U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

52–608 PDF 2009

A REVIEW OF THE COAST GUARD’S 

SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION 

(111–64) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

September 30, 2009 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Brice-O’Hara, Rear Admiral Sally, Deputy Commandant For Operations, 

United States Coast Guard ................................................................................. 6 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McMahon, Hon. Michael E., of New York ............................................................. 27 

Richardson, Hon. Laura, of California ................................................................... 30 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Brice-O’Hara, Rear Admiral Sally .......................................................................... 34 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Brice-O’Hara, Rear Admiral Sally, Deputy Commandant For Operations, 

United States Coast Guard: 

Response to question from Rep. Elijah Cummings, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Maryland ................................................. 11 

Response to question from Rep. Laura Richardson, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of California ................................................. 21 

vi 


Insert offset folio 1 here 52608.001
vii 


Insert offset folio 2 here 52608.002
viii 


Insert offset folio 3 here 52608.003
ix 


Insert offset folio 4 here 52608.004
x 


Insert offset folio 5 here 52608.005
xi 


Insert offset folio 6 here 52608.006
xii 


Insert offset folio 7 here 52608.007
xiii 


Insert offset folio 8 here 52608.008
xiv 


Insert offset folio 9 here 52608.009
xv 


Insert offset folio 10 here 52608.010
xvi 


Insert offset folio 11 here 52608.011
xvii 


Insert offset folio 12 here 52608.012
xviii 


Insert offset folio 13 here 52608.013
xix 


Insert offset folio 14 here 52608.014
xx 


Insert offset folio 15 here 52608.015
xxi 


Insert offset folio 16 here 52608.016
xxii 


Insert offset folio 17 here 52608.017
xxiii 


Insert offset folio 18 here 52608.018
xxiv 


Insert offset folio 19 here 52608.019
xxv 


Insert offset folio 20 here 52608.020
xxvi 


Insert offset folio 21 here 52608.021
xxvii 


Insert offset folio 22 here 52608.022
xxviii 


Insert offset folio 23 here 52608.023
xxix 


Insert offset folio 24 here 52608.024
xxx 


Insert offset folio 25 here 52608.025
xxxi 


Insert offset folio 26 here 52608.026
xxxii 


Insert offset folio 27 here 52608.027
xxxiii 


Insert offset folio 28 here 52608.028
xxxiv 


Insert offset folio 29 here 52608.029
(1) 

A REVIEW OF THE COAST GUARD’S SEARCH 

AND RESCUE MISSION 

Wednesday, September 30, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The Committee will come to order. 

The Subcommittee convenes today to examine the Coast Guard’s 

search and rescue mission, in other words known as ′′SAR.′′ 

The SAR mission is one that the Coast Guard performs on a 

daily basis, and it is a mission central to what our Coast Guard 

is: a service of guardians willing to risk their own lives to save 

those in peril. 

The SAR mission is also a mission that the Coast Guard generally performs with great efficiency and with exceptional distinction. Every year, the service responds to tens of thousands of persons in distress and saves thousands of lives. I often speak of their 

role in Katrina, when they saved well over 30,000 people, many of 

whom would not be with us today if it were not for their heroic efforts. 

In fact, in 2007, I joined the service in celebrating the one-millionth life saved since the formation of the Revenue Cutter Service 

in 1790. This is an astounding milestone and one of which the 

Coast Guard and, indeed, the entire Nation are rightfully proud. 

That said, there have been several recent cases in which, by the 

Coast Guard’s own account, avoidable failures occurred in the prosecution of SAR cases. And these cases point to problems that appear to echo problems we have seen in other mission areas, particularly marine safety. 

Having, in particular, the SAR cases involving Buona Madre and 

the Patriot in great detail, it appears that, in the most general 

terms, the failures associated with these cases occurred not because 

policies that clearly direct how a response should be conducted and 

that clearly call for a, quote, ′′bias toward action,′′ unquote, were 

not in place, but because, for a variety of reasons and in the face 

of cases that were admittedly complex and ambiguous, these policies were not implemented. 

In the case of the Buona Madre, a 28-foot wooden hull fishing 

vessel was essentially run over by the motor vessel, Eva Danielsen, 

2 

on July 13, 2007. At the time the incident occurred, the Eva 

Danielsen reported to the Vessel Traffic Service in San Francisco 

that it may have collided with a fishing vessel. However, subsequent investigation by the VTS, which actually should not have 

been involved in prosecuting what was even then a potential SAR 

case, and the Sector San Francisco’s command center concluded on 

the 13th of July that no collision had occurred. Therefore, assets 

that were within 34 minutes of arriving at the scene of the collision 

were called off, and no further investigations were conducted until 

the morning of July 14th, when the body of the operator who had 

been onboard the fishing vessel was discovered dead in the water. 

In the case of the fishing vessel Patriot, the first Coast Guard 

district, Sector Boston, and Station Gloucester, spent 2 hours and 

23 minutes examining a potential SAR case before launching assets. The circumstances of this case were, indeed, very complex. 

However, even as facts suggesting a possible distress began to accumulate and even though a launch of assets was recommended at 

several different points, Coast Guard personnel continued to investigate rather than to launch. In this case, it is likely that both of 

the individuals on the Patriot probably died and the vessel had 

sunk before the Coast Guard was even alerted to the possible crisis. However, the subsequent investigation uncovered what the 

Coast Guard, itself, calls an ′′inefficient response′′ that revealed 

several procedural training and judgment shortfalls. Those are the 

Coast Guard’s words. 

While the administrative investigation into this case highlights 

these individual shortfalls, the one issue on which the investigation’s final memorandum spends considerable time and which is 

probably the most troubling is the lack of experienced 

watchstanders on duty at the time of the Patriot incident. 

In plain language, the final action memorandum concluding the 

investigation of this case, signed by Vice Admiral Robert Papp, 

commander of the Atlantic Area Command, states, and I quote, 

′′The actions and judgments exhibited by both the First District 

and Sector Boston Command Center watchstanders call into question the qualifications and staffing procedures at both the sector 

and district levels for the command center,′′ end of quote. That is 

a very, very troubling statement. 

This finding is particularly troubling because it eerily recalls the 

findings of the National Transportation Safety Board in its safety 

recommendation report concerning the Morning Dew accident that 

occurred in December of 1997. In that recommendation, the safety 

board wrote, and I quote, ′′In order to appropriately assess the situation and respond correctly in atypical situations, watchstanders 

must have the ability to skillfully apply judgment and analytical 

thinking to the watchstanding task,′′ end of quote. 

The Patriot case was clearly an atypical case, as to some degree 

was the Buona Madre case. And the administrative investigation 

into the Patriot case makes clear that, when confronted with an 

atypical situation, the First District and Sector Boston’s prosecution of the incident exhibited significant failures at critical portions 

of the case. 

The investigation into the Buona Madre highlighted a number of 

failures on the part of the Sector San Francisco command center 

3 

but, frankly, didn’t examine whether these were due to the inexperience of command center staffers. This would be important to 

know. 

The memorandum on the Patriot case also harkens back to the 

NTSB report on the Morning Dew on another point. Today, as at 

the time of the Morning Dew accident more than a decade ago, individuals in supervisory capacities often stand 24-hour watches and 

can sleep during portions of those watches. In some cases, supervisory personnel can even consult from home. 

