threat to their land, 

given existing disputed, overlapping land claims. The Rohingya temporary 

residence ‘white card’ permit was cancelled in 2015 by the Thein Sein government due to protests by the Buddhist majority, thereby taking away the 

Rohingya’s right to participate in that year’s elections. As mentioned earlier, 

there were no Muslim candidates in that election.283

Significantly, Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD has done little toward representing 

Burma’s Muslim population. For instance, NLD’s vice president in Mandalay, 

Win Mya Mya, a Muslim, applied to participate in the 2015 elections but was 

debarred based on her religion. U Thaung Zaw, the head of Burma’s immigration department in Mandalay, stated that anyone Muslim is identified as 

Indian. The government refused to issue national registration cards to those 

Muslims who declined to identify themselves as Indian or Pakistani, despite 

them having no connections to India or Pakistan for generations.284 Muslims 

accuse the NLD of compromising on democratic principles, doing little to 

salvage their desperate situation. Anti-Muslim sentiment is high in Burma 

and Buddhist monks like Asin Wirathu (who ironically calls himself the 

“the Burmese Bin Laden”), routinely preach hatred and fear of Muslims. As 

is well known, monks like Wirathu have a deep influence across the 60-million-strong Burmese Buddhist majority. Buddhist monks created a national 

campaign—the 969 Movement—in 2001 to boycott Muslim businesses in 

Burma. Wirathu portrays Islam as a religion that aims to convert Burmese 

Buddhist girls by intermarriage and then produce numerous offspring to 

skew the population ratio in favor of Muslims.285 Burmese Buddhists are now 

encouraged to visibly place signs on their houses and businesses to display 
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their Buddhist affiliations. Wirathu alleges: “The local Muslims are crude 

and savage because the extremists are pulling the strings, providing them 

with financial, military, and technical power.”286

Since 2012, Burma has been plagued by violence, especially in Rakhine 

state between Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya. Ignited by a rumor that 

a 28-year-old Buddhist woman was raped and killed by Rohingya Muslim 

men, Buddhists set fire to Muslim villages in nine townships. Communal 

violence broke out quickly, and a report by Human Rights Watch accuses the 

Burma state security forces of siding with the Arakanese Buddhists.287 The 

violence in October 2012 was systematically planned, backed by a narrative 

that the Rohingya Muslims were a severe threat to Arakanese Buddhists’ land 

and homes. The violence against the Rohingya was not random, but planned 

months in advance, with local Arakan political parties, like the Rakhine 

Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), and Buddhist monks’ associations, like the All-Arakanese Monks’ Solidarity Conference (AAMSC), issuing statements that targeted the Rohingya, urging local Arakanese Buddhists 

to forcibly remove them from their homes.288 Adding fuel to the fire, President Thein Sein issued a statement in July 2012 that Rohingya Muslims were 

illegal and should be sent to a third country.289

According to Vijay Nambiar, the special adviser to the UN SecretaryGeneral on Burma, the violence perpetrated by Burma’s security forces 

against Rohingya civilians was disproportionate, and he cautioned against 

future violence if more steps were not taken to increase security in the 

affected areas.290 Nambiar issued an appeal to Burma, stating:

I call upon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to reflect on the situation and, 

as she has done on so many occasions, to listen to her “inner voice” 

and speak directly to the people of Myanmar, asking them to rise 

above their ethnic, religious and other differences and to advance 

human dignity, harmony and mutual cooperation between all communities ... Furthermore, a reiteration of her promise to address the 

root causes affecting the local population, namely that of citizenship 

and status, and to provide relief to the internally displaced since 

2012, would go a long way to relieve tension and promote realistic 

and sustainable solutions.291

NLD leader and Nobel laureate, Suu Kyi denied reports that there was 

systematic killing of Rohingya Muslims,292 while at the same time, the UN 
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announced an investigation into reports that the military (Tatmadaw) was 

using disproportionate force against the Rohingya.293 In November 2016, 

John McKissick of the UN refugee agency accused Burma of carrying out an 

ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims under the guise of COIN carried out 

by the Tatmadaw and the Border Guard Police (BGP).294 The Burma government accused the Rohingya of deliberately setting fire to their own houses, 

and international media is barred from traveling to the affected areas.295

Most Burmese populations in Burma support strong action against the 

Rohingya Muslims, whom they view as illegal Bengali immigrants. About 

70,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. The situation became further complicated after nine BGP personnel were killed in a coordinated attack at border 

posts in Maungdaw in October 2016.296 The attack has been connected to a 

Rohingya militant group.297 In August 2017, violence flared up in the Rakhine 

state when about 20 police stations were attacked by insurgents belonging 

to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).298 This brought about a 

massive counter-offensive by the Burmese military, resulting in mass exodus 

of the Rohingya minority to Bangladesh. By mid-September 2017, United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 313, 000 

Rohingya Muslims fled Burma facing atrocities in the hands of the Burma 

military.299 The UN Human Rights Chief, Zeid Ra‘ad al-Hussein termed 

the violence a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”300 Consequently, 40 

percent of Rohingya villages are empty of people.301

Into this scenario of communal violence enters groups like al-Qaeda and 

ISIS.302 Both terror groups have noted the Rohingya crisis, and called upon 

fellow Muslims to fight for the Rohingya cause. There are concerns that 

Rohingya Muslims fleeing Burma may end up joining ISIS, which is looking for new recruits as the war in Iraq and Syria gets more intense. ISIS is 

already posting online messages on its recruiting sites targeting the Rohingya 

community.303 ISIS offers attractive packages for entire Muslim families 

to migrate to its Islamic caliphate, especially attractive to those who have 

nowhere to go.304 Malaysian CT officials warn of ISIS recruits trying to travel 

to Burma to launch jihad in support of the Rohingya, after an ISIS suspect 

was detained in Malaysia.305 A group called Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement; HaY) was alleged to be behind the October 2016 attack on the BGP. 

HaY is a group formed from Rohingya emigres in Saudi Arabia. The International Crisis Group (ICG) cautions that HaY is a well-funded and welltrained group, and is a game changer in Burma, adding one more insurgency 
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with international connections to other jihadi organizations to the Burma 

conflict.306 Wakar Uddin, director-general of the Arakan Rohingya Union, is 

skeptical of the international links to the HaY drawn by ICG. He cautioned:

This unfortunately feeds into the Myanmar government’s narrative 

linking the Rohingya cause to international jihadism as a justification for the recent obliteration of Rohingya villages, causing more 

than 100,000 people to take refuge in Bangladesh and Rohingya 

villages in Maungdaw area, and its armed forces committing crimes 

against humanity.307

HaY has released YouTube videos denying any international terrorist connections, and claim that they are mostly fighting with spears and machetes, 

contrary to the well-funded and well-armed group that ICG claims it is. 

In an interview with CNN, HaY leader Atah Ullah asserted that, “We, the 

vulnerable and persecuted people, have asked the international community 

for protection against the atrocities by the government of Burma, but the 

international community turned its back on us.”308 Moreover, for the ICG’s 

Burma consultant, Richard Horsey, to portray the HaY as a well-organized 

jihadi movement appears implausible, as the group’s goals are locally focused 

on Rohingya rights within Burma, and are not aimed at establishing an 

Islamic state. HaY leader Ullah insists that they have nothing in common 

with ISIS. In addition, Rohingya Muslims are Sufis who follow a moderate 

version of Sunni Islam, and have never participated in any radical transnational terror groups. However, the severely discriminatory situation they find 

themselves in Burma might increase the likelihood of some amongst them 

taking advantage of ISIS’s calls for taking up their cause.

That said, for the Rohingya Muslims to adopt ISIS ideology it would 

require a conversion to ISIS Salafi religious cult, which is unlikely. Rohingya 

Muslims have lived in Burma for decades, 

especially in the Rakhine state of Burma that 

borders Bangladesh. To date, there has been 

little support from that community to terror 

groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. Even those 

who have followed a more conservative version of Islam have shown little or no inclination. The barriers that create natural antibodies against an ISIS/al-Qaeda 

expansion could be language and culture. Nevertheless, areas of concern 

The barriers that create 

natural antibodies against 

an ISIS/al-Qaeda expansion could be language 

and culture.
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for radicalization are the refugee camps across the border in Bangladesh 

which houses nearly 600,000 displaced Rohingya population. Twenty-three 

such camps are housed near Cox’s Bazar, in Bangladesh.309 It is important to 

realize for context that Cox’s Bazar serves as the conduit of illegal small arms 

flowing from Burma to armed insurgencies in Northeast India.310 It houses 

several illegal arms manufacturers who sell these arms for profit thereby 

increasing the feasibility for violence—a factor required for insurgency and 

terrorism to flourish. 

Recently, al-Qaeda released a statement in response to the violence in 

Burma: 

The savage treatment meted out to our Muslim brothers in Arakan 

by the government of Burma under the guise of ‘fighting rebels’ shall 

not pass without punishment, and the government of Burma shall 

be made to taste what our Muslim brothers have tasted in Arakan, 

with the permission of Allah.311

Yet, this call has gone unanswered. ISIS foreign fighters, especially mercenaries, may want to take up the cause of the Rohingya Muslims but it really 

makes little material sense given these areas are extremely poor. Moreover, 

some of the ISIS foreign fighters view the Rohingya as polytheistic non-Buddhists, not worthy of saving in the name of Islam.312 The Rohingya Muslims 

themselves have shunned such extremist foreign help as is vindicated by the 

statements of the ARSA.313 The networks that lured foreign fighters to Syria 

via Turkey does not exist in Burma. 

Nevertheless, the brutal behavior demonstrated by the Burma military 

towards the Rohingya community renders them desperate and this may be 

a factor in them turning to extremist violence. Yanghee Lee, the UN special 

rapporteur on human rights in Burma, who visited the country in January 

2017, urged the government to address the Rohingya situation, asserting 

that denial and a lack of response encourages extremist elements. Two more 

organizations that merit attention are the Bangladesh-based Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), formed in 1982, and a splinter group, the Arakan 

Rohingya Islamic Front, formed in 1986.314 A Burma military intelligence 

report accusing 90 RSO of getting trained in Pakistan and 13 others training in Libya and Afghanistan was called “generally plausible”315 in a 2002 

U.S. diplomatic cable, although it has not been backed by any primary input 
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from the United States. To date, no direct link has been established between 

Rohingya Muslims and ISIS.

Jihadi websites have expressed outrage at the persecution of Rohingya 

Muslims within Burma, but none have shown any proclivity toward establishing a base organization in the country. Groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda have 

to work hard to set down roots in northern Rakhine state, given the strong 

presence of a hostile population (Buddhists) backed by a rather focused 

COIN campaign. Moreover, the Rohingya Muslims are not a priority for 

these terror outfits, which are aimed mostly at Arab Sunni Muslim causes 

or a transnational Islamic caliphate. Rohingya Muslims also have displayed 

little attraction to the brutal tactics of ISIS or Islamic fundamentalism. The 

language barrier, with Arabs unable to speak Bengali and Rohingya Muslims 

not fluent in Arabic, creates a further disconnect. 

The Rohingya issue is a local issue that stems from land and citizenship 

rights, unlike the grandiose aims of al-Qaeda to establish a Muslim ummah 

and ISIS to establish a caliphate. HaY is locally focused against the military 

of Burma, like the other Burma ethnic insurgencies, and does not locate its 

struggle within a global jihad. HaY has pledged not to target civilians and 

to dissolve itself once Rohingya Muslims are given citizenship and other 

related rights within Burma.316 Yet concerns remain, given Burma’s multiple 

armed ethnic insurgencies including the Kachin Independence Organization, the Shan State Army, and the UWSA.317 And, given the attraction 

ISIS has to Iraqi Baath Party members—who were disenfranchised in Iraq 

and barred from representation in Iraq's parliament; and Burma's Rohingya 

population—who were disenfranchised since 2015 and barred from voting 

in elections and holding office, ISIS might be attracted to them as well. Disenfranchisement of the Rohingya Muslims means they have no means of 

peaceful representation within Burma.

There are apprehensions that the disproportionate use of force by the 

Burma military against Rohingya Muslims could result in radicalization, 

rendering them vulnerable to propaganda from ISIS. The escalation of violence in the northern Rakhine state where Rohingya Muslims are viewed 

as a majority and Rakhine Buddhists are a minority have resulted in calls 

by the latter to arm Buddhist villagers for self-defense. This could aggravate 

the conflict-ridden situation even further with HaY, who has made a commitment not to target Buddhist civilians, but might view armed civilians 

as a legitimate target. HaY has laid claim to attacks on BGP and the Burma 
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military on YouTube in order to ensure that Rohingya diaspora funding does 

not go to groups like the RSO, which is mostly defunct. It is in the search for 

external resources, especially from the Middle East, that groups like HaY are 

likely to become susceptible to larger terror groups, like ISIS.

Considerations for U.S. SOF

There are several lessons that can be drawn for U.S. SOF from ISIS goals in 

Bangladesh and Burma, as well as the situation that exists in both countries.

First, given the decreasing territorial hold ISIS has on Iraq and Syria, in 

Iraq and Syria, the terror group will aim to expand its influence and presence 

in countries outside the region. This serves two specific purposes. First, it 

creates the impression that ISIS is a transnational movement with networks 

across regions. Second, it offers a base for continuous regrouping, recruitment, and resources. This can then be utilized to come back at a later stage.

Second, both Bangladesh and Burma have populations that could offer 

sanctuary to ISIS for religious purposes as well as for a payment. Given one 

of the aims of ISIS is to stage attacks in Western countries, as well as against 

foreigners, it makes practical sense to keep a tight rein on its activities in 

Bangladesh and its potential for growth in Burma. USSOCOM, in collaboration with both Bangladesh and Burma security agencies, could trace the 

networks that ISIS has already established or may try to establish in both 

countries, and counter those before they gain traction in society.

Third, ISIS utilizes social media apps to spread its ideology, form networks, and bond with Muslims around the world. Those that are popular in 

Bangladesh and Burma are Viber, We-chat, and WhatsApp. Keeping track 

of those communications is hard, but can be done if one knows how ISIS 

strategizes its communications. Telegram is not popular, while Viber is used 

the most, followed by WhatsApp.

Fourth, the Rohingya issue is already drawing external funding, especially from the Rohingya diaspora in Saudi Arabia who have helped HaY. 

HaY leader Atah Ullah grew up in Saudi Arabia, and left a job there to travel 

to the Rakhine state to stage an insurgency. Similar external funding could 

flow to Bangladeshi terror groups, like ABT and JMB, who pledge allegiance 

to ISIS. Both have talked of taking up the Rohingya issue, which could attract 

funds. For instance, in its April 2016 Dabiq magazine, Bangladeshi ISIS militant Abu Ibrahim called for jihad in Burma to support the Rohingya cause.318
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Fifth, the Rohingya issue and its peaceful resolution within Burma is 

of importance to the USSOCOM mission from two perspectives. First, it 

would deny radicalized Muslim youths a cause to rally around. For example, Ohio State University student Abdul Razak Ali Artan staged an attack 

on campus in November 2016. Artan stated in his Facebook posts that the 

“reports of human rights abuses in Burma pushed him to a ‘boiling point.’”319

ISIS claimed responsibility for that Ohio attack, mainly for the propaganda 

impact of owning up to all lone wolf attacks to demonstrate its reach. The 

Rohingya issue also gives a cause to potential ISIS recruits in Malaysia and 

Indonesia. In November 2016, a terror attack was foiled in Jakarta, Indonesia, that included plans to plant highly explosive chemicals, with the Burma 

embassy as one of the targets.320 Indonesian National Police spokesman Rikwanto believed that Rio Priatna Wibawa, arrested for planning that attack, 

was tied to Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian militant who supports ISIS.321

Finally, Bangladesh has witnessed several terror strikes including the 

11 May 2017 attack. ISIS has claimed responsibility for several attacks, and 

some local terror groups have pledged their allegiance to ISIS. While the 

Bangladesh government denies the presence of ISIS, it is critical to realize 

that allegiance is connected to online communication, sharing of terror 

strategies, travel, as well as loyalty. With loyalty, will come resources. By 

establishing a connection, a social network is established that works to the 

advantage of terror groups like ISIS, allowing them to broadcast their presence over a wider area and reach out to rival groups. The key is to ensure 

that such connections and networks do not establish roots.

