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52–741 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 111–172 

NOMINATION OF LEON PANETTA TO BE 

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 5, 2009 

FEBRUARY 6, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 5, 2009 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ....... 4 

WITNESS 

Panetta, Leon, Nominee to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency ....... 6 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 

Prepared Statement of Senator Barbara Boxer .................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement of Leon Panetta ..................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement of Senator Russ Feingold ..................................................... 21 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 42 

Prehearing Questions and Responses .................................................................... 66 

Questions for the Record and Responses ............................................................... 89 

January 30, 2009 Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, 

to Senator Dianne Feinstein ............................................................................... 100 

January 8, 2009 Letter from David Abshire to Senator Dianne Feinstein ......... 122 

FEBRUARY 6, 2009 

WITNESS 

Panetta, Leon, Nominee to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency ....... 124 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF LEON PANETTA TO BE 

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, 2:34 p.m., in Room 

SDG–50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne 

Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller, 

Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, Feingold, Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse, 

Levin, Bond, Hatch, Snowe, Chambliss, Burr, Coburn, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order. 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets today to consider the nomination of Leon Panetta to be Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency. I’d like to proceed in this way: I’ll make a 

short opening statement and then turn to the Vice Chairman to 

make his statement. We will then use the early bird rule—and I’m 

glad the early birds are here—for five-minute rounds of questions 

and have a second round, if needed. 

Now, we’re due to have a whole series of stacked votes on the 

stimulus, the latest report is, beginning around 3:30. We have 

called and asked to please delay that. If it’s possible to delay to 

4:30—perhaps the staff could call again—we might be able to get 

through the hearing. What worries me is, when they’re stacked 

votes—and they’re 10-minute votes—it’s difficult for Members to 

get back. So we’ll just have to be a little flexible, Mr. Panetta, as 

we move around. 

I’d like to welcome President Obama’s nominee to be the Director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency. Senator Boxer was going to be 

here to introduce him, but cannot due to another pressing commitment with the Majority Leader. 

So I would like to combine with my statement with a brief introduction of Mr. Panetta. He was born in Monterey, California. His 

parents, Carmelo and Carmelina, ran a local cafe and later purchased a walnut ranch, which he still owns. 

He majored in political science at Santa Clara University, where 

he graduated Magna Cum Laude in 1960. In 1963, he received his 

J.D. from Santa Clara University as well. After law school, he 

served in the United States Army from 1964 to 1966 and attended 

the Army Intelligence School. In 1966, Mr. Panetta joined the 

2 

Washington, D.C., staff of Republican Senator Thomas Kuchel of 

California. 

In 1969, he served as Director of the Office of Civil Rights in the 

Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the Nixon Administration. From 1970 to 1971, he worked as executive assistant to 

New York City Mayor John Lindsay. Afterwards, he returned to 

Monterey, to private law practice. In 1976, he ran and won election 

to the United States House of Representatives, and he served in 

that house for 16 years. During that time, he also served as Chairman of the Budget Committee. 

In 1993, he joined the Clinton Administration as head of the Office of Management and Budget. In July, 1994, Mr. Panetta became 

President Clinton’s chief of staff. He served in that capacity until 

January of 1997, when he returned to California and founded and 

led the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy at California State University at Monterey Bay. Mr. Panetta and his wife, 

Sylvia, have three sons and five grandchildren. 

It’s very safe and fair for me to say that he has a reputation for 

intelligence and integrity. And that, certainly, has been my personal experience with him, as well. In speaking with President 

Obama and Mr. Panetta multiple times, I am convinced that Mr. 

Panetta will surround himself with career professionals, including 

Deputy Director Steven Kappas. I know Mr. Panetta has immersed 

himself in CIA matters since being nominated, and his top priority, 

if confirmed, will be to conduct a complete review of all of the 

Agency’s activities. 

Moreover, I strongly believe that the CIA needs a Director who 

will take the reins of the Agency and provide the supervision and 

oversight that this agency, which operates in a clandestine world 

of its own, must have. President Obama has made clear that a selection of Leon Panetta was intended as a clean break with the 

past, a break from secret detentions and coercive interrogation, a 

break from outsourcing its work to a small army of contractors, and 

a break from analysis that was not only wrong, but the product of 

bad practice, that helped lead our nation to war. 

President Obama said, when announcing this nomination, that 

this will be a CIA Director ‘‘who has my complete trust and substantial clout.’’ Now, this is a hugely important but difficult post. 

The CIA is the largest civilian intelligence agency with the most 

disparate of missions. It produces the most strategic analysis of the 

intelligence agencies, and it is the center for human intelligence 

collection. 

It is unique in that it carries out covert action programs implementing policy through intelligence channels. And so the committee’s job is clear—to make sure that Leon Panetta will be a Director that makes the CIA not only effective in what it does, but also 

makes sure that it operates in a professional manner that reflects 

the true values of this country. 

I am encouraged by our conversations and with your responses 

to the prehearing questions, Mr. Panetta. You made clear that you 

will provide independent and unvarnished advice to the President 

and policymakers. You describe the lessons learned from the 2002 

National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. You pledged to review the CIA’s over-reliance on contractors 

3 

and not to use contractors for interrogation. Very importantly, you 

explain the obligation to keep Congress fully and currently informed, and your view that this should apply to the entire committee, not just the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. 

And, as a long-standing member, or just a member, of this committee, I really appreciate that. The responses to all of our prehearing questions will be posted on the committee’s Web site today. 

I now turn to the Vice Chairman for his opening statement before having Mr. Panetta give his opening statement as well. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. BARBARA BOXER

Good morning Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond, and members of the 

Committee. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to introduce my former colleague and 

fellow Californian, Leon Panetta, President Obama’s nominee to be the Director of 

the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Leon Panetta is a person of vast experience and integrity. 

If President Obama wants to build a spirit of trust and accountability in the Central Intelligence Agency, he has picked exactly the right person. 

Mr. Panetta brings to this post decades of public service and the respect of countless individuals in Congress, the Executive Branch, and throughout America. 

Mr. Panetta was born in the beautiful city of Monterey, California. His parents 

were immigrants, and he went on to earn both his bachelor and law degree from 

Santa Clara University, and later serve in the United States Army. 

After coming to Washington in 1966, Mr. Panetta rose to become the Director of 

the U.S. Office for Civil Rights where he passionately fought for the desegregation 

of public schools. 

I saw him bring that same passion to his work as a Member of the House of Representatives, where I am proud to have served with him. I will never forget his successful effort to establish the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary, which preserved this vital coastal resource for generations to come. 

And I will also never forget that it was Leon who worked with me on the first 

ever funding to fight AIDS. 

As we all know, his commitment to public service continued after he left Congress. 

As the Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Clinton, 

Mr. Panetta learned the intricacies of the federal budget process and, most importantly, how to effectively set and manage a budget. 

If confirmed, this knowledge will serve him particularly well. 

As President Clinton’s White House Chief of Staff, he engaged the highest levels 

of the U.S. intelligence community on our nation’s most important national security 

issues. 

And as a member of the highly respected Iraq Study Group, Mr. Panetta served 

with Secretary James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton to formulate 

bipartisan recommendations for a way forward in Iraq. 

Mr. Panetta’s record speaks for itself. He knows how to get things done in this 

town. 

Perhaps most important, I know that Mr. Panetta will tell President Obama not 

what he wants to hear, but what he needs to hear. President Obama has made it 

clear that intelligence should be used to make good policy, not to sell bad policy. 

I am also confident that as the Director of the CIA, Mr. Panetta will work to restore the standing of the United States in the world. 

He has already taken a step in that direction by unequivocally condemning the 

use of torture. 

So Madam Chairman, as you can see, I am very pleased to introduce Mr. Panetta, 

and know that he will work to defend our country from threats, while upholding 

our values. 

I hope that he will get a favorable vote from your committee. 

Thank you. 

4 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and 

Mr. Panetta. 

We welcome you here today for this hearing. We have had pleasant working relationships during the 1990s—not always agreeing, 

but certainly very forthright and direct. The CIA is an important 

player in our national security, and to be nominated for that position is a great honor. 

There’s been some commentary on it in the past few weeks, and 

today you’ll have the opportunity to respond to some of the concerns that have been raised about your position and to describe 

your vision for the CIA. 

I’ve had constructive meetings with you over the past few weeks, 

and I have the confidence that you have the drive and the focus 

for a tough assignment like this, and I thank you for your willingness to serve. 

That said, many were surprised by your nomination, because 

many of us believed that the next CIA Director should have a professional intelligence background. And this raises a number of 

questions which we’ve discussed before and I will raise again today. 

First, I want to hear your understanding of the CIA and the vision 

for it and its role in the 21st-century operations under the authority of the DNI. 

I have questions concerning your views on various intelligence 

disciplines and a number of threats, as well as resource decisions 

for the Agency. As all American people expect us to serve above reproach, we’ll ask some questions about your financial background 

so that we can assure people there’s no counterintelligence concern 

for the nation and to make sure there are no financial surprises 

awaiting discovery. I know you said you’re more than willing to do 

that, and I think the American people want to hear it. 

Finally, I’m interested in the quality of individuals you’ll surround yourself with in this position. I was disappointed very recently to hear a rumor, confirmed by the DNI, that he’s asked 

someone to serve in a sensitive position on an advisory panel. That 

person had a questionable record on intelligence activities and possible damage to national security. I spoke with the DNI yesterday 

and informed him that, while he had authority to make those decisions, I don’t think that it should go unnoticed. 

As I recently said to Director Blair on the broader issue, your 

nomination and his come at an important time in our nation’s history, as we continue to face threats of many different kinds, foremost among them, of course, the threat of terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, we learned many things about ourselves and the 

state of intelligence community information. There have been many 

changes in statute and in practice since then, but weaknesses remain. 

And one of the most glaring examples is the IC’s failure to assess 

properly the state of Iraq’s WMD programs. Your previous statements about the failures make it clear that you have not been fully 

briefed on this Committee’s findings that were unanimously reported in our extensive, two-year review of the failures that we call 

5 

our phase one prewar intelligence assessment on Iraq, and I hope, 

if you have not, you will read these findings carefully. 

The flawed intelligence resulting from that failure was a significant factor used by all policymakers in the decisions about Iraq. We 

have to ensure that failures of this magnitude do not recur. The 

American people spend a lot of money and trust their security to 

the IC, and I think we all deserve better. 

Now, the role of the Director has changed since September 11th, 

since the passage of the Reform Act and Congress created the DNI 

with a strong sense that the IC lacked clear direction. 

There was also a consensus that the old DCI position was too big 

a job for one person and, in my opinion, one of the primary advantages of creating a DNI was to allow the Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency to focus on the Agency’s mission. For too many 

years we’ve had turf battles and power struggles as individual 

agencies and departments tried to protect their own piece of the pie 

and their budgets. I hope with your cooperation we can make these 

destructive battles a thing of the past. 

It’s our expectation that when confirmed you will give your full 

support to the DNI. This doesn’t meant there won’t be honest disagreements or vigorous discussions, which we would hope would 

occur, but at the end of the day the DNI has to be the sole leader. 

Two weeks ago President Obama issued a series of Executive Orders relevant to the CIA’s interrogation and detention program. I 

have some concerns about the impact of these opinions and will be 

interested to hear your thoughts on the impact on the CIA’s intelligence collection capabilities and how you intend to implement 

them. 

They appear to suspend, at least temporarily, an interrogation 

program that’s helped us prevent further attacks on our homeland. 

It makes it even more imperative that the CIA improve its capabilities in other areas, including human or HUMINT collection, as 

we refer to it in the trade, along with covert action and covert influence. 

I also am interested in hearing more from you about extraordinary renditions. That’s a rendition of someone to another country. These practices started well before the September 11 attacks 

and I would like to discuss some of those with you today. 

I’m sure, too, that past and present Agency employees will be 

eager to hear whether you share Speaker Pelosi’s opinion that certain people associated with the CIA interrogation program should 

be prosecuted. The Agency and the IC as a whole also must find 

ways to hire and retain qualified linguists in critical language 

areas. It does us no good to collect information if we can’t translate 

it or use it. Given your background in management, I’m interested 

in your thoughts on what you would do to make these career paths 

more appealing or to bring people with those skills into the Agency. 

I hope, too, you will use your management experience to address 

a longstanding problem that has concerned many of us. I believe 

that over that past several years there has been an unreasonable 

reluctance to hold CIA employees accountable for poor performance 

or bad judgment. In some cases—and I’ll go into specifics in another setting—these individuals have been promoted or otherwise 

rewarded. I conveyed this sentiment to Mr. Hayden and Mr. 

6 

Kappes on several occasions because I believe the practice is unacceptable. And I believe from our previous discussions you would 

agree. 

The committee has adopted a provision I sponsored and I hope 

will become law in the near future to give the DNI the authority 

to conduct accountability reviews of any element in the IC and its 

personnel in relation to a failure or a deficiency. Now, giving the 

DNI authority to step in I hope will encourage accountability and 

good practices. 

Mr. Panetta, I would expect you as the Director to give your full 

support to the DNI if and when he must implement that authority 

so we can send a clear message that poor performance will not be 

necessary. But I hope it would not be necessary under your watch. 

With regard to intelligence experience, I encourage you to jump 

in with both feet and make frequent trips away from Langley. I 

have been in a lot of hearings and had lots of wonderful meetings 

at Langley, but I find out that unless you go out and see what 

they’re doing in the field you really don’t understand it and too 

often your views are clouded by a bureaucracy naturally existing 

in any large organization’s headquarters. 

I understand that you’ll be retaining some current high-level officials and clearly they’ll be familiar with the Agency and its work, 

but there’s a concern they may be too familiar with it. I have heard 

some colleagues talk about how important it is to keep the old 

guard in your corner, but I for one would hope you would bring the 

changes we need in the institution and not be totally beholden to 

the old guard. 

Further, a recurring criticism of the Agency is it tends to be riskaverse and insular. You may or may not find this to be the case. 

In any case, I urge you to look for fresh ideas instead of the status 

quo and encourage perspectives instead of headquarters-centric bureaucracy. 

Madam Chair, there’s a lot of ground to go over today. I hope we 

can fit it in. It will depend on the floor schedule. I want to move 

this process along, but we do need to have thorough hearings. Mr. 

Panetta, we look forward to hearing your views on the direction for 

the CIA and its programs as we fight to keep our nation and families safe from attack. 

As the Chair indicated, you have a long and distinguished career 

of service to the nation. I congratulate you on your nomination and 

look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Mr. Panetta. 

STATEMENT OF LEON PANETTA, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice 

Chairman and members of the Intelligence Committee. I am honored to appear before you as the President’s nominee to lead the 

Central Intelligence Agency. Let me, Madam Chairman, ask that 

my statement be made part of the record and I’d like to summarize 

it if I could. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Without objection. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you. 

7 

I want to begin by thanking the President for placing his confidence in my ability to run this critical agency during a time of 

great peril but also of great opportunity. In particular, I want to 

thank you Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and all of the 

members of the committee for the time that you spent with me 

over the past few weeks and for agreeing to serve as the overseers 

of our nation’s intelligence services. 

And, of course, I could not have served in public life for 40 years 

without the love and support of my family, in particular my wife 

of 46 years, Sylvia, and our three sons. She regrets not being able 

to be here, but she now has sole responsibility for running the Panetta Institute. 

In preparing for this day, I had the opportunity also to talk with 

all of the former Directors of the CIA. They gave me excellent advice and shared many lessons. I especially enjoyed talking to 

former President George Bush, who ran the CIA and later, obviously as President, become one of its important consumers. All of 

them told me to listen carefully to the professionals in the Agency 

but also to stay closely engaged with the Congress. And if confirmed that’s exactly what I intend to do. 

The CIA is on the front lines in the effort to defend this nation. 

It’s a professional organization. It is comprised of dedicated women 

and men whose service to America, out of necessity, often is unrecognized and unacknowledged. At this hour, there are CIA officers 

who are living in the most isolated corners of the globe; they’re 

serving away from their families; they’re often undercover, sometimes under fire. There aren’t any marching bands to trumpet their 

valor and there are no monuments to mark their valor—just the 

quiet dedication to the mission. 

My youngest son, who just completed a tour of duty in Afghanistan as a naval intelligence officer, described CIA officers as silent 

warriors and I think that’s an apt description. 

When President Obama asked me to lead this organization, he 

said he wanted somebody he could trust, who was independent and 

who would call them as he sees them—someone who would tell policymakers what they needed to know, not what they wanted to 

hear, and someone who knew how to get things done in a bipartisan and professional manner. 

What are the qualities I bring to this job? In a word, 40 years 

of experience at key levels of government. As mentioned by Madam 

Chairman, I began my public service career in the Army as an intelligence officer and received the Army Commendation Medal for 

my services as an intelligence operations officer. Over the decades, 

I worked as a legislative assistant to a U.S. Senator, headed the 

U.S. Office for Civil Rights, served in Congress for 16 years, much 

of that as Chairman of the House Budget Committee, led a large 

and professional federal agency, the Office of Management and 

Budget, and served as White House chief of staff. 

At OMB, I was responsible for the federal budget, including the 

funds spent on intelligence activities, those involved with clandestine intelligence activities as well as covert actions. 

In Congress, obviously, I received a great deal of briefings on intelligence, as many as you do and many of you did that were my 

colleagues in the House. And at the White House, I participated in 

8 

the PDB briefings, all of the intelligence briefings with the President, served on the National Security Council and dealt with some 

of the most sensitive intelligence our agencies produced. And during my recent service on the Iraq Study Group, we benefited tremendously from the insights that were provided by the CIA as well 

as other intelligence agencies. 

In short, what I bring is a broad range of experiences to this job. 

I know Washington, I think I know how it works, I think I also 

know why it fails to work. I am proud that in every agency that 

I had the good fortune to lead, that it performed its job in an outstanding manner, and I pledge to do the same at the CIA. 

The last several years have been a period of tremendous change 

and daunting challenges for the CIA. It’s been a difficult period. 

The government-wide failure to prevent 9/11, the 2002 NIE that 

failed to determine the absence of weapons of mass destruction, 

controversies over rendition, detention, interrogation—these issues 

emerged in war, challenged policymakers, are well known to this 

committee, having consumed much of your time and your energy. 

And I know this has been a period that has resulted in frayed relationships between the White House and the Congress, between the 

White House and this committee and between the political parties. 

I want to put that era behind us. 

We are a nation at war. And since the attacks of September 

11th, the CIA has been in an operational tempo that’s unlike anything it’s experienced in its history. It was the first on the ground 

in Afghanistan, it’s been asked to run spies, analyze threats, undertake covert action and work with other intelligence services to 

keep Americans safe. 

