alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Craig Burton, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form10-QSB of USIP.Com, Inc.;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this quarterly report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, andother financial information included in this quarterly  report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and Iare responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for theregistrant and have:

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is beingprepared;

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to thefiling date of this quarterly report (the “Evaluation Date”); and

 

c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on ourevaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and Ihave disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):

 

a) all significant deficiencies in the design oroperation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and haveidentified for the registrant’s auditors any material weaknesses in internalcontrols; and

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal controls; and

 

6. The registrant’s other certifying officers and Ihave indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were significantchanges in internal controls or in other factors that could significantlyaffect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation,including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses.

 
| Date: August 12, 2003 |                    |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
|                  |                    |
|                  | /s/ Craig Burton        |   |
|                  | Craig Burton, President |   |

 

----
No. 46506.

#### Protests 866252-G, etc., of Atlas Accordion Mfg. Co. et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
#### Chas. L. Huisking Co., Inc. *v.*United States

No. 6889.

Entry No. 765249.

-Invoice dated London, England, May 16, 1946.

Certified May 20, 1946.

Entered at New York, N. Y., June 3, 1946.

(Decided February 18, 1947)

*James W. Bevans*for the plaintiff.

*Paul P. Bao,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Cole, Judge (Abstract):

This appeal for reappraisement of various items of merchandise concerns the so-called British purchase tax, described in the law of the United Kingdom entitled, “Finance (No. 2) Act 1940 3 & 4 Geo. 6 Ch. 48.” The said tax was held not to be an item to be included in foreign value as defined in section 402 (c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended by the Customs Admin*395istrative Act of 1938 (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (c)). *United States*v. *Wm. S. Pitcairn Corp.,*33 C. C. P. A. 183, C. A. D. 334.

The cited case has been incorporated herein by consent of the parties who further agree on a set of facts, embodied in a written stipulation submitting the present case, showing export value, section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 TJ. S. C. § 1402 (d)), to be the proper basis for appraisement of the instant merchandise, and that such statutory values are the appraised values of the articles in question, less additions made by the importer on entry because of advances in similar cases.
Before the Second Division,

November 23, 1942.

No. 47740.

#### Protests 73247-K, etc., of Alpha Lux Co. (Philadelphia).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of Abstract 47453, the claim under paragraph 372 was sustained.
#### Edgar B. Corse v. W. L. Kelly.

No. 15,819.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

*Agency*— Commission—Sale *of Real Estate.*Where a prospective purchaser of real estate, who has been solicited to-buy it by a broker having a non-exclusive agency for its sale, definitely decides not to do so, the owner is not liable for a commission, although shortly afterward, acting in good faith, he sells it to the same person through independent negotiations set on foot by one who is not a real-estate agent and who neither receives nor asks compensation for his services, having an indirect interest in the sale being effected.

Error from Kiowa district court; Gordon L. Finley,, judge.

Opinion filed May 8, 1909.

Affirmed.

*John D. Beck,*for the plaintiff in error.

*R. F. Crick,*and *L. G. Turner,*for the defendant in error.

*116The opinion of the court was delivered by

Mason, J.:

Edgar B. Corse sued W. L. Kelly for a real-estate broker’s commission, and having failed to recover prosecutes error. The casé was tried without a jury, and the only question presented is whether there was any evidence to sustain a finding for the defendant, in view of admissions that Kelly listed a farm with Corse, who showed it to one C. Swanson and tried to induce him to buy it, and that, although no sale was made at the time, about a week later Swanson bought the property directly from Kelly. The natural inference from these facts alone would be that the sale was the result of Corse’s efforts, and therefore that he earned his commission.

But there was evidence tending to show these additional facts: After Swanson had been shown the land by Corse he decided not to take it, and bought a stock of hardware of one Grove. But before paying for this he became dissatisfied and concluded to throw it back upon the hands of Grove, as his contract gave him a right to do by forfeiting what he had already paid. Grove, however, persuaded him to try to trade the merchandise to Kelly for the farm, and set on foot negotiations by which that result was accomplished without any aid from Corse.