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Chapter 4. Questioning ISIS Ideology in 

India 

In May 2016, ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, later killed 

in a U.S. airstrike, called upon ISIS supporters to prove their allegiance to 

the caliphate by carrying out attacks in their countries of origin. The Manchester terror bombing of May 2017 is case in point. Instead of demanding 

a show of allegiance by traveling to the caliphate, ISIS now sanctioned lone 

wolf attacks in countries identified by the group as terror targets.

In a May 2016 ISIS video targeted at India, the group pledged to fight for 

Muslims in Kashmir, Assam, and Gujarat, and threatened Indian Prime 

Minister Narendra Modi.322 In the video, an Indian ISIS member warns: “I 

say you have only three options: to accept Islam, to pay jizya, or to prepare 

to be slaughtered.”323 ISIS utilized historical Muslim conquests of Sindh and 

Multan (now in Pakistan), especially under General Muhammad bin Qasim 

of the Umayyad caliphate in the 8th century, as a justification for its present 

ambitions to take over Indian territory.

The stated strategy of ISIS for India is to create fear by collaborating with 

local units, and expand its wilayat, named Wilayat Khorasan. ISIS aims to 

occupy India via Pakistan and Afghanistan based on a two-prong strategy. 

First, the group wants to take over the conventional capabilities of Pakistan 

including its nuclear arsenal, and Afghanistan, and use them against India. 

Second, it plans to collaborate with local Indian terror groups to create fear 

and chaos based on a strategy of attrition. In this second strategy, a faction 

of Indian Mujahideen (IM) or Islamist guerrilla fighters, Ansar ut-Tawhid 

fi Bilad al-Hind (Supporters of Monotheism in the Land of India, or AuT), 

could prove useful to ISIS goals. Local issues like the 2002 Gujarat riots, 

Kashmir, and the treatment of minorities, are cited as reasons for expansion 

by ISIS to India. There is another local Indian faction of ISIS, the Junud al 

Khalifa-e-Hind (Soldiers of the Indian caliphate, or JKH).324 This group is led 

by Indian engineering student Aman Tandel from Mumbai who functions 

under the pseudonym Abu Amr’ al-Hindi.

The primary goal of USSOCOM is to analyze and successfully respond 

to ISIS attempts to spread terror across borders. Within the domain of CT 

and COIN, understanding the manner in which ISIS creates networks in 
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countries outside of its caliphate in Iraq and Syria offers useful lessons not 

only to break those networks, but also to create awareness in the U.S. of 

similar ISIS efforts. ISIS utilizes the same strategy in the West, where it 

aims to motivate Western citizens to join the caliphate and then carry out 

attacks in its name in their countries of origin, as it does in India. The more 

ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria, the more likely it is that the group will 

quickly draw upon this sort of non-state strategy.

The attempts of ISIS to create local terror networks in India is motivated 

by the fact that very few Indians have traveled to the caliphate or made 

attempts to undertake the difficult journey. In order to stay relevant, ISIS 

will turn itself into an al-Qaeda type of transnational terror group. In battling ISIS, CT cooperation between India and the U.S. should be further 

strengthened. For instance, the Indian leader of AuT, Mohammad Shafi 

Armar, has been named a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” by the 

U.S. in June 2017, debunking earlier reports of his alleged death in U.S. airstrikes in Syria in April 2016.325 A statement from the U.S. Department of 

State specifies that “Mohammad Shafi Armar is a leader and head recruiter 

in India for the Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated 

Global Terrorist group, ISIS. He has cultivated a group of dozens of ISIS 

sympathizers who are involved in terrorist activities across India such as 

plotting attacks, procuring weapons, and identifying locations for terrorist 

training camps.”326 This kind of cooperation has led to India’s ability to limit 

the spread of ISIS within its borders. From the perspective of USSOCOM, 

it is pertinent to realize that countries like India and Indonesia may offer 

lessons on how post-conflict stabilization may be achieved in the long term.

The Case of India

India, a Hindu-majority country, hosts the second largest Muslim population in the world.327 By 2050, India will have the world’s largest Muslim 

population with 311 million.328 The country has suffered from a history of 

Hindu-Muslim internal conflicts, beginning with the partition of the country 

in 1947. The 1992 demolition of the Babri mosque and 2002 riots in Gujarat 

caught the attention of the world.329 Then, ISIS included India in its map for 

expansion, released in 2014. In the May 2016 video message, ISIS mocked 

Indian Muslims for living in harmony with kuffar Hindus, and called upon 

them to travel to the caliphate or carry out terror attacks in India. Despite 
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this history and ISIS focusing on India, the number of Indian Muslims traveling to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS pales in comparison to the high flows 

from Russia, the UK, Germany, and France, as noted earlier.

This chapter highlights the factors that have worked within the Indian 

political and social milieu in questioning and delegitimizing groups like 

ISIS. The chapter explains the role of Indian CT units, including the National 

Security Guard (NSG) and the Indian special forces, in their fight against 

terrorism. India also has set up institutions like the National Investigation 

Agency (NIA), which functions as the central CT law enforcement agency 

in India, since the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.330

ISIS Goals in India

ISIS outlined its plans for India in its 2014 expansion map. The timeline for 

the takeover specified: 2013 to 2014 to be spent in taking over territory in 

the Arab world. By 2020 to 2023, they plotted to spread their presence to the 

Indian subcontinent.331 The group's tactical plan for spreading itself inside 

India was to first establish its presence through splinter groups and then 

gradually take over territory. In this, local Muslim terror groups like IM 

could prove useful,332 once it pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi. ISIS aimed 

to enter India via Pakistan and Afghanistan to carry out terror attacks. On 

4 April 2017, for instance, the Indian Coast Guard sent a fax to the Mumbai 

police that three ISIS terrorists attempted to enter India via the sea, rekindling memories of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, whose perpetrators also 

entered the country by sea.333

In its propaganda message, ISIS identifies Gujarat, Assam, and Kashmir 

specifically as issues pertaining to Muslims in India. With regard to Gujarat, ISIS wants to take revenge for the 2002 Godhra riots between Hindus 

and Muslims, at a time when Indian Prime Minister Modi was the Chief 

Minister of the state. There were 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus killed in the 

riots, and there were accusations that the state authorities under Modi failed 

to adequately respond to the riots or safeguard Muslim lives.334 The issue 

of Kashmiri Muslims and their movement for secession led by the Jammu 

and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), is mentioned in the ISIS video. The 

plight of Muslims in Assam, especially due to the politics of identity in the 

state vis-à-vis illegal immigration from Bangladesh is the third issue that 

ISIS mentions as part of its reason to target India. ISIS plans to attack India 
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via its bases in Bangladesh, according to an interview with the ISIS magazine Dabiq given by Shaykh Abu Ibrahim Al-Hanif, or Amir of Khilafah in 

Bengal, in April 2016. Hanif indicated that ISIS bases in Pakistan and Bengal 

(i.e., Bangladesh) will enable the terror group to carry out a two-front attack 

on India.335

In March 2017, ISIS launched its first terror attack in India when an ISISaffiliated Indian recruit set off a bomb on a train in the Indian state of 

Madhya Pradesh, injuring 10 passengers.336 The leader of the Indian ISIS 

cell, Saifullah, was later shot dead by an Indian CT unit in Lucknow. Most 

of those involved in the attack had never traveled to Syria or Iraq, but were 

in contact with an ISIS Khorasan cell via social media. In June 2016, the 

NIA and the Hyderabad police busted an ISIS cell that was planning a terror 

attack. Five people were arrested and a huge amount of ammunition was 

recovered from the site of the arrest.337 Another Indian state, known for 

international tourism, Kerala, also witnessed about 16 of its Muslim citizens 

join ISIS. Again, the recruitment occurred through social media.338 In March 

2017, ISIS threats to the Taj Mahal in Agra resulted in heightened security, 

especially after an ISIS picture, shared on an encrypted social media app 

Telegram, showed the words ‘New Target’ in Arabic superimposed onto an 

image of the Taj Mahal.339 Two bomb blasts followed, one on a train in the 

Agra Cantonment, and the second on the roof of a nearby house. Neither 

resulted in casualties. Although ISIS did not claim responsibility, the terror 

attacks succeeded in creating widespread panic in an otherwise touristfocused city.340 This is a clever strategy on the part of ISIS, creating panic 

and fear that results in poor tourism to India. For instance, the U.S. Embassy 

in Delhi issued a warning to American citizens in November 2016 to avoid 

popular spots in India, due to the looming ISIS threat.341 Moreover, if ISIS 

succeeds in inspiring local Muslims to align with its cause, that is reason 

for concern.

ISIS identifies Kashmir—the only Muslim-majority state in India—as a 

front in its spread to India. Kashmir, on a cursory glance, appears vulnerable 

due to the long-standing political upheaval in the state since India’s independence. While the Hindu Maharaja (King) of Kashmir signed an ‘Instrument 

of Accession’ with India after being attacked by Pakistani tribal armies, the 

state suffered from secessionist violence. With Pakistani military occupying 

parts of the state, the Muslim population of the valley demanded azadi (freedom). In 1948, in UN Security Council Resolution 47 on the India-Pakistan 
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question,342 it was decided to hold a plebiscite to resolve the status of Jammu 

and Kashmir, but only after all Pakistani troops and tribesmen had withdrawn.343 Even after a ceasefire between India and Pakistan came into force, 

Pakistan did not withdraw its troops, and India asserted in 1951 that no plebiscite was required because elections held in Indian administered Jammu and 

Kashmir backed accession to India. By 1957, the Jammu and Kashmir constitution defined the state as part of India. By 1959, another major player, China, 

entered the fray by occupying Aksai China, part of Kashmir. China defeated 

India in 1962 and Pakistan ceded the Trans-Karakoram tract of Kashmir to 

China in 1963. India and Pakistan fought two more wars over Kashmir in 

1965 and 1999, both times resulting in defeat for Pakistan. In 1987, following 

a disputed state election in Kashmir, an insurgency ensued led by the JKLF. 

For the next 10 years or so, the Kashmir valley erupted in conflict, as well 

as cross-border terrorism. India has been accused of using disproportionate 

military tactics in its fight against the insurgency. The Kashmiri terrorist 

group, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), launched terror attacks on the military. 

While JKLF leader Yassin Mallik has agreed to give up violence, Kashmir’s 

movement for secession continues to this day, with protests in the streets 

amid calls to safeguard the Kashmiri Muslim identity.344 ISIS aims to pick 

up the Kashmir issue as part of its Indian goals and garner support for the 

establishment of a caliphate.

The Kashmir dispute motivated other terror groups to strike India. One 

of them is the Pakistan-based Sunni terror group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), 

the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. LeT leader Hafiz 

Saeed aimed to exploit Hindu-Muslim tensions to draw in recruits to target 

India. LeT attacked Indian military bases, civilians, and lent its support 

to Indian terror groups, like IM. Another major terror group is al-Qaeda, 

which announced AQIS in September 2014, at about the same time that ISIS 

established its caliphate.345 AQIS, with bases in Pakistan, is in charge of India, 

Bangladesh, and Burma. To challenge al-Baghdadi’s caliphate, al-Qaeda chief 

al-Zawahiri pledged to establish his own version of the caliphate. ISIS and 

al-Qaeda are not aligned, and there is growing competition between them. 

ISIS considers LeT an ally of al-Qaeda and the Pakistani army, as apostates.346

This could be a reaction to both the refusal of al-Qaeda and LeT to give allegiance to ISIS, and the Pakistani army’s collaboration with the West in CT. 

While the focus of LeT is Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, based on its 

larger goal of “liberating Muslim territories under non-Muslim rule,”347 AQI 
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is not solely focused on Kashmir or India, but Burma and Bangladesh as well. 

Both LeT and AQI have been successful in recruiting locally in Pakistan, to 

include LeT leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saaed, and AQI leader, Asim Umar, 

both Pakistani nationals.348

Similarly, the northeastern Indian state of Assam has long been afflicted 

by the politics of illegal Muslim immigration from Bangladesh. This perceived sense of being overwhelmed by Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants, 

especially by them registering to vote illegally in Assam’s state elections, 

resulted in a five-year Assam student movement from 1979 to 1985. In a 

population of 32 million in Assam, 6 million are believed to be illegal immigrants, though no official data exists. This lack of data creates societal anxiety. Assam witnessed violent movements against illegal Bangladeshi Muslim 

immigrants by the Bodo Liberation Tigers and the United Liberation Front 

of Asom, to name a few. In 2014, hundreds of Muslim immigrants were 

attacked in the Bodo areas of Assam, resulting in several deaths.349 ISIS has 

noted these attacks on Muslims in Assam, and mentioned them as one of 

their reasons to target India.350

The key question for USSOCOM is: Will ISIS successfully spread into 

India like it claims? Do multiple terror attacks allegedly inspired by ISIS 

amount to an increasing ISIS presence in India? Also, why is it that only 23 

Indian Muslims,351 out of a population of 176.2 million Indian Muslims,352

traveled to the ISIS caliphate? To put this in perspective, that is only 0.00001 

percent of the Muslim population in India. Are there lessons to be considered 

from the Indian experiences with CT that could be relevant to the mission 

of U.S. SOF relating to CT and COIN?

Limits of ISIS Appeal in India

Political and Social Factors

India’s independence in 1947 gave birth to a democratic secular nation. The 

right to practice one’s religion without discrimination is a fundamental right 

enshrined in the Constitution of India. Consequently, the Indian state finds 

representation from Muslims across its various institutions. Three Indian 

Muslims have been president of India, the highest state post in the Indian 

Republic: Zakir Hussain, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, and A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. 

The immediate past vice president of India is Mohammad Hamid Ansari.353

Several government positions are filled by Muslims, including the Cabinet, 
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as well as the administration. That, in turn, creates a representative structure 

that is inclusive.

The Indian constitution guarantees fundamental rights that are legally 

enforceable, including the right to equality, which contains guarantees 

against any form of discrimination. Articles 25 to 28 guarantee freedom 

of religion with a commitment to secularism. However, India has suffered 

from religious riots that have highlighted the tensions that exist between 

its religious communities. In December 1992 and January 1993, the city of 

Mumbai broke out in Hindu-Muslim riots in which 1,000 people, most of 

them Muslims, were killed.354 Instigated by a Hindu extremist group, the 

Shiv Sena, riots broke out after the Babri Masjid mosque, in the Indian city 

of Ayodhya, which was destroyed by a Hindu mob on 6 December 1992. 