Let me, if I can, pay tribute to General Mike Hayden, the current 

Director of CIA, who in many ways has made a good effort trying 

to repair relationships. But most importantly, he has done a great 

job in restoring morale at the CIA and he’s been an outstanding 

partner for me in this transition. I want to build on his successes. 

Let me make clear what I want to do if I am confirmed. I believe 

the Director should be responsible for shaping the role of the CIA 

in the 21st century to protect this nation, to keep it safe and to 

bring integrity to intelligence operations. We will provide credible 

and accurate intelligence to policymakers. We will remain cleareyed about the threats that are out there. And we will always perform our responsibilities according to the law, the Constitution and 

our values. 

Let me outline in brief three areas that I think require my principal focus if I am confirmed. First, I want to work with the professionals who are there to get the details of all of our operations and 

to make certain that we’re responding to our fundamental intelligence needs. In this endeavor, I will have a full partner in Steve 

Kappes, who’s one of the most senior intelligence officers at the 

Agency and has agreed to serve as my deputy. I will rely on him 

and the other professional officers at the CIA to analyze intelligence gaps that exist and to do what we can to fill those gaps. 

Let me assure you, let me assure you that while I will rely on 

the professionals for their experience and for their judgment, the 

decisions at the CIA will be mine as the Director. We have to build 

on the work currently under way to develop a first-class workforce 

9 

at the CIA that is diverse, that is well-trained, that is proficient 

in languages and cultures and that is prepared for the world of 

today and the world of tomorrow. We must deploy this workforce 

to fill our key gaps, which I’ve identified more fully in my statement. 

Obviously, what is al-Qa’ida plotting in the tribal areas of Pakistan, the FATA? What will it take to get Iran off of its dangerous 

nuclear path? What will be the keys to long-term stability in Afghanistan and in Iraq? Will North Korea give up its weapons program? Can we defend our networks against cyber-attack? These are 

just some of the crucial areas that require good intelligence, and 

job one will be to look at the Agency operations and make certain 

that we meet these demands. Our first responsibility is to prevent 

surprise. 

Secondly, I want to focus on improving intelligence coordination 

and collaboration under the new structure. I’ve been working with 

Admiral Blair in the days since our nomination to try to create a 

process that will foster collaboration and teamwork. Admiral Blair 

is an outstanding leader, and as a combatant commander, he understands what jointness is all about, and he and I have pledged 

that we will keep our lines of communication open and that we will 

do everything possible to improve coordination among our intelligence agencies. The CIA does not operate in a vacuum. Every day 

the agency is working with dozens of other agencies, including 

DOD and the FBI. We are part of one team. 

Contrary to the views of some, I happen to believe that the new 

structure can work effectively for the CIA. Freed of its community 

management function, we can focus on management of human intelligence. We are primarily responsible for human intelligence, the 

gathering of that intelligence that’s so important to the decisions 

that have to be made. We are responsible for covert action. We 

have tremendous operational strength, and my hope is to use that 

operational strength to perform the goals and the missions assigned by the DNI. We take the lead with our liaison partners, but 

we look to the DNI to establish the strategic goals that are so important for the intelligence community. 

And thirdly, I want to rebuild the relationship of trust with the 

Congress. I am a creature of the Congress and proud of it. I understand the role of the Congress in oversight, those tremendous responsibilities you have with regards to policy in this country. I believe the ‘‘Gang of Eight’’ process was overused and therefore 

abused. Too often, critical issues were kept from this committee. 

Keeping this committee fully and currently informed is not optional—it’s the law, and it is my solemn obligation to fulfill that 

requirement. 

I believe that a strong partnership with this committee and with 

your counterparts in the House of Representatives will improve the 

CIA. You have a tremendous amount of expertise on this committee. We can learn from you and we can partner with you in that 

effort. That’s not to say we’ll always see things the same way, it’s 

not to say that you won’t question us and hold us accountable when 

appropriate. I expect nothing less. But our objective ought to be the 

same—to do everything possible, working together, to give the CIA 

what it needs to be successful. 

10 

Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, if confirmed, I will 

honor the history and professionals of the CIA. For over 60 years, 

the CIA has done some heroic things to protect this country, and 

yet at the same time there have been mistakes. But my goal is to 

build on the tradition of success, of excellence and integrity. 

Together, I think we can turn the page to a new chapter in the 

Agency’s history. I’ve been asked to do this job because we need a 

strong CIA that keeps us safe and upholds our values. I pledge I 

will do everything in my power to make that goal a reality. Thank 

you and I’ll be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Panetta follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEON PANETTA

Madame Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to lead 

the Central Intelligence Agency. 

I want to begin by thanking the President for placing his confidence in me to lead 

this critical Agency during a time of great peril but also great opportunity. 

In particular, I want to thank you Madame Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, the 

Members of this Committee, and their staffs, for the time they spent with me over 

the past two weeks and for agreeing to serve as overseers of our nation’s intelligence 

services. 

And, of course, I could not have served in public life for 40 years without the love 

and support of my family, in particular my wife of 46 years, Sylvia, who has been 

with me every step of the way. She regrets not being able to be here, but she now 

has sole responsibility for running the Panetta Institute. 

In preparing for this day, I had the opportunity to talk with most of the former 

Directors of CIA. They gave me excellent advice and shared many lessons learned, 

especially President George H.W. Bush, who ran CIA and, later, was its most important consumer. They all told me to listen carefully to the professionals at the Agency, but also to stay closely engaged with Congress. If confirmed, that is exactly what 

I intend to do. 

CIA is on the front lines in the effort to defend this nation. CIA is a professional 

organization, comprised of dedicated women and men whose service to America is, 

out of necessity, often unrecognized and unacknowledged. At this hour, CIA officers 

are living in the most austere corners of the globe—serving away from their families, often undercover, and sometimes under fire. There are no marching bands to 

trumpet their valor and no monuments to mark their campaigns—just the quiet 

dedication to the mission. 

When President Obama asked me to lead this organization he said he wanted 

someone whom he could trust, who was independent, and who would call them as 

he sees them. Someone who would tell policymakers what they needed to know, not 

what they wanted to hear. And someone who knew how to get things done in a bipartisan, professional manner. 

Those goals were precisely what led President Truman to create a center for intelligence in 1947. With the lessons of Pearl Harbor fresh in his mind, he wanted a 

single entity that would pull together all intelligence coming into the government 

and analyze it in a timely way, without the bias that was often injected by the policy agencies. CIA has been serving in that important role ever since, and I believe 

it continues to be one its most preeminent functions. 

I began my public service career in the Army as an intelligence officer, where I 

was proud to wear the uniform. Over four decades, I worked with policymakers, 

served in Congress, led a large and complex federal agency, and served as White 

House Chief of Staff. At OMB, I was responsible for the federal budget, including 

the funds spent on our clandestine activities and our covert actions. At the White 

House, I was a consumer of some of the most sensitive intelligence our agencies 

produce. And during my service on the Iraq Study Group, we benefitted tremendously from the insights provided by CIA and other intelligence agencies. 

The last several years have been a period of tremendous change and daunting 

challenges for CIA. The government-wide failure to prevent 9/11; the 2002 Iraq NIE 

that missed badly on weapons of mass destruction; and the controversies over the 

laws and policies governing rendition, detention, and interrogation—these issues 

emerged in war, challenged policy makers, and are well known to the Committee, 

having consumed much of your time and energy. 

11 

We are a nation at war, and since the attacks of September 11, 2001, CIA has 

been on an operational tempo unlike any in its history. Its budget has increased. 

Its missions have expanded. The legal authorities governing CIA have shifted. 

The Agency was the first on the ground in Afghanistan. It has been asked to run 

spies, analyze threats, undertake covert action, and work with other intelligence 

services to keep Americans safe. Few areas of the government have changed in the 

past decade as much as CIA in the effort to protect this country. 

I believe the Director should be responsible for shaping the role of CIA in the 

twenty-first century to protect this nation, to provide credible and accurate intelligence to policy makers, to undertake those missions that will enhance our security, 

and to always perform our responsibilities according to the law and our Constitution. 

Let me outline three areas that I believe will require my particular focus, if I am 

confirmed. 

First, I want to work with the professionals to get into the details of all of our 

operations and to make certain that we are responding to our fundamental intelligence needs. In this endeavor, I will have a full partner in Steve Kappes, one of 

the most senior intelligence officers at the Agency, who has agreed to serve as my 

deputy. I will rely on him and the professional officers at CIA to analyze precisely: 

(1) our intelligence, (2) the quality and credibility of that intelligence, (3) any gaps 

that exist, and (4) what we are doing to fill those gaps. 

Let me be specific. We know that Al Qaeda has reestablished a safe-haven in the 

border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We know they want to hit us 

again. But we don’t know where that next attack will come from, and we don’t have 

answers to a range of important questions. How do we deny Al Qaeda its safe 

haven? How do we effectively operate against this target and their command structure? Where are Usama Bin Ladin and his top deputies hiding? 

We know that Iran is enriching uranium and supporting terrorists. But we don’t 

know when they will have that capacity or what exactly it will take to get Iran off 

of its dangerous path. 

We know that the situation in Afghanistan remains unstable. But we don’t know 

what it will take to reverse that trend, to stop the Taliban, or to control corruption 

and institute long-term stability. 

We know that there have been security gains in Iraq. But we don’t know whether 

these gains will translate into political stability and create favorable conditions for 

a safe U.S. drawdown of forces. 

We know North Korea detonated a nuclear weapon in 2006. But we don’t know 

whether Kim Jong-Il is prepared to give up that nuclear capability once and for all. 

We know that our communications networks are vulnerable to malicious activity 

and cyber threats. But we don’t know what our adversaries are planning and what 

damage they are capable of inflicting. 

These are just some of the crucial areas that require good intelligence. And job 

one will be to look at Agency operations and make certain that we meet these demands. This will take time. But it is our most important task. 

Second, I want to focus on improving intelligence coordination and collaboration. 

Under the 2004 law passed by Congress, CIA continues to conduct Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, operations, but the CIA Director ‘‘reports’’ to the DNI. The law 

states that the DNI is the principal intelligence advisor to the President. I have 

been working with Admiral Blair in the days since our nomination to create a process that will foster collaboration and teamwork. Admiral Blair is n outstanding leader. As a combatant commander, he understands ‘‘jointness.’’ And he and I have 

pledged that we will keep the lines of communication open between us. 

And this is an important point: CIA does not operate in a vacuum. Everyday, the 

Agency is working with the State Department, the military, the National Security 

Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and others. We are part 

of one team, and I pride myself on the ability to get members of a team—in this 

case, across many agencies—to work together. 

Contrary to the views of some, I believe that the new structure can work effectively for CIA. The Director is freed from his community management function. The 

CIA Director has become the National Human Intelligence Manager—meaning our 

professionals are responsible for training, standards, and operations for HUMINT 

collection across the government. We take the lead with our liaison partners. And 

we can focus on those things that no other agency can do, such as covert action. 

Third, I want to rebuild a close working and consultative relationship with Congress. I believe the ‘‘Gang of 8’’ process was overused by the previous White House 

and, therefore, abused. Too often, critical issues were kept from this Committee. 

12 

Keeping this Committee ‘‘fully and currently’’ informed is not optional. It is the law. 

It is our solemn obligation. 

I believe that a strong partnership with this Committee—and with your counterparts in the House of Representatives—will improve CIA. You have a tremendous 

amount of expertise on this Committee. We can learn from you and we will partner 

with you. 

Finally, there is a great deal the public cannot be told about CIA operations without revealing the same information to those who would do us harm. And so, CIA 

confides in you—and counts on you—to provide the oversight that the public cannot. 

Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman,if confirmed, I pledge not only to follow the 

law, but to go a step further and endeavor, as best as I am able, to rebuild the trust 

between Congress and CIA. That’s not to say we’ll always see things the same way. 

That’s not to say you won’t question us and hold us accountable where appropriate—I expect nothing less. But our objective ought to be the same: to give the 

Central Intelligence Agency all that it needs to succeed. 

If confirmed, I will honor the history and professionals of CIA. I will also help 

turn the page to a new chapter in the Agency’s history. I have been asked to do 

this job because we need a strong CIA that keeps us safe and upholds our values. 

I pledge to you that I will do everything in my power to make that goal a reality. 

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Panetta. I appreciate it. This is the order directly following my questions and 

those of the Vice Chairman: Senators Levin, Wyden, Burr, Chambliss, Feingold, Rockefeller, Coburn, Whitehouse, Nelson, Mikulski, 

Snowe, Bayh, Risch and Hatch. 

I have just some questions that are traditional, Mr. Panetta, 

quickly, and a yes or no answer will suffice. Do you agree to appear 

before the committee here or in other venues if invited? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from the CIA 

to appear before the committee and designated staff when invited? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any 

other material requested by the committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that the CIA provide such 

material to the committee when requested? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And a new question that I hope will become part of the tradition, and you have alluded to it: Do you agree 

to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members 

of the Committee of Intelligence activities and covert actions rather 

than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Let me plunge right 

into this. 

Will the CIA continue the practice of extraordinary rendition, by 

which the CIA would transfer a detainee to either a foreign government or a black site for the purpose of long-term detention and interrogation, as opposed to for law enforcement purposes? 

Mr. PANETTA. No, we will not, because, under the Executive 

Order issued by the President, that kind of extraordinary rendition, 

where we send someone for the purposes of torture or for actions 

by another country that violate our human values, that has been 

forbidden by the Executive Order. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. The CIA—this is one of my 

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13 

ligence agency, and approximately one-third of the contractors of 

the entire community of 16 agencies. Most of these contractors 

have been hired since 9/11. Between 2001 and 2006, the number 

of contractors has doubled. The intelligence community has estimated—and I mentioned this to Admiral Blair at his hearing—that 

the cost of contractors is $80,000 more, per year, on average, than 

the cost of a government employee. 

And the cost of contractors and employees at the CIA is likely 

to have a comparable ratio. You’ve mentioned that you’re going to 

review all this. What specifically do you intend to do about it? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I’ve asked the questions that you’ve raised 

during some of the briefings as to the extent of the contracting out 

that has taken place. I recognize that, coming out of 9/11, there 

was a need to reach out to contractors to try to fill requirements 

and responsibilities that the CIA, because of a lack of personnel, 

just simply didn’t have the resources to do. And so obviously, a 

number of contracts were issued during that period. 

I really believe that we have a responsibility to bring a lot of 

those duties in-house, and to develop the expertise and the skills 

within the CIA to perform those responsibilities. I get very nervous 

relying on outside contractors to do that job, A, because I’m not 

sure who they respond to, but, B, sometimes, when an employee at 

the CIA goes out and is then hired by a contractor and then returns, it’s not very good for morale at the CIA. 

Mike Hayden has made some progress in the effort to try to reduce the number of contracts and begin to build up our employee 

force to deal with those responsibilities. My intent is to do exactly 

the same thing. What I would like to see, ultimately, is, yes, there 

may be a need for contracting out where there are particular needs 

that we’ve got to see addressed, but I would like to see all of those 

duties and responsibilities eventually brought in-house to the employees of the CIA. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Quick last question: We’ve discussed this 

privately; I would like to have it on the record. Last week, there 

was a front-page story about a CIA chief of station who has been 

accused of raping two women overseas. The allegations are very 

disturbing and, if true, as you know, completely unacceptable. 

What would be your response if such allegations came to your attention as Director, in terms of dealing with the individual in question and notifying the intelligence committee? Until ABC put out 

a press release indicating that they were going to do a show that 

evening on this subject, we had no formal notification. 

Mr. PANETTA. As I indicated to you, Madam Chairman, I think 

that was wrong. I think when that kind of behavior comes to the 

attention of the Director of the CIA that this committee ought to 

be informed with regards to that behavior, number one. Number 

two, the level of behavior involved in this situation, I think, obviously, it had to be referred to the Justice Department, but frankly, 

from my point of view, I think it is so onerous that the person 

should have been terminated. And we have the responsibility, as 

Director the CIA, to implement that kind of termination. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

14 

Mr. Panetta, to clarify what you just said, that the United States 

has sent individuals to other countries for torture, that’s news to 

me. Now, I understand that during President Clinton’s term there 

were approximately 80 renditions of terrorist suspects that occurred during your watch as chief of staff of the White House. An 

official from Human Right Watch was quoted as saying, ‘‘Clinton 

policies, in practice, meant torture.’’ Do you have any comments on 

the renditions which occurred during your watch as chief of staff? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I think you’d have to define the kind of renditions we’re talking about. Obviously, extraordinary renditions 

were, I think, the situation where we took a prisoner and sent him 

to another country for questioning. And oftentimes, that questioning took place under circumstances that did not meet our test 

for human values. 

Renditions have been a tool used by this government over the 

years prior to returning individuals to countries of jurisdiction. 

Carlos the Jackal was taken and returned to France under a rendition. Others have been—there were prisoners that we captured 

abroad that were rendered back to this country for purposes of 

trial. I think those kinds of renditions are an appropriate tool. I do 

not believe that we ought to use—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Could you hold—the microphone has just 

gone off. 

Mr. PANETTA. I’ve got it. I do not believe that—and as I said, 

under the Executive Order, I do not believe we ought to use renditions for the purpose of sending people to black sites and not providing the kind of oversight that, I believe, is necessary. 

Now, having said that, if we capture a high-value prisoner, I believe we have the right to hold that individual temporarily, to be 

able to debrief that individual and then to make sure that individual is properly incarcerated so that we can maintain control 

over that individual. And I think that—frankly, I think that’s provided for under the Executive Order. 

Vice Chairman BOND. To clarify further, are you saying that the 

government has sent people to other countries for torture? And 

what do you mean by that? 

Mr. PANETTA. I have not been officially briefed on any of the extraordinary renditions as to what actually took place. My understanding is that there were black sites; my understanding is that 

we used those during that time. Some of these were permanent facilities. What took place with those individuals, I don’t have any direct evidence of, but obviously, there were indications that those 

countries did not meet the kind of human values that we would extend to prisoners. So it’s for those reasons that the President acted 

to prevent extraordinary renditions. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Now, since you don’t know about those, I 

would assume that would apply to the renditions in the 1990s, 

when detainees were transferred to a third country where they 

were executed. Does that qualify as torture? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I think in the renditions where we return an 

individual to the jurisdiction of another country and then they exercise, you know, their right to try that individual and to prosecute 

him under their laws, I think that is an appropriate use of rendition. 

15 

Vice Chairman BOND. Now, you’re talking about not holding 

them in black sites. When you capture a high-value target, say 

number two, three, four, five in al-Qa’ida, where would you put 

that target? Where would that person be held? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, again, without going into the exact location 

of these sites, I think it’s fair to say that if we captured Usama bin 

Ladin that we would find a place to hold him temporarily. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Where do you hold him permanently? I 

don’t think you’d want to let him loose, do you? 

Mr. PANETTA. We certainly don’t want to let him loose. We would 

debrief him and then we would incarcerate him, probably in a military prison. 

