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54–246 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–212 

THE PASSPORT ISSUANCE PROCESS: CLOSING THE 

DOOR TO FRAUD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 5, 2009 

Serial No. J–111–19 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

MATT MINER, Republican Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JON KYL, Arizona 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BILL VAN HORNE, Democratic Chief Counsel 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland ............. 1 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 3 

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. ............................................................ 19 

Sprague, Brenda S., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. ......... 5 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Ford, Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., statement ......................................... 27 

Sprague, Brenda S., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

statement .............................................................................................................. 35 

Verma, Richard R., Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of 

State, Washington, D.C., letter ........................................................................... 40 

Walle, Colin Patrick, Vice President, National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE), Washington, D.C., statement ......................................................... 44 

(1) 

THE PASSPORT ISSUANCE PROCESS: CLOSING 

THE DOOR TO FRAUD 

TUESDAY, MAY 5, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Cardin, Feinstein, and Kyl. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND 

Chairman CARDIN. The Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security will come to order. I want to thank our witnesses for 

being here today. I particularly want to thank Senator Kyl and 

Senator Feinstein for the purpose for why this hearing has been 

called, looking into the security of the issuance of passports. It was 

Senator Feinstein and Senator Kyl who asked GAO to undertake 

a study to proactively test the effectiveness of our current passportissuing process to determine whether malicious individuals could 

use counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents to obtain a genuine U.S. passport. 

Now, this is an extremely important issue for us because the 

passport is the gold standard for identification in this country. It 

is used for so many purposes, and it also, of course, gives an individual an ability to travel, which is an important tool for someone 

who wants to do harm, including terrorists. 

The GAO report that we have before us—and we will be hearing 

from GAO today—concludes that terrorists or criminals could—I 

am quoting from the report. ‘‘Terrorists or criminals could steal an 

American citizen’s identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create 

fraudulent documents for that identity, and obtain genuine U.S. 

passports from the State Department. GAO conducted four tests 

simulating this approach and was successful in obtaining a genuine 

U.S. passport in each case. In all four tests, GAO used counterfeit 

and/or fraudulently obtained documents. The State Department 

and the United States Postal Service employees did not identify 

GAO’s documents as counterfeit. GAO’s investigators later purchased an airline ticket under the name used on the fraudulent 

passport and then used the passport to check in for the flight, get 

a boarding pass, and passed through security checkpoints at the 

airport.’’ 

2 

Now, that should alarm all of us—four out of four able to obtain 

fraudulent passports. In one case, the applicant used the Social Security number of a 5-year-old fictitious child, and the applicant was 

53 years old. In another case, the applicant used the Social Security number of a deceased individual who died in 1965, and we 

have records where that could have been checked out. 

Now, the State Department acknowledges the problems, and I 

know recommendations have been made by GAO, and we are talking about making modifications in the system. And that may give 

us some comfort if this was the first time that these issues were 

brought to our attention. But there have been previous GAO reports with similar findings and similar efforts and commitments 

made to correct the failures of the system. 

So as has been pointed out in the report, ‘‘State officials have 

known about the vulnerabilities in the passport-issuing process for 

many years, but have failed to effectively address these 

vulnerabilities.’’ 

That is a serious statement, one in which this Committee is 

going to ask questions today. We are concerned of whether GAO’s 

recommendations will be effectively acted upon. 

Now, I want to submit for the record the National Federation of 

Federal Employees Local 1998, statements talking about the pressure on passport specialists to act quickly on approval. And I understand that. You are probably getting calls from our office telling 

you to move these passports a little bit more expeditiously, people 

have planes to catch, and get these passports issued. There is pressure. I understand that. But we have got to get it right. We cannot 

issue fraudulent passports in this country. We have got to take 

every step to make sure that cannot be done. There is too much 

reliance on the reliability of a passport that goes through our international borders. 

So, today, we will hear from Brenda Sprague, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Passport Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs at the 

U.S. State Department, and from Jess Ford, the Director of International Affairs and Trade at the GAO. 

With that, let me turn to Senator Kyl, who has been the moving 

force behind the GAO report and this hearing. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE 

STATE OF ARIZONA 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks also to Senator Feinstein, as you mentioned, who was also active in seeking 

to get this information. I appreciate the work of the GAO. Obviously, we will learn at the time that Mr. Ford testifies a little bit 

more about their evaluation of the extent to which this is a problem. But certainly in the report, it is evident that we do have a 

problem. 

I want to acknowledge—and, incidentally, I totally agree with everything you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman. The 

passport is supposed to be the gold standard for documents in the 

United States, and yet this GAO report verifies that it is not as reliable as we thought it was. 

There are some corrective actions I understand State has indicated that it is taking, but I think there are some other commonVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Jan 19, 2010 Jkt 054246 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\54246.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
3 

sense things that have not yet been done, and perhaps the best 

thing I can do is just presage some of the questions that I will be 

asking, and perhaps in opening statements you can address these: 

first of all, why so many individuals’ applications were approved 

even though there were no Social Security numbers sought or supplied. Something like 72,000 applicants, according to GAO, in just 

a 6-month period last year received passports without supplying a 

Social Security number. 

And then, conversely, in those situations where there was a number supplied, the State Department approved thousands of applications without any feedback from Social Security as to whether the 

number was accurate or whether the individual was connected to 

the number. And, also, whether it is current policy—this is the way 

current policy at least is described, in which case obviously policy 

was breached in many of these cases—whether it is current policy 

to approve applications from only individuals who have presented 

a Social Security number and only after word has come back from 

the Social Security Administration confirming the information relative to that number. If that is the policy, it has obviously been 

breached. If it is not the policy, why isn’t it? 

And, finally, asking whether—and I will be primarily focused on 

this from our GAO witness, but whether weakening the REAL ID 

driver’s license requirements will also end up making it possible for 

more criminals, terrorists, and others to get fraudulent passports 

and thereby pose an additional risk to the country. 

As I said, the U.S. passport is thought to be the most secure 

identification that we have in this country, and clearly that is not 

the case, according to the GAO report. We need to make sure that 

enough changes are effectuated that we can return to that gold 

standard, and that will be up to our colleagues at the State Department to ensure that this is accomplished. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you. 

As I mentioned at the beginning of the hearing, we thank Senator Feinstein and Senator Kyl for bringing this issue to our Subcommittee’s attention and to the American people’s attention. Senator Feinstein is the former Chairman of this Subcommittee, and 

as I have said many times, I look to her for continuing the priority 

that this Committee has had in protecting the security of our country. 

Senator Feinstein? 

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and I thank you for your leadership. It is very much appreciated. 

And thank you for continuing the tradition that Senator Kyl and 

I began. I think we spent a lot of time on this issue in this Subcommittee, and we now have the GAO report. And so if I may, as 

you know, I went on to chair Intelligence, and so I have got an Intelligence meeting. But I believe this is important, so I would like 

to make a brief statement, if I might. 

Chairman CARDIN. Certainly. 

4 

Senator FEINSTEIN. When the GAO uncovered in its investigation—what it uncovered I think is very alarming. A GAO undercover agent attempted to get a United States passport based on 

counterfeit documents and fraudulent Social Security numbers and 

succeeded in four out of four attempts. That is 100 percent of the 

time. 