This was followed by multiple bomb blasts in Mumbai (then Bombay) on 12 

March 1993, which killed nearly 257 people and was allegedly set off by the 

leaders of the Muslim underworld. Several iconic structures, like the Bombay 

Stock Exchange, the Century Bazar, and the Air India building, amongst 

others, were targeted. The masterminds behind the blasts were Dawood 

Ibrahim (now in Pakistan), who fled to Dubai before the blasts and then on 

to Pakistan, and Tiger Memon. Mumbai was to witness more terror attacks 

in 2003, 2006, and 2008.355 In 2008, multiple terror attacks, perpetrated by 

the Indian Muslim terror group IM, targeted Indian cities like Ahmedabad, 

Jaipur, and Bengaluru, killing nearly 200 civilians.356 The IM, in its manifesto 

sent to Indian media houses, cited the Gujarat riots, Indian antiterrorism 

squads, as well as biased reporting on Muslim groups while turning a blind 

eye to Hindu extremist terror, as causes for its attacks.357

While radical extremism is a potent cause of concern within India,358

Indian political factors such as the representation of Muslim leaders in its 

political structures, help mitigate tensions to a large extent. The Ministry 

of Minority Affairs, led by a Muslim minister, currently Mukhtar Abbas 

Naqvi, is aimed at addressing minority issues related to Muslims, Christians, 

Buddhists, Sikhs, Parsis, and Jains. The vision of the ministry is: “Empowering the minority communities and creating an enabling environment for 

strengthening the multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual 

and multi-religious character of our nation.”359

Besides political representation, several famous Indian personalities are 

Muslim, including popular Bollywood film actors Aamir Khan, Shah Rukh 

Khan, Salman Khan, as well as sports personalities like tennis player Shania 
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Mirza and cricketer Irfan Pathan, to name a few. This visible representation 

of Indian Muslims in society is critical, as it offers the possibility of growth 

and fame, and most importantly, dignity. It is such representation, including 

famous Indian Muslim freedom fighters like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a 

close friend of Gandhi that has worked against creating a perennial condition of religious divide and fear. Even cities like Mumbai have succeeded 

in bouncing back, rekindling its cosmopolitan spirit after the 2008 terror 

attacks.360 This spirit can be traced back in history as far as the 16th century, 

when Indian Mughal Emperor Akbar shaped a unified empire by including 

Hindus in his administration rather than excluding them. This history forms 

an important part of present day national and local folklore, is memorialized in popular films, and is taught in the classroom. Muslim rule in India 

spanned centuries, and Persian, Arabic, and Turkish influences have seeped 

into Hindu culture, including the arts, architecture, and strategic thinking. 

In turn, Islam in India has been influenced by Hinduism, Buddhism, and 

Jainism, and has succeeded in creating a similar theology to the Indonesian 

Nusantara that focuses on pluralism and tolerance of other faiths.

Muslim Civil Society Organizations

Besides social and political factors propelled by democratic representation, the most effective firewall against ISIS spreading into India are Indian 

Muslim civil society organizations.361 The Indian Muslim Ulema (scholars 

with expertise on Islamic theology and sacred law) have issued fatwas (legal 

decrees) against ISIS or anyone from India who joins it. In December 2015, 

in response to ISIS claims that it would spread into India, nearly 70,000 

Indian Muslim clerics issued a fatwa against ISIS during the famous Urs-eRazvi festival at the Dargah-e-Aala Hazrat (a shrine built over the tomb of 

a revered religious figure) in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. Hazrat Subhan Raza 

Khan, chairperson of the influential Dargah, stated that the fatwa was a 

condemnation of terror attacks across the world, and was meant to send a 

message that such acts are un-Islamic.362 Mostly influenced by the Barelvi 

Islamic theology, which is infused with Sufi elements that celebrate compassion and acceptance of others, the Dargah issued an urgent need to completely ban all terror groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. The most 

powerful religious message coming out of the Dargah-e-Aala Hazrat is that 

namaz-e-janaza, or funeral prayer, will not be recited for those involved 

in terrorism.363 In the madrassa run by the Dargah a course is taught titled 
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“Hadith and Terrorism,” in which students compare original Qur’anic texts 

with those offered by terror groups to understand how terror groups misrepresent or only use limited portions of the Qur’an that support their point of 

view, to the exclusion of those that don’t.

The role of Sufi Islam or Sufism is strong in India. Indian Hindus and 

Muslims both deeply revere Sufi saints of the Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin 

Chishti order, like Shirdi Sai Baba. The main belief of the Chisti order 

is “Love towards all, malice towards 

none.”364 Sufism accepts all religions, and 

this expression of universal tolerance and 

acceptance has seeped into the everyday 

expression of faith in India. Besides the 

influence of Sufism, prominent member 

of India’s most powerful Muslim organization, the All India Muslim Personal 

Law Board, and noted scholar, Maulana 

Khalid Saifullah Rahmani, stated: “There 

is no space for ISIS ideology in our religion. The inhuman activities of the ISIS 

go against the teachings of Islam.”365 The 

founder of the Islamic Educational Welfare Society, Mohammad Abdul Rahoof Khan, stated: “We are Indians and 

as per the teachings of Islam we should live harmoniously with people from 

other religions. Hurting others is not permissible in Islam.”366 Statements 

from influential clerics rejecting ISIS have had a deep impact on Indian 

Muslim youth. In fact, Indian clerics and Muslims citizens have so succeeded in rejecting ISIS that they drew the group’s anger. In a recent video 

aimed at Indian Muslim clerics and citizens, ISIS threatened to attack India 

and urged Indian Muslims to reject false calls by its clerics. Indian clerics 

and political parties representing the Indian Muslims rejected the video.367

After having his image shown with dead bodies in the ISIS video, Badruddin 

Ajmal, the president of All India United Democratic Front, a political party 

that represents Muslims in Assam, stated:

An unIslamic organization like ISIS shouldn’t lecture us on our 

role as leader of the community. It’s better you bunch of killers 

stop showing concern about Indian Muslims, they don’t need it. 

In the madrassa run by the 

Dargah, a course is taught 

titled “Hadith and Terrorism,” 

in which students compare 

original Qur’anic texts with 

those offered by terror groups 

to understand how terror 

groups misrepresent or only 

use limited portions of the 

Qur’an that support their 

point of view, to the exclusion 

of those that don’t.
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Indian Muslims never supported terrorism in the past, and never 

will in the future.368

Moreover, some of the areas that ISIS has identified as their future zone 

of operations already house insurgencies, like the Maoists or Naxalites, 

who would have little time to spare for fundamentalist groups like ISIS. In 

Northeast India, decades old insurgent groups—like the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur, or the 

United National Liberation Front—are ethnic insurgencies much older than 

ISIS and grounded in local ethnic issues. They exhibit zero tolerance for the 

ISIS kind of religious theology. Both ISIS and AQIS, led by Maulana Asim 

Umar,369 have identified Assam, with its tensions between illegal Bangladeshi 

immigrants and the indigenous communities, as part of their future operational zone, yet, there is no data to show that Muslims of Assam are drawn 

to ISIS. In fact, in the April 2016 Assam assembly elections, the Muslim 

community both fielded candidates of their choice to vote from and voted 

in large numbers.370

As mentioned earlier, Mohammad Shafi Umar, the ISIS chief recruiter 

in India, was a former IM member, the homegrown terror group that took 

responsibility for multiple terror attacks in India in 2008. Its leader, Yasin 

Bhatkal, is now in police custody and the IM has perished as an outfit. India’s 

1.3-million-strong experienced military will prove too strong for ISIS. The 

role of Indian COIN agencies in thwarting terror attacks is an important 

element in the overall societal ability to limit recruitment, propaganda, and 

terror attacks.

The Role of Indian CT Agencies

There are several Indian CT agencies, including intelligence, military, and 

the police. Within the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), a special cell 

called Combating Financing of Terrorism was established in 2011 as part 

of the Internal Security Division. Its job is to coordinate intelligence on 

terror financing and target sources of these funds.371 Two other bodies at 

the forefront of combating terror funding are the National Crime Records 

Bureau, under the MHA, and the Financial Intelligence Unit-India, under 

the Ministry of Finance. Under Article 355 of the Indian constitution, the 

MHA has the responsibility of ensuring the internal security of the regional 

states in case armed violence breaks out and the state police are unable to 
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maintain law and order.372 The MHA has a separate Department of Internal 

Security,373 which is specifically designed to respond to internal violence. In 

2008, in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks, the NIA was formed to 

investigate acts of insurgency and terrorism.374 The MHA is also responsible 

for the imposition of special laws under which the armed forces deploy in 

COIN mode function, namely the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 

1958, amended in 1972 for the Northeast,375 and the Armed Forces (Special 

Powers) Act for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1990.376

The central security agencies utilized for CT and COIN include the central police organizations, like the Central Reserve Police Force, and the central paramilitary forces, like the Border Security Force, the NSG, the Indo 

Tibetan Border Police, and the Assam Rifles, which all fall under the purview 

of the MHA, as well as the Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles. The NSG was 

established in 1984 “to tackle all facets of terrorism in the country,”377 and 

played a prominent role in the Mumbai attacks of 2008. The 51 Special Action 

Group of the NSG succeeded in thwarting the 2008 Mumbai attack, though 

post-event analysis suggests that there was a severe lack of focused training, 

transport helicopters, as well as coordination.378 As a result, the NSG received 

policy attention, and five more hubs were established in Mumbai, Kolkata, 

Hyderabad, Chennai, and Gandhinagar, besides its main hub in Manesar, 

Gurgaon, in order to decrease response time to terror attacks.379 Moreover, 

intelligence reveals that these cities could face future terror strikes.380

Besides the NSG, three military branches—the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force—have special forces units for CT: the Army’s PARA (special forces) 

and PARA Commando units, the Navy’s MARCOS (Marine Commandos), 

and the Air Force’s Garuds Commando unit. These special operations units 

are mostly trained to function behind enemy lines.381 In June 2015, the PARA 

Commandos targeted insurgent camps of the National Socialist Council of 

Nagaland-Khaplang in the India-Burma border region after a deadly attack 

by the rebel group on an Indian army convoy in Manipur, killing 18 soldiers.382 In September 2016, the paratroopers launched a ‘surgical strike’ on 

terror bases across the Indian-Pakistan border to prevent cross-border terror 

attacks. This was a response to a terror attack on an army base in Uri, in the 

Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.383 The Indian paratroopers have been 

augmented with a 90-day training schedule to include terrain knowledge, 

prevailing obstacles, as well as knowledge of several languages.
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Other Indian special forces utilized against terrorism include the Central 

Reserve Police Force's COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action), 

the Special Frontier Force, under the Research and Analysis Wing (India’s 

external intelligence agency), and Force One, a special unit within the 

Mumbai police to counter terror attacks on the city.384 Force One has been 

trained by Israeli special forces. In combination with Indian intelligence, the 

NIA, and local intelligence, these special forces units have limited the impact 

of terror attacks, although terror attacks have occurred in India against both 

civilians, which is the usual terror strategy, and military bases.385 In January 

2016, there was a terror attack on the Pathankot Air Force Station, which 

houses MiG-21 Bison fighter jets and Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters. In 

this attack, the NSG lost a lieutenant colonel and six other security personnel. JeM was said to be behind the attack.386

With multiple terror groups targeting India, and ISIS planning to spread 

into India, how the future unfolds will depend on how well Indian society 

and these CT agencies rise to the challenge.

Considerations for USSOCOM

The Indian social and political landscape is complex and multifaceted. More 

importantly, India has faced terror attacks on both its civilians and military 

over decades. That has created an institutional culture of learning and adapting to this continuous challenge. India’s border states in Northeast India, and 

Jammu and Kashmir in Northwest India, have been suffering from armed 

insurgencies and terrorism for decades. As a result, a plethora of specialized 

forces have been established to meet the challenge. When ISIS declared in 

2014 that it aims to spread into India via Bangladesh, border security was 

tightened and intelligence shared with relevant organizations in Bangladesh.

A few considerations can be gleamed from the Indian experience of dealing with terrorism in general, and ISIS in particular, that are of relevance 

to USSOCOM. 

First, partner nations with a modern democratic setup, in which members 

of the Muslim community are represented, will not be easily persuaded by 

ISIS’s grand declarations of a caliphate. Often, ISIS recruitment has been 

successful due to the lack of viable alternatives. The Indian example indicates that once state institutions build inclusive mechanisms within them, 

no matter how imperfect, these institutions have the possibility to represent 
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those who feel disenfranchised. In such a setting, extremist groups will have 

an almost negligent draw for these communities. This is vindicated by a 

Brookings study on Democracy and Terrorism which states “that a country’s best defense against terrorism is to improve the legitimacy of the state 

through more democratic, human rights, and rule of law practices at the 

local, national, and international 

levels.”387

Second, intelligence gathering 

by the NIA in India has resulted in 

averting terror attacks and the arrest 

of those suspected of supporting terrorism. This intelligence is gathered 

by both online monitoring and onsite local networks. Such intelligence 

has proved vital to targeting sources of funding, the supply chain of illegal 

weapons, and recruitment to terror outfits. USSOCOM could exchange ‘best 

practices’ with India under a CT agreement. This kind of collaboration is 

crucial, as ISIS recognizes no borders and could aim at collaborating with 

local terror units across regions.

Third, al-Qaeda’s announcement of AQIS coincided with al-Baghdadi’s 

declaration of the Islamic caliphate. At the same time, ISIS’s goals in India 

coincided with the 55-minute video message by al-Qaeda chief al-Zawahiri. 

In the message, he identified Indian Muslims as a persecuted lot in Assam, 

Kashmir, and Gujarat, as well as in Burma and Bangladesh. He stated that 

“your brothers ... did not forget you and that they are doing what they can to 

rescue you.”388 Al-Zawahiri also pointed out, without specifically mentioning 

ISIS, the dangers of division amongst the jihadist groups and called for unity 

instead. Yet, the societal support from Indian Muslims to Wahhabi-inspired 

groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda is limited. Hence, in the nearly four years since 

both ISIS and al-Qaeda announced their goals to expand into India, very 

little has been achieved in terms of physical presence. The role of Indian 

Muslim organizations in rejecting terrorism has a real-time effect. Such 

organizations should exist in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, as well. The challenge for USSOCOM will be to identify and include such anti-ISIS Muslim 

groups into its mission goals of containing recruitment and advancement 

of ISIS ideology, both online and offline.

The Indian example indicates 

that once state institutions build 

inclusive mechanisms within 

them, no matter how imperfect, 

these institutions have the possibility to represent those who feel 

disenfranchised.
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Finally, besides political and social factors, fighting terrorism requires 

firepower, training in unconventional strategy, and superior intelligence 

analysis to counter unpredictable violence. Since civilians are the major 

targets of terror groups, the intelligence required to avert such attacks are 

the focal point of CT missions. Gathering intelligence is not easy, however. 