Vice Chairman BOND. In the United States? I mean, if we’re closing down Guantanamo, where would you send these most dangerous terrorists? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I’m not going to speculate on that, and to 

some extent, even under the Executive Order, there has to be a determination what happens to hard core individuals who cannot be 

tried or transferred. But in that instance, this would not come 

under the definition of a black site, because, number one, individuals who are held would be able to have access to the Red Cross. 

Number two, they are individuals who would be held on a temporary basis. And number three, the Army Field Manual would 

apply. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, that leaves more questions I’ll catch 

in another round. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I would call everybody’s attention to the five-minute clock, which is going to be enforced. Senator 

Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Let me welcome you, Mr. Panetta. I know of nobody better prepared by experience, by character, the integrity that you have, by 

your demeanor to take on this responsibility, and we congratulate 

you and hope that you’ll be speedily confirmed. 

We continue to hear complaints that the Central Intelligence 

Agency and the Department of Defense do not adequately share intelligence. In other words, they keep intelligence which they’ve collected from each other. Do you believe that there should be maximum sharing of intelligence between the Department of Defense 

and the CIA? 

Mr. PANETTA. Absolutely, and I’ve met with the Secretary of Defense and talked to him about making sure that we coordinate our 

efforts so that we know what’s going on, what they’re doing, and 

they will know what we’re doing so that we can share that information. 

Senator LEVIN. President Obama has said that waterboarding is 

torture. The Attorney General has said the same thing publicly, 

that waterboarding constitutes torture. Do you agree? 

Mr. PANETTA. I’ve expressed the opinion that I believe that 

waterboarding is torture and that it’s wrong, but more importantly 

the President has expressed the same opinion. 

Having said, that I also believe, as the President has indicated, 

that those individuals who operated pursuant to a legal opinion 

that indicated that was proper and legal ought not to be prosecuted 

16 

or investigated, and that they acted pursuant to the law as it was 

presented to them by the Attorney General. 

Senator LEVIN. You were quoted as saying in a column in the 

Monterey Herald that ‘‘torture is illegal, immoral, dangerous and 

counterproductive.’’ Do you think it can be made legal by a legal 

opinion? 

Mr. PANETTA. You know, my view as an attorney was that was 

a stretch by the Attorney General during the last administration 

making that decision. But when you’re an employee at the CIA, you 

have to operate based on the legal opinions that are provided you 

from the Justice Department, from the Attorney General. You 

know, there have to be some guidelines here, there have to be some 

standards, and whether you agree or disagree—and I certainly do 

not agree with that particular opinion—nevertheless, when you go 

out there and take the kind of actions that have to be taken and 

rely on those opinions, I do not think that you ought to be prosecuted for that. 

Senator LEVIN. The President, I believe, said—the Attorney General has said that nobody’s above the law and that he will follow 

the law wherever it takes him. If that takes the Attorney General, 

with the approval of the President, into an inquiry as to the CIA’s 

past practices, including the use of waterboarding and other harsh 

techniques, would you oppose that inquiry? 

Mr. PANETTA. My approach hopefully would be that this committee would take steps—if you want—if the purpose is to learn 

lessons from what happened in the past, I think this is the appropriate committee to look at that history and to be able to determine 

what was done right and what was done wrong. 

I also happen to believe, with the President, that if we find that 

there were those who deliberately violated the law—deliberately 

violated the law and deliberately took actions which were above 

and beyond standards that were presented to them, then obviously 

in those limited cases there should be prosecutions. 

Senator LEVIN. In order to help this committee and the public to 

understand exactly what happened and why and what the validity 

of the legal opinion was that was pretty quickly rescinded after it 

was brought to public light, would you support the release of the 

so-called second Bybee memo, which was an Office of Legal Counsel memo addressed to the CIA that has not been released, unlike 

the legal memo which was sent to the Department of Defense, 

which has been publicly released. Would you support that release? 

Mr. PANETTA. I would certainly do everything possible to cooperate with this committee in reviewing that history and try to cooperate with you in getting the information that you need in order to 

determine what actually happened. 

Senator LEVIN. It’s not just to the committee, but it’s also to the 

public. The DOD memo, so-called the first Bybee memo, has been 

made public. Would you support making the Bybee legal memo 

from the Office of Legal Counsel public that went to the CIA? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I’d like the opportunity to review that 

document and to understand what’s in it, but obviously I would do 

whatever I can to release those elements that I believe can be declassified and presented. 

17 

Senator LEVIN. And finally, could you give us your understanding 

of the relationship between the CIA and the DNI? Are you under 

the supervision, for instance, or is it a more cooperative, collaborative relationship? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I think that the intention of the Congress in 

establishing the DNI was to create an operation that would coordinate all intelligence activities within the federal government, would 

report to the President, and would establish strategic goals for the 

intelligence community. I view my responsibility as an operational 

partner in that structure, reporting to the DNI, performing the 

tasks that are assigned to me by the DNI and providing him with 

the information and support that are needed. I’m an operational 

agent of the federal government as head of the CIA, if I’m confirmed as head of the CIA. 

It is a tremendous operational arm. It is very important to producing the intelligence necessary for this country. It is deeply involved, obviously, in covert action and in analysis. So we are an 

operational arm, just like the NSA, just like the NRO. And I believe the role of the DNI is to coordinate all of our activities so 

we’re exchanging information, we understand what the strategic 

goals of this country are, and we are working together as an intelligence team, not stovepiping each of our operations. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I too want to welcome the nominee. I think he’s going to do a 

first-rate job. I’m struck by how much time you’ve spent on things 

like the President’s daily briefing, so clearly you’ve been involved 

in the intelligence policy area. 

But I think what I especially like about your background, Mr. 

Panetta, is your track record of speaking truth to power. And I 

look, for example, at what you did in the Nixon administration 

when there was tough pressure on you to back off on enforcing 

school desegregation. You were a young guy, and you said you 

weren’t going to sacrifice your principles. So I look forward to seeing you confirmed. 

I want to dig into the question of interrogation policy and ask 

you about one area very specifically. I think our country, as it looks 

at this debate, and particularly where we’re headed in the future, 

wants to know how you would at the Agency deal with what we 

call the human ticking time bomb—the person who has critical 

threat information, urgent information and you need to be able to 

secure that information. 

I’m of the view that when you look at the FBI and the U.S. military, that they have been able to show that it is possible to get the 

information that’s needed to protect our country’s security, our 

country’s wellbeing without coercive tactics. They’ve shown that, 

and I want to hear from you first whether you believe these noncoercive approaches can be effective in protecting our country when 

we’re dealing with one of these human ticking time bombs. 

Mr. PANETTA. What the President did in the Executive Order 

was to establish a single standard that would apply with interrogations with the Army Field Manual, and I think it was a step that 

18 

was taken because I think he believes deeply that we don’t have 

to choose between our ideals and our safety and that we can abide 

by the law in doing what has to be done to protect the safety of 

this country. 

And I believe that deeply. I think that’s what this country is all 

about, that’s what all of us who appreciate what the United States 

of America is all about. It’s what my parents, as immigrants, believed that this country was all about, was the rule of law. And I 

think all of us have a responsibility to abide by that. 

In the particular situation that you mention, where you have 

someone who could be a ticking time bomb and it’s absolutely necessary to find out what information that individual has, I think we 

have to do everything possible, everything possible within the law, 

to get that information. And that’s what I would do if I’m confirmed as the Director of the CIA. 

I believe that if you talk to Bob Mueller, if you talk to John 

McCain, if you talk to General Petraeus, that they believe that information can be obtained without having to resort to extraordinary measures. 

Senator WYDEN. I want to continue to work with you on that, because I think that Bob Mueller at the FBI and the U.S. military 

are showing that it’s possible to protect our country when dealing 

with these human ticking time bombs, and as you have said in 

your comments here, do it in line with our values and using noncoercive techniques. 

My second point sort of elaborates on this. Obviously, there are 

some people who don’t agree with that particular view. They say 

you have to use these coercive techniques or our country will be 

put in jeopardy by these kinds of individuals. And so the debate 

just goes back and forth. You’ve indicated, as I feel, that noncoercive techniques will be effective against these kinds of very dangerous individuals, and the argument is made by some that it’s not. 

I think we ought to start declassifying some of the information 

in a way that protects sources and methods so as to better inform 

the public with respect to this issue. Would you be willing to work 

with me and colleagues—this committee—Democrats and Republicans—to responsibly start declassifying some of the information 

about the CIA’s interrogation program. 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator WYDEN. The last question I want to ask you on this 

point is your sense about what can be discussed about the interrogation program in public, because this goes to a sensitive kind of 

area. My view is, unless you were to simply kill people in the 

course of interrogations, which is something no one, obviously, is 

in favor of, almost all of these interrogation practices come to light 

eventually. How would you look at the question about what can be 

discussed publicly and what sensitive information has to be kept 

private? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, what I think I’ve got to do first and foremost when I get into the Agency is find out myself just exactly 

what tactics were used, what information was gathered. At this 

point, you know, I understand that there are some who believe that 

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19 

niques. I don’t know for a fact that that’s the case. I don’t know 

whether or not there was misinformation that was provided. 

I don’t know whether in fact the damage that was done as a result of those kinds of activities certainly counterbalanced whatever 

information we received. Those are all questions that I have and 

my goal is to look into those situations, look into it as best I can, 

and then to share with this committee what I find out. 

Senator WYDEN. My time is expired, Madam Chair. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Panetta. And I know the Chair will expeditiously 

move forward with your nomination and we can have a CIA Director in place. 

Let me stay on the same topic, if I can, for a second that Senator 

Wyden was on. Mr. Panetta, do you believe that the President has 

the executive power to choose to use enhanced interrogation techniques if in fact he felt that was necessary? 

Mr. PANETTA. My view is that—I understand the powers that the 

President has under Article II and they are broad powers, but nobody is above the law. Nobody is above the law, and I think that 

even the President of the United States has to abide by the statutes and by the laws passed by the Congress. So, yes, he has broad 

authority under Article II but I don’t think he can violate the laws 

of this country. 

Senator BURR. You answered Senator Wyden’s question, his initial question, by saying ‘‘I would go to whatever lengths to get that 

information.’’ Would you hesitate with asking the President to use 

this executive power in a situation as Senator Wyden presented to 

you? 

Mr. PANETTA. If we had a ticking-bomb situation and obviously 

whatever was being used I felt was not sufficient, I would not hesitate to go to the President of the United States and request whatever additional authority I would need but, obviously, I would 

again state that I think this President would do nothing that would 

violate the laws that were in place. 

Senator BURR. You and I have had the opportunity to talk about 

the threat bioterrorism presents to us. How serious do you think 

bioterrorism is as a threat to this country and to the world and, 

more importantly, do you have anything you intend to do initially 

when you get to the CIA that would change the way we look at bioterrorism and specifically its threat? 

Mr. PANETTA. Obviously, because of the enemy we confront as 

the result of 9/11, there are obviously a number of areas that 

threaten our security. It’s not only acts of terrorism: it’s the potential for using some kind of nuclear weapon, it’s the potential to use 

cyber-attacks and it is the potential, obviously, to use bioterrorism. 

I’m a believer that when you look at the science and look at the 

potential on bioterrorism, that constitutes a very significant threat 

to the safety of the American people. 

And that’s an area that I would hope to look at very closely as 

Director of the CIA to ensure that we know as much as possible 

about the potential threat out there and that we’re taking steps to 

try to deal with it. 

20 

Senator BURR. On January 22nd, President Obama issued a series of executive orders, specifically the ones that related to CIA interrogations and the detention program at Guantanamo. Let me 

ask you, were you involved in the thought process of those executive orders, if at all, and to what degree? 

Mr. PANETTA. After the announcement that the President made 

that he would nominate me as Director of the CIA I did participate 

in some briefings on the Executive Order but I was not involved 

directly in the development of those executive orders. 

Senator BURR. Are you aware if anybody at the CIA—officials, 

attorneys—were consulted about those orders ahead of time and if 

their input was considered or included in the resulting Executive 

Order? 

Mr. PANETTA. I believe they did and I believe there was actually 

a meeting where they went out to Langley and sat down with individuals out there to discuss the executive orders and their implications. 

Senator BURR. If you determine that there are any legal or operational problems caused by the Executive Orders of January 22, 

will you request that they be modified or rescinded to accommodate 

your concerns? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, under each of those there is a review 

process that’s built into the Executive Orders. Under the interrogation Executive Order there is a review process in which we are to 

look at these enhanced interrogation techniques and determine exactly what kind of information was derived, how they were used, 

et cetera, to determine whether or not any revisions ought to be 

made. I am a part of that review process and, you know, we will 

obviously make that determination. 

Under the Guantanamo process, my understanding is there’s a 

review process to determine three categories—what prisoners can 

be tried, what prisoners can be transferred, what do you do with 

those prisoners who can neither be tried or transferred for some 

reason and what will happen with them. That’s a process that I as 

Director of CIA—I’m not a part of that process, but I would assume 

that information that CIA has certainly would be a part of that 

process. 

Senator BURR. I thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Burr. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Vice Chairman BOND. He’s AWOL. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Not here. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the chair. And, Madam Chairman, 

Congressman Panetta’s integrity and independent managerial—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Could you see that your mike is on, please? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I have it on. His managerial skills and his 

broad experience in both the Executive and Legislative branches 

suggests—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Perhaps If you’d move it closer? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let’s try this. I thank the Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You’re welcome. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Can you hear now? 

21 

Senator MIKULSKI. Is this microphone working? You’ve got to act 

kind of like a rock star. [Laughter.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. Congressman Panetta’s integrity and independence, his managerial skills and his broad experience—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I’m sorry, still can’t hear you. Try the one 

on your right. Try the one on your right. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Let him start over, give him full time. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes, you’ll get your full five minutes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s very kind. [Laughter.] 

Senator HATCH. Somebody in foreign intelligence is interfering 

here, I guess. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I believe Congressman Panetta can and will 

refocus the brave and dedicated professionals of the Agency and 

what they do best and what we need them for the most. And with 

his experience and skills working across agencies I think he’s perfectly situated not only to represent the interests of the CIA within 

our government but also to convey an important message to the 

rest of the world. And that’s when you’re talking to the Director of 

the CIA, he’s speaking for the President and the whole of the administration. 

And let me just praise you, Congressman Panetta, for the directness and clarity of your responses, in particular to the questions 

just raised by Senator Burr. I’d ask the Chair that my full statement be placed in the record. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It will, Senator. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSS FEINGOLD

Congressman Panetta has indicated that he appreciates the need to work with 

Congress. In his opening statement today, he indicates that the ‘‘Gang of 8’’ process 

was abused by the Bush Administration and stresses that notification to the Committee is a legal obligation. I have every reason to believe that he will usher in a 

new, collaborative relationship with the Congress that respects our constitutional 

obligation to conduct vigorous, independent oversight. 

His commitment to implementing the changes already made by President Obama 

in the areas of detention and interrogation are evidenced by his statements—long 

before the election—condemning torture as well as warrantless surveillance of 

Americans. In the coming years, however, the CIA will face many challenges that 

will raise moral and legal, as well as national security, questions. These matters 

will require perspective and a clear-headed understanding of our national interests. 

They will also require close consultation with the Congress and a respect for the 

policymaking role of the State Department and the legal counsel of the Department 

of Justice. The policies already set forth by President Obama are thus only the beginning of a new era, one in which we will need a new kind of leadership. 

In my meeting with Congressman Panetta, I raised a number of issues, some of 

which I will address in today’s hearing. They include human rights, legal reviews 

of existing programs and ongoing authorities, and the need to integrate the CIA’s 

clandestine collection with the information obtained openly by the State Department 

and others in our government. There are also many matters that can only be addressed in classified settings which I look forward to discussing with the nominee, 

should he be confirmed. 

The fact that the CIA’s activities are classified should never obscure the fact that 

it serves the American people and must adhere to our laws and national values, just 

like any other department or agency of our government. I have confidence that Congressman Panetta understands this principle, as well as the notion that members 

of Congress, with full knowledge of the CIA’s activities, are an essential part of the 

checks and balances required of our constitutional system. As he has indicated in 

his statement to the committee, the ‘‘CIA confides in you—and counts on you—to 

provide the oversight that the public cannot.’’ 

22 

Senator FEINGOLD. Congressman, you indicated in your opening 

statement that the legal authorities governing the CIA have shifted 

and acknowledge that there have been controversies over the laws 

and policies governing rendition and detention and interrogation. 

And Director Blair committed to the committee that he would submit to the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice proposed or ongoing activities where there is a legal dispute. 

Will you ensure that the CIA fully cooperates with the DOJ as 

it reviews these matters, as well as any others that may arise? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I will. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And in your response to the committee’s written questions you indicated you are concerned that we’ve not devoted sufficient resources in this area to Africa. You also stated 

that you’d review CIA operations and resources in light of emerging or long-range threats and may adjust the allocation of resources accordingly. That’s not easy, frankly, given the chronic 

tendency of the intelligence community to be reactive to current 

crises at the expense of potential or real emerging and long-range 

threats. 

If confirmed, will you work with me and other members of the 

committee right at the outset on setting those new priorities and 

budget allocations, in particular with regard to Africa? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I will. Senator, I really do think that if we are 

going to come into the 21st century we have got to set a list of priorities that not only look at current crises—and clearly we’ve got 

Afghanistan, we’ve got Pakistan, we’ve got Iraq, and we have 

North Korea. We understand what those more immediate crises are 

that we have to focus on—Iran, et cetera. 

But we also have to clearly look at Russia and China. We’ve got 

to look at Africa. We’ve got to look at Latin America. We have got 

to look at where those potential crises can develop for the future. 

And that’s an area that I would like to focus on and clearly would 

work with the committee in those areas. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Another aspect of allocating resources: As you 

allocate the CIA’s finite resources, if confirmed, I’d like you to consider how much easier that job would be if there were some strategic direction about where we most need clandestine collection 

and, on the other hand, where our government can do a better job 

gathering information through diplomatic reporting or other nonclandestine means. 

It’s clear that a lack of any such strategy, in my view, has prevented us from using our nation’s resources wisely or effectively. 

It’s effectively kept us in the dark on a broad range of national security issues. And that’s why I think this committee approved legislation by Senator Hagel and myself that would have created an 

independent commission to recommend ways to fix this longstanding systemic problem and why a broad range of former officials, including the former national security advisors from both 

parties, have endorsed this legislation. 

Do you agree that an interagency strategy that integrates clandestine and non-clandestine collection would serve our national interests and would you support an independent review aimed at providing recommendations on how to achieve that goal? 

23 

Mr. PANETTA. I would look forward to working with you on that 

legislation. I think those goals are good ones to look at. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In your opening statement, you stress that 

the CIA takes the lead with our liaison partners. As I indicated in 

my statement, I see your nomination as a critical opportunity to 

convey to those partners that there will be no more mixed messages from our government. 

