12-15-00215-CR, 12-15-00217-CR, & 12-15-00218-CR

IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

JACOB LEE ROPER

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee

On Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. 114-0321-15, 114-0320-15, & 114-0322-15

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

Austin Reeve Jackson

Texas Bar No. 24046139

112 East Line, Suite 310

Tyler, TX 75702

Telephone: (903) 595-6070

Facsimile: (866) 387-0152

ACCEPTED

12-15-00215-CR

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

11/3/2015 10:05:14 AM

Pam Estes

CLERK

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 11/3/2015 10:05:14 AM PAM ESTES Clerk
ii

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Attorney for Appellant

Appellate Counsel:

Austin Reeve Jackson

112 East Line, Suite 310

Tyler, TX 75702

Trial Counsel:

Curt Ellis

120 S. Broadway Ave.

Suite 112

Tyler, TX 75702

Attorney for the State on Appeal 

Michael J. West

Assistant District Attorney, Smith County

4th Floor, Courthouse

100 North Broadway

Tyler, TX 75702
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL................................................................. ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................. iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................2

ISSUES PRESENTED ....................................................................................................2

STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................................3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT..............................................................................3

ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................4

I. JURISDICTION..............................................................................................4

II. WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY....................................................................5

III. APPELLANT'S PLEA....................................................................................6

IV. APPELLANT'S STIPULATION...................................................................7

V. PUNISHMENT................................................................................................8

VI. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL...............................................9

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER...................................................................................10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................................................11

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL....................................................................................12

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................12
iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:

Anders v. California, 

 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) ................................... 3, 10, 12

Brady v. Alabama, 

 397 U.S. 742, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (1970) ................................... 6

Strickland v. Washington, 

 466 U.S. 668, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1984) ................................. 9, 10

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

Barfield v. State, 

 63 S.W.3d 446 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).......................................................... 7-8

Eatmon v. State, 

 768 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989)........................................................ 6

Ex parte Sadberry,

 864 S.W.2d 541 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)........................................................ 5

Ganious v. State, 

 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969) ........................................................ 2

Hernandez v. State, 

 988 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) .......................................................... 9

Johnson v. State, 

 614 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981)........................................................ 10

Johnson v. State, 

 72 S.W.3d 346 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) .......................................................... 6

Martinez v. State,

 981 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) ........................................................ 7
v

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (CON’T):

McKenna v. State, 

 493 S.W.2d 514 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972)........................................................ 8

Monreal v. State, 

 99 S.W.3d 615 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) .......................................................... 4

Moore v. State, 

 694 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985)........................................................ 9-10

Miniel v. State, 

 831 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)........................................................ 10

Murray v. State, 

 302 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009)........................................................ 4

Rhodes v. State, 

 934 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)........................................................ 9

Stafford v. State, 

 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)........................................................ 10

Stone v. State, 

 919 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)........................................................ 8

Young v. State, 

 8 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)............................................................ 4

TEXAS COURTS OF APPEAL:

Brink v. State, 

 78 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001) .............................. 4

Castaneda v. State, 

 135 S.W.3d 719 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2003)................................................... 9

Edwards v. State, 

 921 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996)............................... 7
vi

TEXAS COURTS OF APPEAL (CON’T):

Guidry v. State, 

 177 S.W.3d 90 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005)................................. 4

Kirk v. State, 

 949 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1997)................................................... 9

Lord v. State, 

 63 S.W.3d 87 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 2001).......................................... 6, 8

Mays v. State,

 904 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995) ........................................... 3

STATUTES:

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.13...................................................................... 5

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15...................................................................... 7

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 4.05...................................................................... 4

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13.................................................................... 6

TEX. PEN. CODE § 29.03................................................................................... 4, 8

TEX. PEN. CODE § 30.02................................................................................... 4, 8

TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.32 ................................................................................... 8

TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.35 ................................................................................... 8

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2.......................................................................................... 4

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.......................................................................................... 9
12-15-00215-CR, 12-15-00217-CR, & 12-15-00218-CR

IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

JACOB LEE ROPER

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee

On Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. 114-0321-15, 114-0320-15, & 114-0322-15

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT:

COMES NOW, Austin Reeve Jackson, attorney for Jacob Roper, and files 

this brief pursuant to the TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, and would 

show the Court as follows:
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jacob Roper seeks to appeal his conviction and sentence for two aggravated 

robbery cases and one burglary of a building case. (I CR1 42; I CR2 45; I CR3 

39). Mr. Roper was indicted for these offenses in the 114th District Court of Smith 

County, Texas in March of this year and, in response, elected to enter an open plea 

of “guilty” in each case. (I CR1 1, 42; I CR2 7, 45; I CR3 1, 39). In August of this 

year Mr. Roper was sentenced by the trial court to serve a term of confinement in 

each case. (I CR1 42; I CR2 45; I CR3 39). Sentence was pronounced on 11

August and notice of appeal then timely filed. (I CR1 42, 50; I CR2 45, 55; I CR3

39, 47). 