The central point of intelligence collection should ideally be local units with 

cultural expertise, community sensitivity, and an ability to weed out misleading leads. It is in this domain of intelligence sharing and creating actionable 

leads that USSOCOM and Indian special forces can work together under a 

framework agreement on intelligence sharing. Since the adversary (ISIS) 

is common, it makes sense to sketch out a common doctrine. The 2009 

India-U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative provides an overarching 

framework to further this goal.389
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Chapter 5. Resistance to ISIS Ideology 

and Recruitment in Indonesia 

One of the key insights important to the USSOCOM mission of countering extremist groups like ISIS is understanding why the group fails 

in Muslim countries like Indonesia. This knowledge is specifically critical 

to accomplishing the core activity of MISO. MISO is aimed at influencing the emotions, motives, and objective reasoning of foreign audiences 

and governments.390 The knowledge offered in this chapter helps identify 

vital interjection points required to not only keep violent extremism from 

spreading, but also to ensure long-term substantive conflict prevention. 

Understanding the role of local actors in questioning extremist ideologies 

propagated by ISIS helps shape and enhance conditions that work against 

violent extremist actors setting down roots and taking over territory. For 

instance, if Sunni groups in Mosul, Iraq, had been adequately represented in 

local government structures, it is more likely that ISIS social networks would 

have been detected early in order to deter them from taking hold of the city 

with such devastating consequences for its inhabitants. As of the writing of 

this monograph, the battle for Mosul, Iraq, against ISIS has ended with the 

Iraqi and U.S. militaries reclaiming the city.391 The role of USSOCOM in the 

fight against ISIS grows more critical with each passing day. Added to 5,000 

military advisors, trainers, and attack helicopters in Iraq, are 200 personnel 

from a Marine artillery unit, deployed on the outskirts of Raqqa, the headquarters of ISIS.392 They worked in collaboration with the Syrian Democratic 

Forces (SDF) to wrest Raqqa from ISIS. The mission objective of USSOCOM 

is to work in a partner capacity with Syrian local forces, primarily focused 

on training and assisting them.

It is in this area of building partner capacity that a country like Indonesia fits as a case for analysis in the fight against ISIS. While Indonesia is not 

part of the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, it views its fight 

against ISIS in ideological terms, as a battle between moderate and radical 

Islam. Arto Suryodipuro, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Indonesian 

Embassy in the United States, highlighted this aspect in March 2016 when 

he said that Indonesia and the U.S. could expand bilateral cooperation by 
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JSOU Report 18-6

sharing more ideas about this approach, especially through the bilateral 

establishment of a Council on Religion and Pluralism.393

Significantly, although Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim 

population in the world and was included in the 2014 ISIS map for territorial 

expansion, it has witnessed very few recruits to ISIS. With a total population 

of 258.3 million, 87.2 percent of which are Muslim,394 Indonesia has seen only 

about 700 ISIS recruits.395 In contrast to Tunisia, Russia, Germany, France, 

and Saudi Arabia, this is a low percentage of their population. Indonesian 

ISIS leaders, like Bachrumsyah Mennor Usman, Bahrun Naim, and Gigih 

Rahmat Dewa (Dewa is in custody in Indonesia), operated from Iraq and 

Syria through terror cells.396 While this poses an existential security threat to 

Indonesia, given Indonesian ISIS recruits can function with impunity from 

outside bases and succeed in drawing local recruits and resources, their hold 

on the Indonesian psyche is limited. On the other hand, Abu Bakar Bashir of 

al-Qaeda-linked JI, an Indonesian leader of Yemeni descent, operates inside 

Indonesia and inspires a following, especially through his membership in 

Darul Islam, which advocates the adoption of sharia law in Indonesia, and 

the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council.397 The Indonesian government had 

trouble convicting him of terrorism-related charges, but, he was finally convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison in 2011 for funding an extremist 

training camp in Aceh.398

ISIS does have some influence in Indonesia. ISIS leader al-Baghdadi 

appointed Indonesian jihadi leader Bachrumsyah to be leader of the ISIS 

Southeast Asia battalion, called the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah. Bahrun, an Indonesian ISIS member, traveled to Syria, and once there, 

discussed travel plans for potential Indonesian ISIS recruits with Gigih 

Dewa, another Indonesian ISIS member. Gigih, in order to avoid detection, named his terror cell Katibah Gonggong Rebus, or Boiled Snail Cells. 

Gigih’s cell was planning a terror attack on Marina Bay, Singapore, when 

it was detected by Indonesian CT officials in July 2016.399 Indonesia-based 

Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)400 is a 2015 formed cluster organization of 

Indonesian extremist groups who have pledged allegiance to ISIS. JAD is 

believed to be led by Aman Abdurrahman, another former JI ideologue who 

drew in Indonesian recruits to ISIS with his charismatic sermons, even while 

he was jailed. The resurgent JI appears to have similar goals with ISIS like 

its desire to establish a state based on pure Islam where sharia laws apply. It 

is pertinent to point out that JI is locally based and views ISIS as a rival.401
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Several terror plots have been deterred in Indonesia by the elite Detachment 

88 CT unit, created in 2003 and trained, in part, by U.S. forces. The foiled 

plots include ISIS-aligned terror strikes planned for December 2016 in front 

of the presidential palace, at Jakarta’s Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, 

and at the Burma embassy.402

Table 1. Indonesian Terror/Extremist Groups that Pledge Allegiance to ISIS403 

Al-Muhajiroun affiliated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT)

East Java Partisans of the Caliphate (Ansharul 

Khilafah Jawa Timur)

Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam (FAKSI/

Tauhid Waljihad)

Front Pembala Islam (FPI) Garis Gerakan Reformis Islam 

(GARIS/Tauhid Waljihad)

Jemaah Anshar Khilafah (JAK) Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)

Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) Jemaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS)

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) gave allegiance in 2014 

later rescinded it

Katibah Gonggong Rebus (KGR)

Katibah Nusantara Kembang Kuning Prisoners, 

Nusakambangan, for example, Aman 

Abdurrahman and Abu Ba’asyir

Laskar Jundullah (KPSI Sulawesi) Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB)

Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) Negara Islam Indonesia

Ring Batem sharia4Indonesia

Wahdah Islamiyah West Indonesia Mujahideen (MIB)

With pressure on ISIS to relinquish territory in Iraq and Syria, there are 

concerns that terror cells will spread to countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Yet, despite individual efforts to cause terror and 

establish organized radical networks, as mentioned above, ISIS has proved 

unable to spread its networks in Indonesia. Indonesian Muslim civil society 

groups have rejected ISIS ideology and limited both its physical spread and 

ideological appeal. The prevailing structural conditions in Indonesia, discussed in this chapter, have worked against extremist groups like ISIS, and 

identifies critical insights from the Indonesian experience against ISIS for 

USSOCOM. These insights include the methods used to foil terror plots, as 

well as the strategies adopted by Indonesian communities against ISIS-type 

radicalization.
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ISIS Goals in Indonesia

ISIS made itself visible on Indonesian television news coverage by claiming 

responsibility for the January 2016 attacks in Jakarta. Until then, JI, which 

was responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, was the main act on the stage 

of Indonesian terrorism. With the entry of ISIS, the potential for Indonesians to travel to Iraq and Syria and plot attacks back home has become 

a serious possibility.404 ISIS considers Indonesia un-Islamic, or not Dawla 

Islamiya (Islamic State), according to Indonesian national police chief Tito 

Karnavian.405 Moreover, Karnavian asserts that unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS legitimizes the killing of Muslims who are viewed as infidels.406 Significantly, the 

religious-laced ideology of ISIS stands in contrast to Indonesia’s state philosophy, Pancasila, which includes “belief in the one and only God, just and 

civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner 

wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives, social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.”407 ISIS aims to 

take over Indonesia and impose sharia law. In pursuit of these goals, several 

lone wolves have been recruited, including women like Dian Yulia Novi, who 

could have been Indonesia’s first female suicide bomber had she not been 

detected and arrested in December 2016 by Detachment 88.408

ISIS is encouraging both men and women to carry out individual attacks 

in its name. Moreover, the rise of Islamic groups after the 1998 democratization of Indonesia, like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), could theoretically 

create conditions for a quick transition to terrorism. FPI shares the goal of 

ISIS to impose sharia on Indonesia, and both aim for a caliphate in Indonesia.409 The spread of Saudi-funded Wahhabi education in Indonesia could 

dismantle the relaxed and pluralistic Islam prevalent there, in favor of a 

hard-core fundamentalism that has little time for other Islamic interpretations, let alone other religions.410 The Institute for the Study of Islam and 

Arabic, a university funded by the Saudis in Jakarta, offers scholarships for 

students to continue higher studies in Salafism, including a scholarship to 

Riyadh. Another Saudi funded organization is the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Society for the Propagation of Islam). This 

organization preaches anti-Shia, anti-Christian and anti-Ahmadiyah perpectives.411 Schools like al-Mukmim, in Java, teach a radical Islam that includes 

sharia law. Its founder is JI’s Abu Bakr Bashir, who pledged allegiance to 

ISIS. While the exact number is not known, yet dozens of Al-Mukmim’s 
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teachers and students are known to have engaged in terrorism, including 

Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali.412 One of the highest profile 

ISIS supporters was Al-Mukhim teacher, Afif Abdul Majid, who was arrested 

on 9 August 2014.413 Majid had traveled to Syria and lived there with ISIS 

for several months, pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi, before returning to 

Indonesia to preach ISIS ideology. Al-Mukhim is part of the Ngruki Foundation, founded in 1972 that runs not only schools but also medical centers 

and has a long history of political activism that goes beyond Bashir.414 AlMukhim is a boarding school that houses nearly 2,000 students between 12 

and 18 years old. The school did not recognize the Indonesian state or the 

flag and refused to embrace the country’s guiding philosophy of Pancasila. 

The teachers in the school stressed the importance of establishing an Islamic 

state. Some of the students in the school were sent for military training in 

JI run camps in Philippines.415 Such schools continue to flourish and may 

result in the radicalization of students, especially through teachings on jihad, 

war and violence.

In January 2016, ISIS claimed responsibility for attacks in Jakarta in 

which four civilians and five terrorists were killed.416 It is alleged that Bahrun 

planned the attacks from Raqqa, Syria.417 This attack simulated the November 

2015 Paris attack, and was meant to inflict maximum terror. By successfully 

carrying out these attacks, ISIS aims to create the perception that it can 

utilize its local members in different countries to deadly effect. ISIS glorifies the successful targeting of innocent civilians in terror strikes, and the 

perpetrators, mostly in suicide missions, are portrayed as martyrs. There are 

few examples of terrorists targeting trained, competent, and efficient police 

units or special forces. To the advantage of ISIS, the killing of civilians in a 

democracy has a huge political effect.

It requires just one successful terror attack for panic and a fear of ISIS’s 

presence to spread, and the January 2016 Jakarta attacks were aimed at 

achieving that purpose. Instead, after the attack, the Indonesian people 

rallied around the hashtags #KamiTidakTakut and #WeAreNotAfraid.418

Moreover, the terror attack was badly executed, with all four terrorists killed. 

Planned by Bahrun—a former member of Hizb-ut-Tahrir who is now leader 

of the Katibah Nusantara, a Southeast Asian ISIS cell based in Syria—the 

attack was meant to augment both the presence of ISIS and Bahrun’s reputation within the ISIS ranks, but ended up as a failure.
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The brand of Salafi Islam that ISIS projects, including its puritanical and 

literal reading of the Qur’an, has limited appeal in the sociocultural and 

political setting of Indonesia. The structural conditions in Indonesia, where 

Muslims are represented well in society, limits the allure of ISIS, especially its 

promises of returning the dignity of Muslims and removing their feelings of 

disenfranchisement.419 Even the idea of caliphate based on sharia has limited 

appeal, and is not good enough to sway many Indonesians, given their own 

cultural rootedness and traditions. Indonesian Muslims do not feel alienated 

or threatened by a majority, because they are the majority, unlike France or 

Germany, where Muslims are the minority. Moreover, those fringe extremist groups that support or give allegiance to ISIS are disparate groups with 

sporadic networking and multiple claims to leadership, including Bahrun, 

Bachrumsyah, and Abu Jandal. Having several claimants to leadership of 

the Indonesian version of ISIS results in internal 

competition to showcase each’s ability to orchestrate violence, which in turn could be manipulated by the ISIS core leadership.

The Indonesian political and sociocultural 

conditions have worked to keep the impact of 

radical violent extremism limited.420 Foremost 

amongst those groups that have a positive influence are Muslim civil society organizations, like 

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)421 and the Brotherhood 

Forum of the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars, that have visibly 

rejected ISIS. Besides civil society groups, Indonesian extremist groups like 

JI have not given their allegiance to ISIS, and instead continue to look toward 

al-Qaeda and al-Nusra. The political conditions in post-Suharto Indonesia 

have created firewalls against the ISIS kind of extreme violence, and the superior intelligence gathering and CT efforts of the Indonesian special forces 

have averted several ISIS terror strikes.422 In a 2015 Pew Research Center poll, 

79 percent of Indonesians viewed ISIS unfavorably while 4 percent viewed 

it favorably.423

Indonesian Civil Society’s Response to ISIS

It is quite significant to note that Indonesian pro-ISIS ideologue Aman 

Abdurrahman, imprisoned in Indonesia’s Nusakambangan island prison 

Indonesian Muslims 

do not feel alienated 

or threatened by a 

majority, because they 

are the majority, unlike 

France or Germany, 

where Muslims are the 

minority.
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since the 2010 Aceh raid on his terror camp, has successfully published several books from behind bars that are aimed at recruiting Indonesians to 

ISIS. What is even more astounding is that he may be communicating with 

Indonesian ISIS leaders in Raqqa, namely Bachrumsyah and Bahrun.424

Aman’s charisma lies in his knowledge of Islam, his fluency in Arabic, and 

the respect he draws in extremist circles. He utilized JAD to continue his 

work from prison helping ISIS establish its footing in Indonesia by translating their propaganda and ideology into Bahasa Indonesia.425 Three of the 

men Aman has inspired are Bachrumsyah, who styles himself as commander 

of the Western Indonesia Mujahidin; Santoso, a former JI member who led 

the insurgency movement called Eastern Indonesia Mujahidin, and Bahrun. 

