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FEDERAL EFFORTS TO MITIGATE VULNERABILITIES 

IN THE FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING 

THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 24, 2007 

Serial No. 110–59 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


Congress.#13
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

VACANCY 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

JESSICA HERRARA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

AL GREEN, Texas 

VACANCY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JACOB OLCOTT, Director & Counsel 

DR. CHRIS BECK, Senior Advisor for Science & Technology 

CARLA ZAMUDIO-DOLAN, Clerk 

DR. DIANE BERRY, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 

Cybersecurity, and Science: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 

Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 36 

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 40 

The Honorable Marcy Kaptur, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Ohio ................................................................................................................... 38 

WITNESSES

PANEL II 

Dr, David Acheson, Assistant Commissioner, Food Protection, U.S. Food and 

Drug Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Mr. Dan Baldwin, Assistant Commissioners, Office of International Trade, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 28 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 30 

Dr. Carol Maczka, Assistant Administrator, Office of Food Defense and 

Emergency Response, Food Safety Inspection service: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16 

Preapred Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

Dr. Tom McGinn, Chief veterinarian and Director, Food and Agriculture 

Security, Office of Health Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

PANEL II 

Dr. Craig Henry, Senior Vice President, Chief Operating Officer, Scientific 

and Regulatory Affairs, Grocery Manufacturers Association and Food Products Association .................................................................................................... 61 

Mr. Shaun Kennedy, Deputy Director, National Center for Food Protection 

and Defense, University of Minnesota—Twin Cities Campus: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 47 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 49 

Page

IV 

Dr. Allen Mathys, Vice President for State and Federal Regulations, Grocery 

Manufacturers Association and Food Products Association: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 63 

Dr. Lee M. Myers, State Veterinarian, Assistant Commissioner of Animal 

Industry, Georgia Department of Agriculture: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 54 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 56 

APPENDIX

Additional Questions and Responses: 

Responses from Dr. David Acheson .................................................................... 71 

Responses from Dr. Craig Henry ........................................................................ 90 

Responses from Dr.Tom McGinn ........................................................................ 91 

Responses from Dr. Lee M. Myers ...................................................................... 96 

(1) 

FEDERAL EFFORTS TO MITIGATE 

VULNERABILITIES IN THE FOOD 

SUPPLY CHAIN 

Tuesday, July 24, 2007 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, 

AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:21 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. James R. Langevin 

[chairman of the subcommittee], presiding. 

Present: Representatives Langevin, Christensen, Etheridge, 

Green, Kaptur, Thompson (ex officio) and McCaul 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The subcommittee will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to take testimony on Federal Efforts to 

Mitigate Vulnerabilities in the Food Supply Chain. 

Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for being here 

today. This hearing was originally scheduled, as you know, for last 

Thursday, but we had to postpone the hearing due to the HouseSenate Conference Committee on the 9/11 bill. So I appreciate the 

witnesses’ flexibility and patience, and I sincerely thank you all for 

coming back here today on what I know is a very important subject. 

Recent months have brought increased attention to 

vulnerabilities in the United States’ food supply chain. Today’s 

hearing will present us with both the public and private sector perspectives on how best to secure our food distribution networks. In 

the last year, we have witnessed food-borne illness outbreaks associated with spinach lettuce, and peanut butter, among others. This 

spring, incidents including the melamine contamination of vegetable proteins used in pet foods, the diethylene glycol contamination of toothpaste and drug residues in fish demonstrate how intentional food adulteration can pose a far greater challenge than unintentional contamination. 

Now, many of these incidents were traced back to problems associated with the Chinese food supply. And it is evident that China’s 

food and drug safety standards are often weak, poorly enforced or 

both, though I am encouraged by recent indications that China’s 

food and drug administration will be making their processes more 

transparent in order to ensure more stringent safety measures. 

Unfortunately, China isn’t the only problem country. Developing 

nations in Africa and parts of Latin America also have significant 

2 

food safety issues, and it would be shortsighted to place the blame 

on one country or one region. This is a global problem and has the 

potential to cripple the food supply throughout the United States. 

We are here today to figure out how, in working with both the private sector and public sector partners, we can mitigate 

vulnerabilities and secure our food supply chain here at home. 

Just as the Nation’s food sector is comprised of a variety of distinct businesses and operations, so, too, is the Federal Government’s effort in defending the food supply from intentional attacks 

and natural hazards. Now it is not an easy task, and there is a lot 

of work that we must complete, but we all understand what is at 

stake. 

Now I am reminded that, 100 years ago, Upton Sinclair’s investigation into the Chicago meatpacking plants led to the formation 

of the Food and Drug Administration in the United States. That investigation is still relevant today and demonstrates the need for 

transparency in ensuring the safety of these systems. 

In fact, in 2004, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 to help achieve this goal. HSPD–9 establishes 

a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against 

terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. In March 

2005, the GAO identified confusion over the Department of Homeland Security’s role in agroterrorism. The GAO voiced concern that 

the agency hadn’t yet evolved into its leading role under Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 9. Though 2 years have passed, significant problems still remain. Now, as the DHS Office of the Inspector General reported in a February 2007 review of Homeland 

Security food defense activities, the enormity of the food sector and 

the complexity of government oversight pose substantial challenges 

to the food defense and critical infrastructure protection. The complexity of both systems has resulted in the recent publication of 

several reports critical of the bureaucracies associated with these 

efforts. 

In February 2007, GAO designated the Federal oversight of food 

safety as a high risk area for the first time. GAO found that a fragmented system, whereby 15 agencies collectively administer at 

least 30 laws related to food safety, causes inconsistent oversight, 

ineffective coordination and inefficient use of resources. This report 

found several management problems that reduced the effectiveness 

of the agencies’ routine efforts to protect against agroterrorism. For 

example, GAO noted that weaknesses in the flow of critical information existed among key stakeholders. 

Also, in February, the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General issued a record that found that DHS, USDA and 

HHS were failing to meet their obligations under HSPD–9 to prepare an integrated food defense plan. The Inspector General recommended that DHS pursue recruitment, hiring and retention of 

staff with expertise in matters of post-harvest food defense; work 

collaboratively with USDA and HHS on grants and other funding 

mechanisms to carry out food defense missions; and identify a single senior DHS official to be accountable for coordinated implementation of all DHS food sector responsibilities; and provide this official with clear authorities and adequate staffing to perform this 

function. 

3 

Now, I hope that the officials before us today can discuss their 

efforts to improve some of the issues that have been raised. The integrity of our Nation’s food supply is critical to our national, economic and health security. There is much work to be done to fully 

secure our food supply chain, and we must act swiftly to shore up 

the remaining vulnerabilities. That concludes my opening statement. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for the purpose 

of an opening statement. 

[The statement of Mr. Langevin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN, CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

GOOD MORNING. I’D LIKE TO THANK OUR WITNESSES FOR BEING HERE TODAY. THIS

HEARING WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR LAST THURSDAY, BUT WE HAD TO POSTPONE THE HEARING DUE TO THE 9/11 CONFERENCE, SO I APPRECIATE THE WITNESSES’ FLEXIBILITY AND PATIENCE AND I THANK YOU ALL FOR COMING BACK TO BE

HERE TODAY. 

Recent months have brought increased attention to vulnerabilities in the United 

States’ food supply chain. Today’s hearing will present us with both the public and 

private sector perspectives on how to best secure our food distribution networks. In 

the last year, we have witnessed food-borne illness outbreaks associated with spinach, lettuce and peanut butter, among others. This spring, incidents including the 

melamine contamination of vegetable proteins used in pet foods, the diethylene glycol contamination of toothpaste, and drug residues in fish demonstrated how intentional food adulteration can pose a far greater challenge than unintentional contamination. 

Many of these incidents were traced back to problems associated with the Chinese 

food supply. It is evident that China’s food and drug safety standards are often 

weak, poorly enforced or both, though I am encouraged by recent indications that 

China’s Food and Drug Administration will be making their processes more transparent in order to ensure more stringent safety measures. Unfortunately, China 

isn’t the only problem country. Developing nations in Africa and parts of Latin 

America also have significant food safety issues, and it would be short-sighted to 

place the blame on one country or in one region. This is a global problem, and has 

the potential to cripple the food supply throughout the United States. 

We are here today to figure out how—in working with both private sector and 

public sector partners—we can mitigate vulnerabilities and secure our food supply 

chain here at home. Just as the nation’s food sector is comprised of a variety of distinct businesses and operations, so too is the Federal government’s effort in defending the food supply from intentional attacks and natural hazards. 

It’s not an easy task, and there is a lot of work that we must complete, but we 

all understand what is at stake. I am reminded that, 100 years ago, Upton sinclair’s 

investigation into the Chicago meatpacking plants led to the formation of the Food 

and Drug Administration in the United States. That investigation is still relevant 

today and demonstrates the need for transparency in ensuring the safety of these 

systems. 

In fact, in 2004 the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 

(HSPD–9) to help achieve this goal. HSPD–9 establishes a national policy to defend 

the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies. In March 2005, GAO identified confusion over the Department of 

Homeland Security’s role in agroterrorism. The GAO voiced concern that the agency 

hadn’t yet evolved into its leading role under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD–9). though two years have passed, significant problems remain. 

As the DHS Office of the Inspector General reported in a February 2007 review 

of homeland security food defense activities, ‘‘the enormity of the food sector and the 

complexity of government oversight pose substantial challenges to food defense and 

critical infrastructure protection.’’ The complexity of both systems has resulted in 

the recent publication of several reports critical of the bureaucracies associated with 

these efforts. 

4 

In February of 2007, GAO designated the federal oversight of food safety as a 

high-risk area for the first time. GAO found that a fragmented system—whereby 15 

agencies collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety—causes inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. This 

report found several management problems that reduce the effectiveness of the 

agencies’ routine efforts to protect against agroterrorism. For example, GAO noted 

that weaknesses in the flow of critical information existed among key stakeholders. 

Also in February, the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General issued 

a report that found that DHS, USDA, and HSS were failing to meet their obligations under HSPD–9 to prepare an integrated food defense plan. 

The Inspector General recommended that DHS pursue recruitment hiring, and retention of staff with expertise in matters of post harvest food defense; work collaboratively with USDA and HHS on grants and other funding mechanisms to carry out 

food defense missions; and identify a single senior DHS food sector responsibilities, 

and provide this official with clear authorities and adequate staffing to perform this 

function. 

I hope that the officials before us today can discuss their efforts to improve some 

of the issues that have been raised. The integrity of our nation’s food supply is critical to our national, economic and health security. There is much work to be done 

to fully secure our food supply chair, and we must act swiftly to shore up the remaining vulnerabilities. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this hearing. I would like to start out by 

pointing out that the United States’ food supply is among the 

safest in the world. Still, public health officials estimate that over 

5,000 people die and many more get sick from food-borne illnesses 

each year. Recent incidents of nonterrorist-related food contamination, such as the E-coli outbreaks in produce and antibiotics in fish 

from China, show just how easy it would be for a terrorist to manipulate our food supply against us and to utilize it as a weapon 

of mass destruction. I don’t want to overstate the threat posed by 

terrorist attacks against food supply. In fact, there are very few recorded acts of intentional food contamination, I believe only two in 

the United States. But there is no question that the food supply 

chain is vulnerable, and I am not very confident that we are protecting this critical asset. 

The U.S. food and agricultural sector is comprised of more than 

2 million farms, approximately 900,000 firms and 1.1 million facilities, almost entirely under private ownership. This sector accounts 

for about 20 percent of the Nation’s economic activity, and we cannot afford to have consumer confidence undermined. Federal efforts 

to ensure the safety of our food supply have historically been fragmented. There are at least 30 different food safety laws and a 

patchwork of regulations administered by 15 different agencies. 

Subtle differences between food products can dictate which agency 

regulates it. For example, if a packaged ham sandwich is openfaced, it is regulated by the USDA. If it has two slices of bread, 

it is regulated by the FDA. That is almost comical when you think 

about it. 

What is needed here is a cross-agency perspective, one plan that 

provides a single framework to ensure that all agencies’ goals are 

complementary and reinforcing, not redundant. We can and must 

do better. There are some encouraging signs, including the recent 

establishment of DHS’s Office of Health Affairs and the consolidation of agriculture inspectors within Customs and Border Patrol’s 

overall antiterrorism mission. 

The focus of today’s hearing is on the food safety and food defense efforts. It is a sensitive topic, and I hope that we hear more 

5 

about what we are doing to enhance the protection of our food supply rather than on the vulnerabilities themselves. We certainly 

don’t want to advertise our specific vulnerabilities, so please consider this in your testimony. 

And with that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MCCAUL, RANKING

MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY

• The United States’ food supply is among the safest in the world. Still, public 

health officials estimate that over 5,000 people die (and many more get sick) from 

food borne illnesses each year. Recent incidents of non-terrorist related food contamination, such as the E. coli outbreaks in produce and the antibiotics in fish from 

China showed just how easy it would be for a terrorist to manipulate our food supply against us and to utilize it as a weapon of mass destruction. • Yesterday I traveled back to Washington from my home district in Texas via 

airplane. Like many other Members of Congress I travel by plane frequently, either 

back and forth from my district or on House business. And every time I board an 

aircraft I think of 9/11 and of the potential danger of air travel posed by terrorists 

to myself and my family. Now imagine that feeling of apprehension every single 

time you pick up your fork to eat dinner or drink a glass of milk. It would change 

the way we live. • I don’t want to overstate the threat posed terrorist attacks against the food supply. In fact there are very few recorded acts of intentional food contamination (and 

only 2 in the US). And an attack on the food supply does not have the explosive 

effect of an incident like 9/11 or a nuclear bomb that is typically associated with 

groups like al-Qa’ida. • But there is no question that the food supply chain is vulnerable—and I am not 

so confident that we are protecting this critical asset. The U.S. Food and Agriculture 

Sector comprises of more than 2 million farms, approximately 900,000 firms, and 

1.1 million facilities, and is almost entirely under private ownership. This sector accounts for about 20% of the Nation’s economic activity when measured from inputs 

to tables of consumers at home and away from home. We cannot afford to have consumer confidence undermined. 

• I am concerned when I hear the terms ‘‘inconsistent oversight’’, ‘‘ineffective coordination’’, and ‘‘inefficient use of resources,’’ associated with the Federal Government’s handling of food and agriculture defense activities. We MUST and we CAN 

do better. 

• The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned DHS the lead coordination responsibility for protecting the Nation against terrorist attacks, including agroterrorism. 

Subsequent homeland security presidential directives provide more detailed guidance. DHS was assigned this coordinating role because Federal efforts in this area 

have historically been fragmented. There are at least 30 different food safety laws 

and a patchwork of regulations administered by 15 agencies. With such a fragmented approach, I question whether the government can really provide useful guidance to the private sector in protecting the food supply chain? Subtle differences in 

a food products presentation result dictate which agency regulated the product. For 

example, if a packaged ham sandwich is open-faced, it is regulated by the USDA; 

if it is a closed sandwich (2 sliced of bread as opposed to one, FDA is the regulating 

agency. 

• DHS is admittedly somewhat late to the game in its efforts to protect the Nation’s food supply as the other leading agencies with missions in this area, FDA and 

USDA, have long histories of protecting the Nation’s food products. But there was, 

and still is, a lack of coordination between those two agencies. For example, USDA 

and FDA each provided to DHS separate Food and Agriculture Sector Specific 

Plan(s) to fulfill the National Infrastructure Protection Plan—that is two separate 

plans for the same sector. What is needed here is a cross agency perspective, one 

plan that provides a single framework to ensure all agencies’ [USDA, FDA, DHS] 

goals are complementary and reinforcing, not redundant. 

• We are encouraged with the recent establishment of DHS’ Office of Health Affairs. The Secretary’s designation of this Office as the single focal point for internal 

and external coordination on the Department’s food and agriculture responsibilities 

demonstrates that this sector is starting to get recognition as critical infrastructure 

that needs protecting. 

• The challenges posed by food defense are not easy. I don’t want to give the impression that I think protecting this critical infrastructure will take simple physical 

6 

security measures such as that we use to secure chemical facilities and nuclear 

power plants. Food is not a fixed asset. It moves into and across the country rapidly 

so it can be eaten before it perishes without enough time to detect whether there 

has been contamination. There are several opportunities whether in manufacturing, 

processing, packaging, or transit for would-be terrorists to gain access to products 

and introduce harmful agents. 

• A positive example that shows how DHS can contribute to reducing fragmentation and compartmentalization is their effort to consolidate the agriculture inspector 

function within Customs and Border Patrol’s overall antiterrorism mission. There 

are 131 million conveyances entering this country every year and with the volume 

of trade continuing to increase dramatically, CBP is best positioned to meet the agriculture inspection demands. CBP has developed a sophisticated, streamlined and 

efficient process to identify and target high risk shipments which is being applied 

to identify high risk agriculture shipments. Although when the agriculture inspection function transferred from USDA to DHS, there certainly were cultural and 

managerial differences to overcome, they have been overcome with the support of 

both agencies. Now they are focused on strengthening CBP’s capability to apply 

their automated targeting and risk analysis techniques to agriculture. Transferring 

the inspector function back to USDA would be a step in the wrong direction back 

toward an inefficient and fragmented approach to safeguarding the Nation’s imported goods. USDA would have to rebuild capacity and create a new capability to 

automatically target high risk agriculture goods, rather than leverage mechanisms 

employed by CBP. 

• DHS and our Committee need to engage stakeholders in the agriculture community, and establish direct relationships with those stakeholders and regularly solicit 

input. As I learned in drafting H.R 1717, which authorizes the National Bio—and 

Agro-Defense Facility, it is critical to engage the private sector and state and local 

officials in the policy discussions. Doing so will build trust between the homeland 

security and agriculture communities and facilitate information sharing that is in 

the best interest of the Nation. 

• Which brings me to my last point. The focus of today’s hearing is on food safety 

and food defense efforts. It is a sensitive topic. I hope today what we hear is more 

about what the Federal and State governments and the private sector are doing to 

enhance the protection and defense of our food supply, than on the vulnerabilities 

themselves—which have been mentioned in certain press pieces recently. We certainly don’t want to advertise our specific vulnerabilities so please consider this in 

giving your testimony. . . 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for the purposes of an opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I would like to begin by 

thanking the distinguished chairman for reconvening the previously postponed hearing today. The theme of this hearing is extremely fitting, given the circumstances this past year, where our 

Nation has had to deal with issues of pet food, spinach, peanut butter and, more recently, bans on toothpaste and even the FDA ban 

on seafood products. The major threat to the food agriculture sector 

is a crisis of confidence, where a poorly prevented or recognized 

event causes people to question the safety of food regionally or nationally. The time to address whether our food infrastructure is designed to mitigate our abilities is before an occurrence and not 

after the fact. 

We have been extremely fortunate that our agriculture has been 

safe, but we have got work to do if we want to be more secure. Currently, 15 agencies collectively administer at least 30 laws related 

to food safety, causing ineffective oversight, inefficient coordination 

and inconsistent agency leadership. 

One concern I look forward to hearing our witnesses address 

today is the current agency leadership structure in place in the 

event of a food-borne emergency. HSPD–9 sets out to address this 

by establishing the Department of Homeland Security as having 

7 

the lead role in policy coordination in an event of national significance. However, a recent GAO report says that USDA is not planning for DHS to assume the lead coordinating role if an outbreak 

among poultry occurs that is sufficient in scope to warrant a Presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster, or a DHS 

declaration of an Incident of National Significance. Such an inconsistency in planning perpetuates the confusion of who is in charge. 

I look forward to the second panel, comprised of industry, academic 

and State agricultural officials, giving us a more local perspective 

of what uncoordinated efforts mean for our communities. Further, 

I look forward to discussing State and industry involvement 

throughout all of the coordinating and planning. Reports indicate 

that they do not have the ability and information to fulfill their assigned roles in protecting agriculture. 

Though I am pleased to hear that strides have been made in 

CARVER + Shock technology in hardening our infrastructure 

against an international attack, technology is only as good as its 

application. Unless the relevant agencies begin to take HSPD–9 a 

step further, the United States will lack a coordinated national approach to protect against agroterrorism, possibly resulting in gaps 

and needless duplication of effort. By overcoming these challenges, 

the United States will be in better position to protect against and 

respond to a food-borne disease outbreak, whether natural or intentional. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

The theme of this hearing is extremely fitting given the circumstances this past 

year, where our nation has had to deal with issues of pet food, spinach, peanut butter, and more recently bans on toothpaste, and even the FDA ban of seafood products. 

The major threat to the food agriculture sector is a crisis of confidence, where a 

poorly prevented or recognized event causes people to question the safety of food regionally or nationally. The time to address whether our federal infrastructure is designed to mitigate vulnerabilities is before an occurrence and not after the fact. We 

have been extremely fortunate that our agriculture has been safe, but we’ve got 

work to do if we want to be more secure. 

Currently, 15 agencies collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety, causing ineffective oversight, inefficient coordination, and inconsistent agency 

leadership. One concern I look forward to hearing our witnesses address today, is 

the current agency leadership structure in place in the event of a food-borne emergency. 

HSPD–9 sets out to address this by establishing the Department of Homeland Security as having the lead role in policy coordination in an event of national significance. However, a recent GAO report says that USDA is not planning for DHS to 

assume the lead coordinating role if an outbreak among poultry occurs that is sufficient in scope to warrant a presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster, or a DHS declaration of an Incident of National significance. 

Such an inconsistency in planning perpetuates the confusion of who’s in charge. 

I look forward to the second panel—comprised of industry, academic and state agriculture officials—giving us a more local perspective of what uncoordinated efforts 

mean for our communities. Furthermore, I look forward to discussing State and industry involvement throughout all of the coordination and planning. Reports indicate that they do not have the ability and information to fulfill their assigned roles 

in protecting agriculture. Though I am pleased to hear that strides in 

CARVER+sHOCK technology have been made in hardening our infrastructure 

against an intentional attack, technology is on as good as its application. 

Unless the relevant agencies begin to take HSPD–9 a step further, the United 

States will lack a coordinated national approach to protect against agroterrorism, 

8 

possibly resulting in gaps or needless duplication of effort. By overcoming these 

challenges, the United States will be in a better position to protect against and respond to a food-borne disease outbreak, whether natural or intentional. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the Chairman. 

Other members of the subcommittee are reminded, under the 

rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record. Before 

I turn to the panel. I ask unanimous consent that the gentlelady 

from Ohio, Ms. Kaptur, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing. 

I thank her for her attendance. Under the committee rules, Ms. 

Kaptur will be recognized for questions after the committee members. 

I think it is appropriate to recognize here that Ms. Kaptur serves 

on the Appropriations Subcommittee of Agriculture, Rural Development, and Food and Drug Agencies, and actually introduced H.R. 

2997, the Assured Food Safety Act of 2007, that would require a 

seal approval of imported foods coming into the country by seal of 

approval by USDA or FDA. And I was proud to cosponsor the legislation with the gentlelady. So I ask unanimous consent she be allowed to participate in the hearing. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ACHESON, M.D., F.R.C.P., ASSISTANT 

COMMISSIONER FOR FOOD PROTECTION, FOOD AND DRUG 

ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Without objection, I welcome the first panel of 

witnesses. 

Our first witness is Dr. David Acheson, Assistant Commissioner 

of Food Protection, Food and Drug Administration, at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Dr. Acheson provides advice and counsel to the Commissioner on strategic and substantive 

food safety and food defense matters. Dr. Acheson has published 

extensively, and is internationally recognized both for his public 

health expertise in food safety and his research in effective diseases. 

Welcome, Dr. Acheson. 

Our second witness, Dr. Carol Maczka, is the Assistant Administrator, Office of Food Defense and Emergency Response, Food Safety Inspection Service, at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Dr. 

Maczka has more than 20μyears of experience in the field of risk 

assessment. 

Our third witness, Dr. Tom McGinn, Office of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security. Dr. McGinn is the Director of Veterinary and Agriculture Security for the Office of the Chief Medical 

Officer. In his position, he is responsible for internal and external 

coordination of DHS veterinary and agricultural programs. 

Welcome to you as well. 

Our fourth witness is Dan Baldwin, Assistant Commissioner, Office of International Trade, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Baldwin’s office directs the 

national trade policy and national trade program functions at CBP 

and provides uniformity and clarity for the Department of CBP’s 

national strategy to facilitate legitimate trade. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. 

9 

I want to welcome the panel here. Thank you for your testimony 

and your presence. And I now recognize each witness to summarize 

his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Dr. Acheson. 

Dr. ACHESON. Good morning, Chairman Langevin, and members 

of the subcommittee. I am Dr. David Acheson, Assistant Commissioner for Food Protection of the FDA. 

FDA appreciates the opportunity to discuss our food defense activities, and I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from 

the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Agriculture. 

The Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Dr. Andrew von 

Eschenbach, recently appointed me to the new position of Assistant 

Commissioner For Food Protection. My first priority in this position 

is to develop a new strategy for the integration of food safety and 

food defense that will address changes in the global food safety and 

food defense system, identify our most critical needs and serve as 

a framework to help us address the challenges we face. 

Food safety and food defense continue to be top priorities for this 

administration. A terrorist attack on the food supply could have 

both severe public health and economic consequences, while damaging the public’s confidence in the food we eat. To promote the 

safety of imported products, last week the President established an 

interagency working group to review the procedures, regulations 

and practices that are in place to make sure that imported food 

and other products are safe. Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt will chair this working group. FDA will play 

a key role in the group’s activities. The group expects to report 

back to the President within 60μdays with its recommendations. 

At FDA, ensuring the products we regulate are safe and secure 

is a vital part of our public health mission. The agency regulates 

everything Americans eat, except meat, poultry and processed egg 

products, which are regulated by USDA. A great deal has been 

done in the past few years to enhance the safety and defense of the 

food supply in the United States. FDA has worked with other Federal, State, local, and tribal food safety agencies, as well as law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies, and with industry to 

significantly strengthen the Nation’s food safety and defense systems across the entire distribution chain, from farm to table, to 

better protect our food supply against deliberate and accidental 

threats. This cooperation has resulted in greater awareness of potential vulnerabilities, the creation of more effective prevention 

programs, new surveillance systems, and the ability to respond 

more quickly to outbreak of food-borne illness. 

FDA is working closely with DHS and other Federal agencies to 

implement the President’s Homeland Security Presidential Directives. The HHS and USDA Secretaries, or their designees, exercise 

key responsibilities as food-sector-specific agencies. DHS serves as 

the coordinator of the food agriculture sector with the Government 

Coordination Council. HHS and USDA serve as co-leads for the 

food sector, and USDA serves as the lead for the agriculture sector. 

With the close working relationship of FDA and USDA and the 

other government and industry collaborators, the Food and Agriculture Sector activities to protect critical infrastructure have set 

the organizational and operational standard for other critical infraVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
10 

structure sectors. DHS recently released our sector-specific plants. 

To implement HSPD–9, FDA has been involved in numerous activities. 

For example, to increase lab surge capacity, FDA, in coordination 

with USDA, established the Food Emergency Response Network, or 

FERN, to include a substantial number of Federal, State and local 

labs that are capable of analyzing large numbers of food samples 

for agents of concern. At present, the FERN network includes 134 

laboratories, representing all 50 States and Puerto Rico. FDA has 

also developed an online food defense awareness training course in 

partnership with USDA. We have completed 13 vulnerability assessments as part of the strategic partnership program on 

agroterrorism. FDA has also conducted or provided funding for food 

defense research activities and participated in numerous emergency response exercises. In our food defense activities, FDA works 

closely with our State partners. For example, earlier this year, 

FDA conducted a Food Defense Surveillance Assignment for FDA 

and USDA personnel and participating State and local authorities 

to conduct food-defense-related inspections and reconciliation 

exams, and to collect and analyze samples of food products. 

This year, FDA, in cooperation with CDC, USDA and State and 

local organizations representing food, public health and agricultural interests, initiated the ALERT awareness program. It provides a uniform and consistent approach to food defense awareness 

at any point in the supply chain, from farm to retail. ALERT identifies five key points that industry and businesses can use to decrease the risk of intentional food contamination at their facility. 

In 2003, FDA issued guidance on the security measures the food 

industry may take to minimize the risk that food will be subject 

to tampering or other malicious or terrorist actions. FDA issued a 

general guidance entitled, Food Producers, Processors and Transporters: Food Security Preventive Measures, and a number of others. 