In the Morning Dew, the communications watchstander on duty 

at the time did not awaken the duty officer who was sleeping nearby. The watchstander stated that he did not feel, quote, ′′negative 

pressure or reluctance to awaken the duty officer. He simply did 

not think it was necessary,′′ end of quote. 

In the Patriot incident, there was a long delay in waking duty 

officers. According to administrative investigations, the command 

duty officer at Sector Boston was not awakened by watchstander 

personnel until 1 hour and 44 minutes after the sector received notification of this case, a case that we now know as the Patriot case. 

The administrative investigation into the matter notes that, and 

I quote, ′′The fact that both the sector and district command duty 

officer, CDO, were asleep at the time of the incident may have 

played a role in the relatively inefficient processing and analysis of 

case information,′′ end of quote. The investigation notes that failure 

to notify the CDOs and other senior members of the SAR chain of 

command contributed to launch delays. 

The Patriot investigation also notes that requiring CDOs to 

stand a 24-hour watch that includes sleep time means that, potentially, the most experienced watchstander won’t be available when 

time-critical decisions have to be made. Responding to this finding, 

Admiral Papp ordered units in the Atlantic Area to identify those 

sectors in which duty officers were keeping 24-hour watches and to 

convert 24-hour watches to 12-hour watches where staffing permits. 

Finally, according to information provided to the Subcommittee, 

this review has found that there is not adequate staffing to allow 

all of the 24-hour positions to be converted to 12-hour positions. 

The longer I am Chairman of this Subcommittee, the more I 

begin to see similar patterns repeat themselves. And the one pattern that I see over and over and over again is how stretched the 

Coast Guard is and how, at times, despite its best intentions, gaps 

inevitably appear. It was just the other day that Ranking Member 

LoBiondo talked about this and how it is so important that we 

make sure—and I agree with him totally—that we have the personnel that we need for this stretched mission. 

The issues before us today are very complex and subtle, and I 

look forward to a detailed examination of them. I also commend the 

Coast Guard for its thorough examination of these cases, its candor, and for laying bare the problems that it has found. There is 

no way that we can be the great Coast Guard that we are, and are 

becoming, unless we have honesty, integrity, and forthrightness. 

That said, the question now becomes, are SAR operations and, 

frankly, sector command centers organized and staffed in the best 

possible manner? If the answer to that question is ′′no′′—I fear 

4 

that, at least at some times, in some sectors, that is the answer— 

we must then understand what needs to be done to ensure that 

SAR operations and command centers are organized as efficiently 

as possible. 

To put it simply, each SAR case represents a life on the line. 

Each SAR case represents a family member—a father, a sister, a 

brother, a mother. And we must ensure that the hand extended to 

those in distress is as strong as it can possibly be. And I say that 

we can do better, and we will. 

With that, I am going to yield to our distinguished Ranking 

Member, Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for 

holding this hearing. 

Of the Coast Guard’s many missions, search and rescue, I think, 

is the one that the public most closely associates with the service. 

From the coverage during Hurricane Katrina to the countless television programs and films that we have seen, especially in recent 

years, Americans regularly see images of Coast Guardsmen responding to urgent calls for help at sea, often in the most challenging of conditions. These first responders are true professionals, 

and I commend the Coast Guard for this incredible service to the 

American public. 

However, while the vast majority of the Coast Guard’s search 

and rescue missions are carried out with great success, the Subcommittee will be looking this morning for a few instances where 

the Coast Guard’s response was faulted. The underlying connection 

between many of these cases seems to be due to inadequate training or experience among the search and rescue personnel at Coast 

Guard command centers and a failure of those personnel to comply 

with standard procedures governing search and rescue missions. 

While these cases are rare, they do point to a need for continued 

efforts to improve mission performance and capabilities. 

The Coast Guard is in the process of acquiring new tools and assets that will enhance the search and rescue mission. The Rescue 

21 communication system is already in place in 17 Coast Guard 

sectors and is providing direction-finding capabilities to command 

centers monitoring more than 28,000 miles of U.S. coastline. 

The service is also acquiring new small boats and coastal patrol 

boats under the Response Boat-Medium and Deepwater projects, 

which will provide servicemen enhanced and more reliable platforms to respond to calls for help. Both of these programs have had 

their setbacks, however. It is of the utmost importance for these 

new, more capable assets to be added to the Coast Guard’s fleet as 

soon as possible and at the best price to the American taxpayer. 

Professional mariners and recreational boaters are aware of the 

potential dangers that they face each time they leave port, but they 

do this with the knowledge that the Coast Guard is prepared to respond to any future calls of distress. I hope this hearing will provide the Subcommittee with the information and recommendations 

necessary to further improve mission performance. 

I want to thank Admiral Brice-O’Hara for appearing this morning and for taking on the new job of coordinating the Coast Guard 

planning, policies, and procedures as the new deputy commandant 

5 

of operations. I look forward to discussing your plans to enhance 

the service’s mission execution in this newly created position. 

And, finally, I want to note that Coast Guard crews are responding to the tsunami in American Samoa as we speak. While information regarding the situation in the territory is pretty spotty at 

the moment, the Coast Guard, in conjunction with other Federal 

agencies, has dispatched emergency management, law enforcement, 

pollution investigators, and other qualified personnel to restore 

basic governmental functions. This, again, demonstrates the service’s capabilities to quickly respond to emerging situations, and I 

want to commend them for their rapid response. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McMahon? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Chairman Cummings and Ranking 

Member LoBiondo. And a special welcome and a thank you to Rear 

Admiral Brice-O’Hara for your testimony this morning. 

I represent Staten Island and Brooklyn, New York, which certainly have a long history with the Coast Guard, having been an 

original base of the Light House Service now since 1997 and 

hosting the Coast Guard’s main facility for New York Harbor. 

And through that time, we have had great experiences with the 

bravery and expertise of the members of the Coast Guard, whether 

it was just recently with the downing of Flight 1549 in the Hudson 

River and the way that lives were saved there thanks to your expertise; and also with the crash of the Staten Island Ferry, which 

is near and dear to our hearts, and the work that you have done 

in making sure that that fleet of ships now, if you will, operates 

in a much more professional manner. And certainly, with the 

events of 9/11 and the heightened level of security that we have in 

the port, the role that the Coast Guard takes in doing that is something that we are very grateful for. 

So we are grateful for your work, Rear Admiral, and for all of 

that of the men and women of the Coast Guard. And we look forward to your important testimony today in terms of the search and 

rescue procedures that are in place, what needs to be done in the 

future, and how it will affect our harbor back in New York. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time and 

will submit more formal remarks for the record. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. McMahon. 

Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a very brief opening statement. 

I want to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman 

from New Jersey. I think, of all of the duties the Coast Guard performs, search and rescue is the one that probably most people synonymously associate with the Coast Guard. 

Each of us, Mr. Chairman and Mr. LoBiondo, holds the Coast 

Guard and their service to our Nation in the highest regard. I believe our mutual goal is to provide effective oversight to assure that 

the service maintains its high standards. 

For this reason, I appreciate the Chairman calling this hearing, 

because, despite some of our best efforts, there is always room for 

improvement. I hope it will provide an opportunity for constructive 

6 

feedback and dialogue to ensure the safety and security of the hundreds of mariners and of our Coast Guard men and women. 

And, finally, Admiral, good to have you with us today. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Coble. 

Mr. Bishop? 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you. 