Also included in Aman’s sphere of extremist influence is Salim Mubarak 

at-Tamimi, a.k.a. Abu Jandal, who joined ISIS in Syria.426 The problem with 

the Takfiri doctrine that Aman propagates, as pointed out by Indonesian 

national police chief Karnavian, is that it obligates Muslims to kill all other 

Muslims who they perceive as not following their version of true Islam.427

Into this plausible scenario of the spread of ISIS-inspired extremism, 

enter Indonesian civil society groups like NU and Brotherhood Forum of 

the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars. NU was founded in 1926, 

largely to counter Wahhabism, and now projects Islamic principles of tolerance, socioeconomic development and pluralism.428 NU categorically states 

that its mission is to counter extremism, and curb terrorism and radicalism. With a membership of 50 million Sunni Muslims, the impact of NU 

on Indonesian politics and society is high. Former Indonesian President 

Abdurrahman Wahid served as its general chairman in 1984 and present 

Vice President of Indonesia Jusuf Kalla is a member of its advisory board.429

NU’s political wing, the National Awakening Party, formed in 1999, played 

a major role in creating the foundations of the pluralistic Indonesian state.430

NU has set up ‘prevention centers’ in Indonesia to counter radical ideologies online, especially those written and spread in Arabic. NU propagates 

Islam Nusantara or East Indies Islam, the Indonesian version of Islam that 

highlights nonviolence, inclusive living, and most importantly, acceptance 

of other religions.431 According to Yahya Cholil Staquf, the general secretary 

of the NU Supreme Council, NU “is directly challenging the idea of ISIS, 

which wants Islam to be uniform, meaning that if there is any other idea of 

Islam that is not following their ideas, those people are infidels who must 

be killed.”432
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Indonesian scholars on Islamic studies throw light on Arab attitudes 

of racism toward non-Arab Muslims, especially highlighting Arab assertions that they are the only true Muslims. NU directly questions the ISIS 

projection of Islam, especially its assertion that the Qur’an sanctions its 

acts, including beheadings. ISIS, which is Sunni Muslim, categorically states 

that all others, including Shia Muslims, are infidels. On the contrary, NU, 

which is also Sunni Muslim, states that in the Sunni version of Islam, religion is expressed in love and conformity to other human beings, especially 

imbued with compassion. NU is active online, posting videos and articles 

that directly confront ISIS in the language it uses, Arabic. A recent video by 

NU, titled Rahmat Islam Nusantara or The Divine Grace of Islam433 includes 

an ISIS beheading clip, countered directly by the inclusive narrative of the 

former chairman of the NU Supreme Council, KH A. Mustofa Bisri.434 While 

acknowledging the legitimacy of the ISIS representation of Qur’anic scriptures, Indonesian scholars state that the ISIS version of 7th century Islam 

is not relevant to the 21st century. Therein lies a fundamental problem: ISIS 

would assert that its religious discourses are legitimate and question the 

authority of NU to decide which version of Islam is relevant. ISIS claims that 

it represents the Prophet’s word as it is, and do not interpret it, focusing on 

a literal reading of the Qur’an and the Hadith.435

NU, with its powerful credibility and legitimacy in Indonesia grounded 

in its 91-year history, social work, and adherence and commitment to Islam, 

cannot be wished away by ISIS. Comparatively, ISIS is a new (2014), unilaterally declared caliphate, mostly led by Iraqis. ISIS is not going to suddenly 

dominate the Indonesian imagination simply because they claim to be a 

caliphate established by Allah. In questioning the legitimacy and ideology 

of ISIS, NU has the numbers, Islamic legitimacy, and knowledge of Sunni 

theology to evoke a strong counter response.436

The Brotherhood Forum of the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars 

also has been at the forefront of rejecting ISIS.437 They state that the ISIS version of Sunni Islam is completely at odds with the Indonesian identity, which 

is based on an Islam that preaches compassion and tolerance. Indonesian 

scholars on Islam visibly articulate their tolerant version of Islam and locate 

it vis-à-vis the ISIS version, directly questioning the latter’s legitimacy. Added 

to this societal resistance are Indonesian political conditions. For instance, 

Indonesian Religious Affairs Minister Lukman Hakim Saifuddin specified 

that, in his scrutiny of Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia, those that 
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teach radicalism and violence cannot call themselves Islamic.438 This leads 

us to the next section, which highlights the political factors in Indonesia 

working against the ISIS ideology.

The Political Conditions in Post-Suharto Indonesia

When Indonesia became a democracy in 1998, after the fall of the Suharto 

dictatorship of nearly three decades, there were fears that the immensely 

diverse country of 250 million people would not stay together. There were 

violent confrontations between the military and separatists, with the military 

refusing to give up its violent campaigns. Added to this were the business 

interests of the military, which was committed to maintaining its position of 

privilege,439 and rising tensions between Christians and Muslims. Separatism 

raised its head in Bali, Minahasa, the Moluccas, Aceh, etc. In this situation, 

Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid could not afford to lose territory, 

so he played a distinct role in ensuring that rights of minorities were protected in the democratic structure of Indonesia. Unlike Iraq’s first Shia Prime 

Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who incited a sectarian divide that has left Iraqi 

Shias and Sunnis estranged, Wahid was a champion of multiculturalism and 

pluralism. Wahid, as Indonesia’s first elected president, ensured that respect 

for a diversity of views, ideas, religions, and thought, were institutionalized 

into the Indonesian state. His experience, reforming the NU as chairman 

in the 1980s, held him in good stead to steer Indonesia’s path to an inclusive 

and vibrant democracy. It was Wahid who, contrary to the ISIS edict that 

democracy is haram, meaning forbidden, declared that “Democracy is not 

only not haram in Islam, but is a compulsory element of Islam. Upholding 

democracy is one of the principles of Islam.”440

The role of former Indonesian presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri, Susilo 

Bambang Yudhoyono, and the present president, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), in 

strengthening Indonesia’s democracy and pluralism have been immense. All 

three presidents demonstrated leadership in admitting to issues like poverty, 

corruption, and inequality, and adopted measures to address them. The 

repressive laws of the Suharto regime against minorities were removed, and 

freedom of the press was ensured. A liberal version of Islam was encouraged, 

especially one that accepted plurality of thought, culture, and tradition.441

Instead of banning Islamist parties, Indonesia is open to them joining the 

government, provided they can win. Islamist politicians who are co-opted 
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into governing tend to be weak at daily political strategy and are exposed for 

what they are—ordinary people rather than the embodiment of the mystical 

allure they project in their speeches, making tall promises of spiritual and 

political liberation. For instance, in 2013, the former leader of the Islamist 

Prosperous Justice Party, Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, was sentenced to 16 years in 

prison for taking bribes.442

Indonesia lends itself to a complex mosaic of values and thoughts, steeped 

in an Islam that permeated the landscape in the 13th century, and which 

interspersed with other religions and cultures to take on a moderate view 

on faith. The willingness of major politicians in Indonesia to represent their 

constituencies, without taking on religious expressions of politics, limits 

the appeal of groups like ISIS. Significantly, in a 2013 Pew Research Center 

survey, 72 percent of Indonesians favored sharia (the revealed word of God) 

as the official law of the land and had become more devout in their religious practices.443 This should naturally ring 

alarm bells. However, 44 percent of Indonesians 

believe there are multiple interpretations of 

sharia. Moreover, they wanted sharia to be limited to property and family disputes for Muslims. 

The favorable percentage comes down drastically 

when sharia penalties for theft and adultery are 

concerned. Fifty-four percent of Indonesians 

believed that their present official laws followed 

sharia. In a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, 83 

percent of Indonesians supported religious freedom for all and believed in 

democracy.444 It is this belief in their democracy, in which Indonesians feel 

adequately represented, that limits their predisposition to the ideology of 

ISIS or other Islamic extremists. 

Indonesian CT Special Units

One of the patterns that emerges from a study of Indonesia’s success in 

frustrating ISIS efforts to spread its presence and ideology in the country is 

the role of its special forces CT units. Detachment 88, established in 2002 

in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, has been successful in thwarting 

several ISIS-inspired plots. The unit succeeded in 2010 in eliminating the 

terrorist Dulmatin, the top JI leader responsible for the planning of the Bali 

The willingness of major politicians in Indonesia to represent their 

constituencies, without 

taking on religious 

expressions of politics, 

limits the appeal of 

groups like ISIS.
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bombings.445 Detachment 88 was the core force behind the 2010 Aceh raid on 

a terrorist training camp that led to the arrest of JI jihadi ideologues Aman 

Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Bashir. Detachment 88 was responsible for 

busting an al-Qaeda in Aceh terror camp in the jungles of Sumatra in 2010. 

Most of its terror raids are conducted based on intensive intelligence gathered 

by intermingling with the people. Moreover, members of Detachment 88 

participate in anti-radicalization programs, offering spiritual counternarratives to arrested militants. The legal framework utilized do not rely on special 

terror laws, but the normal Indonesian court system. Interestingly, members 

of the police unit participate with terror suspects in prayers while in jail, 

thereby forming connections that could help in deradicalization efforts.446 

In December 2016, Detachment 88 successfully uncovered a terror plot 

to attack the Parliament, police headquarters, Burma embassy, a Buddhist 

temple, and a local TV station by ISIS-affiliated terrorists. The four members 

of JAD believed to be behind the plot—Rio Priatna Wibawa, Saiful Bahri, 

Bahrain Agam, and Hendra Rizki—were arrested.447 Detachment 88 has 

succeeded in foiling 54 terror attacks since 2010. In August 2016, an ISISinspired terror plot, in Batam, Indonesia, to attack the Marina Bay area in 

Singapore was foiled.

Detachment 88’s training headquarters is located in Semarang on the 

island of Java. It consists of about 400 to 500 elite members, including bomb 

specialists, intelligence gatherers, and weapons specialists, and is equipped 

with state-of-the-art weaponry and intelligence gathering devices. The unit 

has benefited from about $200 million in assistance from Indonesian allies 

like Australia and the U.S., including intelligence sharing.448 Led by a core 

task force of 30 senior officers, Detachment 88 prioritizes superior military 

intelligence, especially in online communications, and is filled with police 

personnel having doctorates in social psychology. While not immune to 

accusations of human rights abuses, especially during interrogations of terror 

suspects, the success of the terror unit works in its favor.449

Another CT special unit, established in 2015, is the Joint Special Operations Command, or Koopsusgab.450 It is stationed at Sentul, West Java, and 

comprises 81 specially trained CT military personnel from the Indonesian 

Navy, Army, and Air Force special forces. The Koopsusgab is manned by 

the military, unlike Detachment 88, which is a police-driven unit, raising 

concerns over turf battles.451 That said, the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 

Terorisme, Indonesia’s national counter-terrorism agency, is led by national 
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police chief Tito Karnavian, who has a doctorate in terrorism and Islamic 

radicalization, and successfully led the police effort to dismantle JI. Tito 

has highlighted the importance of counternarratives to ISIS’s radicalism, 

especially prioritizing a community-drawn narrative.452

Considerations for USSOCOM

ISIS’s challenge to Indonesia is real, given that 22 Indonesian terror groups 

have pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi. The spread of Saudi-funded Wahhabi Islam could result in the growth of a puritanical Islam. ISIS aspires 

to take over the space occupied by al-Qaeda-linked JI in Indonesia, as is 

demonstrated by their 2014 map. Former JI leader Bahrun has joined ISIS 

and directs propaganda targeted at Indonesia from Raqqa, Syria. Yet, the 

success of Indonesian Nusantara in limiting the spread of ISIS ideology 

is visible. Indonesian military chief General Gatot Nurmantyo cautioned 

that ISIS “sleeper cells” have been established in almost every province of 

the Indonesian archipelago, mostly established by ISIS from the southern 

Philippine city of Marawi.453

Considerations derived from the Indonesian experience that relate to 

USSOCOM are as follows. First, the U.S. State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program, supporting a well-equipped and politically stable 

counterpart in a partner nation through training, sharing strategies, and 

intelligence, is critical. This amplifies the FID strategy of USSOCOM that 

Detachment 88 has benefited from U.S. assistance, in both funding and 

training the unit, but has managed to keep the U.S. role to a secondary status. 

That is critical given that Indonesia is a functioning democracy and the role 

of outside powers should be limited to assistance. 

Second, Indonesian special forces, both police and military units, are not 

only succeeding in operational matters, but also enjoy societal legitimacy 

because of their Islamic way of life and local roots. For them, it’s not simply 

a job to be accomplished; it’s about safeguarding their homeland from the 

threat ISIS poses. As a result, their passion for the job brings about respect 

from the population, which in turn wants them to succeed. Exposing ISIS 

brutalities and the harsh treatment of people living under their rule diminishes the appeal of ISIS. USSOCOM can share best practices for countering 

extremist groups’ propaganda, and further enhance the online capacities of 

Indonesian partner agencies.
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Third, civil society groups, like Indonesia’s NU, with its 50 million Sunni 

members, are effective social counters to ISIS. ISIS is mostly led by Iraqis, 

and cannot draw the same amount of adherence as locally led civil groups, 

no matter how much it tries to locate itself within a Qur’anic discourse. NU’s 

direct engagement with ISIS religious discourses and offer of an alternative 

counter-discourse on Islam, instead of simply brushing aside ISIS as unIslamic, is a clever, workable strategy.

Fourth, for USSOCOM, the Indonesian example of gathering local intelligence, especially that which helps to deter terror attacks, is something 

that can be further enhanced. USSOCOM could share their own experiences and COIN techniques with partner-nation (Indonesian) counterparts. 

Indonesian extremist groups have changed their communications strategy 

by using hand courier services in order to avoid detection. By blending into 

local areas where extremist groups function, Detachment 88 has made it 

possible to gather intelligence. The number of terror attacks in Indonesia 

has gone down drastically. Between 2002 and 2009, the country suffered five 

major terrorist attacks killing 251 people and injuring 413.454 In comparison, 

between 2010 and 2017, Indonesia suffered three small scale terror attacks 

killing five people and injuring a dozen.455 This can be attributed to better 

policing, intelligence, and international collaboration.

Fifth, the Indonesian political condition offers a better alternative for 

Muslim representation than ISIS. While ISIS is dictatorial and fundamentalist, the Indonesian state is inclusive and moderate. As a consequence, a 

large segment of the Muslim population finds ISIS, and its version of brutal 

governance, ugly.

Sixth, it is important to distinguish between the version of sharia Indonesians want to the ISIS version of sharia. Indonesians want a sharia limited 

to property and family disputes, but ISIS wants to impose it on all aspects 

of the human existence, from determining how one dresses to punishments 

for theft.

Finally, limiting ISIS and defeating the threat it poses requires the combined effort of democratic political resistance, social questioning of its 

religious discourses, and intelligence-based military operations, including 

monitoring its online presence. The Indonesian example of resisting the 

presence and ideology of ISIS is an informative case in this regard.

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Chapter 6. An Effective Response to ISIS 

Written by Robert A. Norton and Greg S. Weaver

This chapter identifies some of the most feasible strategic responses to 

extremist groups like ISIS. It is vital to comprehend at the outset that 

ISIS ideology cannot be completely exterminated. Therefore, it is perhaps 

wise to focus on how to make that ideology unattractive to the large segments of populations living in conditions that render them susceptible. In the 

case of India and Indonesia, we learned that the impact of ISIS ideology and 

stated goals of expansion have limited appeal due to multiple factors. These 

factors include: religious tolerance, political representation of Muslims in 

state institutions, economic conditions, constitutional guarantees of safety 

and well-being, education, effective law enforcement, specific intelligence, 

and Muslim civil society organizations publicly denouncing ISIS ideology 

and designating it as haram. Such strong statements impact the draw of ISIS 

and severely limit their appeal. Insights drawn from earlier chapters reveal 

that, in addition to a strong presence of state forces and CT agencies, one 

effective method of countering ISIS is exposing them and visibly questioning 

their religiously based narratives. In this, India’s Darul Uloom Deoband, 

the largest Muslim seminary in Asia and highly influential in India, issued 

a fatwa against ISIS, declaring it un-Islamic. The fatwa was signed by 1,000 

imams across India.456 Similarly, in Indonesia, the NU, the largest Sunni 

Muslim social organization, denounces ISIS.457

Yet, ISIS has carried out attacks in both India and Indonesia, struck inside 

Bangladesh, and identified Burma as the next base for their expansion. Given 

that the physical presence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria was heavily challenged 

by the U.S.-led coalition, especially by the retaking of Mosul, Iraq, and the 

battle for Raqqa, Syria, it is likely the extremist group will turn to areas 

outside of the Middle East to bide its time and regroup.458 Significantly, on 

21 June 2017, ISIS destroyed the medieval mosque in Mosul, from where its 

leader, al-Baghdadi, declared a caliphate in 2014 and announced himself as 

caliph.459 Does that mean that ISIS is acknowledging defeat, as interpreted 

by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi?460
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Experts studying the group are concerned that, if defeated in Iraq and 

Syria, ISIS members—especially the thousands of foreign fighters—will 

return home. Those who return from a conflict zone will carry their training 

home with them, as well as extremist views, and the conditions at home—say, 

in France, the UK, or Central Asia—may not offer optimal conditions for a 

fundamentalist Salafist daily existence.461 Some may become true defectors, 

while others may blend into societies back home and then carry out terror 

attacks. Foreign fighters will continue to maintain social media communications with ISIS core leaders back in Iraq and Syria, and may carry out lone 

wolf attacks to register the group’s continued presence.