Also in 2003, FDA began using the CARVER+Shock analytical 

tool to perform vulnerability assessments. FDA’s approach has 

been to seek voluntary, mutually beneficial partnerships with various segments of the food industry. We have completed such cooperative assessments with segments of the regulated industry. The 

CARVER+Shock method to determine the vulnerability of individual food facilities to biological, chemical or radiological attack 

has resulted in the development of a software tool now available 

free of charge on the FDA’s Web site. In conclusion, due to the enhancements being made by FDA and other agencies, and due to the 

close coordination between the Federal and State food safety, public health, law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies, the 

United States food defense system is stronger than ever before. 

Although we have made progress, we are continuously working 

to improve our ability to prevent, detect and respond to terrorist 

threats. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss FDA’s food defense activities. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The statement of Dr. Acheson follows:] 

11 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID ACHESON, M.D., F.R.C.P. 

INTRODUCTION 

Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Dr. 

David Acheson, Assistant Commissioner for Food Protection at the Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA or the Agency) which is part of the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS or the Department). I am pleased to be here today with my 

colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department 

of Agriculture (USDA). FDA appreciates the opportunity to discuss our food defense 

activities. 

A great deal has been done in the past few years to enhance the safety and defense of the food supply in the United States. FDA has worked with other Federal, 

state, local, and tribal food safety agencies, as well as with law enforcement and 

intelligence-gathering agencies, and with industry to significantly strengthen the 

nation’s food safety and defense system across the entire distribution chain, from 

farm to table, to better protect our food supply against deliberate and accidental 

threats. This cooperation has resulted in greater awareness of potential 

vulnerabilities, the creation of more effective prevention programs, new surveillance 

systems, and the ability to respond more quickly to outbreaks of foodborne illness. 

The Office of Management and Budget and the relevant food safety agencies are collaborating on ways to most effectively address issues raised in the Government Accountability Office’s designation of Federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk 

item in February 2007. 

Food safety and food defense continue to be top priorities for this Administration. 

A terrorist attack on the food supply could have both severe public health and economic consequences, while damaging the public’s confidence in the food we eat. The 

changes in food defense that we have been implementing in the last few years are 

fundamental enhancements. 

The Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Dr. Andrew von Eschenbach, recently appointed me to the new position of Assistant Commissioner for Food Protection. My 

first priority in this position is to develop a new strategy for the integration of food 

safety and food defense that will address changes in the global food safety and food 

defense system, identify our most critical needs, and serve as a framework to help 

us address the challenges we face. The goal is to ensure a comprehensive and robust 

food safety and food defense program that is tailored to meet the risks posed by the 

types of foods we regulate and that focuses on prevention, ensures compliance with 

preventive controls, and rapidly responds when contaminated food or feed is detected, or when there is possible risk to humans or animals. 

In my testimony today, I will first briefly describe HHS’ role in counterterrorism 

activities. Then, I will discuss our collaborative activities with our food safety and 

defense partners. I will also describe some of FDA’s food defense activities to enhance protection of the food supply. 

HHS’ ROLE IN FOOD–RELATED COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES 

Under the President’s National Response Plan, HHS leads Federal public health 

activities to ensure an integrated and focused national effort to anticipate and respond to biological weapons, emerging diseases, and other threats. HHS is also the 

principal Federal agency responsible for coordinating all Federal-level assets activated to support and augment the State and local medical and public health response to mass casualty events. 

FDA is the Federal agency that regulates all of the food we eat except for meat, 

poultry, and processed egg products, which are regulated by our partners at USDA. 

FDA also is responsible for ensuring that human drugs, human biological products, 

medical devices, and radiological products as well as veterinary drugs are safe and 

effective and that cosmetics are safe. 

FDA’s primary mission is to protect the public health. Ensuring that FDA-regulated products are safe and secure is a vital part of that mission. While performing 

our mission, we play a central and a leadership role in the nation’s defense against 

terrorism. First, terrorists could use an FDA-regulated product, such as food, as a 

vehicle to introduce biological, chemical, or radiological agents into the U.S. stream 

of commerce. Second, FDA-regulated products, such as human drugs, vaccines, tissues, blood, blood products, and medical devices, as well as veterinary drugs, will 

play a central role in preventing or responding to human and/or animal health concerns created by an act of terrorism. It is HHS’s goal, with FDA working closely 

with other HHS agencies and other Federal agencies, and with State, local, and tribal governments, industry, and the public, to reduce the likelihood that an FDA-regulated product could be used to poison or otherwise harm Americans. We also help 

ensure that the nation’s public health system is prepared to deter a potential threat 

and is ready to respond to an act of terrorism. 

12 

By way of background, although FDA has the lead responsibility within HHS for 

ensuring the safety of food products, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC) has an important complementary public health role. As the lead Federal 

agency for conducting disease surveillance, CDC monitors the occurrence of illness 

in the U.S. attributable to the entire food supply. The disease surveillance systems 

coordinated by CDC provide an essential early-information network to detect dangers in the food supply and to reduce foodborne illness. 

COLLABORATION WITH FOOD SAFETY AND FOOD DEFENSE PARTNERS 

In its food safety and defense efforts, FDA has many partners—Federal, State, 

local, and tribal agencies, academia, and industry. FDA is working closely with our 

Federal partners such as USDA, DHS, the Homeland Security Council at the White 

House, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to have the best information possible and to 

be prepared to act as needed. I also want to emphasize FDA’s close working relationships with its sister public health agency, CDC, with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in DHS, and with USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). 

Some of our many Federal partners include USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), USDA’s Foreign Agriculture Service, USDA’s Agricultural 

Research Service, USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service, Department of the Army Veterinary Services Activity, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Treasury’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau. 

FDA’s activities in a public health emergency are coordinated through the HHS 

Secretary’s Operations Center. This relationship facilitates communication among 

all HHS Operating Divisions, the Department, and other Federal agencies and departments, including DHS. FDA also has worked closely with the Interagency Food 

Working Group of the White House Homeland Security Council on three initiatives—development of a national network of food laboratories, identification of 

vulnerabilities and subsequent mitigations for commodities of concern, and the development of a national incident management system. Further, FDA worked in partnership with EPA, USDA, DHS, and the Department of Defense (DoD) to describe 

general Federal roles and responsibilities for decontamination and disposal in response to animals, crop, and food incidents. 

In addition, FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) maintains professional 

relationships with domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies as well as the intelligence community so that it can receive and act on any information regarding 

the intentional contamination of FDA-regulated products. OCI has a specialized 

counterterrorism staff with the clearances, capabilities, and backgrounds to analyze 

information from law enforcement and intelligence community agencies and to assist those agencies in conducting terrorism-related threat assessments involving 

FDA-regulated products. OCI has agents assigned to selected FBI Terrorism Task 

Forces throughout the United States. 

FDA is working closely with DHS and other Federal agencies to implement the 

President’s Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). The Secretary of 

DHS is responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key resources of the nation, including food and 

agriculture defense. The President has issued HSPD–7,–8, and)—9, which identify 

critical infrastructures, improve response planning, and establish a national policy 

to defend the agriculture and food systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, 

and other emergencies. Among other things, HSPD–9 calls for the development of 

a National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS). FDA and CDC participate in NVS Steering 

Committee activities. 

The HHS and USDA Secretaries or their designees exercise key responsibilities 

as food sector-specific agencies. DHS serves as the coordinator of the Food and Agriculture Sector within the Government Coordination Council (GCC). The GCC is 

charged with coordinating agriculture and food defense strategies, activities, and 

communication across government and between the government and the private sector partners. 

Within the GCC, HHS and USDA serve as co-leads for the food sector, and USDA 

serves as the lead for the agriculture sector. The Food and Agriculture Sector is a 

public-private partnership that combines expertise from several Federal agencies 

(FDA, USDA, EPA, DoD, Department of Commerce, Department of the Interior, and 

the Department of Justice) as well as that of state, local, and tribal officials (representing agriculture, public health, and veterinary services), and the private sector 

(more than 100 trade associations and individual firms participate). As part of the 

HSPD–7 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) development, FDA and 

USDA developed sector-specific plans with input from states and the private sector. 

13 

DHS recently released the sector specific plans. With the close working relationship 

of FDA and USDA and the other government and industry collaborators, the Food 

and Agriculture Sector activities to protect critical infrastructure have set the organizational and operational standard for other critical infrastructure sectors. DHS 

has applauded the Food and Agriculture Sector’s organizational structure, consensus 

building, and the steps it has taken to improve food defense. 

FDA also is working closely with our state partners to enhance food defense. For 

example, earlier this year, FDA conducted a Food Defense Surveillance Assignment 

for FDA and USDA personnel and participating state and local authorities to conduct food defense-related inspections and reconciliation examinations (to verify the 

accuracy of declarations in the shipping documents by comparing them with the actual products) and to collect and analyze samples of food products that may have 

an elevated risk for intentional contamination. The activities in this exercise were 

planned in cooperation and collaboration with USDA and a number of organizations 

representing state and local interests including the Association of American Feed 

Control Officials, Association of Food and Drug Officials, Association of Public 

Health Laboratories, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, National 

Association of County and City Health Officials, National Association of Local 

Boards of Health, National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, National Environmental Health Association, and United States Animal Health Association. The purpose of this assignment was to deter intentional contamination of food 

through heightened and targeted preventive activities at various points in the food 

supply and to test the system for responding to an increased risk from food so that 

gaps in the system can be identified and addressed. This assignment enhanced multiple Federal, state, and local government agencies’ preparedness for a future threat 

involving an FDA-regulated product. Since that time, FDA has issued a Protein Surveillance Assignment (PSA) to increase food defense awareness and assess the safety of the human food and animal feed supply following the finding of contaminated 

vegetable protein concentrate coming into the country from China. FDA continues 

to further integrate our food defense activities into our food safety work. 

In addition, FDA and CDC have collaborated with the Council of Association 

Presidents to develop a nationwide food defense awareness training program. This 

Council, which consists of ten of the major state and local public health and regulatory professional associations, has an outreach capability to reach virtually all 

state and local public health officials. The training program, which began in March 

2006 with a satellite downlink nationwide broadcast, has helped to raise food defense awareness at the local, state, and Federal levels. This program is now available for streaming download on the website of FDA’s Center for Food Safety and 

Applied Nutrition. 

Now, I would like to describe some of FDA’s other food defense activities. 

INDUSTRY GUIDANCE AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES 

This year, FDA, in cooperation with CDC, USDA, and state and local organizations representing food, public health, and agriculture interests, initiated the 

ALERT awareness program. It provides a uniform and consistent approach to food 

defense awareness at any point in the supply chain, from farm to retail establishment. 

ALERT identifies five key points that industry and businesses can use to decrease 

the risk of intentional food contamination at their facility: They are: 

• A. How do you ASSURE that the supplies and ingredients you use are from 

safe and secure sources? 

• L. How do you LOOK after the security of the products and ingredients in 

your facility? 

• E. What do you know about your EMPLOYEES and people coming in and out 

of your facility? 

• R. Could you provide REPORTS about the security of your products while 

under your control? 

• T. What do you do and who do you notify if you have a THREAT or issue 

at your facility, including suspicious behavior? 

We have prepared ALERT materials in several languages and offer training on 

the ALERT system on our website that is suitable for state, local, and industry 

stakeholders. 

In 2003, FDA issued guidance on the security measures the food industry may 

take to minimize the risk that food will be subject to tampering or other malicious, 

criminal, or terrorist actions. FDA issued a general guidance entitled ‘‘Food Producers, Processors, and Transporters: Food Security Preventive Measures.’’ The 

guidance is designed as an aid to firms that produce, process, store, re-pack, relabel, distribute or transport food or food ingredients. In addition, we have issued 

14 

specific security guidance for the milk industry, for importers and filers, for retail 

food stores and food service establishments, and for cosmetic processors and transporters. During domestic inspections and import examinations, FDA’s field personnel, as well as our state counterparts, continue to hand out and discuss these 

guidance documents. 

To help reduce the risk of an attack on the food supply, FDA and our partners 

at USDA developed a web-based food security awareness training program entitled, 

‘‘Protecting the Food Supply from Intentional Adulteration: An Introductory Training Session to Raise Awareness.’’ The training is directed at individuals who play 

an important role in defending our nation’s food from attack: Federal, state, local, 

and tribal food-industry regulators; school food authorities; and nutrition assistance 

program operators and administrators. Representatives from the food industry and 

individuals essential in responding to a food emergency due to an intentional attack—such as law enforcement, public health, and homeland security officials—also 

are encouraged to participate in the training program. The program is available to 

any interested individuals free of charge. 

VULNERABILITY AND THREAT ASSESSMENTS 

FDA’s risk-based approach to food defense helps the Agency determine where to 

focus its resources. As part of its efforts to anticipate threats to the food supply, 

FDA has conducted extensive scientific vulnerability assessments of different categories of food, determining the most serious risks of intentional contamination with 

different biological or chemical agents during various stages of food production and 

distribution. FDA’s initial assessment utilized an analytical framework called Operational Risk Management (ORM) that considers both the severity of the public 

health impact and the likelihood of such an event taking place. As part of this process, FDA has incorporated threat information received from the intelligence community. 

To validate our findings, FDA contracted with the Institute of Food Technologists 

to conduct an in-depth review of ORM and provide a critique of its application to 

food security. This review validated FDA’s vulnerability assessment and provided 

additional information on the public health consequences of a range of scenarios involving various products, agents, and processes. 

The ORM approach provided a high-level view of foods and agents that were of 

greatest concern. Since the completion of the ORM, FDA has undertaken more indepth vulnerability assessments of specific food commodities using a method called 

CARVER+Shock. This method uses processes adapted from techniques developed by 

DoD for use in assessing the vulnerabilities of military targets to asymmetric 

threats. Results of these updated assessments are being used to develop technology 

interventions and countermeasures, identify research needs, and provide guidance 

to the private sector. 

In 2003, FDA began using the CARVER+Shock analytical tool to perform vulnerability assessments to identify what an individual or group, intent on doing damage 

to the food and agriculture sector, could potentially do based on the person’s or 

group’s capability, intent, and past history. The CARVER+Shock methodology was 

modified under Homeland Security Council leadership for use in the food and agriculture sector by FDA, USDA, and DoD with coordination by DHS, CIA, and FBI. 

FDA’s approach has been to seek voluntary, mutually beneficial partnerships with 

various segments of the food industry. We have completed such cooperative assessments with segments of the regulated industry that involve bottled water, fluid 

dairy products, juice products, and infant formula. FDA also has collaborated with 

USDA to provide assistance to the USDA Food and Nutrition Service on the use of 

this analytical tool on specific commodities in the school lunch program. 

Since 2005, FDA has been part of a joint Federal initiative along with USDA, 

DHS, and the FBI called the Strategic Partnership Program on Agroterrorism 

(SPPA). The SPPA initiative is again using the CARVER+Shock tool and, through 

industry and state volunteers, is taking the tool to local venues. Local industry, FBI, 

DHS, FDA, USDA, State Departments of Health, and State Departments of Agriculture participate in these assessments. These assessments not only identify 

vulnerabilities in other food commodities but also build local infrastructure around 

food defense issues. The SPPA program will run for approximately two years and 

has a goal of completing 40–50 assessments during this period. The results from 

these assessments will be used to identify mitigation strategies and to focus food 

defense research questions. These assessments included yogurt, export grain, baby 

food—applesauce, frozen entrees/pizza, bottled water, fresh cut produce, apple juice, 

fluid milk processing, milk at retail, infant formula, flour, stadium retail food service, and animal feed. 

15 

Just last month, FDA released a new CARVER + Shock software tool to help processors, manufacturers, warehousers, and transporters in the food industry utilize 

the CARVER+Shock method to determine the vulnerability of individual food facilities to biological, chemical, or radiological attack. The software tool is available free 

of charge on FDA’s website. 

LABORATORY ENHANCEMENTS 

An additional step in enhancing our response capability is to improve our laboratory capacity. An important component of controlling threats from deliberate 

foodborne contamination is the ability to rapidly test large numbers of food samples 

that could potentially be contaminated for a broad array of biological, chemical, and 

radiological agents. To increase surge capacity, FDA has worked in close collaboration with USDA’s FSIS to establish the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) 

to include a substantial number of laboratories capable of analyzing foods for agents 

of concern. We are seeking to expand our capacity through agreements with other 

Federal and state laboratories. At present, the network includes 134 laboratories 

representing all 50 states and Puerto Rico. Participation continues to grow. Once 

it is operating at full capacity, FERN will encompass a nationwide network of Federal, state, and local laboratories working together to build the capacity to test the 

safety of thousands of food samples, thereby enhancing the nation’s ability to swiftly 

respond to a terrorist attack. 

Last fall, the FERN network proved to be a critical asset in the E. coli O157:H7 

outbreak associated with fresh spinach. FERN expanded our laboratory capacity to 

handle the large number of food samples being tested. In addition, FERN analysts 

worked closely with CDC’s Laboratory Response Network personnel to harmonize 

and approve a modified FERN method for detecting E. coli O157:H7 in spinach. This 

method allowed for substantially improved testing of spinach samples as it allowed 

for the detection of E. coli O157:H7 at lower levels. The FERN program also supplied the necessary reagents to the laboratories performing the testing. 

More recently, on April 30, 2007, FDA issued a domestic vegetable PSA, in conjunction with our state and local regulatory partners, to test a variety of protein 

concentrates commonly found in the U.S. food and animal feed supply for the presence of melamine. Eight State FERN laboratories are involved in the analysis of the 

samples being collected. 

IMPORTS 

To manage the ever-increasing volume of imported food shipments, FDA utilizes 

risk-management strategies in the review of foods that are being imported or offered 

for import into the United States. Currently, working with information submitted 

either through CBP’s electronic systems used for import entries or through FDA’s 

Internet-based Prior Notice System Interface, FDA screens shipments electronically 

before they arrive in the U.S. to determine if the shipment meets identified criteria 

for physical examination or sampling and analysis or warrants other review by FDA 

personnel. This electronic screening allows FDA to better determine how to deploy 

its limited physical inspection resources at the border on what appear to be higherrisk food shipments while allowing lower-risk shipments to be processed in accordance with traditional import procedures after the electronic screening. FDA is working to enhance its targeting ability by utilizing data from a much wider range of 

sources to inform our entry decisions. 

These are just a few of the many activities we have underway to enhance protection of the food supply. 

CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, due to the enhancements being made by FDA and other agencies 

and due to the close coordination between the Federal and state food safety, public 

health, law enforcement, and intelligence-gathering agencies, the United States’ food 

defense system is stronger than ever before. Although we have made progress, we 

are continuously working to improve our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to 

terrorist threats. 

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our food defense activities. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Acheson. I appreciate your testimony. 

The chair now recognizes Dr. Maczka to summarize your statement for 5 minutes. 

16 

STATEMENT OF CAROL MACZKA, PH.D., ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF FOOD DEFENSE AND 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE, FOOD SAFETY INSPECTION 

SERVICE, USDA 

Ms. MACZKA. Hello, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the 

issues of defending our food supply. I am Dr. Carol Maczka, Assistant Administrator for the Office of Food Defense and Emergency 

Response at USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service, FSIS. 

My office manages all food defense activities within FSIS and coordinates its activities through DHS, FDA, other Federal and State 

agencies as well as industry. FSIS is the public health agency in 

USDA responsible for ensuring that meat, poultry and egg products 

are safe, secure, wholesome and correctly labeled and packaged. Inspection personnel form the backbone of FSIS’s food safety system. 

FSIS has more than 7,000 inspectors at Federal meat, poultry and 

egg products plants and import establishments. FSIS also has program investigators nationwide who conduct food safety and food defense investigations and enforcement. Consistent with Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 9, the agency works with government and industry on improving awareness and warning systems, 

vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies, response planning 

and recovery, and research and development. FSIS uses a comprehensive system to ensure that imported meat, poultry and egg 

products are safe and secure. It includes an initial determination 

of the equivalence of a country’s inspection systems, on-site audits, 

and reinspection of all meat and poultry products coming into the 

United States. FSIS import inspectors ensure shipments are properly labeled and examined. Import surveillance offices conduct surveillance activities at ports and in commerce, and coordinate with 

other agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection. The agency 

also works with Customs’ National Targeting Center to develop 

rule sets for targeting high-risk shipments entering the country, 

and is moving forward on a system that will allow the sharing of 

import tracking data by FSIS, Customs, and DHS. 

FSIS and FDA co-chair the Food Emergency Response Network, 

FERN. It is a coordinated effort between Federal, State and local 

laboratories to provide ongoing surveillance, as well as detection 

and surge capacity for large-scale food-related events. The agency 

has developed specific procedures for sampling food, depending 

upon the threat level designated by DHS. The agency also engages 

in active surveillance through a series of food defense verification 

procedures that are performed daily in all FSIS-regulated facilities. 

The agency’s Consumer Complaint Monitoring System and national 

surveillance system monitors food-related consumer complaints, 

which assist the agency in identifying potential attacks on the food 

supply. FSIS has conducted food defense awareness training nationwide with State and local inspectors, and in cooperation with 

FDA with Federal agencies. FSIS has created and distributed 

model Food Defense Plans for use by meat, poultry and egg products facilities, and import establishments. These plans identify the 

types of preventive steps that establishments might take to minimize food defense risks. The agency has also held numerous workshops and Web casts on Food Defense Plans to reach out to small 

17 

plants. In the area of responding to food emergencies, FSIS has developed State response plans and conducted six exercises with industry and State and Federal agencies to test emergency response 

procedures. A total of 15 exercises are planned, which will take into 

account 50 States. FSIS also continues to enhance its readiness for 

a possible outbreak of avian influenza. The agency has conducted 

an exercise and developed a testing protocol for detecting high path 

avian influenza in poultry meat. 

In addition, FSIS has actively engaged its partners in developing 

pandemic plans. This spring, FSIS worked closely with FDA to respond to the discovery that some swine and poultry had been fed 

pet food scraps containing melamine. FSIS quickly ensured that 

swine and poultry were held under State quarantine or voluntarily 

by owners. A joint risk assessment concluded that the potential exposure to the public, even in the worst case scenario, was well 

below any level of public health concern. Subsequently, FSIS 

cleared animals on farms in question for inspection and processing. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss FSIS’s leadership role in protecting the food supply. We take pride in knowing 

that our Nation’s food supply is among the safest in the world, but 

we also realize that it is vital to continue to improve our system. 

I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The statement of Ms. Maczka follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAROL MACZKA, PH.D. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before 

you today to discuss the issue of defending our food supply system from farm to 

table. I am Dr. Carol Maczka, Assistant Administrator for the Office of Food Defense and Emergency Response at the United States Department of Agriculture’s 

(USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). 

The program area within FSIS that I lead is the Office of Food Defense and Emergency Response (OFDER), which manages all homeland security activities within 

FSIS. OFDER makes sure that policy makers, scientists, field staff and management are prepared to prevent and respond to any food security threat. OFDER develops and coordinates all FSIS activities to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from non-routine emergencies resulting from intentional and non-intentional 

contamination affecting meat, poultry, and processed egg products. OFDER also 

serves as the agency’s central office for homeland security issues and ensures coordination of its activities with the USDA Homeland Security Office, the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), the FDA, other Federal and State government agencies with food-related responsibilities, and industry. 

FSIS is the public health agency in the USDA responsible for ensuring that the 

nation’s commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe, secure, wholesome, and correctly labeled and packaged. FSIS is charged with administering and enforcing the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, the Egg Products Inspection Act, portions of the Agricultural Marketing 

Act, and the regulations that implement these laws. FSIS also ensures compliance 

with the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, which requires that all livestock be 

handled and slaughtered in a humane manner. The Agency is responsible for determining equivalence to Federal standards at the State level and among our foreign 

trading partners. 

FSIS plays a key role in the nation’s food safety system, which also includes agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services’ Food and Drug Administration as well as state, tribal and local food safety partners. FSIS works closely 

with these agencies and other partners to share information and protect public 

health. 

Our inspection program personnel form the backbone of FSIS’ public health infrastructure in laboratories, plants, and import houses throughout the country. FSIS 

has more than 7,600 inspectors and veterinarians in approximately 6,000 Federal 

meat, poultry, and processed egg product plants, and at approximately 130 import 

18 

establishments every day to prevent, detect, and respond to food-related emergencies. In fiscal year 2006, inspection program personnel performed antemortem 

and postmortem inspection procedures to ensure public health requirements were 

met in the processing of more than 46 billion pounds of livestock carcasses, almost 

57 billion pounds of poultry carcasses, and about 4.4 billion pounds of liquid egg 

products. 

In fiscal year 2006, FSIS inspection program personnel conducted more than eight 

million procedures to verify that establishments met food safety and wholesomeness 

requirements. In addition, during fiscal year 2006, approximately 3.9 billion pounds 

of meat and poultry and about 5.9 million pounds of egg products were presented 

for import inspection at U.S. ports and borders. FSIS also has Program Investigators nationwide who conduct food safety, food defense, and outbreak investigations 

and enforcements. 

The Agency also engages in active surveillance through a series of food defense 

verification procedures performed daily in all FSIS-regulated facilities. With a 

strong food safety verification system in place, FSIS has been focusing on fortifying 

existing programs with a greater emphasis on food defense and improving internal 

and external lines of communication, including the integration of the food defense 

system databases with the larger public health data infrastructure. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directives most relevant to our work are: • HSPD–5: Management of Domestic Incidents; • HSPD–7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection; • HSPD–8: National Preparedness; and especially • HSPD–9: Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food. 

HSPD–9 was signed on January 30, 2004, and establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 

other emergencies. It directs the Secretary of Agriculture to work with other Federal 

department and Agency leaders on improving awareness and warning systems, vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies, response planning and recovery, outreach and professional development, and research and development. 

FSIS uses a comprehensive system to ensure that imported meat, poultry, and 

processed egg products are safe and secure. It includes a thorough analysis of each 

country’s food laws and inspection systems to determine initial equivalence; on-site 

audits of each country’s food safety system to ensure equivalence is maintained; and 

port-of-entry inspection on all meat, poultry, and processed egg products coming into 

the United States. It is enhanced by FSIS’ Import Surveillance Liaison Officers, who 

conduct a broader range of surveillance activities at import facilities and in commerce, and serve as liaisons to improve coordination with other agencies like U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 

Every day, FSIS personnel are at U.S. ports, inspecting shipments as they come 

in and pulling out samples. The Agency focuses on stopping illegal shipments at 

their point of entry. When meat and poultry imports enter the United States, FSIS 

import inspectors ensure that each shipment is properly certified, examine each lot 

for general condition and labeling, and conduct reinspection as directed by a centralized computer system, the Automated Import Information System. Using protocols 

developed by FSIS with USDA’s Office of Inspector General and the Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), 111,000 pounds of ineligible product were 

detected and 1,766,050 pounds of product detained in fiscal year 2006 out of 9 billion pounds of meat and poultry and about 5.9 million pounds of egg products presented for import inspection at U.S. ports and borders. 

The Agency also worked with CBP’s National Targeting Center to develop rules 

for targeting high-risk, FSIS-regulated shipments entering the country. This effort 

included a two month pilot program in 2006 in which a total of 3,229 shipments 

were screened at two ports using the rule sets. The Agency is also moving forward 

on a system which will allow the sharing of import tracking data by FSIS, CPB, 

and DHS to further strengthen our ability to ensure the safety and security of imported meat, poultry and processed egg products through better and more rapid access to data on imports. 

FSIS is currently working with other Federal government agencies to integrate 

its International Trade Data Systems (ITDS) design requirements with the ePermits 

system developed by Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the 

larger Automated Commercial Environment under development by US Customs and 

Border Protection. Ultimately, these efforts would result in a Federal-government 

wide linkage of all inspection and border control data systems, meeting FSIS’ regulatory needs along with those of sister agencies. 

FSIS and FDA are leading the development of the Food Emergency Response Network, a joint effort of national, State, and local laboratories to provide ongoing surveillance and monitoring of food and to promptly respond to a foodborne illness outVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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break or intentional contamination that targets the Nation’s food supply. In addition, FERN is a critical source of data for the FSIS public health data infrastructure. 