ISSUES PRESENTED

Counsel has reviewed the appellate record in this cause and reluctantly 

concludes that as a matter of professional judgment the record contains no 

reversible error and no jurisdictional defects are present. Where counsel concludes 

that there are no arguable grounds for reversal, he is required to present a 

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable 

grounds to be advanced. Ganious v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969).
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the spring of 2015, Appellant, Mr. Jacob Roper, was indicted for three

felony offenses in the 114th District Court of Smith County: two aggravated 

robberies and one burglary of a building. (I CR1 1; I CR2 7; I CR3 1). To these

charges Mr. Roper elected to enter a plea of “guilty” without the benefit of a plea 

agreement. (I CR1 42; I CR2 45; I CR3 39). The trial court, after accepting the 

plea, found Mr. Roper guilty and pronounced sentence at a term of two years’ 

confinement in the burglary and forty years’ confinement in each of the robberies. 

(Id.). Sentence was pronounced on 11 August and notice of appeal then timely 

filed. (I CR1 42, 50; I CR2 45, 55; I CR3 39, 47). 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In accordance with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 

744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel has reviewed the record 

and determined that, in his professional opinion, the record contains no reversible 

error or jurisdictional defects. Under circumstances where there appears to be no 

arguable grounds for reversal on appeal, counsel is required to present a 

professional evaluation of the record supporting this assertion. See Mays v. State, 

904 S.W.2d 290, 922-23, (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). 
4

ARGUMENT

Mr. Roper entered a plea of “guilty” to the charged offenses. (I CR1 42; I 

CR2 45; I CR3 39). A valid guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to appeal a 

claim of error when the judgment of guilt was rendered independently of, and is 

not supported by, the alleged error. See Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 666-67 

(Tex.Crim.App. 2000), superseded in part by TEX. R. APP. PROC. 25.2(b) as stated 

in Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Thus, for a defendant 

to be successful on appeal he must be able to demonstrate a nexus between the 

alleged error and the judgment of guilt. Guidry v. State, 177 S.W.3d 90, 93 

(Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Brink v. State, 78 S.W.3d 478, 484 

(Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). 

I. JURISDICTION

As indicted, the offenses with which Mr. Roper was charged were felony 

offenses. TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 29.03 (robbery); 30.02 (burglary). Therefore, 

jurisdiction properly rested with the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas. 

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 4.05 (Vernon 2007) (stating that district courts 

shall have original jurisdiction in felony criminal cases); Murray v. State, 302 

S.W.2d 874, 877 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009). Additionally, because they alleged all of 

the essential elements of the offenses charged, the indictments returned in each

case provided Mr. Roper with sufficient notice of the offenses he was alleged to 
5

have committed. (I CR1 1; I CR2 7; I CR3 1). Consequently, no error regarding 

the trial court’s jurisdiction can be advanced.

II. WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY.

Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a

defendant may waive the right to trial by jury if that waiver is made in writing, 

joined by the State, and approved and accepted by the trial court. TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. art. 1.13 (Vernon 2007). A waiver meeting all of these statutory 

requirements was filed in each case currently before the Court. (I CR1 36; I CR2 

39; I CR3 33). 

Prior to accepting this waiver the trial court ensured that the waiver was 

freely and knowingly made by inquiring into whether Mr. Roper understood 

various rights and options available to him including the right to have the issues of 

guilt and punishment resolved by a jury, the right to make the State prove its case 

against him beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to call and cross-examine 

witnesses. (I RR 6-19). Additionally, the court ensured that at the time he made 

the waiver Mr. Roper was not under the influence of any controlled substance and 

had had sufficient time to consult with his attorney. (Id.). Ex parte Sadberry, 864 

S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). The record created as a result of the trial 

court’s investigation into these issues, coupled with its compliance with Article 

1.13, has resulted in appellate counsel’s inability to identify any non-frivolous 
6

error to be advanced on appeal regarding this issue. Johnson v. State, 72 S.W.3d 

346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). 

III. APPELLANT’S PLEA.

Like a waiver of the right to trial by jury, to have been validly made a 

defendant’s plea of “guilty” must be freely, knowingly, and intelligently made. 

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon 2007); Brady v. United 

States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (1970). Article 26.13 of 

the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the steps a trial court must take before 

accepting a plea in order to ensure that it is, in fact, being voluntarily made. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13. If a trial court substantially complies with 

these steps a prima facie case is established that the plea was validly entered. 

Eatmon v. State, 768 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). “Substantial 

compliance exists when the trial court has undertaken to admonish the defendant, 

the sentence given was within the range prescribed by law, and the defendant has 

failed to affirmatively show harm.” Lord v. State, 63 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex.App.—

Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). 

In this instance, the trial court substantially complied with Article 26.13. As 

noted, before accepting the pleas, the trial court admonished Mr. Roper as to the 

full range of punishment in each case, the right to remain silent, the right to trial by 

jury, and the consequences of waiving those rights. (I RR gen.). The court also
7

inquired as to whether Mr. Roper had had sufficient time to consult with counsel 

and whether he was being forced or coerced into entering his pleas. (I RR 6-19). 