The State Department failed to clear all four of these passports 

through the Social Security number clearance check—first mistake—which takes only 24 hours. 

The State Department did not identify the counterfeit birth certificates or the counterfeit driver’s licenses. It also issued all four 

passports to the same individual and had no system to pick this 

up. One passport, as we know, was issued to a middle-aged man 

based on a 5-year-old’s Social Security number, and another was 

issued even though the Social Security number was from a deceased individual. 

Now, the question arises: How many passports are out there that 

were wrongly issued and are being used by those seeking to do others harm? 

The State Department will testify today that it has made concrete steps to begin to close these vulnerabilities. While this is encouraging, State Department officials have known about these 

vulnerabilities for many years, but have failed to fully secure the 

process. 

For example, the GAO, in a report released in 2005—that is 4 

years ago—recommended that the State Department check all Social Security numbers against the Social Security Administration’s 

data base of deceased individuals. But this was not done until December 2008, 3 years later. In addition, it is my understanding that 

employees processing the passports had raised this solution with 

the State Department as early as 2001. 

Now, the GAO’s report contains problems and solutions, and let 

me run through a few of them. 

Problem: Applications were not held for 24 hours to allow for Social Security numbers to clear a system. Solution: No passports 

should be issued before the 24-hour Social Security check is clear. 

Problem: Adjudicators did not identify counterfeit birth certificates. Solution: A birth certificates data base to provide greater access to a national data base verifying birth certificates. This is in 

existence. 

Problem: Adjudicators did not identify counterfeit driver’s licenses. Access to a national driver clearinghouse is available. Bureau of Diplomatic Security can request that the passport office 

gain access to this data base. 

Problem: All four passports were processed to the same person. 

Solution: Develop the technology to have the photograph matched 

against existing data bases. The State Department is building a facial recognition system currently. 

Problem: Social Security number did not match with date of birth 

given, was flagged by computer, but missed by adjudicator on the 

screen. This is a human error. Training and oversight for all adjudicators is presented as the solution, along with regular audits and 

undercover checks internally of passport issuance process. 

5 

Problem: Social Security number that belonged to deceased was 

not caught. Solution: Again, the Social Security death match system is now up and running since December of 2008. 

And the final problem: The State Department did not know it 

had wrongly issued the passports until the GAO told them. And 

the solution is to require an audit for passports issued wrongfully. 

So there are solutions to every one of these problems, but, you 

know, I think that the passport is more and more becoming the 

common identity document. And if this passport is easily forged 

and so easily obtained that the clearances are not gone through by 

State, I think it jeopardizes the whole system. 

In my view, this is a very important hearing, Mr. Chairman. I 

thank you for holding it, and hopefully the State Department will 

be willing to take the necessary actions. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

I would ask that Ms. Sprague and at the same time if Mr. Ford 

would just be prepared to take the oath, that way we could do both 

of you at one time. Thank you. If you would raise your right hand. 

Do you affirm that the testimony you are about to give before the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I do. 

Mr. FORD. I do. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you. Ms. Sprague, we are pleased to 

hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF BRENDA S. SPRAGUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR PASSPORT SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Chairman Cardin, Senator Kyl, Senator Feinstein, 

and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this 

opportunity to discuss the passport issuance process and the plans 

we have to address our fraud vulnerabilities. We take seriously our 

responsibility to protect U.S. borders and the integrity of the U.S. 

passport through vigilant adjudication. The Bureau of Consular Affairs works diligently to improve training, procedures, and oversight throughout the passport adjudication process. The outcome of 

the General Accountability Office’s recent investigation shows that 

we need to do more. We have already taken a number of immediate 

actions and are in the process of devising a detailed plan to enhance our entire process and program. 

As you already have been briefed, a GAO investigative team informed Consular Affairs on February 10, 2009 that they had performed a probe of the passport issuance process. The team reported 

that a GAO investigator submitted four passport applications— 

three at local postal acceptance facilities and one at a passport 

agency—utilizing a combination of counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents. All four applications resulted in U.S. passports 

being issued in error. The subsequent GAO report specifically identified two major/significant vulnerabilities in our process: one, that 

passport specialists were unknowingly approving applications before all information checks were completed; and two, passport speVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Jan 19, 2010 Jkt 054246 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\54246.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
6 

cialists and acceptance agents did not recognize fraudulent documents. 

CA immediately initiated a number of measures to address these 

vulnerabilities and to mitigate potential fraud in the future. Some 

measures taken or contemplated would be more appropriately discussed only in a closed session. 

First, upon receiving information from the GAO regarding the 

four passports issued in error, we promptly identified each passport, and in accordance with standard operating procedures, we revoked the passports and posted corresponding ‘‘lookout alerts’’ in 

our internal systems and with U.S. border officials and Interpol. 

We suspended adjudication approval authority for the four passport specialists who issued the four GAO applications. 

We suspended the authority of the acceptance facilities that accepted the three GAO applications. 

We immediately provided counterfeit document detection refresher training to all passport agency managers and specialists. 

Biweekly case study meetings are being held by agency supervisors 

with the passport specialists regarding unfamiliar or fraudulent 

documentation received in the office. The GAO report was shared 

with passport agency staff to reiterate the importance of carefully 

reviewing identification and citizenship documents, as well as the 

information on passport applications, to detect fraud. In addition, 

we revised performance standards for passport specialists to reemphasize the importance of quality adjudication and fraud prevention performance standards. 

We instituted a 100-percent audit of all live applications. Passport specialists were released from the audit only when they had 

demonstrated to their supervisors that they were processing work 

in full compliance with adjudication standards as related to both 

proper annotation and attention to possible fraud indicators. 

We revised our procedures regarding the processing of same day 

‘‘will call’’ service cases. Additional supervisory oversight is required for all same day applications. Agencies have been directed 

to complete all information checks prior to the issuance of the passport. These procedural changes enhance our ability to identify potential fraudulent applications or documents. Additionally, passport 

acceptance agents at post offices and courthouses and passport specialists at our passport counters must now photocopy all identification documentation submitted by applicants so that it can become 

a permanent part of the passport record. 

Second, we created an Adjudication Policy and Process Review 

Working Group in mid-March to help further identify necessary improvements. This working group consists of five subgroups, which 

are: 

One, Restructuring of Adjudication Process and Oversight: This 

subgroup is reviewing the current adjudication program and working on recommendations to restructure our processes. Additionally, 

the subgroup is working on recommendations for a new adjudicative managerial oversight function. 

Adjudication Requirements and Standards: This subgroup is developing standardized desk and counter adjudication procedures. 

Additionally, it is developing standardized procedures for passport 

7 

specialists regarding the use of the Social Security number and 

other commercial data-bases. 

Post-Issuance Audit: This subgroup is developing a statistically 

valid audit process for previously issued passports. The results 

from this audit will be used for future training purposes. 

Training Initiatives: This subgroup is identifying enhancements 

for fraud training for all passport specialists, supervisors, and 

fraud prevention managers. It is reviewing the curriculum of the 

National Training Program, which we use for training our new employees, to ensure that it appropriately and thoroughly addresses 

the document verification requirements used by passport specialists. Also, the subgroup is identifying and recommending standard 

requirements for on-the-job training for new hires once they complete the National Training Program and begin working with 

‘‘live’’—unapproved—applications. Additionally, it is developing 

standardized fraud awareness training for our courthouse and post 

office acceptance facilities. 