FERN enables FSIS to utilize State and local laboratories in handling the numerous samples required to be tested in the event of an attack on the food supply, a 

natural outbreak, or even a hoax, involving a meat, poultry, or egg product. It is 

vital for the Agency to respond rapidly to such emergencies to not only protect the 

public’s health, but also to ensure public confidence in the safety of the food supply. 

The first line of this rapid response is the laboratories, which must be provided with 

training, methodology, and state-of-the-art laboratory equipment. 

FERN provides ongoing surveillance, as well as detection and surge capacity for 

large-scale food-related events. It enables not only the sharing of standardized 

methodologies and proficiency testing but also a secure electronic reporting system 

for lab results. Four Federal Labs and 18 existing State labs are currently under 

FSIS cooperative agreements. Additionally, FSIS has cooperative agreements targeting total of 25 State labs geographically located across the country. The FERN 

laboratories will eventually be proficient to screen for the same threat agents as 

Federal labs, some with capability to do confirmation testing. FSIS primarily focuses 

on microbiological agents with our partners at FDA focusing on chemical and radiological agents. 

Another example of interagency coordination and collaboration by FSIS is participation in the integrated consortium of lab networks developed by DHS. This consortium ensures coordination among Federal and State partners focused on both food 

and agriculture. The consortium ensures consistency of methods development, reporting of lab results and the sharing of lab results among all Federal and State 

partners. 

The Agency has developed specific procedures on monitoring and sampling to be 

taken depending on the threat level as determined by the DHS. The appropriate 

testing is based on vulnerability or risk-based assessments for selected domestic and 

imported food products, which allows the Agency to rank food products and potential 

contaminating agents in order of highest concern. The Agency’s enhanced Consumer 

Complaint Monitoring System (CCMS), a national surveillance system that monitors 

food-related consumer complaints which will eventually be integrated with other 

data systems, also assists in the Agency’s efforts to track potential attacks on the 

food supply. 

FSIS’ comprehensive and ongoing training and education efforts ensure that every 

FSIS employee fully understands their role in preventing, or responding to, an attack on the food supply. Food defense awareness training is also conducted at locations nationwide with State and local inspectors and in cooperation with other Federal agencies. Training courses were also developed in conjunction with the FDA; 

USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services; and the Department of Transportation (in development) to focus specifically on food defense for each agency’s respective workforce. 

FSIS has created and distributed model food security plans that meat, poultry 

and processed egg products facilities and import establishments can use to develop 

and implement a Food Defense Plan. These plans identify the types of preventive 

steps that establishments might take to minimize food security risks for products 

under their control. A simplified version of guidance on food defense plans was developed in consultation with industry trade groups. This guidance provides an easy 

three-step process which will result in a completed food defense plan. The Agency 

has also held numerous workshops and Webcasts on Food Defense Plans to reach 

out to as many small and very small plant owners and operators as possible; 

Webcasts specifically targeted to State officials; efforts to reach various targeted audiences, such as Spanish speakers and various industry and trade associations. 

As it is widely understood that the response to most large-scale food emergencies 

will be initiated at the State level, FSIS and FDA have worked with the National 

Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA) to develop, test, and implement an emergency response template. 

FSIS continues to enhance readiness for a possible outbreak of avian influenza. 

The agency’s goal is to ensure that all appropriate preparations are being made for 

the potential spread of the H5N1 strain of the virus to the United States, whether 

in birds or in humans. FSIS has also carried out a tabletop exercise on avian influenza with other Federal and State agencies, as well as industry and consumer 

groups. 

USDA is playing many important roles in this effort. The Department’s four-part 

approach to combating avian influenza includes limiting the spread of the virus 

overseas through international outreach. Second is educating the American public 

through a proactive campaign to inform without causing alarm. Third is USDA’s 

20 

and the Department of Interior’s aggressive surveillance program in partnership 

with States, which includes wild birds, live bird markets, backyard flocks and 

thanks to the cooperation of industry—testing of commercial flocks. The fourth aspect is to practice executing our response plan. As you may know, USDA has a long 

and successful history of dealing with highly pathogenic avian influenza. 

It should be noted, of course, that detection in birds does not signal the start of 

a human pandemic. This virus is not easily transmitted from person to person. Most 

human illnesses that we’ve seen overseas have resulted from direct contact with sick 

or dead birds. No human illnesses have been attributed to properly handled and 

cooked poultry. This is another area where FSIS and USDA have been actively engaged with our partners in government, industry and the consumer community to 

make sure concerns related to any possible pandemic are addressed before that ever 

happens. 

As part of its coordinated response plan with the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the Agency has developed a product testing protocol for 

detecting Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in poultry meat. In should be stressed, 

however, that cooking poultry to an internal temperature of 165 degrees kills all viruses and all other foodborne pathogens, including avian influenza. 

In fiscal year 2006, FSIS’ activities better prepared the Agency and its stakeholders to detect, respond, and recover from food-related emergencies. In the area 

of food defense, FSIS conducted about 1,200,000 daily food defense verification procedures in FSIS-regulated and State-inspected facilities. The Agency also conducted 

six tabletop exercises with stakeholders and other local, State, and Federal agencies 

to test and validate standard operating procedures and directives for responding to 

non-routine (emergency) incidents. A total of 15 tabletop exercises are planned, 

which will take into account all 50 states. 

In April and May of this year, FSIS worked together closely with FDA to respond 

to the discovery that some swine and poultry in the human food supply chain had 

been fed animal feed supplemented with pet food scraps that contained melamine 

and related compounds. FSIS and FDA alerted the public and investigated the 

source and extent of the situation. As soon as the situation arose, we also ensured 

that swine and poultry on farms known to have received or suspected of receiving 

contaminated feed that had tested positive for melamine and melamine-related compounds were held under State quarantine or voluntarily by the owners. After a risk 

assessment conducted by scientists from FSIS and FDA, in consultation with scientists from CDC, the Environmental Protection Agency and DHS, concluded the 

potential exposure to the public, even in a highly unlikely worst-case scenario, was 

250 times lower than the dose considered safe and therefore well below any level 

of public health concern, FSIS cleared the animals in question for inspection and 

processing. 

FSIS has also developed and implemented a series of FSIS directives (two of 

which have been updated thus far in fiscal year 2007) for each of the agency’s eight 

program areas that prescribe how protective measures defined by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, Homeland Security Advisory System are to be implemented. Directive 3 established a threat advisory system to effectively communicate 

the level of risk of a terrorist attack to the American people. It prescribes that agencies develop appropriate ‘‘Protective Measures’’ in response to each of the five threat 

levels established. The measures developed by FSIS include active surveillance 

through a series of food defense verification procedures performed daily in all FSISregulated facilities, including import inspection facilities and in-distribution facilities. Results of the verification procedures are reported to and are analyzed by the 

agency. The results of the analysis direct outreach and guidance initiatives and 

countermeasures development. 

The Office of Management and Budget and the relevant food safety agencies are 

collaborating on ways to most effectively address issues raised in GAO’s designation 

of Federal Oversight of Food Safety as a high-risk item in February 2007. 

USDA, the Department of Health and Human Services, and DHS are working together to create a comprehensive food and agriculture policy that will improve the 

government’s ability to respond to dangers to the food supply. For fiscal year 2008, 

the Agency has proposed a budget which includes $31 million to further improve 

FSIS’ ability to detect and respond to intentional or accidental contamination of the 

food supply. 

While food defense is critical to our work, another threat to the food supply is naturally-occurring pathogens. Our work identifying and limiting pathogens in the food 

supply will also help mitigate vulnerabilities in food defense. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and all Members of the Subcommittee, I want to 

thank you again for this opportunity to explain the vital role played by USDA and 

FSIS in protecting the nation’s food supply. We take pride in knowing that our naVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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tion’s food safety and food defense system for meat, poultry, and processed egg products is the best and safest in the world. But we also realize that it is vital not to 

stand still but instead to continue improving our nation’s food safety and food defense systems. We take this stand not only as public health professionals but also 

as everyday Americans who ourselves rely on the results of what we do. I am happy 

to answer any questions you may have. 

FSIS FOOD Defense Mission and Initiatives 

• To prevent, prepared for, respond to, and recover from an intentional attack on 

the food supply and large scale food-related emergencies. 

• Consistent with HSPDs 5,7, and 9. 

Outreach and training to prepared stakeholders to protect the food supply.-Security guidance materials for food processors, transporters, & distributors. 

-Self assessment and food defense plan tools for industry, including 

training. 

-Food defense awareness training for employees, industry, and other Federal and State government agencies. 

Assessing Food System 

vulnerabilities for developing countermeasures.

-Ten FSIS vulnerability assessments conducted-identified products, 

agents, and nodes of highest concern, as well as countermeasures. 

-Participate in Strategic Partnership Program on Agroterrorism (DHS, FBI, 

FDA) to conduct vulnerability assessments (includes States & industry) 

-Workshops for industry, G8 task force, & APEC economies on methodologies to conduct vulnerability assessments to protect imports and exports. 

Collaborated with FDA and State Department on the workshops for G8 

countries and APEC economies 

FSIS Food Defense Initiatives 

Developing countermeasures 

to mitigate vulnerabilities.

-Coordinating with ARS, CSREES, DHS on filing research needs relating 

to critical food defense data gaps (e.g., detection methods, feasibility, 

and agent characterization studies). 

-Working directly with industry and through DHS’s Sector Coordinating 

Council to develop countermeasures. 

Conducting surveillance to 

identify attack on the food 

supply.

-Daily testing of samples for specified threat agents. 

-Homeland security directives—direct personnel on what food defense 

verification procedures to perform on a daily basis in federally-inspected 

establishments and in distribution. working with industry to harden infrastructure. 

-Targeting illegal & high-risk shipments with Customs and Border Protection. 

Managing food defense & 

food safety emergencies.

-Created the Emergency Management Committee & a Non Routine Incident Management System for managing & tracking non-routine incidents. 

-Conduct food defense exercises with States, industry, consumer groups, 

& other federal agencies (eg; FBI, DHS, FDA). 6 conducted to date, 4 

planned in FY07, and 5 in FY08. Conducted and A1 outbreak exercise in 

FY 06 and planning a Pandemic exercise in FY 07. 

-Guidance for industry on the disposal of food products & facility decontamination. 

-Template for developing State response plans for food emergencies. 

-Provide training on Incident Command System and ESF 11 for key personnel. 

22 

FSIS Food Defense Initiatives—Continued 

Ensuring Agency Continuity of 

Operations.

-Conduct agency-wide COOP exercises. 

-SOPs to ensure critical essential functions are maintained. 

-Established alternative relocation sites, designated essential personnel, 

and identified vital records. 

Developed All-Hazards, Avian Influenza, & Human Pandemic plans. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Maczka. 

The chair now recognizes Dr. McGinn for 5 minutes to summarize your statement. 

STATEMENT OF TOM MCGINN, D.V.M, DIRECTOR, 

AGRICULTURE AND VETERINARY DEFENSE, OFFICE OF 

HEALTH AFFAIRS, DHS 

Dr. MCGINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you today 

about the safety of our national food system. My name is Dr. Tom 

McGinn, and I serve as the Director of Food, Agriculture and Veterinary Defense within the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs, which is led by the Acting Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Jeff Runge. My job is to be 

the primary point of contact within DHS to synchronize our food, 

agriculture and veterinary assets. One of our responsibilities within the Office of Health Affairs is to coordinate 30 programs within 

DHS that address some aspect of food, agriculture and veterinary 

defense. I am pleased to testify today with Dr. Acheson, with Carol 

and with Dan Baldwin from Customs and Borders as well. These 

are valued friends and colleagues. 

FDA and USDA represent the sector-specific agencies with the 

subject matter expertise and the legal authority for the protection 

of the food in our country. Together with the private sector and our 

State and local and academic partners, who you will hear from 

later today, we all provide food defense for the United States. Together we cultivate a complex, effective set of resources that are becoming better known to each of us and better able to be integrated 

into a National Incident Management System. 

I will highlight the following three areas: one, the contribution 

of DHS to food defense; two, the Office of Health Affairs’ strategic 

plan to further implement HSPD–9; and three, the way forward for 

food defense. 

DHS’s contribution to food defense: Food defense includes activities beyond our borders and across our domestic food supply chain, 

as well as in our homes. It involves everyone, from the local ice 

cream shop to the most capable sector-specific agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture. The large majority of incidences involving food 

issues are handled at the private, State and local level, with the 

leadership of HHS and USDA. DHS makes its resources available 

to instances involving food when requested by Federal agencies or 

the President or when multi-agency involvement requires the integration of Federal, State and local resources to preserve the security of our Nation. DHS also makes its resources available to its 

23 

Federal partners and to its Centers of Excellence to do research in 

the area of threat. It makes its resources available to States to 

build surge capacity to reduce the risk to the food supply, and to 

train and exercise food defense systems. 

Secretary Chertoff created the Office of Health Affairs as part of 

a reorganization on January 11th, 2007. Its mission is to protect 

the health and security of the American people, and the coordination and collaboration of the DHS components with Federal, State 

and local partners and the private sector. With specific reference 

to agroterrorism, the Secretary appointed the chief medical officer 

to be the official accountable for the implementation of the Department’s responsibilities for veterinary, food and ag security, and it 

includes the coordination of the Department’s responsibilities for 

the implementation of HSPD–9, the defense of U.S. agriculture and 

food. 

Number two, in the area of post-harvest preparedness and 

HSPD–9, the enormity and complexity of the food sector poses substantial challenges to food defense and critical infrastructure. 

These challenges include overlapping roles and responsibilities 

among Federal departments and agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget, but the relevant food agencies are collaborating to address these issues. DHS brings unique and complementary tools and expertise to bear, and such tools as the National Security Risk Assessments and the integration of surveillance. The 

Department of Agriculture and FDA provides tools and expertise in 

the area of food and agricultural critical infrastructures. The Food 

and Drug Administration and USDA work closely with Customs 

and Border Patrol on a day-to-day basis in imported food inspections and laboratory analysis. 

As a highlight, I would like to mention that these agencies 

worked well together during the recent melamine incident, which 

is consistent with the intention of HSPD–9. HSPD–9 was issued to 

establish a national policy to defend the Nation’s food and agricultural systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters and emergencies. DHS has 17 of the 21 tasks designated to us, and we lead 

or co-lead in 12 of these tasks. The landscape of food safety and defense is changing. Evolving risks include a tremendous growth of 

imported food markets. 

Federal and State regulatory programs, as well as laboratories, 

are currently the backbone of our Nation’s food safety network. 

Threats to the food supply typically cross State borders and have 

national implications. We need to be diligent in coordinating planning involving the key stakeholders, importantly including State 

and local authorities and the private sector. Realistic exercises help 

to develop the relationships, plans and preemptive tools we need to 

prevent, mitigate and respond to food system events. An alignment 

of resources at the interagency level with local, State and national 

governments, with strong collaboration with the private sector is, 

or needs to be, continually strengthened. 

Number three, the way forward: We are focusing our efforts more 

completely on resilience within the food chain. DHS is currently 

studying key components of the Nation’s food chain in partnership 

with the FBI, USDA and FDA in programs with the industries and 

the States to better understand the vulnerabilities of 50 major food 

24 

and agricultural commodities. The challenge is sharing this information in an appropriate manner with all relevant stakeholders. 

FDA has a great example of a Web-based tool as a first step. Another tremendous first step—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Dr. McGinn, if you could summarize your statement. We are way over the 5 minutes. 

Dr. MCGINN. Okay. Thank you. In summary, a more resilient 

food infrastructure is a most important way to build resilient communities. The recent Mayor of Gulfport said that a simple way of 

building resiliency is the restoration of a favorite restaurant. It 

gives a place for his people to rest in a tragedy, such as in recent 

hurricanes, and spend a few minutes outside of a familiar place 

with familiar food, and finding confidence that the rest of his community will be restored. He clearly understood that food system resilience is part of community resilience. 

Mr. Chairman, I will stop with those comments, and I will be 

happy to entertain any questions as we go forward. Thank you. 

[The statement of Dr. McGinn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR DR. TOM MCGINN, DVM 

INTRODUCTION 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 

to talk with you about the safety, and in particular the post-harvest defense, of our 

food supply. The United States has not only the most bountiful food production capacity in the world, but it is among the safest as well. Safety is not an inherent 

quality of U.S. food production—it takes continual dedication to ensure the safety 

and security of the food supply. I appreciate the chance to highlight the contributions of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to Food, Agriculture and Veterinary (FAV) Defense. I will also discuss the role that DHS played in the recent 

pet food contamination incident as demonstration of the diversity of DHS programs. 

Finally, I will discuss the Office of Health Affairs’ (OHA) strategic plan to further 

implement Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD–9) along with state 

and local governments and the private sector. Importantly, managing any event will 

not be a federal issue alone. Success in the realm of food safety and defense will 

depend upon coordination among states, local and private entities, and national programs that utilize our Nation’s resources effectively. 

DHS OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS (OHA) 

Secretary Chertoff created the Office of Health Affairs as part of the departmental 

reorganization on January 18, 2007 in response to P.L. 109–295 δ516. OHA was created to protect the health and security of the American people in coordination and 

collaboration with other DHS components, federal, state and local partners, and the 

private sector. Responsibilities and activities of OHA do not duplicate or supplant 

activities currently being provided by other components of DHS or the departments 

and agencies of the Executive Branch. The Chief Medical Officer (CMO) has the following responsibilities: 

• To serve as the Secretary’s principal medical and veterinary authority for 

DHS; 

• To coordinate DHS biodefense activities, to include policy, planning, strategy, 

requirements, operational programs and metrics; 

• To ensure internal/external coordination of DHS’ medical [including veterinary] preparedness and response activities; 

• To serve as the primary DHS point of contact for federal/state/local/tribal governments and the private sector on medical [including veterinary] and public 

health issues; and 

• To discharge DHS’ responsibilities under Project BioShield, in coordination 

with the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate. 

The Department serves as the integrator of federal, state and local resources that 

are needed to preserve the security of the Nation. With specific reference to 

agroterrorism preparedness, in a memo dated March 28, 2007, Secretary Chertoff 

designated OHA’s Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer as the DHS official 

accountable ‘‘for the implementation of the Department’s responsibilities of veterinary, food and agriculture security. . .[who] will also coordinate the Department’s 

25 

responsibilities for implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, 

Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food.’’ 

Within OHA, I serve as the Director of Food, Agriculture and Veterinary (FAV) 

Defense. FAV goals are to ensure that the food and agriculture sectors are actualized as Critical Infrastructure; understand and strengthen public confidence in food 

protection through assessment and enhancement; ensure critical stakeholders are 

functionally aligned; and assist all DHS Food, Agriculture and Veterinary programs 

in attaining operational capability. OHA/FAV Defense activities are working to foster efficiency and effectiveness across DHS regarding food, agricultural and veterinary defense. 

HSPD–9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, was issued to establish 

a national policy to defend the nation’s agriculture and food systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD–7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection, identifies DHS as ‘‘responsible for 

coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States,’’ and recognizes the DHS Secretary as ‘‘the principal federal official to lead, integrate and coordinate implementation of efforts.’’ HSPD–9 assigns to the DHS Secretary tasks in this area that are 

specific to the defense of food and agriculture. These tasks include mitigation of 

vulnerabilities in food, agriculture and water systems, as well as developing robust 

biological threat awareness capacity. Of the 21 tasks for which DHS has been designated some degree of responsibility, we have the lead for 12. Those 12 activities 

fall under the following five pillars: 

(1) Awareness and Warning—Includes intelligence operations and biological 

threat assessment and analysis activities 

(2) Vulnerability Assessments—DHS, in coordination with USDA and HHS, is 

to conduct comprehensive studies to determine the nation’s vulnerability to a 

wide variety of foodborne pathogens and adulterants 

(3) Mitigation Strategies—DHS will aid in prioritizing, developing and implementing, as appropriate, mitigation strategies and shall build upon existing efforts to expand development of screening and inspection procedures at the borders 

(4) Response Planning & Recovery—Includes activities involving local response 

capabilities and coordinated response planning 

(5) Outreach and Development—Includes information sharing and analysis 

mechanisms, specialized training in agriculture and food protection, continued 

development and research for countermeasures against introduction of animal/ 

plant diseases, plans to provide biocontainment labs for researching capabilities 

and establishing university-based Centers of Excellence. 

All five pillars, in fact, are being undertaken across all sectors, in collaboration 

with all Federal agencies. 

THE PET FOOD CONTAMINATION INCIDENT 

Approximately sixty percent of American households contain pets. Early this year, 

the U.S. government became aware that high levels of low-grade melamine, which 

contained not just pure melamine, but additional melamine analogues, were intentionally added to products labeled as ‘‘wheat gluten’’ and ‘‘rice protein concentrate.’’ 

These products were imported from China into the U.S. and subsequently incorporated into many pet food products. In addition, certain salvaged pet food products 

that were melamine contaminated were unknowingly fed to some food producing 

animals. This combination of contaminants was not detected until it was learned 

that certain pet foods were sickening and killing cats and dogs. In addition to the 

illness and death burden, many lessons observed were highlighted by this incident 

are also being addressed. 

Contaminated ‘‘wheat gluten’’ and ‘‘rice protein concentrate’’ were imported into 

the United States in the fall of 2006. Menu Foods, the producer and distributor of 

many brands of pet foods nationally and internationally, became aware of reports 

of illness and death in pets and began recalling certain brands of pet food in March 

2007. Chinese sources admitted to intentionally adding melamine to increase nitrogen content in rice products and wheat gluten, which falsely elevated protein measurements. In addition to pet food products, melamine-laced feedstuffs were also fed 

to production animals in the U.S. These animals could have entered the human food 

chain. Compounds fed to food-producing animals may, through tissue adulterant 

residues, make it into the human food chain. An interagency risk assessment considered the risk to humans from melamine-contaminated products fed to food producing animals and concluded that this was very unlikely to cause harm to humans. 

26 

While more research is needed on the exact cause of the illnesses in cats and dogs, 

this melamine event demonstrated a potentially significant vulnerability to the 

human food supply due to the global nature of our food and agricultural systems. 

COLLABORATION AMONG DHS ENTITIES 

OHA worked to organize the Department’s various components soon after the pet 

food contamination incident began. Initial meetings generated a comprehensive list 

of capabilities that each component could leverage to respond to this incident. It also 

identified methods of sharing timely information. As the situation evolved and the 

true scope emerged, an Interagency Working Group (IAG) met at the DHS National 

Operations Center. The IAG established the process for a national-level Situational 

Report (SITREP), as well as the corresponding flow of information. OHA took the 

lead in forming the IAG and worked with the Operations Directorate to produce and 

disseminate the SITREP. 

Heretofore, DHS had not established a formalized process for reporting on issues 

such as a food contamination event. The National Biosurveillance Group (NBSG), 

composed of the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) member Federal agencies, developed and implemented a formalized process. This was accomplished by coordinating information flow among DHS, the components and headquarters of Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and USDA, as well 

as other affected DHS entities. The efforts of other DHS offices assisted in the coordinated response. These efforts are summarized below: 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—CBP used its FDA-coordinated, automated 

systems and laboratory analytic capabilities to identify, target, sample and test additional incoming shipments of wheat, corn, and rice glutens for the presence of melamine. During the enforcement operation, CBP tested samples of products from 23 

countries shipped by suppliers and producers that account for over 59 percent of the 

imported volume of the merchandise in the previous 12-month period. That contributed to a greater degree of assurance that products coming into the U.S. were free 

of the contamination and that the melamine issue was isolated to a few Chinese 

producers. 

National Protection & Programs Directorate (NPPD)—The Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) is a shared program between NPPD 

and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. HITRAC monitored intelligence and related infrastructure information from open sources and classified reporting. 

HITRAC shared this information with the members of the IAG for use in their analysis. 

Science and Technology (S&T)—The S&T National Science, Technology and 

Threat Awareness Reachback (NSTTAR) service provided real time, technical information and analysis reachback capability. This was provided to the homeland security community for anticipating, evaluating and responding to foodborne threats. 

NSTTAR, the Biodefense Knowledge Center, the Chemical Security Analysis Center 

located at the US Army facility in Edgewood, MD and the Department Of Energy 

Field Intelligence Establishment (intelligence division) were all called upon for technical and threat support relating to melamine toxicity, contamination paths, effects 

in food chains, production sites and the potential for intentional misuse. The National Center for Food Protection & Defense, one of the DHS Centers of Excellence, 

prepared and provided a continuous assessment of the situation. The assessment included potential impact on the domestic food chain, international trade, and public 

confidence. It also addressed the incident relative to the overall trade situation with 

China and an on-going timeline of events. 

COLLABORATION AMONG FEDERAL ENTITIES 

As a result of the pet food contamination incident, DHS/OHA fostered senior level 

engagement to enhance partnerships in homeland security. DHS brought unique 

and complementary tools and expertise to bear, such as tools for national security 

risk assessment and investment. Other agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration, provided tools and expertise regarding the Food and Agriculture Critical Infrastructure. The Food and Drug Administration also worked closely with CBP on a day-to-day basis in food inspections and 

laboratory analysis. In addition, OMB and the relevant food safety agencies are collaborating on ways to most effectively address issues raised in GAO’s designation 

of Federal Oversight of Food Safety as a high-risk item in February 2007. 

Another point of synergy was the overall public communication effort. The huge 

volume of information requests generated by governmental and private sources was 

handled through interagency press conferences. During one such call, nearly 200 

members of the press participated. The government presented a common access 

point for information—questions, concerns, and suggestions. 

27 

AREAS OF FUTURE ENGAGEMENT 

In a recent report by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG), four main 

limitations in the Department’s food defense and security efforts were identified. 

First, DHS must improve internal coordination. Second, DHS needs to engage its 

public and private food sector partners more effectively. Third, DHS could do more 

to prioritize resources and activities based on risk. Finally, DHS must fully discharge its food sector responsibilities. 

In response to the OIG report, our Chief Medical Officer has the responsibility for 

food and agriculture efforts including: 

• Working to ensure collaboration with the Food Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) 

• Seeking improvement in DHS’ relationship with food sector partners 

• Expanding national infrastructure coordinating center outreach efforts 

• Evaluating the feasibility of providing financial support and/or facilitating the 

detailing of state or local government and private sector representatives to OHA 

and NPPD 

• Developing and maintaining a DHS report on sector research and development initiatives 

• Expediting the review of existing food sector assessments 

• Expanding food sector modeling 

• Evaluating the integration of additional federal foodborne illness reporting, 

surveillance and detection systems 

• Continuing to develop and disseminate information about food subsystem specific operational protective measures and best practices with FDA and USDA 

Areas the OIG identified that are still in need of attention include: 

• Developing a grant process to support non-urban, multi-jurisdictional preparedness 

• Working with DHHS and USDA to prepare integrated food defense budget for 

fiscal year 2009 

• Considering collaboration of food-specific criteria and guidelines for Customs—Trade Partnership Against Terrorism with food industry with USDA/ 

FDA 

• Studying the integration of food defense awareness into transportation security and considering additional research to improve the security of food in transit 

• Expanding efforts to sponsor food contamination event exercises with an emphasis on exercises spanning multiple state and local jurisdictions 

COLLABORATION WITH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 

The landscape of food safety and defense is changing. Evolving risks include the 

tremendous growth of imported food markets from countries that have limited regulatory oversight. Federal and state regulatory programs and laboratories are currently the backbone of the nation’s food safety network. However, threats to the food 

supply typically cross state borders and have national implications. 

A concerted communication strategy for these types of operations is essential, and 

falls within the purview of DHS. Additionally, information flow is typically much 

faster than anticipated, frequently outpaces the ability to analyze and interpret, and 

comes in from various sources. Frequently, information is made available to the private sector before the government is informed. DHS is building the mechanism 

through its National Operations Center (NOC), the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) and the National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC) 

to gather and analyze such information in real time. DHS is forming partnerships 

with members of the food sector and its academic centers of excellence to improve 

information sharing and mutual awareness. 

CONCLUSION 

The food chain infrastructure is rapidly globalizing, which demands a commensurate improvement in our preparedness posture. This globalization, manifested by 

both the vertical integration of certain commodity groups such as poultry and grain, 

and the seemingly opposite phenomenon of ‘subcontracting’ various pieces of common production processes (as in the pet food contamination incident), outlines why 

it is so important that our planning efforts be comprehensive and all-inclusive of 

intelligence, disciplined information sharing with states and local governments and 

the private sector, coordinated incident management, and maintenance of public 

confidence. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee. I look 

forward to continuing my working relationship with you, and I am happy to address 

any questions or concerns that may arise regarding this topic. 