What kind of working relationship will you establish with the 

Department of State and others in our government to ensure that 

your message is consistent with all elements of our foreign and national security policies, including counterterrorism and democratization, counterproliferation and human rights? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I think this country is at its weakest 

when we send mixed messages abroad as to what our policy is. I 

think we have to speak with one voice; we have to implement one 

policy. The President sets that policy and we have to follow it. And 

I will do everything possible to work not only with our liaisons, but 

with the State Department, the Department of Defense and the 

other key agencies to make sure that we are all saying the same 

thing. And, frankly, I think that’s part of the role of the DNI, is 

to make sure that we are all saying the same thing. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. Thanks to the Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Panetta, I am delighted by your appointment. And I think 

one of the qualities that you bring is this enormous array of experiences you’ve had, including a great deal of intelligence, an enormous array of knowledge of government. And you bring it to the 

head of the CIA, where we have had people who are of the CIA but 

who have never been able to translate to the rest of the world or 

to the rest of this government or to the rest of this Congress in the 

broad terms, practical terms, professional terms that you will be 

able to do. 

You will be able to give the CIA new standing, together with 

Steve Kappes at an operational level, you both, that I don’t think 

any other CIA Director has ever had. And so I strongly support 

your nomination. I have only one line of questions to ask you because they have to be asked. 

A certain former senior official suggested that the Obama Administration is more concerned about reading the rights to al-Qa’ida’s 

terrorists than they are with protecting the United States. He suggested that the Obama Administration thinks it can defeat terrorist enemies by ‘‘turning the other cheek,’’ and that , ‘‘if we just 

talk nice to those folks, everything is going to be okay.’’ 

That needs to be clarified because it’s so extraordinary that such 

a statement would be made at such an early point in a new administration. So, to clear the air, do you think language like this is 

helpful in developing effective intelligence policies that can have 

broad bipartisan support? Can you envision a debate on these difficult issues in which the people have strong opinions about how 

to keep America safe but do not denigrate the motives or integrity 

of people who have different opinions? 

24 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I was disappointed by those comments because the implication is that somehow this country is more vulnerable to attack because the President of the United States wants to 

abide by the law and the Constitution. I think we’re a stronger nation when we abide by the law and the Constitution. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Agreed. I’m curious about who that particular former official was talking about. Of all of the people you 

know in the Obama Administration—and you have over the years, 

but particularly in this last transition period—do you know anyone 

who cares more about reading the rights to a terrorist than protecting America, on the one hand; anyone who thinks we should 

turn the other cheek against terrorists, on another hand; and anyone who thinks that everything will be okay if we just go talk nice 

to terrorists? 

Mr. PANETTA. No. Senator, there are thousands of men and 

women who are on the front lines trying to protect this country and 

fighting the battle to ensure that our security is protected. They’re 

using every tool that our nation can provide them. And I think that 

all of us, all of us within this administration, Republican and Democrat alike, have a responsibility to make sure that we are all fighting this battle together and not blaming one or the other for particular weaknesses. If we don’t act together to try to protect this 

country, then that is the surest way to lose our security for the future. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Have you ever met anyone who thinks, in 

this Administration and in the transition period, that dealing with 

detention and interrogation policies, including closing Guantanamo, 

is actually an easy issue, number one, anyone who does not know 

that these issues are complicated and fraught with difficult and 

even dangerous questions? 

Mr. PANETTA. Now, look, these are tough issues. Nobody has any 

easy answers here, but I think the fact is that I am absolutely convinced that we can protect this country, we can get the information 

we need, we can provide for the security of the American people 

and we can abide by the law. I’m absolutely convinced that we can 

do that. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Can you remember any discussions, finally, in which you felt that the safety and security of the American people was not the absolute, number one priority of everyone 

with whom you worked and have worked? 

Mr. PANETTA. Everyone agrees that that’s the number-one priority. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator Coburn and then Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Panetta, thank you, thank you for your service. I enjoyed our 

conversation in my office this past week. I have a couple of questions for you, one of them is hypothetical. But before I get to those, 

I wasn’t clear in your answer to Senator Levin. Is the DNI your 

boss or not? 

Mr. PANETTA. The DNI is my boss. He’s the person I respond to. 

Senator COBURN. Okay. Thank you. If an employee of the CIA 

under your watch grossly mishandled highly classified information 

25 

in a way that that information was divulged to an adversarial foreign government, would that be grounds for termination at the CIA 

under your watch? 

Mr. PANETTA. Absolutely. 

Senator COBURN. Is that information that should be fully and immediately briefed to the full membership of the oversight committee? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, it should be. 

Senator COBURN. Here’s the hypothetical: If a staff member of 

the House or Senate intelligence committees similarly mishandled 

highly classified information and that information ended up in the 

hands of an adversarial foreign government, what actions would 

you take, in light of the fact that the CIA adjudicates itself the 

staff clearances? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I would certainly bring it to the attention of 

this committee, to the Chairman, to the Vice Chairman and to 

membership of this committee. That’s a serious, serious breach, 

and obviously I think the disciplining of that individual I would 

leave to this committee, but I could certainly make a recommendation. 

Senator COBURN. Can you imagine what that recommendation 

might be? 

Mr. PANETTA. I think you—— 

Senator COBURN. I’d like to hear it. 

Mr. PANETTA. If we were sure that kind of breach had taken 

place, then obviously I’d recommend pulling the clearance. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. Third question: Are you aware that 

former DCI John Deutch, who in 2001 had his security clearances 

revoked and received a pardon for mishandling highly classified information, do you realize that he has recently been asked by DNI 

Director Blair to serve in a fairly sensitive position on an advisory 

panel overseeing our most sensitive intelligence overhead architecture? 

Mr. PANETTA. I’m not aware of that. 

Senator COBURN. Do you think that’s appropriate? 

Mr. PANETTA. I think I’d have to sit down and talk with Admiral 

Blair about just exactly what he had in mind. 

Senator COBURN. What kind of message do you think that appointment sends to the men and women of the CIA, who work 

every day to collect and protect the most sensitive intelligence? 

Mr. PANETTA. Again, Senator, because, this is the first time I’ve 

heard that, I don’t want to jump to any quick conclusions about 

what the Admiral may or may not have had in mind, but clearly 

this is something I need to talk to him about. 

Senator COBURN. All right, thank you. In your pre-hearing questions, you said that one of your first management priorities would 

be to review the CIA’s overreliance on contractors—and I know 

that’s been asked before. Are you at the position now where you 

can judge how effectively and how fast you could do that, because 

my understanding is much of that’s based on a lack of adequate, 

available people, as well as those transferring out and coming back 

in? 

Mr. PANETTA. I think that’s right. And so it’s going to be a transition. It’s not something that can happen overnight, where you 

26 

suddenly get rid of all your contractors and hope your people can 

fill that job. I think it ought to be done on a transition basis. We 

ought to determine what are those areas we can move into the employees of the CIA and the skills set that they can pick up, but I 

do think, over a period of time we ought to be reducing our dependence on contractors and building an in-house responsibility in each 

of these areas. 

Senator COBURN. Does that apply even when you could do it outside for a much lower cost? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I guess I’d be interested in that, you know. 

As Director of OMB, I always had to look pretty closely at people 

who said you can get cheaper services by contracting it out, because when we went back and looked at some of those contracts, 

we found that the costs, often times, increased. 

So my answer would be, I’d like to look at where we do have to 

use contractors—and as I said, I’m not saying we shouldn’t use any 

contractors at all. There may very well be a need for that. We may 

need a certain capability, we may need a certain language skill so 

that we may need to do that. But in doing it, I would make very 

sure that the taxpayers are protected. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, and I think you would, too. Thank 

you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Coburn. 

Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Panetta, 

congratulations and welcome. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. During the course of the Bush Administration, the Department of Justice, through its Office of Legal Counsel, provided an opinion, which in relevant part I had de-classified, 

which indicated that the President was not under any obligation to 

follow Executive Orders. He could depart from Executive Orders 

without ever disclosing it or modifying the Executive Order. In effect, the Executive Orders were something from which the President and the people operating under his direction were entirely immune. 

Obviously, that’s not my understanding of what rule of law 

means, nor of what Executive Orders amount to. What I would like 

you to tell us, given the importance of these new four executive orders that President Obama has indicated, and standing Executive 

Orders such as 12333, which tends to provide most of the oversight 

over some of these areas, in the event that the CIA is tasked to 

depart from any valid, pending Executive Order, will you inform 

the committee of that? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I would. I think that’s a serious matter and 

this committee ought to be informed of that if I’m being asked to 

do that. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you. Following up on Senator 

Rockefeller’s topic with respect to a recent administration official, 

very early on, when Guantanamo was first opened up, the Vice 

President described the occupants of that facility as the worst of a 

very bad lot, they are very dangerous, they are devoted to killing 

millions of Americans, innocent Americans if they can, and they’re 

perfectly prepared to die in the effort. The number ran up close to 

27 

800 that were contained in that facility. About more than twothirds of those detained have already been released by the previous 

administration. 

More recently, in June of 2005, Vice President Cheney said this: 

‘‘We had some 800 people down there. We’ve screened them all and 

we’ve let go those that we’ve deemed not to be a continuing threat. 

But the 520-some that are there now are serious, deadly threats to 

the United States. For the most part, if you let them out, they’ll 

go back to trying to kill Americans. The 520-some that are there 

now are serious, deadly threats. We’ve screened them all.’’ They 

then released 270 of those 520. 

The reason I point this out is because in the past administration, 

the great and necessary privilege of secrecy that has been conferred 

upon our intelligence community for very, very good and legitimate 

reasons, I believe, has been abused. And it has been abused to prevent this committee and the public from having access not to 

sources and methods whose release would compromise national security, but to the other side of an argument that, for political purposes, the administration wanted to position in a particular way— 

not having access to what was going on at Guantanamo, not having 

a fair and real understanding of what happened with interrogation 

policies, not having a fair understanding of what was going on with 

the warrantless wiretapping program. 

Over and over again, secrecy was used for rhetorical propaganda 

purposes, not for national security purposes, in my view. I would 

like to urge you, in the course of your tenure—I don’t think you 

will behave that way, but once these things have been done, people 

can go back and do them again. I’d like to be able to work with 

the committee and with you to think of ways in which we can create different incentives so that problem doesn’t occur. At the moment, the Executive branch has all the declassifiers and you, as the 

Director of central intelligence can sit there and you can say something and it could be the biggest secret we have, and you haven’t 

revealed it in any prosecutable way; what you’ve done is declassified it. 

If Chairman Feinstein were to answer you with something that 

was, perhaps, considerably less harmful to national security, but at 

least corrected what you had just said publicly, she would be at 

risk for, you know, the administration sending FBI agents to her 

office. There’s an imbalance there that somehow I think needs to 

be corrected if we’re going to stop this behavior from happening 

again in the future, because the precious trust of secrecy is too important to be abused that way. What are your thoughts about that? 

Mr. PANETTA. I had a tremendous regard for Senator Moynihan, 

who said a great deal about this issue in terms of the over-classification that goes on. Look, there’s a balance here. Clearly, there 

are areas that have to be classified, particularly when it involves 

the lives of people and involves important sources and methods 

that are being used. But, at the same time, the public and this 

committee has a right to know what’s taking place. And there are 

areas where we have to declassify in order to ensure that the public is made aware of what takes place. It’s a fine balance. I’d like 

to work with this committee to try to achieve that balance. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I look forward to it and I thank the Chair. 

28 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Whitehouse. Senator Nelson is next. I do not see him. 

Senator Mikulski. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mr. Panetta, welcome to the committee, and I’d like to say to the 

committee, perhaps out of any Member here, I’ve known Mr. Panetta the longest and, in some ways, the most up-close and personal. For the record, I’d like it to show that Mr. Panetta and I 

came to the Congress together in 1977. We were the bicentennial 

class; we came in at the 200th anniversary of our country. People 

came in with us like Gore, Gephardt—when we got past the Gs, we 

made something of ourselves. [Laughter.] 

But we also had names like Shelby and Stockman. I served in 

the House with Mr. Panetta and watched his excellent work on the 

Budget Committee and then see him go to OMB and then chief of 

staff to the President, and most recently, have been working with 

him in his work on the Pew Commission to really deal with the 

challenges that our oceans are facing, in terms of the environment. 

I can say to my committee colleagues that in all of those years, I’ve 

known Mr. Panetta to be a man of incredible honor, integrity and, 

really, an incredible diligence and work ethic. 

And if ever there’s anyone who’s served in government that’s 

duty-driven, it’s Leon Panetta. And if you know him the way I do, 

he’s put his values into action. Family, faith and country—that’s 

the way he was raised; that’s the way he lives; and that’s the way 

he functions. He has represented the most beautiful place in America—outside of Maryland and the Chesapeake Bay—in Monterey, 

and I think we’re lucky to have him. 

Having said that, Mr. Panetta, I do have—my questions are, 

though, about restoring the honor and integrity of the CIA in the 

public—and functionality—in the public’s mind. I’d like to give not 

a hypothetical, but a real case example about what happened to 

Colin Powell and his involvement at the CIA. Mr. Powell—as we 

know, Mr. Secretary Powell, General Powell, citizen extraordinary 

Powell—went before the United Nations and presented our case for 

the Iraq war. 

The information he presented was deeply flawed. Therefore, we, 

through the CIA and his briefings, discredited one of the most esteemed men in the world. That occurred because of either the CIA 

was grossly incompetent in their preparation of General Powell or 

it was cynical manipulation coming from orders of other areas of 

our government. 

Could you tell us what you will do at the CIA so that we would 

never again have another event like what happened to General 

Powell as he presented to the world the United States of America’s 

case for taking a military action? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I promised the President of the United 

States that if I was fortunate enough to be honored with this position that what I would present him is the very best intelligence 

that I could bring together and that I would tell it straight to him, 

whether he likes to hear it or not. And I feel that’s my obligation. 

I will present the best evidence that we have, the best intelligence 

that we have and I will present it to the policymakers and I will 

ensure that they have that very best information. 

29 

And if by chance someone goes out and strays from that position 

and indicates something that’s contrary to what I presented, then 

I would not only bring it to the attention of that individual, I’d 

bring it to the attention of the President of the United States. 

Senator MIKULSKI. That’s an excellent answer. Let me ask, 

though, within the CIA there were those that dissented. I’m not 

sure always that the highest levels of the CIA knew the dissent 

among people working at the CIA. If confirmed, how would you 

treat dissent at the CIA and, as we talk about truth to power, 

would you actually establish some type of channel for dissenting 

opinions to be brought to your attention or to the leadership of you 

and Mr. Kappes? 

Mr. PANETTA. My experience in government, Senator, is that the 

worst thing you can have is a group of yes-people around you: you 

got to have people that are dissenters; you got to have people that 

are willing to ask questions. They have to feel free to question 

what’s going on. I think people have to have that opportunity because in the end, you know, the truth is something that sometimes 

depends on a certain perspective, but it’s when you get a series of 

those perspectives that you can have a better sense of what reality 

is all about. 

So I would encourage dissent; I always have. When I was chief 

of staff to the President I was often the only person in the room 

who dissented, but I felt that was a role that I had to fulfill. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I think we’ve been very clear that you 

will speak truth to power in terms of the President and to the DNI, 

for whom you work, but I would really hope, in conclusion, that you 

would consider a way that the worker bees at the CIA have a 

chance of communicating with you and look forward to further conversation. 

Mr. PANETTA. I will. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If I can just announce my intent, it’s my 

understanding that there are going to be 13 votes beginning in 

about 10 minutes. The remaining Senators are Senators Snowe, 

Bayh, Risch and Hatch. I’d like to conclude a first round. If a second round is required, it will be my intention to recess the committee and, if it’s agreeable with you, Mr. Panetta, and my colleagues, carry out the second round tomorrow morning at 10:00 

a.m. 

Mr. PANETTA. That’s fine. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So I’d like to conclude the hearing part 

this week. So we will continue and go hopefully until everybody has 

at least a first chance. Senator Snowe. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to welcome you and congratulate you. I know we go a long 

way’s back—I won’t say how long, either, but a little bit shorter 

than Barbara—but I certainly want to commend you. And you’re 

obviously assuming the helm of this agency at a very critical time 

in its history as well as in our nation’s history, without question, 

and you’re certainly equal to the challenge. 

As you mentioned that you’re going to rely on professionals in 

the Agency, you’re going to surround yourself with those professionals, at the same time ultimately you’re going to make the decisions. As you know, the Agency has gone through, you know, conVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:45 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 052741 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\52741.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
30 

siderable turmoil and particularly since 9/11, starting with that 

event, and then of course the failure to predict the weapons of 

mass destruction, the failure to have the accurate intelligence, the 

warrantless surveillance, the interrogation, detention, renditions— 

I mean, all of those issues combined that has created very troubling circumstances both for the Agency and for this country. 

How will you make those independent decisions? If you’re to 

change the status quo within the Agency but yet you have to rely 

on the professionals, exactly how will you be changing the direction 

of the Agency, because many of these individuals obviously were 

part of the policymaking decisions at the time within the Agency. 

So how will that represent change? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, my approach to every major job I’ve had 

to deal with is to go in and rely on the people that are there first 

and foremost. I did that when I took over at the Office for Civil 

Rights, I did that when I took over the Office of Management and 

Budget ,and I did that when I became chief of staff to the President. 

My approach is that I will rely on the people that are there. I’ll 

rely on their experience. I’ll see how they do the job, if they do it 

effectively, if they participate in the staff meetings. If I feel that 

I can get a sense of their dedication to the job and that they will 

recommend those policies that I think are best for the Agency and 

for the country, then we will work as a team. 

If I feel that there are people there that won’t perform in that 

manner, then obviously I’ll take steps, but my hope is that we can 

develop that kind of professional relationship. The people I have 

met, I am very impressed with their professionalism, I’m very impressed with their experience and their abilities, and I think we 

have to learn to work together as a team. But we also have to understand that if changes have to be made, they ought to be made 

for the benefit of not only the Agency but, more importantly, for 

the country. 

Senator SNOWE. What do you consider to be the greatest challenge? 

Mr. PANETTA. I think greatest challenge at the CIA is the need 

to develop the very best intelligence in areas that we are not anticipating right now may be problems for the future. And I think we’ve 

got a very good effort in Afghanistan. I think we’ve got a good effort in Pakistan. I think we’ve got a good effort in Iraq. I think 

we’ve got a good effort in Iran and North Korea. But what I worry 

about are those areas that concern me for the future. We aren’t as 

strong as we should be, I believe, in Russia, in China, in Africa. 

