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THE REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 7, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE

OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 7, 2009

Page 

Perry, Dr. William J., Chairman, Congressional Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States ............................................................................... 4 

Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Vice Chairman, Congressional Commission on 

the Strategic Posture of the United States; Accompanied by Senator John 

Glenn, Dr. Harry Cartland, and Dr. John Foster ............................................. 11 

(III) 

(1) 

THE REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF 

THE UNITED STATES 

THURSDAY, MAY 7, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pusuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, E. 

Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, 

Sessions, Thune, Martinez, and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Paul 

J. Hubbard, receptionist. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., deputy 

Republican staff director; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff 

member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; and Dana W. 

White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Mary C. Holloway, Jessica L. Kingston, and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator 

Hagan; Gerald Thomas, assistant to Senator Burris; Anthony J. 

Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and 

Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. First, let me welcome our Commission, Dr. Perry, Dr. Schlesinger, Chairman and 

Vice Chairman, John Glenn, a dear and old friend of ours, Dr. Foster, Dr. Cartland. We welcome you all. We thank you for your wonderful service. Many of you are old friends and have been before 

us, served with us, in the case of Senator Glenn for many, many 

years, and so this is a homecoming in a sense, a little bit of a reunion. I hated to bang the gavel. We’re having some reminisces 

2 

going on. But we must get on with our work because we have a 

bill on the Senate Floor and that means I’m going to have to leave 

at 10:30 a.m. 

I know that Senator McCain probably will want to be there, as 

well. He’s been a total partner on a bill that we have on the Senate 

floor. This is going to be a bit hurried for the two of us and maybe 

others, as well, but you’re used to that. 

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 

United States was established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to examine recommendations with respect to the long-term strategic posture of the United States. 

Over the course of the last several years, there’s been much debate and discussion about the future of nuclear weapons but there’s 

been a lack of a coherent plan or policy. For the most part, the debates here in Congress center on specific programs, such as lowyield nuclear weapons, the mini-nukes, the robust nuclear earthpenetrator, the reliable replacement warhead. 

Then in September 2007, when the Air Force unknowingly flew 

nuclear weapons across the country and then later on when the Air 

Force discovered it had unknowingly shipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) nose cones to Taiwan, nuclear matters became 

the source of public discussion again and the cause for dismissal, 

in fact, of the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Various reviews and reports in the months following those events 

disclosed additional problems and issues within the nuclear enterprise. 

The conclusions in these reports demonstrate that the uncertainty and confusion in U.S. nuclear policy was a major source of 

the chaos in the nuclear enterprise. All of these events led in turn 

to the erosion of the funding, to conflicting direction, and to the 

general breakdown of consensus that had generally existed for the 

first decade of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). 

The task before this Commission was to examine all elements of 

the nuclear enterprise and nuclear policy, to make recommendations as appropriate and to determine where there is and is not 

consensus on these important matters. 

The Commission’s report contains 11 separate discussion topics 

and 100 recommendations. Some will have very broad support, 

such as the conclusion that the United States must lead international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 

reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide. Other conclusions will need more discussion and review and have less consensus behind them perhaps. 

An overarching finding of the report is that the United States 

has an opportunity and there’s urgency to reengage with the international community by seeking international solutions to the problems of nuclear proliferation and nuclear threats. 

Our committee thanks you all for your extraordinarily hard 

work. The staff, the working group members, all of you, we’re 

grateful to all of you for this report, and together with the Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR), this report should help to restore clarity 

and hopefully consensus to U.S. nuclear policy. 

Senator McCain. 

3 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to again 

echo your sentiments about our witnesses today who we’ve had the 

opportunity to work with and to serve with for many years and 

through many contributions to the security of this Nation. Thank 

you, Dr. Schlesinger, Dr. Perry, Senator Glenn, Dr. Cartland, and 

Dr. Foster. Thank you all for being here and thank you for this latest contribution you’ve made in helping us ensure the future security of this Nation. 

This Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture report 

both addresses many of the complexities we face in the world today 

and plays an important role in fostering a national bipartisan discussion on the current state and path forward of our strategic deterrent. 

This report takes an important look at the steps needed to make 

sure that our deterrent remains credible and that our nuclear infrastructure remains viable. It addresses missile defense as well as 

the path forward for reenergizing our nonproliferation efforts. 

The work of this Commission will likely influence the upcoming 

NPR as well as congressional consideration of strategic issues over 

the next few years. It will also play an important role as the 

United States formulates its approach to discussions about the future of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which will 

expire at the end of this year. 

As we move through these steps, it’s imperative that we move to 

reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal to the lowest levels possible, 

while at the same time taking the appropriate steps to ensure that 

our nuclear deterrent remains safe and reliable. 

In addition, we must maintain our focus on developing a robust 

missile defense system and superior conventional forces capable of 

defending both the United States and our allies. 

As we all know, there are significant hurdles before us, including 

the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, ensuring that nuclear weapons remain out of the hands of terrorists, and strengthening the international will of imposed sanctions towards those 

who seek to proliferate nuclear arms. 

We should begin a dialogue with China to encourage its conformity with the practices of the other foreign nuclear weapon 

states recognized in the Nuclear Nonpoliferation Treaty (NPT) and 

work with Russia to build confidence in our missile defense program. 

Among the other steps we must take, I agree in principle with 

a number of the recommendations outlined in the report that we’re 

here today to discuss. 

Above all, it is imperative that America lead by example. Our 

leadership on strategic issues is as vital today as it was during the 

Cold War. 

Internationally, reports from Pakistan are a major cause for concern. With the Taliban only 60 miles outside of Islamabad, the 

prospect of an insecure Pakistani nuclear arsenal poses a grave 

threat to our national security. We must do whatever it takes to 

ensure that Pakistan is able to secure its nuclear assets, and I look 

forward to hearing the panel’s views on this matter. 

4 

As for missile defense, early last month Secretary Gates announced the transition in focus to the theater missile threat posed 

by rogue states. I have some concerns with the proposed $1.4 billion overall reduction in funding and I look forward to hearing from 

our Commission about Secretary Gates’ proposal and how the 

changes he has outlined could affect the important role missile defense plays in our strategic posture. 

For too long Congress has avoided serious debate on significant 

strategic force issues. I thank the members of this Commission for 

their thoughtful assessments and recommendations and I look forward to today’s hearing and working with you to address the future 

of our strategic posture and our shared desire to reduce the danger 

of nuclear weapons being used. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do apologize to the witnesses. 

We are on the floor at 10:30 a.m. with our first real serious attempt in some time in bringing the cost overruns of our defense 

systems under control. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Dr. Perry, let’s start with you. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Very early in our deliberations, we met with Senator Sessions 

and he urged us to come up with a consensus report. He said, ‘‘A 

consensus report would have a much greater weight with the Senate than anything else we’d come up with.’’ At the time, I said, 

‘‘Easy for you to say.’’ [Laughter.] 

But we gave it our best shot and with one exception this report 

is a consensus report and that was no small effort to achieve. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions was right. It does have greater power when you’re able to do that and we congratulate you for 

it. 

Dr. PERRY. We have, as you pointed out, 100 different recommendations in this report. I do not propose to review all those 

with you. I do have written testimony which I would like to submit 

for the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be part of the record. 

Dr. PERRY. My comments then are going to be focused on briefly 

relating the major findings in this report. The strategic policies of 

the administration as it goes into office. These policies will no 

doubt evolve as the administration does their own NPR, but I’m relating these policies to the going-in policies, articulated by President Obama in his speech in Prague. 

First of all, he said, ‘‘The nation faces a new threat, nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, but besides that, it needs to hedge 

against the possible resurgence of the old threat.’’ One statement 

of policy. This Commission agrees with that statement. 

Second, he had said, ‘‘NPT is critical to dealing with this new 

threat. The United States should work to strengthen the NPT and, 

in particular, should commit more resources to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency.’’ This Commission agrees with that finding. 

5 

Third, he said, ‘‘The success in preventing proliferation will require the effort of all nations, not just the United States, and not 

just the nuclear powers, and getting cooperation will entail the 

United States and other nuclear powers making progress in nuclear disarmament.’’ I agree fully with this statement. Some of our 

members think that would be overstated. Others say there’s a difference in degree of that issue, but all of us see some coupling between those two areas. 

Fourth, the President, in his Prague speech, made a very strong 

statement that ‘‘the United States seeks a world without nuclear 

weapons and that therefore we should reduce their numbers and 

their salience,’’ but he says, ‘‘As long as nuclear weapons exist, the 

United States must maintain safe, secure, reliable forces capable of 

providing deterrence and extended deterrence.’’ All of our members 

agree with the latter part of that statement, mainly the importance 

of maintaining safe, secure, and reliable deterrent forces. 

I strongly agree with the full statement. I must say that some 

of the members do not agree that we should be seeking a world 

without nuclear weapons, but all of them fully support the view 

that we should be reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, if that 

can be done in a bilateral fashion. 

The fifth statement of the administration is that ‘‘we should seek 

new treaties, a new START, a fissile material cut-off treaty, and a 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).’’ All of our members agree 

that it’s important to seek a new START and a treaty on fissile material cut-off. 

On the CTBT ratification, our members are divided. We clearly 

articulate that division in the report and the pros and cons. My 

own view is that the United States cannot assume leadership in 

the field of proliferation if we do not ratify the CTBT and so I 

strongly support that ratification. This is an issue which will be 

coming before the Senate very shortly. Many of us will no doubt 

be asked to testify on that matter. I will be testifying in favor of 

it, some of our members will be testifying against it. So we are divided on that issue. 

On missile defense, we focused on two different aspects. One, the 

President said, ‘‘We should move forward on missile defense as long 

as the Iranian threat persists’’ and that ‘‘we should seek to find a 

way of cooperating with the Russians on this.’’ We agree with both 

of those conclusions. 

There are real differences among our members on the relative 

role as well as the importance of missile defense, but on those two 

issues, we are in agreement. 

The President has talked about civilian nuclear programs, and 

we need to get that under control; and we need a new international 

framework to discourage the spread of enrichment and processing 

capabilities, and we all agree with that. 

Finally, the President said, ‘‘We should seek to roll back North 

Korea’s nuclear program and prevent Iran.’’ He observed, ‘‘The SixParty Talks have failed to stop North Korea from going ahead with 

their nuclear program,’’ that ‘‘compliance with the NPT is in tatters 

and that there must be consequences when nations violate it.’’ We 

agree with all of those conclusions. The question is: how do you do 

those things? 

6 

Beyond reporting on these policy issues, we make specific recommendations on how to sustain the deterrent force, particularly 

in the face of an American policy of no testing, no design of new 

weapons, and the limited funding that has been put on the program. 

The key to doing this is maintaining the strength of our weapons 

laboratories which have outstanding technical staffs. We have had 

remarkable success to this date in the SSP and the Life Extension 

Program, but as our weapons age, that success is going to become 

very much harder to achieve. 

Given that problem, the government has responded by cutting 

the staff at the weapons laboratories and we find that inexplicable. 

We argue that that trend should be reversed and beyond that we 

suggest that the laboratories should have added responsibilities in 

other fields besides nuclear weapons. In particular, in civilian energy, nuclear intelligence, and in general research and development. 

The labs are unique national assets and by giving them this expanded national security role, they can be a great benefit to the 

Nation. If that were done, they probably should be renamed national security laboratories for the Nation, not just the nuclear 

weapons labs. 

If this were done, we should really give them freedom of action 

appropriate for this mission. In particular, the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) should have more autonomy than 

it now has and we have recommended that it report to the President through the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) 

which is different from present reporting channels. 

The problem in the past with NNSA was its inability to provide 

adequate management, because of the bureaucratic staff, mostly in 

DOE. We need to find a way of getting full engagement of the Secretary of Energy without the burdensome bureaucracy imposed by 

his staff. 

I’m going to conclude by observing that we have a world ahead 

of us which has very imposing dangers. The danger that the nonproliferation regime will collapse is facing us right now. There is 

also the danger that there will be a cascade of proliferation in the 

next few years. Both of these increase the risk of nuclear terrorism; 

and the danger that nuclear powers will reengage in a competition, 

reminiscent of the Cold War. There is also some hope we can have 

a brighter future if we can find a way of sustaining the nuclear 

nonproliferation regime, constraining proliferation, stymieing nuclear terrorism, and that the nuclear powers will find a way of cooperating instead of competing in the nuclear field. 

The report which we are submitting to you describes the strategy 

which we think will lead to a more hopeful future rather than the 

bleak future which I’ve previously described. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to now turn it over to Dr. 

Schlesinger. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and Members of the Armed Services 

Committee, it is a pleasure to be here today with my colleague Dr. Schlesinger to 

7 

present to you the findings and results of the work of the Congressional Commission 

on the Strategic Posture of the United States. 

Last year, Congress appointed our 12-person bipartisan group to conduct this review of U.S. strategic posture, and asked me to serve as Chairman with Jim Schlesinger as Vice Chairman. This Commission has deliberated for the last 11 months 

and is now prepared to report to the administration, to Congress, and to the American people, and we are here today to do so. We all applaud the wisdom of Congress 

in setting up this Commission. For too long, there have been unanswered, even 

unasked, questions about the strategic posture of the United States, especially the 

nuclear dimensions of that posture. This ‘‘strategic silence’’ has not served America 

well. Continuing questions about our broader strategic posture have gone 

unaddressed, while the military, geopolitical, and technical needs that underlie 

these questions have grown ever more insistent. We understood from the outset that 

the lack of consensus about the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent was a key 

motivator in Congress’s charge to the Commission. So your tasking last year to the 

Commission was timely. We hope that our report will be a useful input to the new 

administration as it prepares to undertake a new nuclear posture review. 