28 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. McGinn. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Baldwin, to summarize your statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAN BALDWIN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, 

OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PATROL 

Mr. BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the 

actions we are taking at Customs and Border Protection to ensure 

the safety of imported food. 

My name is Daniel Baldwin, and I am the Assistant Commissioner in the Office of International Trade at U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection. My office holds the responsibility of formulating 

CBP’s trade policy, developing programs and enforcing the U.S. import laws. The food and agriculture industry contributes significantly to the United States’ economy. And as the value and complexity of our food imports continues to grow, CBP recognizes the 

challenges we face to maintain a safe and secure food supply. 

CBP has taken great strides towards securing America’s borders, 

including the protection of our food supply, and the economic 

health of American agriculture. Since September 11th, 2001, CBP’s 

primary mission has to be to secure the Nation’s borders from terrorists and terrorist weapons, while facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. In support of this mission, CBP has designed strategies to manage the risk of an agricultural product contamination that may cause harm to the American public or damage 

the Nation’s economy. CBP has worked extensively to coordinate 

activities and enforcement actions with USDA and HHS. As the 

guardian of our Nation’s borders, CBP has broad authority to interdict imports of food and agriculture products at the ports of entry. 

We frequently interact with FSIS and FDA on questions regarding 

enforcement actions, as those agencies house the subject matter expertise on food and agriculture admissibility. 

CBP is able to rely on the statutory authority of other Federal 

agencies, with the specific mandate of enforcing food safety regulations to finalize enforcement actions on those food safety issues. As 

with our approach to antiterrorism, CBP has taken a multi-layered 

approach to protect the safety of America’s food imports. 

In my testimony today, I would like to highlight the three key 

aspects that CBP has utilized in its effort to date: CBP’s National 

Trade Strategy, CBP targeting methodologies, and CBP personnel. 

After briefly discussing these three topics, I can highlight some of 

our experiences with these food safety operations. 

Pursuant to our twin goals of fostering legitimate trade and travel while securing America’s borders, CBP has developed a National 

Trade Strategy to help our agencies successfully fulfill our trade facilitation and trade enforcement mandate. Our National Trade 

Strategy is based upon six Priority Trade Initiatives. These PTIs 

are antidumping and countervailing duty protection; intellectual 

property rights enforcement; textile and wearing apparel enforcement; revenue protection; punitive actions; and of course, agriculture and food safety. Under the terms of our Trade Priority 

Strategy, we focus CBP resources in our efforts to address these 

29 

key areas of trade. I would like the committee to know that agriculture is one of our key six priority issues. 

The goals of our National Agriculture Strategy are, first, to detect and interdict any instances of agro and bioterrorism; second, 

to detect and prevent unintentional introduction of pests or diseases into the United States; third, to detect and prevent unintentional introduction of adulterated, contaminated or unsafe agriculture and food products; and fourth, to promote our Nation’s economic security through the enforcement of these trade laws. To 

support this national strategy, CBP employs several robust targeting methodologies, ensuring the compliance and safety of our 

food and agriculture products imported into the United States. 

CBP, in coordination with FSIS and FDA, utilizes the following 

mechanisms to ensure safety of the American food supply. First, 

our Automated Targeting System, which is based on various algorithms and rules, and is a flexible, constantly evolving targeting 

system that integrates enforcement and commercial databases. 

ATS is essential to CBP’s ability to target high-risk cargo entering 

the United States based upon advance manifest information. Another system CBP uses is our Automated Manifest System, which 

provides us with the advance cargo information, to be used for targeting and screening of all imported merchandise. We utilize AMS 

to ensure appropriate coordination with other regulating agencies. 

And finally, the Automated Commercial System, ACS, CBP’s automated system of record for entry processing and cargo clearance allows us to screen for additional food and agriculture risks. 

I would also like the committee to know, the majority of the targeting criteria present in the system today are intended to prevent 

the introduction of contamination, pests or disease. Approximately 

87 percent of the criteria used in our ACS systems are agriculture 

related. 

In addition to these CBP systems, CBP also maintains the National Targeting Center. The NTC is the facility at which personnel 

from several separate government agencies are co-located to review 

advance cargo information on all inbound shipments. Personnel 

from CBP, FDA, FSIS, APHIS, are all stationed at the NTC. 

In addition to the sophisticated targeting systems and coordination between the agencies, CBP maintains a diverse workforce that 

is specially trained to detect and prevent imports that may be 

harmful to the health of the American public. CBP officers and 

CBP agriculture specialists receive specific training on ag/bioterror 

incidents. We currently have the ability to rapidly deploy more 

than 18,000 CBP officers, 2,000 agriculture specialists and 1,000 

import specialists in response to emerging threats to our agriculture and food supply. Furthermore, CBP’s Laboratory and Scientific Services maintains eight separate laboratories around the 

country, with a 24/7 technical reachback center. 

While we have found various examples recently where we have 

coordinated with FDA and HHS and DHS along the lines of melamine, toothpaste, seafood imports, we are finding that that level 

of cooperation has been very important in ensuring the safety of 

our Nation’s food supply. Food defense and food safety concerns 

will only increase as world trade in food and agriculture continues 

to grow and diversify. CBP will continue to approach this as a chalVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
30 

lenge worthy of a combined government effort. We will continue to 

partner with other Federal agencies in order to refine our targeting 

skills and ensure the prevention of contaminated products entering 

the United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, other members of 

committee for this opportunity to testify today, and I would be 

happy to answer any of your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Baldwin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL BALDWIN

INTRODUCTION 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before 

you today to discuss the actions we are taking at Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) to ensure the safety of imported food. My name is Dan Baldwin and I am 

the Assistant Commissioner in the Office of International Trade at U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection. My office holds the responsibility of formulating CBP’s trade 

policy, developing programs, and enforcing U.S. import laws. The food and agriculture industry contributes significantly to the United States economy. As the 

value and complexity of our food imports continues to grow, CBP recognizes the 

challenges we face to maintain a safe and secure food supply. To meet this challenge, OMB and the relevant food safety agencies are collaborating on ways to most 

effectively address issues raised in GAO’s designation of Federal Oversight of Food 

Safety as a high-risk item in February 2007. 

CBP has taken great strides toward securing America’s borders, including the protection of our food supply and the economic health of American agriculture. Since 

September 11, 2001, CBP’s priority mission has been to secure the nation’s borders 

from terrorists and terrorist weapons while facilitating the flow of legitimate travel 

and trade. In support of this mission, CBP has designed strategies to manage the 

risk of an agricultural product contamination that may cause harm to the American 

public or damage to the nation’s economy. 

CBP has worked extensively to coordinate activities and enforcement actions with 

USDA and HHS, and in particular the FDA. As the guardian of our nation’s borders, CBP has broad authority to interdict imports of food and agricultural products 

at the Port of Entry. We frequently interact with USDA and FDA on questions regarding enforcement action, as those departments house the subject matter expertise on food and agriculture admissibility standards. CBP is able to rely on the statutory authority of other federal agencies with the specific mandate of enforcing food 

safety regulations to finalize enforcement actions on food safety issues. 

CBP’S CURRENT ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 

As with our approach to anti-terrorism, CBP has taken a multi-layered approach 

to protect the safety of America’s food imports. In my testimony today, I would like 

to highlight the three key aspects that CBP has utilized in its efforts to date: CBP’s 

National Trade Strategy, CBP Targeting, and CBP Personnel. After briefly discussing these three topics, I will discuss our experience with food safety operations. 

NATIONAL TRADE STRATEGY: AGRICULTURE ESTABLISHED AS PRIORITY TRADE INITIATIVE 

Pursuant to our twin goals of fostering legitimate trade and travel while securing 

America’s borders, CBP has developed a National Trade Strategy to help our agency 

successfully fulfill our trade facilitation and trade enforcement mandate. Our National Trade Strategy is based upon six Priority Trade Initiatives (PTI), these PTI’s 

are: Antidumping and Countervailing Duty, Intellectual Property Rights, Textiles 

and Wearing Apparel, Revenue, Agriculture, and Penalties. Under the terms of our 

trade prioritization strategy we focus CBP resources in our efforts to address areas 

of key trade importance. I would like the committee to note that Agriculture is one 

of our six PTIs. 

The goals of the agriculture trade strategy include: 

(1) The detection and prevention of agro-terrorism and bio-terrorism, i.e., the intentional contamination of an agricultural product or food, or the intentional introduction of diseases or pests intended to cause harm to the American public, 

American agriculture, or the nation’s economy. 

(2) The detection and prevention of the unintentional introduction into the 

United States of pests or diseases that would cause harm to the American public, American agriculture, or the nation’s economy. 

31 

(3) The detection and prevention of the unintentional introduction of adulterated, contaminated, or unsafe agricultural and food products into the United 

States that would cause harm to the American public, American agriculture, or 

the nation’s economy. 

(4) The promotion of our nation’s economic security through the facilitation of 

lawful international trade and enforcement of regulatory trade laws. 

TARGETING 

CBP uses various targeting mechanisms to ensure the compliance and safety of 

food and agricultural products imported into the U.S. These mechanisms are specifically designed to incorporate the food safety concerns of USDA and HHS. 

One of the systems used is our Automated Targeting System (ATS). ATS, which 

is based on algorithms and rules, is a flexible, constantly evolving system that integrates enforcement and commercial databases. ATS is essential to CBP’s ability to 

target high-risk cargo entering the United States. ATS is the system through which 

we process advance manifest information to detect anomalies and ‘‘red flags,’’ and 

determine which cargo is ‘‘high risk’’ and should be scrutinized at the port of arrival. 

Another system CBP uses is the Automated Manifest System, which provides us 

with advanced cargo information to be used for targeting and screening of all imported merchandise. This advance information allows CBP to identify shipments of 

interest in advance of arrival. By identifying shipments in advance, CBP is better 

able to focus resources on those shipments which may be of concern, prevent their 

introduction into the commerce, and ensure appropriate coordination with other regulatory agencies. 

The Automated Commercial System (ACS), CBP’s automated system of record for 

entry processing and cargo clearance, allows us to screen for additional food and agricultural risks. The majority of the targeting criteria present in this system are 

used to prevent the introduction of contamination, pests, or diseases. Approximately 

87% of the cargo criteria in ACS are agriculture related. 

In addition to these CBP automated systems, CBP maintains the National Targeting Center (NTC). The NTC is the facility at which personnel from several separate government agencies are co-located to review advanced cargo information on all 

inbound shipments. At the NTC, CBP personnel are able to quickly coordinate with 

personnel from other federal agencies such as the FDA, Food Safety and Inspection 

Service (FSIS), and Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to target high 

risk food shipments 

Furthermore, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (BTA) authorized FDA to receive prior information to target 

shipments of food for human or animal consumption prior to arrival. The BTA gave 

CBP the opportunity to assist FDA with the prior notice requirements. CBP worked 

in concert with FDA to augment an existing automated interface to institute a priornotice reporting requirement with minimal disruption to the trade. In addition, 

under the BTA, we worked with FDA to commission over 8,000 CBP officers to take 

action on behalf of the FDA. This commissioning allows FDA to assert a 24/7 presence to enforce the Act at all ports. 

PERSONNEL 

In addition to sophisticated targeting systems and coordination between agencies, 

CBP maintains a diverse workforce that is specially trained to detect and prevent 

imports that may be harmful to the health of the American public. CBP Officers and 

CBP Agriculture Specialists receive specific training on ag/bio-terror incidents. We 

currently have the ability to deploy more than 18,000 CBP Officers, 2,000 Agricultural Specialists, and 1,000 Import Specialists in response to emerging threats to 

our agriculture and food supply. Furthermore, CBP’s Laboratory and Scientific Services (LSS) maintains seven separate laboratories around the country, with a 24/7 

technical reach back center. LSS employs approximately 220 chemists, biologists, 

engineers, and forensic scientists. 

Our diverse workforce enables CBP to mount rapid and effective responses to protect U.S. agricultural resources by utilizing the specialized training of CBP Officers, 

Agriculture Specialists, Import Specialists, International Trade Specialists, and Laboratory Technicians. Each of these CBP occupations works together to gather intelligence, establish target criteria, gather and test samples, and analyze and report 

results. Because of their specialized training in the use of personal protective equipment for handling potentially hazardous or infectious materials, CBP Agriculture 

Specialists play a vital role during food safety operations. 

FOOD SAFETY OPERATIONS 

Trade analysis and targeting methodologies designed to ensure the safety of the 

food supply allow CBP to proactively identify shipments containing possible food 

32 

contamination prior to its arrival. This targeting allows us to fulfill our mission 

while allowing us to facilitate legitimate trade. 

While food safety has recently grown in importance in the public eye, CBP has 

been involved in food safety related initiatives for the past several years. 

In 2006, CBP was involved in the detection of numerous incidents of food contamination or smuggling of prohibited food products from China. A significant number 

of shipments of Chinese poultry products were seized including 45 containers smuggling prohibited product. CBP developed a food safety operation to combat the smuggling by targeting known smugglers of prohibited poultry products. 

In April 2007, it was discovered that food from China was contaminated with melamine potentially harmful to animals as well as humans. CBP initiated a special 

operation to determine the scope of the potential problem. The nature of the operation was to augment FDA’s focus with the intention to assess the risk of contamination from countries worldwide and to identify possible transshipment of Chinese 

product. CBP sampled and conducted laboratory analysis, the results of which were 

coordinated with FDA. 

In this most recent action, CBP targeted and detained 928 entries (shipments) 

over a four-week period. Samples were pulled on 202 entries, comprising over 400 

separate production lot samples, and sent to CBP’s laboratories for analysis. All 

samples tested negative for the presence of melamine. As a result of the operation, 

CBP tested samples of product from 23 countries and shipped by suppliers/producers that account for over 59% of the imported volume of the merchandise in the 

previous 12-month period. This scientific data gives the government and the public 

assurance that the melamine issue relating to imports was in fact isolated to a few 

Chinese suppliers, and not a widespread, global problem. In coordination with FDA, 

CBP developed a follow-up monitoring program that uses a computer-generated statistical sample to measure ongoing compliance. 

This high profile enforcement effort has helped CBP refine its methodology to conduct future food safety operations and enhance our working relationship with other 

federal agencies. In response, CBP has developed a Concept of Operations Document 

for food safety to institutionalize our communication and cooperation as well as the 

methods, processes, and procedures. Additionally, this food safety incident has 

brought to the forefront the need to maximize the power of the government to respond to future food safety issues. 

As you are well aware, there have been further contamination issues, for example, 

with imported toothpaste and selected seafood. Based on lessons learned from the 

melamine incident, we are coordinating with FDA to develop an appropriate action 

plan commensurate with the threat. 

CONCLUSION 

Food defense and food safety concerns will only increase as world trade in food 

and agriculture continues to grow and diversify. One of the methods CBP will use 

to ensure the safety of the food supply is to use statistical sampling to monitor for 

compliance. CBP will continue to approach this as a challenge worthy of a combined 

government effort. We will continue to partner with other federal agencies in order 

to refine our targeting skills and ensure the prevention of contaminated products 

from entering the U.S. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Baldwin. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I will remind each member, he or she 

will have 5 minutes to question the panel. 

And I now recognize myself for questions. I think the one thing 

that is on everyone’s mind today is, how secure are we in terms of 

preventing what happened in terms of contaminated food and products coming out of China entering the food supply again? Are we 

there yet to ensure that it can’t happen again? So my question is, 

what efforts are underway to ensure that the Chinese don’t continue to intentionally add melamine or other dangerous products to 

their exports? What is the U.S. doing to sanction China? And what 

does HHS expect yet out of its meeting with China at the end of 

the month? Pose that to the panel. 

Dr. ACHESON. This is David Acheson of FDA. Maybe I could take 

the first shot at that, since you specifically addressed HHS. Since 

the melamine issue, and in fact before that in relation to a number 

of technical issues, we have worked very closely with Chinese auVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
33 

thorities to try to address specific food safety concerns. Clearly, the 

melamine situation was something that we did not predict. Since 

that has happened, there has been an ongoing, and continues to be, 

close dialogue with Chinese authorities to address this problem, to 

deal with it. 

I think we have to accept that their food safety system, the Chinese food safety system, is not the same as that in the United 

States. It is a rapidly expanding economy. They are exporting a lot 

of food to the United States. And we have to work with the government and build systems to essentially address that challenge. To 

that end, there are ongoing meetings with Chinese government officials. There will be one occurring at the end of this month. There 

will be another one in August. There is a further one planned for 

September. All towards trying to develop a memorandum of understanding that will focus on how to address these problems. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you see them moving aggressively to mitigate 

these problems to ensure that it is not going to happen again? 

Dr. ACHESON. I think, within the capacity of the Chinese government to attain those goals, yes. I think they are very committed to 

try to prevent it. But as I said, they are dealing with a very fragmented system. So one of the things they are trying to put in place, 

I think very deliberately, is a system of certification or authorization that will ensure that products that are exported do meet a certain level of safety and security to ensure that they won’t harm 

American consumers. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And since we can’t rely necessarily on the Chinese to fully solve this problem because the system is so fragmented, then what are we doing to step up our efforts? Are we 

there yet to ensure that the food coming in or product coming into 

the United States is secure? 

Dr. ACHESON. Well, again, we are obviously focusing on the areas 

that are of the greatest concern. Using a risk-based strategy, we focused on testing products that we had concerns about, either historically or because of human illness. That was what led to the recent announcement of the import alert in relation to aquacultured 

fish of five different species related to the use of specific drugs. And 

as you know, there is now in place a hold so that we have to test 

that material. 

Clearly, the melamine and wheat gluten was something that we 

weren’t anticipating. We learn from these things constantly and 

are, as we move forward, trying to focus our strategies based on 

risk. Ultimately, where we need to take this, though, however, is 

to focus it on prevention. We need to prevent these problems from 

happening in the first place, as opposed to reacting when they do. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I agree. 

Dr. Maczka? 

Ms. MACZKA. Well, I think FSIS does have a very robust import 

system where we are able to ensure the safety of food coming into 

the United States. It involves an initial determination of a country’s equivalence to our systems. It also involves on-site audits and 

then reinspection of all products coming into the United States. If 

something were to go wrong with a particular product, we can increase audits in a country. We can step up reinspection of products 

coming into our country. We also, one of the things that we are 

34 

working on collectively together here with Customs and Border 

Protection, DHS and FDA and the Centers of Excellence is a study 

on melamine and other pathways that can be used for economic 

adulteration, and so that we can put protective measures in place. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Dr. McGinn? 

Dr. MCGINN. We are stronger and more secure than we have 

ever been in our food supply, yet incidences like melamine give us 

an opportunity to get even stronger. Since this incident, our Center 

of Excellence you will hear from this afternoon has been looking extensively at food imports from China, and doing that in collaboration with USDA and FDA and Customs and Borders, as well as the 

intelligence community. So we are actually doing a review of the 

imported foods to see what additional concerns there are. We are 

certainly going to be able to make those available to you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

And Mr. Baldwin? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Very quickly, just to echo the comments made earlier, I think we do have the safest food supply security system in 

the world. And targeting and intelligence gathering, I think, is one 

of the key components, so that even when you do detect an incident 

like this, that we are able to have a concept of operations in place 

how to deploy, how to proceed so we can mitigate any of these circumstances and anticipate any future developments. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the panel. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. McCaul, the 

gentleman from Texas, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the chair. Just as a follow-up on the food 

imports from China, particularly the seafood, and maybe Dr. Acheson, you are the expert to address this. How confident are you 

that these imports coming into the country now from China, as I 

understand they have not been banned, what is your comfort level 

that there is no contamination, particularly given the fact that one 

of the certifying labs that qualifies to certify that it is not contaminated is actually from China? 

Dr. ACHESON. FDA is very comfortable that those five fish that 

we have the import alert are essentially being held. You are correct 

in saying that it is not a ban. It is not intended to be a ban. What 

it is intended to be is a hold at the port of entry in some way, or 

in some holding situation, preventing it from going into commerce 

until FDA has seen clear evidence that the fish does not contain 

any of the antimicrobial agents that we have concern about. 

Now you point out, what can we do if we don’t believe the lab 

results? Well, we can check the lab results. We can test it ourselves. We can ensure that the samples were taken correctly, that 

the assays were done correctly, that the controls were done correctly by reviewing the paperwork. And if we are not comfortable, 

it doesn’t proceed. 

Mr. MCCAUL. You said, you can test it yourselves. I mean, do 

you? 

Dr. ACHESON. We have certainly done that. We challenge things 

on a regular basis in terms of—I mean, import alerts are not new. 

We have been doing them for years. And we have many out there. 

35 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me just say, let’s say it is certified in China 

that it is not contaminated. It comes to our country. Do you have 

any systems to perhaps do any sampling to ensure that this food 

is safe coming into the United States? 

Dr. ACHESON. Yes, indeed, we do. We undertake sample assignments on top of import alerts. To give you a case in point, several 

years ago, we had problems with cantaloupe from Mexico. There 

was a countrywide import alert, much like China. We worked with 

the government of Mexico to fix it. Once the country was coming 

off the import alert, we continued to test cantaloupe. It was fine 

for a couple years. We then found a problem, and we worked with 

the government again to fix it. So, yes, simply the import alert is 

not it. We will continue to follow-up, and we will continue to test, 

and we will continue to look more widely. 

Mr. MCCAUL. How was this discovered in the first place? How 

did you discover that, gee, we have food coming in from China that 

is contaminated? 

Dr. ACHESON. With the melamine or with—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. The anti—or the microbe agents that were found 

in the fish. 

Dr. ACHESON. Through testing programs. Those testing programs 

go back to 2001, where we first started to see problems and we 

were putting individual companies on import alert. And we have 

been doing that for some time. And we have essentially been 

ramping up, adding more and more companies, to the point at 

which we said, this isn’t working. The technical discussions with 

China aren’t solving the problems. We need to make this countrywide to protect the American consumer. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Baldwin, another topic. We have a farm bill 

coming up this week in Congress, and there is some discussion, in 

fact some Members of Congress would like to move inspection authority away from Customs and Border Patrol and give it back the 

USDA at the inspections being done at ports of entry on the border. 

Can you comment, even though the USDA does not want that mission, by the way—not something that I support—but can you comment on that and then also comment on the transition that did 

take place between USDA to CBP at the border? And how well is 

that transition going, and how well are your inspections at the border? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Sure. First off, I would offer that I believe a transfer of our CBP agriculture specialists back to USDA would in fact 

be a detriment to our food supply security efforts. We have a significant number of diverse workforce that we have at the border 

that we can leverage and use for a diverse array of food supply 

chain issues. I think we have had tremendous success in the few 

short years since CBP agriculture specialists have been at the border with our CBP officers, who look for immigration issues, cargo 

issues, and agriculture and pest contamination issues. I think we 

are underestimating the tremendous improvements we have made 

with USDA in forming our task force and working with our bioterrorism act personnel with FDA and soon FSIS and our NTC. I 

think we are making tremendous headway in solidifying our efforts 

and creating the best food supply chain security efforts at the borVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
36 

der. I think a move back, this reaction would be a detriment to our 

efforts. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, 

Mrs. Christensen, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this hearing and making sure it happened, despite the fact that we had to put it off. And thank the 

panelists again for your flexibility in being here this morning. I 

have a lot of concerns about our food safety, given all of what has 

already been referenced here by my colleagues, and what seems to 

be a tremendous increase in food contamination, and sometimes 

the length of time it takes to find out what the source is and so 

forth. So I am hearing that coordination is improving and so forth. 

I hope so. 

I have a quick question for Dr. McGinn. The Office of Health Affairs, how does that relate to the Chief Medical Officer? Is that the 

same office? Is there some coordination there? What is their role 

in the food safety issue? 

Dr. MCGINN. The Chief Medical Officer is the head of the Office 

of Health Affairs. The Chief Medical Officer is a position that is 

about a year old within DHS, and then most recently, that has become the Office of Health Affairs. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. I just wanted to know. 

Dr. MCGINN. And the veterinary component is a component of 

the medical component within DHS. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. 

And Dr. Acheson, you talk about the laboratories that are in the 

FERN, in the network. And they include the 50 States and Puerto 

Rico. How does that network address issues with the territories, either the Virgin Islands or the ones in the Pacific? 

Dr. ACHESON. The network is constantly expanding. And at this 

stage, I don’t have specific information as to what is on tap in 

those, but I can certainly find that information and get that back 

to you specifically on that question. But that network has worked 

well. We used it in spinach, and we used it in melamine. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. And, apparently, a week ago or so, 

there was another hearing in one of the Energy and Commerce 

subcommittees, and what was reported there is a cause for a lot 

of concern, one that—and I read about this in the paper either 

Sunday or Monday as well—that FDA inspects about 1 percent of 

the food over which it has jurisdiction. This is what was reported 

at the subcommittee. And of that 1 percent, just a fraction is actually sampled, that the agency sometimes allows importers to take 

possession of suspect foods and arrange for the testing by private 

laboratories that may or may not be approved by FDA. This is from 

testimony given in a hearing at a House subcommittee last week. 

And the other issue is the fact that you have 13 laboratories that 

test for these kinds of problems, and seven of them FDA intends 

to close. Can you just help me figure out, can you just respond to 

those concerns that were raised in another subcommittee hearing? 

Dr. ACHESON. Sure. You raised a lot of points there. Let me try 

to cover them briefly. 

37 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. The 1 percent. 

Dr. ACHESON. Yeah. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. The private labs testing for suspect goods, 

private labs that are not FDA approved, and also the closing of 7 

out of 13 laboratories that are used. And it goes on; inspectors, the 

number of inspectors are less, but the food imports have doubled, 

you know. 

Dr. ACHESON. First of all, the 1 percent is correct. In order for 

a product to be imported, a food product to be imported into the 

United States, there are a number of things that has to happen. 

The paperwork for that, usually submitted electronically, is 100 

percent through our prior notice center, in collaboration with Customs and Border Protection. What that does is, it will target certain foods that are of concern from a food defense and bioterrorist 

perspective. And if we see anything anomalous there, it gets put 

to one side in terms of potentially a hold or an inspection. On the 

food safety side, again, all that food is screened electronically. Some 

of it, where we have never seen a problem historically—— 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. So 100 percent is screened, but 1 percent is 

inspected. Is that what you are saying? 

Dr. ACHESON. Yes, 100 percent is screened electronically. About 

80 percent of that electronic screening is then diverted for an FDA 

individual to look at it and make a determination, should this be 

inspected or should it not be inspected, based upon experience? 

Now a lot of that is stuff that goes through really quickly because, 

again, it is high volume. It is things we have never seen problems 

with. And that is how the 1 percent then gets picked out. It is 

based upon risk. It is based upon areas where we have seen problems, and it is based upon concerns that we have either had in the 

past or currently have. So it is vetted 100 percent, but you are correct in saying that only 1 percent is actually physically inspected. 

In terms of the private labs, yes, private labs do get used, as they 

are allowed to be used for import alerts. But, again, FDA is able 

to look at the data from the private labs. They have to ensure that 

the samples are collected properly, under the appropriate conditions, that the testing is done correctly, that the assays are validated, that the controls are appropriate. And if there are any problems with that, FDA will refuse to take that data and do. I could 

not tell you what percentage that we refuse, but I can find that out 

for you. But we do do that. 

Finally, on the lab closures that you mentioned, yes, you are correct, there is a current consideration of consolidating labs. Those 

labs were developed and situated in the days when shipping samples around was much more complex than it is now. We can obviously, as you all know, ship materials across the U.S. very easily. 

The goal here is to improve efficiency, to improve through put and 

to do more faster, cheaper, so that, at the end of the day, even 

though physically some labs will close, we envisage that what we 

will be able to do here is to get more samples tested faster for less 

money, thus increasing overall efficiency, simply because of the 

way things move in modern technology. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you for your answer. 