I think we need to know more, for example, with regards to the 

current economic crisis that’s not only impacting this country but 

impacting the world. What are the consequences of that in terms 

of stability in the world? We need to understand that. We have to 

be prepared to ensure that we are not surprised, and I think the 

biggest challenge I have right now is to figure out where those gaps 

are and how do we best deal with them. 

Senator SNOWE. Do you believe that al-Qa’ida remains the number one priority and the top demonstrated threat? 

31 

Mr. PANETTA. I do because clearly they are the terrorist who attacked us on 9/11 and we have to do everything possible to strike 

against them. 

Senator SNOWE. Well, what do you think it says that we have 

been unable to capture Usama bin Ladin since 9/11? What do you 

think that says about our resources or our ability or our focus? 

Mr. PANETTA. That’s the same question I ask every day, because 

I think one of the responsibilities we have is to go after our worst 

enemy, and that is Usama bin Ladin. I’ve asked the question, you 

know, why have we not been able to do it? There obviously have 

been a lot of efforts to try to locate him. Oftentimes the trail goes 

cold, but there is a continuing effort to try to ensure that we do 

everything possible to try to find him. It would be one of my priorities, frankly, to make sure that we in fact do find him and bring 

him to justice. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe. 

Senator Bayh. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Panetta. I’ve been very impressed by your testimony here today, as I was by our meeting some time ago. It is my 

hope that you will be an exemplary Director of Central Intelligence. 

That’s a vitally important position, as you know, often thankless as 

I’m sure if you don’t know you will find out. But I am personally 

grateful to you for your willingness to take on this important responsibility at this challenging time. 

Some of my questions may be in the vein of playing the devil’s 

advocate, but as we wrestle with these I think it’s important to 

sometimes examine them from not only the point of view that we’ve 

adopted but perhaps from an alternative point of view as well to 

ensure that we’ve reached the right decision. 

With regard to the detainees at Guantanamo, as you know and 

I think as Senator Whitehouse pointed out, the previous administration released quite a few detainees for repatriation. 

It has been published that a significant percentage of them have 

returned to terrorist activities. 

In fact, published reports indicate that at least one carried out 

a deadly attack or participated in a deadly attack on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, killing several Yemenis and one U.S. citizen. It is 

my understanding that this administration will continue the practice of the previous administration of repatriating at least some of 

these detainees. They go through the process in Saudi Arabia that 

is considered to be good. But some of them, it’s not successful. 

So my question to you is, if some of these individuals that we release from our custody go back to participating in these activities 

and innocent people are killed as a result of that, what do we say 

to the families of those victims? How do we justify that decision? 

Mr. PANETTA. I hope we never have to do that. And I think the 

best way to try to prevent that from happening is to make the best 

determination about what prisoners can in fact be repatriated and 

whether or not they are subject to being able to return to civilian 

life in some way. 

I think we have to do a very challenging job of gathering the evidence, gathering the information on each of these prisoners, and 

32 

then making the determination which ones can be tried, which 

ones can be transferred, but which ones ought never to leave incarceration. There probably has to develop some kind of process that 

allows for some kind of reporting to the federal courts so that there 

is an ongoing system of reporting why they are being incarcerated 

and why they are being held so that they just aren’t, you know, put 

away without any resort to our justice system. But I think there 

are going to be a group of prisoners that, very frankly, are going 

to have to be held in detainment for a long time. 

Senator BAYH. I think your answer was right to the heart of the 

matter. And I would just encourage you, we need to be realistic 

about the success of some of the countries to whom we repatriate 

individuals, look at their track record, and make our evaluations 

accordingly. And as you say, in evaluating which category these individuals fall into, I personally would—where in doubt—encourage 

you to err on the side of protecting the safety of innocent people. 

And I’m sure that you will. 

Let me move on. This involves the National Intelligence Estimates. We had an unfortunate case that I’m sure you’re aware of 

with regard to Iran, where the way in which the National Intelligence Estimate was written highlighted the fact that apparently 

they suspended the weaponization aspect of their program. Then, 

in a footnote, it noted that they continued apace with their attempts to develop fissile material and delivery capabilities and 

those kind of things, and in fact may have restarted their 

weaponization efforts. We just don’t know. 

So I would encourage you—just a comment—to look very carefully how these things are written, because that really undermined 

our diplomatic efforts to gather our allies to put pressure on Iran 

to stop those kind of activities. So my comment, my question is, is 

it your belief that Iran is seeking a nuclear military capability? Or 

are their interests solely limited to the civilian sphere? 

Mr. PANETTA. From all the information that I’ve seen, I think 

there is no question that they are seeking that capability. 

Senator BAYH. Two quick questions. In, I guess, his exit interview or last testimony before the committee, Admiral McConnell 

talked about the leak phenomenon that I’m sure you’ll become intimately familiar with. And he indicated that he had referred numerous cases to the Justice Department, none of which had been prosecuted. They couldn’t make a case. 

It was his opinion that some of the pending legislation that 

would deal with shield laws and that kind of thing—this was his 

opinion now—would make it virtually impossible in the future to 

ever bring a prosecution for a leak. I’d be interested if you’ve had 

a chance to contemplate that issue and, if so, if you shared his 

opinion? 

Mr. PANETTA. When I was chief of staff, one of the things the 

President constantly complained about were leaks. And they’re not 

easy to deal with because you don’t know, you know, where the 

leak came from. You can make all kinds of assumptions but it’s 

very difficult to prove it. 

Having said that, you know, I consider leaking—particularly 

where it involves secrets that are important to this country—treasonous. And I think they have to be prosecuted in that manner. 

33 

And I guess I would hope to work with the Attorney General to 

make sure that we aren’t simply referring these things into an 

empty hole, but that they would take actions against them. 

Senator BAYH. I’ve exceeded my time. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Bayh. 

Interestingly enough, the votes have been postponed until 4:30. 

I believe we will be able to go through the remaining three Senators, and I know the Vice Chairman has some additional questions. So I’m going to try to keep going as long as we can in hopes 

of concluding it today. 

Let me call upon Senator Risch. You’re next. And then Senator 

Hatch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Panetta, thank you for coming to see me. I sincerely appreciate it. Madam Chairman and members of the committee—— 

Mr. PANETTA. It’s a part of the Senate I’ve never seen before. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you for pointing that out. I’m reminded of 

that every day when I get to work. Madam Chairman, members of 

the committee, Mr. Panetta held up well under my withering crossexamination and answered all the questions I had very well and, 

I think, openly and candidly and I sincerely appreciate that. And 

that’s all I have. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, and thank you for 

remaining; it’s very much appreciated. 

Senator Hatch, my old friend. 

Senator HATCH. You’re right about that; I’m your old friend. But 

I’m also Leon Panetta’s old friend as well, and I welcome you to 

the committee. And I appreciate the time and courtesy you showed 

me in coming to my office and spending as much time as you did. 

We’ve known each other a long time and we’ve worked together on 

numerous occasions, but none of these occasions dealt with national security issues at all. 

Now, I might add, you’re not the most inexperienced person to 

be nominated for this job, as you know, and I certainly believe that 

one can lead the Agency without having spent a lifetime—or spent 

your previous life as an ‘‘espiocrat’’—we’ll put it that way. 

But you’re choosing to accept this nomination at a time when 

this country is engaged in two major wars, as well as the global 

war against terrorism and terrorists. And the role of intelligence in 

prosecuting these wars is unprecedented. And the ranks of the intelligence officers, due to the Presidential mandate, are larger than 

ever, with many dynamic junior officers volunteering to spend their 

careers spending work that, by definition, will never be specifically 

heralded. 

In short, the role of intelligence has never been greater in advancing our national security, and the demands have never been 

higher. So I believe that you have a wonderful opportunity ahead 

of you to help our country and help protect it. And I believe you’ll 

fulfill that responsibility very well. 

Let me just say, referring to Senator Mikulski’s questions, you’re 

aware that the CIA wrote Secretary Powell’s speech? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator HATCH. They wrote it, and of course, George Tenet was 

seated right behind him at the time. So it’s an important thing to 

34 

realize that they were relying on worldwide intelligence at the 

time—not just ours—and every major country intelligence community believed that was the case. Right? 

Mr. PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator HATCH. Yes. Perhaps we can agree that the primary goal 

of the CIA is to prevent another ‘‘strategic surprise’’ such as the 

one that occurred on September 11th. Now, you held the position 

of chief of staff to the President from 1994 until 1997. Now, presumably, this is the period when you had the most experience as 

a consumer of intelligence, although you did have experience in the 

military. 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, let me correct you. I was chief of staff 

from roughly 1993 to 1997—early 1997. 

Senator HATCH. I was wrong. I’ll be corrected. It was during this 

period that President Clinton must have become aware of the rise 

of O sama bin Ladin. I first spoke publicly of this in 1996 and I 

threw out warnings that we’d better watch him because he’s going 

to kill Americans, at the time. Now, as a consumer of intelligence 

at that time, what did you do with regard to the first reports you 

were getting about bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida? And I’d just like to see 

where we go on that. 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I can remember in the briefings that I 

was part of that terrorism, very early on, became a major area of 

concern—that bin Ladin, other terrorists, particularly after what 

happened in New York at the Trade Center—the bombing of the 

Trade Center—that there was an awareness that, clearly, there 

were these major threats from terrorists that we had to pay attention to. 

And our national security advisors—our national security team— 

all continued to bring those matters to the attention of the President and there were oftentimes steps that were recommended to go 

after them when the intelligence was there that they were trying 

to either go after planes in Los Angeles or in the Philippines or 

what have you. So it was a matter that the Administration continued to pay attention to as a major priority. 

Senator HATCH. I notice my time is up, Madam Chair. So I’ll finish with that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch. 

It looks like we may be able to finish. I know the Vice Chairman 

has additional comments. So if it’s agreeable with you, I’d like to 

just turn to him. Mr. Vice Chairman, why don’t you proceed? 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Several of our members on this side had left thinking they wouldn’t 

have the opportunity to ask questions. There are a number of questions that I have further to clarify some of the issues that we have 

discussed. And I’m a little bit at a loss to make sure exactly what 

you meant. 

Now, near the end of my first round of questioning, you said, and 

we’ve discussed it a little bit, that you sent people to other countries for torture. And you said that—number one, I assume that 

was not the case when you were chief of staff. Were you fully advised of the extraordinary renditions that went on during that 

time? 

35 

Mr. PANETTA. Renditions were discussed. I was not aware of all 

of the steps that were taken, because sometimes those involved 

with the National Security Council were involved with particular 

renditions. But generally, they would indicate when they were 

moving someone to an area of jurisdiction or moving someone from 

outside the country into the country because of the need for prosecution. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And you said we have transferred detainees to other countries for torture. Now, what information do you 

have about that. Did I misunderstand you? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, let me correct it in terms of—I have not seen 

specific information and I did not have access to specific information within the Agency that determined that was the case. Clearly, 

there have been indications that waterboarding was used in instances early on, and—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. In extraordinary renditions? 

Mr. PANETTA. I don’t know whether it took place in extraordinary 

renditions or not. But the indication has been that even Mike Hayden has basically admitted that—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, they said three detainees were subjected to waterboarding. 

Mr. PANETTA. That’s correct. And I don’t know whether there 

were other steps. Clearly, under the definition that was provided 

by the Attorney General in providing additional enhanced interrogation, that was something that obviously was used. And, as I said, 

it followed the legal opinion that was provided at the time. Whether those were done as parts of renditions or not, I don’t know. 

It is clear that there were black sites. It is clear that individuals 

were brought there. What happened there, you know, I can’t tell 

you specifically what kind of actions were taken, but clearly steps 

were taken that prompted this President to basically say those 

things ought not to take place again. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, we have been advised that no extraordinary renditions occurred during your period in the Clinton 

Administration, during the Bush Administration, if there was any 

doubt that—if there was any question that torture might be used. 

But I want to go back to the assertion that there were renditions 

for torture. Are you saying now you have no information about 

that? 

Mr. PANETTA. I’m saying that I can neither affirm or deny what 

took place, because I haven’t had access to that information. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, so you would have to withdraw your 

blanket statement. 

Mr. PANETTA. I guess my understanding is that there were renditions to countries that engaged in certain behavior. I have not 

seen that evidence. I’m basically saying what I’ve read in the press. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I think that’s a lot different from making 

a blanket assertion. And I would hope you would make that clear, 

that you have no—— 

Mr. PANETTA. I will make clear, I have no official information 

from within that, in fact, those kinds of renditions took place. 

Vice Chairman BOND. All right. 

36 

Now, in talking about disposition of detainees, Senator Bayh 

mentioned the problem of recidivism of some of the people who 

have been let loose from Guantanamo. 

I believe the one person who went back to Saudi Arabia has now 

been claimed by al-Qa’ida as the deputy chief of operations for alQa’ida in the Horn of Africa. And I read in the papers today that 

Saudi Arabia has on their most wanted list, I believe—the news 

story, and again this was only from the news story—has 11 Guantanamo alumni on their most wanted list. 

And I further understood that Saudi Arabia had what was regarded as one of the best rehabilitation programs of any of the 

countries to which we return their citizens whom we have captured 

on the battlefield. 

Now, does that raise a question? You said we’d have to review 

it. I think that raises a question about the effectiveness. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I understand. Your time is up. And I know 

others, if there is going to be a second round, would like to—— 

Mr. PANETTA. If I could respond to your question—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. I want to follow up but I do want to let 

others, if they have questions. 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, you’ve raised obviously—I read the same stories and shared the same concern. 

I do think that there are indications that they have probably a 

pretty effective rehab program that they go on. But the problem is 

that we have evidence that some of these individuals are making 

their way back to al-Qa’ida, and that concerns me. I think in making determinations about what happens to prisoners at Guantanamo we really do have to make a determination whether or not 

in fact any of these individuals can be rehabilitated before we send 

them there. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If I may just, before calling on Senator 

Wyden, say one thing, it seems to me that maybe too we ought to 

look at some different criteria, like despite the fact that someone 

did not commit an offense against the United States but was 

picked up on the battlefield—if in fact they have been trained or 

participated in training with al-Qa’ida in the past, it may well put 

them in a different category, is what I have been seeing from looking at some of this material, where they remain a security threat 

because the intention is to go back to al-Qa’ida, no matter how long 

it takes. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Very briefly, Madam Chair, and I may have 

been out of the room when we got into this rendition issue as well, 

but I think that a fairly straightforward question gets at what I 

think your views have been, and that is, Mr. Panetta, do you believe that the U.S. has rendered people to a third country for purposes of torture? 

Mr. PANETTA. I suspect that that’s been the case. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Speak up, please. I missed that. 

Mr. PANETTA. I said I suspect that has been the case, that we 

have rendered individuals to other countries knowing that they 

would use certain techniques in order to get information from individuals that violated our own standards. 

37 

That’s what I suspect. I don’t have any evidence of that. I haven’t 

looked at the information within the CIA to determine whether or 

not that took place. But every indication seems to be that we used 

this extraordinary rendition for that purpose. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay. We’ll want to talk with you some more 

about that in a classified kind of fashion. 

I want to ask you one question about the Hamas and Gaza conflict. I mean, clearly this issue between Israeli forces and Hamas 

is going to be one of the major national security challenges facing 

the country. Now you’ve been out of the government for a while, 

and obviously you’re going to get up to speed on it. What do you 

think, in terms of your current information on this, are the big 

challenges to understanding this problem? 

Mr. PANETTA. Obviously this is an area that we really do need 

the very best intelligence that we can get with regards to what’s 

taking place there. 

And I’m afraid that what we really need to do is to develop much 

better intelligence about what’s going on with Hamas, where the 

tunnels are located, what’s taking place with regards to these tunnels, what is the information with regards to how Iran is or is not 

providing arms to Hamas in this effort. 

I think we need to have the very best intelligence we can gather 

because if George Mitchell is to make a difference there, then he’d 

better have the best information we can provide as to what, in fact, 

is taking place. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

It’s my understanding that Senator Chambliss is on his way 

back. He is not yet here. Senator Hatch, I understand you have 

some questions. 

Senator HATCH. I hate to keep you any longer, but if I could just 

ask a few questions, I’d appreciate it. 

We in Congress have certain biases when it comes to—you know, 

when we think of reform, as a creature of Congress, I know that 

you’ve shared some of those biases from time to time that we have 

around here. When we try to reform a large agency like the CIA, 

we create boxes, we move boxes around. 

And this is not to disparage, for example, the creation of the 

DNI, which I know is an initiative of our esteemed Chairman here. 

On the DNI to date, I still remain agnostic. But I have admired the 

most recent Directors and their contributions and look forward to 

working with our new Director. 

But this is what Congress does, because creating new boxes in 

an organization chart and moving others around are things that we 

can dictate through legislation. The organizational culture is much 

harder to affect by legislation. It’s changed from the outset by sustained oversight. 

Now, in your view, is the organization and culture of the CIA the 

right one to face the threats of our lives today and the threats that 

may come in the future, or do you need to make some wholesale 

changes out there based upon what you do know at this point? 

And if you don’t feel like you can answer that question, that’s 

okay. 

38 

Mr. PANETTA. No, I think based on what I’ve seen out there and 

the briefings that I’ve had, I really do think that the CIA has the 

tools necessary to deal with the threats that are there. What we 

have to ensure is that we are continuing to push to get the very 

best people involved in human intelligence. And it’s my view that 

we have got to have people who are well trained, who understand 

the language, who understand the cultures, so that we can place 

these people in positions where we can get the very best human intelligence. 

And I do think, while we have the tools, I think we still have to 

stress the kind of training, the kind of language training, the kind 

of diversity that would make the CIA much more effective in producing intelligence. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you. I want to help you in this job and 

will do whatever I can to bring help to you. 

Mr. PANETTA. I appreciate it, sir. 

Senator HATCH. As you know, I support you. 

And last Wednesday, members of the committee heard about allegations of gross—it’s been raised, but I’m going to raise it again— 

gross illegality by a CIA employee serving in a Muslim country. 

Now, we did not learn about that from CIA. We learned about that 

from ABC News, which I think is pretty pathetic. 

And then while we cannot and should not talk about an investigation that’s under way, the manner in which this story unfolded 

was very troublesome to me, not only for the Legislative branch of 

government, which conducts CIA’s oversight, but also, it blew back 

on the Executive as well, I think unfairly, in this case. 

First on oversight, do you believe such a development as alleged 

in the story that I’ve alluded to is a ‘‘significant intelligence matter’’ to be briefed to the oversight Committee in a timely manner? 

Mr. PANETTA. Absolutely. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. Now, the repercussions for the administration. These allegations ran in the media less than 48 hours after 

President Obama conducted a major high-profile public diplomacy 

effort by taking an interview with Al–Arabiya, one of the largest 

media broadcasters in the whole Arab world. And while I would 

disagree with some of the rhetoric the President used in the interview, I commend him for granting the interview and trying to communicate over the heads of the leaders of the Middle East—and 

right to the publics, as well. Now, it was bold. And based on first 

impressions, I think it had a positive effect. 