The Commission has greatly benefited from the input of a number of Members 

of Congress, outside groups and individuals of every stripe that care deeply about 

these issues and their country. Likewise we have been enriched in our understanding of these issues by the thoughtful perspectives and advice of nations that 

are U.S. allies, friends, or fellow nuclear powers. We received unstinting assistance 

from the executive branch, which has been individually and collectively supportive 

of the Commission. The United States Institute of Peace, its employees and contractors have provided outstanding support to the Commission, and I thank them. I also 

want to make special mention of and praise the members of our five Expert Working 

Groups and their leaders, who have volunteered countless hours of their time in 

supporting the Commission and its work and provided us with strong intellectual 

assistance of the highest caliber. 

While each Commissioner would have written a report that would be worded 

somewhat differently than our final report, it is most significant that with the exception of parts of the chapter on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), this 

is a consensus document. Even with CTBT, while we could not agree on common 

language overall, we did agree on recommendations that would prepare the way for 

Senate reconsideration of the Treaty. We strove to ensure that the essence of our 

disagreement was presented as clearly and succinctly as possible so that interested 

individuals and groups can review the arguments, weigh them carefully, and reach 

their own conclusions. 

At the beginning of the Commission’s work, I did not imagine that such an ideologically disparate group of senior experts would find so much common ground. The 

trail we followed to arrive at this document was not always easy for us, logistically, 

intellectually, or emotionally. But the seriousness of the issues, and the stakes involved for America and the world, called forth the ‘‘better angels’’ in all of us Commissioners, producing the largely consensus document you have before you today. 

We hope that the executive branch and Congress will also face these critical security 

policy issues in a similar nonpartisan spirit. 

In conducting its work, the Commission has adopted a broad definition of strategic 

posture. We defined the scope of our work to include all dimensions of nuclear weapons, including the key infrastructures that support them, and all the major tools to 

counter the nuclear threat to the United States and its allies, including arms control, missile defense, and countering nuclear proliferation. But we also defined some 

limits to our inquiry. For example, we chose not to expand our scope of work to address issues associated with all weapons of mass destruction, though we did address 

the question of whether and how nuclear weapons have a role in deterring attacks 

with biological weapons. Neither did we examine threats such as cyber attacks and 

space conflict, though this does not mean we consider them unimportant, and believe they merit serious examination in the near future. Also, our pre-eminent conventional military capabilities are themselves a major strategic force, but we understood Congress was not seeking our advice on these matters. 

When one considers the destructive power of the nuclear weapons within our strategic posture, which generated important disagreements throughout the Cold War 

and after, it is not surprising the American nuclear posture has been, and will continue to be, highly controversial on key issues. What was surprising is the extent 

to which our commission did reach agreement on numerous issues related to our deterrent capabilities, nonproliferation initiatives and arms control strategies—what I 

believe are the three key components of U.S. strategic posture in the years ahead. 

The Commission agreed that the Nation must continue to safeguard itself by maintaining a nuclear deterrent appropriate to existing threats until such time as 

8 

verifiable international agreements are in place that could set the conditions for the 

final abolition of nuclear weapons. That is, we seek to safeguard our security by 

supporting military and intelligence programs that maintain our deterrence force. 

At the same time, we also seek to safeguard our security by supporting largely nonmilitary programs that prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, 

that reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide, and that provide better protection for the residual nuclear forces and fissile material. Both approaches are necessary for America’s future; each can and should reinforce the other; and neither 

by itself is sufficient as long as nuclear weapons still exist in the world. 

Nuclear weapons safeguarded our security for decades during the Cold War by deterring an attack on the U.S. and its allies. We will need them to continue to perform this deterrence role as long as others possess them as well. On the other hand, 

if nuclear weapons were to fall into the hands of a terror organization, they could 

pose an extremely serious threat to our security, and one for which traditional forms 

of deterrence would not be applicable, given the terrorist mindset. We must be 

mindful that al Qaeda, for example, has declared that obtaining a nuclear weapon 

is a ‘‘holy duty’’ for its members. Preventing nuclear terrorism is closely tied to stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and recent developments in North Korea 

and Iran suggest that we may be at or near a tipping point in nuclear proliferation. 

(The urgency of stopping proliferation is articulated compellingly in the recent WMD 

Commission report: ‘‘World at Risk.’’) 

While the programs that maintain our deterrence force are national, the programs 

that prevent proliferation and safeguard nuclear weapons and fissile material are 

both national and international. Indeed, it is clear that we cannot meet our goal of 

reducing the proliferation threat without substantial international cooperation. We 

cannot ‘‘go it alone’’ on this crucial security issue, nor need we, given that other nations are at risk from nuclear proliferation as much as we. But the international 

programs that are most effective in containing and rolling back proliferation can 

sometimes be in conflict with the national programs designed to maintain deterrence. Thus a strategic posture for the U.S. that meets both of these security requirements will necessarily have to make some tradeoffs between these two important security goals when they are in conflict. Some commissioners give a priority 

to dealing with one threat while others give a priority to dealing with the other 

threat. But throughout the deliberations of the commission, there was unswerving 

member loyalty to the importance of assuring U.S. security in the years ahead, and 

all of our members sought to strike a balance that supports, to reasonable levels, 

both of these security needs. To a large extent, I am pleased to say, we were able 

to meet that objective. 

The need to strike such a balance has been with us at least since the ending of 

the Cold War. President Clinton’s policy on nuclear posture spoke of the need to 

‘‘lead but hedge.’’ That policy called for the U.S. to lead the world in mutual nuclear 

arms reductions and to lead in programs to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons, while at the same time maintaining a nuclear deterrent force that hedged 

against adverse geopolitical developments. The leadership aspect of this policy was 

demonstrated most vividly by a cooperative program with Russia, established under 

the Nunn-Lugar Program that dismantled more than 4,000 Russian nuclear weapons and assisted Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in removing all of their nuclear 

weapons, a signal contribution to a safer world. U.S. leadership was also demonstrated by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which seeks a 

permanent end to all nuclear testing, and negotiating with Russia a new arms control treaty for further reductions in nuclear weapons. However, neither treaty was 

ratified by the Senate. The Bush administration initially took a different view on 

U.S. strategic posture, but last year Defense Secretary Gates explicitly reaffirmed 

that the American nuclear posture would be based on the time-tested ‘‘lead but 

hedge’’ strategy. 

President Obama has moved this strategy forward, stating that the U.S. should 

work towards the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. But he has 

also said that until that goal is reached, he is committed to maintain a U.S. nuclear 

deterrent that is safe, secure, and reliable. This is, in a sense, the most recent formulation of the ‘‘lead but hedge’’ policy. The Commission believes that reaching the 

ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a fundamental change in 

the world geopolitical situation, something that none of us believe is imminent. Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of this committee, who has espoused the vision 

of nuclear elimination, has described this vision as the ‘‘top of the mountain,’’ which 

cannot be seen at this time, and the exact path to which is not yet visible. But he 

argues that we should be heading up the mountain to a ‘‘base camp’’ that would 

be safer than where we are today, and from which the path to the mountaintop becomes clearer. In Nunn’s view, getting the international political support to move 

9 

to this ‘‘base camp’’ requires the United States to affirm the vision of global elimination of nuclear weapons. When we reach the base camp, it would: 

• provide for U.S. nuclear forces that are safe, secure and can reliably deter 

attacks against the U.S. and our allies; 

• be headed in the direction of the global elimination of nuclear weapons; 

and 

• be stable—that is, it should be sustainable even under typical fluctuations in geopolitical conditions. 

This base camp concept serves as an organizing principle for my own thinking 

about our strategic posture, since it allows the United States to both lead in the 

struggle to reduce and ultimately eliminate the nuclear danger; and hedge against 

a reversal in this struggle, providing an important safety net for U.S. security. 

While some of the commissioners do not accept this view of the base camp as an 

organizing principle, all commissioners accept the view that the U.S. must support 

programs that both lead and hedge; that is, programs that move in two parallel 

paths—one path which protects our security by maintaining deterrence, and the 

other which protects our security by reducing the danger of nuclear weapons. 

The first path, ‘‘Deterrence,’’ would include the following components: 

• Clarify our policy on use of nuclear weapons to include a statement that 

our nuclear forces are intended to deter an attack against the U.S. or its 

allies (extending this security guarantee to our allies is often referred to as 

‘‘extended deterrence’’) and would be used only as a defensive last resort; 

at the same time, our policy would reaffirm the security assurances we 

have made to non-nuclear states that signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT). 

• Back up our deterrent and extended deterrent policy by assuring that our 

nuclear forces—including the weapons themselves, their delivery platforms, 

and the surveillance, detection, and command/control/communications/intelligence infrastructures that support them and the National Command Authority—are safe, secure, and reliable, and in sufficient quantities to perform their deterrent tasks; 

• Maintain the safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of our nuclear 

weapons stockpile by an enhanced nuclear weapons life extension program 

as long as it is feasible; but ensure the nuclear weapons laboratories maintain their capability to design a new weapon should that ever become necessary; 

• Provide robust support for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, DOE’s 

highly successful program to ensure the safety, security and reliability of 

the Nation’s nuclear stockpile without testing. This program seeks a comprehensive, science-based understanding of nuclear weapon systems, and 

entails pushing the frontiers of computing and simulation along with ensuring robust laboratory experimental capabilities. The weapons labs have 

achieved remarkable success with stockpile stewardship, but continued success is endangered by recent personnel and funding cuts. 

• Maintain all three weapon laboratories with programs that fully support 

the nuclear weapons programs and maintain their scientific and design vitality. Besides weapons programs, their program mix should include fundamental research and energy technologies as well as an expanded national 

security role, which will benefit other dimensions of the security challenges 

we face. 

• Transform our weapons production capability by reducing and modernizing it, giving first priority to the Los Alamos plutonium facility, followed 

by the Y–12 site Uranium Processing Facility site after the plutonium facilities are under construction. The goal would be to have a capability to 

produce small numbers of nuclear weapons as needed to maintain nuclear 

stockpile reliability. 

• Provide proven strategic missile defenses sufficient to limit damage from 

and defend against a limited nuclear threat such as posed by North Korea 

or Iran, as long as the defenses are effective enough to at least sow doubts 

in the minds of such countries that an attack would succeed. These defenses should not be so sizable or capable as to sow such doubts in the 

minds of Russia or China, which could well lead them to take countering 

actions, increasing the nuclear threat to the U.S. and its allies and friends 

and undermining efforts to reduce nuclear numbers, and nuclear dangers. 

• Reprogram funding to initiate F–35 fighter aircraft contractor participation with NNSA to assure that the U.S. would maintain current capabilities 

available to support U.S. allies. 

10 

The Commission recognizes the tension between modernization and nonproliferation. But so long as modernization proceeds within the framework of existing U.S. 

policy, it should minimize political difficulties. As a matter of policy, the United 

States does not produce fissile materials and does not conduct nuclear explosive 

tests, and does not currently seek new weapons with new military characteristics. 

Within this framework, the United States should seek all of the possible benefits 

of improved safety, security, and reliability. 

The second path, ‘‘Reducing the Danger,’’ includes the following components: 

• Re-energize efforts to reverse the nuclear proliferation of North Korea 

and prevent the nuclear proliferation of Iran. Seek global cooperation to 

deal with other potential proliferation concerns arising from the anticipated 

global expansion of civilian nuclear power. 

• Negotiate arms reduction treaties with Russia that make significant reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the United States. The 

treaties should include verification procedures and should entail real reductions, not just a transfer from deployed to Reserve Forces. The first treaty 

could decrease deployed strategic warheads to numbers lower than the 

lower SORT limit (Moscow Treaty of 2002), but the actual numbers are 

probably less important than the ‘‘counting and attribution rules’’ of preceding agreements. I am quite encouraged by President Obama’s announcement that he will seek a replacement strategic arms agreement before 

START I expires this December, and the positive Russian response. Followon treaties should seek deeper reductions, which would require finding 

ways to deal with difficult problems such as addressing ‘‘tactical’’ nuclear 

forces, Reserve weapons and engaging other nuclear powers. 

• Seek a deeper strategic dialogue with Russia that is broader than nuclear 

treaties, to include civilian nuclear energy, ballistic missile defenses, space 

systems, nuclear nonproliferation steps, and ways of improving warning 

systems and increasing decision time. 

• Renew and strengthen strategic dialogue with a broad set of states interested in strategic stability, including not just Russia and our North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization allies but also China and U.S. allies and friends in 

Asia. 

• Augment funding for threat reduction activities that strengthen controls 

at vulnerable nuclear sites. The surest way to prevent nuclear terrorism is 

to deny terrorist acquisitions of nuclear weapons or fissile materials. An accelerated campaign to close or secure the world’s most vulnerable nuclear 

sites as quickly as possible should be a top national priority. This would 

build on and expand the important foundation of work begun under the 

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Commit to the investment necessary to remove or secure all fissile material at vulnerable sites 

worldwide in 4 years. This relatively small investment could dramatically 

decrease the prospects of terrorist nuclear acquisition. 

• Seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and encourage other hold-outs to do likewise. I strongly support Senate ratification 

of the CTBT, but I want to be clear that my view is not shared by all commissioners. I believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, established 

as a safeguard when the U.S. signed the CTBT, has been an outstanding 

success, and, with sufficient funding support, can continue to be. The 

United States has refrained from testing nuclear weapons for 17 years already and has no plans to resume such testing in the future. Prior to seeking ratification, the administration should obtain an explicit understanding 

with the P–5 states as to what tests are permitted by the treaty, and conduct a careful analysis of the issues that prevented ratification a decade 

ago. (All commissioners agree that these preceding steps should be taken, 

but not all commissioners support ratifying the CTBT.) 

• While the Senate has the responsibility for considering the CTBT for ratification, both the Senate and the House should support funding for any 

Treaty safeguards the Obama administration may propose, which will be 

essential to the ratification process. 

• Prepare carefully for the NPT review conference in 2010. If we are able 

to make progress in a new arms reduction treaty and CTBT ratification, 

this would reassert U.S. leadership and create favorable conditions for a 

successful conference. 

• Seek an international Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, as President Obama 

has called for, that includes verification procedures, and redouble domestic 

and international efforts to secure all stocks of fissile material, steps that 

would discourage both nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. 