Mr. Chairman, I think that this bears some looking into, just so 

that we can be sure that we are giving the proper oversight for 

38 

some of these changes, closing of the labs and the low percentage 

of inspections and some of the other issues raised. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I couldn’t agree more, and I promise you that we 

will continue to exercise aggressive oversight in this area. And this 

hearing will be the first of what I intend to be several hearings on 

the subject. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Ohio, Ms. Kaptur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for 

permitting me to come here today and participate in this very important hearing. Thank you for your leadership on this issue. And 

it is a pleasure to join the panel, if only briefly. 

Thank you for your focus on food safety, an issue that I have followed for quite a number of years. I would like to ask any of the 

panelists to respond to very specific questions here. 

Do any of you know what percent of the U.S. food supply is currently imported and what percent of the U.S. drug supply is currently imported or even, generally speaking, what that might be? 

Dr. ACHESON. This is David Acheson, FDA. 

Let me start on the food supply because I can speak to that. For 

drugs, I do not have that information, but we could certainly get 

that for you. 

Overall, about 13 to 15 percent of the U.S. food supply is imported, but it varies greatly with commodities. Seafood is about 80 

percent. Others are much less. Produce varies with the time of 

year, but it can be 30 to 40 percent. 

Mr. BALDWIN. I would just like to add that I think it is somewhere between 4 to 5 percent of all imports in the United States 

that are actually, you know, our food supply, our food products. 

Four to 5 percent of all imports of all products are food products. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What about drugs? 

Mr. BALDWIN. That information I do not have specifically, but I 

would be happy to get that for you. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Does anybody want to take a guess? I am talking 

about the components of those products, not just the final product. 

Mr. Acheson, you do not want to comment on that? 

Dr. ACHESON. I did not come armed with information to specifically discuss the importation of drugs, but as I have said, I would 

be very happy to get that information to you. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is it your sense that the majority comes from offshore on the drug side? 

Dr. ACHESON. I know that drug ingredients are imported, but 

yes, in terms of finished drugs, I think it is not a huge number. 

Mrs. KAPTUR. I think the American people were very surprised 

to find that large amounts of our medications and, perhaps, vitamins are comprised of ingredients that come from offshore. I think 

it is quite a significant number, and it is surprising to me that you 

do not really have that at the top of your fingertips here today. 

Dr. ACHESON. Well, I apologize. I am focused on food and feed 

as opposed to drugs, but I promise we will get that information to 

you. 

Mrs. KAPTUR. Is it your impression that food imports and drugs 

imports into the United States are growing? 

Do any of the panelists want to answer that? 

39 

Ms. MACZKA. On the meat, poultry and egg side, no. As far as 

your first question—— 

Mrs. KAPTUR. Meat and—excuse me? 

Ms. MACZKA. Meat, poultry. Meat and poultry, which is what 

FSIS regulates, 6 to 8 percent is imported. That is in response to 

your first question. 

Dr. ACHESON. In response to your question about is it increasing, 

certainly, on the food side, yes, it is. 

Mrs. KAPTUR. Yes. With 1 percent or less inspected, as a country 

we have been pretty lucky, actually. 

I wanted to ask you: Who are the worst offenders by nation in 

terms of food safety and then drug safety? If you were to kick off 

those who have been cited the most times, which three countries 

would be at the top of your list or which five countries would be 

at the top of your list as the worst offenders on the food side and 

then the worst offenders on the drug side? 

Dr. ACHESON. In the context of the foods that the FDA regulates—and we inspect and refuse foods on a regular basis. For example, in June, the FDA refused foods from 80 different countries. 

China and India were at the top of the list and, certainly, in recent 

months have been at the top of the list. Part of that is related to 

the volume of products that are imported. We do import a lot of 

foods from China and from India, so there is a denominator component to this. 

I suspect where you are going is the proportion or the percentage 

of foods from individual countries that are unsafe, and I do not 

have all of the denominator information at hand, but again, you 

know, we could provide that. 

Mrs. KAPTUR. To provide the inspection, do you focus on key importers? 

Dr. ACHESON. In terms of the inspections, there are a lot of parameters that are weighed into this. From a food defense perspective, yes. The intelligence, the country of origin, the foods, those 

kinds of things on the food safety side, again, yes, in relation to 

proprietary records, the history of problems with the importers or 

the foods. 

Mrs. KAPTUR. There is very little time remaining in my 5 minutes, but I did want to place on the record the distinction between 

what the U.S. Department of Agriculture calls a ‘‘recall’’ if we find 

something that is out there that we are troubled with. There are 

all of these stories that come out in the paper that we are going 

to recall certain products. 

The problem is that we recover almost none of it. Five percent 

or less is ever recovered, so we might read that something is recalled, and people say, ‘‘Oh, I feel so safe. The toothpaste is recalled 

or the steak is recalled or the hamburger is recalled or the fish is 

recalled.’’ Yet, the truth is that the Department of Agriculture, 

speaking for the Department of Agriculture, is able to recover almost none of it. So it is still out there. It is still out there. 

So I just wanted to place on the record in this very important 

subcommittee the fact that some of the language that is used is 

very misleading to the public. 

I believe my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

40 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, the gentlelady raises a very important 

point, and the American people need to be aware of this, and we 

need to see what we can do to step up efforts to enhance the recall 

effort to make sure it actually has meaning and that the product 

is actually recovered. I could not agree more. I thank the 

gentlelady. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Etheridge, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. I think it is vitally important. 

Let me ask the panelists. You know this is a critical issue to the 

American people, and I want to go back so I can come forward. 

In November of 2003, the GAO had a report titled Bioterrorism: 

A Threat to Agriculture and the Food Supply, and they found that 

most of USDA’s and the FDA’s field staff had not received training 

on security matters, and although the field staff were instructed to 

be vigilant and on heightened alert, they were also told not to document or to report their observations regarding security at the 

plants because the information could be obtained under a Freedom 

of Information Act request. My question is this: 

Has this policy changed? Number two, can you confirm that staff 

were instructed not to document or to report observations? Number 

three, do field staff currently receive security-specific training? 

Who wants to tackle that first? Okay. 

Ms. MACZKA. Thank you, Congressman. 

Well, we perform food defense verification procedures in our 

plants every day, and I do not have the numbers with me, but hundreds of verification procedures are performed, and we document 

the results of those in what we call a Memorandum of Interview. 

The inspection personnel are supposed to take the results of that 

and discuss it with plant management so that countermeasures can 

be put in place. So I think our system there is quite strong. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Well, let me ask you a question. You did not answer my question. 

Number one, has the policy changed? Was that correct what 

GAO put out in 2003 or was that incorrect? 

Ms. MACZKA. The policy has not changed. We have been doing 

these food defense verification procedures since the events of 9/11, 

and we continue to do them, and our staff does get ongoing training, by the way. We have food defense awareness training of all of 

our field staff as well as headquarters staff. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. So we do document? 

Ms. MACZKA. Yes, we do document. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. We do report the observations? 

Ms. MACZKA. Yes, we do. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. To whom? 

Ms. MACZKA. To the trade associations and to industry so that 

countermeasures can be put in place, and we also analyze the information at headquarters to look at trends. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. So it does come to the Department? 

Ms. MACZKA. Absolutely. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Okay. Does anyone else want to comment on 

that? 

The FDA. 

41 

Dr. ACHESON. Yes. This is David Acheson. I will speak on the 

FDA side. 

In terms of the training, we have been aggressively adopting a 

training program with our inspectors, mainly focused on raising 

awareness and having them understand the importance of giving 

out guidances to the industry in terms of what they can do to ensure the security of the food supply. 

As I mentioned in my oral, we have developed a program called 

ALERT, which is heavily focused on raising awareness. It basically 

operates from farm all the way through to retail. Virtually every 

inspector has been trained on ALERT. We have developed a Webbased training system for that, suitable for both industry and for 

our inspectors. Certainly, about 2 months ago, we were up to— 

about 95 percent, 96 percent of the inspectors had received that 

training and were implementing it, and we have used this in some 

of our assignments as well. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Okay. So it is currently an operation that is ongoing? 

Dr. ACHESON. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. 

Dr. McGinn, can you describe what steps the Department has 

taken to lead an interagency in response to an act of agroterrorism 

or other disasters in the agricultural sector? Because, obviously, 

your department would have that charge. Specifically, what plans 

have you developed, what training exercises have you done, and 

what are the staffing changes in the Department to accomplish the 

mission in your department? 

Dr. MCGINN. Okay. As it relates to the staffing issues, our office 

is new, the Office of Health Affairs, and currently we are an issuer 

and are actually adding people in the area of food as well as in animal agriculture, in public health, and agro threat. This year, we 

are hoping to, as the IG report said, add the persons who are needed to actually staff up this coordinating role up to about 11 people 

the first year, and then by the end of 2009 we are looking to add 

up to about 40 people to actually do this coordinating role and several million dollars to do this effort. That is not a lot considering 

it is one-sixth of the economy and that this is a critical infrastructure for our country. 

In terms of the exercising and the planning and in terms of attacks on our country, one of the main ways that we within the Department of Agriculture are preparing for that is in actually assisting the States to be prepared because any incident that is going to 

be of national significance is going to be in a lot of States at the 

same time. So one of our key responsibilities is to provide grants 

to the States to be able to then utilize and to actually do the training and exercising and build the kinds of capacities that we need 

to have in order to be able to respond in multiple States at any 

given time. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Can you tell us where we are along that track 

in terms of getting that done? 

Dr. MCGINN. In terms of the grand analysis, that is one of the 

key things, that I add personnel to our office, which I intend to do. 

We have already begun the analysis of this, and we are looking at 

what States are actually spending on those grants in terms of 

42 

building this kind of preparedness, and the research capacity within the labs as well as the field personnel are critical, as you know. 

In order to effectively do this kind of analysis with the grants, 

I am going to need some additional—the personnel that we are 

bringing on staff right now to actually do that, and I will be able 

to follow through on it. My intention is to do an annual review of 

those grants and then to be able to share that information back 

with the States so that they will be able to do a better job of competing for those resources to build capacity in the States. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

Given the import of this issue and the fact that I know Chairman 

Thompson wanted to question—he is on his way back—with the 

panel’s indulgence, we are going to go to a second round of questions. So, with that, I will begin recognizing myself. 

I wanted to inquire of Dr. McGinn: The Inspector General released a report in February on the role of DHS in post-harvest food 

security. The IG noted that there are four main limitations in DHS’ 

efforts. First, DHS must improve internal coordination. Second, 

DHS needs to engage its public and private food sector partners 

more effectively. Third, DHS could do more to prioritize resources 

and activities based on risk. Finally, DHS must fully discharge its 

food sector responsibilities. 

So my question is how many staffers has DHS dedicated to this 

mission, and how have you worked to improve these areas? 

Dr. MCGINN. Within the 30 programs across DHS, there are several people who are actually involved, but in our office currently, 

I am an office of one, but I have the ability to actually add up to 

five people as FTEs and then some detailees as well to get to eleven by the end of this first year that we are in place so that the 

IG Office or the IG report recommended that we have a very limited number of staff and that we need to actually add to our resources to actually be able to discharge our responsibilities, not just 

for HSPD–9 but for the other HSPDs, as well as other issues as 

were mentioned by the Executive order and the Office of Budget 

and Management. There are lots of different issues that we are actually working to synchronize our resources in. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you feel that level of resources in staffing is 

going to be adequate to complete your mission? 

Dr. MCGINN. It is very adequate to start the job in this first year 

of our existence. We are a new office, and we are rapidly developing capabilities, not just in the veterinary area but also in the 

medical area as well. Coordinating those responsibilities across all 

of DHS is a huge task as well. So, yes, we have got the resources 

to start the job, and then our ramp-up over the next couple of years 

will in fact give us the full capability to discharge those responsibilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. To the panel, Mr. Kennedy’s testimony that we 

will hear later suggests that food and ingredient movement is not 

well characterized across firms—or food and ingredient products. 

He states that a clearinghouse for such information that would be 

accessible for research and threat purposes would be a significant 

step forward. 

What efforts are underway to create such a tool? 

43 

Dr. ACHESON. This is Dr. Acheson at FDA. 

I am not sure I quite understand the scope of the question. Is 

it suggesting that the traceability is inadequate? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is what he is suggesting, yes. 

Dr. ACHESON. Okay. Under the Bioterrorism Act, there is a requirement for certain facilities to maintain records of one up and 

one back; in other words, where they receive the material from and 

where they send it. That has served us well in relation to recent 

outbreaks. Obviously, we have not had to test it in a terrorist situation, but that structure has allowed us to, essentially, trace forward and trace back when an outbreak occurs, to determine origins 

and where food has gone. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Would anybody else on the panel care to comment? 

Ms. MACZKA. We also have procedures in place to trace forward 

and to trace back. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Let me ask this last question within the time that I have left. 

China has claimed that the U.S. is raising unnecessary alarm 

about the safety of their food products. According to one of their 

ministers, ‘‘one company’s problem does not make it a country’s 

problem. If some food products are below standard, you cannot say 

all of the country’s food is unsafe,’’ end quote. Do you agree? 

Dr. ACHESON. Let me take the first shot at that. 

I would agree that one company’s problem does not mean that 

there is a problem nationwide. However, if we return to the example of the imported fish, we have been putting one company at a 

time on import alert as we have been demonstrating that their 

products are problematic and of concern to the public health in the 

United States. Beginning last October, we expanded our surveillance of these categories of fish and did a lot of testing, and overall, 

about 25 percent of the species that we had concerns about from 

a variety of different companies contained these unapproved antimicrobial agents. So that was clearly not just one company, and it 

was at the point where we had to say this had to be countrywide. 

It is correct to say it is not 100 percent, but I do not believe for 

1 minute that we are overreacting. I think it is very important that 

we do this. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Anybody else on the panel? 

Ms. MACZKA. Our process is such that we not only determine if 

a country’s system is equivalent to us and is eligible to export to 

us, but we also look into whether establishments should be certified. So we take it on an establishment-by-establishment basis as 

well as a country basis. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the panel. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

McCaul, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. McGinn, I look forward to seeing your office go from a oneman shop to many hirees in your office and in ramping up your efforts. I know you are under a lot of—I will not say ‘‘stress’’—but 

a lot of responsibilities for one person to bear, so I look forward to 

seeing that progress. 

44 

My second round of questioning has to do with something that 

impacts probably more of my home State of Texas, and that is foot 

and mouth disease. When I go down to some of the border towns, 

you actually see cattle going back and forth between Mexico and 

Texas. It has been going on for a long time, and obviously the 

threat of contamination is real. In Minnesota, we had a recent 

scare of foot and mouth disease which, actually, turned out not to 

be foot and mouth disease, but it did provide, I think, an opportunity for the USDA and the DHS to sort of test their efforts in 

working together on this. My question is to the panel. 

Could you comment on the coordination between the USDA and 

the DHS on that issue in this particular case? Then if you could 

comment also on the overall threat, if you will, of foot and mouth 

disease, which would have a real damaging impact not only on border States but on the whole ranching industry? 

Dr. MCGINN. I will lead off. 

As it relates to that recent incident that you were describing, it 

was an excellent opportunity, as most incidences are, to develop additional strengthening capability. Some of the encouraging things 

that we did in a collaborative sort of way was we were immediately 

on the cell phones with each other. We have each other’s cell phone 

numbers. We call each other any time, day or night. Certainly, 

when the incident was brought to our attention it was in the 

evening, and the questions or the requests that came to us were 

of an intel nature, and so what we were asked to do was to look 

at the intentional aspects of this to rule out or to rule in these sorts 

of things early on because the sooner you can determine if there 

is an intentional component, particularly in a biological or in a 

chemical situation, you are much farther ahead of the ability to 

contain that situation. So we were asked, and we worked through 

the night, actually, on behalf of the USDA to actually determine 

the issues of risk around intentional disruption. 

Another thing that was, really, very encouraging that was done 

was Customs and Borders Protection and the USDA worked together to look at if in fact we were to have an incident that would 

progress, that we would need to be able to know in the last few 

weeks what animals had actually come across the border so that 

we would know the size of the tracing-out that needed to be done, 

and it was incredibly encouraging how quickly that information 

was able to be brought together from their joint efforts, and they 

got not just all of the cattle and swine, but they got down to the 

camels and the goats and everything else that had come into the 

country over that period of time. 

So those two are two great examples of some increased collaborative work that was done. 

One more that I would add to that is the Center of Excellence— 

and you will hear from Shaun Kennedy this afternoon—which 

worked closely with the plant owners in Minnesota to actually deal 

with that situation, so that there is a feedback loop from the private sector that these Centers of Excellence are so helpful in creating for all of us. That was a part of that incident as well. So 

those are three examples of increased and excellent coordination. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is good to hear. 

Mr. Baldwin, do you have any comments? 

45 

Mr. BALDWIN. I would just echo what Dr. McGinn has said. I 

think that we have found that our cooperation with the USDA, especially on the foot and mouth issue, has been tremendous. I mentioned earlier in my testimony that I think that 87 percent of our 

criteria in our automated commercial systems are dedicated to agriculture and food systems, and I will tell you that those are predominantly on the foot and mouth issue that we have been addressing for quite a few years. So I think that the work we have 

done in the past few years on foot and mouth with the USDA has 

been a tremendous example of how cross-cutting work with the 

agencies is really the way to go and how it has proven to be successful, and we are always working to improve that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Dr. Maczka, you mentioned in your opening statement the avian flu in poultry. Obviously, that is of great concern 

as the risks can be very high. We have talked a lot about the fish 

coming from China as being contaminated. 

How much of our poultry is actually imported from Asian countries? 

Ms. MACZKA. Right now, we receive—none of our products are— 

no products are coming in from China. No meat, poultry or egg 

products, FSIS-inspected products, are imported from China, and 

no establishments, processing establishments, are certified to export to us. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is good to hear. 

In terms of poultry that is imported, I would assume most of the 

poultry is homegrown in the United States, that most of the poultry consumed in the U.S. is actually raised in the United States. 

Ms. MACZKA. The numbers that I gave before, 6 to 8 percent, of 

our poultry and meat are exported, and I do not have the breakdown of what is meat and what is poultry, but I can get that to 

you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. In terms of what Americans consume, most of that 

is homegrown in the United States and is raised and not imported? 

Ms. MACZKA. That is correct. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair is now pleased to recognize the chairman of the full 

committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the issues I think the committee is grappling with is who 

would be in charge if something happened, and I guess I will go 

with Dr. McGinn first by saying: 

If an incident of national significance were declared along the 

lines we have talked about, who would be in charge? 

Dr. MCGINN. Well, if an incident of national significance is declared, then the Department of Homeland Security is the coordinator of the overall response. Therefore, we would be in a leadership role as it relates to that. The technical leads come from whatever emergency support function is involved with the incident. In 

this particular situation, if it were both the FDA and the USDA as 

technical leads, then we would be coordinating with them in terms 

of the subject matter expertise and the legal responsibilities within 

46 

our responsibilities for an incident of national significance to coordinate under the National Response Plan. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So is your definition of ‘‘coordination’’ the equivalent of being in charge or just serving as the traffic cop for the particular incident? 

Dr. MCGINN. Well, ‘‘being in charge’’ is exactly what it means, 

but it also recognizes that the subject matter expertise, whether we 

are talking transportation or whether we are talking food or health 

as sectors—recognizing that those expertises are needed in that 

emergency support function actually leads to support in that particular area. We definitely hope when an incident occurs, whether 

it is food—or agriculture-related, that we would be first, and most 

of them are incidents at the local level. The progression of most incidents is, if it progresses to the place where it is at the State level, 

then the State would be in charge. If it progresses further, then either the FDA or the USDA is actually in charge. So as the incident 

progresses—and they can progress very fast or they can progress 

slowly—who is in charge changes as it does within any incident 

command system-type responsibility, as you know from your work 

in firefighting. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Dr. Acheson, you have heard Dr. McGinn’s comments about the coordinating role of DHS. 

Is that your understanding? 

Dr. ACHESON. Absolutely, yes, yes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. And there is no conflict between who is in charge 

and who is the lead in this scenario? 

Dr. ACHESON. No. I mean, as Dr. McGinn pointed out, things 

tend to build up at some speed or another. For example, spinach. 

The FDA was in charge of that. It was not declared a national 

emergency. We stayed in charge and we took care of it. We worked 

with other Federal agencies during the course of that. 

Melamine was slightly different. Again, there were very close coordination efforts between the FDA, the USDA, the DHS, and a 

whole variety of other Federal agencies in that context. So, absolutely. Depending on the level of the emergency, it will vary who 

is in charge, but we are totally in sync with that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Dr. Maczka, would you like to respond to that? 

Ms. MACZKA. I am in agreement with my colleagues here that 

that is pretty much the way it works, and actually we have tested 

it out in some of our State district exercises where we have invited 

our colleagues to these exercises, and it has played out that way. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you all have basically said that there is no 

gray area as we proceed along this line in terms of who is in 

charge, whether the protocols are already established and all of 

that? 

Dr. ACHESON. Yes. 

Ms. MACZKA. Yes. 

Dr. MCGINN. Yes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I think, as we go forward, you will see, Mr. Chairman, some 

other comments relating to this, but I wanted to make sure we 

were on the record with that issue. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the chairman. 

47 

I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and 

the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee 

may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask 

you to respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. 

At this time, the first panel of witnesses is dismissed, and the 

Chair now calls up our next panel. Thank you. 

I would like to welcome our second panel of witnesses. Thank 

you for being here today. 

Our first witness is Shaun Kennedy, the Deputy Director of the 

National Center for Food Protection and Defense at the University 

of Minnesota. The University of Minnesota is a DHS Center of Excellence. We are so happy to have you here today, Mr. Kennedy. 

Our second witness is Dr. Lee Myers, State Veterinarian and Assistant Commissioner of the Animal Industry Division in the Georgia Department of Agriculture. Dr. Myers has spearheaded numerous initiatives to improve the States’ and the Nation’s capacity to 

prevent and to respond to agricultural emergencies, including acts 

of agroterrorism. I welcome you here today as well. 

Our third witness is Dr. Craig Henry, Senior Vice President and 

Chief Operating Officer of Scientific and Regulatory Affairs of the 

Grocery Manufacturers Association and Food Products Association. 

Dr. Henry, we thank you for being here, and please send our regards to Dr. Matthys, who was going to testify before we switched 

the schedule on him, so we appreciate your filling in. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record, and I will now ask each witness to summarize his 

or her statement for 5 minutes beginning with Mr. Kennedy. 

STATEMENT OF SHAUN KENNEDY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL CENTER FOR FOOD PROTECTION AND DEFENSE, 

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA—TWIN CITIES CAMPUS 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss 

recent events involving the food system in the United States and 

our future needs for reducing the possibility of intentional disruption or contamination of this system. 

As you have noted, I am here today as a representative of the 

university community that is committed to finding new solutions to 

protecting the food system and also as the co-director of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense. 

At the Center, we are focused on fundamental and applied research to develop new strategies, tools and approaches to address 

the threat of intentional food contamination. The university research community is one important partner with the public and 

private sectors in developing innovative solutions to the threat presented by intentional food contamination. 

Food terrorism is not a new threat. In fact, the use of food as a 

weapon is actually one of the oldest weapons that is still of concern 

for catastrophic harm. However, a more global food system now 

means that intentional contamination of one location can literally 

reach around the country or across the globe to cause economic 

harm, illness and even death in multiple locations simultaneously. 

I have been personally struck by the degree to which the public 

intuitively understands the threat of intentional contamination of 

48 

the food system. One group of NCFPD researchers found that consumers would allocate more funding to protect the food system 

than a range of other critical infrastructures even though they perceive the relative probability of an attack on the food system to be 

lower than those other infrastructures. Upon reflection, this is not 

surprising. The food system is the one critical infrastructure where 

we cannot take ourselves out of the target population. 

The implications of this are not trivial. I think it is important to 

consider that a long history of Federal, State and local food safety 

regulations and enforcement has allowed us to be confident, not 

only in the safety of our food but in the quality of our government. 

A loss of public confidence in our ability to deliver a safe food supply could challenge both public trust in government and public confidence in the integrity of our food system. 

There is, unfortunately, however, no silver bullet for fortifying 

the food system. The strengths of our system—affordable and fresh 

fruits, vegetables, meat, poultry, eggs, and dairy all year long—also 

represent the challenges of this complex system. The Federal and 

State agencies and the private sector which own and manage the 

food system have all made dramatic strides in protecting the food 

system from potential terrorism since it became a front and center 

concern. There is, however, much more to be done, and we should 

not be surprised by this. 

Protecting our food supply from intentional contamination represents a far more difficult challenge than the Mother Nature problems we are used to dealing with since it involves things that 

should not happen. While zero risk is, by definition, unachievable, 

through intensive and targeted research we can reduce the risk. 

Research themes that I believe to be central to this effort, that 

NCFPD are actively engaged in, include the following: 

The first is event modeling. That is how we can stay ahead of 

terrorists and others who want to cause us harm. One of the criticisms from the 9/11 Commission was that various Federal agencies 

suffered from a lack of imagination. In short, terrorists had explored more innovative threat scenarios than those for which the 

government had prepared. Having learned this lesson once, we cannot afford to do so again. Realistic, flexible and dynamic models of 

potential food system events are thus an invaluable tool for vulnerability and consequence assessment, intervention prioritization, resource allocation, and decision support during an event. 

The second area of focus is in agent and food matrix interactions. 

We know a great deal about how conventional foodborne pathogens 

interact with food and the environment, and yet it is still not entirely clear how the E. coli 0157:H7 contaminated the spinach in 

last year’s outbreak. Intentional contamination of food for public 

health or economic harm or economic opportunism elevates the 

challenge of understanding how agents interact with the food system to an entirely new level. Efforts are, unfortunately, complicated by the fact that traditional ‘‘select agents’’ comprise only 

a small subset of the agents of concern. With the food itself serving 

as a very effective and efficient delivery vehicle, the agents of concern go well beyond those of traditional chemical and biological 

weapons considerations. 

49 

All of you are undoubtedly familiar with the ‘‘sniffer’’ at Ronald 

Reagan National Airport, which represents a great stride forward 

in detecting potential explosives to prevent them from being taken 

onto airplanes. Detecting potential explosives in air samples, however, is very different than rapidly detecting agents of concern in 

frozen cream of broccoli soup or hot dogs, let alone a truck of 

produce. Novel sample acquisition and pre-analytical processing 

strategies are therefore a crucial link in any effective detection 

strategy. 

Third, the food system is very much that, a system. As such, it 

presents inherent challenges with respect to risk and vulnerability 

assessments as well as the prioritization of investments to enhance 

food system protection. Unlike many of the 17 critical infrastructures and key resources, it is primarily composed of complex systems, and it is specific elements within these systems and the 

interdependencies of these systems that are of most concern. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you again for the opportunity to talk with you about recent 

food system events and the challenges they represent for protecting 

and defending our food supply. We need better food system intelligence, more flexible and responsive prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery strategies, and an expanded armamentarium 

of technologies and trained professionals to meet these new challenges. The university research community is an important partner 

in this national imperative. As Co-Director of the National Center 

for Food Protection and Defense, I am honored to have had this opportunity to provide you with my perspective. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHAUN P. KENNEDY

Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for giving the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, a Department of Homeland Security 

funded Center of Excellence, based at the University of Minnesota (NCFPD) the opportunity to discuss recent events involving the food system in the United States 

and our future needs for reducing the possibility of intentional disruption or contamination of the U.S. food system. The rapid globalization of our food supply chain 

has added demands upon our existing food safety systems. The threat of intentional 

contamination of the U.S. food system represents a further significant increase in 

the challenges that must be addressed to reduce the probability of public harm. 

Building upon prior experiences with challenges in the United States, one of the important pillars of an effective defense is fundamental and applied research to develop new strategies, tools and approaches to address the threat. This program 

would include preparation, prevention, response, and recovery. The university research community is one important partner with the public and private sectors in 

developing innovative solutions to the problems presented by intentional food contamination. The National Center for Food Protection and Defense is honored to have 

the opportunity to provide one perspective on both the continuing research needs 

and also how university researchers such as those participating in NCFPD can help 

address the considerations of intentional attacks on the food system. 

Before moving into specific concerns and future needs, some historical perspective 

is provided on food system contamination to position the challenges ahead of us. 

While the horrific events of September 11, 2001 have changed our national view on 

nearly everything, food terrorism is not a new threat. 

