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i 

52–187 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–68] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR AIR FORCE 

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 20, 2009 
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

BEN GLERUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, May 20, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for Air Force Modernization Programs .......................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, May 20, 2009 ....................................................................................... 51 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST FOR AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 5 

WITNESSES 

Ahern, David G., Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics ........................... 7 

Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space 

and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 8 

Johns, Lt. Gen. Raymond E., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic 

Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force .......................................... 10 

Shackelford, Lt. Gen. Mark D., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition ................................................... 9 

Sullivan, Michael, Director for Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 10 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ahern, David G. ................................................................................................ 55 

Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J., joint with Lt. Gen. Mark D. Shackelford 

and Lt. Gen. Raymond E. Johns, Jr. ........................................................... 68 

Sullivan, Michael .............................................................................................. 90 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 115 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 115 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 116 

Mr. Marshall ..................................................................................................... 115 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 20, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:41 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, everyone, thank you for coming. We are 

sorry we are starting a few minutes late. The vote apparently took 

place in such a way that we are about 10 minutes behind. Again, 

aloha to all here, and thank you very much for coming. 

This afternoon, the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets to 

receive testimony regarding the Department of the Air Force modernization programs. We certainly welcome our witnesses, Mr. 

David Ahern, Director of Portfolio Systems Acquisition, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 

Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements and Lieutenant General Mark Shackelford, Military 

Deputy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for the Air Force 

for Acquisition. 

Lieutenant General Raymond Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs; and Mr. Mike Sullivan, 

Director for Acquisition and Sourcing Management of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), with whom I think virtually all 

of us are more than familiar right now. We are glad to see all of 

you. 

I first note and I want to underline this, that we have just recently received some of the detail of the fiscal year 2010 budget request. The request did not include any information or data regarding plans, programs or budgets for fiscal year 2011 and beyond. 

That is of great concern to me because of some of the decisions 

that we are being asked to make in this defense budget and what 

we will be recommending to the appropriations committee involve 

decisions that obviously have implications that go beyond 2011. So 

I am hoping that we can clear some of that up before the markup. 

Overall, the Air Force has faced a number of challenges in executing its modernization programs. The F–22, the F–35, the combat 
2 

search and rescue helicopter, the KC–X tanker and the Next Generation Bomber (NGB) programs have been the most prominently 

reviewed or critiqued. 

The current F–22 program of record is 187 F–22s. Yesterday, the 

Air Force Chief of Staff, General Schwartz, testified that 243 aircraft is the right number, but 187 is ‘‘the affordable number.’’ The 

budget request does not include any more F–22s and line shutdown 

activities are proposed to begin in the fiscal year 2010. 

The Air Force has just taken the lead in the Joint Strike Fighter 

Program Office. That program continues to have cost and schedule 

problems, with testing further delayed and greater development 

and procurement concurrency being incurred. 

Yesterday, the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donnelly, was 

quoted as regarding the Joint Strike Fighter, as follows: ‘‘We need 

to stay on cost and schedule.’’ A rather amazing statement, but 

nonetheless one that I felt we needed to quote. 

We have heard that refrain before, on other major programs. Let 

me start with the first line of the recent GAO report, ‘‘Joint Strike 

Fighter development will cost more and take longer to complete 

than reported to Congress in April 2008.’’ 

The facts as provided by the GAO are that the Joint Strike Fighter development program in 2001 was estimated to cost $34 

billion with an aircraft, average aircraft procurement unit cost of 

$69 million. This is 2001. 

The December 2007 estimated development cost was $44 billion, a 30 percent increase, and an aircraft average unit cost of $104 

million, a 50 percent increase per aircraft over 2001. The initial operation capability date has slipped two years to 2012. 

I am going over some of this detail, ladies and gentlemen, on our 

subcommittee and for members of the audience and to our witnesses, not because I don’t think you know it or this isn’t part of 

the conversation, but this is for the public record and for public 

consumption, and we wanted to make sure that the public has at 

least all of the perspective and perception of what our perspective 

is in a context that may be new to them. 