This evidence warranted a judgment for the defendant, inasmuch as it justified a finding that after the efforts of Corse to induce Swanson to buy the land had definitely failed and had spent their force Kelly, acting in good faith, made a sale to Swanson which was the result of a new and independent cause, not connected with anything that Corse had done. (19 Cyc. 257, 262, 268; 23 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 914, note 2.) If Grove had been acting as a real-estate agent he, and not Corse, 'would under such a finding have been entitled to the commission. The fact that his purpose in promoting the deal was to induce Swanson to complete the pur*117chase of the stock of merchandise can not require that Kelly should pay Corse for services which did not in fact cause the sale.

The judgment is affirmed.
BPW ACQUISITION CORP.




_________, 2008







Perella Weinberg Partners LP

767 Fifth Avenue

New York, NY 10153




Re: Administrative Services Agreement




Ladies and Gentlemen:




This letter will confirm our agreement that, commencing on the listing date (“Listing Date”) of the securities of BPW Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”) on the American Stock Exchange, pursuant to a Registration Statement on Form S-1, File No. 333-147439, and prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Registration Statement”) and continuing until the earlier of the consummation by the Company of an initial business combination or the Company’s liquidation (in each case as described in the Registration Statement) (such earlier date hereinafter referred to as the “Termination Date”), Perella Weinberg Partners LP shall make available to the Company, at 750 Washington Boulevard, Stamford Connecticut 06901 (or any successor location of Perella Weinberg Partners LP), office space and certain office and secretarial services as may be required by the Company from time to time.  In exchange therefor, the Company shall pay Perella Weinberg Partners LP the sum of $10,000 per month, commencing on the Listing Date and continuing monthly thereafter until the Termination Date.




This letter agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding of the parties hereto in respect of its subject matter and supersedes all prior understandings, agreements, or representations by or among the parties hereto, written or oral, to the extent they relate in any way to the subject matter hereof or the transactions contemplated hereby. 




This letter agreement may not be amended, modified or waived as to any particular provision, except by a written instrument executed by all parties hereto.




No party hereto may assign either this letter agreement or any of its rights, interests, or obligations hereunder without the prior written approval of the other party.  Any purported assignment in violation of this paragraph shall be void and ineffectual and shall not operate to transfer or assign any interest or title to the purported assignee.




This letter agreement, the entire relationship of the parties hereto, and any litigation between the parties (whether grounded in contract, tort, statute, law or equity) shall be governed by, construed in accordance with, and interpreted pursuant to the laws of the State of New York, without giving effect to its choice of laws principles.





[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]





























Very truly yours,







BPW ACQUISITION CORP.







By:___________________________

Name: Michael E. Martin

Title:   Chief Executive Officer




AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED BY:




PERELLA WEINBERG PARTNERS LP







By:___________________________

Name: Joseph R. Perella

Title:  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
No. 96-7572.

#### Warren *v.*California.

Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-rari denied.
### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE A ssi gne d on Brie fs , S ep te m be r 20, 200 4 IN R E: ES TAT E OF BA RS HA ELLA RO YS TON , D ECE AS ED Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Sull ivan Coun ty No. P -97-09062 Hon. Richard E. Lad d, Chan cellor

No. E2004-00963-COA- R3-CV - F ILED S EPTEMBER 29, 2004

Ap pe llant h a s a

pp e a le d b e fo refi na l ju dg me nt w a s e nte re d. We d ism iss thea pp e a l.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; A ppe al D ism iss e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

Wil liam Harold Roy ston, Appellee, pro se. J ohnny Roy ston, Appellant, pro se.

OP IN ION This is an action broug ht by one of the heirs of the dece ased. The Clerk and Master e ntere d this Order in the Estate: I n the matter of

the Fina l Accounting in the estate of Ba rsha Ella Roy ston, dece ased, it appe aring to the Clerk and Ma ster this 16 day of F ebrua ry 2004 Wil liam th Har old Roy ston, the Administrat o r o f t he Estate of Ba rsha Ellen Roy ston, having ma de a fi na l re po rt , whi c h is une xce pte d to, an d that the e state ha s b e e n c omp le te ly administered.-2- I T I S, T H E RE F O RE , O RD E RE D th a t th e A d mi n is tr a to r b e a n d is here by dis c ha rg e d u po n p a y me nt to the he ir s o f the ir sh are , a ndtheSur e tie s o n h is b on d, if any , are also rele ased f