11 

• Seek to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its 

task to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations and 

control access to fissile material. In particular, work with the IAEA to promote universal adoption of the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which would 

allow extra inspections of suspected nuclear facilities as well as declared facilities. 

• Develop and pursue options for advancing U.S. interests in stability in 

outer space and in increasing warning and decision-time. The options could 

include the possibility of negotiated measures. 

• Renew the practice and spirit of executive-legislative dialogue on nuclear 

strategy that helped pave the way for bipartisanship and continuity in policy in past years. To this end, we urge the Senate to consider reviving the 

Arms Control Observer Group, which served the country well in the past. 

In surveying six-plus decades of nuclear history, the Commission notes that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. It is clear that a tradition against 

the use of nuclear weapons has taken hold, which we must strive to maintain, and 

urge all nuclear-armed nations to adhere to it. 

In sum, this is a moment of opportunity but also of urgency. The opportunity 

arises from the arrival of the new administration in Washington and the top-down 

reassessment that must now begin of national security strategy and of the purposes 

of U.S. nuclear weapons. The opportunity also arises because the Russian government has indicated a readiness to undertake a serious dialogue with the U.S. on 

strategic issues. The urgency arises because of the imminent danger of nuclear terrorism if we pass a tipping point in nuclear proliferation. The urgency also arises 

because of an accumulation of difficult decisions affecting our nuclear posture. 

The commissioners know and agree on what direction they want to see the world 

take. We reject the vision of a future world defined by a collapse of the nonproliferation regime, a cascade of nuclear proliferation to new states, a resulting dramatic 

rise in the risks of nuclear terrorism, and renewed fruitless competition for nuclear 

advantage among major powers. 

As pragmatic experts, we embrace a different vision. We see a world where the 

occasional nonproliferation failure is counter-balanced by the occasional rollback of 

some and continued restraint by the many. We see a world in which nuclear terrorism risks are steadily reduced through stronger cooperative measures to control 

terrorist access to materials, technology, and expertise. We see a world of cooperation among the major powers that ensures strategic stability and order, and steadily 

diminishes reliance on nuclear weapons to preserve world peace, not as a favor to 

others, but because it is in the best interests of the United States, and the world. 

We commissioners believe that implementing the strategy our report recommends 

will help the United States lead the global effort to give fruitful birth to this new 

world. 

Chairman LEVIN. Dr. Perry, thank you so much. 

Dr. Schlesinger. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES; ACCOMPANIED BY SENATOR 

JOHN GLENN, DR. HARRY CARTLAND, AND DR. JOHN FOSTER 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Congress established the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States in order to provide recommendations regarding the appropriate posture for the United States 

under the changed conditions of the 21st century. The appointed 

commissioners represented a wide range of the political spectrum 

and had quite diverse judgments on these matters. 

Nonetheless, urged by Members of Congress, including Senator 

Sessions, the Commission has sought to develop a consensus view. 

To a large extent and to some an astonishing extent, the Commission has succeeded in that effort. 

12 

Secretary Perry and I are here to present this consensus to the 

committee. We are, of course, indebted to the committee for this opportunity to present these recommendations. 

For over half a century, the U.S. strategic policy has been driven 

by two critical elements: to maintain a deterrent that prevents attacks on the United States, its interests and, notably, its allies, and 

to prevent a proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

Dr. Perry mentioned that nuclear proliferation is a new issue. It 

is an old issue which is now enhanced by subsequent developments. 

The end of the Cold War and particularly the collapse of the Soviet Union Warsaw Pact, along with the substantial edge that the 

United States is developing conventional military capabilities, have 

permitted this country sharply to reduce our reliance on nuclear 

weapons, radically to reduce our nuclear forces, and to move away 

from a doctrine of nuclear initiation to a stance of nuclear response 

only under extreme circumstances of major attack on the United 

States or its allies. 

On the other hand, the growing availability of nuclear technology, along with the relaxation of the constraints of the Cold 

War, have obliged us to turn increasing attention to the problem 

of non-proliferation and, in particular, the possibility of a terrorist 

nuclear attack on the United States. 

Secretary Perry has just spoken on the issues of arms control, diplomacy, the problems of proliferation, and the risks of nuclear terrorism. I, for my part, will focus on the need, despite its substantially shrunken role in the post Cold War world, to maintain a deterrent reduced in size, yet nonetheless reliable and secure and sufficiently impressive and visible to provide assurance to the 30-odd 

nations that are protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

Since the early days of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), the United States has provided extended deterrence for its 

allies. That has proved a far more demanding task than the protection of the United States itself. In the past that has required a deterrence sufficiently large and sophisticated to deter a conventional 

attack by the Soviet Union Warsaw Pact. 

It also meant that the United States discouraged the development of national nuclear capabilities, particularly during the Kennedy administration, both to prevent proliferation and to avoid the 

diversion of resources away from the development of conventional 

allied capabilities. 

With the end of the Cold War and the achievement of U.S. preponderance and conventional capabilities, the need for so substantial a deterrent largely disappeared. Nonetheless, the requirements 

for extended deterrence still remain at the heart of the design of 

the U.S. nuclear posture. Extended deterrence still remains a 

major barrier to proliferation. Both the size and the specific elements of our forces are driven more by the need to reassure those 

that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone. 

Even though the overall requirements of our nuclear forces have 

shrunk by some 80 percent since the height of the Cold War, nonetheless, the expansion of NATO and the rise of the Chinese nuclear 

force is significant, if modest, have altered somewhat the requirements for our own nuclear forces. 

13 

Two, even though the modest probable source of a weapon landing on American soil, increasingly as that of a terrorist attack, 

nonetheless, the sizing of our forces, in addition to other elements 

of our deterrent posture, remains driven in large degree by Russia. 

Our NATO allies, and most notably the new members of NATO, 

remain wary of Russia and would eye any sharp reduction of our 

nuclear forces relative to those of Russia, especially in light of the 

now greater emphasis by Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. 

Consequently, the Commission did conclude that we should not 

engage in unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces and that such 

reductions should occur only as a result of bilateral negotiations 

with Russia under a follow-on START agreement. Any such reductions must, of course, be thoroughly discussed with our allies. 

Three, our East Asian allies also view with great interest our capabilities relative to the slowly-burgeoning Chinese force. Clearly 

that adds complexities, for example, to the protection of Japan, 

though that remains a lesser driver with respect to overall numbers. Still, the time has come to engage Japan in more comprehensive discussions akin to those with NATO in the Nuclear Planning 

Group. It will also augment the credibility of the Pacific extended 

deterrent. 

Four, the Commission has been urged to specify the numbers of 

nuclear weapons the United States should have. That is an understandable question, particularly in light of the demands of the appropriations process in Congress. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to 

focus unduly on numbers without reference to the overall strategic 

context. 

Clearly, it would be illogical to provide a number outside the 

process of negotiations with Russia, given the need to avoid giving 

away bargaining leverage. In preparation for the Treaty of Moscow, 

as with all of its predecessors, the composition for our prospective 

forces was subject to the most rigorous analysis. Thus, it would 

seem to be unacceptable to go below the numbers specified in that 

treaty without a similarly rigorous analysis of the strategic context 

which has not yet taken place. 

Moreover, as our Russian friends have repeatedly told us, strategic balance is more important than the numbers themselves. 

Five, given the existence of other nations’ nuclear capabilities 

and the international role that the United States necessarily plays, 

the Commission quickly reached the judgment that the United 

States must maintain a nuclear deterrent for the indefinite future. 

It must convey not only the capacity but the will to respond in necessity. 

Some members of the Commission have expressed a hope that at 

some future date we might see the worldwide abolition of nuclear 

weapons. The judgment of the Commission, however, has been that 

attainment of such a goal would require a transformation of world 

politics. 

President Obama also has expressed that goal but has added 

that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United 

States must maintain a strong deterrent. We should all bear in 

mind that the abolition of nuclear weapons will not occur outside 

the transformation of world politics. 

14 

Six, we sometimes hear or read the query: why are we investing 

in these capabilities which will never be used? This is a fallacy. A 

deterrent, if it is effective, is in use every day. The purpose in sustaining these capabilities is to be sufficiently impressive, sufficiently formidable to avoid their use in the sense of the actual need 

to deliver weapons to targets. That is the nature of any deterrent 

but particularly so a nuclear deterrent. It exists to deter major attacks against the United States, its allies, and its interests. 

Years ago the role and the details of our nuclear deterrent commanded sustained and high-level national interest. Regrettably 

today, they do so far less than is necessary. Nonetheless, the role 

of the deterrent remains crucial. Therefore, I and the other members of the Commission thank this committee for its continued attention to these critical questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JAMES SCHLESINGER

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Congress established the Commission 

on Strategic Posture in order to provide recommendations regarding the appropriate 

posture for the United States under the changed conditions of the early 21st century. The appointed Commissioners represent a wide range of the political spectrum 

and have had quite diverse judgments on these matters. Nonetheless, urged by 

Members of Congress, the Commission has sought to develop a consensus view. To 

a large—and, to some, a surprising—extent, the Commission has succeeded in this 

effort. Secretary Perry and I are here to present that consensus to this committee. 

We are, of course, indebted to the committee for this opportunity to present these 

recommendations. 

For over half a century, the U.S. strategic policy has been driven by two critical 

elements: to maintain a deterrent that prevents attacks on the United States, its 

interests, and, notably, its allies—and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War, and particularly the collapse of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, along with the substantial edge that the United States has developed in 

conventional military capabilities have permitted this country sharply to reduce our 

reliance on nuclear weapons, radically to reduce our nuclear forces, and to move 

away from a doctrine of nuclear initiation to a stance of nuclear response only under 

extreme circumstances of major attack on the United States or its allies. 

On the other hand, the growing availability of nuclear technology, along with the 

relaxation of the constraints of the Cold War, have obliged us to turn increasing attention to the problem of nonproliferation and, in particular, to the possibility of a 

terrorist nuclear attack on the United States. 

Secretary Perry has just spoken on the diplomatic issues and the problems of preventing proliferation, and the risks of nuclear terrorism. I, for my part, will focus 

on the need, despite its substantially shrunken role in the post-Cold War world, to 

maintain a deterrent reduced in size, yet nonetheless reliable and secure—and sufficiently impressive and visible to provide assurance to the 30-odd nations that are 

protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

1. Since the early days of NATO, the United States has provided Extended Deterrence for its allies. That has proved a far more demanding 

task than protection of the United States itself. In the past that has required a deterrent sufficiently large and sophisticated, to deter a conventional attack by the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. It also meant that the 

United States discouraged the development of national nuclear capabilities, 

particularly during the Kennedy administration, both to prevent proliferation and to avoid the diversion of resources away from the development of 

conventional allied capabilities. With the end of the Cold War and the 

achievement of U.S. preponderance in conventional capabilities, the need 

for so substantial a deterrent largely disappeared. Nonetheless, the requirements for Extended Deterrence still remain at the heart of the design of 

the U.S. nuclear posture. Extended Deterrence still remains a major barrier 

to proliferation. Both the size and the specific elements of our forces are 

driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone. Even though the overall 

15 

requirements of our nuclear forces have shrunk some 80 percent since the 

height of the Cold War, nonetheless the expansion of NATO and the rise 

of Chinese nuclear forces, significant if modest, have altered somewhat the 

requirements for our own nuclear forces. 

2. Even though the most probable source of a weapon landing on American soil increasingly is that of a nuclear terrorist attack, nonetheless the 

sizing of our own nuclear forces (in addition to other elements of our deterrent posture) remains driven in large degree by Russia. Our NATO allies— 

and most notably the new members of NATO—remain wary of Russia and 

would eye nervously any sharp reduction of our nuclear forces relative to 

those of Russia—especially in light of the now greater emphasis by Russia 

on tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently, the Commission did conclude 

that we should not engage in unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces 

and that such reductions should occur only as a result of bilateral negotiations with Russia under a follow-on START Agreement. Any such reductions must, of course, be thoroughly discussed with our allies 

3. Our East Asian allies also view with great interest our capabilities relative to the slowly burgeoning Chinese force. Clearly that adds complexities, for example, to the protection of Japan, though that remains a lesser 

driver with respect to overall numbers. Still, the time has come to engage 

Japan in more comprehensive discussions—akin to those with NATO in the 

Nuclear Planning Group. It will also augment the credibility of the Extended Deterrent. 

4. The Commission has been urged to specify the number of nuclear 

weapons the United States should have. That is an understandable question—particularly in light of the demands of the appropriations process in 

Congress. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to focus unduly on numbers, without 

reference to the overall strategic context. Clearly, it would be illogical to 

provide a number outside of the process of negotiation with Russia—given 

the need to avoid giving away bargaining leverage. In preparation for the 

Treaty of Moscow, as with all of its predecessors, the composition for our 

prospective forces was subjected to the most rigorous analyses. Thus, it 

would seem to be unacceptable to go below the numbers specified in that 

Treaty without a similarly rigorous analysis of the strategic context—which 

has not yet taken place. Moreover, as our Russian friends have repeatedly 

told us: strategic balance is more important than the numbers. 

5. Given the existence of other nations’ nuclear capabilities and the international role that the United States necessarily plays, the Commission 

quickly reached the judgment that the United States must maintain a nuclear deterrent for ‘‘the indefinite future.’’ It must convey, not only the capacity, but the will to respond—in necessity. Some members of the Commission have expressed a hope that at some future date we might see the 

worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. The judgment of the Commission, 

however, has been that attainment of such a goal would require a ‘‘transformation of world politics.’’ President Obama also has expressed that goal, 

but has added that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the 

United States must maintain ‘‘a strong deterrent.’’ We should all bear in 

mind that abolition of nuclear weapons will not occur outside that ‘‘transformation of world politics.’’ 

6. We sometimes hear or read the query: why are we investing in these 

capabilities which will never be used?’’ This is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it 

is effective, is in ‘‘use’’ every day. The purpose in sustaining these capabilities is to be sufficiently impressive to avoid their ‘‘use’’—in the sense of the 

actual need to deliver the weapons to targets. That is the nature of any deterrent, but particularly a nuclear deterrent. It exists to deter major attacks 

against the United States, its allies, and its interests. 