Last year’s projection for the Joint Strike Fighter research and 

development was $2.1 billion. This year, the request is $3.6 billion, 

a 67 percent increase. This is without the cost of an alternate or 

competitive engine program. 

I would also note that under the current procurement plan, 273 

Joint Strike Fighters will be procured before flight testing is projected to be complete. I want to make sure that that number is before you, in case you want to dispute it or amplify on it. Two hundred seventy-three Joint Strike Fighters will be procured before 

flight testing is projected to be complete under the current procurement plan. 

Also, yesterday General Schwartz was quoted as saying that he 

would prefer ‘‘a more rapid production rate for the Joint Strike 

Fighter,’’ yet the Air Force request for the Joint Strike Fighter this 

year is two aircraft fewer than projected last year for this year. 

Regarding other Air Force programs, the helicopter program that 

would have procured 141 helicopters has been cancelled—excuse 

me one moment—yes, the search and rescue helicopter program 

would have procured 141 helicopters. 
3 

That has been cancelled in favor of a new undetermined search 

and rescue helicopter program that Secretary Gates believes will 

have a more realistic requirement and, if acquired, be a joint service program. 

The KC–X program that would procure 179 aerial refueling tankers to replace the 48-year-old KC–135 tankers was cancelled last 

year, after the attempted acquisition failed following a GAO protest. The GAO did not protest. That is a bit awkward, excuse me. 

Following the protest which was submitted to the GAO; is that 

more correct, Mr. Sullivan? 

A new request for proposal will be issued this summer, that is 

the present plan of Secretary Gates, with a source selection plan 

for the spring of next year. It has not yet been announced whether 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Air Force will execute 

the source selection. Perhaps you will be able to enlighten us today. 

The Next Generation Bomber program, which would have replaced the aging B–52 fleet, has also been delayed. We are told 

that a new program may be started pending a review of the requirement and technology during the Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) to be done later this year. 

Facing funding challenges in 2010 and in future years’ defense 

program, the Air Force has decided to propose the accelerated retirement of about 250 fighter aircraft. The Air Force indicates this 

will save $351 million in fiscal year 2010 and $3.5 billion across 

the future years’ defense program. 

In the aggregate, the Air Force is facing significant changes in 

fiscal year 2010, therefore, to its modernization programs. 

Regarding now the specific issue of the Joint Strike Fighter program and the competitive engine program, overall, as I mentioned, 

the joint fighter testing schedule continues to slip to the right, 

while the Pentagon insists on maintaining the current production 

schedule. This creates more development and production concurrency, much like what was experienced with the Army’s Armed 

Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program. 

I am using the word production concurrency here to—to me, it 

is kind of like the equivalent of what my mother used to say to me, 

if wishes were horses, we would all be riding. That is the best I 

can figure out what concurrency means. 

It apparently means we are going to produce and at the same 

time be able to say, with some certainty that all the testing, safety 

requirements and all the expectations of the fighter will continue 

apace with the production schedule. 

I have never seen that happen in anything in my life, but apparently they think that is going to happen with the Joint Strike 

Fighter. 

The current Joint Strike Fighter baseline engine has barely 

begun flight testing, has yet to even fly in the most stressing 

vertical flight and landing modes and will not have its first flight 

in that flight regime until September. 

Aircraft design and engine testing problems have thus far caused 

a two-year slip in the F–35B’s first vertical landing. The baseline 

engine for the Joint Strike Fighter had two turbine blade failures 

within the last two years requiring redesign, re-manufacture and 

delaying the flight test program. 
4 

In April, the former Air Force Assistant for Acquisition, Ms. 