I am sorry I have arrived a little late, but I represent New York 

1, which is the eastern half of Long Island, so I represent a great 

deal of coastline. And I have to say that my interactions with the 

Coast Guard since I have come to office have been uniformly superior. The Coast Guard is an entity that is one that does great service to our area. 

And I look forward to your testimony, and I will have a few questions for you when you are done. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bishop. 

We now welcome our panelist, Rear Admiral Sally Brice-O’Hara, 

who is the deputy commandant for operations with the United 

States Coast Guard. 

Rear Admiral, thank you very much for being with us, and we 

look forward to your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL SALLY BRICE-O’HARA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES 

COAST GUARD 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your comments, and thank you for the opportunity to provide a written 

statement, which you already have. It is certainly an honor to appear before you to discuss the Coast Guard’s search and rescue program. 

As a Coast Guardsman with more than three decades of service, 

I have dedicated much of my career to our search and rescue mission. I have served as a station commanding officer, as a group 

commander in a group that was a precursor to the sectors that we 

now have deployed across the Nation. More recently, I have commanded two of our districts: the Fifth District in the mid-Atlantic 

coastal region and the 14th District in the Pacific. 

And, certainly, this morning, my heart and prayers are with 

those in American Samoa, where we have Coast Guard members 

stationed, as well as many friends, associates, and other citizens 

there who are at great risk. 

I am incredibly proud of the Coast Guard’s rich heritage as a humanitarian service dedicated to rescuing those in peril on the sea. 

Our motto, ′′Semper Paratus,′′ is a constant reminder that we must 

retain a bias for action. Our success demands readiness that is 

founded on good training and good equipment, blended with courage, dedication, and vigilance of our men and women. 

Let me start by citing a few figures. 

In 2008 alone, the Coast Guard prosecuted more than 24,000 

search and rescue cases. We saved 4,910 lives, assisted an additional 31,628 people in distress, and we protected property worth 

in excess of $158 million. I attribute these remarkable outcomes to 

7 

our relentless pursuit of search and rescue mission excellence and 

to our continual investment in our people, in our equipment, and 

in our infrastructure. 

In recent years, we have significantly improved our ability to detect, locate, and respond to mariners in distress. Rescue 21 is replacing our antiquated National Distress and Response System to 

enable superior communications and to help us take the ′′search′′ 

out of search and rescue. The Search and Rescue Optimal Planning 

System, better known as SAROPS, has proven to be one of the 

most advanced search and rescue planning tools in the world. The 

Response Boat-Medium will bring us speed, better sea-keeping and 

integrated navigation capabilities that will enable better response 

operations. We have introduced direction-finding equipment on our 

search aircraft. 

These are but a few of many investments that will more accurately direct our waterborne and aviation assets, which ultimately 

will save time, money, and, most importantly, lives. And I want to 

thank you, Members of Congress, for your support of these enhancements. 

At the core of our search and rescue mission performance are the 

men and women who stand the watch at the command centers in 

our nine districts and 35 regional sectors. They are always ready 

for the call. It is a combination of highly trained military and civilian professionals who staff these command centers around the 

clock. They manage distress communications, plan and coordinate 

searches, and oversee the operations. 

The Coast Guard is wholly committed to building the competence 

of this critical cadre. Sound training and education, a formal qualification process, combined with standardized policies and procedures, will help maintain their edge. 

Additionally, in 2003, the Coast Guard established the Operations Specialist Rating. That is the backbone of our search and 

rescue command and control workforce. They bring operational 

savvy to our command centers, as well as broad perspectives 

gained from serving across the Coast Guard. That diversity of experience hones their judgment and decision-making. 

We have incorporated dedicated civilian employees into standing 

the watch with leadership, continuity, and invaluable expertise. 

Every segment of our workforce fulfills key roles in the SAR program. 

We continue to augment our watches with additional positions— 

218 new positions in fiscal year 2009. Policy and procedural compliance is essential. To that end, we have a Command Center Standardization Team which visits our units. They spend 3 days on-site 

to conduct a thorough and independent review of performance and 

then to report that back to the sector and district leadership. 

Today, I can unequivocally state that we are better equipped, 

better organized, and better trained to meet the public’s expectations for world-class SAR performance. But even with improved 

systems, enhanced training, and our very best efforts, mariners 

will continue to be lost at sea. Despite sophisticated technology, 

search and rescue remains a mixture of art and science. A SAR 

case is impacted by human factors that range from the sketchy initial reports that come in from panicked mariners to our own Coast 

8 

Guard members making judgment calls under the most pressing of 

circumstances. The sea is a dangerous and unforgiving place. 

We will never be satisfied with our efforts until we study and 

learn why a life was lost. That is why we aggressively review our 

actions for potential systemic improvements. That is why we continually review the SAR system and individual performance. That 

is why we undertake rigorous self-examination so that we may continuously learn, so that every distressed mariner has the best 

chance of rescue. 

Before I close, let me also note that we also must take every 

forum to educate and encourage boaters, fishermen, and commercial mariners to also adopt prudent safety/self-help measures so 

that they, too, are doing all that they can to be prepared in the 

event of an emergency. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, I thank you for supporting the Coast Guard as you do. And I stand ready to answer 

your questions. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Rear Admiral. 

I want to go back to something that Mr. Coble said a moment 

ago, and I want to make it very clear—because he is absolutely 

right; there is nothing that he said that I disagree with—but I 

want to make it clear that this hearing is about making sure that 

we are the best that we can be. This is not one of these sessions 

where we are trying to just tear apart. We are just trying to see 

where the possible gaps are so that we can do what we need to do 

to help you accomplish everything that you have to accomplish. 

And I want to thank you, Mr. Coble, for your statement. 

Admiral, you wrote in your testimony, ′′Our command and control organization, improved by the creation of Coast Guard sectors, 

places officers with demonstrated experience and sound judgment 

in critical leadership positions.′′ 

In your statement just now, I think you sort of reiterate this. 

But, as I discussed in my opening statement, the administrative investigation into the Patriot case would not seem to demonstrate 

that claim. 

On duty at the time of the case in the sector command center 

was a lieutenant, junior grade, as the command duty officer, for 

whom this was the first assignment outside of the academy, who 

had attended SAR school but not received a SAR qualification and 

who, because of the length of the watch to which that person was 

assigned, was asleep at the time the initial calls on what became 

the Patriot case came to the command center. 

The operations unit controller did have 23 months of experience 

as a SAR-qualified watchstander, but the communications 

watchstander and the situation unit watchstander had a combined 

total of 4 months of experience in their positions, and neither of 

them had the SAR qualification. 

In fact, Admiral Papp’s memo notes that these two individuals 

had limited experience and, thus, limited ability to assist the sector 

OUC. Now, those are Admiral Papp’s words, not mine. The memo 

also notes he at times felt overwhelmed by the sheer volume of 

calls he was handling with the district and other actors during the 

management of this case. 

9 

My question is this: Did the staffing in the Sector Boston command center during the Patriot case really represent the placement 

of officers with demonstrated experience and sound judgment in 

critical leadership positions? 

Admiral Papp’s memorandum would suggest that, at the time of 

the Patriot case, Sector Boston was not staffed with the 

watchstanders who had the ability to skillfully apply judgment and 

analytical thinking to the watchstanding task. 