Technology: This subgroup is identifying technical and procedural vulnerabilities to the integrity of the passport process. Additionally, it is working on recommendations for improvement to our 

automated systems through access to additional data-bases. In connection with this initiative, we have already developed the business 

process requirements for introduction of a facial recognition tool by 

the end of the calendar year. 

Formal recommendations from the subgroups are expected by the 

summer of 2009. Shortly afterward, they will be compiled, finalized, and forwarded for Department management approval. 

Third, CA is already working on some long-term initiatives to address our process vulnerabilities. We are currently pursuing an initiative to combine the systems platforms for domestic and overseas 

passport adjudication and issuance to ensure consistency and improve overall quality control. The combined system will utilize as 

many automated adjudication checks as possible. 

The GAO report recommended that we work with State-level officials to develop a strategy to gain access to their data-bases and 

incorporate reviews of these data-bases into our adjudication process. Prior to the GAO undercover test, CA officials had held ongoing meetings with Federal and State government agencies regarding access to information and data-bases for citizenship and identity verification. As a result of the GAO’s recent recommendation, 

I also sent a letter to all State Registrars asking for their assistance in providing the Department access to their birth and death 

records for verification purposes. We plan to vigorously continue 

this effort. 

I appreciate the opportunity to share with you the Department 

of State’s comprehensive approach to enhancing U.S. border security by augmenting the security of all aspects of the U.S. passport 

program. We appreciate GAO’s constructive recommendations and 

look forward to working with Congress and the GAO to produce the 

most secure passport possible. Let me end by assuring you that the 

Department is fully committed to a secure passport issuance process and deterring and detecting fraud. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to be here 

today. I will be pleased to answer any questions that you, the 

8 

Ranking Member, and other distinguished members of the Subcommittee might have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sprague appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman CARDIN. Well, Ms. Sprague, thank you very much for 

your testimony. I think everything you said, it is hard to disagree 

with any of the changes that you are putting in place. 

I want to point out that I will confer with Senator Kyl and Senator Feinstein after this hearing to determine whether we need a 

closed session to go over the recommendations that cannot be done 

in a public session, and we will make a determination. 

But I want to just ask you first, tell me the reaction in your Department when you found out about the GAO report that four out 

of four fraudulent passports were obtained by the use of fraudulent 

information. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Speaking for our management team, I would say 

the correct reaction would be they were heartsick, horrified, embarrassed. Speaking for the passport specialists with whom I have spoken, they were horrified, upset, anxious, concerned, and they have 

cooperated in a tremendous way with us, all of them, to try and 

address these vulnerabilities and find ways to improve our situation and to make things better. 

Chairman CARDIN. I appreciate that. 

Senator Feinstein pointed out something I had read earlier, that 

these passports were used to obtain boarding passes for flights. It 

is very conceivable that this method could have been used by a terrorist in order to gain into travel and then having a passport that 

would not reflect any sign of concern to the security people at the 

border. That obviously is a significant breach in the security system of our country. 

What concerns me is that this is not the first time. There have 

been previous GAO reports and there was your own internal report 

in 2008 that showed the issuance of passports that should not have 

been issued to criminals. 

Why is it different this time? Why should this Committee expect 

that these recommendations will be effectively implemented when 

in the past they have not been effectively implemented? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Mr. Chairman, we have a very difficult challenge 

facing us, and we have addressed it in a number of ways. 

When we look at a passport and we sit down to adjudicate it, we 

are trying to establish three things: No. 1, the identity of the individual; No. 2, whether or not this individual is a citizen; and, No. 

3, whether or not there is some reason this person should be prevented from traveling. 

I would like to address the alert system first. We have, since 

2005, done a great deal of work on our alert system working with 

the Terrorism Screening Group, working with NCIC, working with 

our own colleagues in the visa office, to make a system, a lookout 

system that is first class. We believe that people who have been 

identified to us by law enforcement who apply in their own names 

would, in fact, be intercepted. 

The second part of that is identity. Identity is very difficult. We 

rely upon, for the most part, driver’s licenses. There are difficulties 

with driver’s licenses. We, of course, have difficulties verifying the 

9 

identity of driver’s licenses. But even when we can verify that a 

driver’s license was issued to a particular individual, we have no 

guarantee that that person is, in fact, who—— 

Chairman CARDIN. I also understand you do require in almost all 

cases a Social Security number. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We do require a Social Security number, but we 

cannot refuse to adjudicate a passport if someone does not provide 

a Social Security number. 

Chairman CARDIN. Let us first start with those who do supply 

a Social Security number. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. 

Chairman CARDIN. We have data banks which could have discovered in, I would think, both of the cases in which the fraudulent 

Social Security numbers were used that they were fraudulent. Why 

were they not used? And has that been corrected? Will there be 

routinely the use of the data banks to determine whether the number given is from a person who is alive and at the proper age? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We have a system—it is a 24-hour batch process— 

that we rely upon to confirm the validity of the Social Security 

number. Actually, the overnight check provides us a hit against the 

Social Security Death Master File as well as giving us a match/nomatch. But it also provides us with reasons that there is not a 

match so that we can further resolve it, because in many instances 

the Social Security data-base will have errors or there will be data 

entry errors, and we are able to resolve those with the help of Social Security. 

The reason this happened—and this was something that GAO 

brought—— 

Chairman CARDIN. But my question is—— 

Ms. SPRAGUE.—to our attention—is that the 24-hour batch did 

not run. For probably the first time in our history, we were able 

to move passport applications so quickly that we were unaware of 

the fact that the check had not been run. We—— 

Chairman CARDIN. I do not follow that. I cannot follow that. You 

lost me. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The applications—— 

Chairman CARDIN. You are saying that there was a system in 

place for the Social Security number checks, you thought they had 

been done, but they were not done? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. The short answer is yes. At headquarters—— 

Chairman CARDIN. That is even more concerning. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It is a concern. 

Chairman CARDIN. Because how do we know that that will not 

happen—that is not happening right now? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Because we have given directive to the field that 

no application is to be processed until the 24-hour match is. 

Historically, passport applications did not move through the system as quickly, and after the passport surge, we had hired a great 

deal more people, and then when passport demand went down in 

2008, the work began to move through the system so quickly that, 

unbeknownst to the people who were processing it and unbeknownst to us at headquarters, it actually was given to the adjudicators before the check had been run. And just looking at the 

10 

batch, there was no way for the supervision or the individual employee to realize that had not been done. 

Chairman CARDIN. How would they know today that it has been 

done? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Because we are not going to permit anything to go 

faster than 24 hours. It simply will not be turned over. 

Chairman CARDIN. Well, how will they know that the actual 

check has been done? Let us take the case that there is—that the 

system is down that does the checks or that someone does not show 

up that is responsible for it or it is one of those that gets lost 

through the system and no check was done. How will the individual who approves the passport know that the actual check has 

been done? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. There is a screen that appears on the—there is a 

box that appears on the screen that says ‘‘No record found.’’ We 

have instituted new procedures that when that happens, it must 

immediately be turned over to a supervision. So, in this particular 

instance, the passport adjudicators got the ‘‘No record found’’ and 

proceeded anyway. We have put a stop to that. 