Payton, citing the Joint Strike Fighter baseline engine cost growth 

as ‘‘an ongoing concern.’’ Continuing, ‘‘From fiscal year 2007 to 

2008, the Joint Strike Fighter engine costs have grown causing a 

$3 million increase to the short takeoff vertical landing aircraft’s 

unit fly away costs.’’ 

Without a competitive engine program, current Air Force plans 

call for approximately 90 percent of all Air Force demand fighters 

and a substantial percentage of all other service manned fighters 

to be dependent on one engine type from one manufacturer by 

2030. 

The last time the Air Force proceeded with such a plan was the 

acquisition of the F–15 and F–16 aircraft. That resulted in dependence on one engine type for a large proportion of the Air Force 

fighter fleet. Because of engine reliability and durability problems 

in the 1970’s, the Air Force ended up with a large percentage of 

its F–15 fleet grounded. 

As a result, in Europe, to keep up with the demands for refurbished engines due to much lower engine life than planned, the Air 

Force bought a small fleet of cargo aircraft and shuttled F–15 engines back and forth between bases and a centralized engine depot. 

The engine problems that resulted in an alternate engine program, in the late 1970’s, were not discovered until two years after 

initial operational capability was achieved for the F–15. Currently, 

initial operation capability will not be achieved for the F–35B until 

2012, five years after the Pentagon quit funding the current 

version of an alternate or competitive engine. 

The Pentagon fully funded the alternate engine program in the 

Pentagon’s annual budget request for 10 years, fiscal year 1997 

through 2006. Parenthetically, forgive me if I am giving you information you already know, but again, it is very important for the 

public to understand the context within which we have to make 

this decision. 

Cost overruns—again, I want to repeat, the alternate engine or 

competitive engine was funded by the Air Force—by the Air 

Force—funded by the Congress at the Air Force request for 10 

years. 

Cost overruns in other areas of the Joint Strike Fighter program, 

not the engine or the alternate engine program, in other areas of 

the Joint Strike Fighter program caused the Pentagon to discontinue its budget requests for the alternate engine. 

Three studies the committee asked to have done in 2007 were inconclusive with regard to the financial benefits of competition for 

engine development, procurement and operations and support. 

However, all three reports cited numerous likely non-financial 

benefits of engine competition, including insurance against fleet 

grounding, contractor responsiveness, technological innovation, 

force readiness and industrial base breadth. 

All of these benefits were derived from the experience of what 

came to be known as the ‘‘Great Engine War,’’ GEW, the ‘‘Great 

Engine War.’’ It has achieved a phrase of art in Pentagon lore. 

With that as our background, we look forward to our witnesses’ 

opening remarks, and I am sure they look forward to making them 

now with that background, but before we begin—and I appreciate 
5 

and thank all the members in the audience for their indulgence in 

this rather lengthy and, I hope, informative opening remark. 

Let me call on my good friend and a friend to armed services 

members everywhere, the ranking member of this subcommittee, 

the Honorable Roscoe Bartlett. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is no doubt that 

this budget and the decisions that come along with it will fundamentally change the United States Air Force. 

In the recent series of full committee posture hearings, a consistent theme has carried through and I want to echo it here today. 

I feel that there has been an absence of thoughtful debate, discussion, and in some cases, analysis to support this budget request. 

I see two problems here. First the budget should not drive the 

strategy. The strategy should be set. Then the funding requirements are laid out in the budget that follows. It appears to me that 

in many cases, funding limitations in the fiscal year 2010 budget 

top line were the sole driver in major policy decisions. 

The second problem that I see is that instead of openly engaging 

the legislative branch on policy matters, proposed force structure 

changes and the shifting of requirements for major weapons system 

platforms, the executive branch has chosen to lock us out of those 

debates and tie our hands by unveiling sweeping policy changes 

buried under the guise of a budget request. 

As a case in point, take the retirement of 250 legacy fighters. It 

is my understanding that this idea came up sometime last year 

and the details were worked out over the course of many months. 