This chapter analyzes these scenarios and emphasizes the critical necessity of continuously and persistently countering ISIS messaging, especially 

in the cyber domain. For sure, ISIS will reinvent itself; the response, therefore, should be both tactical and strategic. With its loss of territory in Iraq 

and Syria, ISIS is adapting and morphing toward a less centralized and 

more equivocal ideological message. 

It remains to be seen how this shift will 

affect actions and behavior. A primary 

strategy found in ISIS messaging is to 

foster the idea of religious purity, using 

violence as a means of purging the 

kuffar and Christians, as described in 

detail in the 2004 online publication, Management of Savagery,

462 allegedly 

written by jihadist strategist Abu Bakr Naji (believed to be Muhammad 

Khalil Al-Hakaymah). Similarly, in 2015, Zainab Mai-Bornu wrote:

The modernity and simple sophistication deployed by ISIS help shape 

and reconstruct the unique religious identities of the target audience. 

They achieve this through the creation of a sense of belonging by 

simply calling out to their target audience to come home to a land 

of peace, love and join their brothers from other parts of the world 

for the cause of no other but Allah (God). The impact achieved by 

ISIS through the use of new media serves to escalate the conflicts 

between Western countries and ISIS. The group is recruiting more 

young boys and girls from Western countries, which in the end, 

produces a culture of hate and enmity between these youths and 

their home countries.463

With its loss of territory in Iraq 

and Syria, ISIS is adapting and 

morphing toward a less centralized and more equivocal 

ideological message.
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Whereas cyber threats from nation-state adversaries, including China, 

Russia, Iran, and North Korea, could be categorized within the realm of an 

‘advanced persistent threat’ domain,464 ISIS is perhaps the first and most 

advanced cyber-battlefield messaging adversary. The cyber element is inextricably tied to most of what ISIS does or accomplishes, resulting in economies 

of effort, force protection, agility, and adaptability. Writing for the Center 

for Complex Operations, Maeghin Alarid describes the process of online 

radicalization and recruiting used by ISIS as having:

great advantages over the traditional (and riskier) public communications. Terrorist groups can reach out to an incalculably vast 

audience. With no travel required, cost is minimal, no logistics or 

transportation support is needed, and the odds of detection are low. 

And the newly radicalized need not necessarily pack up and head 

for the Middle East—jihadi groups encourage attacks at home to 

avoid the risk of infiltration while traveling.

The threshold for engaging in cyber jihad is markedly lower than 

for someone who gives up a familiar, comfortable life to travel to an 

actual battle zone and risk death or capture. If the notion of online 

activism as a proper, respectable, and sufficient form of jihad wins 

wide acceptance within radical circles, we can expect ever-increasing 

efforts in online propaganda and cyber attacks. This could further 

inspire yet more individuals, facilitating both radicalization and 

recruitment, and lead to a new cycle of attacks.465

It is agreed, both within and outside of the military and government that 

attempts by the United States and its allies to counter ISIS messaging efforts 

have largely failed.466 The reasons for this failure are many, but Boaz Ganor 

notes that external, U.S.-led efforts to shape opinion are unlikely to succeed 

because, to put it bluntly, the West is not viewed as having legitimacy over 

the Islamic State or, for that matter, over Islam itself.467 Evidence of a similar 

theme can be found in an important article by Hagan, Kaiser, and Hanson, 

who suggest that cynicism associated with U.S. coalition attacks (particularly 

if civilians were involved) has led to not only decreased support, but in some 

cases to retaliatory violence.468
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As the adversary becomes more dispersed—particularly if ISIS-held territory continues to decline—social media will no doubt be an important 

element in efforts to promote ideals and influence others. As Alarid notes:

Terrorist groups have good reason to use social media, whose popularity suits them in many ways ... the Internet is fast overtaking 

conventional forms of media such as books, magazines, and television to become the leading research and entertainment platform. 

Social media outlets allow them to present themselves as just another 

part of mainstream news. Most social media platforms are easy to 

use and cost little or nothing. With them, terrorists can tailor their 

message to narrow audience niches, enlisting the help of the virtual 

world to enter the homes of millions of people.469

If expanded social media use indeed becomes reality, this sole element 

will make modified messaging efforts more difficult, because the virtualized environment expands perhaps by magnitudes, severely reducing the 

likelihood for the development of some completely new counter-messaging 

strategy.

The counter-ISIS messaging strategy, even where present in Islamic countries, also cannot be viewed as effective, as the numbers of fighters increased 

(i.e., recruiting efforts were successful) in the early to mid-years of territorial 

gains in Syria and Iraq. The message associated with being on a “winning 

team” proved popular and supplanted any counter messaging. It successfully fed into the operative religious narrative continually propagated by 

ISIS, which is strongly reinforcing their belief that Allah was blessing the 

territorial gains and, therefore, the group and people that became part of the 

group, or in many ways, the tribe. Alarid describes the ease with which the 

radicalization process is accomplished with some individuals:

The common denominator seems to be that everyone who is radicalized and recruited online feels sympathetic toward the group’s cause, 

and people who feel there is “something missing” from their lives 

appear to be more susceptible than others. Radicalization is more 

widespread where conditions of inequality and political frustration 

prevail. It often takes root in people who sympathize with the plight 

of the oppressed and wish to show their solidarity. Radicalized 

men and women alike often feel despair, humiliation, and outrage 
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over injustice and perceive few options for influencing change. One 

brief moment of intense emotion evoked in them while they watch 

a YouTube video of innocent victims in Africa or the Middle East 

can be all it takes to spark their interest.470

The massive tide of fighters into the contested areas of Syria, Iraq, and 

perhaps even Yemen, has abated somewhat with the new realities of the 

battlefield being faced by ISIS. This has caused the directional flow of former 

fighters to trend increasingly toward a return to their countries of origin. 

Although open documentary data is scant, some evidence indicates a portion 

of the returning fighters are actually disheartened, having decided the group 

didn’t deliver on their apocalyptic promises for achieving paradise, while 

another fraction are actually disillusioned from ISIS.471 If true, these findings would be significant in that these are elements that could be exploited 

further in psychological operations (PSYOP) and MISO. The purported disenfranchisement is likely in part the result of the purges instigated by ISIS 

leadership in the wake of battlefield losses,472 or perhaps more obscurely, 

following events where top leadership is being targeted, like the poisoning 

incidents reported in 2014 and 2015,473 or the more recent rumored poisoning 

of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2016.474

Purges have been initiated in an attempt to ferret out spies following the 

U.S.-led coalition’s successful targeting and killing of top ISIS commanders, 

such as Abu Hayjaa al-Tunsi, “minister of war” Omar al-Shishani, Iraqi jihadi 

Shaker Wuhayeb, and top finance official Abu Ali al-Anbari.475 These purges 

have also reportedly caused a significant number of fighters, including some 

close to top ISIS leadership, to flee out of fear that they would be targeted 

next by ISIS purists. Paranoia within ISIS leadership, a highly desirable state 

from the U.S.-led coalition’s perspective, has been present since Mohammed Emwazi (a.k.a. Jihadi John) was successfully targeted in Raqqa in 2015, 

despite his constant movement between safe houses. The increasing paranoia 

creates an advantage that can be further fostered to encourage internecine 

conflict within ISIS.

Given the changes that appear to be happening, there is significant reason 

for optimism. Battlefield losses are inevitably changing the ISIS narrative. 

It is no longer the invincible foe it might once have seemed to potential 

recruits. With this nascent change in perception, one must wonder whether 

the battlefield defeats and territorial losses have led to a questioning within 
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the ranks, perhaps implying to those who are sympathetic, but do not yet 

fully embrace ISIS, that the group may indeed not be blessed by Allah, as 

it so often claims. Although the U.S. must scrupulously avoid this messaging strategy, regional partners are not so constrained and, therefore, might 

choose to express this theological opinion, even though in the short-term, 

it may lead to further negative sectarian consequences.476

Overall, there appear to be two large categories of ISIS fighters: the hard 

core, who have passed to the “dark side,” and the less strident, perhaps more 

fair-weather ISIS patriots, who possibly can be persuaded away from continuing support of the group. The hard-core ISIS members will likely remain 

largely irretrievable, although recent defections have indicated that even 

some in this category are subject to persuasion toward self-preservation. 

For the hardest of the hard-core, targeting by direct action should continue 

to be expanded and refined, as success there will continue to foment ISIS 

leadership paranoia by artificially reinforcing the idea that there are spies 

within the ISIS ranks. Continued success and expansion of direct action 

operations also becomes the message in itself, further eroding confidence 

in ISIS leadership competency and morale.

This internal narrative of inevitable ISIS defeat could be fostered further by modified PSYOP and MISO operations in which elements within 

the ranks are openly identified, while still protecting sources and methods. 

Significant parallels can be drawn between ISIS, which functions in part as 

a “virtualized tribe,” and hacker groups, which operate under a different 

set of priorities. Both succeed only as long as they remain hidden. Exposure 

brings peril, whether from military or the police, and peril can motivate a 

shift in behavior toward self-preservation.

Industry-based, cyber-adversary hunter teams have recognized the 

importance of exposure in countering hacker activities. Many of these teams 

work in the corporate shadows so as to not become targets themselves, but 

with the full knowledge of government, a necessary requirement in this very 

dark world of adversaries. A recent white paper, published by the information security training group SANS, provides a concise description of the 

reasoning behind the strategy for hunting and exposing cyber adversaries:

Threats are human. It is the adversaries, not just their tools, such as 

malware, that interest threat hunters. These adversaries are persistent 

and flexible and often evade network defenses. The threats are often 
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identified as advanced persistent threats (APTs), not just because of 

the capabilities that the adversaries wield, but also because of their 

ability to initiate and maintain long-term operations against targets.

Focused and funded adversaries will not be countered by security 

boxes on the network alone. And threat hunters are not simply waiting to respond to alerts or indicators of compromise (IOCs). They 

are actively searching for threats to prevent or minimize damage.477

The process of cyber hunting consists of a number of steps, culminating 

with offensive operations or “active defense,” which includes the Cyber Kill 

Chain478 and Diamond Model of Intrusion479 analyses, processes that first 

identify and then neutralize the ability of the adversary to continue to act. A 

key component of this strategy in many operations is the feature of exposure, 

whereby the person is identified by name, location, and wherever possible, 

by imagery. The result of such activity is frequently an alteration in behavior. Outed hackers quickly become pariahs in their own social networks. 

Previous collaborators quickly cease interacting with the outed subject, out 

of fear that they will be linked criminally. Potential new collaborations are 

also discouraged, again motivated by self-preservation.

A particular hunter team leader, interviewed by the author, discussed 

a recent successful operation that located and identified a group of hackers in an Eastern European nation. After identifying the members of the 

hacker group, the hunters exposed their identities to the hacker world and 

actually took out an advertisement in a local newspaper, further exposing 

the identities to the surrounding community and asking, “Isn’t it terrible 

that these young people are acting illegally and bringing disgrace to the 

community and on their families?” The team leader stated the community 

backlash was swift and quickly motivated the hackers, who happened to be 

young adults and youth, to stop their hacking activities and return to “selling illegal pornography.”

The example described above is not an isolated case. This approach and 

technique has been used for many years within the hacker community itself. 

Persons perceived by the community as having violated some hacker norm 

are often exposed by other hackers. The practice is so common that those 

persons (and groups) seeking vengeance even have a nickname (they are 

sometimes referred to as “blue hat” hackers) within the hacker community.480 Criminal enterprise hackers also have been noted to expose rivals. It 
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is reasonable to speculate whether adapting the strategy of exposure as a 

modified element in counter-ISIS operations might produce similar modifications in behaviors, particularly for those sympathizers who may not yet 

fully embrace the tenants of the group. Terrorism expert Yannick VeilleuxLepage, from University of St. Andrews, writes:

In order to frame its message, IS has developed a range of exceptionally professional and sophisticated communication and social media 

initiatives that are exceptionally easy to access and highly attractive 

to their audiences, including publishing eBooks and eMagazines and 

professionally edited videos produced by al-Furqan and al-Hayat.

481

Veilleux-Lepage further writes that an amateur grade of sympathizers is 

also vital to ISIS messaging success, indicating:

This extensive reliance on unaffiliated sympathizers either re-tweeting or re-posting content produced and authorized by IS leadership 

has ‘no clear precedent’ and thus can be seen as a groundbreaking 

paradigm shift in the evolution of jihadism in cyberspace. This 

reliance on unaffiliated sympathizers was clearly exemplified on 

the day Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of the 

Caliphate; IS began circulating pictures of his speech before a video 

of the speech was uploaded several times on YouTube. The links to 

these YouTube videos were then uploaded on the widely popular file 

sharing website justpaste.it by agents for IS’ official media groups 

prior to being tweeted by IS to tens of thousands of sympathizers.482

ISIS propagandists can be described as taking two general forms: the 

more professional grade, often widely separated from the battlefield; and the 

more amateur, unaffiliated sympathizers, many of whom can be described 

as “jihobbyists”483 or “eHadis,”484 who help crowd source jihad, and are 

perhaps as motivated as the professional class of propagandists to never 

actively participate in actual combat. Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, of British think-tank Demos, describe these sympathizers as being on “the edge 

of violence.”485 There is, however, a third category of sympathizer, markedly 

rarer, but more potentially dangerous to USSOCOM operations: individuals 

who initially participate in crowd sourcing propaganda activities, but then 

move toward the battlefield.
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The messaging success of ISIS can therefore be described as chain mail 

in which linkages are interwoven, and thus widely dispersed, so as to create 

a figurative propaganda garment to “cover the world.” In this model, the 

professionals link to the amateurs, some of whom will seek mortal combat 

(and others who will not). Like chain mail, intact linkages are essential for 

the garment to be able to protect the heart and other vital organs. Breaking 

even a few links, particularly in vital areas, renders the chain mail not only 

useless, but a heavy burden that can be leveraged by the opponent seeking 

to slow the movement of his adversary.

A recent RAND report highlights the complex structure of these networks and also offers insight on the “who” and “how” of influencing them. 

Specifically, their analysis of approximately 23 million tweets that reference 

ISIS, identifies four major groups: ISIS supporters; Shia; Syrian mujahideen; 

and Sunni networks. Excluding the Sunni groups, which are fragmented 

largely along nationalistic lines, the authors suggest a moderate level of cohesiveness among the other three networks. To that end, counter-messaging 

directed towards ISIS supporters and opponents should take into account 

location and level of support. For example, the Syrian mujahideen network 

may serve as a conduit of sorts between ISIS supporters and moderate Sunnis. 