Chairman CARDIN. I am still not comfortable that we have a system in place that will stop the issuance of a passport, checks have 

been made as to whether this person has a valid Social Security 

number or not. You are telling me that on the screen of the person 

who is going to approve the application there will be a reply saying 

‘‘No record found,’’ or something like that. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It says ‘‘No record found,’’ and in that case it must 

be pulled and handed over. 

In the case of a death match, for instance, adjudication stops and 

the application cannot be processed anymore. 

Chairman CARDIN. OK. Let us take both cases, and let me just 

finish this up. If it shows that the person is deceased, the Social 

Security number used, obviously you are not issuing the passport, 

at least that is—— 

Ms. SPRAGUE. That is correct. 

Chairman CARDIN. What do you do? Do you then send it to investigation? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We send it to the fraud prevention manager, and 

after he has conducted his investigation, it can be turned over to 

Diplomatic Security for further investigation, and that is normally 

the route that it would go. 

Chairman CARDIN. And that could lead to prosecution or—— 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It could indeed. 

Chairman CARDIN. And now, if you find no record found, previously if it was 24 hours later, the passport would have been 

issued, and now you are telling me it will not be issued, it will be 

sent to a supervisor? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It should never have been issued, but we have 

taken additional steps to ensure that the ‘‘No record found’’ will, 

in fact, stop the adjudication. 

Chairman CARDIN. Can you override that? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. At this time we can, but that is one of the things 

we are going to be looking at and making it impossible to do so. 

One of the problems that we have with Social Security is that 

there can be a lot of errors in the Social Security data-base. 

11 

Chairman CARDIN. I understand. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. And as a result of that, we do want to enable the 

supervisor, and at times even the adjudicator, to be able to override 

what can be easily identified, for instance, transposition of a number. But we have to—— 

Chairman CARDIN. I just want to make sure it is not overridden 

because of an anxious traveler. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I agree with you. 

Chairman CARDIN. I want to make sure that there is someone 

looking at it that is satisfied that this person is entitled to have 

a passport issued. I am still not satisfied that you have that in 

place. And I must tell you, you are not giving me a comfort level 

that I would like to have today. 

I have some more questions for the second round. Let me turn 

it over to Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Senator Feinstein, do you need to leave? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I have just—if I may just for a minute and 

then I will excuse myself. 

Ms. Sprague, we have been looking at this for a while now. I 

think the only way to really know if your reforms are effective is 

in 6 to 9 months ask for another GAO investigation. I found when 

I was mayor of San Francisco, I sent an undercover officer out to 

San Francisco airport with a concealed weapon and said, ‘‘See if 

you can go through the magnetometers. I want to see how good 

they are.’’ Again, four out of four times they got through, which 

sent a very loud message of what we had to do, and I think this 

sends a very loud message of what you have to do. 

My view is that no passport should be issued until these checks 

are complete. No system should be overridden to give a passport. 

And what I suspect has happened—and I cannot prove this—is 

that somebody has said, you know, move those passports. And so 

they go out before the checks have been adequately performed. 

I think as the Chairman referenced—and the Ranking Member 

knows very well—this is really the soft under-belly of our country, 

and it really puts us in harm’s way if these checks are not made. 

So I have no question other than to say to you it is really up to 

you, and I believe that the Senate will support you in this matter. 

We cannot put out passports that are gained with fraudulent documents, ever. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So thank you very much for being here, and 

we will do another report, and we will see how good you did. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Senator Feinstein, I did want to tell you that, in 

response to the GAO investigation, we are working with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to create red teams who will test our 

system and give us a heads up, so the next time that GAO comes, 

we will be ready. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Good. 

Chairman CARDIN. Will we get those reports from what your red 

teams find? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I think we can arrange for that. 

Chairman CARDIN. Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Thank you—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Kyl. 

12 

Senator KYL. Sure, you bet. 

There are so many questions here. This may seem a little scattershot, but let me just fire away here. One of the things that Mr. 

Ford’s report says is that the limitations in the access to interagency information contribute to vulnerabilities related to processes. Do you concur with that? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I think that we get very excellent cooperation from 

our Federal partners. We work very closely with the Department 

of Homeland Security, with the FBI, and with other organizations. 

Our difficulties arise when we are attempting to assimilate and 

work with the data from the 50 States and the District of Columbia. 

Senator KYL. So to the extent that he may be referring to State 

agencies, you concur, but you do not agree that limitations and access to interagency information—‘‘interagency’’ sort of seems to me 

within the Federal Government. You would not agree with that aspect of the report? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. No, I would not. I think that we get very good support from Homeland Security, from the intelligence community, everybody does—— 

Senator KYL. So there is no Federal data-base that you are not 

able—— 

Ms. SPRAGUE. No. Some of the Federal data-bases, we wish they 

were a little bit better than they are, but—— 

Senator KYL. But no limitations on access to them. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. No limitations. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. OK. You indicated you are in the process of designing a plan. You proceeded then to indicate a lot of 

other things that are already being done, but with regard to this 

plan, do you have an estimate of when that will be done? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I am sorry. I do not—— 

Senator KYL. One of the very first things you said when you 

began your testimony was that you are in the process of designing 

a—— 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Oh, OK. We are going to have—we have the preliminary reports of the working group are being done this week. 

We have our regional directors here in town. They have done some 

outstanding work. I have had a pre- briefing from the five groups. 

I think we will be moving forward on implementing most of those 

recommendations before the end of the summer, some of them even 

sooner than that. 

Senator KYL. You will let us know when that has occurred and 

provide that to us. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Absolutely. 

Senator KYL. Thanks. You said that you cannot refuse to issue 

a passport if there is no Social Security number supplied. Is that 

correct? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. That is correct. 

Senator KYL. What is the reason for that? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Because we do not have legislative authority to do 

that. 

Senator KYL. What legislative authority do you have to deny a 

passport? 

13 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Someone is not a U.S. citizen or they are not a 

person who—they are not the individual—they are not applying in 

the correct name, obviously, identity, but also they—— 

Senator KYL. So it is the judgment that they are not a citizen 

or they should not be able to travel? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. And there are also some other holds on the 

issuance of passports such as active warrants, if people have child 

care—— 

Senator KYL. OK. So they—excuse me for interrupting here, but 

so the bases for denial certainly could be that there is no valid Social Security number supplied, but you cannot deny it simply based 

on that fact. Is that what you are saying? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. That is what I am saying. The lack of a Social Security number is considered a very significant fraud indicator. 

Senator KYL. Right. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. And it immediately subjects the application to additional scrutiny. 

Senator KYL. OK, or at least should have and will in the future. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Absolutely. 

Senator KYL. Is the same thing true with regard to a driver’s license? Because you said that mostly for identity purposes you rely 

on driver’s licenses. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Driver’s licenses are a serious problem for us, and 

we have been working with, for example, the American Association 

of Motor Vehicle Administrators and seeking to have access to a 

data-base. There is a law enforcement data-base. The Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security is working on getting us access to it. 