Why may I ask, were we not brought into that discussion well before the budget request was formulated? 

Shouldn’t the members of this committee have been given the opportunity to discuss this matter on the substance of the issues and 

the implications of national security and homeland defense before 

it ended up as savings in the budget request? 

The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is another example. All of you 

have heard my thoughts on this over the course of the previous full 

committee hearings. I have asked witnesses from the Army, the Air 

Force and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) what has 

changed? 

Why is this mission being moved out of the Army and solely over 

to the Air Force when not four months ago, we received the quadrennial roles in missions review report that stated that, ‘‘the option 

that provided most value to joint force was to assign the C–27J to 

the Air Force and Army.’’ 

None of them have been able to answer the question, but all of 

them stated that there was no new study or analysis conducted 

that countered the existing plan or reduced the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council (JROC)-approved requirement for 78 Joint Cargo 

Aircraft, not the 38 envisioned in this budget. 

What has happened as a result of all this is that the Congress 

is now left to debate the puts and takes in the budget when there 

has been no vetting of the underlying threat assumptions, policy or 
6 

strategy. Furthermore, we have not been provided a five-year funding plan, although it is required by law. 

We have not been provided an annual aircraft procurement plan 

and certification as required by law. How is it that we are being 

asked to authorize funding for the advanced procurement of aircraft and ships and ground vehicles, when we cannot see the Department’s procurement plan for the fiscal year 2011? 

We can’t see the strategy. We can’t see the assumptions. We 

can’t see the plan for the out years. All we can see is a budget request that terminates the Next Generation Bomber, terminates the 

combat search and rescue helicopter. It terminates production of 

the F–22. It terminates production of the C–17 and it terminates 

the Army’s involvement in a Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

What are we supposed to tell the American people? We and you 

are supposed to function as a team, perhaps analogous to the husband and wife team. If we related to our wives as you have related 

to us, I don’t think we would have happy marriages. Indeed, we 

might not even have a marriage. 

This body, not the executive branch, is charged with the constitutional mandate to raise and support armies and navies. I am extremely troubled that these decisions have been made in a vacuum 

and appear, at least on the surface, to be informed by nothing 

other than top line budget pressures. 

I am very interested to hear from our witnesses today. Perhaps 

they can shed some light on these decisions. Gentlemen, thank you 

for taking the time to be with us today. I will look forward to your 

testimony, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. Gentlemen, I think 

you can see that Mr. Bartlett and I prepared our remarks separately, as we always do. We talk all the time, but our remarks are 

not coordinated on purpose so that there is no conspiratorial accusations able to be rendered. 

But you can see that we both have zeroed in on as particularly 

where the advance procurement is concerned, what we consider to 

be fundamental policy questions well within the jurisdiction and 

purview of the subcommittee and by extension, the full committee. 

These are serious policy implications and I hope they can be addressed forthrightly today. Without objection, all witness prepared 

remarks will be included in the hearing records. So, if you can 

summarize your views and/or take the opportunity perhaps to respond even—not necessarily in detail to the opening remarks that 

will be welcome. 

We will proceed first then with Mr. Ahern. Am I pronouncing 

your name correctly, sir? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. That is fine. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. And we will, when the statements 

are finished, we will proceed in regular order today in terms of seniority. Mr. Ahern, if you please. Thank you, for your appearance 

today and thank you for your service to the Nation. 
7 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. AHERN, DIRECTOR, PORTFOLIO SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you, and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman Abercrombie, ranking member Bartlett, distinguished members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. 

I will be brief in order to move to the committee’s questions. 

As you know, on April 6th, Secretary Gates announced key decisions he would recommend to the President in regard to the fiscal 

year 2010 defense budget. As part of his remarks, the Secretary 

stated that one of his principal objectives was to rebalance the Departments’ programs, to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are 

most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies. 