At no time did Mr. Roper indicate that his plea was anything other than freely and 

knowingly made. (Id.). Additionally, Mr. Roper filed a series of written waivers 

and admonishments in each case that reflected the same topics and identical 

responses as those discussed between he and the court. (I CR1 32-38; I CR2 36-

41; I CR3 30-36).

Under such circumstances, counsel has been unable to make a non-frivolous 

argument that the presumption that there was no irregularity in the trial court’s 

acceptance of any of the pleas could be overcome. Edwards v. State, 921 S.W.2d 

477, 479 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.); See also Martinez v. 

State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).

IV. APPELLANT’S STIPULATION

Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State to 

introduce some evidence showing the guilt of the defendant in support of a guilty 

plea. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2007). After being offered and 

admitted without objection a stipulation of evidence and judicial confession 

embracing all of the essential elements of the offense and enhancements charged is 

sufficient to support the plea. See Barfield v. State, 63 S.W.3d 446, 450 
8

(Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 

1996).

The essential elements of the offense at issue are found in the Sections 29.03 

and 30.02 of the Penal Code. TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 29.03; 30.02; (I CR1 1; I CR2 7; 

I CR3 1). In support of his plea to each offense the State offered a signed 

“Stipulation of Evidence” in which Mr. Roper admitted the truth of all of the 

elements of the offenses charged. (I CR1 37-38; I CR2 40-41; I CR3 34-35).

These stipulations constitute a judicial confession to all of the essential 

elements of the offenses. McKenna v. State, 493 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex.Crim.App. 

1972). A judicial confession provides sufficient evidence to support the judgment. 

Lord, 63 S.W.3d at 92. Therefore, there was legally and factually sufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding of guilt.

V. PUNISHMENT.

As alleged, the offense of burglary is a state jail felony. TEX. PEN. CODE § 

30.02 (I CR1 1). The offense of aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. 

TEX. PEN. CODE § 29.03 (I CR2 7; I CR3 1). As a result, the applicable 

punishment range was up to two years’ confinement in the burglary and up to forty 

years’ in each robbery case. TEX. PEN. CODE § 12.32, 12.35. Mr. Roper was 

sentenced to serve the full two years for burglary and forty years in each robbery 

case. (I CR1 42; I CR2 45; I CR3 39). 
9

At the time that sentence was imposed no objection was raised as would be 

required in order to preserve any error for purposes of the direct appeal. See TEX.

R. APP. Proc. 33.1(a)(1); Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex.Crim.App. 

1996); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). 

However, even if an objection had been raised, a sentence within the statutory 

punishment range for the offense, as this sentence is, is presumptively not 

constitutionally cruel and unusual under these circumstances. Kirk v. State, 949 

S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d). 

Consequently, there exists no non-frivolous error to be advanced on the 

issue of punishment.

VI. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

Effective assistance of counsel is to be evaluated under the standard 

enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 

344 (1984); see also, Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

(1) that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that, but for trial 

counsel’s alleged errors, the result would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687-88. On appeal, the defendant carries the burden of proving ineffective 

assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. Moore v. State, 694 S.W.2d 528, 
10

531 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). Trial counsel’s performance is not to be judged with 

the benefit of hindsight. Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex.Crim.App. 

1992).

With the Strickland standard in mind, counsel has reviewed the record 

before the court and found no conduct that would rise to the level of rendering trial 

counsel’s assistance ineffective. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 148, 152 

(Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (holding that, on appeal, courts will not secondguess reasonable trial decisions). 

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

As counsel was unable to raise any arguable issues for appeal, he is required 

to move for leave to withdraw. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1991). 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, counsel prays that the Court, 

after affording Mr. Roper the opportunity to review the record and file a pro se

brief should he desire to do so, accept this brief and grant the attached Motion to 

Withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 

1396 (1967).
11

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Austin Reeve Jackson

Texas Bar No. 24046139

112 East Line, Suite 310

Tyler, TX 75702

Telephone: (903) 595-6070

Facsimile: (866) 387-0152

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of this brief was delivered to counsel for the 

State by e-file concurrently with its filing in the Court.

/s/ Austin Reeve Jackson
12

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

The attorney’s role as an advocate requires that I support my client’s appeal 

to the best of my ability. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738. I, Austin Reeve 

Jackson, counsel of record in this appeal, do hereby state that I have diligently 

searched the entire record in this cause. I have researched the law applicable to the 

facts and issues contained therein, and it is my professional opinion that the record 

reflects no reversible error. In conformity with the applicable law pertaining to an 

appeal of this nature, I have set forth any potential grounds of error and have 

briefed them to the extent possible. I have further caused a copy of this brief to be 

served by certified mail on Appellant, accompanied by a letter informing Appellant 

of the right to examine the record for the purpose of filing a pro se brief. 

/s/ Austin Reeve Jackson

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document complies with the requirements of Rule 9.4 and 

consists of 2,320 words.

/s/ Austin Reeve Jackson