Years ago the role and the details of our nuclear deterrent commanded sustained 

and high-level national attention. Regrettably, today they do so far less than is necessary. Nonetheless, the role of the deterrent remains crucial. Therefore, I thank 

this committee for its continued attention to these critical questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger. Senator 

Glenn or other members of the Commission, do you want to add 

anything at this point? [No response.] 

Let’s try a 6-minute round for our first round. I’d like to focus 

on one of the many notable provisions of this report and that’s the 

area of missile defense. 

16 

This report supports a direction for a missile defense program 

which could help missile defense become a unifying issue instead 

of a divisive issue. First of all, you provide strong support for missile defense systems against short- to medium-range missiles. 

There has been a consensus on this committee in support of such 

missile defenses throughout the history of those defenses, including 

Patriot and Theatre High Altitude Area Defense and other defenses. 

As a matter of fact, this committee, I think it’s fair to say, has 

actually led the way in a sense because we have not only supported 

these efforts, we’ve added to them significantly in terms of funding 

over the years. 

However, we’ve been not together and whether it’s been divisiveness has to do mainly with the ground-based systems they are intended to defend against long-range missiles and there, the Commission is making some points which could unify us in a lot of 

ways and open and support a direction which a number of us have 

been exploring. I want to just read a couple paragraphs here. I usually don’t do this. I look to the Commission to usually read their 

own report, but I want to emphasize what you’ve provided here. 

‘‘Further, in terms of these long-range defense interceptors,’’ let 

me read from page 32, ‘‘further development and deployment of 

these long-range defense interceptors should depend on the results 

of tests and depend upon developments in the ICBM threats facing 

the United States and its allies.’’ 

‘‘For more than a decade,’’ you write, ‘‘the development of U.S. 

Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMDs) has been guided by the principles of protecting against limited strikes while taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about strategic 

stability. These remain sound guiding principles. Defenses sufficient to sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing about the viability of their 

deterrents could lead them to take actions that increase the threat 

to the United States and its allies and friends. Both Russia and 

China have expressed concerns. Current U.S. plans for missile defense should not call into question the viability of Russia’s nuclear 

deterrent.’’ 

Then the Commission says the following: ‘‘The Commission supports a substantial role for defenses against short- to mediumrange missiles. Defenses against longer-range missiles should be 

based upon demonstrated effectiveness and the projected threat 

from North Korea and Iran. Defenses against these limited threats 

should be designed to avoid giving Russia or China a reason to increase their strategic threat to the United States or its allies but 

these defenses should become capable against more complex limited threats as they mature. As noted above, this long-range missile defense system is now incapable of defending against complex 

threats.’’ 

This is the line that I want to focus on after I read it. ‘‘Cooperative missile defense efforts with allies should be strengthened and 

opportunities for missile defense cooperation with Russia should be 

further explored.’’ 

Now, three of us recently went to Russia, Poland, and the Czech 

Republic to explore that possibility, of whether or not we could 

move to greater cooperation with Russia on missile defense, at the 

17 

same time maintaining our cooperation obviously with our NATO 

allies, including Poland and the Czech Republic. 

I went with, by the way, Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Collins. We spent about 4 days on our trip. From my perspective, and 

I think the others join in this, one of the reasons for trying to figure out a way to involve Russia in missile defense is the statement 

that it would make to Iran. It would be a very powerful statement 

to Iran if Russia joined with us or with NATO in a missile defense 

program which, from our perspective, would clearly be aimed 

against an Iranian missile threat. If they moved to the nuclear 

weapon direction, clearly it will make a statement to them about 

how the world, including Russia, views that threat, if we were able 

to work together on a missile defense system. 

I wanted to ask you—let me start with Dr. Perry—about that 

recommendation that you’re making that we explore opportunities 

for missile defense cooperation with Russia. Again, I just wanted 

to add one further thought and that is that there is now in Azerbaijan a Russian radar. It’s the Gambala radar, and there’s a radar 

under construction in Southern Russia itself at Armivir and both 

of these clearly provide coverage of Iran in a way that probably 

provides better coverage of Iran than any other radars we could locate. 

So, Dr. Perry, do you believe that that radar-sharing, that information or in other ways that cooperation with Russia on missile 

defense could be a very useful move? 

Dr. PERRY. I have met with Russians three times this year exploring that and other questions but with a major focus on that 

question. I met with both technical people and policy people in Russia. 

It seems clear to me that the Russian view on this issue has been 

evolving in the last year. It’s now possible to do things that it was 

not possible to do a year ago. First of all, they have today a clear 

concern for the danger that Iran nuclear missiles pose to Russia. 

In fact, they think that the potential threat to Russia is greater 

than the threat to the United States. 

Second, their best course of action is to try to prevent Iran from 

getting nuclear weapons, and I think it’s now possible to get cooperation with Russia on that in a way that was not possible a 

year or 2 ago. 

Third, if that prevention is not successful, they would like to see 

a missile defense program to protect them as well as to protect us 

and Western Europe. They’re not only willing but anxious to work 

with us on a joint missile defense program and that joint missile 

defense program could include systems based in Russia as well as 

other countries. 

The best way of designing that system, I think, is still open. I 

would think it would involve that Azerbaijan radar which you described, but it could also involve interceptors in Russia. I would 

recommend that the United States undertake a program for serious 

discussion with Russia, first of all, at the technical level on what 

is the best way of designing such a system and that would be done 

in parallel with the policy efforts we have with them to try to develop a diplomatic approach to prevent nuclear weapons from being 

developed. 

18 

I do think that the time is right for some real progress in that 

area. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, and just in conclusion before I turn 

it over to Senator McCain, I know that President Obama has 

talked to the Russian president, at least in a general way, about 

this possibility. I’ve talked to our Secretary of State as well as to 

President Obama about this. I’ve talked to Secretary Gates who, 

before this committee, has expressed the kind of support for exploring this possibility that the Commission report describes. 

General Jones, I’ve also talked to him about this, and so there 

is, I think, a willingness at the highest levels of this government 

to further explore this possibility. 

I’m glad, Dr. Perry, that you mentioned the prevention of Iran 

getting missiles or nuclear weapons in the first place has to be our 

Number 1 goal. That has to be the focus and I’ve also heard from 

the Russians directly that they do not want Iran to receive or obtain, more accurately, a nuclear weapon. As a matter of fact, 

former President Gorbachev put it just as succinctly as you did a 

moment ago, as has the Russian Foreign Minister, that our number 

one goal should be to prevent Iran from getting that nuclear weapon. 

Hopefully Russia will join us much more strongly in that effort. 

If there’s a possibility of a joint missile defense system for the reasons that your Commission gives, we want to explore, the three of 

us and others obviously are exploring, that. It could really be a 

very strong statement of moral unity against Iran that may give 

them a wake-up call as to how serious their effort would appear to 

us and be to us if they decide to move in the nuclear weapon direction. 

Thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Schlesinger, have you detected the same eagerness on the 

part of Russia to cooperate with us on missile defense and their belief that the Iranian nuclear weapons are a greater threat to them 

than to us or Israel? 

I think I pay close attention to events of the day and I haven’t 

detected that same eagerness on the part of the Russians. In fact, 

I’ve seen them engage in attempts to reassert their view abroad 

and breaking an agreement with President Sarkozy concerning the 

presence of troops in Georgia and many others. 

Specifically, have you detected this same eagerness that the 

Chairman and Dr. Perry have detected, which I obviously have 

missed? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Russians, indeed, have a reason to have 

extended conversations with us in this area. Our relations with 

Russia are subject to ups and downs, but this is an area of potential cooperation. 

Senator MCCAIN. I guess my question was, Doctor, have you detected any real moves towards that cooperation, besides rhetoric? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the conversations that Dr. Perry 

and others have had in Moscow are suggestive that the proof is in 

the pudding, as you have suggested. 

19 

With regard to the Chairman’s question, when President Reagan 

suggested the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, it was directed against Russia. There have been two developments since 

that time. First, the threat has, to a substantial extent, disappeared. We do not expect to get engaged in a missile exchange 

with Russia, and second, defenses can be overwhelmed by offensive 

capabilities which the Russians have in terms of innumerable warheads and so on. 

So the interest has shifted to work with the allies. I’d add to 

what the Chairman said, particularly not just our allies in Europe 

but in Japan, as well, which has shown a great deal of interest in 

missile defense vis-a-vis China and North Korea. 

Only time will tell, Senator McCain, whether or not there’s real 

possibility here for close cooperation with Russia. 

Senator MCCAIN. Again, I hope that’s the case. I’ve heard conversations and we have a new day. I’ve not seen any concrete proposals or significant proposals on the part of the Russians. Meanwhile, the Iranians continue inexorably on their path to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

The one issue I would ask the witnesses, the one issue where the 

Commission was unable to reach a consensus was on the CTBT. A 

few weeks ago during a conference in Rome, former Secretary of 

State George Schultz urged ratification of the CTBT. With respect 

to the 1999 vote in the Senate, Secretary Schultz stated that his 

fellow Republicans may ‘‘have been right in voting against it some 

years ago but they would be right voting for it now based on new 

facts.’’ 

Secretary Schultz cites the development over the past decade of 

a vast global monitoring system of seismic and other technologies 

dedicated to detecting small and clandestine nuclear tests like that 

of North Korea’s small nuclear blast in 2006. As for the reliability 

of our nuclear arsenal, Secretary Schultz cited the SSP and the 

DOE Annual Certification as additional reasons why CTBT should 

be ratified. 

I would ask, do you agree with Secretary Schultz’s assessment on 

the notion of detection? Do you believe that, in light of Secretary 

Gates’ assessment, without testing it will ‘‘become impossible to 

keep extending the life of our arsenal?’’ Do you believe that any 

ratification of the CTBT must be preceded by plans for a new, redesigned and more reliable warhead? 

Dr. PERRY. In our report we state that it is essential to maintain 

the reliability and security of our warheads for the indefinite future. If that requires new designs, then we would support new designs. To this date that reliability has been achieved without new 

designs. We do not think we should preclude the laboratory from 

making new designs, if that’s what is required to maintain. 

On the testing issue, I think it’s quite correct that the global 

monitoring system has improved greatly since the day that the 

Senate had the vote on the ratification and can be improved more 

in the future. Nonetheless, I think it would be desirable to have 

some onsite monitoring systems. For example, to have an agreement with Russia that there would be onsite monitoring systems 

built in the United States and in Russia to give further confidence 

in that area. 

20 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. As Secretary Schultz indicated, the SSP has 

enhanced our ability to sustain confidence in the stockpile. It is not 

total confidence and the laboratory directors have testified before 

the Senate, stating that the uncertainties are growing as the force 

ages, which raises the question whether it is wise for the United 

States to surrender the option of testing. 

We are not going to test in the foreseeable future, but to retain 

the option is the question that is open. 

I should point out that the CTBT mechanism for enforcement is 

quite questionable. An Executive Council was established with 51 

members. It requires a vote of 30 members to investigate a presumed violation. The number of Western countries on that Council 

is limited and there is grave question about whether or not we 

could ever get an affirmative vote with regard to investigating such 

a site. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. Senator Glenn, do you have anything to add to this, given your long involvement in this issue? 

Senator GLENN. Thank you. I wasn’t here when we voted on that 

before but I was here when we had a lot of the discussion of it before on CTBT. 

In my view, I would like to have the CTBT, but I’d want to know 

what we’re agreeing to. I don’t think it’s adequately defined yet. 

The Soviets or the Russians now define it, their interpretation of 

it, in a different way than we do, and I think the value of the 

CTBT is probably not in my mind as great as it was back some 20 

years ago or so. At that time we thought that any nation to be a 

valid nuclear weapons nation, had to have a test. We didn’t know 

that they were going to be a nuclear nation and they didn’t know 

themselves whether their technology was good enough to set the 

bomb off, so they tested. 

Now we know that anybody that has the material can have a 

bomb. The value of CTBT to me is that we retain a leadership position in our own psychological thinking and the way the world looks 

at us as being an advocate for peace and for a balance and for not 

going ahead with unbridled weaponry. I would favor CTBT, but I 

would only vote for it if it had better definition. 

Right now the Russians do not have an agreement with us, as 

far as I know, on exactly what it is we’re agreeing to. They, for instance, have said that, as I understand it, they can test to smaller 

levels as long as it’s not detectable. To me that’s like saying it’s 

okay to rob the bank so long as nobody catches me and it just 

doesn’t fit right. If we’re going to agree to this thing and they 

should agree to it, it becomes an international treaty. A treaty is 

equal on both parties and right now the Russians do not see it that 

way, as I understand it. 

I would want better definition of it and then I’d be for it because 

I think I would want to see us keep a leadership position in the 

world’s drive toward controlling some of these things. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Senator Lieberman is next, and I’m 

going to ask him, and he’s more than willing to take the gavel, to 

21 

keep us going and Senator McCain and I can go to the Senate 

Floor. We thank you for your really tremendous contribution here. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Before you go, I do 

want to thank you and Senator McCain for convening this hearing 

so that we can hear from the members of the Commission. 

There’s surprisingly little discussion in Congress today of America’s strategic nuclear posture. There’s somewhat more discussion 

about BMD which is obviously related and there is a lot of discussion about the Iranian nuclear program. I think too often we’ve not 

connected those and I’m going to explore that a bit with you; that 

is, we haven’t connected our own nuclear strategic posture and the 

set of agreements we’ve had with the threat of the Iranian nuclear 

program. 

I thank all of you. This is a very important piece of work. It’s 

good to see Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger and Senator Glenn 

again. Senator Glenn did really pioneer work in his time particularly, I say with pride, on what was then the Governmental Affairs 

Committee as chairman in focusing Congress on some of these 

issues. It’s been my honor to succeed him as chairman of the committee. 

Dr. Perry, it struck me at one point in your remarks, you said 

that this is the time of peril but hopefulness. You said there’s a 

possibility of worries, let’s put it that way, that the existing nonproliferation regime in the world could collapse. 