And I was just wondering what—I mean, could you answer that, 

in light of what you have said? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Mr. Chairman, as somebody who has 

overseen SAR operations at multiple levels within the Coast 

Guard, I will tell you, first and foremost, that we have to instill 

within our watchstanders a complete sense that any question, any 

need for assistance in standing their watch tautly and properly 

should never be considered something embarrassing. They should 

always have the understanding that they should call someone else 

as they become immersed in situations that may be out of the ordinary, something different than what they have prosecuted before. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You are saying that that is part of their training? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. I am saying that that is something that 

we need to ensure every district commander and sector commander 

discusses forthrightly with all of their watchstanders. 

In my own experiences, I have spent a lot of time talking with 

my watch so that I knew what caliber of individual they were, 

what their background was, where we might need to shore up and 

improve their abilities, and mentor and guide and appropriately 

steer them to be able to continually raise their abilities and capabilities. So I think, first and foremost, leadership. 

But then, in addition to that, sir, I also want to point out that 

there are several individuals who can be contacted during the 

course of a watch. We have talked a lot about the command duty 

officer as a source of reference. We also have a supervisor of each 

watch position within the command center. We have a command 

center chief. Usually, that command center chief is at the lieutenant commander level—very, very experienced in their craft. And 

then above that person we have the response department head, another individual who is very experienced. Both the response department head and the command center chief must be SAR-qualified to 

hold those positions. 

So we have several other steps in the chain of command that our 

watchstanders can turn to for advice and assistance in prosecuting 

the watch. I have never been at a unit, sir, where there was not 

regular interaction between watchstanders and their chain of command, particularly the command center chief and the ops boss in 

the group days, now the response department chief under the sector construct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, let me ask you this: How common is it for 

such a group of, frankly, relatively inexperienced individuals to be 

placed together in a sector command center, noting that the sectors 

are where most SAR cases are managed? 

And let me just ask you this one, too. I understand all of what 

you just said. I guess my question is,you know, when we look at 

10 

another parallel between the Morning Dew case and the Patriot 

case, in the Morning Dew case the communications watchstander 

did not awaken the duty officer, who was sleeping. He stated that 

he did not feel—and this is his statement—′′negative pressure or 

reluctance to awaken the duty officer. He simply did not think it 

was necessary,′′ unquote. 

Now, it is one thing to have all of these experienced people in 

place. I still want to go back to my first question, too. But is there 

something that we are missing? I mean, we were running into 

problems because somebody just didn’t think it necessary. I mean, 

is this a perception problem? I mean, with your experience, I am 

sure you have seen all kinds of things. 

And when you talk about teaching folks that they should not feel 

ashamed, they should just do what they have to do, as a result of 

these incidents was there more emphasis placed on those kinds of 

things? Or is this something that just boils down to judgment? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Mr. Chairman, there were a lot of questions embedded in that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I know, and I am sorry. I apologize. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Let me go back to the first part, and 

your question was about the relative experience of one—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, a group of people being together, inexperienced, yes. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. And, as a former commanding 

officer and commander, I would tell you that there is leadership responsibility on the part of the sector commander to assess who they 

have and look at anticipated rotations and then to have a frank 

dialogue with the assignment officers, both officer assignment officers as well as the enlisted assignment officers, to ensure that 

there is a holistic look each transfer season to then offset, as somebody more experienced is departing, to make sure that that is replaced with an experienced person. 

So there needs to be that give and take—we call it ′′command 

concerns′′—that are articulated from the sector commander to our 

personnel command as they prepare for assignment rotations. 

Now, the second piece to that, sir: As you know, we have embedded civilian positions across the Coast Guard in both the sector 

command centers and the district command centers. Those civilians 

have provided absolutely central support to increasing the experience, the local knowledge, the proficiency of our watches. And those 

civilian employees do not rotate, so they are there to provide that 

thread across the military moves. 

We have invested in training. We brought a new course online 

just this past year, 2009. We brought online—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. When was that? Do you know what month that 

was? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. I would have to get that question back 

to you, sir. 

[Information follows:] 

11 


Insert offset folio 30 here 52608.030
12 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just want to know how new it is and how many 

people have been trained. I mean, I assume that some people have 

completed the training? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I just would like to know a little bit more 

about it when you get a chance. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. How many people? How often? How are they selected? Things of that nature. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. This is a course that is approximately 3 

weeks in length, sir. It is the Command Center Watchstander 

Course, administered at Training Center Yorktown as part of our 

Command Center Standardization Team. Those two programs are 

married together. 

We have had one convening this year in April of 2009, and 32 

individuals completed that course. We anticipate a throughput of 

upwards of 64 per year. Quite honestly, we have taken a little bit 

of a pause. We want to go back and take a look at that curriculum 

and fine-tune it, so the next class will be delivered in December of 

this year. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And where is it? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yorktown, Virginia, at the training center, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. I would like to come down and visit, just 

to observe, if you don’t mind. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. We would welcome that. 

I also want to point out that, in addition to the Command Center 

Standardization Team, which we would like to have visit every 

command center on a biannual basis—currently, they are on a triennial basis because of some staffing issues—we also want to complement that very rigorous examination with a similar program 

managed by the district command centers with oversight of their 

sector command centers. 

So, ultimately, as we get our staffing correct and move forward 

on our planned visit program, every sector would be visited one 

year by the Command Center Standardization Team and then the 

next year by a district assessment team at the sector level. So that 

will help bring us up to a higher level of consistency and standardization. 

Now, I am not sure that that gets yet to your question about experience and judgment and analytical thought. Mr. Chairman, 

what I would like to point out in that regard is that both the maritime search and rescue planner course and the command center 

watchstander course have extensive scenario-based exercises and 

drills embedded into those curricula. We purposely extended the 

maritime search and rescue planner course this last year by several additional days so that we could run them through scenarios. 

We have embedded 2 weeks’ worth of scenarios into the 3-week 

curriculum of the command center watchstander course. 

When our Command Center Standardization Team visits a unit, 

much of that visit is scenario-based. And that scenario is personalized to the sector, to the types of operations and geographic area 

and customer base that are within that sector. 

13 

So we know that one of the best ways you get better is to be 

faced with very hard, difficult cases and work through them. And 

we have brought that into our training and our curriculum and our 

regular assessment of our sectors and districts, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just before we go to Mr. LoBiondo, let me ask 

you this. One of the things that—and this is sort of an analogous 

situation, but when we have the bar exam in Maryland, normally 

what they do is they take two or three actual cases and put them 

on the bar examination. You never knew what cases they were, but 

they used to do that all the time, so everybody is reading every 

case that comes up over a year or 2 before the bar. 

And I am just wondering, do you use—you talk about really 

bringing it to real life and personal. Do you use cases in these 

courses that have actually happened and said, you know, ′′This is 

what happened right here just a year ago,′′ a month ago, whatever, 

and not beating up on anybody but actually showing them exactly 

what needs to be done so that they know. I mean, this is not some 

hypothetical. This is real stuff. 

I mean, do we use them? Or is it sort of like everybody knows 

about them, and they sort of talk about them under their breath, 

but they don’t actually put them out there? Do you follow me? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Oh, no, sir. We approach this with the 

greatest honesty and internal examination and do provide actual 

cases in our training curricula. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Good. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. I cannot tell you today that the Patriot 

case has embedded itself into our training, but it will be. We are 

still working through the marine casualty investigation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. We are still working through the followon from the final action memorandum from Vice Admiral Papp. So 

it is probably a bit premature, but I will assure you the Patriot 

case is going to go into our study curricula and be used, discussed, 

and learned from for future generations. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very, very much. 