In terms of tactical Air Force structure, the Department position 

is that the force structure we have programmed meets the requirements for the national military strategy. The capabilities contained 

within the Air Force and across the services to include strike fighter aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, aerial refueling tankers 

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets combine to form a robust program prepared to deter and defeat a wide 

range of threats to our security. 

In terms of the F–22, the Department believes the program force 

of 187 F–22 aircraft, combined with a larger force of F–35 aircraft, 

provide the necessary mix of strike fighter aircraft to meet the 

military strategy. The Department’s analysis showed that while we 

have adequate air-to-air capability, we need a significant amount 

of air-to-ground capability that the F–35 provides. 

One key area in regard to the F–22 is that the Department must 

ensure that the program force can prevail against advanced threat. 

The Air Force plans a $7 billion modernization effort across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to provide important improvements for the F–22 fleet. 

For the Joint Strike Fighter, the budget request includes $10.8 

billion to continue development and to support the procurement of 

10 conventional, 16 short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft and the first four carrier variants. 

The Secretary has also stated his intention to increase the number of F–35 aircraft across the FYDP. That creates a more efficient 

ramp rate as we prepare to enter full rate production. Recognizing 

the committee’s interest in the F–35 alternate engine, I can tell you 

that the F–35 acquisition strategy contains provisions for a second 

engine program provided funds are available. 

Consistent with our past positions, the Department did not include funding in the budget for the F136 engine because there is 

not a compelling business case to fund completion of the development effort. The Department does, of course, continue to execute 

appropriated development funds for the 136 engine. 

Among the Secretary’s decisions, was that of canceling the Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle Program known as 

CSAR-X. The services in the U.S. Special Operations Command 

possess a wide spectrum of overlapping and complementary personnel recovery capabilities. 
8 

A deep penetration mission to recover downed crews in a complex 

threat environment requires a joint solution. Since this mission 

drives many of CSAR-X requirements, it is imperative we reassess 

that mission in the context of joint force capabilities. 

The Joint Cargo Aircraft program is important to help address 

the aging force structure supporting the Army’s time-sensitive mission-critical airlift mission. The decision to transfer the Army JCA 

mission to the Air Force was based on an agreement between the 

two services, a real breakthrough in jointness. 

The reduction in the total quantity of JCA aircraft is an acknowledgement that the Department can expect to meet more requirements through better management of our intra-theater airlift assets. 

Moving now from intra-theater to strategic airlift, from a fleet capacity perspective there is no indication that the Department needs 

additional strategic airlift beyond the 205 C–17s and the 111 C– 

5s already programmed. 

As to the KC–X program, now that the Deputy Secretary and the 

Under Secretary for Acquisition Technology and Logistics have 

been confirmed, the Secretary will meet with them along with the 

Air Force Secretary and the Air Force Chief of Staff to finalize an 

appropriate course of action with regard to the KC–X. 

The Secretary has stated his intention to consult with Congress 

and to brief them before finalizing the Department’s approach. We 

anticipate being able to solicit proposals from industry this summer 

with award of a contract by late spring, 2010. 

We are grateful for the continued support of Congress, which has 

been critical to ensuring our airmen are the best trained and best 

equipped air force in the world. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify in the Department’s 

plans to continue to equip them for today’s wars and tomorrow’s 

challenges. I look forward to answering any questions you may 

have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, very much. 

General Darnell, I have you next. If you want to change the 

order, you can. Is it all right? 

General DARNELL. That is just fine. Thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, and thank you for your service as 

well, General Darnell. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL J. DARNELL, USAF, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AIR, SPACE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, HEADQUARTERS U.S. 

AIR FORCE 

General DARNELL. Sure. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, ranking 

member Bartlett and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you for calling this hearing and for the opportunity to discuss our Air Force programs. 

The Air Force continues to contribute to operations across the 

globe to provide support to the combatant commanders, ensuring 

that they have the means necessary to accomplish their assigned 
9 

missions. As you know, that level of continuous effort takes its toll 

on the readiness of our air assets. 