rom furthe r oblig ation in con n ec t i on with the matters involved. The Admini strator will pay the shareof Jamie Roy ston and Mary Roy ston into court as they

cannot be located. The pe rsonal re prese ntative cha rg ed no fe e. Appar ently , this Order w as fu rn is h e d th ea p p ellant by

certified mail which wa s signe d for by the W arde n at R oane Mountain on Fe bruary 18, 2004. On M arc h 5, 2004, the appe llant filed wh a t a mou nts to e xce pti on s to theRe po rt by the Cle rk a nd Ma ste r i n th e Es tate . Su bs e qu e ntl y , it appea rs that documentation supporting the a dminist ration of the E state wa s fi l ed by the administrator. Howe ver, the rec ord bef ore us doe s not establish that the Court ruled on the exception s t o t h e Or d er enter ed by the Clerk and Ma ster. See , Tenn. Code Ann. § 30- 2-607, and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 53.05.

Since the parties are pro s e , we a re una war e of whether the Trial C ourt ruled on the exceptions to the Report by the Clerk and Ma ster. The re is no fina l judgment in the r ecor d. The appea l must l ie from a

final Judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a ). Ac c or din g ly , w e dis mis s th e Ap pe a l f ile d b y app e llant. The c ost of the appe al is assessed a g ainst the appe llant, J ohnny Roy ston.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.
No. 54390.

#### Jack Schaefer & Associates *v.*United States,

petition 6701-R (Los Angeles).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

At the trial one of the owners of the importing firm testified that he knew of no .higher prices than those shown on the invoice for the merchandise; that an appeal for reappraisement was abandoned because of information which the importer received at a later date from Mexico City that the seller extended a special 10 percent discount; that petitioner did not receive any discount, its purchases being at a fixed price quoted by the agent of the manufacturer through whom petitioner purchased the merchandise; and that prior to entry, the customs officials were supplied with copies of the orders and correspondence pertaining to this particular transaction. From a thorough review of the record the court was satisfied that there was no intent to defraud the revenue of the United States or to conceal or misrepresent the facts of the case or to deceive the appraiser as to the value of the merchandise. The petition was therefore granted.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 32

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C SECTION 1350,
                                  AS ENACTED BY
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with Third Wave Technologies, Inc. (the "Company) Form 10-Q for
the period ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Kevin Conroy, Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, and Maneesh Arora, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 18
U.S.C Section 1350, that on the date of this certification:

     (1) The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q (the "Report") fully complies with
the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and

     (2) The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

                                       /s/ Kevin T. Conroy
                                       ----------------------------------------
                                       Kevin T. Conroy
                                       Chief Executive Officer
                                       August 8, 2006

                                       /s/ Maneesh K. Arora
                                       ----------------------------------------
                                       Maneesh K. Arora
                                       Chief Financial Officer
                                       August 8, 2006



                                       23
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Faheem Abdul SABOOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-10128

Non-Argument Calendar.

D.C. Docket No. 04-00391-CR-1-1.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 26, 2005.

Jimmy Hardy, Stephanie Kearns, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Amy Levin Weil, Justin S. Anand, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant pled guilty to one count of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and the district court sentenced him to prison for a term of 151 months. He now appeals his sentence, contending that according to *Blakely v. Washington,*542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the Sixth Amendment precluded the district court from treating him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and thereby imposing the sentence he received. The court overruled his objection on the ground that *Blakely*did not apply to the federal guidelines sentencing system. In *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), however, the Supreme Court made *Blakely’s*rationale applicable to the federal system; hence, we therefore consider appellant’s objection under *Booker.*

We need not decide whether the district court committed Sixth Amendment error-—-by basing appellant’s sentence on facts appellant did not admit—because the court erred in sentencing appellant under a mandatory guidelines scheme. The question thus becomes whether the error was harmless.