I took that to be a reference to the consequences of an Iranian 

nuclear program, am I right? 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Dr. Schlesinger, you talked about the extent 

to which a smaller but still robust American nuclear capacity is a 

deterrent to proliferation and I took that to mean, again particularly with reference to the real case of Iran now, that the fact that 

nations, particularly in the Middle East but even beyond but particularly in the Middle East, certainly Arab countries, are somewhat discouraged from pushing ahead on their own nuclear programs because they know that we have ours, should Iran go nuclear. Am I right in that? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It is primarily the impact on our allies who are 

under the nuclear umbrella, and perhaps most notably at this occasion, Japan. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. Even more perhaps than in the Middle East? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Unquestionably, the Iranians recognize that 

the United States has immense military capabilities and that is 

going to be a deterrent to any military action on their part. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So I just appreciate your answers because it is what I thought I heard you say. When we talk about 

Iran developing a nuclear weapon, we naturally talk about the consequences that would have most immediately for our allies in the 

Middle East, Israel and the Arab allies, and ourselves. But it would 

also have, in a larger strategic context, a very threatening impact 

on the existing nuclear nonproliferation through the world and that 

would be a terrible consequence. 

22 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. As Dr. Perry indicated, it may be the tipping 

point. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. It may be the tipping point. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We may have an Iranian nuclear weapon before the NPT Review Conference in 2010 that would do significant 

damage to the possibility of making that stronger. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. I agree totally and that’s 

a real concern. 

Let me go the next step on that, Dr. Perry, if you’re able to share 

with us what some of the discussions were with the Russians, you 

have very valuable communication access there, about what you 

think they may be willing to do with us now to prevent the Iranians from obtaining nuclear capacity. 

Dr. PERRY. I look at the history of the negotiations in the past, 

it’s been the Russians and the Europeans with the Iranians and 

the Americans on the sideline. 

I think the first step is to get the Americans as a key part of the 

team that’s negotiating so that we—and that involves developing a 

common strategy with them. I do not believe the Iranians are going 

to easily give up nuclear weaponry. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree. 

Dr. PERRY. They see many advantages to having a virtual nuclear weapon capability, to be within a few months of building a 

bomb. They’re not going to give that up very easily. I think it 

would take coercive diplomacy for that to happen. 

Setting aside the possibility of a military action, the coercions are 

going to have to be economic and the nations in a position to apply 

it—no one nation can apply that economic effectively. It has to be 

Russia and the United States all agreeing on it. I think that Iran 

is highly vulnerable to economic pressure, more so than most people realize. As long as Russia or China or some other nation is not 

going along with that, then there’s an easy way out for it. 

It does require that cooperation and the indication I got in my 

discussions at least was that the Russians, the Europeans, and the 

United States could be on a common strategy of that kind of economic pressure. I’ve not discussed this issue with China, but in my 

judgment, it would require China to be agreeable to that, also. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That makes a lot of sense to me. I agree. I 

think you spoke with real clarity which is that it’s not going to be 

easy to convince the Iranians to stop the nuclear program. To do 

so will require not just diplomacy but, I liked your adjective, coercive diplomacy, and probably the most effective thing we can do is 

to put very strict severe economic sanctions on them or the threat 

of those. 

For that to be effective, we have to have support and the Russians can play a very important part in that, if they will cooperate 

with us. I had somebody say to me, and I think it was consistent 

with what you’ve just said, I don’t want to put these words in your 

mouth, but it relates, which is that there’s only one thing more important to the Iranian regime right now than the development of 

nuclear weapons and it is the survival of the regime. If coercive diplomacy could threaten the survival of the regime, then there is a 

chance that they might negotiate to stop their nuclear weapons. 

Dr. PERRY. I agree with that. 

23 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m going to go back to the CTBT from a little different perspective. As Senator McCain said, we had a rather impressive vote 

back in 1999 as to the feelings about the ratification of this treaty 

and I was pretty active in that debate. 

I think the first matter any arms control treaties have to address 

is compliance with its obligations and that it can be verified, as 

Ronald Reagan said, ‘‘Trust, but verify.’’ I think it was found by the 

Senate to be lacking in this point and as recently as October 2008, 

Secretary Gates stated, when he made his speech to the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, ‘‘To be blunt, there’s absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the 

number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to 

testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.’’ 

Dr. Perry, we talked informally before the meeting about the fact 

that perhaps the most important part of the job that you had to 

do was addressing the CTBT. However, you had made the statement that it’s impossible to have any kind of consensus. 

Personally, I’d ask, could you define consensus? Is that a majority or is that 100 percent? 

Dr. PERRY. We’re split about evenly on that. 

Senator INHOFE. Oh, you were? Okay. So if you have consensus, 

you would actually have—by consensus, I meant everybody. 

It doesn’t mean everybody, it means a majority? 

Dr. PERRY. Yes, it means everybody. 

Senator INHOFE. It means 100 percent? 

Dr. PERRY. 100 percent. 

Senator INHOFE. The problem with 100 percent is you have two 

problems. As we’ve mentioned, I use the word ‘‘prima donnas’’ and 

I shouldn’t have. That has a negative sense. Highly-educated proven authorities in these areas which all 12 were. However, you have 

that problem, along with the fact that there are 12 and to get consensus in 12 people would be a very difficult thing. 

Was it pretty well split even in terms of the ratification of the 

CTBT? 

Dr. PERRY. Yes, it was. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. That’s interesting to know. 

Dr. PERRY. In our report we gave each side the opportunity to 

give their reasons. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Let me ask you this. Senator Glenn has 

already made his comments as to his feelings. Would the rest of 

you state whether or not you agree with Secretary Gates’ statement of October 2008. 

Dr. Cartland, do you pretty much agree with that? 

Dr. CARTLAND. Yes, I agree. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Dr. Perry? 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Now, one other thing that is confusing to 

me because I’m not quite into this as most of the rest of them are, 

when we talk about numbers, we had our private meeting, Dr. 

Schlesinger here, and I appreciate that very much. As I understand 

24 

it now, our number that we’re using is a range between 1,700 and 

2,200. 

Obviously there may be something that’s classified that would be 

more specific than that. I won’t ask you what that is. But it’s also 

my understanding that the Russians are at about 2,800 now, is 

that correct? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. They exceed the prospective limit. They have 

to come down by 2012. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. You’re anticipating they have to come 

down a little further than we have to come down if we’re going to 

come to some unknown figure to me anyway by that time? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Commission expressed concern about the 

number of tactical nuclear weapons that they have. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. That’s good. The second thing I’d like 

to get into is Recommendation 1. The report states that the ‘‘force 

structure should be sized and shaped to meet a diverse set of national objectives. This requires a high-level assessment of strategic 

contacts,’’ and I agree with that. But this is precisely what the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the NPR would be giving 

you the information that is in your Recommendation 1. 

Why is it we can’t, since that’s starting right now, go ahead and 

proceed or do away with that decision until we have the results of 

the QDR and NPR? I know that you have a deadline of the expiration of December 5. I understand that, but I also know that there 

are provisions by which that deadline can be extended up to 5 

years. 

Is the problem we can’t do that mostly that Russia wouldn’t do 

it or would you comment as to any way that we could delay this 

until we have the information that will be given to us by the NPR 

and the QDR? 

Dr. PERRY. I think the START follow-on either could be negotiated by the end of the year or, if there are still issues remaining, 

they could get an extension of the previous START. 

Senator INHOFE. At that time—so if we have information that 

you would have—we would have the benefit of into December as 

a result of our QDR, we might then at that time request an extension? 

Dr. PERRY. I think that’s conceivable. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. My time’s going by fast here and I want 

to get into missile defense. 

When the announcement came out as to Secretary Gates and 

what’s going to be the position of the administration, of course, I 

was stressed over a lot of things you were not addressing in this 

meeting, such as the F–22, C–17, the Future Combat System, but 

they do get pretty specific in some of the recommendations in terms 

of our Missile Defense System. 

I know you’ve already addressed this and I’m going a little bit 

over my time, Mr. Chairman. I’d just like to get your feeling about 

the recommendation on the Czech Republic and Poland. 

It would seem to me that that could be pretty well verified that 

that is to preclude a threat that would emanate from Iran. Yet, I 

think those parliaments, and I was there and I was told that they 

were ready to come to the table on that and agree that they could 

have the radar capability in the Czech Republic and the capability, 

25 

the launching capability in Poland, except they were waiting to see 

where this administration was going to be. That was a disappointment to me, the $1.4 billion cut, and I’d 

just like to have the feeling of the Commission on those particular 

sites, if that was addressed in your report. 

Dr. PERRY. We do not address that in our report, Senator Inhofe. 

My own personal view is that if, and it’s a big if, we can negotiate 

an agreement for a site based in Russia, it would be a more effective site against an Iranian missile. 

If we cannot do that, the sites in Poland and Czechoslovakia 

could be satisfactory. 

Senator INHOFE. I like that answer. Do the other members pretty 

much agree with that answer? All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. This is a political issue, Senator Inhofe. The 

Russians do not so much object to missile defense in Europe or 

against Iran. They object to our putting those sites in former satellite territory which they regard as provocative. 

Senator INHOFE. I understand that, although I think the words 

that were used were they don’t object to doing it against rogue nations and, I think we all have our definition of that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to welcome all of you here and I am honored to be here listening to you 

and I applaud you for the work that you’ve done on this Commission. 

Senator Glenn actually brought this up, talking about the use of 

the fissile material, but what I was concerned was with the ongoing 

nuclear proliferation coupled with the accessibility of information 

on the Internet that could enable terrorists with the human capital 

to construct a nuclear weapon, provided that they obtained the required fissile material, to include the highly-enriched uranium. 

I’m concerned about the civilian nuclear reactor facilities, do they 

have the capability and the power to protect and safeguard the 

highly-enriched uranium and other fissile materials onsite at those 

locations? 

Could you please provide information on initiatives in place 

aimed to work with our international partners to safeguard the 

fissile materials in the civilian nuclear reactor facilities and also 

perhaps address the security vulnerabilities at these sites? 

Dr. PERRY. We agree that that’s a very serious problem. The 

basic premise is that if a terror group could get their hands on 

enough highly-enriched uranium they could make a bomb and we 

agree with that. We think that’s one of the most important dangers 

facing us today. 

Some of the facilities have highly-enriched uranium, not all of 

them, because most of reactors operate on low-enriched uranium. 

The move has been to try to get that highly-enriched uranium 

under safe control and also have these reactors converted so they 

can operate into low-enriched uranium. 

The administration is working on that and we encourage that effort to be accelerated. 

26 

Senator HAGAN. But are there initiatives in place to secure that 

currently? 

Dr. PERRY. There are initiatives in place. We think they should 

be accelerated. 

Senator HAGAN. I also was concerned in your opening remarks 

in the written testimony, there was talk about cyber attacks. You 

didn’t examine threats related to the cyber attacks, and it seems 

like in any area of the military today that so much of it would be 

involved with. 

Dr. PERRY. All of the Commission members would agree that 

cyber attack is potentially very dangerous in the future. We did not 

go into that in enough detail to represent ourselves and the Commission has no authority on that subject. 

Senator HAGAN. Do you think that’s something we should begin 

the process and examine that in great detail? 

Dr. PERRY. I strongly agree with that. I see it as a very serious 

potential future problem. 

Senator HAGAN. Also on the proposed cuts by Secretary Gates involving missile defense affect our capability to counter against nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran? 

Dr. PERRY. I’m sorry. I didn’t understand the question. 

Senator HAGAN. How do the proposed cuts by Secretary Gates involving missile defense affect our capability to counter attacks 

against the nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran? 

At one point you talked, too, about the number of people that had 

been cut over the years. 

Dr. PERRY. I think we do not now have the capability against 

Iran and the question is whether we should continue to put resources into the program established a few years ago based in the 

Czech Republic or whether we should move towards a program in 

cooperation with Russia. I think that’s an open question right now, 

and I believe that if it turns out to be possible to have a joint program with the Russians, that’s the way I would recommend going. 

Senator HAGAN. Dr. Schlesinger, any other comments? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. With regard to Iran and North Korea, they are 

not going to be much affected in the short run by anything that we 

do with regard to missile defense. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The consensus builder. 

Senator SESSIONS. The issue, the feeling that we had, members 

of the panel, thank you so much for your service, that two things 

were happening. 

One, we were having some divergent ideas about the nuclear posture of the United States, but, two, I think there was a feeling that 

Congress had not dealt with this issue in a long time. We had not 

thought about it and the world was going forward. There was even 

some suggestion that the errors in Minot were all to some degree 

part of an ignoring of this whole question and putting on the back 

burner and were such a big deal that we needed to get our graybeards—I don’t see any beards out there, but thoughtful people to 

help us reach a national consensus about where we needed to go. 

27 

I know Senator Bill Nelson, my colleague on the Strategic Subcommittee, supported this, as have others, and we thank you for 

your service and the importance of it. 

A number of questions have been raised. I would just like to 

point out a few things I think are themes in this report, Mr. Chairman, and make a few comments and also just say how much I appreciate, Senator Lieberman, your depth of understanding of these 

issues and commitment to them over the years. 

The report, I think, is pretty clear in saying there is a need to 

maintain a nuclear deterrent for an indefinite future. In fact, you 

say nuclear elimination would, ‘‘require a fundamental transformation of the world political order.’’ 

I don’t know how many of us have seen those in our lifetime but 

it is not likely, I think, that we’ll be in a world where we can completely eliminate nuclear weapons. So we have to think rationally 

about what we can do to reduce risk and threats. 

Non-material. I think the report indicates the importance of extended deterrence to reassure our allies and that that should influence heavily our design and size of our nuclear forces. If it’s going 

to destabilize our allies and cause them to perhaps develop their 

own nuclear weapon system, then we would have the perverse consequence of maybe reducing our forces to provide world safety and 

actually creating a proliferation. I think that was reflected to some 

degree in your report. 