We are here today to discuss those effects and our plans to work 

within the fiscal year 2010 budget to ensure we find the correct 

balance of maintaining and procuring the necessary assets to meet 

current and future Air Force requirements. I thank the subcommittee for allowing me to appear before you today and for your 

continued support of the Air Force. 

My opening comments are brief, but I respectfully request our 

combined written statement be submitted for the record. I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Darnell, General 

Shackelford, and General Johns can be found in the Appendix on 

page 68.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, General Darnell. 

General Shackelford. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. Chairman Abercrombie, ranking 

member Bartlett, distinguished members of the committee, thank 

you for calling this hearing and for the opportunity to provide you 

with an update on Air Force modernization efforts and other matters that are important to our Air Force and the Nation. 

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have made 

recapturing acquisition excellence a top Air Force priority. Earlier 

this month, they approved the Air Force Acquisition Improvement 

Plan, which identified the following five initiatives: revitalize the 

Air Force acquisition workforce; improve the requirements generation process; instill budget and financial discipline; improve Air 

Force major systems source selections; and establish clear lines of 

authority and accountability within acquisition organizations. 

We are developing more detailed implementation plans for the 

individual actions within each of these initiatives and will remain 

flexible with the ability to adjust as suggestions and initiatives proposed by Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense come 

our way. 

I will conclude my opening remarks by saying that we are committed to recapturing acquisition excellence by rebuilding an Air 

Force acquisition culture that delivers products and services that 

are essential to Air Force modernization programs as promised on 

time, within budget and in compliance with all laws, policies and 

regulations. 

Thank you for inviting me today. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Shackelford, General 

Darnell, and General Johns can be found in the Appendix on page 

68.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Again, thank you for your service, General 

Shackelford, and finally, General Johns. I just wanted to mention 

for purposes of the member’s attention and the emphasis that if 

you have questions with regard to requirements, they should go 

to—first you can send them to anybody. 
10 

But I think General Darnell is the key person here; General 

Shackelford, of course with acquisitions, and now General Johns, 

who will be speaking to us in the area of long-range planning. 

Well, thank you. Welcome and thank you for your service as well, 

General Johns. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RAYMOND E. JOHNS, JR., USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND PROGRAMS, HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE 

General JOHNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Bartlett, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this distinguished committee to speak on behalf of the United States Air 

Force and the dedicated airmen who are defending freedom in air, 

space and across cyberspace. 

I am proud of the fighting spirit of these brave young Americans 

who carry the great traditions of our Air Force. Our airmen stand 

watch every minute of every day as they do so with pride and 

honor. I thank this subcommittee for all that you have done for the 

airmen and for their families because their families also serve our 

Nation. 

I am honored to be here and I stand ready to answer your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Johns, General Darnell, 

and General Shackelford can be found in the Appendix on page 68.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, very much. 

And now, Mr. Sullivan. Again, Mr. Sullivan has been involved in 

his professional capacity with acquisition and sourcing management for the GAO, and we are happy to have you back again, Mr. 

Sullivan. And thank you for the perspective that you have been 

able to provide both this committee and the full committee over the 

years. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Bartlett, members of the committee. I am very pleased to be here today. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Can you pull the microphone a touch. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. A little closer. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR FOR ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. I am very pleased to be here today to 

discuss the status of the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition program. I would like to make a few brief points in my opening statement and ask that my written statement be submitted for the 

record. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Without objection. 

Mr. AHERN. First, the F–35 is critical to our Nation’s plans for 

recapitalizing the tactical air forces and it will require continued 

long-term commitment to very large annual outlays. Second, cost to 

develop the F–35, which has already increased by 30 percent as the 

chairman noted earlier in his statement from $34.4 billion to $44.4 

billion, is now projected to increase an additional $2.4 billion according to the program office. 
11 

And as much as $7.4 billion according to a Joint Estimating 

Team (JET) comprised of OSD, Air Force and Navy cost estimators 

assuming the joint team’s estimate development costs would now 

be projected at $51.8 billion, a 50 percent increase from the original 

baseline. 