And, to the panel, we are going to have a second round of questions. 

Mr. LoBiondo? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, we have talked about the standing duty for not more 

than 12 hours in a 24-hour period and how that all comes together. 

Do you believe that the Coast Guard has adequate resources and 

personnel to transition to the 12-hour watch system for command 

duty officers? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. In direct answer to that, sir, I would tell 

you that we do not have the resources. As you may know, sir, we 

do not have a full-time command duty officer at every sector yet. 

That is our desire, but we don’t have a full-time, dedicated command duty officer populating those 35 sectors. And if we were then 

to require a 12-hour as opposed to the 24-hour watch, we would 

need additional resources, sir. And that is why we have taken the 

concept of using collateral duty watchstanders as opposed to the 

alert watch for that particular position. 

14 

Mr. LOBIONDO. This is sort of related. The Coast Guard is authorized at an end-of-year strength of 45,000 active-duty personnel. 

Do you think that this is adequate to develop service men and 

women with the specialized skills necessary to direct search and 

rescue and other programs? Is that 45,000 number enough? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. As you know, Mr. LoBiondo, we have 

many complex missions and demands on the Coast Guard. We will 

put to best use every position that comes to the Coast Guard. And 

there are more than enough ways that we could gainfully employ 

the individuals as new positions come onboard. 

I have to be very frank in saying that, as we have brought more 

than 200 positions onboard this year just for our sectors, we have 

the whole dilemma of juniority. It is going to take us some while 

to get those people recruited and hired and in place and experienced. So, as positions come online, it is not like we can immediately have someone ready to go in that new job. 

So it is a growing process that has many different aspects. It is 

very complex to bring people into the Coast Guard. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral, have command centers been instructed 

to make use of all available positioning and identification tools as 

part of the search and rescue mission? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. And I think you know how powerful the Rescue 21 system is from some of the very initial work 

that was done in New Jersey. 

And we continue to move forward with the Rescue 21 program. 

We have not built out all of our sector commands. We have made 

good progress across the Southeast, in the Gulf region, in the 

Northwest. We still have build-outs to do in 2009-2010 in New 

England and in California. And then, the following year, we will 

focus on the island sectors, the Great Lakes, followed by the Western rivers, and finally Alaska. The Rescue 21 system will not be 

completely built out until 2017. 

But we know from all of our use thus far that it is tremendously 

capable when it comes to taking the ′′search′′ out of searching because we have that direction-finding capability. We have much 

clearer communications. We have the ability to monitor up to five 

channels of communications. We have the ability to communicate 

with our partners. 

For all of those reasons, Rescue 21 has greatly enhanced our performance, and we look forward to completing that acquisition program. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And my last question for now, Admiral: Do Coast 

Guard personnel have the capability to e-mail and communicate 

with fishing vessels through the VMS system? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. There have been a lot of questions about VMS, and let me clarify a couple of things. 

It is one tool in our kit bag of tools. It is a system owned by 

NOAA Fisheries for a very specific purpose that is not search and 

rescue. However, the VMS plot provides a good snapshot of the vessels that are under way on the fishing grounds at a particular 

time, if they are required to be outfitted with VMS. Nationally, we 

estimate we have 85,000 fishing vessels between those that are 

commercially licensed and State-registered. Only about 7 percent of 

those vessels are required to carry VMS. 

15 

When it is available to us and we do get a feed from NOAA and 

our watchstanders can pull that up at their desktops on the Common Operational Picture, they can see where a vessel is tracking 

at a particular time. And the VMS feature does allow for an e-mail 

to go out to the vessel, but there is not necessarily a mechanism 

to get a return to know that that e-mail has been acknowledged. 

We have proactively used VMS. As a recent example, in the First 

District, in preparing for hurricanes, in an effort to warn all of 

those who were out on the high seas as Hurricane Bill was approaching, one of the ways we communicated with the fishing fleet 

was to send messages to them through VMS that also guided us 

in our maritime patrol overflights to see where the fishing fleet 

was accumulated to make sure we overflew and warned them of 

the pending weather. 

We have also been very proactive in using VMS to identify the 

fishing fleet and then to make sure that we could talk with them 

and that their EPIRB was properly registered. We learned that not 

every EPIRB on a fishing vessel in our recent sweep had been 

properly registered, and we were able to get that corrected. As you 

know, EPIRBs are another very important tool in saving lives in 

distress at sea. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Before we get to Mr. Bishop, let me just ask you 

one real quick question: Of those 218 people, you said those are 

new billets, is that right? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Are these people, most of them, in the pipeline, 

or are they already assigned? I mean, right now, you said they are 

in different status. What is the situation? I just want to know 

where they are, because I think that would help all of us. 

Excuse me, Mr. Bishop. I just want to get that one answer. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Sir, when we get the new billets, those 

positions don’t come online until the second half of the fiscal year. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. So we have just gotten the positions. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. They are in the process of being filled. 

It is going to take us a while to fill them because those who will 

be enlisted will need to go through the training system. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. When do you expect they will be all up, 

though? I guess that is what I am trying to get to. Do you have 

any idea? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. We should get back to you with a firm 

answer. It is going to take us a couple of years, sir, to hire everybody and get them trained. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am not trying to push you. I am just trying to 

get an answer. In other words, I am trying to put all the things 

that we are talking about in some kind of context. That is all. 

In other words, I am just trying to figure out—you know, we do 

things up here, and I want to know, first of all, how long it takes 

what we do here to affect what you do there, so that we can make 

sure that we are doing all that we are supposed to do, so that you 

can be most effective and efficient. 

16 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. And it is a recruiting process. 

It is recruit training for 7 1/2 weeks. It is the Class A school for 

several more weeks. It is the assignment to the unit. And then it 

is building the skills and credentials. It is going through the training at the unit, a rigorous performance qualification system. It is 

the certification. And then it is maintaining currency in the watch. 

All of that is going to take many months, if not a few years, to 

get the people whose positions came online this fiscal year to the 

point that we would call them ready, able, and very experienced 

watchstanders. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Bishop? 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral, thank you for your testimony. 

I want to focus on what might be referred to as, sort of, natural 

or environmental impediments to the search and rescue mission of 

the Coast Guard. And, as I said before, I represent a coastal district. And one of the concerns that I have right now is the ability 

of the Coast Guard to have access to navigable channels, which relates to the work of the Army Corps. 

And so I guess my general question revolves around the issue of 

the coordination between the Coast Guard and the Army Corps and 

other governmental entities that the Coast Guard would be reliant 

upon in order to carry out its mission. I mean, my specific concerns—and I don’t expect you to be able to deal with these specifically. But the Fire Island Inlet, right now, has sholed over as a result of both natural processes and some storms. That is impairing 

the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct its search and rescue mission. 

But the Army Corps cannot, given its process, schedule a dredge 

of that inlet for several months. At Moriches Bay, we are having 

a hard time maintaining a navigable channel there. Shinnecock 

Bay, hard time maintaining a navigable channel. 