This point highlights the necessity of targeting messaging at the appropriate 

tribal, community, or national level as appropriate.486

USSOCOM, other combatant commands, and the intelligence community are, of course, currently exploiting social media connectivity to target 

ISIS and other affiliated groups. Given the sensitivity, the specific mechanisms are well beyond the scope of this document. Suffice it to say human 

intelligence, open-source intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and other types of intelligence are being used in some combination 

to create an intelligence picture of the “who” and “where.” The open press 

has gained a very cursory knowledge that this type of social media exploitation is taking place.487 What is not being transmitted is the sources and 

methods, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) being utilized, 

which must always be guarded.

A question emerges as to whether the TTP could remain guarded, while 

the intelligence garnered is used purposely for a different effect. If so, should 

the United States stop targeting the message altogether and instead focus 

entirely on the messenger? To some degree, this outing of identities has 

already begun amidst the freedom and the chaos of the internet. Andrew 
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Emett, writing for The Free Thought Project.com, described the exposure of 

ISIS identities:

Disillusioned with ISIS leadership, a whistleblower within the terrorist organization just released the identities of 22,000 jihadis hailing 

from at least 51 countries, including the U.S., U.K., and Canada. 

Stolen from Islamic State’s [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] internal 

security, the detrimental memory stick contains tens of thousands 

of documents, including a personal 23-question form each jihadi 

was required to fill out before induction into ISIS.488

Furthermore, another cyber vigilante group, called Cyber of Emotion and 

based in Saudi Arabia, allegedly hacked into email accounts of purported ISIS 

sympathizers, discovered their identities, many of whom they claim were 

women in relationships with jihadis, and looked for sensitive information. 

They then transmitted the sensitive information to Saudi security forces and 

reported accounts to Twitter for banning. “We targeted them specifically 

to try to stop their dangerous and deviant ideas from spreading in Saudi 

society.”489

The previous example touches upon an important point that is receiving 

an increasing amount of attention in relation to our understanding of ISIS 

and its activities, namely the role(s) of women within the organization. Broad 

estimates suggest that approximately one in five Western recruits to ISIS are 

female. Media accounts tend to suggest women’s participation is related to 

gender roles: they are enamored by male fighters (and accounts of their activities) and/or they are seeking husbands. Regardless, these depictions suggest 

the roles of females are dictated by—and should 

be viewed in terms of traditional gender roles 

within Islam.490 However, a growing number of 

scholars contend otherwise, stating these oversimplified depictions reflect more the gendered 

lens through which ISIS is viewed rather than 

the roles themselves. It is an exaggeration to view female participation as 

personal (as opposed to political or religious), or to characterize them as 

“cheerleaders” for or victims (of males).491 To the contrary, females typically 

join and become involved with ISIS for the same and varied reasons as do 

males, including a sense of identity and belonging, agreement with ideological tenets (e.g. establishing a caliphate), or as a reaction to perceived or real 

Broad estimates suggest 

that approximately one 

in five Western recruits 

to ISIS are female.
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discrimination—individual or collective—against Muslims. In addition to 

being valuable recruiters and conduits for dissemination of information, there 

are multiple examples where females take on an active role in violent acts.492

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Chapter 7. Conclusion 

The literature on terrorism, insurgency and IW indicates that terrorists 

and insurgent groups that utilize violence for political ends usually base 

their movement on popular support, legitimacy, ideology, and local grievances. This is true of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS who highlight 

Muslim grievances to justify their use of violence.493 They claim to represent 

those marginalized groups and fight for their redemption and dignity. While 

a majority of Muslims reject these apocalyptic self-styled groups that claim to 

represent Muslims, there is a target audience that has proved susceptible. The 

key is to find out who this minority audience is, that supports this kind of 

violence, and work towards limiting their influence by connecting the silent, 

‘usually neutral’ majority with the minority audience who visibly opposes 

these terror groups and their activities especially in areas where they have 

established presence.494 Usually, this requires security guarantees from CT 

forces as people living in conflict areas are motivated by ‘self-preservation’ 

and suffer from high stress.495 The primary goal of terrorist groups like ISIS 

is to undermine the legitimacy of the state, promote disorder and establish 

control over the target population in the short term towards meeting their 

long-term goals of establishing their own state structure. As seen from the 

chapters in this monograph, the strategy adopted by ISIS is to coerce, persuade, and intimidate the population to support its political causes. This ISIS 

operationalized, by running parallel governments, visibly broadcasting its 

presence, and threatening the population via its armed presence with dire 

consequences if support is not enlisted.496 ISIS framed its movement within 

well-known apocalyptic Islamic literature of end-times, and portrayed the 

idea of their caliphate as offering the space where the Messiah or Mahdi will 

emerge. To this end, ISIS captured strategically inconsequential towns like 

Dabiq in Syria, as it finds mention in apocalyptic literature as the site where 

“Western crusaders” will be defeated.497

The rapid takeover of territory by ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2014, its secretive organizational structure, and its goal of establishing a sharia-based state, 

or caliphate, marked the entry of a new type of territorially oriented terror 

group. Heavily influenced by AQI, led by al-Zarqawi, in terms of tactics and 

visible demonstrations of violence, including the beheading of foreigners 
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on video, ISIS went on to develop a propaganda strategy that streamed its 

videos and speeches to millions.498 Unlike al-Qaeda, who had a long-term 

goal of targeting the West, ISIS aimed to take on more near-term enemy—

namely, the Shia community and those who 

did not adhere to its interpretation of Islam. 

Also unlike al-Qaeda who broadcasted its 

audio and video tapes through networks like 

Aljazeera,499 ISIS produced its own films, short 

documentaries, and audio narratives of what 

an Islamic state should look like, and then 

utilized social media to disseminate its videos 

and imagery. ISIS has utilized its online presence to reach out to Muslims across the world, 

especially from the West, by calling them a 

‘chosen few from distant lands’500 and cleverly 

using British or Canadian Muslims to describe life in the caliphate as normal, 

prosperous, and a religious paradise. In one of the videos, a Canadian ISIS 

member describes how he enjoyed a normal life in Canada, earning good 

money and enjoying a good life, when the call of the caliphate, a religious 

obligation for all true Muslims, landed on his doorstep (i.e., laptop). Using 

Canadian or British English, such videos are aimed at susceptible Muslim 

youth in the West. And the impact has been felt with several youths, mainly 

in the 16 to 35 age group, traveling to the caliphate.

ISIS locates its discourse in a heady mix of sectarianism, apocalyptic 

narrative, longing for a caliph, and an attention to spreading their propaganda beyond Arab-speaking populations. ISIS magazines, videos, and audio 

discourses are available in several languages, and are easily accessible. The 

designs are slick and cater to the millennials’ sense of internet savviness. 

Significantly, ISIS leadership, as discussed in earlier chapters, are mostly 

drawn from Iraq, the seat of Sunni grievance, to include Saddam Husseinera military officers at the level of colonel and above. What this implies is 

that ISIS brings to the table years of military training, survival tactics, local 

networks, and the experience that these officers gathered while sustaining 

Hussein’s authoritarian regime. The fusion of intoxicating religiosity, heavily based on the life and sayings of the Prophet, social media campaigns, 

Qur’anic singing, ancestry, ethnicity, and military culture all fused together 

to deliver to ISIS the quick success it enjoyed when it rolled into Syria and 

The rapid takeover of 

territory by ISIS in Iraq 

and Syria in 2014, its 

secretive organizational 

structure, and its goal 

of establishing a shariabased state, or caliphate, 

marked the entry of a 

new type of territorially 

oriented terror group.
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Iraq. The civil war in Syria only helped matters for ISIS, especially when 

coupled with the Assad regime’s own focus on ensuring that it does not 

become another victim of regime change in the Middle East, as was the fate 

of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.501

Moreover, while al-Qaeda has established subgroups for different territories, it has not established a caliphate. ISIS established a caliphate and then 

released a map in which it identified territories, including some examined 

in this monograph like Bangladesh, Burma, India and Indonesia, to which 

it aimed to expand its presence and domain. Towards this end, ISIS utilized 

the idea of Khorasan, historically viewed as the golden age of Islam. This 

belief is based on Hadith in Sunan at-Tirmidhi 2269 that black banners will 

rise from Khorasan and then spread to the Mecca and Jerusalem, cities with 

deep seated religious significance in Islam. ISIS envisions an end-times battle 

in India (Ghazwa-e-Hind) between true believers and unbelievers. With ISIS 

losing territory in Iraq and Syria, there are concerns that ISIS will aim to 

expand to Afghanistan, and then through its Khorasan province into South 

and Southeast Asia. This is based on its “remaining and expanding” goals. 

ISIS aims to spread physically to Bangladesh, Burma, India and Indonesia. 

ISIS aims to spread physically to Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Indonesia. Table 2 on page 112 summarizes the ISIS perception of opportunities 

in these four countries, along with each country's strengths and threats 

vulnerabilities. In recent years, violent attacks have been registered against 

secular bloggers, and foreigners with ISIS claiming responsibility specifically 

for those targeting foreigners. ISIS locates Bangladesh in its ‘The Revival of 

Jihad in Bengal’ manifesto and warns that it will use Bangladesh as a base 

for further expansion into Burma and India. The rising intolerance in the 

country to include the growing political chasm between the AL and the 

BNP over the targeting of JI leaders in a criminal investigation by the AL 

government, creates a vicious atmosphere of division and hate. Organizations 

like the ICS whose goal is to establish sharia law in Bangladesh, have been 

accused of instigating violence against secular bloggers. The matter gets further complicated by the fact that while the Bangladesh constitution includes 

secularism as one of its principles, its state religion is Islam. Both ISIS and 

AQIS aims to spread to Bangladesh, taking advantage of divisions within the 

country. The Bangladesh government denies the existence of ISIS within its 

territory blaming local terror groups for the growing violence. The weak state 

presence in rural areas of Bangladesh could provide some ground for ISIS 
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expansion but that can be deterred with effective intelligence and shoring 

up state presence. Areas of vulnerability could be Rohingya refugee camps, 

as well as the Cox Bazar area, infamous for its illegal small arms factories 

and as a conduit for the flow of illegal small arms, given its proximity to the 

Golden Triangle.502 The U.S. and Bangladesh issued a joint statement in 2016 

that identified the shared threat posed by ISIS and al-Qaeda and Bangladesh 

is a participant in the U.S. Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. USSOCOM 

and Bangladesh could work within that framework to share intelligence. Of 

special relevance is ISIS usage of apps like Viber, We-chat and Whatsapp 

to share its ideology and recruit volunteers for its cause. Bangladesh lacks a 

skilled regulatory system to monitor these activities efficiently. International 

partnerships can augment this capacity. 

Burma has witnessed growing violence against its Rohingya community from its majority Buddhist population. Rohingya Muslims are denied 

citizenship despite living in Burma for generations, and most have fled the 

violence in recent years to seek refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. In the new 

democratic structure, the NLD has failed to offer 

representation to this community thereby rendering them voiceless. Muslims accuse the NLD of 

compromising with democratic principles, while 

anti-Muslim sentiments are raked up by Buddhist 

monks like Asin Wirathu. Both ISIS and al-Qaeda 

noted the Rohingya crisis, and pledged to fight on 

their behalf. The Rohingya Muslims have armed 

groups like HaY and the RSO claiming to fight on 

their behalf. HaY has attacked the Tatmadaw and the BGP bringing about 

a massive counterinsurgency operation that has been accused of massive 

human rights violation. There are concerns that Rohingya Muslims could 

fall for ISIS propaganda and recruitment. This view is strongly countered 

by Wakar Uddin, director-general of Arakan Rohingya Union, who believes 

that linking the Rohingya crisis to ISIS is a deliberate attempt to distract 

international attention from the humanitarian crisis underway. In addition, 

Rohingya Muslims follow a moderate Sunni Islam, and practice Sufism. Puritanically extreme Islam of ISIS holds little appeal. Furthermore, the areas 

that ISIS aims to spread in Burma harbor strong ethnic armed insurgencies 

like the Was and Kachins. This will pose a severe threat to ISIS presence. 

Of special relevance 

is ISIS usage of apps 

like Viber, We-chat 

and Whatsapp to 

share its ideology 

and recruit volunteers for its cause.
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

ISIS’s aims to occupy territory in India via Pakistan and Afghanistan, by 

first establishing bases in these two countries and then adopting a strategy 

of attrition vis-à-vis India. It aims to collaborate with Indian terror groups 

like IM, AuT, and JKH. ISIS cites the 2002 Gujarat riots, the issue of Kashmir and treatment of Muslims in a Hindu majority India as causes for its 

expansion into India. ISIS mocks Indian Muslims for peacefully co-existing 

with Hindus (kuffar) and tries to instigate them to carry out terror attacks 

in India. In a May 2016 video, ISIS pledged to fight for Muslims in Assam, 

Kashmir, and Gujarat. ISIS mocked Indian Muslim clerics for standing up 

to their extreme tactics and designated them infidels. In March 2017. ISIS 

launched its first terror strike in India injuring 10 passengers by setting off a 

bomb on a train. The chapter on India specifies four factors that have limited 

ISIS appeal in India; its representative political structure; its social fabric of 

diversity that infuses together several cultures and creates societal harmony; 

the issuance of fatwas (legal decrees) by influential Indian Muslim Ulema

against ISIS; and a web of CT agencies and ‘Special Forces’ that have worked 

to limit terrorism. Two key areas of vulnerability in India are regions that 

have a weak state presence as well as the rising tide of Hindu nationalism.503

Indonesia views its fight against ISIS in ideological terms, a battle between 

moderate and radical Islam, with its version of moderate Sunni Islam offering 

a fitting counter to ISIS. Despite this, ISIS still attempts to spread its presence 

in Indonesia. ISIS Indonesian leaders like Bachrumsyah Mennor Usman, 

Bahrun Naim, and Gigih Dewa operated from Iraq and Syria. Bachrumsyah 

was appointed by al-Baghdadi as leader of ISIS Southeast Asia battalion 

called the Katibah Nusantara. However, major Indonesian terror groups like 

JI views ISIS as a rival. Moreover, Indonesian civil society organizations like 

NU and Brotherhood Forum of Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars 

has rejected ISIS ideology and instead preaches an Islam based on pluralism, 

tolerance, and socioeconomic development. Indonesian political institutions are based on democratic values and Muslims are well represented. 

Former Presidents like Abdurrahman Wahid played an instrumental role 

in accepting the country’s diversity as part of Pancasila principles of peaceful co-existence.504 Special CT units like Detachment 88 have succeeded in 

thwarting ISIS inspired plots. The unit has benefited from assistance from 

the U.S. and Australia towards training and intelligence sharing. It is critical 

to persistently counter ISIS messaging in the cyber domain, given the fact 

that it is perhaps the most advanced cyber-battlefield messaging adversary. 
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JSOU Report 18-6

With battlefield losses, especially in its declared caliphate, ISIS is losing its 

power of invincibility that attracted thousands of foreign recruits. This message should be sent to the target audience by U.S. regional partners in the 

Middle East through online platforms in regional languages. It is perhaps 

important to know who are hard-core ISIS fighters and who are fair-weather 

patriots in order to intelligibly decide direct 

operational action against the hard-core. 