For our purposes, we would like to have front-end access so that 

all that information is available to the adjudicator before they 

start. At this stage, what it appears would be the only thing available to us is query access, which does not give us as good a feeling 

as it would be if we could check everything, as we do with warrants, for example. 

Senator KYL. Failing to prove identity of proving the wrong identity is a basis for refusal. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Absolutely. 

Senator KYL. Using the driver’s license is one of the key things 

that you use to determine identity. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. 

Senator KYL. Theoretically, you could identify a person through 

some other means and still issue a passport. Is that what you are 

saying? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Well, not everyone has a driver’s license. 

Senator KYL. Right. So the answer is, yes, theoretically you 

could. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. 

Senator KYL. OK. What would be the impact if the REAL ID requirements were loosened in some way? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I will candidly tell you I am very disappointed at 

the idea that we will back away from some of those requirements. 

We were very enthusiastic about tougher standards for driver’s licenses. 

Senator KYL. One thing. Based on the comprehensive immigration bill that I helped to draft a couple years ago, the two-stage 

14 

process of checking the Social Security and then verifying the identity of the individual based upon a visual check of the driver’s license. One of the ideas that had come out of that was that there 

is some kind of association of State driver’s license bureaus, whatever that is called, and that it should be possible to get that group 

to compile all of their information together for at least an accessing 

of information, if not pre-access to it. 

Are you aware of that? Or is that what you were referring to? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We are aware of that, and we have been in touch 

with the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 

and they are doing work in this area. However, they are encountering significant difficulties because of privacy requirements on a 

State-by-State basis. 

Senator KYL. Could you, as a part of the follow-up to this hearing, give us a little memo on what you would like to see there, how 

it might be useful to you, what problems you are encountering? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We would be delighted to do that. 

Senator KYL. I appreciate that. You talked about the facial recognition tool and said that you hope to have that in effect by the 

end of the year. But that is only for a certain number of people or, 

I guess, as a pilot or what? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We are hoping to have the whole program in place, 

and we will be using some of the technology that we have developed over the years working with visa applicants. The State Department has been doing that for a long time, and we are going to 

draw upon the expertise of those people. 

It is a daunting technical challenge because we are going to be 

screening these pictures against a 92-million-file data-base, and 

that can be very daunting. And we are going to have to figure out 

how we are doing it. 

As a first step, which we hope to implement even sooner, we will 

be doing facial recognition against the fraud information that we 

have in our own fraud library, and that will be step one. 

Senator KYL. But that is not in every case. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. You would only catch people who were known to 

be frauds. 

Senator KYL. Yes, right. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The repeats, such as the ones we had in this, will 

not come about until we get the full facial recognition. 

Senator KYL. And you hope to have that by the end of the year, 

but it is only the first type of facial recognition, then you are going 

to make it more—well, you describe to me what it is. I am still not 

sure. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The fraud—the hit on the fraud—— 

Senator KYL. That is all you will have by the end of the year? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We hope to have by the end of the summer. The 

larger program we hope to have by the end of the year. 

Senator KYL. OK, and describe the ‘‘larger program.’’ 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The larger program would be that trained specialists at the National Visa Center in Kentucky would be looking at 

the application before it comes to the adjudicator, reviewing it 

against the hits that come out of the system, and saying this likely—— 

Senator KYL. What hits would come out of the system? 

15 

Ms. SPRAGUE. They would be looking for look-alikes, and they 

have a technology in which they try and do that facial recognition 

and identify characteristics and present people who are possible 

matches. The applicant applies—— 

Senator KYL. Can I just take one more minute here on this? The 

applicant applies and presumably has a driver’s license with a photograph? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We are using the photograph that he has submitted in connection with—— 

Senator KYL. With the passport, OK. And then you run that 

against a data-base—— 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Of 92 million records. 

Senator KYL. OK. And that data-base, does it purportedly have 

in it all of the driver’s licenses that have been issued in the country? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. No. It has passport photos, and we would be reliant on passport photos to do this check. 

Senator KYL. So it would be past passport photos. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Exactly. 

Senator KYL. So if somebody had a previous passport and it was 

validly issued, you should have a match. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Exactly. 

Senator KYL. If they had a previous passport invalidly issued, 

you would still have a match. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes, if they were applying now under a different 

name, there would be a match to the picture. 

Senator KYL. And that would not show up as a ‘‘to be checked’’ 

item in that case. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Absolutely—well, if you have not—if we had a picture come up—— 

Senator KYL. If it is a different name. 

Ms. SPRAGUE.—With a different name and it was the same person, that would be an absolute—— 

Senator KYL. Double-check it. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. 

Senator KYL. Yes, OK. All right. And I gather at some point you 

would hope to be able to check it against driver’s license photos. 

Is that correct? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I do not know that we would want to go that far 

because I do not know we would have access to that kind of record. 

What we would very much like to do is be able to take the driver’s 

license number and check it against a data-base that would give 

us the picture, and then we could compare that to the passport 

photo. That would be a wonderful—— 

Senator KYL. And if I just could, Mr. Chairman, in the bill, 

again, on the comprehensive immigration reform, which was not 

passed, that is exactly the system that was set up, that the Association of Motor Vehicle Departments would house the photos of all 

the people with driver’s licenses, and when the applicant for a job 

came to the individual and the computer screen showed—you 

punch in the driver’s license information, it would show the driver’s 

license photo taken on the day that the driver’s license was issued, 

and the individual would then have the opportunity to match visVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Jan 19, 2010 Jkt 054246 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\54246.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
16 

ually the photograph on the driver’s license with the individual 

standing in front of him or her. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. 

Senator KYL. Is that a potential way to help resolve this situation? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Obviously, that would be terrific. 

Senator KYL. Could you, in that little short memo I asked you 

to do for us, discuss that possibility for us? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Happy to do that. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you, Senator Kyl. 

I just want to expand on that. I want to give you an opportunity. 

If there is a need for us to strengthen the laws on passport 

issuance, we want to hear from you. So if you believe that the law 

is inadequate as it relates to those people who have Social Security 

numbers and providing information for you to do an adequate 

check, then let us know so that we can consider strengthening the 

law. Or if you do not have adequate resources to get this job done, 

we want to know about it. So maybe I can just tag onto Senator 

Kyl’s request, make his memo a little bit longer and include those 

points. But if there is a need for us to consider changing the law, 

or if you do not have the resources to get the job done, we want 

to know about it. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Our most striking need is to have better access to 

State data-bases—death, birth, and also driver’s license. If we 

could have that, it would take us a long way. It would not solve 

all our problems because you do not necessarily have a direct link 

between a birth certificate and what happens to an individual later 

on. But it would certainly enable us to know that a certificate was 

issued in this name at that time and that the number matched to 

a number in their system. 

Chairman CARDIN. And Senator Feinstein alluded in her opening 

comments to data banks being created in this area. Can you give 

us the status on births? What is the status? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The National Association of Public Health Statistics Information Systems has been given a grant by the Department of Homeland Security to create a consolidated data-base of all 

the 50 States and the District of Columbia, and they are hard at 

work on that. They anticipate that that will be available for all the 

50 States and the District of Columbia by 2010. We are working 

with them. They have given us access, and we are routinely accessing those States which are already participating, but it is not a 

complete list. It is not even half. And we have actually worked with 

them to approach some States to accelerate because these are 

States in which we have a very high number of people applying, 

and we would very much like to verify it. And they are working 

with us on that, but we are not there yet. 