And then the CIA story comes out less than two days later. Now, 

I haven’t seen substantive analysis of the impact, but it’s not 

counterintuitive that such a story had to have dampened the effects of the President’s efforts two days prior. And assuming the 

CIA couldn’t control the release of the story on the allegations of 

gross illegality, but also assuming the CIA knew about this more 

than two days prior, what do you think they should have done to 

mitigate such conduct—or conflict, I should say? 

Had you been the Director the last six months, what would you 

have done differently? And what will you do if such an event occurs 

on your watch? And how will you manage to control spillover effects on other executive policy efforts? 

That’s a lot of questions. 

39 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, my understanding is that first information about this actually came to our attention some time back in 

October. And I think that was the time to have briefed the Congress and the committees as to that situation—A. 

B, that person should have been immediately brought back. 

I believe that he was relieved of duty at that time. But he was 

referred to the Justice Department for action. And as I said, I 

think the allegations were serious enough that he should have been 

terminated. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you. My time is up. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

There are 12 minutes left on the first vote. Do you have additional questions? 

Vice Chairman BOND. Yes, ma’am. I have a significant number 

of questions, and Senator Chambliss and others have indicated a 

desire to do it. I would propose that we follow your suggestion and 

reconvene at 10:00 in the morning. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right. That’s fine with me if that’s 

agreeable with Mr. Panetta. 

Vice Chairman BOND. If that’s all right, if that’s convenient for 

Mr. Panetta. He’s been very courteous. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It is. And we will be in Hart 216 tomorrow 

morning, Mr. Panetta. 

So I will recess the committee until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning 

for a hearing in Hart–216. 

[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene 

at 10:00 a.m., Friday, February 6, 2009.] 

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NOMINATION OF LEON PANETTA TO BE 

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller, 

Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse, Levin, Bond, Hatch, and Chambliss. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order. 

We meet today to continue the confirmation hearing for Leon Panetta to become the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

We’ll proceed with the second round of questions for Mr. Panetta. 

Prior to that, I will call on Senator Chambliss. He did not have a 

first round, so he will go first with questions this morning. 

I hope there will not be a need to send a lengthy list of questions 

for the record following this hearing. I believe everybody has had 

ample chance to ask their questions. And I’d like to ask that all 

questions for the record be submitted in writing by 5:00 this afternoon so we can get them over the weekend to Mr. Panetta for his 

responses. 

Before the questioning begins, I’d like to offer the nominee the 

chance to make any statements up front or add or clarify any statements that he made yesterday. It’s not necessary, Mr. Panetta, but 

if you’d like to, this is an opportunity. 

STATEMENT OF LEON PANETTA, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. PANETTA. What I would prefer is just to proceed with the 

questions, and—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Fine. 

Mr. PANETTA [continuing]. As we proceed, then I can make any 

appropriate clarifications. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Fine. And I ask unanimous consent that 

the record for the hearing be held open for additional materials regarding the nomination. Without objection. 

And I will turn to Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And I apologized to the witness earlier for hopefully not being responsible for him having to be back here today. But obviously, with 

what was going on on the floor yesterday, I just got caught twixt 

and between. 

First of all, Mr. Panetta, thank you for your willingness to come 

back in public service. You and I had a lot of contact during your 

125 

days in the Clinton Administration. And you served us well, and 

we appreciate your willingness to come back. 

And I want to start off by asking about the interrogation process, 

and particularly about what has transpired over the last several 

years since September 11th. There appears to be some indication 

from some folks on the Hill that they’re not only interested in going 

back and reviewing what’s happened in the past, but even potentially moving towards prosecution of individuals who carried out interrogations in a way that we may not be interrogating folks going 

forward, even though there appeared to be legal justification for 

those interrogations. 

And these individuals, obviously, will be your employees or your 

contract employees as DCI, so I’d like your comments and what 

your thoughts are relative to that issue. 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, thank you for the question. And as I indicated yesterday, my view is that, whether you agree or disagree 

with the opinions that were issued by the Attorney General with 

regards to interrogation methods, that the employees at the CIA 

were operating pursuant to those opinions. And I think as long as 

you operate based on the legal opinions that are provided by the 

Justice Department, by the Attorney General to guide you in those 

interrogations, that frankly you ought not to be prosecuted, you 

ought not to be investigated; you did your job, pursuant to the law, 

as it was defined by that Administration. 

And for that reason, certainly as Director of the CIA, it isn’t my 

intent to go to the past. I think we’ve got to move forward to try 

to deal with the challenges we face from here on out. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Obviously I can’t imagine anything of more 

detriment to the morale of the brave men and women that carry 

out the job of the CIA if in fact the opposite to what you just alluded to was true or was to take place. 

One of the criticisms of you—and you and I have talked about 

this in my office—is the fact that you don’t have the experience 

that maybe some other DCIs have had in the past. And as we talk 

through what experience you do have there, obviously, as chief of 

staff to the White House you indicated you had the benefit of the 

PDBs, and you also sat in on national security meetings. 

During that time when you were chief of staff, there were two 

NIEs that were issued relative to terrorist threats to the United 

States, one in 1995, I guess before you were chief of staff, and one 

in 1997. And, according to the 9/11 Commission report, the 1995 

NIE predicted future terrorist attacks against the United States 

and in the United States, and it warned that this danger would increase over the next several years. It even indicated that the most 

vulnerable assets were the White House, the Capitol, such symbols 

of capitalism as Wall Street, et cetera. 

My question is, were you involved in discussions relative to the 

issues pointed out in those NIEs? If so, tell me what the genesis 

of those discussions was and what preparations or action did you 

and those that you were involved in discussing this issue take relative to those significant warnings? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, acting on recollection here, I believe I was 

there for the 1995 NIE as the chief of staff. I was not there in 

1997; I’d left that position at that time. 

126 

But with regards to the terrorism NIE that was provided in 

1995, as I mentioned yesterday to the Committee, terrorism was 

one of the major priorities that was identified within the Administration that needed attention—obviously, the bombings that took 

place, and the fact that it was clear that there was a rising threat 

with terrorists throughout the world. This became a major focus of 

attention within the Administration and within the White House. 

The national security advisers—Tony Lake, Sandy Berger—constantly reminded the President of the importance of dealing with 

this issue. And as a result of that, people like Richard Clarke and 

others—and I can remember this, as chief of staff—brought to my 

attention as chief of staff when there were indications that additional threats were out there. 

We had one instance where there were—there was a possibility 

that we had received information that they would take over airlines in the Philippines or be able to hold hostages. And as a result 

of that, we advised and took steps to ensure that would not happen. There were other things that took place, as well. But I can assure you that within the Administration there was a great deal of 

attention to the issue of terrorism and what steps we needed to 

take to try to protect this country. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

We will now go on to our second round of questions. I wanted to 

ask you a question about covert action. The CIA conducts covert actions under clear authorities and with clear oversight. And that’s 

all laid out in the National Security Act. Each covert action must 

be authorized by a written Finding, signed by the President. And 

significant undertakings are governed by what we call MONs, or 

memoranda of notification. The Intelligence Committees must be 

notified. And there are quarterly updates to the Committees. We’re 

going to have one shortly. 

The Department of Defense has separate authorities under Title 

10 for clandestine operations for military source operations. That’s 

what they call it, in quotes, ‘‘military source operations.’’ Now, 

these often are almost identical to covert operations, but under a 

different guise. 

So you have one entity doing this, and you have another entity 

doing this. Do you believe the CIA should be consulted on these defense activities? Should the chief of station have oversight and the 

ability to veto such intelligence activities in his or her area of responsibility? 

Mr. PANETTA. Madam Chairman, this is an issue that I think we 

are going to have to work with the committees, to ensure that 

there is not only proper notification but that there’s coordination 

of these efforts. These are all covert actions. They come under different titles. 

Title 50 requires, as you pointed out, that we go to the President, 

that we get the Finding, that we provide notice to this Committee. 

There are rules required under the law in order to ensure that the 

Committee and others are properly notified about the actions that 

are taken under covert action. 

Under Title 10, these are military actions taken to basically deal 

with the environment in the battlefield. That’s how this originated. 

127 

However, as a result of what we’ve seen in the last few years, there 

are clearly covert actions that are being taken that have to be coordinated. 

There’s no question here. There has to be coordination. If each 

of these go off on their own, we’re going to be tripping over each 

other and we’re going to be failing to use resources properly. And 

frankly it isn’t going to work. What we need to do is to have better 

coordination of these efforts. 

And I’ve talked to the Secretary of Defense about this, that we 

need to improve our coordination, that people in the field, particularly the station chiefs, need to be aware of these efforts so that 

they can coordinate them and make sure that each understands 

what is involved here. And I would think the third thing that I 

would suggest to you is that there has to be some kind of notification process that’s involved. 

Now, I understand, they do provide some notice to members of 

the Armed Services Committee. But, very frankly it seems to me 

that it’s appropriate that perhaps the committees in the Congress 

establish some kind of notification procedure to ensure that it isn’t 

just the Armed Services Committee but it’s the Intelligence Committee that is aware of these kinds of actions. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I thank you for that. I think that’s very 

important. Some countries may be very small. The ambassador 

doesn’t know. The chief of station doesn’t know, and we don’t know. 

And I think that’s a big mistake. So I very much appreciate that 

answer. 

Second question: What steps do you intend to take, beyond what 

has been done already, if there is anything, so that the analysis of 

information is improved, so we can be assured that a flawed and 

bad NIE cannot happen again? 

Mr. PANETTA. It’s really important to have analysts who are 

trained, who are aware of the country that they’re getting information from, the sources that they’re getting information from, and 

analysts who are prepared to ask questions, to challenge the information that’s being provided, so that they can ensure that information comes from reliable sources. 

I think, you know, I’m very impressed by the analysts that I’ve 

met. They obviously are in their own ways independent and objective. And I think that’s important. 

But sometimes there is—as we all know, within any bureaucracy 

there’s a kind of groupthink that takes place, in which there’s a 

sense that you kind of do it by the numbers. Information comes in, 

and you pass it on, and nobody says ‘‘stop, wait, what’s involved 

here?’’ and is willing to challenge it. Because kind of the message 

in the bureaucracy, from my own experience is, you don’t make 

waves. 

Well, very frankly, you have to make waves. If you’re not asking 

those questions, if you’re not challenging, then that’s when we 

make mistakes, and that’s when this country becomes vulnerable. 

So what I hope to do, working with the good people in that section, 

is to create an atmosphere where they’re willing to ask those questions and to challenge it, and if it doesn’t happen at their level, you 

can bet it’s going to happen at the Director’s level. 

128 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, I just want to say that my prime 

mission, and one of the reasons I was interested in the chairmanship of this Committee, is to see that it never happens again. I 

know I cast a vote that I have to live with for the rest of my life, 

based on that Iraq NIE. And I think about it every single day. So 

I will plague your house to see that we have in place everything 

we can to see that intelligence is good and never again is a Secretary of State put out before the world based on a CIA speech that 

is dead wrong. 

Mr. PANETTA. I agree with that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Madam Chair. And again, 

thank you, Mr. Panetta, for bringing your considerable background, 

experience and abilities to this position. I appreciated your answers 

to Senator Feinstein’s two questions, and I agree with those. 

But yesterday you made a statement with which I believe everyone on this Committee agrees, and you said, ‘‘We can protect this 

country. We can get the information we need. We can provide security for the American people. And we can abide by the law.’’ That 

was the position of your predecessors in the previous administration, and that’s what I’ve been aware of ever since I’ve served on 

this oversight panel. And I’m very pleased, as we all are, that you’ll 

continue, if confirmed. 

But I need to pick up where you left off yesterday, because I’m 

still not sure I completely understand your follow-up to one of your 

responses to the Chair during the first round of questions yesterday, and several others, in which you stated that the United States 

has sent individuals to other nations ‘‘for torture.’’ That implies deliberate intent of U.S. officials to send individuals to other countries for the purpose of being tortured. 

That’s a serious allegation, and one which should not be made 

lightly or without evidence. Now, if that’s ever happened, it’s news 

to me. Former Secretary of State Rice made clear on a number of 

occasions what the Bush Administration policy was on renditions. 

For example, December 5, 2005: ‘‘The United States does not transport, and has not transported, detainees from one country to another for the purpose of interrogation using torture. The United 

States has not transported anyone and will not transport anyone 

to a country when we believe you will be tortured. Where appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred persons 

will not be tortured.’’ 

Now, if you’re saying that she was wrong and this was done, 

then I would expect your first order of business as Director of the 

CIA to round up your people that did this and turn them over with 

a crimes report to the Justice Department for prosecution. 

I, for one, don’t believe this has happened. So you said yesterday 

that you have not even been briefed into these programs, so I’m not 

sure how you can make such a statement. So my question is, what 

evidence are you basing this assertion on? Or would you like to retract that statement. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you for the question, Senator, because I 

think there is some clarification required here because renditions 

are one of these areas where the press has identified extraordinary 

129 

renditions. Nobody quite has defined exactly what that means; everybody has a certain reaction to what is involved and there are 

obviously other kinds of renditions. Let me describe what I think 

are the three types of renditions that we need to discuss. 

One is the rendition that takes place where individuals have 

been delivered to black sites and questioned there. Under the Executive Order that the President provided, because it requires that 

we eliminate black sites, that kind of rendition will not take place 

because black sites will no longer exist. 

There is a second kind of rendition, where individuals are turned 

over to a country for purposes of questioning, and it is my understanding that—and I want to clear up the record on this—there 

were efforts by the CIA to seek and to receive assurances that 

those individuals would not be mistreated and that they did receive 

those assurances. 

As I pointed out yesterday, there are obviously some claims that 

was not the case; I am not aware of the validity of those claims but 

clearly those claims have been made that was not the case. With 

regards to that area, I think using renditions we may very well direct individuals to third countries. I will seek the same kinds of assurances that they will be not treated inhumanely. I intend to use 

the State Department to ensure that those assurances are in fact 

implemented and stood by, by those countries. 

In addition to that, I would point out that under the Executive 

Order, we are to look at those kinds of transfers and how that 

takes place to ensure that those kinds of assurances are received 

and that those countries stand by those assurances. 

And I would point out there’s a third area of renditions, which 

involves transferring individuals to countries for purposes of legal 

action, and in those instances I think those are appropriate tools 

of rendition and hopefully we would continue to use those. 

Vice Chairman BOND. But to follow up on that, I don’t believe I 

was clear on your answer. You stated yesterday that we transported people for the purpose of torture. Now, nothing you’ve said 

tells me that you have any solid information for that. Do you have 

any information? So would you retract that statement? 

Mr. PANETTA. But Senator, on that particular quote—that people 

were transferred for purposes of torture—that was not the policy 

of the United States. It was clearly to transfer people for purposes 

of questioning and receiving assurances that would not take place. 

So to that extent yes, I would retract that statement. 

Vice Chairman BOND. All right, because that’s a serious assertion. Maybe media, liberal blogs—but having made that statement, 

you—not a private citizen, but as a nominee for this very important 

position—cannot be making statements or making judgments based 

on rumors or news stories. And that was one of the elements that 

was at the base of our misinformation and the bad intelligence we 

got, so I would ask you to assure this Committee that you will not 

make rash judgments based on hearsay, you will demand that the 

Agency make statements only based on hard facts and rule out political bias, determine the truth and then deliver your best judgment to us and to the President and, to where appropriate, to the 

media. Do I have your assurance? 

130 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, you have my assurance that I intend to 

do that. My approach is going to be to seek the truth and do everything possible to seek the truth and I will in turn provide that kind 

of information to this Committee. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Mr. Panetta. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Two questions at this point, Mr. Panetta. The first: There’s been 

some discussion about the rule of law and how it applies to interrogations that were conducted by the CIA. One of the hazards, as we 

all know, of the rule of law is it’s not always easy. It’s not always 

convenient and it’s not always conducive to everybody’s good morale. But it is, in my view, a very high principle. 

In this case, the rule of law includes things like defenses that follow from, say, advice of counsel. Those are defenses that have their 

own legal limitations to them. You don’t give up on a racketeering 

prosecution against a mobster just because he has a mob lawyer, 

who’s handed him a document saying this is a legitimate business 

proposition. Advice of counsel has its limits. Waiver by estoppel is 

a doctrine that prevents a government agency that has licensed 

conduct from then sanctioning the conduct that it has itself licensed. 

That as a doctrine of law also has its own limitations. However 

all this works itself out, will you assure that whatever backward 

look is necessary into the CIA and whatever forward conduct is undertaken by the CIA abides ultimately by the rule of law? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I think, as I said yesterday, as the son of immigrants who came to this country, the one thing that they always 

said was one of the reasons they came to this country was because 

of the rule of law. And I think that’s what has made this country 

great; that’s why we stand out as moral authority around the 

world, is because we abide by the rule of law. And I feel it’s my 

obligation and, frankly, my sworn duty to ensure that we live by 

that rule of law in whatever we do. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Even if it’s not easy, even if it’s not convenient, even if it’s not conducive to everybody’s good morale? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, as an attorney, having dealt with cases 

like you and obviously having run into serious challenges as you 

go through a trial process to try to make those decisions, I’m still 

convinced that in the end it is the best process in the world for providing due process to individuals. And yes, it gets tough sometimes 

and yes, it’s not convenient and yes, sometimes you don’t get to the 

end you want to achieve. But the reality is that if you abide by due 

process, if you abide by our constitution and the rule of law, that 

in the end we serve the best interest of this country. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Switching to the other side of the world, 

you noted in your written statement that al-Qa’ida has reestablished a safe haven in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now, I’ve been out there and been thoroughly briefed on 

the difficulties that this border creates. The Talibani syndicates 

and al-Qa’ida don’t even notice it. It is a zero-factor in their operations. For us, it is a significant factor because of the sovereignty 

prerogatives of the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments. 

131 

We have there a border coordination center that has been set 

up—just one. There are supposed to be six. My sense is that it’s 

going very slowly. Only the one is operational and I think these 

border coordination centers, if they can develop into trilateral targeting and tactical direction centers for that area, could provide 

enormous advantage in the battle with al-Qa’ida and the Taliban 

syndicates. 

I will ask you this question for the record because my time is 

running out and if you could get back to us in writing I would appreciate it, but I would like to know what do you think the U.S. 

government can do to move more quickly to establish the remaining five border coordination centers and make them secure, because 

as we all know there have been issues with information leakage in 

various places, and effective—as effective as we are capable of 

making them, which in other areas and contexts the coordination 

efforts have been extremely, extremely effective. 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, be careful not to get into a classified area 

here, but obviously let me look into that issue and try to get you 

the answer that I can provide because I think that issue is important. It’s obviously an area where operationally there are all kinds 

of things that are taking place that are very important. But I believe that we need to set up those kinds of border stations in order 

to improve our relationship, in order to improve our security, particularly in Afghanistan. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. It has operational and political value because of the sovereignty problem. Thank you very much, Madam 

Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Hatch, you are next. 

Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 

I’m not going to ask you, Leon, what you’ve been reading on intelligence as you prepare for this key position, but I am going to 

remind you that this Committee does much more than conduct 

nomination hearings, produce authorization bills—we will be passing one later this year, won’t we, Madam Chair? [Laughter.] 

Vice Chairman BOND. Two. 

Senator HATCH. Two—that would be a wonderful thing. 

As I mentioned in Admiral Blair’s hearing, the Committee has 

conducted historic investigations, none more historic than the one 

that resulted in our report of July 2004 on the intelligence failures 

related to the Iraqi WMD. And yes, I’m blowing the Committee’s 

horn but yes, this intelligence failure was spectacular and I cannot 

imagine anyone taking any responsible position in the IC without 

understanding it in detail. Have you read that report yet? 

Mr. PANETTA. I have not read the full report. 

Senator HATCH. You need to read it. I think it’s important to you. 

Do you think it’s important? 

Mr. PANETTA. Absolutely. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. Now, this may be unfair at this time but 

let me ask it anyway. What in your opinion were the causes of the 

intelligence failure regarding the Iraqi WMD and do you believe 

this could occur again and why and why not? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, obviously, I mean, this Committee did a full 

study into the issue and provided that report. I’ve looked at some 

132 

of the summaries that were involved there and there were several 

problem areas that developed. Obviously, one was that we did not 

have sufficient sources of information within that country to be 

able to verify that there were in fact weapons of mass destruction. 

And so a lot of this is the result of not having adequate resources, 

not having adequate assets within the country to help verify that 

kind of information. 

Secondly, we relied on sources that were questionable in terms 

of saying that it was present. The questionability of those sources 

was not really brought to the attention of the people that should 

have known that. And thirdly, I think there was a kind of groupthink, in which everybody basically assumed that those weapons 

were there, that Saddam Hussein had used those weapons and 

therefore he must have them at the present time and frankly his 

behavior conveyed the impression that somehow he continued to 

maintain them. 

Now, I think it’s the result of all of that produced the NIE that 

said, essentially, that he had all of these weapons of mass destruction. It is a great learning lesson as to how you should not do intelligence. The problem is that sometimes when policymakers are trying to make decisions and move to a certain conclusion that people 

who are involved in intelligence will try to respond to what policy 

makers want to hear rather than the truth. And I think that’s 

what took place. 

Senator HATCH. While the DNI is specifically a named participant, the CIA Director is not specifically named as a member of the 

review team created by Executive Order that will consider the status of Guantanamo Bay detainees. 

Do you expect to play, either personally or through personnel of 

the CIA, any role in the disposition of these detainees? And let me 

just add a couple other questions to that. 

If criminal trials are initiated, either in the federal district courts 

or in U.S. military courts, what issues are there and what procedures should apply to take into account the need of the CIA to protect its sources and methods? That’s an important question. 

And finally, what criteria do you believe should be used to determine whether a detainee is tried, held indefinitely pursuant to a 

procedure other than trial or returned to another country or released? Sorry to add all those questions, but I think they go together. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Senator. Obviously, there is established, under the Executive Order, a review process to go through 

the very questions that you’ve raised and to determine which individuals can be brought to trial, which ones ought to be transferred 

to other countries, and which ones ought to be held indefinitely. 

The reality is that, as Director of the CIA, I think I’ll have to play 

a role because there’s information involved here that involves our 

assets, that involves individuals and sources that were involved in 

the arrest of many of these individuals. 

And so I hope to participate in that process, to provide that kind 

of information. Obviously, if there are situations where the information would reveal important sources or information that could 

jeopardize lives, then it would seem to me that the Attorney General and others who are going to make the final decisions need to 

133 

be aware of that, because that could impact on whether or not 

these individuals are tried. 

There are going to be a group of individuals that I think all of 

us recognize will not be able to be tried for those reasons and probably ought not to be transferred because they remain dangerous. 

And it is that situation that I think we probably all need to focus 

on, because if we are going to maintain those individuals and keep 

them in prison, the reality is we probably ought to establish at 

least some kind of reporting mechanism with the federal courts to 

ensure that there is at least some mechanism to make the courts 

aware of why we are continuing to hold these individuals. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch. 

We are joined by Senator Nelson. As you know, Mr. Panetta, he 

is one of the crossover members between Armed Services and Intelligence, and we’re delighted to have him. This is his first round, so 

if you require a little bit more time, just say so. Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Well, if I took any more time, it would certainly 

upset Senator Rockefeller, who—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You don’t want to do that. 

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Who likes to cut me off. [Laughter.] 

But I’m accustomed to operating within those constraints. I just 

want to say that, as your name came up and the fact that the first 

questions arose, does Leon have any experience in this area, my response—and I think most of our responses—is that anybody who 

has been chief of staff in the White House is capable of handling 

any position in the government of the United States. And that, especially since you have had the wisdom, as you announced yesterday, to keep a real professional like Steve Kappes as the deputy. 

I think it’s a great team. One area that has not been covered is 

that there was some question in the past as to whether or not a 

message was sent of questioning or intimidation of the Inspector 

General of the CIA for that IG to do the aggressive job that an IG 

ought to do. We’ve seen that in some other agencies in the last 

eight years, and I’d like for you, just for the record, to say how 

you’re going to handle your Inspector General. 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I’m a believer in inspectors general. I was in 

the Congress when the inspector general law was passed. I really 

do believe you have to maintain a person who’s independent, who 

can investigate matters within the various departments and agencies. And I believe that having an IG at the CIA is extremely important for those very reasons. 

And from my point of view, I expect the IG to perform independently, to be objective, to do the investigations that have to be done 

and to arrive at those conclusions without any interference from 

the Director or from people within the Agency. You need to have 

independent judgments that are made by the IG. And, if I’m confirmed, that will be the case with regards to my IG. 

Senator NELSON. Just in conclusion, Madam Chairman, I just 

want to say that the privilege that I’ve had on this Committee and 

traveling on a good part of the globe and meeting the young people 

that are going into the CIA, I am mightily impressed. And as the 

134 

Director-designate indicated yesterday, so much of the success of 

his agency will be in human intelligence. And these young people 

that we have on the ground all over the globe are just exceptional. 

So I’m very optimistic. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Good morning, Director-designate Panetta. 

Mr. PANETTA. Good morning, Senator. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. This may have been discussed somewhat 

this morning already, but I wasn’t here so how am I to know? I 

think, from my point of view, it’s indisputable that the Bush Administration changed the United States interrogation and detention policies after 9/11. They used the fear of attack, John Yoo, neocon cabal—I mean, you can mix whatever you want into it—but 

there was no question, you know, this man can no longer do us any 

justice. These kind of public statements indicate carrying something further. 

So I have disagreed strongly with the direction of the administration. But let me ask you this. Do you think that the Bush Administration ordered any renditions for any other reasons than because 

they thought, rightly or wrongly, that it would help secure our 

country? 

Mr. PANETTA. No, I don’t question the sincerity of the Bush Administration in trying to make decisions that they thought would 

protect the security of this country. I think they made some wrong 

decisions; I think they made mistakes. But I don’t question the sincerity of how they approached that issue. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. So that you think that sometimes the 

government can get off track in doing things that are counterproductive, even if they intend for those things to be—— 

Mr. PANETTA. I think sometimes they believed that the ends justified the means, and I think that’s where people sometimes go 

wrong. But I don’t question that their ends were what they thought 

was in the security interest of this country. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Do you think that the Bush administration got off track, for whatever motivation, maybe a good motivation, or not, on rendition policies? 

Mr. PANETTA. I think what happens is that, obviously, in the concern about—particularly after 9/11—the concern of what happened 

to the country, the concern that perhaps we might suffer another 

attack, that in that mode that followed, in which there was a great 

deal of consternation about what could happen next, that it’s at 

that point that you have to kind of stop and say, wait a minute, 

how do we approach this to ensure that we don’t violate the Constitution and we don’t violate the laws that are out there? 

And I think, to some extent, in that situation, the mood—and I 

can imagine this within the Oval Office, having been there—that 

the mood is, we have to do whatever’s necessary and take whatever 

steps we can, and that we can’t be bothered with legalisms. And 

I think it’s that kind of thinking process that probably took place. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. All right. Let’s go on. We’ve got more 

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ken about that, you know, that there are some bad apples in there, 

but these are good people. Many of them are American citizens. 

Their income, actually, is higher—average income is higher than 

the non–Muslim American income, because they’re very, very successful in what they do and work very hard. Do you think that they 

believe the United States at least enabled the torture of Muslim 

detainees and, at worst, participated in torture? Do you think that 

would be their view? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, it’s always dangerous to draw broad conclusions about how a group of people feel. I mean, I am sure there are 

those that think that was the case. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. And do you think that affects our 

counterterrorism policies—the effectiveness of them, implementing 

them? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I don’t think there’s any question but that 

the approaches that were taken, the decisions that were made as 

to how we treat individuals has a serious downside in terms of 

causing damage to the moral authority of this country around the 

world. Our greatest weapon is our moral authority and our stature 

and the view that we always abide by the Constitution, and I think 

the sense that we were willing to set that aside, I think, did damage our security. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Madam Chairman, I’ll just ask to finish 

with a statement. Don’t you think it’s important, therefore, that if 

there are ambiguities, let’s say if there’s an incident and then they 

tighten up, they want to hunker down in the national security, but 

on the other hand, if they have, let’s say, sort of what they call a 

unitary form of government—that there’s really only one branch of 

government that counts—that we go to particular lengths, and that 

you might go to particular lengths, working with the White House 

to make sure that what is begun in the way of unusual methods 

is shared a little bit more easily with the Intelligence Committee, 

or a little more early with the Intelligence Committee than five 

years later? 

Mr. PANETTA. I think the best way to ensure that those kinds of 

mistakes are not made is to rely on the process, our democratic 

process. A, that involves, within the White House and within the 

Administration, people who are willing to stand up and speak what 

they believe, that they’re willing to say wait a minute, a serious 

mistake is being made here. I mean, that’s not easy. I’ve been 

there; I know what it’s like. People like to tell the President what 

he likes to hear. 

You have to have people who are willing to stand up and say this 

is a mistake. And frankly, if they feel strongly enough about it, 

they ought to quit to make that point. In addition to that, the other 

part of it is the ability to speak to members of this Committee, who 

have a lot of experience, who have a lot of dedication to what this 

country is all about, and to have your input in that process. I 

mean, it makes a difference if, you know, the Vice Chairman or the 

Chairman go to the President of the United States and say wait 

a minute, you know, we’ve just been notified about this; this is 

wrong. 

It makes a President stop and think about what’s going to happen. Those are the checks and balances in the democratic process. 

136 

And when you avoid those checks and balances, that’s when we get 

in trouble. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. And notification is at the heart of that? 

Mr. PANETTA. Absolutely. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Chair and I thank the Chairman for patience. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. We’ll begin another 

round. 

Mr. Panetta, sometime in late 2006, I had a call from Al Gore 

who asked me if I would take a look at a program. The program 

was MEDEA. And I said I would and I had a meeting in February 

of 2007. I received the classified and the unclassified documents. I 

looked at them and what I found was that a program had been instituted where a very distinguished scientific panel was put together and certain assets were used to map climate change. 

And as I looked at some of the mapping that was done, I found 

it to be very precise and very interesting, because it had a national 

security nexus. And it became a kind of ongoing compendium of 

what was happening in the world. Now, it has had people that are 

not very enthusiastic about it, to be very candid, within the Agency. We put it back into the intelligence budget, and I’d like to ask 

that you take a good look at both the classified and unclassified 

documents and, hopefully, support this program to its fullest. 

Nothing can track climate change quite like the CIA’s assets can. 

And if you do this over a period of years, even decades, I think 

we’re going to get very, very useful and lifesaving information from 

it. So I am a big supporter of it. 

Mr. PANETTA. Madam Chairman, the former Vice President gave 

me a call on this very issue and indicated his concern, having put 

this in place. And I know that you have exercised leadership on 

this issue to try to maintain that program. You know, my view is 

that we need to seek out important intelligence in many different 

ways in order to determine what the impact is going to be in terms 

of the security of this world. 

For example, I think, on the economic side, we need to look at 

the impact of a worldwide recession in terms of the stability of 

countries like China and others and what the impact will be in 

terms of our own security. 

The same thing is true with regards to climate change issues. We 

need to know if there are countries that are going through 

droughts—serious droughts—if there are sea-rise impacts on ports 

and facilities. We need to know that. We need to know what’s happening in the world as a result of that. And I think that’s an important aspect of gathering intelligence in a broad range of areas 

in order to get the best information possible. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Now, a couple of quick questions. You know our concern about 

not being notified about people being taken from the field because 

of unacceptable activities. And I would like your commitment that 

the new Congressional relations person for the department carry 

out the National Security Act fully in terms of notifying this Committee, in writing, of bad events. The good takes care of themselves; the bad do not. And may I have that commitment, please? 

Mr. PANETTA. Absolutely. 

137 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And will you do this as a first order of 

business? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I will. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I appreciate it very much. I have watched 

a situation—and I agree with what Senator Nelson said; people in 

the CIA are, in the main, very good. They care a lot about the 

country. They work very hard. They put themselves in great personal danger. And it’s a very difficult job. 

But I have seen occasions where the Agency has engaged in poor 

analytic tradecraft—we’ve been through that—poor use of taxpayer 

dollars, unbecoming conduct overseas and even applying incorrect 

legal standards to CIA operations. 

And they’ve had no adverse affect on their career. As a matter 

of fact, some of them have even been promoted. How do you intend 

to hold people accountable for failures in carrying out what are, in 

fact, official duties? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I’m a strong believer in ensuring good discipline within any operation, but particularly within the CIA, I 

think, it’s very important that people behave according to a certain 

standard, because these are individuals that are out there. They’re 

in difficult positions. They have to serve in difficult places and they 

have a difficult mission to implement. 

We have to rely on their good character. We have to rely on their 

commitment to a standard of behavior that will ensure that the difficult job they do will not result in the kind of accusations and misbehavior that can damage the agency. I want to get that message 

across to the employees. 

I believe as you do that a large majority of individuals associated 

with the CIA are good people trying to do the right kind of job. But 

one bad apple can hurt. And so my view will be that, if I find that 

kind of misbehavior, I’m going to take action to make sure that 

those kinds of individuals are either withdrawn or terminated from 

their position. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and 

Mr. Panetta. 

We certainly agree on accountability, and the chair and I are 

working together to make sure we operate on a bipartisan basis, 

that our majority and minority staffs work together. And we also 

have to have open channels of communication with the intelligence 

community. 

You may have already said it, but for the record, will you cooperate with the members of the Committee, Democrat and Republican, 

the chiefs of staff of the majority and the minority, responding 

promptly to any written or oral inquiries, sharing information as 

soon as it is available, directing your staff to do the same? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Vice Chairman BOND. You’ve heard several examples where 

that’s not happened. And we also want to set a new tone of bipartisanship on the Committee and assure accountability. And not just 

for you, but of our own operations as well. If we expect you to keep 

your house, then we expect you to help us. And information has 

138 

come to us that there may be problems in our own house. We have 

had to find that out by the back door, not having been fully briefed. 

Therefore, would you agree to brief this Committee on any investigations or inquiries that you become aware of concerning leaks or 

security violations by Congressional staff both from the House and 

Senate? That would come in the form of criminal referrals through 

the Department of Justice or your own efforts and any subsequent 

result, findings, and/or damage assessments? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I would. 

Vice Chairman BOND. As I said, we’ve learned about some of 

these by our own investigative work. And we’ll find out about it at 

some point, but we expect you, when you are confirmed, as I’m sure 

you will be, to take the lead and let us know. If we’ve got a problem, we’ve got to fix it. So we will count on you so we won’t have 

to ask the question, but you will come forward with it. 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, we are dealing with very sensitive issues, 

and sensitive intelligence, and lives are on the line. And I think 

when people misbehave and reveal those kinds of leak information 

that could impact and jeopardize lives, that’s a serious matter. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I couldn’t agree more. And now, as we discussed yesterday, in order for the intelligence community to function as we’ve directed, the DNI must be the top intelligence adviser 

for the President. I think that’s in the law. And will you ensure 

that any personal or professional relationship you may have with 

the White House takes a back seat, and the DNI, Director Blair, 

is the President’s intelligence adviser? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. I know it’s not going to be easy. That’s 

why I want you to—I want you to try. 

Mr. PANETTA. You know what, I’ve spent my share of time in the 

Oval Office. That’s not a big deal for me. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Okay. 

Mr. PANETTA. I’m fully prepared to allow the DNI to do that. And 

when the President wants me to be there, I’ll be there. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Further clarification on a question you answered yesterday about the use of contractors. Given the fact that 

high value detainees are very infrequently questioned, and that experienced interrogators in such sensitive matters may not be on the 

CIA payroll, and you will have to inform yourself fully of that if 

you’ve not. You mentioned yesterday a lack of language skill. Do 

you believe there should be a complete ban on using properly 

trained contractors under full CIA supervision for this purpose? 

Mr. PANETTA. No, I wouldn’t support a complete ban because 

there are going to be instances where you may have to get a certain language ability or a certain capability that isn’t in-house. And 

if you’ve got to question somebody you’re going to have to get somebody who has that capability. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Under the strong supervision of CIA? 

Mr. PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Vice Chairman BOND. On the detainees, Senators Roberts and 

Brownback and I have introduced legislation requiring Congress to 

be notified 90 days before any action is taken to close Guantanamo 

Bay and transfer detainees to the United States with a comprehenVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:45 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 052741 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\52741.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
139 

sive study addressing the feasibility of closing Gitmo, including the 

legal ramifications of transferring detainees to the United States. 

Do you agree that Congress should be notified and provided with 

a full plan in advance of action taken to close Guantanamo and dispose of these detainees? 

Mr. PANETTA. Obviously, there is this review process that’s going 

on, and I would think that it would be very important to notify 

Congress as to what conclusions are arrived at, and be able to seek 

your guidance and consult in that process. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair, I have another line of questioning that’s going to go rather long, so I will—well, I’ve already 

gone over my time anyhow. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I will wait until the next round. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right, thank you. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 

I just want you to know that I feel very deeply as—your importance, and—and I respect your willingness to serve after all these 

years you’ve been back here, after all the pain you went through 

in the past in the Oval Office as well as probably even worse up 

here in the Congress. But I appreciate you, I always have. And I’m 

proud to support you. 