Sentencing a defendant under a mandatory guidelines scheme, such as the pre*Booker*federal scheme, is harmless error “if, viewing the proceedings in their entirety ... the error did not affect the sentence, or had but very slight effect. If one can say with fair assurance that the sentence was not substantially swayed by the error, the sentence is due to be affirmed *240even though there was error.” *United States v. Mathenia,*409 F.3d 1289, -, -, slip op. 2326, 2328 (11th Cir.2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

It is the Government’s burden to satisfy us that the error in this case was harmless. The Government has not shown (on the record before the district court) that under the *Mathenia*test, the district court’s error-—treating the Guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory—“did not affect the sentence, or had but very slight effect.” In short, the Government has not carried its burden of proof to demonstrate harmless error. As a consequence, we must vacate appellant’s sentence and remand the case for resentencing.

VACATED and REMANDED.
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1955 

To authorize the interstate traffic of unpasteurized milk and milk products 

that are packaged for direct human consumption. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 7, 2011 

Mr. PAUL introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 

the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To authorize the interstate traffic of unpasteurized milk and 

milk products that are packaged for direct human consumption. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. INTERSTATE TRAFFIC OF UNPASTEURIZED 

4 MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS. 

5 (a) SALE ALLOWED.—Notwithstanding the Federal 

6 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), 

7 section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 

8 264), and any regulations or other guidance issued under 

9 such Act or section, a Federal department, agency, or 

10 court may not take any action (such as administrative, 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1955 IS

1 civil, criminal, or other actions) that would prohibit, inter2 fere with, regulate, or otherwise restrict the interstate 

3 traffic of milk, or a milk product, that is unpasteurized 

4 and packaged for direct human consumption, if such re5 striction is based on the determination that, solely because 

6 such milk or milk product is unpasteurized, such milk or 

7 milk product is adulterated, misbranded, or otherwise in 

8 violation of Federal law. 

9 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the following defi10 nitions apply: 

11 (1) The terms ‘‘interstate traffic’’, ‘‘milk’’, and 

12 ‘‘milk product’’ have the meanings given those terms 

13 in section 1240.3 of title 21, Code of Federal Regu14 lations (as in effect on the date of enactment of this 

15 Act). 

16 (2) The term ‘‘packaged for direct human con17 sumption’’ means milk and milk products that are 

18 packaged for the final consumer and intended for 

19 human consumption. Such term does not include 

20 milk and milk products that are packaged for addi21 tional processing, including pasteurization, before 

22 being consumed by humans. 

23 (3) The term ‘‘pasteurized’’ means the process 

24 of heating milk and milk products to the applicable 

25 temperature specified in the tables contained in secVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:14 Dec 08, 2011 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1955.IS S1955

jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 1955 IS

1 tion 1240.61 of title 21, Code of Federal Regula2 tions (or successor regulations), and held continu3 ously at or above that temperature for at least the 

4 corresponding specified time in such tables. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
# C_2015107EN.01000501.xml

| 30.3.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 107/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.3.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 107/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 22 January 2015 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj — Romania) — Vasiliki Balazs v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Cluj (C-401/13), Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Cluj v Attila Balazs (C-432/13)

(Joined Cases C-401/13 and C-432/13) (1)

((References for a preliminary ruling - Social security for migrant workers - Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 - Article 7(2)(c) - Applicability of social security conventions between Member States - Repatriated refugee whose country of origin is a Member State - Completion of periods of employment in the territory of another Member State - Application for grant of an old-age benefit - Refusal))

(2015/C 107/05)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Cluj

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Vasiliki Balazs (C-401/13), Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Cluj (C-432/13)

Defendants: Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Cluj (C-401/13), Attila Balazs (C-432/13)

Operative part of the judgment

Article 7(2)(c) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, in the version amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1992/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006, must be interpreted as meaning that a bilateral agreement which relates to the social security benefits of nationals of one of the signatory States who had the status of political refugee in the territory of the other signatory State, which was concluded on a date when one of the two signatory States had not yet acceded to the European Union and which is not listed in Annex III to that regulation does not continue to apply to the situation of political refugees who were repatriated to their State of origin before the bilateral agreement was concluded and the regulation entered into force.

---

(1)  OJ C 298, 12.10.2013.

---