The use of food as a weapon is actually one of the oldest weapons that is still 

of concern for catastrophic harm. The Athenians’ contaminated the drinking water 

for the city of Kirrha of the Amphictyonic League in 590–600 B.C., taking advantage 

of the resulting severe gastrointestinal illness of all inhabitants to overtake the city. 

A similar strategy was employed by the Carthaginian General Maharbal, utilizing 

contamination of wine left for his enemy which then rendered them defenseless to 

50 

his ensuing attack. In more modern times, the Japanese Army experimented with 

the use of food for the delivery of pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis, Shigella 

spp, Vibrio cholerae, Salmonella Paratyphi and Yersinia pestis. 

Frequently cited examples of intentional contamination of food for political gain 

or intentional harm in the U.S. include the 1984 Rashnishee cult contamination of 

salad bars in Oregon and the disgruntled grocery worker who contaminated ground 

beef in Michigan in 2002. Importantly, these historical examples all represent local 

contamination. Our ever more global food system means that intentional contamination at one location does not limit the impact of such an act to its immediate environment or a single geographic location. As illustrated by recent foodborne illness 

outbreaks as well as the recent contamination of wheat gluten with melamine from 

China, food adulteration from around the world can now have direct consequences 

across the nation. The challenges of our global, just-in-time food system represent 

a unique area of concern which was recognized by the Administration in implementing Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD–9). 

The public, independent of sophisticated risk and vulnerability assessments, intuitively understands the concerns associated with intentional contamination of the 

food system. In a survey conducted by NCFPD supported researchers at the University of Minnesota in 2005, consumers ranked the probability of an intentional attack 

on the food system behind attacks on air transportation, all other public transportation, the energy grid, national monuments and the release of a threat agent in 

an urban area. In contrast, however, consumers ranked the food system as the infrastructure of this list in which they are most concerned about an attack based on 

their recommendation that more funds be invested in food protection than in the 

other sectors. This apparent paradox is actually not surprising. The food system is 

the one critical infrastructure that reaches into every home, every day, with the potential for those of ill will to cause direct, widespread harm. It is the one critical 

infrastructure where you can not take yourself out of the target population. 

The intuitive insight of the public into the importance of attending to the defense 

of the food system does not, unfortunately, translate into easy, readily available solutions to close potential vulnerabilities. The federal and state agencies involved in 

the food system have made dramatic strides in protecting the food system from potential terrorism since it became a front and center concern. Similarly, the private 

sector, which owns and manages the food system, has also worked incredibly hard 

to identify and address potential food system vulnerabilities. There is, however, 

much more to be done, and we should not be surprised by this. 

For many of us, Upton Sinclair’s expose ́ and novel ‘‘The Jungle’’ was our introduction to food safety and the need for private and public sector efforts to ensure a safe 

food supply. After more than one hundred years experience with the food safety regulations that this groundbreaking book helped push forward, food safety continues 

to pose a significant public health challenge. In the last year, foodborne illness outbreaks associated with spinach, lettuce and peanut butter, among others, have reminded us of these concerns. This spring the melamine contamination of vegetable 

proteins, diethylene glycol contamination of toothpaste and drug residues in fish 

serve as surrogate models of how intentional food adulteration can pose a far more 

significant challenge than unintentional food contamination. There is thus much 

more work to be done to protect the food system. Some of these research needs that 

are central to effective and full implementation of HSPD–9 are addressed by 

NCFPD. 

Event Modeling 

One of the primary criticisms from the 9/11 Commission was that the various federal agencies suffered from a ‘‘lack of imagination’’. In short, terrorists had explored 

more innovative threat scenarios than those for which the government had prepared. Having learned this lesson once, we can not afford to do so again. The recent 

melamine contamination provides a stark reminder, even though it was a simple 

case of economic subterfuge. Although not its apparent intent, the event outlined 

a pathway of contaminating a pet food raw material as a means of getting a contaminant into animal feed so that it could make its way into the human food supply. 

While no public harm resulted from this non-obvious scenario, it did demonstrate 

the ability to contaminate the U.S. food system from afar. It is therefore worth further investigation if only for the economic and psychological consequences of such 

an event. 

Realistic, flexible and dynamic models of potential food system events are thus a 

very important tool for consequence and vulnerability assessment, development of 

shields and mitigation strategies, resource allocation and decision support during an 

event. One such modeling system has been developed through collaboration of 

NCFPD investigators, the Food and Drug Administration—Center for Food Safety 

51 

and Applied Nutrition (FDA–CFSAN), the U.S. Department of Agriculture—Food 

Safety Inspection Service (USDA–FSIS), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and 

a broad range of state agency experts and the private sector. Although highly successful, including its use for the 2008 Bioterrorism Report from the National Bioterrorism Analysis and Countermeasures Center, efforts on this and other models have 

highlighted some significant challenges. While there are specific research projects 

already underway in each of these areas, there is still far more to do: 

• Food and ingredient movement is generally very well understood within 

firms, but it is not well characterized across firms or food and ingredient products. This importantly includes the degree to which the federal, state and local 

agencies can access specific details on movement either in real time or for planning purposes. Given that supply chain management is the core competency of 

many food system companies, it is unrealistic to expect them to provide details 

on how the system works in real time without clear assurances of the protection 

of such information. A clearinghouse for such information that would be accessible for research and threat assessment purposes, but with no potential for private sector competitive disadvantage, would be a significant step forward; 

• Imported products, especially ingredients, represent a special challenge with 

which the current data and information systems were not designed to deal. The 

Department of Commerce data on imported food products is based on a categorization system designed to ensure compliance with various tariffs, duties 

and import/export restrictions. Efforts by USDA such as the Offshore Pest Inspection System (OPIS) and the FDA’s Operational and Administrative System 

for Import Support (OASIS) are significant strides forward, but more robust systems to both enable analysis of product and country specific imports over time 

as well as real time targeting for inspection based on such analyses would be 

beneficial; 

• Like all catastrophic event models, food system event models are based on a 

broad range of assumptions of how the various stakeholders in an event would 

respond—from the impacted food company to potential patients and everyone 

in-between. Event models would be much more useful for all involved if there 

were a more robust, exercise driven database on probable responses and their 

potential effectiveness. 

Agent Behavior 

One of the outstanding questions from the E-coli 0157:H7 outbreak associated 

with spinach last year is how was the spinach actually contaminated—did the bacteria come from the soil, animal feces, process/harvest cross—contamination, irrigation/surface water contamination or some other source? This challenge stems at 

least partially from limited understanding of the bacteria’s interaction with such diverse environments, something which the industry has stepped forward to address 

through a competitive research program. Intentional contamination of food for public health or economic harm elevates the challenge of understanding how agents 

interact with the food system to an entirely new level. This importantly encompasses agent/matrix based vulnerability assessments, new detection and diagnostic 

strategies and potential event response. 

DHS, EPA, FDA and USDA, among others, have probed various aspects of this 

select agent/matrix challenge. Fundamental projects at both FDA and USDA on 

some select agents and other contaminants of concern, and how they might impact 

product characteristics or survive in food products, have increased our knowledge 

base. NCFPD investigators’ efforts on detection (e.g., botulinum neurotoxin detection 

technologies, micro-fluidic pre-analytical sample processing), inactivation (e.g., Bacillus anthracis process inactivation) and decontamination (multiple agents in complex systems) are important steps forward but also illustrative of the challenges 

ahead, including; 

• Traditional ‘‘Select Agents’’ comprise only a small subset of the agents of concern. With the food itself serving as a very effective and efficient delivery vehicle, the agents of concern go well beyond those of traditional chemical and biological weapons considerations. If the food can be used to deliver nutritionally 

important, targeted levels of vitamins and minerals, agents that can cause 

harm could also be thus delivered. The range of agents that need to be well understood consequently is far longer than the Select Agents of general concern; 

• The range of potential agents highlights a detection challenge. Melamine is 

a good example of a potential agent that would only have been found in the 

wheat gluten if you knew to look for it. Conventional quality assurance test 

methods would not have highlighted its presence. This would also be true for 

a broad range of food/agent combinations so there is a need for both specific deVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
52 

tection technologies for specific agents of concern and broadly useful techniques 

to rapidly identify that something is amiss and thus requires further testing; 

• Understanding how such agents behave in complex food matrices and processes is a nascent area of research, and one that is not traditionally rewarded. 

Knowing that a particular chemical will turn a certain fluid food product a 

strange color, thus eliminating that combination as a potential threat, is an incredibly valuable finding for removing a food/agent combination from the list of 

those of concern. It is not, however, the subject of traditional federally-funded 

research. Results in this area, nevertheless, will make a significant difference 

in enabling focus on a smaller set of agent/food combinations; 

• Private companies, academia, national laboratories and a range of agencies 

have devoted a great deal of effort to novel detection technologies, pushing the 

scientific frontier forward in innumerable ways. All of you undoubtedly are very 

familiar with the ‘‘sniffer’’ at Ronald Reagan National Airport, which represents 

a great stride forward in detecting potential explosives to prevent them being 

taken onto airplanes. Food systems, however, provide a unique challenge due 

to the complexity of the food matrix itself. Food systems from frozen cream of 

broccoli soup to hot dogs make the challenge ever more so difficult than air or 

bodily fluids. Novel sample acquisition and pre-analytical processing strategies 

are therefore a crucial link in any effective detection strategy. 

Systems Strategies 

The systems-based nature of the food system presents inherent challenges with 

respect to risk and vulnerability assessments as well as prioritization of investments 

to enhance food system protection. Unlike many of the seventeen critical infrastructures and key resources, it is primarily composed of complex systems and it is the 

interdependencies of these systems that are of most concern in the food system, not 

specific assets at a location with an address. This is the very reason that DHS is 

funding several projects to look at new approaches for determining criticality and 

assessing risk and vulnerability for systems-based infrastructures. While working 

toward new additions to the tool kit for risk and vulnerability assessments for the 

food system, there are a number of other systems focused efforts that can both deliver near term improvements as well as form the foundation for long term fundamental improvements. Current projects at NCFPD in food supply chain security and 

transportation system resiliency are being coupled with economic assessment tools 

to help focus potential investments. In addition, new approaches to both public 

health systems surveillance/response and social sciences such as risk communication 

are important ongoing NCFPD research efforts and aim at closing other research 

gaps. Examples include: 

• For many foodborne illness outbreaks today, the detection system that identifies that a food has been contaminated is the public health system. For the melamine contamination it was veterinarians identifying unusual patterns of illness and for the E-coli 0157:H7 associated with spinach outbreak last year it 

was the public health authorities at state and local level. In both cases, however, much of the food had already been consumed before anyone identified the 

problem. Any approach that could therefore decrease the time from first presentation of illness to recognition of the outbreak could dramatically reduce the potential consequences. 

An ongoing example of such efforts that includes investigators from NCFPD, 

other academic institutions and collaborators across federal agencies and associations is an examination of how various local, state and federal agencies respond to and manage foodborne illness disease outbreak investigations. The 

goal is to develop a set of performance standards that result in an even more 

rapid response to any food related disease outbreak than is already provided 

today; 

• Reducing the potential vulnerability within any specific food supply chain, including its distribution system, first requires characterizing how that system 

functions in the interdependent infrastructures we have today. Once characterized, more effective vulnerability and risk assessments are possible, thus highlighting points for the most effective introduction of interventions by either the 

private or public sector. Projects are underway that look at best practices in the 

food industry as a starting point. These studies will be complemented by recently initiated efforts on more detailed analyses of the transportation system 

and imported product pathways. Perhaps more so here than in any other area, 

public-private partnerships are crucial to moving things forward as each group 

has detailed information in different areas that have to be brought together for 

an effective outcome; 

53 

• A challenge for all investments in terrorism prevention, response and recovery is determining how much should be spent to reduce the probability or the 

consequences of an attack. In either the private or the public sector, there is 

a limited amount of potential funding available and it has to be focused on the 

points of greatest impact. This is perhaps even more important in the food system than in some of the other critical infrastructures because of its complicated, 

globally dispersed and highly dynamic, privately held, nature. Secondary benefits for food defense-motivated investments, alternative investment returns 

through vehicles such as insurance/re-insurance and better means of capturing 

the potential impact of events at the firm and system level are all areas of ongoing research that should help guide future investments; 

• In the focus on ‘‘hard’’ tools for event prevention and response, the importance 

of ‘‘soft’’ tools such as risk communication is often overlooked. Effective risk 

communication before, during and after an event will significantly reduce the 

consequences of the event itself. Food, because of its very personal nature, requires that any such risk communication strategies take into account the very 

different information and communication needs of the range of groups and cultures in the U.S. Research on how to communicate most effectively with various 

underserved and non-traditional audiences is highlighting the range of strategies required. This research importantly includes the current collaboration of 

NCFPD investigators and other experts with the various federal, state, local 

and private sector groups who are front and center in any food system event. 

Products such as the NCFPD developed Risk Communication Best Practices are 

only a start in the significant effort to use risk communication as an effective 

intervention strategy. 

Summary 

Outstanding progress has been made by both the private and public sectors in reducing the probability and potential impact of intentional food contamination. Much 

more, however, is needed for full and effective implementation of HSPD–9. This includes the need for ongoing basic through applied research to address each of the 

primary policy areas identified in HSPD–9 for effective protection of the food system: 

• Prioritization of the critical food protection and defense needs is a continual 

process due to the dynamic nature of our food system. As the system changes, 

our research strategies, prevention efforts and preparedness must change. Supply and demand changes, new products, new markets, and new consumer demands drive the ever changing nature of our food system. The shift of corn from 

animal feed to ethanol production illustrates this well; 

• Forewarned is forearmed. Understanding changes underway and anticipating 

their impacts underpins effective early warning systems and robust prevention 

and preparedness. Public-private partnerships can support robust food system 

intelligence to recognize potential threats. While imports of wheat gluten from 

China nearly doubled between 2005 and 2006, and economic adulteration was 

rampant, we were unaware; 

• Mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production, processing, distribution and 

other nodes builds off of the identification and prioritization of critical elements 

and resources within the food system, but includes the need to develop new 

mitigation strategies as the vulnerabilities continue to evolve. Collaboration 

across DHS, EPA, FDA, USDA, state/local agencies, the private sector owners 

of the food system and academia will be an important ongoing partnership for 

vulnerability mitigation strategy/technology development and cost effective deployment; 

• Melamine contamination, antibiotic residues in imported fish and other imported product adulterations illustrate the need for enhanced screening procedures for imported products. Foodborne illness outbreaks associated with domestically sourced products reinforce that the same need exists for domestic 

production. Unfortunately it is just as unlikely to successfully ‘‘test in’’ food system defense as it is to ‘‘test in’’ food safety. Enhanced procedures for targeting 

inspection and detection will continue to be important from the farm (wherever 

in the world it is) through distribution to the final containment point, prior to 

consumer access; 

• Given the degree to which the global food system is necessarily open and 

therefore potentially vulnerable, efforts must include enhancing response and 

recovery procedures to deal with the realistic probability that there will be an 

actual food system event. Both public/private partnerships and very innovative 

strategies for preparedness will be required for effective response and recovery 

efforts; 

54 

• Determining the right way to communicate to underserved communities is 

best not done in the face of a crisis just as designing practical facility decontamination and contaminated product disposal protocols is best not done when 

you have contaminated facilities and products. It will take continual effort to 

develop flexible strategies to make response and recovery efforts most effective; 

• Across all of these policy goals for HSPD–9, the need to develop the future 

leaders in food protection and defense is central to creating the enduring capability that is needed in the future. The students, from high school through postdoctoral, that are engaged in NCFPD and other academic programs in food protection and defense are how the policy goals outlined by HSPD–9 and addressed 

above are made sustainable over the long haul. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you again 

for the opportunity to talk with you about recent food system events and the challenges they represent for protecting and defending our food supply. The threat of 

intentional contamination of our food is real. While we all have come to enjoy an 

abundant, affordable, diverse and safe food supply as our birthright, our overall successes have made us complacent. Our food system is global and will always be global: we all demand coffee and chocolate; bananas and bonita. . .and our year-round 

cornucopia of food results from an ever-changing global supply chain. Ironically, the 

very advances that afford us these luxuries also create new dilemmas: a small intentional contamination can become a national foodborne disease outbreak due to the 

scale of production and wonder of the supply chain. We need better food system intelligence, more flexible and responsive prevention, preparedness, response and recovery strategies, and an expanded armamentarium of technology, training professionals and tested interventions to meet these new challenges. The university research community is an important partner in this national imperative. As Co-Director, on behalf of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD), we 

are honored to have provided you with our perspective on continuing research needs 

and how university researchers can help address this global threat to food system 

and American way of life, and defend the safety of the food system through research 

and education. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Myers for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. LEE M. MYERS, STATE VETERINARIAN 

AND ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY, 

GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Dr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify as to the State involvement in 

protecting our Nation’s food and agricultural systems. My name is 

Lee Myers. I am the State Veterinarian and Assistant Commissioner with the Georgia Department of Agriculture, and I am appearing here today on behalf of the National Association of the 

State Departments of Agriculture and as President of the United 

States Animal Health Association. NASDA represents the commissioners, secretaries and directors of agriculture in the 50 States 

and 4 territories, and the USAHA has served as the Nation’s animal health forum for well over a century. I would like to outline 

the critical role that State agriculture departments play in defending agriculture and food in our country and describe our efforts and 

challenges to build capacity to combat food and agricultural emergencies. 

State agriculture departments license, permit, inspect, and oversee activities along the entire farm to fork continuum in cooperation with our Federal partners, with the USDA and the FDA. You 

may be surprised to hear that 80μpercent of all food inspections nationwide are conducted by representatives of State and local authorities. State employees by the thousands are on the ground each 

day, inspecting agricultural facilities at the operational level. We 

own farms; we own buying stations, slaughterhouses, food procVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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essors, cold and dry storage units, warehousers, wholesalers, retail 

and food service establishments. We also oversee the transportation 

of agricultural commodities and products between all of these entities. Our employees collect samples, analyze those samples in State 

laboratories, and issue seals of approval that commodities or products meet the government standards to be transported, planted, 

processed or otherwise consumed by the general public. 

When problems arise, such as these recent recalls that have been 

discussed earlier today of spinach, peanut butter, canned meat 

products, and pet foods, it is the employees of the State Departments of Agriculture who respond within hours to track down these 

contaminated products, assure that these recalled items are removed from the grocery shelves, and directly oversee their destruction. Also, State Departments of Agriculture are the primary agencies responsible for the protection, response and recovery to animal 

and plant pests and diseases, natural disasters and other hazards 

that can harm the agricultural industry. 

We must recognize that 99 percent of emergencies are not incidents of national significance and are managed by State and local 

authorities, not the Federal Government. This includes an outbreak of a foreign animal disease, which would be managed 

through a unified command structure with our colleagues in the 

USDA, utilizing State-issued quarantines and State requirements 

for carcass disposal and State requirements for debris removal. The 

DHS recognizes that State regulatory programs and laboratories 

are the backbone of the Nation’s public network for ag and food 

safety. 

What I have described, gentlemen, is the boots on the ground, 

front-line defense for our Nation’s food and ag. This is ‘‘a day in 

the life’’ of the State Department of Agriculture. Although the vast 

majority of resources and these tactical operations and interfaces 

with the private sector are realized at the community level, States 

are the most underfunded component of the national food and ag 

security strategy. Available funding is irregular; it is modest and 

on a catch-as-catch-can basis. So how can Congress help us get it 

right and overcome the challenges of building the necessary capability to combat food and ag emergencies? 

Firstly, there is an urgent need for Congress to provide consistent and sustained funding to State agricultural authorities, to 

develop agricultural security programs and abilities within each 

State. The USAHA at its last annual meeting passed a resolution 

urging Congress to appropriate funding to States for the development of animal emergency management plans and the implementation of sustainable capabilities. It is difficult to rationalize that the 

U.S. Government doles out billions to protect our ability to surf the 

World Wide Web, and yet, the March 2007 Congressional Research 

Service Report indicates that agriculture has received on average 

2 percent of the nondefense Homeland Security budget over the 

last 5 years to assure that we have a safe and secure food supply, 

one of the primal essentials to sustain life. Ag and food defense 

must become a national priority and require that it be named as 

a State priority on State strategic plans. We believe that resources 

should be directed to each State agency and that Congress and 

56 

Federal departments should develop a detailed, integrated budget 

with sustainable dollars. 

Secondly, we recommend that Congress request Federal departments to work with States to expedite the development and the implementation of tools to identify critical infrastructure and key resources and conduct vulnerability assessments. NASDA, in cooperation with the USDA, the FDA and the DHS, announced the 

availability of a model food emergency response template over a 

year ago, and this template provides a guidance for managing food 

emergencies of varying magnitudes. However, State government 

agencies need assistance to develop and to implement their food 

emergency plans, and we believe it is cost-effective to invest in 

State and local governments with these valuable tools. NASDA has 

also partnered with other stakeholders to develop similar tools for 

the animal and plant sectors, but again, resources are short to complete the development and the implementation for tactical work in 

the States. 

Thirdly, there is no operational, comprehensive and secure communication network for agriculture to share these alerts of threats 

and linking local, State, Federal, and private partners with the appropriate security clearances. The DHS has identified strengthening information-sharing and collaboration as a specific priority, 

but quite frankly, progress is moving at a snail’s pace, and as a 

consequence we have these duplicative communication systems 

that rarely communicate with each other. A single integrated 

Homeland Security communication network for all sectors, including ag and food, should be imperative and a time certain established. The fulfillment of these three requests would be a good start 

in mitigating the current crisis of confidence that was referenced 

earlier. 

In conclusion, the State Departments of Agriculture and the 

USAHA appreciate the efforts of Congress and the administration 

to enhance the safety and security of our food supply, but yet there 

is a lot of work that needs to be done, and we want to be in full 

partnerships with our Federal colleagues to help ready America to 

prepare for, to plan for and to stay informed during significant agricultural or food emergencies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share a State 

perspective with the committee. 

[The statement of Dr. Myers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. LEE M. MYERS

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify on the safety and protection of our Nation’s food and agriculture system 

against terrorist attacks, major pests and diseases and other emergencies. My name 

is Lee Myers. I am the State Veterinarian and Assistant Commissioner of Animal 

Industry for the Georgia Department of Agriculture, and I appear here today on behalf of the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA). 

NASDA represents the commissioners, secretaries and directors of agriculture in 

the fifty states and four territories. States clearly form the first line of defense 

against the threat of a terrorist attack against our food supply. Today, I would like 

to broadly outline the critical role the state agriculture departments play in food 

safety and defense, and describe our efforts and challenges to prepare for food and 

agriculture emergencies. 

Complexity of Regulation for Food and Defense of the Agriculture Sector 

The ‘‘farm to table’’ food supply chain is a complex system that includes millions 

of acres of cropland, billions of livestock and poultry, thousands of feedlots, procVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
57 

essing plants, warehouses, and packaging and distribution networks that bring food 

from around the nation and the world to neighborhood markets and restaurants 

across the nation. 

The threat of a terrorist attack on the food and agriculture industries is likely 

to involve the contamination of commodities rather than the destruction of infrastructure. However, the diverse and widespread nature of the industry makes it extremely difficult to identify and secure every facility that might be a potential target. In the case of food, for example, introduction of minute levels of certain hazardous agents could cause widespread harm, including serious economic and social 

disruption. Local, state and federal partners as well as the industry itself have already taken important steps to help protect the food and agriculture industry from 

terrorist attack. NASDA believes there needs to be a greater linkage at all levels 

of government and the private sector of resources, expertise, and initiatives to 

achieve our shared security and emergency preparedness goals. 

Roles of State Agriculture Departments in Food Safety and Defense 

Protecting the nation’s food and agriculture industry demands the coordinated effort of public, private and university partners in the same way that all of these 

stakeholders have cooperated for decades on issues of food safety, animal health and 

plant protection. In the area of food safety, for example, the statistics are surprising: 

while this is the shared responsibility of all partners, approximately 80% of all food 

safety inspections are conducted by state and local agencies. 

State agriculture departments need sufficient field inspection forces to promote 

biosecurity of food and agriculture businesses; enhance prevention by enforcing uniform food and agriculture safety and security laws with industry; provide routine 

surveillance of food, plant and animal products; respond quickly in the event of an 

attack; and provide the means to restore confidence in the food and agriculture sector. States agriculture departments are the lead agencies in the prevention, detection and eradication of plant and animal pests and diseases in accordance with the 

national and state response plans. 

Vulnerability 

Recent food safety events have made regulatory agencies and industry realize the 

landscape of food safety and defense is changing. Risks include the tremendous 

growth of the imported foods market with limited regulatory oversight and centralized food production, processing and storage. According to USDA’s Foregin Agriculture Service (FAS) statistics, 48 percent of America’s agricultural consumption 

was imported in 2007. This includes ‘‘bulk’’ products such as wheat and cotton, ‘‘intermediate’’ products such as oils and livestock, ‘‘consumer oriented’’ products such 

as butchered meat and vegetables, and ‘‘other’’ products such as timber and seafood. 

State regulatory programs and laboratories are currently the backbone of the Nation’s food safety network. However, threats to the food supply typically cross state 

borders and have national implications. There are limited resources to develop preparedness and response plans for animals and plants (i.e. crops, hay, pasture, and 

rangeland). ‘‘Point source’’ facilities exist in agriculture (plans to protect them are 

similar to other fixed facilities). The ‘‘nonpoint sources’’ are more difficult to plan 

for, but need to be carefully considered in any agriculture preparedness and response plans. 

Vulnerability Assessments in the Food and Agriculture Sector 

The assessment of terrorist threats to food and agriculture and evaluation of the 

agriculture industry’s vulnerabilities will form the basis for developing a preparedness and response strategy for the Nation’s food and agriculture industry. The challenge is to determine the likelihood of various forms of attack and identify on a priority basis the gaps in the existing systems. 

The states have been conducting this activity for several years. In July 2004, 

NASDA and it’s affiliate organization, the Association of Food and Drug Officials 

(AFDO) conducted a survey of states to collect information about homeland security 

activities in state departments of agriculture. The purpose of the survey was to obtain a baseline assessment of state initiatives, including emergency response and 

planning, vulnerabiilty assessments, specific funding for agriculture and food defense, and training. All fifty states responded to this baseline survey. The survey 

data found that many states had completed a substantial number of vulnerability 

assessments utilizing a variety of methods from formal surveys and expert panels 

to informal assessments during regular inspections. The survey found that many 

states had developed plans across all sectors of the plant, animal, and food areas 

to mitigate perceived vulnerabilities.The survey also found that states have participated in dozens of exercises or drills to test emergency response capability and most 

included other state or federal agencies. Specific highlights of the survey results are: 

58 

• 52% of respondents indicated that their food program had received some level 

of funding for food security initiatives. 

• 56% or 28 states have developed a written food emergency response plan. 

• 44% or 22 states have conducted some type of food and agriculture vulnerability assessment. 

• 18% or 9 states have developed some type of vulnerability reduction plan to 

address food and agriculture vulnerabilities. 

The baseline survey results indicate that states are engaged in many areas of food 

and agriculture defense, but more needs to be done. 

In addition, states are working with our federal partners in several activities. We 

are participating in the Administration’s Food and Agriculture Coordinating Council 

(FACC) and Government Coordinating Council (GCC) to help meet the goals of 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD–9). Many state agriculture departments have participated in vulnerability assessments through the Strategic 

Partnership Program on Agroterrorism (SPPA), and we commend USDA for this collaboration. SPPA is a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-led partnership with 

FSIS, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) that brings a variety of stakeholders together to conduct 

vulnerabilty assessments on a variety of food commodity systems. One goal of the 

SPPA initiative is to identify countermeasures that need to be developed. 

However, state departments of agriculture need access to the findings of SPPA to 

help develop cost-effective measures to enhance our ability to prevent an attack, detect an attack at the earliest possible time, respond to protect both the public health 

and industry and recover from an attack by restoring public confidence and the economic viability of affected sectors. NASDA urges USDA, FDA, DHS, and other federal partners to complete risk and vulnerability assessments in all areas of the food 

and agriculture industry and share information relevant to the development of specific state preparedness strategies. Such information sharing is imperative as states 

develop and refine individual State Homeland Security Strategies (SHSS) and will 

be important for the seamless integration of state plans into the National Homeland 

Security Strategy. 