But let me just ask you just one or two more questions. Correct 

me if I’m wrong on this, but if I recall, you’ve indicated that the 

CIA and the intelligence community may have a role with regard 

to globalization issues. What do you mean by that? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, you’re talking about the economic area. I just 

think that what we’re seeing happen as a result of this economic 

recession that’s impacting across the world that we just need to be 

aware of what the implications of that are in terms of the stability 

of the world. 

I mean, the best example of that obviously is China, and what 

could happen if they fall below a certain growth level, and what 

kind of stability problems might develop as a result of that. I just 

think we need to have the capacity to be able to gather that kind 

of intelligence and make sure that policymakers are aware of 

what—— 

Senator HATCH. Do you consider that part of what the CIA’s role 

is in obtaining intelligence, in obtaining secrets that—some say 

stealing secrets. 

Mr. PANETTA. It’s all of that. 

Senator HATCH. I didn’t really want to say that, but there is 

something to it. 

Just one last question. In your responses to the Committee’s prehearing questions, you stated that the CIA Director can achieve 

sufficient independence from political considerations by ensuring 

that there’s a system in place to produce clear, objective, unbiased, 

timely and complete analysis responsive to the President’s needs. 

Do you believe that the CIA has not been producing clear, objective and unbiased analysis? I just wondered what you feel, because 

you could go either way on that, and frankly, I’d probably go one 

way more than on the other. 

140 

And in your opinion what safeguards would be included in the 

system you describe? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, you know, obviously, I guess we all have 

to draw our own conclusions about what happened with regard to 

how intelligence was presented to the President of the United 

States, and whether or not it was intelligence that the President 

and others wanted to hear, or whether it really revealed the truth. 

Having been in the Oval Office, I understand that if you walk 

into the Oval Office, you’re dealing with the President of the 

United States. The tendency is not to confront the President, but 

hopefully to try to tell the President what he likes to hear because 

you don’t want to offend him. You’re in the Oval Office. It has an 

intimidating impact on people that walk into that office; I’ve seen 

that happen. 

But, at the same time, I think the President is badly served if 

he does not have individuals, not only within the White House staff 

but in agencies like the CIA, that are not willing to walk into the 

Oval Office and tell him the bad news, tell him what he may not 

want to hear. That’s the role of having a CIA present the very best 

intelligence that has to be presented to the President. And it may 

often conflict with what the President wants to do. It may often 

conflict with what policymakers may want to do. It may often conflict with what the Joint Chiefs of Staff want to do. But the purpose of the CIA is to present that kind of information. And I think 

we violate certainly a commitment to presenting objective, independent intelligence if you only tell people what they want to hear. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you. You know, there have been a plethora of books written about the CIA, many of them highly critical. 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator HATCH. Which I agree with, and a lot of which I think 

is overstated. But this is a very complex important position. And 

my caution to you is, you have tremendous academic credentials. 

You have great administrative credentials, good Congressional credentials. But you haven’t had a lot of experience in this area. It’s 

a very complex, very difficult area, as we all know. But if anybody 

can handle it, I personally believe you can. And I’m just personally 

grateful you are willing to take on this job. 

I just hope that you will continue to help us here on this Committee to do our job. We have a very limited amount of time to 

spend on these things compared to the CIA Director and others at 

the CIA. So we need your help, and we hope you’ll give it. And I 

know you will, having had lots of experience with you in the past. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you for your service. 

Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch. 

We are joined by the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, also, the second crossover member of this Committee. And 

I’d like to recognize him. Senator, take the time that you need, because you missed a couple of rounds. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. 

Welcome again, Mr. Panetta. Yesterday you said that when you 

get to the Agency, which we look forward to, that you’re going to 

be looking at the interrogation tactics which have been used and 

141 

whether those tactics yielded valuable information or misinformation, and whether damage done as a result of the use of those tactics might have counterbalanced whatever information was received. And that’s fair enough and we think it would be valuable 

for you to do that. 

But I think it’s important that you broaden your inquiry when 

you look at what you call counterbalancing. I want to ask you 

whether you’re willing to look at some other aspects of this issue 

that should go on that scale. 

First, Alberto Mora, who is the former general counsel of the 

Navy, has pointed out that the tactics which were used damaged 

our national security down at the tactical or operational level in a 

number of ways. And he cited a number of examples. 

First he said there are U.S. flag rank officers serving now who 

maintain that the first and second identifiable causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq, as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighter into combat against them are, respectively, the 

symbols of Abu Ghurayb and Guantanamo. 

Now, so we have flag officers who are commanders who are saying that those symbols are the major cause of U.S. combat deaths 

because they helped to recruit people to come to war and to attack 

us. Will you take a look at that testimony and those statements of 

those commanders as part of your review? Because if you are looking to see at the balance, did we get any useful information, and 

is it counterbalanced by the—I think as you phrased it yesterday— 

the damage to our country, will you specifically take a look at that, 

what I just mentioned? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. I think any review process that looks at those 

kinds of interrogation techniques and the value of whatever information was brought has to consider the downside, and you have 

just pointed out part of that downside. 

Senator LEVIN. All right, let me give you some more downsides, 

which I’ll ask you if you’re going to take a look when you’re looking 

at the overall scale here. Allied nations, according to Mr. Mora, 

have hesitated on occasion to participate in combat operations if 

there was a possibility that as a result individuals captured during 

the operation could be abused by U.S. or other forces. Are you willing to take a look at that downside? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Third, allied nations have refused on occasion to 

train with us in joint detainee capture and handling operations because of concerns about U.S. detainee policies. Will you take a look 

at that downside? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Fourth, senior NATO officers in Afghanistan 

have been reported to have left the room when issues of detainee 

treatment have been raised by U.S. officials out of a fear that they 

may be complicit in detainee abuse. Will you add that to your list? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Will you also take a look at some of these other 

factors? When I visited our troops in Afghanistan, I spoke to one 

of our senior intelligence officers who told me that treating detainees harshly is an impediment, it’s actually a road block—to use 

that officer’s words—to getting useful intelligence from them. 

142 

Now this can happen in a number of ways. One of the ways this 

could happen—and there is testimony to this effect that we had at 

our hearings on torture at the Armed Services Committee—one of 

the reasons this could happen is that you actually can increase the 

resistance on the part of a detainee to cooperate, because if you 

mistreat him or abuse him or torture him, that can reinforce the 

idea that’s been placed in his head that he will be tortured, and 

instead of treating that person humanely, which can break down 

that previous training that he’s going to be tortured, it reinforces 

that previous training and makes it less likely that we would be 

getting information from him. 

Now this is testimony from our people. Will you add that to your 

list of downsides from the use of these tactics? 

Next, we have testimony and there’s a great deal of it, that when 

you mistreat or torture people, that they will say anything to end 

the torture, particularly with waterboarding as an example. And 

when they say anything, that means that they will give you false 

information which can then be the basis of your taking action 

which can, because it’s based on false information, actually cost 

lives and create injuries as a result of acting on the false information which is obtained when people will say anything or do anything to end being tortured. 

Can you put that on your list? 

Mr. PANETTA. Yes, I will. 

Senator LEVIN. By the way, we have examples of that, or may 

be examples—I’ve got to be careful here. We don’t know why a man 

named al–Libi gave us false information. We’re not sure of that. 

But we do know he gave us false information, saying that first 

hand information that the Iraqis had trained al-Qa’ida in the use 

of poison gases. That was used as one of the major reasons, the 

linkages alleged between Iraq and the people who attacked us for 

our going to war. False information, part of the reasons used for 

going to war. So that becomes—and again, I’m not saying and I 

don’t know that was the result of torture, but we do know it was 

false information, and that torture produces false information. 

So I welcome what you’re going to do. I think it’s important, your 

review of the use of the techniques and the tactics, and to see 

whether or not the information which may have been produced by 

the use of abusive tactics counterbalanced the downsides, as you 

just put it. But I think it’s important that you broaden this view. 

You could look at broadening on both sides of the equation. If 

there’s anything on the upside, I don’t know of it. But if there is 

any, throw that on the balance as well. 

But sometimes it’s much too narrow a view taken of the 

downsides of torture. We hear a lot, and properly so, about what 

we stand for as a country, and how we are injured when that perception of us is changed to a negative perception, how it makes it 

more difficult to win allies in the war on terror when we are perceived as engaging in inhumane treatment ourselves. And those 

are important points, and I’ve made them many times. 

But specifically here, because you’re going to get into this area 

when you are confirmed, I think it’s important that you take a look 

at the vast number of downsides to our security and how we are 

harmed, and how these abusive practices cost us lives. The arguVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:45 Dec 01, 2009 Jkt 052741 PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\52741.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
143 

ment is made, they can save lives. Take a look at that, see if it’s 

valid. But take a look at all of these downsides that exist. 

And one further one. Just the other day when the prosecution of 

somebody had to be dropped because we had engaged in abusive 

tactics against that person, you know, if we lose the ability to prosecute terrorists because of our treatment of them, we surely are 

weakening our own security. And this seems to be evident by the 

acknowledgment by the convening authority of the military commissions, Judge Crawford who said the charges against al–Kitani 

could not proceed because she had determined that he had been 

tortured. So these are—putting aside all the moral issues, the 

endangerment to our own troops if and when they’re captured, 

when we engage in these practices, there are significant threats to 

our own wellbeing and security when we engage in these practices. 

And we look forward not just to your review, which you yesterday talked about, but also then, as you also committed to do, to 

keeping this Committee informed of that review. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. PANETTA. I appreciate all of your comments. This is obviously an important area to review. I think, when it comes to interrogation, everybody, going back to my days as an intelligence officer, everybody kind of had their own views as to what was the 

most effective way to draw information. 

But I think in particular today, considering the situation we face 

in the world, we had better develop those kinds of techniques that 

produce the best kind of information and don’t provide the kind of 

down sides that you pointed out. And hopefully the review process 

that I will conduct will look at all of these aspects. 

Senator LEVIN. I believe you yesterday said that in any event, 

whatever this review produces, that you will not condone or authorize illegal conduct by CIA personnel or contractors. 

Mr. PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator LEVIN. Did I hear you correctly? 

Mr. PANETTA. That’s correct. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Madam Chairman, thank you so 

much. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

I believe we’re winding down, Mr. Panetta. There’s likely to be 

votes at 11:30. I’d like to, just for a moment, follow up on what 

Senator Levin said, and then I think the Ranking Member and perhaps Senator Rockefeller has a question. 

I feel very strongly about not using contractors for interrogation. 

I have studied the matter. I think there are real problems. Bob 

Mueller pulled his people out in 2002, and I think it was because 

of what they witnessed going on. I believe that any contract with 

a contractor to do interrogation should be severed. 

I think the concept of,‘‘Well, the government will distance itself 

from the person doing interrogation’’ is wrong. The military does 

their own interrogation. The FBI does their own interrogation. And 

I believe it was FBI interrogators in the 1993 World Trade bombings that got a number of convictions without torture. And an FBI 

interrogator that interrogated Saddam Hussein was able to get a 

death penalty sentence, again, without torture. 

144 

And, I mean, I’ve reached the point where this is a fundamental 

question of credibility, because it is a distancing of responsibility 

from the actions taken in the interrogation process. I really want 

your assurance that you will sever these contracts. 

Mr. PANETTA. You have my assurance that, you know, I want to 

obviously go in and look at the situation and determine what’s happening. But my approach is going to be to—as I said, I think these 

kinds of responsibilities ought to be brought in-house, particularly 

with regards to questioning and interrogation. And so my approach 

will be that this ought not to be areas that are contracted out and 

in which we allow others to do the job that we’re responsible for. 

As I indicated to the Vice Chair, there may be some situations— 

once we’ve gotten rid of these contractors, there may be some situations where we have to rely on a particular ability. But if that’s to 

happen, it has to happen under clear supervision of the CIA. And 

frankly, I think we ought to inform this Committee if, in fact, we 

need to do that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I believe you should as well. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. Vice Chairman, do you have a comment? 

Vice Chairman BOND. Yes, Madam Chair. I’ve got about two or 

three rounds of questioning and a comment. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, we’re not going to do two or three. 

Perhaps you can submit questions after—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. If there are further questions that Senator 

Rockefeller has, I’ll be happy to yield to him. I can finish this up 

very quickly. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Good. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And I will have some further questions for 

the record. 

But just for the record, Mr. Panetta, in December we were at the 

facility, the military facility in Afghanistan, and they found that 

two-thirds of their interrogators are contract employees operating 

under the close supervision of U.S. military officials. And they did 

so because those were the only, the contractors were the only people who had the ability. So your answer to my original question 

was correct. There are instances where you must use them. And we 

will leave it to the Armed Services Committee to look into the use 

of contractors there. 

I want to pursue a line of questions that Senator Coburn brought 

up yesterday regarding former Director John Deutch. It’s been reported that, as chief of staff in 1995, you backed the nomination 

of John Deutch as Director of Central Intelligence. Is that correct? 

Did you support—— 

Mr. PANETTA. I was chief of staff, and I think personnel actually 

made the recommendations, and I conveyed those to the President, 

and the President makes that choice. 

Vice Chairman BOND. All right. As we found out after he left office, his actions while serving both as Deputy Secretary of Defense 

and the DCI caused grave damage to our national security. In 

2000, the CIA’s Inspector General issued a report on Mr. Deutch’s 

improper handling of classified information. This report noted, 

‘‘CIA records reflect that Deutch had problems before becoming Director with regard to the handling of classified information.’’ 

145 

Knowing more about the classified portion of that report, I can 

tell you that quote is just the tip of the iceberg. Much lies below 

the surface. In summary, the Inspector General found Mr. Deutch 

to be a known counterintelligence risk, yet he was allowed to serve 

in two positions, at DOD and as DCI, all three requiring confirmations. 

Neither the Armed Services Committee nor this Committee were 

made aware of the risks Mr. Deutch posed to our national security. 

And before he could be prosecuted, he was pardoned on President 

Clinton’s last day in office, as were Marc Rich and others. 

Can you tell me why, during the time you were chief of staff, if 

you had information on this, neither this Committee nor the Senate 

Armed Services Committee were informed that Mr. Deutch posed 

a counterintelligence risk that would have disqualified him from a 

position with access to our most sensitive information? 

Mr. PANETTA. Senator, I can assure you that as chief of staff I 

was not aware of any of that information. 

Vice Chairman BOND. With that potential security risk, would 

you think he would be an effective Director of the Agency? 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, as I said, at the time I was certainly not 

aware of any of that information. He did do his job over at the Department of Defense. And, you know, as far as we knew, he had 

all of the capabilities to go in as Director of the CIA. Obviously the 

things you pointed out that have taken place after that occurred, 

looking back on it, it raises legitimate concerns. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Did you at any time support or advocate 

a pardon for Mr. Deutch? 

Mr. PANETTA. No. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, I will ask you to review the IG report to see whether he should be holding a security clearance. 

Mr. PANETTA. Right. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Next, a staff statement to the joint inquiry 

into the terrorist attacks September 11 described some problems 

with the PDD–35 issued in 1995, which established a tier system 

for national security priorities. The staff statement noted that as 

certain threats, including terrorism, increased in the 1990s, none 

of the lower-level tier one priorities were downgraded so as to allow 

resources to be reallocated. The end result was that terrorism 

issues were set on a priority—remained on a priority with other existing priorities. Did you have any role in the issuance of PDD–35? 

Mr. PANETTA. No, I did not. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Were you aware of its existence when you 

were chief of staff? 

Mr. PANETTA. I don’t recollect that, Senator. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And you don’t recall whether you were 

briefed on that—— 

Mr. PANETTA. No. 

Vice Chairman BOND [continuing]. PDD–35. One of the primary 

criticisms of the pre–9/11 world is that terrorism was treated primarily as a law enforcement matter, where much of the focus was 

on arresting and prosecuting terrorists. Do you now believe that 

terrorism is a law enforcement matter? 

146 

Mr. PANETTA. I believe it’s a national security matter. And I 

think that those walls have come down, and they should come 

down, in terms of dealing with this threat. 

Vice Chairman BOND. All right. The recent Executive Order ensuring lawful interrogations currently allows no flexibility for interrogating terrorists using techniques outside the Army Field Manual. Have you been briefed by General Hayden on his view that interrogation techniques listed in the Army Field Manual or in other 

media are not and will not be effective in obtaining critical information from well-informed, hardened and bright HVTs who have 

access to a description of these techniques? 

Mr. PANETTA. I have not. Again, there is a review process that’s 

built into that Executive Order that I am going to be a part of that 

will look at those kinds of enhanced techniques to determine how 

effective they were or weren’t and whether any appropriate revisions need to be made as a result of that. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I would hope you would. And I would ask 

you, do you believe the President has the authority to expand upon 

and supplement this order for the use of lawful techniques, lawful 

techniques, similar to but different from the EITs that are authorized in the Army Field Manual? 

Mr. PANETTA. As I pointed out yesterday, Article II provides a 

great deal of power to the President of the United States. But I believe that whatever power he can exert under Article II still is limited by the laws passed by the Congress. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And by treaties and the Constitution. 

Mr. PANETTA. And by treaties and by other—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. And I think we’re all in agreement with 

that. But I would ask you to pay very careful attention to that and 

report back on your findings. 

Mr. PANETTA. Right. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And I will submit several other questions 

based on general operations. And I would ask, finally, do you think 

Congress should legislate in the area of interrogation techniques, 

or is this something that must be handled by the executive with 

full briefing, using the Article II authority, carrying out the full 

briefing required by the Intelligence Committee? 

Mr. PANETTA. I would hope—the preferred way to do that is to 

be able to have the Executive branch implement the approaches, 

but with full consultation with the members of this Committee so 

that Congress is fully aware of what approaches are being used 

and should be used. 

Vice Chairman BOND. We would expect a full briefing. And we 

appreciate very much your answers. 

Madam Chair, I think I’ll just give him a few more questions—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. How about in writing? 

Vice Chairman BOND [continuing]. For the record. I will do it. 

And when you give us the notifications that we asked about, this 

business of calling up a member of the staff, one of the staff directors, and saying, ‘‘Here’s some information,’’ and when they asked 

for it writing, said, ‘‘Oh, we can’t do that,’’ that day has come to 

a close. 

Mr. PANETTA. It has. 

147 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Most of all, I thank Mr. Panetta for taking on a very difficult job. 

As you have seen, we follow the work of the community very 

closely. We want to work with you, because your success and the 

success of the great men and women you will be leading is absolutely critical to our national security. So I thank you, Mr. Panetta, 

for being willing to get back into the ring. You deserve a lot of credit. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I also would like to thank you and look forward to your service. We will keep the record open. Hopefully the 

questions will be in by 5:00 tonight, and hopefully you will be able 

to answer them over the weekend. It is my intention—I believe 

we’re having three meetings next week—to schedule a markup at 

one of them. 

So at this time the hearing will be adjourned. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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