Nuclear force reductions, you find, must be done bilaterally with 

Russia and must be based on a rigorous analysis of the strategic 

context and the current balance in non-strategic forces is a concern, 

you find: ‘‘Dealing with this imbalance is urgent.’’ 

Now what I understand that to mean is that while we negotiate 

with Russia to draw down their total nuclear weapons and they’re 

doing so but not as much, nearly as much as have, they have 3,800 

tactical nuclear weapons, we have only five and that’s not being 

part of this negotiation or at least we haven’t dealt with that with 

clarity. So that is a matter I think you’ve put on our plate that we 

need to and the administration needs to deal with. 

You deal with the question of force modernization pretty directly, 

including the weapons complex, which is necessary, you find, to 

maintain a nuclear deterrent at reduced levels. If we’re going to reduce the number continually and go further than we are today, we 

need to be sure it’s modernized and workable. 

Dr. Foster, you’ve had some experience in that. Maybe you’d like 

to share a thought on that. 

Dr. FOSTER. I’m sorry, Senator. Would you sharpen the question 

for me, please? 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes. With regard to the modernization of our 

nuclear weapons, why, based on your experience and expertise in 

these areas, do you think that is a factor we have to deal with if 

we reduce the numbers even further? 

Dr. FOSTER. As the Secretary has pointed out, we recognize that 

we have a problem trying to maintain the nuclear stockpile indefinitely and it would be helpful if the laboratories were permitted 

more freedom to make the necessary adjustments. 

28 

I believe that there is a more serious problem and that has to 

do with the tactical nuclear situation, which Dr. Schlesinger has 

referred to. 

We had the opportunity to listen to comments by a number of nations who were represented and presented their views to us, in particular their concerns. Those allies that are on the periphery of 

Russia and those allies that are on the periphery of China are concerned. They are concerned about whether or not the nuclear umbrella will be credible, as they see it, against the statements that 

have been made by potential adversaries. 

Now, in particular, the representatives from one of our allies 

have described in some detail the kind of capabilities that they believe the U.S. nuclear umbrella should possess and so they have 

talked about capabilities that can be stealthy and they can be 

transparent and they can be prompt, and then they would like capabilities that can penetrate hard targets with minimum collateral 

damage and low yield and so on. 

Now those are not the characteristics that we currently deploy, 

and so the question is whether or not, in discussions with our allies, we will be able to accommodate their concerns. 

Now, I believe one cannot answer that question without having 

the laboratories given the freedom to address whether or not such 

capabilities might be provided without nuclear testing and with 

confidence. 

Does that answer the question? 

Senator SESSIONS. Well said, Dr. Foster. I think it was and it 

just drives home this point of we do need to let our laboratories 

have some freedom to anticipate future capabilities and make sure 

our system is modernized. 

You also support and indicate that BMD supports deterrence and 

damage limitations. You find that the United States should deploy 

missile defenses against regional nuclear aggressors, including limited long-range threats, and should ‘‘also develop effective capabilities to defend against increasing complex missile threats,’’ and I’m 

afraid our budget may be being whacked enough there that that 

may not meet those standards that you’ve asked for. 

We’ve had a major reduction, more than a lot of people realize, 

in our National Missile Defense Program, but you call for it to not 

only be in place but to be prepared to deal with increasingly complex threats and, finally, I would note that the United States must 

take steps to reduce nuclear dangers of proliferation and nuclear 

terrorism, and I believe that this is the real danger in the 21st century. 

I would ask just briefly, my time has expired, while it’s important for us to deal with, Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, the Russians and to negotiate with them and continue to have more of a 

partnership relationship and not an adversarial relationship, do 

you agree that the most likely immediate threat to us would be 

through a rogue nation or nuclear terrorism rather than—— 

Dr. PERRY. I would agree that the most likely threat would be 

from nuclear terrorism. My concern with rogue nations is not that 

they would attack us but that they might let their nuclear fissile 

material or nuclear bombs out of their hands into the hands of the 

terrorists. 

29 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The likelihood of a terrorist attack is the most 

likely, most probable weapon that will last on American soil. As we 

have discussed, though, it is necessary to deal with a much larger 

set of issues in constructing our deterrent. The ability of the nuclear deterrent to deter a nuclear terrorist attack is very modest. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Thanks for 

your informed leadership on this question which has been unique 

in the Senate in recent years and therefore all the more important. 

I think you made a very important point at the end, Dr. Schlesinger, and maybe if I get a second round, I can come back, which 

is the extent to which our nuclear deterrent can deter nuclear terrorists. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The potential nuclear threats posed by the vulnerabilities in 

Pakistan’s nuclear posture, coupled with the fact that the United 

States doesn’t know where all of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are located, clearly leaves us in a position to no longer accept blanket assurances from Pakistan that the weapons are safe. 

As a matter of fact, in 2002, in a meeting in Islamabad with 

President Musharraf, I asked him directly the question if he was 

confident that all of the nuclear armaments were under satisfactory control and were secure and his answer was that he was 95 

percent certain. 

So we have every right to be concerned about that, if his answer 

was anywhere near correct. I hope that he was on the low side as 

opposed to the high side. 

In any event, do you have any recommendations to what might 

be the nuclear tipping point caused by the ever-emboldened Pakistani insurgency? 

Dr. PERRY. Senator Nelson, I believe you are correct in saying 

that’s the most serious danger we face today. I’m not in the position to make recommendations on how our government should deal 

with that. I know they’re serious about the problem. I know they’re 

working very hard on it, but I don’t feel that I’m in a position to 

recommend what they should do on that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Dr. Schlesinger, do you feel emboldened to 

make a suggestion? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. One of the things that the United States 

should be a model on is with respect to protecting nuclear weapons. 

An enterprising journalist from the New York Times interviewed 

after the Minot incident the general officer in Pakistan who was in 

charge of safety of nuclear weapons and the New York Times reporter said, ‘‘What help are you getting from the Americans?’’ to 

which the general officer responded, ‘‘Who the hell are the Americans to give us advice with regard to the safety of nuclear weapons? You just took missiles off from Minot Air Force Base, flew 

them down to Barksdale Air Force Base, and you didn’t know what 

you were doing, and we are supposed to turn to you for advice?’’ 

We have to be credible if we are to be convincing in dealing with 

countries like Pakistan and the safety issue. 

30 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Glenn, perhaps you have some 

thoughts, having spent a great deal of time being concerned about 

these issues. 

Senator GLENN. I was concerned way back when President Zia 

was still President of Pakistan, and I made two trips over there 

when they sat and lied to us about whether they were making nuclear weapons or not. We had very good intelligence information at 

that time and they just denied they were making any nuclear 

weapons at all. 

I’ve been concerned about this for a long time, about what might 

happen if al Qaeda, or other sympathetic groups, came into power 

in Pakistan. The best hope we can have is that I hope they are 

keeping some of the triggers and things like that of their nuclear 

weapons separate and in some spread-out area where, if the actual 

bomb case itself was taken over in a raid by al Qaeda or something 

like that, that they still wouldn’t be able to use a nuclear weapon 

as such already constructed. 

The biggest danger to me, I think, that we face right now in this 

whole field is loose fissile material, because making a nuclear 

weapon these days is no problem if you have the fissile material. 

It’s fairly simple, and if you have enough of it and know what 

you’re doing, which I think they would have the expertise to do it, 

why, they would have weapons to use against us. 

That’s my concern in Iran, also. I’m not quite as concerned as 

some people are about whether in Iran we should put in missile defenses and all for what might be a single shot or even a double 

shot. If they ever develop nuclear weapons or boosters to that 

point, but I am concerned in Iran that maybe their control of fissile 

material might be weak enough that some of the al Qaeda sympathetic people in Iran might be able to get fissile material, and I 

think any of our negotiations from now on, whether it’s START or 

anything else, should make every effort we can to get fissile material control back and make that the emphasis. 

Our ability, our controlling this whole thing through the last 60 

years or so has been pretty doggone good and I don’t look at the 

use in World War II, like some people do, that was horrible and 

never should have done it. It saved probably a couple million lives. 

I was in a squad and getting ready to go back to Japan at that 

time for the invasion and we saved lives by that. So in that case, 

I think it was a good use of nuclear weapons to end that war. 

But do we ever want to repeat that? No, absolutely not, but I 

think the greatest danger we have now—and the point I’m making 

is that our agreements so far, the treaties now have been nation 

state to nation state and so we do that in the international treaties 

and through the U.N. sanctions and it’s dealing with nation states. 

Now, our threat is not from nation states, as I see. I don’t think 

the likelihood that Russia is going to attack us or China is going 

to attack us. I think there’s a major danger, though, from fissile 

material running around from people who are not representing nation states. They’re representing their own interests, their own 

whatever interests they have, terrorism, and if they get fissile material, then we have deep trouble, and it’s not going to be something that’s going to be subject to treaties and things like that. 

31 

I think that’s the biggest danger we have right now and how we 

control or get a better inventory of all the fissile material in the 

world, that’s a big, big challenge, and I think we should be concentrating a lot more effort on that than we do. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Even if we get the inventory in the case 

in Pakistan, it remains that the government could be toppled and 

these terrorists, these rogue individuals could end up with the 

whole weapon in their hands and perhaps through some magic or 

otherwise they could find the detonating capability, as well, and 

that is a threat. 

Well, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Interesting 

questions. 

Senator Collins, good morning. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Good morning. 

First, let me join in welcoming such a distinguished panel before 

our committee today. Senator Glenn, it’s always wonderful to welcome you back to the Senate. We had the honor of serving together 

on what was then known as the Governmental Affairs Committee 

for many years, and I have such respect for all of the members of 

this panel. 

Dr. Perry, a couple of years ago Max Kampelman came to see me 

and he brought with him the Wall Street Journal op-ed that you, 

George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn authored and it’s 

called ‘‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,’’ and I must say, as I 

talked with Mr. Kampelman and read this op-ed, it put forth an 

inspiring vision, one that I think all of us wish could come about 

today. 

When I looked through your report, it seems to reach a different 

conclusion. Rather than reflecting a plan to go forward to achieve 

the goal outlined in this op-ed, it says that we need to maintain 

a reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent. 

So I wonder if you could talk about the two different visions presented in this op-ed 2 years ago and in your report today. Second, 

I would be interested in knowing whether the increasing threat 

from Iran and the North Koreans has altered your view. 

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

My colleague and your colleague, Sam Nunn, has described this 

vision in the Wall Street Journal article, in which Max Kampelman 

was describing as being like the top of a mountain and he says we 

cannot see the top of the mountain today but we should be moving 

in that direction. He argues that the immediate goal should be establishing a base camp much higher up the mountain than we are 

now and at that base camp we should be able to see the top of the 

mountain and therefore we can plan the final ascent. That base 

camp has to be safer than we are today, and it has to be stable 

enough that if we have to stay there for a few years, we can do 

that. 

Our immediate goal is moving up the mountain, and I think this 

report is consistent with moving up the mountain. It makes recommendations for positions which make us safer than we are today 

which reduces our nuclear weapons and which deals more specifically with the most immediate dangers which are proliferation dangers, the dangers of nuclear terrorism. 

32 

This report is dealing more with the near future and through the 

Wall Street Journal op-ed it can be described as a strategy for getting to the base camp, not as a strategy for getting to the top of 

the mountain. 

Both Sam Nunn and I have said publicly that this vision, which 

we call the top of the mountain, is a vision where we cannot even 

see the top of the mountains now, and that’s what we mean when 

we say it’s going to require a change in the geopolitical situation 

to do that. But we also believe, and I want to make very clear on 

this point, that this vision helps us get up to the base camp. Without that vision, we feel we’re going to slip farther down the mountain. 

We need the support of nations all over the world to do that. In 

more practical terms, other nations of the world want to see we’re 

serious about maintaining our commitment under the NPT, of moving towards disarmament. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger, the Commission, 

as I indicated, calls for a continued reliance on nuclear weapons as 

a deterrent. Nevertheless, and I do accept that conclusion, should 

steps be taken to change or reduce the danger of an accidental or 

unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon? 

I’m talking about the debate of the deployment, the targeting, 

the hair trigger debate that we’ve had. Could we and should we be 

taking steps to help lower tensions by still having that deterrent 

but perhaps moving back? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The question has been raised about so-called 

hair trigger alert and we speak to that at some length in the Commission report. 

The hair trigger alert problem, I think, is, as we say in the report, substantially exaggerated in that on both sides, there are very 

careful controls, including electronic controls, coming from the 

President of the United States or the President of Russia, to prevent the launch of a weapon. 

Our concern, following this, is that there be enough decision time 

for the President of the United States, and I think particularly the 

President of Russia, to examine the evidence before he hypothetically responds, and lengthening that decision time will be 

helpful. Negotiations with the Russians will, I think, help with regard to the decision time issue, but the question with respect to 

hair trigger alert is really a question of the past with regard to 

both U.S. and Russian forces and thus Chinese forces, as well. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Udall, welcome back. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to welcome the panel. It’s truly an honor to be able to 

sit here today and soak up the accumulated wisdom and experience 

at this table before us. I am a casual mountain climber myself, Secretary Perry. So I find your climbing analogies apt. 

I wonder what Senator Glenn would utilize, given his experience 

as a fighter pilot and an astronaut, as the base camp that we need 

to reach. I don’t know if it would be a space station, Senator Glenn, 

or whether it’s a forward operating base, in Marine parlance, but 

I really appreciate you all and the work you’ve done. 

33 

If I might, Secretary Perry, I’d turn a question to you but I’d invite the entire panel to comment. 

I’m interested in delivery systems, specifically the land-based leg 

of the Triad or ICBMs, and do you have any views on retaining our 

current number, which total about 450, or reducing those ICBMs 

as part of an overall arms agreement? 

Dr. PERRY. In our report we have argued the desirability of 

maintaining the Triad, even if we reduce the overall number of 

weapon systems. We think that the Triad is the way to configure 

those. We would argue for continuing to maintain the land-based 

ICBMs for the particular advantages that they bring to deterrence, 

but we could also be open to seeing that number reduced if it’s 

done bilaterally with the Russians. 