Chairman CARDIN. And it is on track now for 2010? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. They tell us December of 2010. 

Chairman CARDIN. The end of 2010. And on the driver’s licenses, 

you have already covered a good part of this, but with the current 

requirements for driver’s licenses, that, of course, will be impleVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Jan 19, 2010 Jkt 054246 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\54246.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
17 

mented over the next several years, absent further delays. Will 

that give you better access for verification of identification? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It would give us greater confidence in the documents that we do see, but the ability to verify that these are validly issued driver’s licenses would still rely upon a national database. When we have spoken to the people from the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, they have given us a rather bleak assessment of when such a data-base would be available. 

Chairman CARDIN. Is there a commitment to have a national 

data-base? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. The law enforcement community does have a national data-base. It is not available to us at this time. But the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is acting as a sponsor for us to have 

access to it. 

Chairman CARDIN. Is there a reason why you should not be able 

to do a Social Security number check with everyone who has Social 

Security numbers? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. No, there is not. 

Chairman CARDIN. But currently that information is not necessarily given to you? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It is given to us in the 24-hour batch processing, 

and we have it within 24 hours after we submit that information 

to the Social Security Administration. 

Chairman CARDIN. And you are implementing a process that that 

check must be returned before the passport can be issued. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Yes. Our Inspector General just completed an investigation, an ongoing audit of our activities, and they recommended that we stop the process if there is any Social Security 

problem, and we are responding to the OIG’s recommendation. 

Chairman CARDIN. I am not sure we all agree with Senator Feinstein that there should be no exceptions to the rule, but I think we 

all agree that there has got to be some really good reason for 

issuing a passport if you have not gotten the information back. It 

should not be a routine decision made because of time or those 

types of considerations. We have to have confidence that the person 

has cleared the basic data checks. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. At the present time, we have restricted same-day 

issuances, which would be the only instance in which we would 

issue such a—we would issue before the 24-hour batch to truly lifeand-death emergencies. And we have the ability, even for those, to 

get an instant check with this Social Security Death Master File, 

so that no one is getting a passport until that check is completed. 

Chairman CARDIN. And I would ask that you would share with 

our Committee, with our staff, your internal audits that you do or 

inspections that you do so that we have an understanding of where 

we are in that process. I think that would be helpful for us to be 

able to get that information, and I appreciate your willingness to 

make that available to us. 

Let me just tell you, I think your first response to the first question I asked was a very telling response and one that I really sincerely appreciate, because obviously this is a very difficult situation 

for dedicated people who are working very hard, and we are all 

very concerned about it. 

18 

I would just make one final observation, and that is, you know, 

we are under pressure to allow other countries more liberal access 

for their citizens coming into America, and we base that upon their 

reliability and the people who come here as being eligible to visit 

our country. And I think that if we would have seen this type of 

a survey from one of the countries that was seeking visa waiver, 

we may have been very reluctant to grant that country a visa waiver. So this is a very serious issue, and I think your first response 

indicated that, and we want to work with you to get this corrected. 

We know how important a passport is to a person who is applying 

for it, so it is a very anxious moment until they get that passport 

in their hands. We understand that, particularly if they have vacation plans. So we want to work with you to make sure we can get 

this done as efficiently as possible, but we cannot compromise our 

national security. 

Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. 

Back to the use of the Social Security numbers, according to the 

GAO report, in the last 6 months before the end of 2008, close to 

72,000 applicants received passports without supplying a Social Security number. Why did that happen? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. In looking at the records quickly—and I cannot tell 

you we did a complete audit review, but we did look at it quickly— 

most of those were children under the age of 1. It was out of a universe of 6-million-plus passports, I believe, and most of those were 

children or people living abroad who had never acquired a Social 

Security number. 

Senator KYL. You talk about a batch process. Is the reason why 

this takes overnight because you bundle them all up and send 

them in all at once? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. It is the way we best interface with Social Security 

to provide data of that volume. 

Senator KYL. OK. Well, you know that the E-Verify system works 

almost on a real-time basis. If I am an employer and I want to 

check the Social Security number of an applicant, I take the information from him, type it into the computer, it goes to Social Security, and within a matter of seconds I get the information back, it 

is a match or no match. Why can’t you do that? 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We don’t do it for two reasons. First of all, because 

we want to make sure that it is done, and so that is the reason 

that we want it to be available to the adjudicator before he even 

starts. 

Second of all, by going through the batch process, they give us 

a lot more information. When you go with the E-Verify process, 

which is the other alternative that they can offer, they give you a 

match or a no-match. We get information—and I am not as up on 

this as I should be. But we will get information, for example, that 

will indicate to us that a number has been transposed, and we can 

look on the screen and see that someone read a 7 as a—— 

Senator KYL. OK, so if you had to—— 

Ms. SPRAGUE. So that has been very useful to us. 

Senator KYL. If you had to, you could use it in the E-Verify system and get an immediate response, but you get more useful information by taking the 24-hour period. 

19 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Exactly. 

Senator KYL. OK. Thank you. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Exactly. 

Senator KYL. The only other thing I wanted to ask you to do, you 

answered my question that reducing the requirements under REAL 

ID would be a real problem. I have forgotten—I do not mean to put 

words in your mouth, but it was—— 

Ms. SPRAGUE. We are extremely disappointed. 

Senator KYL. Extremely disappointed in any effort in that vein. 

In the ever lengthier memo that we are asking you to send us, 

could you just describe the reasons for that, what your concerns 

really are and the reasons for that? Because there is still a lot of 

debate about exactly what we should do with that, and I think your 

weighing in, indicating how important it is to have good information there, could be influential with colleagues who may simply not 

be aware of the reasons why the State Department needs to have 

this information. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. I would be delighted. 

Senator KYL. Great. That would be much appreciated. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Ms. Sprague. We appreciate your testimony. We appreciate the work that you all do, and we look forward to working 

with you. 

Ms. SPRAGUE. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman CARDIN. Mr. Ford, we have the GAO report to Congress that was made available at the request of Senator Feinstein 

and Senator Kyl. The report will be made part of our Subcommittee 

record. We thank you for the work that you have done in this area, 

and we look forward to hearing your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL 

AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to discuss our recent work on significant 

fraud vulnerabilities in the passport issuance process. My testimony today will highlight the results of our March 2009 report, 

which you just referred to, and also will summarize a letter we 

sent to you in April which catalogued a number of suggestions that 

we had for the State Department to try to remedy some of these 

vulnerabilities. 

As you know, a passport not only allows an individual to travel 

freely in and out of the United States, but it also can be used further as an identification document to prove U.S. citizenship and set 

up bank accounts, among other things. Because passports issued 

under a false identity help enable individuals to conceal their 

movements and activities, there is great concern that passport 

fraud could facilitate acts of terrorism. Further, passport fraud facilitates other crimes such as illegal immigration, money laundering, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and alien smuggling. Malicious individuals may seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the State 

Department’s current passport issuance process by using counterVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Jan 19, 2010 Jkt 054246 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\54246.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
20 

feit or fraudulently obtained documents as proof of identity and 

U.S. citizenship. 