These initial efforts have strengthened our ability to prevent, rapidly detect, and 

respond to bioterrorism incidents, but need to be expanded. One key issue at the 

state level is the amount of effort required to accomplish this huge task. DHS, FDA, 

and UDSA have funding to accomplish vulnerability assessments, but the availability of funding is a ‘‘catch as catch can’’ basis from state to state. Funds need 

to be targeted directly to the state departments of agriculture to accomplish this 

work. 

Without better targeted and consistent funding, we will have to compete with 

other non-agriculture in-state homeland security entities. For example, the state 

homeland security grants have an 80/20 split, with the local governments receiving 

80% of the funding. We realize that all emergencies are local, and for the most part 

this is a model that works well. However, there is no local authority for agriculture 

agencies as exists for public health, fire services, or law enforcement. The agricultural authority in most states rests with the state agriculture department; but since 

these departments are considered a ‘‘state’’ entity, they do not qualify for the local 

funding. This discrepancy needs to be remedied to benefit state food defense capability. 

Challenges for State Departments of Agriculture 

• Emphasis Needed on Food Defense 

The President’s National Homeland Security Strategy recognizes the importance 

of securing the Nation’s food supply and designated agriculture as a ‘‘critical infrastructure.’’ However, ‘‘food defense’’ is difficult to achieve and needs to be considered 

one of the highest priorities for DHS. NASDA has been concerned that the emphasis 

on homeland security in border protection overshadows the need to remain vigilant 

in protecting the food and agriculture industry from the introduction of pests and 

disease at the border. We strongly believe that prevention of animal and plant terrorism and protection for the Nation’s food supply must be considered a critical priority of DHS. 

• Federal Funding and Support 

Managing the short and long term consequences of an attack on the food supply 

is among the responsibilities of state and local government supplemented by the 

resouces of the federal government. Issues related to activities such as initial response, animal and plant quarantines, withhold orders, tracing of contaminated 

product, secure communications following an event, and short and long term recovery are some of the many responsibilities faced by state governments. 

59 

To date, federal support for state departments of agriculture for agriculture and 

food defense has been very limited and inconsistent. Modest USDA support was provided to enhance animal and plant laboratories and to begin work on projects including rapid notification and other systems. While almost a billion dollars in FY03 

was provided through the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to state health agencies for uses including food security, agriculture departments have been excluded 

from receiving funds. In June 2003, NASDA released a state resource survey conducted by AFDO. The survey data indicated that of $960 million federal counterterrorism funding given to states, a mere $43 million (4.5%) went to Plant and Animal Disease Response, Surveillance and Testing; and $3.6 million (0.4%) was devoted to protecting all other elements of the food supply, such as manufacturing, 

processing, distribution, storage and retail levels for food. 

Federal funds should be better targeted and consistent to help states accomplish 

many of the tasks described above. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 

issued a Report to Congress on March 12, 2007 titled ‘‘Agroterrorism: Threats and 

Preparedness.’’ The report notes that ‘‘as a percentage of non-defense budget authority for homeland security, agriculture receives about 2.1% of the total.’’ The report 

further notes that ‘‘regular appropriations for agriculture in DHS are irregular and 

tied to particular initiatives, such as university research grants or facility construction.’’ 

• DHS Grant Program 

NASDA has been very concerned that the overall decreased funding available to 

states under the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program will have a significant impact on states’ abilities to prepare for emergencies affecting food and agriculture. 

The problem is further complicated by the fact that the grant program is currently 

one of the only sources of funding to states to support homeland security preparedness in all sectors. DHS could address this problem by assuring that the risk calculation—which is one of two components that is used to determine each state’s allocation under the grant program—fully considers the risks, vulnerabilities, and impacts associated with threats to our food and agriculture sector. 

With appropriate funding, states could: 

• develop programs dedicated to food defense, animal defense, and plant defense; • improve inspection, testing and surveillance activities; • conduct additional threat, vulnerability and risk assessments; • work with industry to identify critical infrastructure, key resources, and develop 

mitigation strategies and defense capabilities. 

• Food and Agriculture Defense Planning 

The states are particularly interested in one activity where DHS could assist in 

food defense planning and preparedness training for state agriculture, health and 

emergency management agencies. In Feburary 2006, NASDA, in cooperation with 

USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), the Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), announced the availability 

of a model Food Emergency Response Plan Template. The template is a tool that 

will enhance the protection of the Nation’s agricultural industry and food security 

through increased prevention, detection, response, and recovery planning. 

The template provides states with a guide for developing a food emergency response plan. It is designed to assist states with development of either a stand-alone 

plan for responding to a food-related emergency or an addendum to an existing allhazard state emergency response plan. Because a food emergency could occur at any 

point in the food chain from farm to fork, including pre-harvest production and 

transportation, the application of this template assists in managing emergencies 

with varying magnitude and scope. 

The template is also a ‘‘building block’’ in the national effort to develop a seamless 

system of food defense from local, state and federal perspectives. It identifies how 

these efforts will be effectively integrated with the National Response Plan (NRP) 

and state response plans, including descriptions for responding to, mitigating and 

recovering from a domestic incident. In addition, the template provides a baseline 

structure for preparing state-level plans to protect critical infrastructure and key resources identified through the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 

The state agriculture departments and other state government agencies need assistance to develop and implement their food emergency plans, along with preparedness training and education. NASDA has asked DHS to provide initial funding for 

this activity. We believe it is cost-effective to provide state and local governments 

with a valuable readiness tool to facilitate seamless regional and national responses 

to food emergencies. 

In addition to the food defense template, NASDA has partnered with others at 

the state and regional level to develop animal and plant defense planning and reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
60 

sponse templates. These templates are in a final stage of development, but additional funding is needed for full implementation and associated training. These templates should be incorporated into the context of an all-hazards approach. 

• Communications and Coordination of State and Federal Resources 

Providing the means for the food and agriculture sector to communicate during 

all phases of emergency management, particularly during a response, is the foundation for overall preparedness. There is a vital need to establish a well coordinated 

and efficient communication strategy that links agriculture stakeholders and allows 

for the rapid dissemination of information. Since local and state agriculture or 

health departments will often be the first to respond to a food emergency, communication channels between local, state and federal partners must be clearly defined 

and practiced. The same is true for any animal or plant emergency as well. Some 

of the information that needs to be efficiently shared includes: specific threat alerts 

from intelligence partners; incident notifications from field staff, industry or others; 

routine surveillance information from inspections, laboratory analyses and other 

local and state sources; and other information deemed critical to preventing human 

illness, death or serious economic harm to the industry from a terrorist attack at 

any juncture from farm to fork. 

State and federal governments must effectively communicate and coordinate resources in an emergency using the Incident Command Structure (ICS). Despite the 

federal emphasis on ICS, the response to the recent melamine contaminated proteins was not managed using ICS. States had no situational awareness and could 

not effectively respond to their constituents. The Nation’s slow response eroded consumer confidence in the pet food industry and threatened the confidence of the 

human food supply. While not a replacement for ICS in this event, NASDA set up 

and operated an information network to keep directly affected states informed. 

The use of ICS would have allowed the federal government to leverage state resources during the response to the melamine incident and other national recalls. Resources include animal diagnostic laboratories, food testing laboratories, and regulatory and administrative personnel to repond to and support the concerted effort. 

As we strengthen our laboratory resources and other response capabilities, management of resources on a national scale using ICS will become increasingly important. 

At present, there are serious impediments to establishing such a system which 

need to be addressed. These include: 

• The loss of information through unnecessary ‘‘classification’’ of documents, 

and the inefficient processing of security clearances for state agriculture officials; 

• Federal resistance to accepting investigation results, recalls and other actions 

from nationally accredited state and local laboratories; 

• The lack of an operational, comprehensive and secure communications network to share threat alerts and other information linking local, state, federal 

and private partners, with appropriate security clearance; 

• The lack of a comprehensive incident notification process for the food and agriculture industry; 

• The lack of adequate risk communications preparedness and response planning and training; as a result, states are hampered in their ability to disseminate adequate safety and technical information to the media and public during 

an incident. 

Many state agriculture officials have experienced substantial delays in the processing of their security clearances. In order for NASDA to function as an important 

organization, assisting in the liaison between state and federal governments, and 

participate fully in the homeland security initiatives of the food and agriculture sector government coordinating council, key staff have a need to know certain sensitive 

information. There is an immediate need for DHS to expedite security clearance applications for key state agriculture personnel. 

NASDA also believes more effort is needed to address the communications gap 

bewteen state and federal partners in the sharing of critical information and intelligence. Federal agencies should review currently classified information and make 

determinations about whether it needs to remain classified for security purposes. 

The results of state and local inspections and laboratory analyses found to be consistent with federal requirements should be recognized as equivalent to federal inspections and analyses. Development of rapid communications and incident notification systems should have top priority and include both public and private sector decision-makers. 

NASDA supports ongoing work being done by DHS to implement the Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN could be a significant communications 

61 

tool for local, state and federal partners, but the system is not yet operational, despite years in the making. 

Another important area is the need to protect the confidentiality of information. 

Because the majority of agricultural assets are in the private sector, necessary information may be proprietary or pertain to trade secrets or business operations. Congress should require that such information obtained from the states be maintained 

as confidential. 

Recommendations to Enhance Food and Agriculture Defense Capabilities 

As we have emphasized throughout our testimony, states clearly form the first 

line of defense against the threat of a terrorist attack against our food supply. The 

federal government should capitalize on the proven strengths of the state programs 

by providing funding, guidance, and coordination of resources to effectively protect 

the agriculture and food sector. NASDA offers the following recommendation to enhance our food and agriculture defense capabilities: 

• Congress and federal departments should develop a detailed integrated budget for food and agriculture defense, as requested by HSPD–9. 

• DHS should survey state departments of agriculture to determine homeland 

security requirements; further DHS should fund these requirements as a priority through state grants or other federal legislation that directs resources for 

food and agriculture defense. 

• DHS should develop an action action review process for agriculture and food incidents of national importance; such review should identify the gaps, lessons 

learned, and solutions to improve reponse and coordination. 

• DHS Office of Health Affairs should review the Homeland Security State Grant 

Program for food and agriculture defense and publish annual guidance for this sector to better target resources. 

Conclusion 

The state agriculture departments appreciate the efforts by Congress and the Administration to enhance the safety and security of the Nation’s food supply and the 

agricultural production system which supports it. As partners in the federal system, 

we stand ready to work with the Committee and Congress to accomplish these goals. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Myers. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Henry to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CRAIG HENRY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, SCIENTIFIC AND 

REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

Mr. HENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for inviting GMA to participate in this hearing to discuss Federal efforts to mitigate vulnerabilities to the food supply 

chain. 

The food industry is committed to assuring the safety and security of the U.S. food supply. Food defense addresses the intentional 

adulteration of food products and/or ingredients using chemical, biological, radiological agents. This requires a vigilant effort from the 

food manufacturer to know how to identify the vulnerabilities and 

to adopt effective mitigation strategies. 

The food industry has worked collaboratively with various Federal agencies for several years now to ensure the best practices are 

identified and disseminated and to develop mechanisms for Federal 

agencies to share intelligence with the food industry that can enable companies to target their vigilance. 

In preparing for a deliberate attempt to contaminate the food 

supply, food companies have participated in vulnerability assessments with government officials, with industry trade associations 

or independently, and participated as well in Table Top Exercises 

designed to simulate an actual attack on the food supply. 

62 

Food safety and food defense are the ultimate goal of all food 

companies, and achieving that goal requires the cooperative efforts 

of the regulatory agencies; that is Federal, State and local, as well 

as the food industry. 

Deliberate contamination of the food supply is still viewed as a 

relatively low potential risk but a serious concern versus food safety concerns from conventional contamination or product mishandling or mislabeling, which also includes economic adulteration, 

which has the potential to be a food safety event. 

I would like to mention the Strategic Partnership Program on 

Agroterrorism. The ‘‘SPPA,’’ as it is referred to, is a cooperative initiative among Federal and State government agencies and private 

sector volunteers to provide government and industry with more a 

complete, sector-wide perspective of food and agricultural defense. 

Under the initiative, vulnerability assessments are conducted in 

the food and agriculture sector using CARVER+Shock evaluation to 

help distinguish between real and perceived food defense 

vulnerabilities and risks. 

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002, otherwise known as the ‘‘Bioterrorism Act,’’ 

provided the FDA with the authority to promulgate regulations 

concerning the registration of food facilities, the establishment and 

maintenance of records, prior notice of imported food shipments, 

and the administrative detention of food. The FDA rules are in 

place and are being enforced. Unfortunately, funding for the 600- 

plus additional inspectors initially provided to the Center for Food 

Safety and Applied Nutrition to better enforce the regulations has 

evaporated, and the Agency has had to reduce staffing to cover the 

budget. This has largely negated any gain in efficiency the Agency 

perceived by having prior notice of all food imports so they could 

coordinate sampling and inspection efforts. Agency funding is critical to enforcement operations. 

The GMA is an active member of the Food and Agriculture Sector—Government Coordinating Council. This is a self-organized, a 

self-run and a self-governed committee composed of members in the 

food and agricultural sectors, and it serves as the government’s 

point of entry into each sector for developing and coordinating a 

wide range of infrastructure protection activities and issues. 

There is also the Food and Agriculture Sector Joint Committee 

on Research. This committee has identified a number of private 

sector needs such as better vulnerability assessment tools. As mentioned previously today, the FDA recently released a 

CARVER+Shock software tool that provides a means for all companies to conduct a vulnerability assessment of their operations. 

CARVER+Shock vulnerability assessment tool is used to assess the 

vulnerabilities within a system or infrastructure to an attack. As 

you may know, ‘‘CARVER’’ is an acronym for Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability. 

A seventh attribute, ‘‘Shock,’’ has been added to the original six 

to assess and combine health, economic, psychological impacts of an 

attack within the food industry. 

Lastly, I would like to mention another valuable tool, which is 

the Table Top Exercise. Joint industry, regulatory agency, health 

63 

department, and law enforcement officials participate in training 

exercises simulating an intentional product contamination event. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today, and I 

am pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Matthys follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ALLEN W. MATHYS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee 

I am Allen Matthys, Vice President, Federal and State Regulations, Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA). Thank you for inviting GMA to participate in this 

Hearing to discuss Federal efforts to mitigate vulnerabilities in the food supply 

chain. The food industry is committed to assuring the safety and security of the U.S. 

food supply. This includes company or third part audits as well as a review of any 

government inspection reports. 

Food safety concerns deal with identifiable risks and incorporate mitigation steps 

(including Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) evaluations, time/temperature processes, etc.) to control or reduce the likelihood of a problem occurring. 

Food defense addresses the intentional adulteration of food products and/or ingredients using chemical, bacteriological and/or radiological agents. This requires a vigilant effort from the food manufacturer to know how to identify the vulnerabilities 

and to adopt effective mitigation strategies. 

The food industry has worked collaboratively with various federal agencies for 

several years to ensure that best practices are identified and disseminated and to 

develop mechanisms for federal agencies to share intelligence with the food industry 

that can enable companies to target their vigilance. 

In preparing for a deliberate attempt to contaminate the food supply, food companies have participated in vulnerability assessments with government officials (the 

Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA)), with industry trade associations, or independently and participated in Table Top Exercises designed to simulate 

an actual attack on the food supply. The SPPA program introduced industry to the 

CARVER + Shock vulnerability assessment but the information was available only 

to those companies that participated in the SPPA event. FDA recently released a 

CARVER + Shock software tool that provides a means for all companies to conduct 

a vulnerability assessment of their operations. 

Food safety and food defense are the ultimate goal of all food companies. Achieving that goal requires the cooperative efforts of the regulatory agencies (federal, 

state, and local) and the food industry. 

Food Industry Action 

When information surfaced indicating that the food and agriculture sector was 

considered as a potential target for terrorist organizations, regulatory officials communicated this information to the industry. FDA officials indicated that they had 

conducted an internal analysis of several food product categories using the CARVER 

+ Shock analyses and identified a number of considerations that affect the risk that 

a food, at a particular point in its production, could become the target of intentional 

contamination. The following four characteristics were common to each of the food 

products identified as being at a higher risk: 

• Large batch size, resulting in large number of servings 

• Short shelf life or rapid turnaround at retail and rapid consumption 

• Uniform mixing of contaminant into food 

• High accessibility to the critical node of production, processing or distribution 

The ‘‘higher risk’’ foods received priority attention by FDA for the identification 

and implementation of preventive measures. Likewise, USDA began a similar analysis of meat and poultry products. [The initial reports were then provided to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials and duly classified as ‘‘Top Secret’’ and 

thus became inaccessible to food industry representatives.] 

Points to Cover: 

Deliberate Contamination still viewed as a low potential risk versus food 

safety concerns from conventional contamination or product mishandling 

or mislabeling (also economic adulteration has potential to be a food safety 

event). 

Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) 

Individual food companies have volunteered to participate in the SPPA program 

for several commodity groups identified by FDA/USDA as fitting the potential target 

profile. The SPPA is a cooperative initiative among federal and state government 

64 

agencies and private sector volunteers to provide government and industry with a 

more complete sector-wide perspective of food and agriculture defense. Under the 

initiative, vulnerability assessments are conducted in the food and agriculture sector 

using CARVER + Shock* evaluation to help distinguish between real and perceived 

food defense vulnerabilities and risks within the food and agriculture sector. It also 

assists in identifying potential mitigation measures and strategies that may be appropriate for the food and agriculture sector. In addition, the SPPA has assisted in 

the identification of research needs and the allocation of research investments to address priority needs. 

These vulnerability assessments with industry on a variety of foods regulated by 

the Food and Drug Administration a number of research questions were generated. 

The commodities evaluated were dairy products, fruit juices, bottled water, water 

used for food processing, and infant formula. The research questions fell into the 

following general categories: 

• partitioning of chemical compounds into the water or lipid fractions of a food; 

• thermal stability of chemical and microbiological agents; 

• stability of chemical and microbiological agents to acidic and alkaline pH; 

• changes in food conductivity upon exposure to chemical agents; 

• UV inactivation of biological agents; 

• effectiveness of disinfection agents against chemical and biological agents; 

• oral toxicity of chemical agents; and 

• filtration to eliminate or reduce chemical and biological agents 

A summary of the main research results released to date is provided at 

http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/defres05.html 

Regulatory Requirements under Bioterrorism Act 

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 

2002 (Bioterrorism Act) provided FDA with the authority to promulgate regulations 

concerning registration of food facilities, establishment and maintenance of records, 

prior notice of imported food shipments and administrative detention of food. FDA 

rules are in place and being enforced. Unfortunately, funding for the 600+ additional inspectors initially provided to CFSAN to better enforce the regulations has 

evaporated and the agency has had to reduce staffing to cover the budget. This has 

largely negated any gain in efficiency the agency received by having prior notice of 

all food imports so they could coordinate sampling and inspection efforts. Agency 

funding is critical to enforcement operations. 

GMA is an active member of the Food and Agriculture Sector—Government Coordinating Council (FASCC).FASCC 

A self-organized, self-run and self-governed committee, composed of members in 

the food and agriculture sector that serves as the government’s point of entry into 

each sector (i.e., plant and animal producers, processors/manufacturers, restaurants/ 

food service, retail, warehouses and agriculture production) for developing and coordinating a wide range of infrastructure protection activities and issues (e.g., research and development, outreach, information sharing, vulnerability assessments/ 

prioritization, shielding and recovery). 

GCC FASCC: The government counterpart to the SCC that is established to enable interagency coordination of agriculture and food defense strategies and activities, policy, and communication across government and between the government and 

each sector to collaborate and develop consensus approaches to the CI/KR protection. Membership is comprised of various levels of government (Federal, State and 

Territorial, local and tribal). . 

Food and Agriculture Sector Joint Committee on Research 

Guidelines available to industry 

Materials available from FDA, USDA, and industry 

http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/defguids.html 

Private Sector Needs 

• Better vulnerability assessment tools (FDA software tool attempts to address 

this need) 

• Efficient area surveillance technologies 

• Chemical/biological agent detection sensors—must be rapid, inexpensive, low 

false positive, low false negative, multi-agent, multi-food, easy to use, low acquisition and operation costs 

• Definitive cleaning/sanitizing and decontamination methods 

• Traceability tools 

• Robust communication tools between the food industry and federal, state and 

local authorities 

65 

• A clear understanding of how a bioterrorist event will be communicated to consumers and coordinated with other stakeholders • Basic understanding of CBR agents • Coordinated activities between the various federal agencies are still confusing 

and needs to be clarified including how state authorities are integrated into the food 

defense strategies and tactics 

CARVER + Shock Vulnerability Assessments—Tools for individual company 

evaluations 

*CARVER + Shock is an offensive targeting prioritization tool adapted from the 

military version (CARVER) for use in the food industry. The tool can be used to assess the vulnerabilities within a system or infrastructure to an attack. It allows the 

user to think like an attacker to identify the most attractive targets for an attack. 

By conducting a CARVER + Shock assessment of a food production facility or process, the user can determine the most vulnerable points in their infrastructure, and 

focus resources on protecting the most susceptible points in their system. Conduct 

vulnerability assessment; identify critical nodes, under take mitigation steps to reduce vulnerability. 

CARVER is an acronym for the following six attributes used to evaluate the 

attractiveness of a target for attack: • Criticality—measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack • Accessibility—ability to physically access and egress from target 

• Recuperability 

• ability of system to recover from an attack 

• Vulnerability—ease of accomplishing attack 

• Effect—amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production 

• Recognizability—ease of identifying target 

A seventh attribute, Shock, has been added to the original six to assess the combined health, economic and psychological impacts of an attack within the food industry. 

The attractiveness of a target can then be ranked on a scale from one to ten on 

the basis of scales that have been developed for each of the seven attributes. Conditions that are associated with lower attractiveness (or lower vulnerability) are assigned lower values (e.g., 1 or 2), whereas, conditions associated with higher 

attractiveness as a target (or higher vulnerability) are assigned higher values (e.g., 

9 or 10). Evaluating or scoring the various elements of the food sector infrastructure 

of interest for each of the CARVER-Shock attributes can help identify where an attack is most likely to occur in that infrastructure. Federal agencies, such as FDA 

and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the United States Department 

of Agriculture (USDA), have used this method to evaluate the potential 

vulnerabilities of farm-to-table supply chains of various food commodities. The 

method can also be used to assess the potential vulnerabilities of individual facilities 

or processes. 

Table Top Exercise 

Joint industry/regulatory agency/health department/law enforcement officials participate in training exercises simulating an intentional product contamination event. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Henry. I am glad that you 

brought up the CARVER+Shock program. I was reading in my 

briefing material about this program, and it is an important tool, 

obviously. 

Again, I want to thank all of the witnesses for their testimony. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

To the panel, based on your work with the Federal Government 

over the years, how would you grade the Federal effort on food security? 

We will start with you, Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I have been greatly encouraged by the collaboration we have received since we started with the National Center for 

Food Protection and Defense and how all three of the primary 

agencies are very much working with us on advancing the research 

to try and further protect the food system. We work very closely 

with FSIS, with CFSAN and with the Office of Health Affairs and 

DHS, and as I believe Carol Maczka mentioned in the first panel, 

66 

we are now working together on an imported foods research project 

specifically related to China and to other foreign countries. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Henry. 

Mr. HENRY. From the industry perspective, I would say the process that has been put forth by the Federal Government has certainly matured and improved since the onset of 9/11 initially, and 

I think during the early years the industry saw a real challenge 

amongst the various agencies to have, if you will, nice, coordinated 

communications so that each agency knew what was going on, how 

the funding was being applied, what the net results were going to 

be, and I think that that has really portrayed itself very well in recent years. Currently, through the SPPA initiative and other integrated stakeholder programs, we are much better set now to execute a program, should it occur, with an event that develops within 

the United States. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Dr. Myers. 

Dr. MYERS. I believe there have been tremendous efforts put forward by the Federal Government. However, there still remains a 

large disconnect between the Beltway here in the Washington area 

and Federal departments and what is happening in the real 

world—boots on the ground level—with State governments. State 

governments need to be brought in as full working partners, many 

times at the developmental stage rather than at the end of the 

process where we are asked for casual comments very often on 

short timelines. We want to be full working partners throughout 

the continuum, developing from the initial policy development 

stage to full implementation. 

So there has been tremendous effort, I think, particularly a 

working collaboration between Federal Governments, but there 

needs to be great enhancement of reaching out and working with 

local and State partners. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So to quantify this a little more, I want to ask 

each of you to assign a letter grade to the Federal Government’s 

efforts on food security. 

Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I would say a ‘‘B’’ at this point. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Dr. Henry. 

Mr. HENRY. I would concur. A ‘‘B’’ would be appropriate. 

Dr. MYERS. I concur, a ‘‘B.’’ 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kennedy, the University of Minnesota has a great food security simulation that has been funded by DHS. 

How has this simulation been put to work, and can you tell us 

about some problems that your scientists are most concerned about 

today? 

Mr. KENNEDY. The simulation that, I believe, you are referring 

to is something called the Consequence Management System, and 

it is built by obtaining data from the private sector in how food actually moves within the system, both internationally and in the 

United States, combined with public health system response data 

on how we would expect an actual outbreak to progress. So it allows us to provide more realistic evaluations of how potential intentional food contaminations would unfold, what would the conVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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sequences be, and therefore, how would certain interventions 

change that outcome to reduce the possible consequences. 

One of the challenges in developing a system like this is that it 

is very dependent upon the private sector data, and quite understandably, the private sector needs to check that information, so we 

do not have an easy vehicle to ensure that we have all of the appropriate data into the models on private sector food movement. 

The second challenge that we encounter is we do not have a good 

idea of exactly how the public health system will respond if there 

is an event. As a simple example, in a research study 2 years ago, 

the researcher found that emergency room physicians when presented with a case history got Bacillus anthracis right 75 percent 

of the time on the first try and botulinum neurotoxin right 50 percent on the first try. How fast will we know when it actually happens? That is an unknown in our models. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Briefly, Dr. Henry, you spoke about the CARVER+Shock program. I know one of your biggest issues of the private sector is a 

better vulnerability assessment tool. 

So can you expand upon how the CARVER+Shock software tool 

is helping you and what more the private sector is looking for in 

this area? 

Mr. HENRY. Certainly. 

The CARVER+Shock tool now being brought to bear online by 

the FDA is a very positive step forward. As you know, a number 

of our members are large as well as small and very small production facilities. They do not have the luxury of coming to various 

places, especially like Washington, D.C., to obtain training in the 

area of CARVER+Shock. This online tool will provide an excellent 

vehicle for them to capture that information and match it against 

their own in-house food defense program. We see the 

CARVER+Shock program, of course, being enhanced through additional efforts such as the one that we will be carrying forth with 

GMA later on this year where we will be doing an online Web and 

are basically open to certainly our members and others, where they 

can gain hands-on input, ask questions and try to expedite the utilization of that tool. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you, Dr. Henry. 

I thank the panel. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. McCaul of 

Texas, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

When we look at this threat, I see two scenarios. One is manmade. One could be intentional, deliberate, an act of terrorism. The 

other, probably more likely, scenario is accidental. It could be natural. It certainly could be manmade but not an intentional act. 

I agree with you, Dr. Henry, that the threat level of a deliberate 

attack is low, and let us hope it stays that way, but the risk could 

be very high. Dr. McGinn and I discussed, you know, one nightmare scenario of botulism being put in an ice cream factory which 

distributes all throughout the country, and of course children 

would be the primary consumers, and I know there are all sorts of 

nightmare scenarios. My first question is: 

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We just heard from the panel of Federal experts—the FDA, the 

DHS, the USDA—about their efforts. One of the biggest, more recent concerns is the importation of contaminated fish from China. 

That could be just as damaging as a deliberate attack. So whether 

we are importing from a country that actually intentionally wants 

to harm us through that vehicle or whether it is just accidental, 

how confident are you—and this is to the panel as a whole—that 

our ability to screen and sample as our imports come into this 

country—how confident are you in terms of our ability to secure 

and make safe the food coming into this country? 

Ms. MYERS. I may take an initial stab at that. That is one of the 

things we are struggling with at the State level, is the increase in 

ethnic and diversity of foods, many times that have foreign labels 

that are difficult for us to translate, with symbols we don’t understand. And these type of foods are increasing at an alarming rate 

through imports. 