Hacking into accounts of ISIS sympathizers 

can reveal effective intelligence. Moreover, 

the role of women in ISIS, mostly depicted 

as based on gender roles within Islam, and 

affected by personal feelings, is highly exaggerated. More often than not, women join ISIS 

for the same reasons men do; agreement with 

its ideological doctrines, a shared sense of identity, and in reaction to perceived or real discrimination against fellow Muslims. Through the cyber 

domain, ISIS now transcends borders like al-Qaeda.

Eradicating the ISIS threat requires a five-pronged strategy. First, it 

requires a ground-based military effort that eradicates its bases, thereby 

activating an ‘area denial’ strategy. ISIS’s core appeals are its territory and 

the caliphate; deny those and they lose much of their appeal. This area 

denial strategy will have to consist of simultaneous military response and 

enhanced civilian governance: establishing a state structure where Muslims, 

both Sunni and Shia, believe they are adequately represented. This aspect is 

particularly significant given ISIS loss of territory to an international coalition in recent months. Terror groups, that are weakened, usually tend to 

lie low, merge into the civilian population and then regroup at a later date. 

Consequently, it is pertinent for USSOCOM along with partner nations to 

help improve partner capacity in governance. 

Second, it is critical to publicly question ISIS’s interpretation of Islam by 

utilizing the Qur’an. Indonesian and Indian Muslim elders have effectively 

activated such a strategy and it has had a social impact especially in countering ISIS social media strategy. This could form part of ‘countering the 

messenger’ strategy as part of USSOCOM-partner nations collaboration, 

either bilaterally or through a multilateral forum. 

Third, broadcast the internal divisions within ISIS, and expose the poor 

conditions when it governed. Exposing the so-called paradise for what it 

It is critical to persistently 

counter ISIS messaging in 

the cyber domain, given 

the fact that it is perhaps 

the most advanced cyberbattlefield messaging 

adversary. 
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

is, is critical. In this, ISIS defectors play a critical role, as their stories have 

greater credibility than a campaign run by USSOCOM. 

Fourth, connect the CT efforts against ISIS into a single grid. The battle 

to defeat ISIS took so long due to the mixed purposes and fractious relationships of those who were fighting against it. For example, the Turkish military 

and the Kurdish peshmerga did not get along, the Russians attacked Syrian 

rebel forces that fought ISIS, and there were divisions and much misinformation in rebel camps. It’s a complex battlefield and greater effort will 

definitely help future CT efforts. CT cooperation—including joint training 

efforts, intelligence assessments, and strategic planning, especially with those 

countries identified by ISIS as future areas of operation—will help thwart 

any capability ISIS develops in establishing terror networks. 

A goal of USSOCOM is to analyze and successfully respond to ISIS 

attempts to spread terror across borders. Within the domain of CT and 

COIN, understanding the manner in which ISIS creates networks in countries outside of its caliphate in Iraq and Syria offers useful insights not only to 

break those networks, but to also create awareness in the U.S. of similar ISIS 

efforts. ISIS utilizes the same strategy in the West, where it aims to motivate 

Western citizens to join the caliphate and then carry out attacks in its name 

in their countries of origin, as it does in India. The more ISIS loses territory 

in Iraq and Syria, the more likely it is that the group will quickly draw upon 

this sort of non-state strategy. It is therefore critical to be prepared for that 

metamorphosis is bound to happen sooner than later.
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JSOU Report 18-6

Table 2. ISIS Perception of Opportunity, Country's Strengths, and Country's Threat Vulnerability Ctry

ISIS Perception of 

Opportunity

Country’s Strengths Country’s Threat 

Vulnerability

Bangladesh

HIGH

1. Divisive Politics

2. Growing Intolerance and 

Societal Radicalization

3. Local Presence of 

Affiliated Terror Groups

MODERATE TO HIGH

1. Democratic Institutions

2. Strong Military Presence

3. Trained Special Forces

4. Free Media

5. Presence of Moderate Islam

HIGH

1. Multiple Terror Attacks 

2. Weak State Presence in 

Rural Areas

3. Porous International Borders

4. Flow of Illegal Small Arms

5. Weak Internet Regulation

6. Unification of Radical Groups 

7. Reach of ISIS Social Media

Burma

LOW

1. Rohingya Muslim Crisis

2. Increase in Armed 

Rohingya Groups

3. Muslims not Represented 

in Democratic Institutions

4. Highlighted in ISIS Online 

Discourses

MODERATE

1. Rohingya Muslims not 

Attracted to ISIS

2. Moderate Islam

3. Strong Military

4. Multiple Ethnic NSAGs 

Present in Areas ISIS Aims 

to Establish Presence

5. Buddhist Majority

MODERATE TO HIGH

1. Porous International Borders

2. Conduit of Illegal Small Arms

3. Weak State Presence in 

Rohingya Areas

4. Lack of Institutions to 

Salvage Rohingya Muslim 

Grievance

5. Reach of ISIS Social Media

India

HIGH

1. Part of Wilayat Khorasan, 

Included in Apocalyptic 

Islamic Literature 

2. India Central to ISIS 

Perception of the Rise 

of a Mahdi During 

End-times, as Referred in 

Ghazwa-e-Hind

3. 1992 Babri Masjid 

Demolition, the 2002 

Gujarat Riots and 

Kashmir

4. Affiliated Local Groups

HIGH

1. Secularism as Mentioned 

in Preamble to Indian 

Constitution

2. No State Religion

3. Strong Armed Forces

4. Growing Economic Strength

5. Indian Muslim Organizations 

Reject ISIS

6. Inclusive Local Democratic 

Structures

MODERATE

1. Rise in Hindu Nationalism

2. Weak State Presence in 

Rural Areas

3. Porous International Borders

4. Lack of Networked 

Infrastructure in Conflict 

Affected Areas

5. Reach of ISIS Social Media

Indonesia

HIGH

1. Establishment of ISIS 

Southeast Asia Battalion

2. Affiliated Local Terror 

Groups

3. Ability to Infiltrate Society

4. Presence of Radical 

Sunni Islam

HIGH

1. Inclusive Democratic 

Institutions

2. Strong Armed Forces 

Including Special Forces

3. Rejection of ISIS by Powerful 

Civil Society Organizations

4. Strong Presence of CounterReligious Narratives

MODERATE

1. Ability to Orchestrate Terror 

Attacks

2. Porous International Borders

3. Presence of Radical Schools 

like Al-Mukhim

4. Allegiance Given by 

Influential Former JI Spiritual 

Leader, Abu Bakr Bashir

5. Reach of ISIS Social Media
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

Acronym List 

AAMSC All-Arakanese Monks’ Solidarity Conference

ABT Ansarullah Bangla Team

AL Awami League

AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq

AQIS al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent

ARSA Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army

AuT Ansar ut-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind

BGP Border Guard Police

BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COIN counterinsurgency

CT counterterrorism

CVE combating violent extremism

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FID foreign internal defense

FPI Islamic Defenders Front [Front Pembala Islam]

HaY Harakah al-Yaqin

HeI Hefazat e-Islam

HuJI Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami

ICG International Crisis Group

ICS Islami Chhatra Shibir

IM Indian Mujahideen
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JSOU Report 18-6

IS Islamic State

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

IW irregular warfare

JAD Jamaah Ansharut Daulah

JI Jemaah Islamiyah

JeM Jaish-e-Muhammad

JKH Junud al Khalifa-e-Hind

JKLF Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

JMB Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh

JTJ Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad

LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba

MHA Ministry of Home Affairs

MISO military information support operations

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

NIA National Investigation Agency

NLD National League for Democracy

NSAG non-state armed group

NSG National Security Guard

NU Nahdlatul Ulama 

PSYOP psychological operations

RNDP Rakhine Nationalities Development Party

RSO Rohingya Solidarity Organization

SOF Special Operations Forces

SP Sinai Province
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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UWSA United Wa State Army 

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Goswami: ISIS 2.0

Endnotes 

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2016, accessed 6 November 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2016/12/02/one-year-after-san-bernardino-police-offer-a-possiblemotive-as-questions-still-linger/?utm_term=.80ba8eacc587.

3. Shimon Prokupecz et al., “Note Found Near Truck Claims Manhattan Attack 

Done for ISIS, Source Says,” CNN, 6 November 2017, accessed 6 November 2017, 

http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/31/us/new-york-shots-fired/index.html.

4. Thomas Jocelyn, “The Terrorist Diaspora: After the Fall of the caliphate,” FDD’s 

Long War Journal, 13 July 2017, accessed 6 November 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/07/the-terrorist-diaspora-after-the-fall-of-thecaliphate.php.

5. Jocelyn, “Diaspora.”

6. Hugh Kennedy, Caliphate: The History of an Idea (New York: Basic Books, 2016); 

Sami Moubayed, The Mind of the Islamic State (Carlton: Redback Quarterly, 

2015); Lawrence Wright, The Terror Years: From al Qaeda to the Islamic State 

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7. Jacob Wirtschafter and Karim John Gadiaga, “Africa Becomes New Battleground 

for ISIS and al-Qaeda as they lose Ground in Mideast,” USA Today, 25 October 2017, accessed 7 November 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/

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EN.pdf.

10. Michael Andregg, “Some Comparisons with End Times Thinking Elsewhere 

and a Theory,” Comparative Civilization Review 75, no. 13 (2016), 96–105; J.M. 

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http://theconversation.com/how-isis-terrorists-neutralise-guilt-to-justifytheir-atrocities-66593.

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13. Kumar, “Apocalypse, Iconoclasm, and ISIS,” 7–10.

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Defence Chiefs,” The Guardian, last modified 22 August 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/21/isis-us-military-iraq-strikes-threat-apocalyptic; 

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the Islamic State Movement,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 3 (June 2017), 

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The New York Times, last modified 26 May 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/

interactive/2016/05/26/world/middleeast/isis-taxes-fines-revenue.html?mcubz=1.

16. Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Raqqa, ISIS ‘Capital’ Is Captured, U.S. Backed 

Forces Say,” The New York Times, 17 October 2017, accessed 6 November 2017, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/middleeast/isis-syria-raqqa.html.

17. Tim Lister, “Islamic State 2.0: As the caliphate Crumbles, ISIS Evolves,” CNN, last 

modified 3 July 2017, accessed 12 April 2018, http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/22/

europe/isis-2-0/index.html.

18. Tim Lister et al., “ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries have Killed 

2,043,” CNN, last modified 11 February 2017, accessed 12 April 2018, http://www.

cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html.

19. “UK Raises Threat Level to Critical as ISIS Claims Responsibility for London 

Attacks”, CBS, 15 September 2017, accessed 12 April 2018, https://www.cbsnews.

com/news/uk-raises-threat-level-critical-isis-responsibility-london-attack/.

20. CBS, “Threat Level.”

21. Riyadh Mohammed, “Islamic State Expands: Up to 100,000 People have 

Joined, Experts Say,” Mashable, last modified 26 August 2014, accessed on 

12 April 2018, http://mashable.com/2014/08/26/100000-people-join-islamicstate/#41fWQj1iDSqs.

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12 April 2018, http://time.com/4816005/indonesia-islamic-state-isis/; Richard 

C. Paddock, “He Aimed to Fight in Syria. ISIS Had a Broader Plan: Southeast 

Asia,” The New York Times, last modified 3 September 2017, accessed 12 April 
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2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/asia/isis-fighters-philippinesindonesia.html?mcubz=1.

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last modified 23 January 2016, accessed 12 April 2018, http://www.atimes.com/

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https://clarionproject.org/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/.

The URL is to the clarion project that announced they’ll be linking to Dabiq and 

Rumiyah magazines. The site for Rumiyah is: https://qb5cc3pam3y2ad0tm1zxuhho-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Rumiyah-ISISmagazine-10-issue.pdf.

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An Interview with Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman,” Georgetown Journal of 

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fact-sheet-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-levant-isil.

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of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesperson (website), Washington D.C., 22 

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isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/. There have been a number of open 

press articles about the ongoing ISIS social media battles, in many cases, concluding the messaging war has been lost by the West. Speaking about the message or 

“brand” created by ISIS following the murder of 14 people in San Bernardino, 

California, by Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik, Koerner writes: “That message, 

like so many other pieces of Islamic State propaganda, was crafted not just to 

stir the hearts of potential recruits but also to boost the organization’s ghastly 

brand—to reinforce Westerners’ perception of the Islamic State and its devotees 

as ruthless beyond comprehension. All terrorist groups seek to cultivate this kind 

of image, of course, because their power derives from their ability to inspire dread 

out of proportion to the threats they actually pose. But the Islamic State has been 

singularly successful at that task, thanks to its mastery of modern digital tools, 

which have transformed the dark arts of making and disseminating propaganda.”

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470. Alarid, “Recruitment and Radicalization.”

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their droves—many crashing their vehicles in their desperation to flee,” The Sun, 18 

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com/middle-east-news/1.664853. A total of 45 ISIS militants were reportedly 

killed by some type of unidentified poison, following a claimed introduction of 

it into food being used for an iftar meal during Ramadan. Although confirmed 

claims of responsibility occurred, Kurdish forces at the time indicated this event 

could have occurred as the result of deliberate poisoning or, alternatively, food 

poisoning. Chris Ghee, “A Dozen ISIS Fighters Killed After Chefs Infiltrate 

Camp and Poison Terrorists’ Lunch,” Mirror Online, 8 November 2014, accessed 

12 April 2018, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/dozen-isis-fighterskilled-after-4590573. In November 2014, 12 ISIS fighters at the Fath El-Sahel 
155

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camp were killed by poison, placed in food by rebels of the Syrian Free Army 

posing as cooks.

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2016, accessed 12 April 2018, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/10/04/isisleader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-reportedly-poisoned.html; Thomas Burrows, “ISIS 

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al-Tunsi was a Tunisian jihadi and senior commander, who was killed in a drone 

strike as he traveled through northern Syria. “The fear of informants has fueled 

paranoia among the militants’ ranks. A mobile phone or internet connection can 

raise suspicions. As a warning to others, ISIL has displayed the bodies of some 

suspected spies in public—or used particularly gruesome methods, including 

reportedly dropping some into a vat of acid.”

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of action adversaries take to achieve their goals. The Kill Chain has been used 

in a variety of ways. One of its most important uses is in detailing the phases 

of individual intrusions, extracting indicators for each phase and identifying 

patterns across multiple intrusions. Defenders can combine key indicators, 

such as the human aspect of intrusions, and related intrusions into a grouping 

representing an adversary’s campaign.”

479. Lee and Lee, “The Who, What, Where,” 9. “The Diamond Model of Intrusion 

Analysis directly complements this kill chain analysis. It is often used for generating intelligence, as opposed to the consumption of it ... The Diamond Model 

helps analysts structure indicators observed in the Cyber Kill Chain to define 

and understand adversary campaigns. This ability to group intrusions into campaigns allows threat hunters to counter adversaries’ efforts over long periods of 

time instead of countering single intrusions.”

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156

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at West Point, in his 2008 book. Brachman used the term to describe al-Qaeda 

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General Hawk Carlisle, commander of Air Combat Command, speaking at the 

Air Force Association, is quoted as saying, "These guys that are working down 

at Hurlburt (Florida), they're combing through social media. And they see some 

moron standing at this command and control capability for Da'Esh, ISIL. These 

guys go, 'ah we got an in ... Long story short ... three JDAMS take the entire 

building out.”

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