So I guess, as I say, my general question is: A, how would you 

characterize the interaction between the Coast Guard and the 

Army Corps? B, should there be a line item for funding in the 

Coast Guard budget relative to the dredging needs for navigable 

channels? Are there other impediments, sort of structural impediments, that perhaps the Congress can help with in terms of helping 

the Coast Guard perform its mission? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Thank you for your question, Mr. Bishop. 

I am not familiar with that particular geographic area you described. 

Mr. BISHOP. As I said, I wouldn’t expect you to be. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. But I have certainly had much experience on the eastern seaboard and understand the continued problems with silting and constrictions of our waterways. 

The Coast Guard has a normal and natural dialogue with the 

Army Corps of Engineers at the port level through our sector commands, particularly with the area committees that are focused on 

environmental response, as well as the Area Maritime Security 

Committee that is focused on the safety and security of the region. 

There are ongoing discussions because the Coast Guard frequently has access to stakeholders, understands the needs of the 

waterway’s users, and can help translate and be a voice to the 

17 

Army Corps of Engineers as they determine where they will fund 

projects, where they will place their priorities in managing the 

dredging and other channel work that has to be accomplished. So 

I would tell you, at the field level, at the lowest levels, there are 

regular dialogues that occur with our Army Corps of Engineer professional partners. 

That also occurs here in Washington. From a program and policy 

interaction, there is an open dialogue with the Army Corps of Engineers. As recently as just a couple of weeks ago, Admiral Allen, our 

commandant, met with his counterpart, and I also have worked 

regularly with my counterparts within the Army Corps. 

You asked a question about funding, sir, and I think that appropriately belongs with the Army Corps of Engineers. 

Mr. BISHOP. Well, thank you. I appreciate your response. 

But if your rescue mission is compromised, no reasonable person 

would argue that it is not. So that issue is not in dispute. And if 

the Army Corps says, ′′I am awful sorry, we understand the problem, but we have no funds,′′ what is the answer? I mean, where 

do we go to solve this problem? 

And that is why I am asking the question of whether or not there 

ought to be some provision that allows the Coast Guard to declare, 

perhaps, some form of exigent circumstance that would either provide funding or would accelerate the Army Corps process or would, 

perhaps, use Coast Guard funding to take the place of the required 

local match, whether it is New York State or whether it is a county 

or whatever. 

So I know I am asking a bunch of different questions here, but 

my concern is that we are in the sort of situations in which the 

Coast Guard can’t do its job because the Army Corps doesn’t have 

the funding to do their job. And yet we are left with a problem that 

isn’t resolved, and leaving the problem unresolved is not acceptable. 

So where do we go from here, I guess is my question. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Sir, I think that I would like to go back 

and talk with our local commanders to determine whether our 

search and rescue mission has been degraded by the situation you 

have described. 

There are certainly other means of rescuing people in distress. 

Helicopter rescue would be one alternative if someone is in a waterway that we are not able to access. There routinely might be a 

situation where duck hunters are in marshes and our boats can’t 

get there anyway, and a helicopter rescue would be appropriate. Or 

we would turn to one of our many partners. Certainly State and 

local partners who have assets, sometimes much smaller boats 

than the Coast Guard has, can trailer and get into those locations. 

Or we have some smaller, special-purpose craft that might be 

trailered to access an area. 

So I am not aware of any instance where access to channels has 

not permitted us to do our job effectively, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. I thank you. 

And thank you for the extra time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

18 

Admiral, good to have you with us. 

Admiral, much has been said about Rescue 21, and I want to 

continue along that line. How many miles of coastline are currently 

covered by Rescue 21, A? And, B, what areas lack coverage, and 

when do you anticipate full deployment? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Thank you for your question, Mr. Coble. 

We have more than 28,000 miles of coastline that are currently 

covered by the Rescue 21 system. Our next priorities are the New 

England area, the two sectors in northern and southern New England. We then will focus on rollout in southern California, followed 

by the island sectors—San Juan, Guam, and Hawaii; the Great 

Lakes; then the western regions of river systems off the Mississippi; followed by Alaska. 

Mr. COBLE. And when do you anticipate full deployment? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Full deployment will not be completed 

until 2017, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Oh, I think you said that earlier. 

You may have touched on this, Admiral, but let me revisit it. 

Generally, how is Rescue 21 improving and enhancing the Coast 

Guard’s search and rescue capabilities? And could the system be 

expanded for application in areas other than search and rescue 

cases? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Sir, I would point to, first, just generally 

much clearer, better communications. The old system often was 

spotty; you would have garbled transmissions. We have great clarity with the tower array and updated, sophisticated equipment that 

has been installed. 

So we also have then the capability to direction-find, and often 

the array of towers allows us to actually plot a position, so that 

tells us exactly where the call originates. We can get to that mariner in distress much more quickly. 

There are multiple communications channels, so the 

watchstander can be working multiple cases as necessary at any 

point in time. We have better interoperability with our partners because of the channels that are available with the Rescue 21 array. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. We also have the ability to play back. A 

lot of times we need to clear up the transmission, so the automatic 

playback feature is much more manipulable than previously, and 

allows us to clear out any background noise so that we better understand what the mariner is telling us. 

The Rescue 21 system also has provided us with an ability to get 

coverage out to 20 miles. That is its published coverage, but I will 

tell you it has proven itself beyond that 20-mile costal range. So 

we have been very impressed with the Rescue 21 system. And as 

I mentioned, over the course of the next 3 years we are going to 

focus on completing the continental United States, the islands, and 

then the last piece will be Alaska in 2017. 

Mr. COBLE. And do you see any other areas other than search 

and rescue where this can be utilized? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Well, it would help us with all of our 

missions in terms of the communications capabilities, the playback 

features, law enforcement cases. Rescue 21 certainly enhances first 

and foremost our legacy mission, our most critical mission of search 

and rescue, but it will suit our needs in the coastal regions across 

19 

all of the mission sets that are prosecuted by our districts and our 

sectors. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Coble. 

Ms. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to start off, first of all, with a comment following up 

on Mr. Bishop’s question, and then my question for our witness 

today. 

What Mr. Bishop was referring is that the HMT—and I think 

you are aware that we brought forward legislation, HMT reform— 

the harbor maintenance tax is collected for port dredging and port 

maintenance. Currently, we receive from Customs approximately 

$1.3 billion, and yet the appropriators only spend approximately 

$600,000. And so currently there is a surplus of over $4.5 billion 

in that account, HMT, for port maintenance and port dredging. So 

I hope and would look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, 

and Mr. Bishop, in bringing that forward if that can assist the 

Army Corps to address some of our longstanding needs that we 

have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. We will do that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. In terms of my question for our witness here 

today, I represent the area of the Port of Long Beach and Los Angeles, which are the largest ports in this Nation. And before I say 

that, let me first of all say, and I apologize, to thank you for all 

of your work. 

In the Los Angeles area, over 415 search and rescue missions are 

performed annually, and so, despite all the challenges and the 

things we have talked about today, many lives are being saved, as 

well as property, and so we thank you for your work. 

My question is, in my particular area, the larger ships are beginning to come in and out of those particular ports. Some of them are 

as high as 10,000 TEU vessels, which means that the ships are basically longer than the Empire State Building is tall. And so my 

question is, what steps have you taken to prepare for, in the event 

of a disaster or search and rescue that needs to be done, to be able 

to deal with these larger ships? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Good morning, and thank you for your 

question. 