In March of 2009, we reported on the results of our investigation 

into the vulnerabilities of State’s passport issuance process. Specifically, our undercover investigator was able to easily obtain four 

genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained 

documents. We attempted to obtain the four genuine U.S. passports 

by using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents, such as 

birth certificates and driver’s licenses, and Social Security numbers 

of fictitious or deceased individuals. In the most egregious case, our 

investigator obtained a U.S. passport using counterfeit documents 

and a Social Security number of a man who had died in 1965. In 

another case, our undercover investigator obtained a U.S. passport 

using counterfeit documents and the genuine Social Security number of a fictitious 5-year-old child—even though the individual applying for the passport was 53 years old. 

The results of our investigation confirmed that the State Department continues to struggle with reducing fraud risks that we had 

previously identified in reports we issued in 2005 and in 2007. In 

2005, we reported that using stolen identities and documentation 

was a primary tactic of those who sought to obtain a U.S. passport. 

We also reported weaknesses in the State Department’s information-sharing system. For example, we reported that State did not 

receive information about U.S. citizens contained in the Federal 

Government’s consolidated terrorist watch list, and the State Department did not routinely obtain the names of other individuals 

wanted by both Federal and State law enforcement authorities. We 

also found that the information that the State Department received 

from the Social Security Administration was limited and did not include access to Social Security death records, although State Department officials said at the time they were exploring the possibility of using these records. 

A little over 2 years later, in July of 2007, we reported that the 

State Department lacked a formal oversight program over its 9,500 

acceptance agencies and noted that State lacked a formal oversight 

effort to ensure that the individuals who worked in these facilities—primarily postal offices—had adequate controls to ensure that 

fraud was not perpetrated by applicants. 

The State Department, as you have heard, has responded to 

many of the vulnerabilities that we recently reported. With regard 

to adjudication, the State Department told us that human error 

and a lack of access to information contributed to failures to identify our recent undercover tests. According to the State Department, passport specialists did not wait for the results of a required 

Social Security data-base check before approving our fraudulent applications. 

In all four of our tests, State failed to identify the fraudulent 

birth certificates that we used. State officials attributed these failures to a lack of access to the State-level vital records data that 

would have allowed them to verify the authenticity of the birth certificates. State officials indicated they were exploring ways to access vital records and the Department of Motor Vehicle records nationwide to help address this problem. 

21 

In the case of our most egregious application in which we fraudulently obtained a passport using the Social Security number of a 

man who had died in 1965, State officials said that the lack of an 

automated check against Social Security death records had been a 

longstanding vulnerability in the passport system. In an attempt to 

provide automated death record information in all cases reviewed 

during the adjudication, passport officials told us they recently purchased a subscription to the Death Master File, which includes 

weekly updates of deaths recorded by the Social Security Administration. 

With respect to the passport acceptance process, State officials 

told us they are working toward improving oversight of the passport acceptance facilities that we had recommended from our 2007 

report. They said that in September of 2008, they announced a new 

oversight program, and they are currently in the process of staffing 

that office to provide oversight over all of the acceptance agencies. 

In addition, the State Department told us they have taken several actions with respect to our undercover investigation. As was 

mentioned, they suspended the adjudication authority of the passport specialists responsible for approving the fraudulent applications and the authority of the facilities that accepted the applications. It revised the performance standards for passport specialists 

to eliminate production targets while all other aspects of performance standards were left intact. The State officials added that Passport Services will be conducting a study working with its union to 

develop new targets. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we made several recommendations 

to the Secretary of State to help reduce the vulnerabilities, and I 

will quickly just cite these, and we can discuss these further. 

No. 1 is they certainly need to do more training and devote more 

resources to the whole issue of passport fraud, particularly with detecting false and counterfeit documents. 

Second, we recommended that they explore using commercial options to providing real-time checks on the validity of Social Security 

numbers and other information on applicants. 

Third, we recommended that they develop what we call ‘‘red 

teams’’ to do intrusive tests similar to our own to test their system 

to make sure that the system does not have the same 

vulnerabilities that we identified. 

We also indicated that they should work with State-level officials 

to gain better access to the key information that they need on driver’s licenses and vital statistics to help ensure that the documents 

they receive are authentic. 

We also recommended that they wait 24 hours before they approve passports from Social Security except under extenuating circumstances. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to stop and answer any 

of the questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman CARDIN. Senator Kyl? 

Senator KYL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me go out of 

order here. I am going to have to leave in just a moment. But I 

wanted to thank you, Mr. Ford, and thank the folks that you work 

22 

with that produced this report. It is very valuable to us, and one 

has to wonder if you had not done this and brought these matters 

to the attention of the State Department, would they still be making the same errors that they were making that your report 

verified? 

While I have a lot of questions, I may submit one or two to you 

for the record. I would like to just highlight one matter and ask 

for you to respond for the record. You do not need to do it right 

now. But if you share the same view that weakening the REAL ID 

driver’s license requirements would be a bad thing, as the previous 

witness, could you expound on that a little bit in a written response to the Committee? 

Mr. FORD. I would be happy to do that. I think in general we 

would—given what has happened here in terms of using fictitious 

driver’s licenses, clearly this is an issue. 

Also, I might add that in one of our tests, we did obtain using 

counterfeit documents a D.C. ID and used that as part of our test. 

So we have at least one example where we were able to obtain an 

authentic D.C. Government identification document, which we in 

turn used to acquire one of the passports. 

Senator KYL. I really appreciate it. Thank you very much, and, 

again, I apologize for having to leave, but I just got a notice that 

I have got to run. So thank you very much. 

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you, Senator Kyl. I think you do raise 

a good point, though, about the identification documents that are 

used to support application for a passport. There may well be some 

follow-up that we need to do to protect the integrity of being able 

to obtain those types of documents. It does not relieve the passport 

office from its responsibility, but we do not want to see fraudulent 

documents being able to be obtained. You showed several 

vulnerabilities in the system, in addition to just the passport problem itself. 

Would it be helpful for you to have access to the red team tests 

that the State Department indicates that they are going to be implementing? Would it be useful for—I have an idea that we are 

going to be asking you to do this again, and prior to that, I assume 

there is going to be some covert tests done by the State Department. Is it useful for you to have that information? 

Mr. FORD. Absolutely. If we are asked by Congress to look into 

this matter, to the extent that we can see whether the State Department has done its own internal tests, we certainly would find 

that beneficial. Of course, we have our own investigative unit here 

in GAO, and we can certainly do those ourselves. And given the 

fact that many of these vulnerabilities we reported 4 years ago, certainly we are concerned about whether these tests need to be done. 

They need to be done more frequently than they currently are. 

Chairman CARDIN. I believe I read in the report—and maybe I 

am inaccurate, so correct me if I am wrong. One of the things I 

found very troubling is that one of the applicants in seeking the application was pretty much assured that the passport would be 

ready pretty quickly and got the impression there was not going to 

be much of a review done. 

I guess my concern is this is at least your third time down this 

road. Some of these recommendations are similar to recommendaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:38 Jan 19, 2010 Jkt 054246 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\54246.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
23 

tions that have been made in the past. I assume as a result of the 

prior investigations there were good-faith commitments made by 

the State Department to implement the type of changes needed. Is 

there something that you have seen in the response from the State 

Department this time that would give you greater confidence that 

the recommendations will be acted upon? 