So I think we are very concerned about the type of foods, the volume, and the different mechanisms by which they land on the 

shelves. Our ability can only be as good as we are informed and 

trained. And so, again, I point to the disconnect that we really need 

better information sharing; we need better training tools. A lot of 

these are actually tested in State laboratories. And I may use the 

melamine as a recent example. You may remember, actually, it was 

the veterinary community that discovered the problem initially in 

companion animals. And so there is a disconnect again between 

companion animal surveillance, what we might see there. The majority of these diseases through animals are zoonotic; they are contagious from animals. So we have a lot of shoring up to do. There 

are a lot of lessons learned and gaps that we need to overcome. 

And a lot of this was discovered in State veterinary labs first. So 

as was pointed out, I think our main gap is the ability to quickly 

detect that something is there before we diagnose it or recognize 

it as an outbreak. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Dr. Myers. 

Dr. Henry? 

Mr. HENRY. Yes. I think the foremost issue here on dealing with 

imports or any other products coming into the United States, but 

particularly focusing today on food, is funding. As you may be 

aware, GMA is a member of the Coalition for a Stronger FDA. 

Many efforts have been put forth here on the Hill to try to have 

Congress focus on the lack of funding that is necessary, as was 

brought up in my testimony. Funding, tied with proper resource allocation, is paramount to getting the job done. I think that, as Dr. 

Acheson testified earlier, that when you have known agents, it 

makes it a lot easier to go out there and try to make sure your 

screening and your inspection process is adequate and efficacious. 

Certainly the situation with melamine, the food industry, along 

with the Federal Government and the State agencies, we are all 

kind of scratching our head, and we are working very diligently 

right now to try to identify what the unknown agents are. And in 

this case, of course, it was pretty well defined as not an intent of 

harm, but more as an intent of economic adulteration to create a 

low-grade product into a high-grade product and then command a 

higher price. 

69 

I think, as we go through this process, we also need to look at 

the funding, which Dr. Myers brought to bear. In the case of 

CARVER+Shock or the SPPA meetings or anything else, the State 

agencies certainly are not getting the funding they need and many 

times do not have the resources to attend a lot of these events. And 

I think that that is paramount, especially if we are going to maintain a close communication and operating system to address these 

things. 

I certainly want to touch upon two other areas, and that is the 

importance of risk-based inspection and allocating risk among both 

USDA and the Food Safety Inspection System directly and FDA. As 

you may know, GMA leads the Coalition for Risk-Based Inspection, 

and certainly would look forward to Congress moving that along, 

because that is an excellent platform for the United States to embrace today. We also are driving now forth with our industry on a 

Food Safety Task Force, and later this fall, we will be holding a 

special symposium here on suppliers’ best practices. And that 

workshop is really to get down and try to define what we are doing 

right and what we could do better to make sure the imports coming 

into the United States are safe and meet the quality that the consumer expects today. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. Kennedy, do you have any comments? 

Mr. KENNEDY. In addition to concurring with the other panelists, 

I would just like to point out one item of additional concern, which 

is that, as you look at the box of food that you are eating tonight 

or the can that you pick up, look at that list of ingredients and recognize how many of those ingredients we don’t know necessarily 

from what country they came from when they are in that finished 

product. So as Mr. Langevin pointed out earlier, and in my written 

testimony, there is a comment on a repository for information on 

where food comes from, how it moves, that we can trace. Right 

now, if there were intelligence indicating that a specific country’s 

source of ingredients were of concern, a food company may not actually know that their ingredient comes from that particular company or country. We don’t have that supply chain verification mandated all the way back to the primary supplier. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I see my time has expired. Mr. Chairman, I thank 

you for holding this hearing. I look forward to working with you on 

legislation to address this important issue. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Likewise, and I thank the ranking member. I 

want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and, 

again, the members for their questions. 

The members of the subcommittee may have additional questions 

for the witnesses, and I would ask that you respond expeditiously 

in writing to those questions. Your presence here was important, 

and I thank you for that. Hearing no further business, the subcommittee now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

RESPONSES FROM DR. DAVID ACHESON

Submitted by Stepen R. Mason, Acting Assistant Commissioner for Legislation 


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QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE JAMES LANGEVIN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

RESPONSES FROM DR. CRAIG HENRY

Question 1.: Under the National Response Plan, DHS is supposed to be a 

‘‘coordinating agency’’ during a terrorist attack, major disaster, or other 

emergency involving the nation’s agriculture or food systems. Please detail 

your agency’s experience in DHS carrying out its role as coordinating 

agency? Has this been an effective process? If not what have been the challenges? 

Question 2.: With more than 15 agencies administering at least 30 laws 

related to food safety, how has your Department prepared against 

vulnerabilities? What type of coordination or information sharing do you 

routinely practice? 

Question 3.: What type of staffing challenges (vacancies, retention, recruitment, expertise, etc.) exists within your Department in carrying out 

your food mission? 

1. GMNFPA experience with DHS as a coordinating agency. 

DHS serves as the coordinating agency for the Critical Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Councils. Food and Agriculture is one of seventeen identified Critical Infrastructures as identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. DHS 

works in concert with FDA, USDA, State and local officials and food industry representatives (through the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council 

(FASCC) and its Sub-Councils) in addressing food defense issues. As the assigned 


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regulatory agencies, USDA and FDA play a major role in food defense efforts. FDA 

is responsible for implementing regulations under the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 

(Registration of Food Facilities, Establishment and Maintenance of Records, Prior 

Notice of Imported Food Shipments, and Administrative Detention). Likewise, Food 

Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) 

have implemented directives and guidelines for meat and poultry establishments 

and government purchase contracts respectively that incorporate food defense initiatives into the plant environment. FDA has prepared a single source web link to assist the food industry in meeting its food defense obligations 

http:www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼dms/defterr.html. 

2. GMNFPA experience in addressing food industry vulnerabilities. 

GMNFPA, in partnership with the Juice Products Association and representatives 

of juice processing companies conducted a vulnerability assessment of the juice industry using the method. In 2006—07 the association participated in the Strategic 

Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) vulnerability assessments for juice, 

baby food, and breakfast cereal with representatives from DHS, FDA, USDA, FBI, 

State and local food regulators. The results of these vulnerability assessments are 

classified and not directly available to the industry. FDA and USDA contracted to 

have appropriate software developed to permit private industry vulnerability assessments without access to the actual agents of concern. The software was beta tested 

by interested GMNFPA members who provided suggestions which led to appropriate 

modification and a more user friendly product. The software is now available on the 

FDA web page for downloading to a company computer for use to further safeguard 

individual company vulnerability assessments. Additional information on possible 

corrective actions. 

3. GMA/FPA staffing challenges to accomplishing food defense mission. 

GMA/FPA has one FTE assigned to represent the association on the FASCC and 

Sub-council and to deal with food defense related regulations and legislation. A significant portion of staff deal with various food safety issues including participation 

in industry training initiatives. 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE R. LANGEVIN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING

THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

RESPONSES FROM DR. TOM MCGINN

Question 1.: Under the National Response Plan, DHS is supposed to be a 

‘‘coordinating agency’’ during a terrorist attack, major disaster, or other 

emergency involving the nation’s agriculture or food systems. Please detail 

your agency’s experience in DHS carrying out its role as coordinating 

agency? Has this been an effective process? If not what have been the challenges? 

Respone: Secretary Chertoff created the position of Chief Medical Officer (CMO) 

within the Preparedness Directorate of the Department as part of the Second Stage 

review in July 2005. The office of the CMO officially commenced operations in September 2005 with a staff of three people. Since becoming operational, the office exceeded many of its original goals and milestones in 2006. On January 18, 2007, in 

response to the changing domestic security needs of the Nation, and recognizing the 

cross-cutting potential for responsibilities within the Department, Secretary Chertoff 

further expanded the role of the CMO and proposed that the Office be renamed the 

Office of Health Affairs (OHA) reporting directly to the Secretary through the Deputy Secretary. 

OHA’s role as the coordinator of DHS’s efforts related to protecting the Nation’s 

food supply focuses on Homeland Security Presidential Directive—9 (HSPD–9) (Food 

and Agro-Defense). Under this Presidential Directive, OHA leads the coordination 

for HSPD–9 implementation efforts. To assist OHA with broader access to expertise 

in its coordinating role, Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson requested ‘‘In the interest of coordination. . .that each Directorate and Office with primary expertise related to HSPD–9 (S&T, NPPD, I&A, CBP, and FEMA) assign a subject matter expert for each HSPD–9 provision.’’ 

OHA also has coordinated the support of subject matter experts from the DHS/ 

S&T managed Centers of Excellence at the University of Minnesota and Texas A&M 

University to provide advice, incident monitoring, event assessments and the capturing of lessons learned during several recent food and agriculture sector incidents, 

such as the recent foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom. 

92 

Also of note is the fact the OHA was tasked to chair and coordinate the interdepartmental working group to prepare the DHS response to the Presidential Executive Order on Import Safety. 

Question 2.: With more than 15 agencies administering at least 30 laws 

related to food safety, how has your Department prepared against 

vulnerabilities? What type of coordination or information sharing do you 

routinely practice? 

Response: DHS is working with USDA and FDA to conduct comprehensive risk 

assessments for agricultural and food commodities, which can then be used to identify protective measures and research and development gaps. Additionally, we are 

working with those agencies and sector partners to exercise communications, response and recovery efforts. OHA also coordinates 30 programs within 6 Directorates, including S&T and IP. A major threat in the food and agriculture sectors 

is a crisis of confidence, where a poorly prevented or recognized event causes people 

to question the safety of food regionally or nationally. Therefore, a swift confidencebuilding response is a critical objective of our planning and exercising efforts. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are collaborating with the private industry and the states in a joint 

initiative referred to as the Strategic Partnership Program for Agroterrorism (SPPA) 

Initiative. The SPPA Initiative is a true interagency coordinated partnership program, where an industry member or trade association and a state volunteer to participate. Each assessment involves a site visit followed by facilitated discussions between industry and government representatives. During the course of this program, 

every Food and Agriculture Sector sub-sector will be studied (i.e. production, processing, retail, warehousing, and transportation) in order to assess vulnerabilities 

across the entire farm-to-table continuum. The primary purpose of the program is, 

in full partnership with the private sector and the states, to validate or identify 

vulnerabilities at specific points within the agriculture and food supply chain and 

the sector as a whole. These visits are built upon the work done by the Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) in order to assist in implementing the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (NIPP) and the food and agriculture Sector Specific Plans (SSP). All 

of the visits are being conducted on a voluntary basis. 

A sector focused information sharing strategy that addresses incident information 

reporting, sector defense guidance and event lessons learned, such as those from the 

SPPA program, is essential. Such information sharing programs fall within the purview of DHS. 

It is also important to note that information sharing must be based upon accurate 

and timely data. Often, open source information from developing events typically 

flow much faster than anticipated, frequently outpaces the ability to validate, analyze and interpret such information. As a result, information is sometimes made 

available to the private sector before the government is informed. Therefore, several 

important information sharing channels have been developed that will aid the sector. For example, while not yet mature and fully functional, a sector specific portal 

on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is being developed. 

Significantly, DHS is leading an interagency effort to establish a National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC). NBIC’s mission is to provide situational 

awareness and facilitate early recognition of biological events, to include natural disease outbreaks, accidental or intentional use of biological agents, and emergent biohazards through the acquisition, integration, analysis and dissemination of information from existing human disease, food, agriculture, water, meteorological, and environmental surveillance systems and relevant threat and intelligence information. 

NBIS will coordinate and gather biosurveillance information across the federal government and disseminate biosurveillance information to contributing partners for 

use by senior decision-makers. 

In response to the mandates specified in HSPD–9 and HSPD–10, reflected in the 

above mission statement, DHS established the NBIS Program and by 

Decemberμ2005 achieved a nascent operational capability with a 24/7 Watchdesk in 

the National Operations Center (NOC). Concurrently, development of the NBIS 

Operational Display System (NODS) IT system began. In September 2006, a contract was awarded for development and fielding of the NBIS 2.0 IT system as a follow-on to the initial NBIS NODS System. Throughout this period to the present, the 

program has continued to add subject matter expertise while negotiating increased 

involvement and participation from prospective future member departments and 

agencies. In January 2007, Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) were established with the Departments of State, Agriculture, Defense, Interior, and Health 

and Human Services. Subsequently Department of Transportation was added 

93 

through an existing umbrella MOU. As the program evolves, an estimated five additional Federal NBIS Member Agencies (NMAs) will be added (11 total), in addition 

to select private sector and international organizations. 

With the passage of Public Law 110–53 on August 3, 2007, the NBIS mission and 

the role of the partner agencies have been reinforced and codified. 

Question 3: What type of staffing challenges (vacancies, retention, recruitment, expertise, etc.) exists within your Department in carrying out 

your food safety/defense mission? 

Response: In the near term, OHA is actively recruiting five additional staff and 

leveraging the support of NPPD and SMEs from the sector specific Centers of Excellence The FY08 budget funds enough personnel to continue a focus on the veterinary and agro-defense policies, modestly expand partnership efforts and enhance 

operational and strategic planning efforts, as well as ad-hoc incident coordination. 

In FY 2009, the OHA Food, Agriculture and Veterinary (FAV) Defense Office will 

continue to be involved with policy, planning and preparedness efforts, as well as 

sector specific strategic planning at the Federal, state and local levels. The OHA 

FAV Defense Office will continue to lead coordination efforts between DHS entities, 

as well as between other Federal, state, local and private level entities. 

One challenge to current coordination efforts is that preparations for a FAV-related emergency are, as is often the case, simultaneous with real-time events. This 

requires that DHS have enough staff capability to plan, coordinate, communicate, 

and respond to events and responsibilities now, as well as plan, coordinate, and 

communicate for future emergencies. Further, events such as infected swine importation from Canada into Minnesota, and the U.K. FMD outbreak have shown that 

an incident does not have to be intentional to cause great harm at a national level. 

These recent events all required a direct or indirect role for the OHA FAV Defense 

Office. These incident management activities have included interagency coordination, information/event reporting and providing advice directly to the Secretary and 

White House Homeland Security Council. These incidents have also required OHA 

to lead the coordination and integration of effort within DHS, and with state, local 

and private sector entities. 

The OHA FAV Defense office must continue its efforts to work with FDA, USDA, 

and our other partners to protect our homeland against food, agricultural and veterinary threats. This includes the implementation and coordination of over 30 DHSspecific biodefense/agrodefense activities under HSPD–9. 

Question 4.: Dr. McGinn, do you believe your Department needs additional authorities to fulfill your HSPD–9 responsibilities? 

Response: None at this time. However, as OHA expands its engagement with the 

private sector and the states, other authorities may be required to protect sensitive 

private sector information that is critical to understanding and sharing sector specific risk, threat, criticality, vulnerability, sector component shielding and mitigation 

strategies. 

Question 5.: Dr. McGinn, can you describe what steps the Department has 

taken to lead an interagency response to an act of agro-terror or other 

major disasters in the agriculture sector? Specifically, what plans have you 

developed and what training exercises have you completed? 

Response: DHS, in accordance with HSPD–5, has drafted a revised National Response Framework (NRF) that provides the policy and operational framework for response to all major incidents and disasters, including those that might occur with 

the food and agriculture infrastructure. Under DHS guidance and coordination, each 

sector specific agency has developed annexes to provide sector specific guidance for 

the response to such events. The National Response Framework is in the comment 

period. OHA is working with NPPD to gather state and industry response to the 

documents. 

The Framework is designed to simplify the National Response Plan for senior officials. OHA co-led a working group on animal issues as part the revisions to the NRP 

in February of 2007. While the proposed Framework document does add some information about service and companion animals, it does not include recommendations 

from the animal issue working group for a mission area[0] that would address the 

disaster management needs of the broader livestock and pet populations. This is a 

short coming for the private sector and does not provide the needed guidance for 

federal, state and local governments when dealing with the needs of these populations in times of disaster. 

DHS, in accordance with HSPD–7, has developed and published the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) that provides guidance for developing protection 

and event mitigation plans for our critical infrastructures. In addition, USDA and 

94 

FDA, developed the Sector-Specific Plans (SSP) for agriculture and food. These SSPs 

provide an overarching planning framework for a cooperative effort between Federal, state, local and tribal governments and the private industry to protect agricultural and food systems from the effects of major disasters or a terrorism event that 

targets or impacts the food and agriculture sector. 

DHS is also advancing scientific research and analysis through several national 

facilities. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is one such facility that 

provides diagnostic, research, and teaching services to prevent the introduction and 

spread of foreign animal diseases. As PIADC is aging and becoming increasingly 

costly to operate, DHS is working with USDA to build the next-generation laboratory that will allow advanced research to understand and develop better preventions 

against the threats to humans, crops, and animals. DHS sponsors two university 

Centers of Excellence to study emerging issues related to food and agro defense. One 

center at the University of Minnesota, conducts research on food defense and actually has developed a tool that allows rapid analysis of the probable distribution footprint for a contaminated food product and of the potential human morbidity and 

mortality from such events. The other is a Center of Excellence at Texas A&M University where research into the potential threats to animal agriculture is conducted. 

DHS also wants to integrate the various border defenses and enhance them with 

human and technological capabilities to defend this country against the deliberate 

or accidental introduction of foreign pathogens or pests that could affect the viability 

of our crops and animals. One key part of our border defense is the agricultural specialists within DHS’ Customs and Border Protection (CBP). These inspectors are 

specifically trained and capable of focusing on reducing the risk from imported 

foods, plants, or animals. Agricultural inspectors intercept more than 4,000 prohibited meat, plant, and animal products every day at US ports of entry. DHS recently 

formed a task force with the USDA to address the concerns of agricultural stakeholders and to identify and close gaps in the inspection process. 

In March of 2004, after a series of facilitated conferences, firms and organizations 

representing a broad range of constituents across the food and agriculture sector 

created the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council (FASCC). Shortly 

after the formation of the FASCC, DHS, USDA and FDA agreed to form a government counterpart to the FASCC called the Government Coordinating Council (GCC). 

The two councils work collaboratively on sector defense initiatives and information 

sharing. The industry sector coordinating council (SCC) is comprised of private companies and associations representing key components of the food system. The SCC 

has seven sub-councils spanning the farm-to-table continuum—agricultural input, 

animal producers, plant or crop producers, food processors, retail operations, warehouses and import/export establishments. The government coordinating council 

(GCC) is comprised of Federal, state, tribal and local governmental agencies responsible for a variety of activities including agricultural, food, veterinary, public health, 

laboratory, and law enforcement programs. In simple terms, the SCC and GCC are 

the liaison bodies that will plan, coordinate, and implement homeland security policies and programs for the food and agriculture sector. These bodies pre-date the 

NIPP and were created to build upon the Information Sharing Analysis Center 

(ISAC) approach to information sharing. 

DHS has also engaged the Centers of Excellence at the University of Minnesota 

and Texas A&M to assist in developing food and agriculture disease and product 

adulteration event modeling tools, as well as training tools and programs. Additionally, the DHS Office of Grants and Training has funded several university and community college training and training tool development efforts that are focused on the 

food and agriculture sector. Finally, there have been numerous regional and state 

sector specific response exercises funded by DHS, such as High Plains Guardian, an 

exercise conducted by the State of Kansas. 

Question 6.: According to a February 2007 DHS Inspector General report, 

DHS does not have a clearly defined system of authorities or adequate 

staffing to carry out food sector responsibilities. What has been done to address this issue? 

Response: With the assignment of departmental responsibility for coordinating 

DHS roles and missions under HSPD–9, OHA FAV Defense Office is currently expanding its staff base and mission capability. The present office staff expansion is 

focused on the recruitment and hiring of 5 additional sector specialists in the near 

term and to continue the growth of the sector focused staff in FY08. OHA has a 

Senior Sector Specialist that has joined the FAV team under an American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Fellowship and is also negotiating with 

the DHS/S&T Office of University Programs for an additional Fellow within this 

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specialty to be assigned to work out of the FAV Defense Office to work the intersection of the Research, Development (S&T) and the OHA Operational missions. 

Question 7.: According to the 2007 DHS Inspector General report, ‘‘until 

DHS develops a method to adequately track federally funded research efforts, the United States will lack a coordinated national approach to protect against agroterrorism, possibly resulting in gaps or needless duplication of effort.’’ Are there currently any coordinated efforts to track federally funded research? 

Response: Initial steps have been taken to track federally funded food and agricultural defense research. DHS has provided FDA and USDA with a summary of 

each of its projects in this area for use by the Food and Agricultural Sector Joint 

Committee on Research and for inclusion in the 2007 Food and Agricultural Sector 

Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Protection Annual Report. ‘‘In addition, an effort has been initiated at the DHS sponsored National Center for Food Protection 

and Defense to develop a combined database listing all DHS, USDA, and FDA, academic and industry programs in this area. 

Question 8.: GAO issued two reports in 2002—on foot-and-mouth disease 

and on mad cow disease—examining U.S. measures for preventing those 

diseases from entering the United States. Because of the sheer magnitude 

of international passengers and cargo that enter this country on a daily 

basis and the inspection resources that are available, completely preventing the entry of those diseases may not be feasible. GAO found that 

USDA did not provide timely guidance to border inspectors for screening 

cargo and international passengers after foot-and-mouth disease struck Europe in 2001. 

What federal efforts have been taken to address this vulnerability? 

How has communication improved between USDA and border inspectors? 

Our nation’s ports could be unnecessarily vulnerable to the intentional introduction of a disease or pest, unless the Department is able to analyze the reasons for 

declining agricultural inspections and streamline the flow of information between 

USDA and DHS inspectors at ports of entry. 

What federal efforts have been taken to address this vulnerability? 

Response: The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed a joint procedure that specifically identified the roles and responsibilities of CBP Agriculture Specialists (CBPAS) at the 

ports of entry regarding products received from restricted countries. Both agencies 

agreed to amend their existing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which addresses the agencies’ respective functional responsibilities and requirements for coordination at Headquarters and in the field. The MOU was signed on February 9, 

2003 which gave CBP the authority to enforce USDA restrictions. 

As a result, CBP and USDA performed an assessment of the controls in place to 

prevent shipments listed as being on hold in CBP’s database from exiting ports of 

entry without proper authorization. Animal and Plant Inspection Services (APHIS) 

and CBP have established that if CBP has any questions about a shipment, they 

will contact the APHIS subject matter expert to request guidance on clearance. Currently, CBP personnel thoroughly review the documentation associated with shipments received from Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) affected countries to ensure 

that prohibited product is refused entry, when appropriate. As necessary, CBP requests guidance or technical expertise from USDA on imported products. Agriculture Programs and Liaison (APL) has issued alerts, musters, and memoranda updating the field with the latest information and instructing CBP personnel to thoroughly review the documentation associated with shipments received from FMD-affected countries. 

How has communication improved between USDA and border inspectors? 

Response: CBP recognizes the importance of communicating and working collaboratively with USDA to identify, address and develop measures to exclude harmful plant pests and foreign animal diseases in protecting American agriculture. The 

revised MOU stipulates that the headquarters Agriculture Programs and Liaison 

(APL) office will continue to assist CBP Directors of Field Operation (DFOs) with 

any significant changes in operational procedures that require consultation with 

USDA in accordance with the MOA prior to implementation. 

CBP and USDA communicate relevant and vital information between both agencies. The USDA, APHIS is in a unique position of being both a partner and ally to 

CBP in fulfilling its agricultural mission. Conversely, CBP collects and maintains 

valuable information that contributes to the USDA’s scientific knowledge base, upon 

which the USDA determines national policies and procedures to protect this country 

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from agro-terrorism and other forms of agricultural economic harm. CBP has arranged training for USDA employees at the National Targeting Center (NTC) to 

hone their skills in targeting. There is presently one USDA liaison at the NTC to 

assist with the development of the agro-terrorism rule concepts and certain agricultural health and safety concerns. Data sharing allows USDA to develop specific 

alerts and targeting information for CBP, which are used at the ports of entry 

(POEs). Targeting plans call for CBP to enhance advance targeting systems support 

to collect information that will better identify, monitor, and report on current and 

emerging threats. 

Daily communications between CBP and APHIS Headquarters, monthly meetings 

between executive Directors from APL and APHIS, quarterly meetings between the 

Assistant Commissioner Office of Field Operations and APHIS Deputy Administrator, as well as quarterly meetings between the Commissioner and APHIS Administrator, all provide timely opportunities to discuss and share information at various 

levels USDA and CBP are responsible for communicating relevant and important 

agricultural information up and down their respective chain of command, as needed. 

This protocol enables every level of management to remain fully appraised of USDA 

information and to assess its potential impact at the local level. 

QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE JAMES LANGEVIN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

RESPONSES FROM LEE M. MYERS, DMV, MPH, DIPL. ACVPM 

Please Note: The responses below are submitted on behalf of the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture. The statements are intended to represent 

state agriculture departments as a whole and not any individual state agency. 

Question 1: Under the National Response Plan, DHS is supposed to be a 

‘‘coordinating agency’’ during a terrorist attack, major disaster, or other 

emergency involving the nation’s agriculture or food systems. Please detail 

your agency’s experience in DHS carrying out its role as coordinating 

agency. Has this been an effective process? If not what have been the challenges. 

Response: The National Association of State Departments of Agriculture 

(NASDA) believes that it is too early to project the effectiveness of DHS as a coordinating agency during an agriculture or food emergency. Hurricane Katrina has been 

the only major emergency since the formation of DHS and there are many reports 

detailing the lessons learned to this disaster. State agriculture representatives from 

Louisiana and Mississippi expressed frustration about the lack of federal government coordination and slow assistance to the agriculture sector during Hurricane 

Katrina. Many individuals, businesses, and agencies have not yet received financial 

compensation from the federal government as a result of hurricane damage. 

One of the primary issues that Congress has not yet resolved is the application 

of agriculture to the Stafford Act. The provisions of agriculture and food should be 

clearly outlined in the Stafford Act and should not be subject to individual interpretation. In the event of natural disaster, the agriculture and food sector should receive emergency assistance and compensation to help minimize disruption of the 

food supply. The responsibilities of federal agencies for agriculture and food during 

an emergency should be codified to minimize competing interests and agency conflicts. 

Question 2: With more than 15 agencies administering at least 30 laws related to food safety, how has your Department prepared against 

vulnerabilities? What type of coordination or information sharing do you 

routinely practice? 

Response: State agriculture agencies have completed a substantial number of 

vulnerability assessments utilizing a variety of methods, although states are relying 

upon the federal government to provide consistent tools for data collection and assessment. The joint efforts of the FBI, DHS, USDA, and FDA to develop a Strategic 

Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) initiative are encouraging. NASDA appreciates the FDA providing the assessment tool on-line for use by private industry 

in the food sector, and encourages the USDA to complete a similar on-line version 

for production agriculture. Only through consistent data collection and analysis in 

each state can a national threat matrix be formulated. State government agencies 

need additional resources to conduct these assessments, and develop and implement 

their food emergency plans. States need assistance in implementing cost-effective 

measures that enhance our ability to prevent an attack, detect an attack at the earliest possible time, respond to protect both the public health and industry and reVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:55 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\110-HRGS\110-59\48933.TXT HSEC PsN: DIANE
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cover from an attack by restoring public confidence and the economic viability of affected sectors. 

As indicated in my written and oral testimony, there is no operational, comprehensive and secure communications network for agriculture to share threat 

alerts and other information linking local, state, federal, and private partners, with 

appropriate security clearances. Current methods of routine communication are primarily through a hodge-podge system of emails and conference calls, neither of 

which provide a secure environment. 

Question 3: What type of staffing challenges (vacancies, retention, recruitment, expertise, etc.) exists within your Department in carrying out 

your food safety/defense mission? 

Response: States are in dire need of additional human resources to fully implement their food safety/defense duties. State appropriations specifically for agriculture defense have been limited and the homeland security duties in most states 

are being assumed by personnel with full schedules in traditional regulatory programs. 

Recruitment and succession planning is vital for the success of state food defense 

programs. It is critical that states successfully attract highly qualified career employees. With the majority of state employee salaries well below the market midpoint, recruiting and retaining a workforce to develop new programs and ensure 

business continuity is challenging to say the least. 

The development and implementation of a national food defense strategy must be 

identified as a national priority and the compensatory resources allocated to state 

agriculture authorities from Congress. 

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