Senator UDALL. Dr. Schlesinger, do you have a comment? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think Dr. Perry’s covered the point. As we 

come down from the 2,200 level, unavoidably it will have an impact 

on our missile posture. So some of the ICBMs will be reduced. 

Some of our sea-based forces will be reduced as we come down. 

One of the things that I hope that the Senate watches, and we 

recommend the revival of the Arms Control Observer Group that 

the Senate has had in the past, needs to watch what is the impact 

of the reduction in force on the specifics of the composition of our 

forces and does this weaken our overall deterrence, including extended deterrence? 

Senator UDALL. So in effect, you’re saying keep the three legs of 

the Triad and they may be adjusted but you need all three legs and 

they’re interactive, if you will. They complement each other. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That was the belief of the Commission. It is 

not a universal belief. 

Senator UDALL. Other panelists would like to comment on that 

particular question? Dr. Cartland? 

Dr. CARTLAND. No. I agree. I obviously support that position myself, at least with regards to any near-term reductions that might 

be done in the stockpile. 

Unfortunately, at some point dollars do matter, and at some 

point in the future we may have to reconsider this issue again, 

whether it makes sense to maintain three legs of the Triad. 

Senator UDALL. Senator Glenn. 

Senator GLENN. I think what you want to do in trying to discourage any potential aggressor that might be wishing us ill, you want 

to keep them guessing as to what the response may be if they do 

something dumb and attack us. You have the greatest flexibility 

there if you have the whole Triad, and that way they can’t just defend against submarines, they can’t just defend against the ICBM, 

or just defend against whatever. 

The Triad is the very thing that gives them the most doubt. It’s 

the most ambiguous thing you can do to keep them guessing and 

make them less confident in any attack they might consider on us. 

So I favor, at least for now, until we can maybe some time in this 

nirvana we’re talking about in the future, work our forces down 

and everybody else works their forces down, that’s the time when 

to consider this but certainly not now. 

Dr. PERRY. The one point we should keep in mind, if I might add, 

is the impact of the Triad in the Cold War, where the Russians 

34 

spent an excessive amount, in our judgment, on air defense, and 

they would not have been spending that money on air defense if 

we did not have the bomber force; if they had not been spending 

it on air defense, they would have been spending it on offensive 

forces that might have been a greater worry to us. 

Senator UDALL. Dr. Foster, did you want to comment, as well? 

Before I move to a question in the broader sense, Nunn-Lugar 

and working further with the Russians, I just want to take a 

minute, Dr. Schlesinger, to commend you for the work you did on 

the Rudman-Hart Commission and the prescience that the Commission showed. I think the fundamental recommendations that 

you have about investing in our country, whether it’s in the public 

health system or in a new energy policy and a transformed military, I think the conclusions in that important seminal document 

are still very, very applicable to this day. I use the wisdom that 

was put forth in that document on the stump in campaigns and in 

policy settings and I want to just take a minute to thank you for 

that. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator UDALL. I think it’s a document that will live a long time 

and the template’s clear where we need to invest to keep our country strong. 

If I could, I’d like to throw to the panel, and I see my time’s expired, but perhaps a brief comment from one or two of the panelists, some thoughts on why we haven’t been able to make, I think, 

all the strides we could under the umbrella of Nunn-Lugar. 

Is it the intransigence of the Russians in some cases? Is it clumsiness on our part? Would anybody care to comment briefly on 

that? 

Dr. PERRY. First of all, I think we’ve made considerable progress 

on Nunn-Lugar. During the period I was Secretary of Defense we 

dismantled 4,000 nuclear weapons which we could not have done 

without the Nunn-Lugar program. 

Senator UDALL. I stand corrected, Mr. Secretary. 

Dr. PERRY. The program continues to this day. I cannot give you 

an authoritative current account of what’s going on, but I know the 

program still continues. I think it’s been indispensable, though certainly in my role as Secretary of Defense, it was indispensable. Beyond the dismantlement, it provided the safety of many of the facilities in Russia. I think the world is far safer today because of 

what the Nunn-Lugar program has done. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that DOE is quite satisfied with the 

achievements in terms of providing security for Soviet nuclear 

weapons which did not exist in the past. They are less than satisfied with regard to fissile material, but this is an ongoing process 

and Nunn-Lugar has been an immense success, even though sometimes we get into squabbles with the Russians with regard to security issues. 

Senator UDALL. Thanks again to the panel. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Udall. Thanks for your 

interest and good questions. 

If the panel is prepared, I think Senator Sessions and I would 

like to do one more round. 

35 

Let me go back to a question underneath what we’ve been discussing and you alluded to it in your answer about the nuclear terrorists, which is the question of whether, in the context of the most 

serious challenges we face today from terrorists, from Iran, and 

now control, the great country controlled by an extremist Islamist 

regime, does our nuclear strength actually deter? 

In other words, as you all know better than I, during the Cold 

War we reached a point with the Soviet leadership where it was 

pretty clear that they were not going to die from Marxist-Leninist 

principles. Maybe they reached the point where they stopped believing them as a matter of fact, but, unfortunately, it’s painfully 

clear post-September 11 that the Islamist terrorists are prepared 

to die, in fact they yearn for it. Perhaps it’s not as clear with regard to the leadership of a country like Iran, although you can find 

statements from top leaders that seem to be prepared to accept the 

large loss of life in the interest of the greater cause. 

Do nuclear weapons still deter? I know that you’ve thought about 

that and I invite it. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think, unquestionably, our overall military 

capability, including nuclear, is a substantial deterrent to other nation states, including Iran. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Ayatollah Khameni is not about to see the end 

of Iran or Shiism in order to fulfill the wilder comments of President Ahmadinejad. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. So with regard to nation states, we do quite 

well, I think, on deterrence, not as well as with the Soviet Union 

in which their belief was that history was on their side. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It was an erroneous belief, but they believed 

it at the time. 

With regard to the issue of terrorists, if they get ahold of nuclear 

weapons, it is plain that our forces are not much of a deterrent. 

What we have to hope is that any nation such as Iran or North 

Korea will be deterred from turning over weapons or fissile materials to terrorist groups. That is a much more limited deterrent. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Dr. Perry, do you have a thought on that? 

Dr. PERRY. I would say the same thing that Dr. Schlesinger said. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. Anyone else want to get into that? 

It does strike me that, to some extent, now this won’t work with 

a nuclear—well, one reaction to the nuclear terrorism and this goes 

back to the Hart-Rudman report, is that the best defense to nuclear 

terrorism is homeland security, a robust homeland security. I don’t 

want to dwell on that. 

Another defense, which perhaps rises to some extent against a 

country that has leadership that’s perhaps less rationale, is a robust BMD, so that at least they know that the prospects of succeeding are reduced by that defense. 

I want to bounce an idea off of that somebody put to me the 

other day and in some sense it’s kind of an inside Congress/inside 

Washington grand bargain. I must say there are parts of the basis 

of the bargain that are suggested in some of the conclusions or our 

inability to include in the report. 

36 

I’m speaking specifically of the CTBT where you had a disagreement. I would say about your BMD sections, I don’t mean any disrespect, but they’re more summary than some of the other sections. 

This is what one of the think tankers in town said—who happens, to disclose all the cards, both for the CTBT and a very robust 

BMD, and he observes that, I’m overstating the case here, but that 

there’s a lot of support on the left in American politics here in 

Washington for the CTBT. There’s less support on the left for 

BMD, reluctant or limited. 

On the right, there’s a lot of support for the robust BMD but 

many more questions about the CTBT. So he raises the suggestion 

about whether there ought to be an inside Washington brand 

where we agree to support both CTBT and a BMD which in this 

case would involve restoring some of the funds that the President’s 

budget will apparently cut from the Missile Defense Agency. 

Insofar as you care as individuals to respond to such a thought, 

I would welcome it. Anybody so bold? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It’s inside Washington, inside political Washington. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We’re going to leave it to Congress to work out 

those kinds of things. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Very wise. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I might throw in that, in addition to BMD, we 

are concerned about the funding of the laboratories and that would 

have to be part of it. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That’s good. That’s my last question. 

Dr. PERRY. On CTBT, my support of it is contingent on safeguards and the most important of those safeguards is robust support on the laboratories. That is what gives us our main confidence. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. That’s very interesting. I have a final 

question. It seems to me as I read the report, which is an excellent 

piece of work, that the most comprehensive set of recommendations 

is not with regard to the sort of flash button—flashier public 

issues, CTBT, START, BMD. It’s about the NNSA, but I think you 

make a very compelling argument, including the suggestion of 

some potential legislative action that might make NNSA a separate 

agency reporting to the President through the Secretary of Energy 

as opposed to being just within DOE. 

Do you want to add anything to that, any sort of flesh to what 

we’ve said about this part of your report, because ultimately it may 

be what is really most important in the short term? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We recognize that NNSA, as designed by Congress and hopefully designed by Congress in 1999, has been a failure and it’s been a failure because of the intrusion of other elements of DOE, so that the laboratories and the plants have to get 

triple approval of anything that they want to achieve. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We have models like the Agency for International Development and previously the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Department of State which were separate. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Within the DOE, we have the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC) which is independent. We also 

37 

have the Energy Information Administration (EIA) which is independent. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It does not necessarily, in the case of the EIA, 

even have to have the approval of the Secretary of Energy, but 

those are models in which the ability of, say, the General Counsel’s 

Office or the Environmental Health and Safety Group in the DOE 

cannot come down on the laboratories with additional requirements 

and, indeed, we have had in the various departments these kinds 

of arrangements. 

FERC is not the best example simply because it’s a regulatory 

body and therefore separate from the DOE Secretary. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The fact is that, as Senator Glenn well remembers, that creation of NNSA in 1999 came not so much out of 

concern for the scientific and engineering base as it was a reaction 

to the Wen Ho Lee case, the scandal, the concern about Chinese 

interruption or espionage really. 

You make a very strong point and almost regardless of what side 

you’re on in any of these issues, I suppose unless you’re for total 

nuclear disarmament, this makes a lot of sense and I appreciate it 

very much. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Schlesinger, I remember you making a 

comment once, not too long ago, that when Americans make declarations of policy and set goals, by nature we tend to want to 

achieve them and that the Europeans are used to living with more 

ambiguity and internal contradictions than the United States is. 

You deal with some of those issues, I think, in Chapter 4, the Declarations of Policy. 

Would you express to us the hesitance of the Commission in not 

explicitly adopting a goal of a total elimination of nuclear weapons? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that Secretary Perry may have some 

comments after I’m through. If we look back to the old days, the 

United States regarded nuclear weapons as this great equalizer in 

dealing with a possible Soviet Warsaw Pact conventional attack on 

Western Europe. Other nations think in terms of great equalizers, 

including Iran, that the Chairman has mentioned, and when one 

thinks about these other nations, what incentive do they have to 

give up nuclear weapons? 

The United States now has conventional superiority and as a 

consequence of our conventional superiority, we are quite comfortable with a world without nuclear weapons, if we could get 

there, but for the other nations that have nuclear weapons, Pakistan, India; Pakistan looking across perhaps excessively at now the 

conventional superiority of India. The North Koreans, their only 

stake in this world is their nuclear capability which they have exploited politically with great effectiveness. The Russians today, as 

mentioned in the report, moved towards an emphasis on tactical 

nuclear weapons. 

It is not clear which countries we could persuade to give up nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, the British would be prepared to do 

so. Perhaps the Chinese, but to find the incentives that will persuade all nuclear powers today and possibly in the future to abandon nuclear weapons is, I think, an uphill fight. 

38 

Bill, you may want to develop on that. 

Dr. PERRY. I do not disagree with what Dr. Schlesinger said. It 

is really an uphill fight. 

I would also point out that during the Cold War, the nuclear 

weapons protected our security in very important ways. Now with 

the ending of the Cold War, we see India getting nuclear weapons 

and Pakistan getting nuclear weapons. 

Pakistan selling their technology to other countries through A.Q. 

Khan Network, Iran on the verge of nuclear weapons, and where 

Iran goes, we see Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia wanting nuclear 

weapons. 

Then in the face of all of this proliferation, we now have terrorist 

groups emerging whose professed goal is to kill large numbers of 

American civilians. Now we see nuclear weapons today as a danger. If they could be eliminated, the world would be better. 

I agree with Dr. Schlesinger. I don’t see a way to do that today, 

but that should not stop us from trying to work towards that goal. 

Senator SESSIONS. One question, I’ll ask if any of you would like 

to comment on it. The Commission dealt with an issue that we 

hear about periodically, I don’t think from the administration, but 

we hear sometimes raised that we should renounce first-use capability or policy. 

You conclude in Chapter 4, the United States ‘‘should not abandon calculated ambiguity by adopting a policy of no first use.’’ 

Would any of you like to comment on that conclusion? 

Dr. PERRY. Besides the danger of nuclear weapons, there’s also 

a danger of biological weapons. We have renounced biological weapons. There’s a danger that biological weapons might be used 

against us and we believe we should use deterrence of biological 

weapons that are used against us with the threat of nuclear retaliation. We do not have the ability to threaten biological retaliation 

nor would we want to. We do not want to abandon it for that reason. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think, Senator Sessions, that the United 

States is not going to use nuclear weapons against others, save in 

extraordinary conditions. The ambiguity to which you refer deals 

not with a nuclear attack on the United States but with other 

types of attacks. 

For example, the possibility—I stress the possibility—of electromagnetic pulse attack, cyber warfare. There is no defense against 

a sophisticated cyber warfare attack and the Russians and the Chinese and perhaps others have developed cyber offensive capabilities. 

We may need to use a nuclear response to such things. Biological 

warfare. The retention of ambiguity there is not to suggest that we 

are going to use weapons initially. We are prepared not to do so, 

but that we might have to respond to a non-nuclear attack with the 

use of nuclear weapons if it is severe enough. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and let me thank 

the panel for helping all of us in Congress and I thank the American people to think through very challenging issues and to get our 

heads straight as we go forward because there are some actions 

that Congress needs to take and they will reflect some of the policies and suggestions you’ve made. 