Mr. FORD. Well, first of all, let me say I applaud the fact that 

the Department took our investigation seriously. They met with 

our investigators. They met with those of us on the audit side at 

GAO, and they sincerely indicated that they needed to address the 

vulnerabilities that we found. 

I would like to say that I have a high level of confidence that 

some of these vulnerabilities will be closed, but I will also say that 

we have been down this road before with them in prior reports. I 

think that it is clear that they did close some vulnerabilities that 

we reported in the past, but I am not sanguine about the fact that 

we will not have similar problems like this in the future. 

I think there is an issue of vigilance that the Department needs 

to maintain, and I think there is also an issue of commitment, you 

know, that they make this part of their everyday way of doing business. And I think if they do that, there is a likelihood that we can 

reduce the risk of these types of things happening. But I am not 

sure we will ever get to a point where we can say with certainty 

that these risks will be 100 percent remedied by the Department. 

Chairman CARDIN. We had received a statement from the National Vice President of the National Federation of Federal Employees telling us that there is tremendous pressure put on the workers 

here to process a large number of applicants, that there is a lot of 

community pressure for these passports to be issued, and that at 

least at one point there seemed to be quotas installed, although 

that has been denied as to any quotas existing today. 

Did you find this in your report that there was pressure put on 

the employees to complete applications so that the numbers were 

adequate to meet the public demand? 

Mr. FORD. That was not one of the focuses of our review. However, we have done some prior work related to the issue from last 

summer—or 2007 when the Department was under extreme pressure to process passports because of the delays, and the American 

public was quite concerned about being able to get their passports. 

While that was not the focus of our review, we did hear instances 

of cases when passport specialists had indicated that they were 

under pressure to produce as quickly as possible the passports, to 

get them out. 

I know that the union believes that the performance standards 

that the Department has placed on them, which have certain production goals—I am not sure how they rephrased them; I guess 

‘‘goals’’—of how many passports should be produced in a particular 

timeframe in their view affected their ability to do quality review 

for fraud. We have not examined that in detail, but I can say that 

there is definitely a tension there between the passport specialists 

who want to get the passports done quickly because of those performance standards and the issue of doing a quality review to 

make sure that the proper checks are made to ensure that there 

24 

is no fraud involved. So that tension certainly existed, particularly 

in 2007 when they were under the gun to get the passports out. 

Chairman CARDIN. I appreciate that. I think there are two separate issues here. I just want to clarify this. If we had the best data 

bank information available today, the procedures being used by the 

State Department in issuing passports had such lack of control in 

it because of the 24-hour turnaround without doing the checks, it 

is likely that your four cases would have still been able to obtain 

fraudulent information. It was not the lack of information being out 

there. It was the process being used and the training of the individuals, and you point that out pretty clearly. 

On the other hand, if we correct the first part, if we do all the 

due diligence, we need to have the adequate data bank in order to 

make this an efficient system and an effective system. And I think 

today we have heard how we can improve that. Certainly as it relates to driver’s licenses, as it relates to birth certificates, we can 

certainly improve that type of information, and it would be extremely helpful to the future issuance of proper passports. 

But I just really want to underscore the point of your study, 

which was the fundamentals were not there. They were not doing 

the necessary due diligence. And it was not the data bank failures; 

it was more the human failure in this case. Isn’t that a fair assessment at this point? 

Mr. FORD. Well, again, that is what the State Department told 

us. We did not investigate whose fault it was for not doing the 

check. We were told by the Department that it was human error, 

that they had not filed the checks. However, there was a lot of confusion about what the requirement is. Whether they actually have 

to wait the 24-hour period or not, whether or not they had a firm 

policy in place that said you must wait 24 hours, that part we have 

not really studied in depth. So I cannot say with certainty it is just 

a human error problem, if that is your question. That is—— 

Chairman CARDIN. No, I think you have answered it. Using your 

report based upon their response, it was predominantly a human 

error problem in the end, using their reaction to it. I know you 

have not studied how accurate their response has been. 

Mr. FORD. Right. 

Chairman CARDIN. But a lot of our testimony here has dealt with 

that issue as well as how we can improve the processing by having 

more reliable data banks accessible by the passport office to check 

births and check driver’s licenses. We have it for Social Security 

numbers. That is there now. 

Mr. FORD. Right. 

Chairman CARDIN. So that could have been done. In at least two 

cases here, it was not done. 

Mr. FORD. That is correct. 

Chairman CARDIN. We know that because that information was 

there. On the driver’s licenses and birth certificates, it is unclear 

whether they could have gotten sufficient information from the 

search. 

Mr. FORD. Well, I think that is true, but I also think that there 

is also some training involved about, you know, looking at the documents themselves. 

Chairman CARDIN. Absolutely. 

25 

Mr. FORD. You know, these are the ones we used. Some of these, 

you know, you can go on your home computer and make them, and, 

you know, it is not just checking the data-base. In some cases, the 

person who is accepting your application needs to do at least the 

rudimentary check to see whether or not does this look like a real 

birth certificate type document or not. And they ought to have 

some knowledge, particularly if they are in some State, what kind 

of birth certificates does the State issue. 

It is a little more sophisticated than just, you know, doing a data 

check. The people who accept these applications need to have some 

training in authenticity of documentation, whether it be one of 

these or even driver’s licenses, and they should be familiar with the 

types of documents that are available in the location where they 

operate. 

So there is a training element to this that we have called for in 

our prior work—and I think it is still valid today—that we need to 

have trained people out there that have some general knowledge 

of what does a genuine document look like. 

Chairman CARDIN. And that was your first recommendation, if I 

remember correctly, the proper training of the people who take 

these applications. 

You raise a very, very important point, a very valid point, that 

at the end of the day, a good part of this will be the training of 

the person issuing the application as to whether there is something 

that does not seem right in this application, whether it is the way 

the document looks or other factors. And you need that human aspect to this, and training is critically important if we are going to 

be successful in dealing with it. That is all part of national—homeland security is based upon that type of observation by trained professionals. 

We have to figure out—I assume the next time we do this test, 

we are going to try to test that again by using similar type documents and see whether, in fact, they have improved. 

Mr. FORD. Yes. 

Chairman CARDIN. Well, I thank you. This has been extremely 

helpful, and I will conclude this hearing where I started, and that 

is, you know, this is a matter of, I think, extreme importance for 

national security. We rely more and more on passports in this 

country. It is a standard that we demand from other countries if 

they want access of their citizens to America, and we have an obligation to make sure that our system is done in an adequate way. 

This report was very, very troubling, and I was pleased to see the 

State Department acknowledge that from the beginning. And we 

need to now all work together to make sure that the changes are 

put in place in order to protect the security of our country and the 

integrity of our passport. 

We look forward to working with GAO as we move forward with 

additional work and working with the State Department so that we 

accomplish the objectives of the proper issuance of passports. 

The hearing record will remain open for 1 week for additional 

questions and statements from Senators. I would ask the witnesses 

to respond in a timely manner to any additional written questions 

that may be propounded. 

26 

With that, the hearing will stand adjourned. Thank you all very 

much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Submissions for the record follow.] 

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