The complexity of the waterways users, as we see increasingly 

greater sized vessels, as you have cited, has prompted the Coast 

Guard to think about how we prepare ourselves for a mass rescue 

operation. We plan, we drill and exercise, but I will tell you it is 

not going to be only a Coast Guard response. When we get to something of that magnitude, it is going to require all of our professional partners. 

And so when we drill and practice, we bring our local, other Federal, and certainly the State partners into those exercises so that 

we know that we have the same protocols in place, that we will respond accordingly, that we have the ability to communicate, and 

that we understand one another’s roles, authorities, and capabilities. 

When we have an incident of that nature, we are going to see 

that move to a Unified Command. Something that large is going to 

20 

require us to stand up our Incident Command system and have a 

very well, nuanced, and deeply integrated response to a situation 

like that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Let me be more specific, and I am glad you referenced what you did. In my particular port area, the Port of Los 

Angeles has the larger fire boats, which can shoot large enough the 

water over some of these larger vessels. However, the Port of Long 

Beach, for example, does not have this fire boat and many ports 

across this Nation do not. Are you aware of which ports do or do 

not have the larger vessels or the larger crew ships that are coming 

into port? Have you evaluated, are they properly prepared to be 

able to work with you to respond? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. I am not personally aware, but I can assure you that the sectors commanders, as part of their planning 

and preparedness, are very much aware of the assets that are 

available within the port. And one of the things that we have done 

with fire departments is share our own vessel plans with them and 

bring the firefighters onto our vessels so that if we were to have 

a problem, they have walked through, they understand the layout. 

But more importantly, getting to others who might be in distress, 

we have worked very closely to improve the maritime proficiency, 

understanding, knowledge, awareness of firefighters who may not 

have that depth of experience. Certainly, if they are on the fire 

boats, they probably do, but a lot of times it is also going to be a 

shoreside response. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Ma’am, what I am saying and what I would 

like to ask you to do is to evaluate the ports of entry that you support to determine whether they have sufficient fire boat capability 

to address and to assist you, if need be. It is my understanding it 

does not exist, it is not in place, and that many of our ports, if we 

were to have ships collide, whatever situations were to occur, you 

would not have the sufficient water support to deal with the situation. 

So if you could come back to the Committee or supply in writing 

for us where those incidents might be the case, and if fire boats 

need to be recommended from this Committee from a funding perspective. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information follows:] 

21 


Insert offset folio 31 here 52608.031
22 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Ms. Richardson. 

Just a few more questions, Admiral. 

What are the specific efficiencies and improvements that have 

been made in the conduct of SAR cases that you can attribute specifically to the creation of sectors? That is one question. And two, 

you talked about what we have learned from the cases that I have 

mentioned in my opening statement and the establishment of 

these—I guess you call it courses? Are there other things that we 

have done since these incidents to try to improve our efficiency and 

effectiveness? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, having the experience of being in a group that then became the activities and very 

much the model for the sectors, I saw marked differences in the integration and cohesion of Coast Guard operations in the region because of the combining of the legacy Marine Safety Offices with the 

group offices. 

Previously, it was the groups that had the assets, it was the Marine Safety Offices that had relationships, the compliance and prevention aspect of the work. And so by bringing those two together, 

we have a much better opportunity to provide consistency to our 

partners to provide integrated operations that look holistically 

across the mission sets and requirements of our service. So I think 

that the first thing that I would point to is better cohesion, better 

integration across our mission sets. 

Specifically to search and rescue, as we have brought these communities of experience and background together, we do our jobs 

better because of the deeper understanding of both prevention and 

the compliance regimes that the Marine Safety Program has to 

carry out, and how those can help us raise levels of preventative 

activities and to guard against accidents happening. 

It also has helped us learn better how to dialogue with key 

stakeholders. We have a number of search and rescue professionals 

that we have to work with. Whenever we have a search and rescue 

case, we look for the best provider, and it might not be a Coast 

Guard asset that is available at that time. So a response organization plans better because of the deeper experience, and we communicate and work with our stakeholders and partners better because 

of the things we have learned by melding these two distinct cultures into the one sector construct. 

Specifically, to the watch standing, because of the consolidation 

into sector commands, we have had to look very hard at our staffing of these organizations. And that, combined with a series of 

studies as well as the lessons learned from the Morning Dew case 

forced us to grapple with how to stand the watch better. And that 

is what has led us to a sector command center that answers to the 

deputy sector commander, not to response, not to prevention, recognizing that those two have to both be served by the command center, but this is an important enough entity within the sector that 

it needs to report directly to that deputy commander. 

We then have been able to fine-tune what is expected of the 

watch that has led us to the operations unit, the communications 

unit, and the situation unit in each of our sectors. And the billets 

23 

that have come on in the last year will help us completely build 

out those situational units at the sectors. 

You talked earlier about the Morning Dew and the watch stander 

being fearful of not needing to wake someone up. Not only do we 

have that communications watch stander on the alert 12-hour 

watch now, we have the operations unit, our SAR-skilled individual 

on an alert watch now. In Morning Dew, that is the person that 

was sleeping, but we now have that person standing the alert 12- 

hour watch at our sectors. Those two are the key positions. They 

are facilitated by the information that is managed, the situation 

awareness that occurs in the third unit of 12-hour alert watches at 

our sectors. So as part of the new organization, it was a fine-tuning 

and honing of the watch structure that we would imbed within 

these new organizations. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me just move on to another subject very 

quickly. 

I want to look more closely at some of the issues raised by the 

Buona Madre case. Our focus today is on SAR, but this case does 

raise a number of questions regarding casualty investigations and 

other issues that the Subcommittee has examined in some detail in 

the past. Again, I understand that the Coast Guard is a named 

party in a legal action arising from the Buona Madre case, but I 

do want to at least raise some of these issues, and if I am stepping 

over the line, you just tell me. 

The casualty report on this Buona Madre incident indicates that 

the Eva Danielson ′′failed to comply with navigational rule number 

5 in its failure to post a lookout, rule number 6, safe speed, rule 

7, risk of collision, and rule 19, conduct of vessels in restricted visibility, rule 35, sound signals and restricted visibility.′′ 

As a result of the investigation into the Buona Madre incident, 

the report indicates that the Coast Guard referred a civil penalty 

enforcement action against KS Aries Shipping for violations of 46 

U.S.C. 2302(a), and it goes on. There was another violation alleged 

for bridge operation, ship handling, and another one for collision. 

Are you familiar with all that? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What is the status of the civil penalty case now? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Mr. Chairman, that civil case was dismissed without penalty, so the sector has the opportunity to resubmit that. It was returned to Sector San Francisco last November. 

They are continuing to process that and intend to send that civil 

penalty forward again, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, it is interesting, I was kind of surprised by—I just wondered what happened to the case. I mean, we 

have a vessel that has allegedly falsified information, run over a 

fishing vessel and killed a fisherman, allegedly, and yet apparently 

the civil penalty case pertaining to this matter wasn’t developed to 

the degree where it could withstand certain scrutiny. And as a lawyer, I know all kinds of things happen in cases, but I just want to 

make sure that we have the kind of personnel we need putting 

these cases together, I guess. That is what I am trying to get at. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think it was an 

issue of the substance and content of the civil penalty case that 

was forwarded recommending that penalty; rather, it was the quesVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:42 Jan 27, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\52608 JASON
24 

tion the hearing officer had as to who should be held accountable 

as we set that case forward. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, I note that this Subcommittee has examined the Casualty Investigation Program at Sector San Francisco 

previously, and during the Cosco Busan incident. Regarding that 

incident, the DHS Inspector General found that five of the six individuals assigned to marine casualty investigator billets were not 

qualified for those positions. All three of the individuals who responded to the Cosco Busan were unqualified as marine casualty 

investigators. Likely, as a result of the inadequate training and experience and the use of inadequate manuals, the investigators who 

responded to the Cosco Busan failed to identify, collect and secure 

perishable evidence related to this casualty. 