39 

Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you again, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. I want to thank the panel again and commend 

you for creating what I think I could characterize as a realistically 

idealistic approach to a world without nuclear weapons. We have 

a long ways to go. 

Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. I like that phrase. Realistically idealistic. I 

think that’s good. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The first time either Senator Sessions or I 

use that phrase, we’ll give you credit. After that, it will be ours. 

[Laughter.] 

I want to join in thanking the panel and all members of the Commission for what you’ve done. This has been a very thoughtful and, 

I’d say, informative exchange we’ve had this morning. I hope that 

some folks may be watching on television. 

We have some significant decisions to make. We’ve had a change 

of administrations obviously. There’s going to be a renewed focus 

on START and CTBT and, of course, ongoing discussions about 

BMD. So you’ve really given us a primer here, all Members of Congress and the public, to get us ready for these discussions, and I 

appreciate it very, very much. 

Almost all the members of the Commission, this is just the latest 

chapter in a long story of public service by all of you. 

Dr. PERRY. If I may make a final comment? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Please. 

Dr. PERRY. When Congress asked me to undertake this as Chairman, I requested that the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) be selected as the administrator of the program and that has happened. 

I just want to acknowledge the very great support I received 

from them. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your doing that and they deserve our thanks, as well. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. May I interrupt there? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Please, yes. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) has 

also cooperated with USIP in providing security for us and providing considerable editorial assistance to USIP. So IDA should 

also be thanked. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. We join you in thanking them. 

Any other members of the panel want to make a final statement? 

It’s the custom here, well, it’s the reality, that nongovernmental 

witnesses, which you’re now in that glorious status, are not required to respond to questions for the record. If you’re willing, I’d 

like to keep the record open until next Tuesday for questions from 

any members, particularly those who were not here, and we’ll give 

you plenty of time to answer them in writing. Is that acceptable? 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. All right. I appreciate it very much. 

I thank my colleagues. I thank all of you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

40 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

JOINT U.S.-RUSSIA EARLY WARNING

1. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Schlesinger, one of the elements in the joint U.S.-Russian 

initiative is a recommended effort to increase decision time for the Russian President or the U.S. President before launching a retaliatory launch. One of the steps 

that the Commission recommends taking is to revive the crisis hot line. What is the 

status of the hot line? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Direct Communications Link (DCL) (‘‘hot line’’) was established in 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis to help resolve misunderstandings and thereby help avert the outbreak of nuclear war. It has operated continuously on a 24/7 basis for over 45 years and has been upgraded several times 

since 1963. We understand that there are several further upgrades being considered 

now for the DCL that would expand and strengthen its capabilities to ensure continuous service and broaden the kinds of services that can be provided to our leaders. 

We support improvements to this vitally important capability. 

2. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Schlesinger, a second recommendation is to establish a joint 

early warning center. There was a previous effort that failed. What steps should be 

taken this time to ensure a center is successful? 

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In June 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create a Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow to provide for advance notifications of launchings of spacecraft and ballistic missiles. As 

we understand it, implementation of that agreement became embroiled in a larger 

dispute about tax and liability issues for U.S. funded projects in Russia. More recently, continuing disagreements over U.S. planned deployment of ballistic missile 

defense components in Poland and the Czech Republic have also complicated moving 

forward. We believe that as part of the process of ‘‘resetting’’ U.S.-Russian relations 

the United States should make renewed efforts to implement the 2000 agreement. 

3. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, much has been written about 

the concept of dealerting—removing the U.S. and Russian Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missiles (ICBMs) from ‘‘hair trigger alert.’’ The report is pretty clear that the Commission believes that this is an ‘‘erroneous characterization of the issue.’’ Could you 

explain this conclusion and why efforts to insert physical effects or changes to 

ICBMs, to achieve additional decision time, are not recommended? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. The term ‘‘hair trigger’’ suggests to many the 

possibility of accidental or unauthorized launch. We believe this concern to be unfounded. As our report notes, ‘‘The alert postures of both countries are in fact highly 

stable. They are subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring clear civilian and indeed presidential decisionmaking.’’ We note that ICBMs in the United States have 

been on alert for almost half a century with no suggestion that accidental or unauthorized launch has been a risk. Instead, once again quoting our report, we believe 

that the real risk is ‘‘the possibility that the president of Russia [or, less likely, the 

U.S. President] might authorize a launch as a result of a decision made in haste 

that is deliberate but mistaken. The best approach to this problem has been and 

remains to improve Russian warning systems. . . .’’ 

Inserting changes in ICBMs that delay implementation of an authorized launch 

would not increase decision time available to either president. Instead, by shortening the window during which ICBMs could escape destruction such changes would 

put additional pressure for rapid decision, especially in Russia, which is more dependent on ICBMs than is the United States. While increasing decision time is valuable, until we can devise an effective method for doing so, improving Russian warning systems to avoid bad decisions remains the best approach to reducing the chance 

of launch through miscalculation. We note that the DCL would play an important 

role during the decisionmaking process. 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

4. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, among the recommendations 

made by the Commission are changes to the organizational structure of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). One of these is to have the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulate the weapons complex, including the laboratories. 

Did the Commission members discuss this recommendation with the NRC and the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. No, it did not. 

41 

5. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, do either of you have an assessment of the cost to the NNSA and the delay in new construction a shift to the NRC 

would entail? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. We have no assessment of cost, although we do 

not believe it would be high. Indeed, some of the experts the Commission consulted 

believe that the total operations costs for NNSA would probably decrease over time 

with NRC oversight. The NRC must define their requirements in a public arena, 

and must measure site performance against those requirements. One of the major 

problems with existing NNSA oversight is that firm requirements are not defined. 

Therefore, over time, sites operations are ratcheted up in the level of controls and 

associated costs. 

Our proposal was not intended to require a delay in construction of any presently 

planned facilities. The 3-year transition period the Commission recommends would 

allow working out of arrangements for regulation of existing facilities. We would include those facilities previously approved for construction in this process. In the 

1990s Congress provided a similar period for the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to come into compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements when the Energy Policy Act of 1992 required Department of Energy (DOE) to lease the gaseous diffusion plants to USEC. 

6. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, does the regulatory approach of 

the NRC, which is strict compliance, match the needs of the weapons complex? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. We believe that it does. Having a civil regulator 

regulate weapons facilities has been effective in the United Kingdom. Navy fuel production facilities are presently operating satisfactorily under NRC regulation. ‘‘Strict 

compliance’’ is, in theory, the current DOE standard, so the shift should be manageable. 

7. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, nuclear safety oversight is currently provided by the DNFSB, a small, 100-plus-person, oversight body that makes 

recommendations to DOE and the NNSA, to ensure the DOE and the NNSA are 

following their own safety orders and procedures. The DNFSB does not have regulatory authority or shutdown authority as does the NRC. Did you look at changing 

the nature of the DNFSB to a regulatory body rather than assigning the task to 

the NRC? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Commission did not consider this option. 

Rather, our proposal would permit external regulation by the DNFSB rather than 

the NRC as the single regulator. The Commission’s concern is with multiple levels 

of regulation. Under the current system, NNSA provides oversight of contractor facilities. DOE provides oversight of that oversight, in practice if not in theory. The 

DNFSB similarly provides oversight. We believe that regulation by a single entity 

is preferable to the current system and will allow clarification of roles and responsibilities, reduction in the overall regulatory burden and no diminution of the safety 

of nuclear operations. Whether the DNFSB or the NRC should be that regulator requires additional analysis. There are several factors to consider. The DNFSB has 

specialized knowledge the NRC does not possess. The NRC has broader experience, 

perhaps more standardized rules, and an independent viewpoint developed over the 

years. The experience and viewpoints of the DNFSB have been developed around 

the much-criticized (risk averse, uncoordinated) DOE rules. It would be important 

to evaluate not only which entity has the most detailed immediate expertise, but 

also which one could best meet the objectives the Commission set forth. The Commission did not perform such an evaluation. 

8. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, the DNFSB is intimately familiar with all of the operational nuclear safety issues and there are many in the complex. How will the NRC improve operational nuclear safety in older unlicensed facilities? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Commission proposal is not based on improving operational nuclear safety but on providing equivalent safety in a more effective manner. It is our judgment that NRC oversight would accomplish this. 

9. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, would design and construction 

on new facilities, such as the uranium processing facility at the Oak Ridge Site in 

Tennessee and the chemical and metallurgical facility at the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory have to stop to allow the NRC to develop standards and a licensing process for the facilities? 

42 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. Not under the Commission’s proposal. Our proposal is not intended to require a delay in construction of any presently planned facilities. 

10. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, the report appears to conclude 

that there is too much oversight of the operating contractors by the NNSA and that 

the contractors should be told what work is expected of them by the NNSA and then 

the NNSA should get out of the way, letting the contractors implement the direction. This approach to contract management appears to be contradictory to every 

lesson that the Department of Defense (DOD) has learned in the last decade. Would 

this approach still produce clear requirements, full and complete cost estimates, 

comprehensive schedules, and clearly understood milestones? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. There is every reason to believe this recommended management approach should safely enhance NNSA safety, effectiveness, and efficiencies, especially for the production facilities. ‘‘Clear requirements, 

full and complete cost estimates, comprehensive schedules, and clearly understood 

milestones,’’ are an inherent part of specifying what is to be done. We note, however, 

that scientific projects—as opposed to construction—at the national laboratories are 

inherently less subject to binding schedules. A good DOD analogue might be operation of shipyards. The government establishes requirements and holds the contractor responsible for meeting those requirements. However, it does not prescribe 

internal operating procedures. This is the distinction between what to do (a government function) and how to operate (a contractor responsibility) that we seek to reestablish within NNSA. 

Our report provides an illustration of why we believe this approach will succeed. 

In 2006 and 2007, NNSA conducted a pilot program exempting the Kansas City 

Plant from essentially all DOE regulations and making other management changes 

in oversight. An external audit documented $24 million in first year savings, about 

5 percent of the Kansas City annual budget. No problems with schedules or milestones were noted. 

We note that the traditional government-owned, contractor-operated approach to 

the national laboratories has been a great success in fostering world-class science 

and technology. Excessive regulation and micro-management threatens the continuation of this success. Our proposal for OSHA and NRC regulation is intended to 

avoid this threat while addressing past operational concerns and ensuring future 

safety. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN THUNE

POST-STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

11. Senator THUNE. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, on April 6, 2009, Secretary 

Gates announced a series of major budget decisions aimed toward reshaping the priorities of the America’s defense establishment, and which would profoundly reform 

how DOD does business. With regard to U.S. nuclear and strategic posture, Secretary Gates said, ‘‘We will examine all of our strategic requirements during the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and in 

light of post-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) arms control negotiations.’’ 

Of particular interest to me is that it appears that Secretary Gates is proposing to 

suspend development of the Next Generation Bomber until a new START is negotiated. The current START is set to expire on December 5 of this year. To me, this 

proposal to delay development of the Next Generation Bomber until post-START 

arms control talks are completed appears problematic. Waiting until a new START 

is negotiated could literally take years. In fact, the lead START negotiator at the 

State Department has already indicated that the negotiations for a follow-on START 

could last beyond December 5, 2009. Secretary Gates himself also voiced concerns 

during a speech last fall at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace about 

how long it might take to negotiate a follow-on START. With regard to post-START 

arms control negotiations, is it realistic to expect that a follow-on START will be 

negotiated by December 5, 2009, when the current START expires, particularly 

when the lead START negotiator for the United States is already lowering expectations on that front? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. We believe it is possible, although unlikely, that 

negotiations will be completed by December 2009. Whether they conclude by then 

will depend heavily on the attitude of the Russian Federation. We believe it is unlikely that negotiations will be completed in time to allow ratification and entry into 

43 

force of the new treaty before December 2009; therefore, some interim arrangements 

may be required. 

12. Senator THUNE. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, in your view, when do you believe a follow-on START could be successfully concluded? A year from now? Longer? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. Assuming a reasonable attitude on the part of 

the Russian Federation, we believe a new treaty could be concluded by the end of 

2009, or more likely, early in 2010. 

13. Senator THUNE. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, if negotiations for the followon START drag on after December 5, 2009, wouldn’t it be problematic for DOD to 

delay decisions about its strategic requirements until after negotiations for the follow-on START are concluded? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. We assume that decisions on strategic requirements will be made during the QDR and NPR, both of which we anticipate will be 

completed this year and both of which are required by law to be submitted with the 

fiscal year 2011 budget early next year. While we assume both the QDR and NPR 

will be informed by the progress of ongoing arms reduction negotiations, we doubt 

that decisions on either review will be delayed pending completion of START followon negotiations. We would oppose such a delay. 

14. Senator THUNE. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, the President announced an 

objective to complete post-START negotiations by the end of this year, which would 

provide a better idea of strategic requirements by early next year once the QDR and 

NPR are finished. However, Congress made it pretty clear that any negotiations 

should be informed by the NPR. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008 mandates the review and clearly states, ‘‘It is the sense of Congress that 

the NPR . . . should be used as a basis for establishing future United States arms 

control objectives and negotiating positions.’’ If the NPR is supposed to inform postSTART negotiations, then the President won’t be able to complete negotiations by 

the end of this year. In your opinion, should the administration complete the NPR 

prior to post-START negotiations in accordance with the wishes of Congress? 

Dr. PERRY and Dr. SCHLESINGER. We believe the administration should complete 

the NPR prior to actually signing a post-START. This is consistent with the legislation establishing the NPR, which requires evaluating the ‘‘relationship among 

United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives.’’ Given the importance the Commission attached to continuity in an arms control regime with Russia, we would not favor delaying the beginning of negotiations 

until completion of the NPR. We would expect the post-START negotiations and the 

NPR to be closely coordinated. Indeed, the results of the NPR will depend, in part, 

on the degree to which Russia is interested in an improved strategic relationship. 

The post-START negotiations should provide insights into this issue and thus improve the quality of the NPR. 

44 

[The Report ‘‘America’s Strategic Posture—The Final Report of 

the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 

United States’’ follows:] 


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[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

Æ 


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