Additionally, the Coast Guard incorrectly classified the investigation of the Cosco Busan casualty as an informal investigation rather than a formal investigation. Does the apparent failure of the effort to prosecute the Eva Danielson suggest that there are continuing shortfalls with the casualty investigation program in Sector 

San Francisco? I know what you just said, but I am just curious. 

And has this situation improved, the one that I just talked about? 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Mr. Chairman, we know that we had 

shortcomings in our Marine Safety program, and we specifically 

have embarked on a Marine Safety Improvement Plan. The Cosco 

Busan case, the Buona Madre case are indicators of, again, that 

rigorous self-examination and the knowledge that we must do better. 

With the Marine Safety Improvement Plan, it went into place in 

May of 2008, so this was after the Buona Madre case had already 

occurred, we have laid out a course, and we are making progress 

on that course to return our skills and our proficiencies to the high 

standards that they need to be. 

This is a very deliberative process that is going to take us several 

years. Our plan stretches between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 

2014, measured progress as we bring billets on, as we improve skill 

sets, focusing on all of the marine safety missions. So it is looking 

at our licensing and documentation program, looking at our compliance and oversight, looking at how we manage investigations and 

accident follow-on, outreach and partnerships, recreational boating 

safety. All of that is embedded within the Marine Safety Improvement Plan. 

One key piece of that are Centers of Expertise that we are establishing in key locations around the country so that we have a cadre 

of senior mentors, if you will, who are able to help us. We have established a Marine Safety Center of Expertise in the Miami area 

that will focus on crew ship issues. We are in the process of standing up our Marine Safety Investigations Center of Expertise in 

New Orleans. We have picked key locations where there is a lot of 

that business that occurs naturally. New Orleans we have a plethora of investigative activities that occur within that sector already. 

We are collocating our Center of Expertise. We are putting in a 

staff of six experienced investigators who can help us as we develop 

doctrine, as we assess capabilities. If we have an investigation, 

they can actually send an investigator to assist. 

25 

So those are some of the things that I would cite that are already 

happening through the Marine Safety Improvement Plan. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me ask you this, and this will be my last 

question; you know, when I listen to all the things that are happening, I am very pleased that we are going in the direction that 

we are going in because it is about making things better. 

As you were speaking, I was just wondering to myself, is it that 

we had a high standard, and for whatever reason slipped back? Is 

it that circumstances have changed that where—I mean, in the 

cases that we have talked about today, have circumstances 

changed where there is just a different environment? Has the post9/11 stretching of the Guard and more responsibilities had an impact? I guess what I am trying to figure out—it may be a combination of all of those or none of those, I don’t know, but I am trying 

to get to what you see as having gotten us to the point where we 

have to do all the things that you talked about, new courses, all 

the things you just talked about. And they are all good. But I want 

to make sure that we are on a path where if it is a thing of standards, if it is a thing of personnel, if it is stretched too far—particularly post-9/11—whatever it is, that if we can get off the path of 

what appears to be a slipping back so that we can fix what we have 

and stay steady. I want to kind of know what your assessment is. 

And I know that is kind of a loaded question, but I am sure you 

have thought about this a lot. The Coast Guard, rightfully so, has 

earned a phenomenal reputation—I talk about the Coast Guard all 

the time. I want to make sure that that reputation stays intact and 

that the Coast Guard has everything it needs. 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. I thank you for your support, Mr. Chairman. As I was considering the dialogue that we would have today, 

one of the things that crossed my mind was—you have probably 

seen the recent article, ′′First-Class Cadet Jacqueline Fitch: A Regimental Commander of the Coast Guard Academy.′′ I think of individuals like her—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. From my district—— 

Admiral BRICE-O’HARA. Yes, sir. I think of individuals who are 

young, promising, eager to serve, they have joined the Coast Guard 

because they want to make a difference. We have not lost that passion. We have not lost that bias for action. But there were periods 

before 9/11 where we were chronically underfunded, we were 

underresourced. Even before the Morning Dew case surfaced, we 

knew that we were stretching our people with the watches they 

were standing. Unfortunately, it took that crisis to enable us to get 

the resources to shift to the 12-hour watch that people had been 

telling us. National Transportation Safety Board studies, our own 

studies pointed us to those 12-hour watches. 

So we have begun to get resources. We have applied those resources as they were intended by Congress. But it has taken us a 

while to be able to fill all of our positions and to grow the stature 

and the experience and the wisdom within our workforce for the 

missions that are becoming increasingly more complex. 

I think that the good news here is nobody is diminished in their 

desire to do well. The Coast Guard has not stepped back from the 

candid, hard examination of how we are performing, and that we 

have put interventions in place. And we now must stay the course 

26 

and never step back from these very high standards that we have 

established and continue to push our people so that they are 

trained, guided, mentored, prepared, equipped, and with the right 

leadership to do the job that is expected of them by you, by the 

public, by the world. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I want to thank you very much for your 

testimony. 

I was visiting one of the stations, and a fellow told me that when 

these hearings come on, that the Coast Guard watches them. I 

didn’t know that. So everybody watches them. But the reason why 

I raise that is because I want it always to be understood that everybody on this Committee—and particularly this Subcommittee, I 

know—want the very best for the Coast Guard. We have a phenomenal amount of respect. And I don’t think there is one Member 

of this Committee that does not understand that we as a Congress 

can do better by the Coast Guard. I know Mr. LoBiondo agrees 

with me because he talks about it all the time. 

We are going to fight with everything we have to try to make 

sure that you get the resources that you need to do your job. I 

know you didn’t come here complaining. I asked you certain questions, and you just told the truth. But all we want is the very, very 

best for your personnel so that they can be the best. And so I really 

thank you very much. 

Mr. LoBiondo, did you have anything to add? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to echo your 

comments that when we have incidents like this, we are interested 

in trying to drill down a little bit deeper; but just a remarkable 

record of service for men and women who have dedicated their lives 

under incredibly difficult circumstances on many occasions, doing 

a great service to our Nation in many different respects. And our 

heartfelt thanks goes out to everyone in the Coast Guard for the 

tremendous job and the service they are rendering to our Nation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

27 


Insert offset folio 32 here 52608.032
28 


Insert offset folio 33 here 52608.033
29 


Insert offset folio 34 here 52608.034
30 


Insert offset folio 35 here 52608.035
31 


Insert offset folio 36 here 52608.036
32 


Insert offset folio 37 here 52608.037
33 


Insert offset folio 38 here 52608.038
34 


Insert offset folio 39 here 52608.039
35 


Insert offset folio 40 here 52608.040
36 


Insert offset folio 41 here 52608.041
37 


Insert offset folio 42 here 52608.042
38 


Insert offset folio 43 here 52608.043
39 


Insert offset folio 44 here 52608.044
40 

Æ 


Insert offset folio 45 here 52608.045