The main reason for these costs and schedule overruns continues 

to be problems with manufacturing development aircraft and engines. Design changes, parts shortages, out of station work and 

supplier problems have caused significant manufacturing inefficiencies and increased labor hours that have led to higher costs and 

have caused the program to adjust manufacturing and delivery 

schedules four times so far in development. 

My third point, the Joint Strike Fighter flight test program 

which was reduced last year to pay for development cost overruns 

has once again been extended this time by a year. This lessened 

the overlap between development and operational testing which is 

a good thing. It gets rid of some of that concurrency that you were 

talking about, Mr. Chairman. 

But the plan is still very aggressive, very little white space, very 

little room for error. Flight testing of the first vertical lift test aircraft has been slowed by engine problems. And the first flight of 

the first carrier variant test aircraft has been delayed. As the program stands now, it will have procured 273 F–35s before flight 

testing is finished. 

My fourth point, the program is aggressively ramping up its procurement rates in the next five years in order to recapitalize the 

aging tactical Air Force fleet. This means the Department will now 

spend an estimated $54.3 billion to procure 383 aircraft by 2014 before the development program is completed. 

There are also plans to procure an additional 28 aircraft between 

2011 and 2015; however, we have not seen the annual schedule for 

those buys because these aircraft will all be procured before development and testing is complete. The government plans to procure 

them using cost reimbursable contracts placing most, if not all, of 

the financial risk on the government. 

Fifth, the program has not funded its alternate engine program, 

as you cited, Mr. Chairman, which was part of its original acquisition strategy since 2007. And it has no funding in its current budget request. 

Our past work examining the costs and benefits of a competitive 

engine program found that the program would have to achieve 

about 12 percent savings across the engine’s lifecycle through competition in order to recoup its initial investment in a competitive 

engine’s source and that—sorry, sir, I don’t know how that happened—and past programs, most notably the F–16 competitive engine program that you cited earlier which spurred the ‘‘Great Engine Wars’’ achieved much higher savings than that. 

In fact, I believe the ‘‘Great Engine Wars’’ achieved an overall 

lifecycle savings of 21 percent. In addition there is great consensus 

that non-financial benefits such as increased engine performance 

over the lifecycle, increased reliability, contractor responsiveness, 

and improved industrial base health could also be achieved with 

this alternate program. 
12 

The F–35 program is at a crossroads with continuing manufacturing problems, increasing costs and slowing deliveries of test aircraft. The flight test program remains about two percent complete 

today. 

While the Department must move forward with the program to 

recapitalize our aging tactical air fleet the rate at which it is accelerating its orders before flight testing is complete increases risks 

that the aircraft will not meet requirements, will need additional 

work after they have been bought and will eventually cost much 

more than expected. 

In March, we recommended that the Department reexamine its 

plan to ramp up procurement under these conditions and to analyze the risk it is accepting by procuring as many as 273 aircraft 

under cost reimbursable contracts. The Department agreed with 

that recommendation. 

We believe that with an improved delivery schedule and contracting strategy the program can more effectively meet the needs 

of the war fighter. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time. I will do my best to answer any questions the committee might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 90.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Will you be submitting your summary for the 

record? Did I understand that correctly? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, we have a written statement—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. That we have. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. That will be submitted for the record. 

We also have—we were asked to provide some PowerPoint slides 

as an attachment. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, that is in our—that which you have just 

read, can you submit that for the record as well? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Good. Thank you. Before we begin, Mr. 

Ahern, I want to make sure that I understand something that was 

in your statement. I want to make sure I am reading it correctly. 

On page four, if you can look, it is our page four. I am presuming 

you have the same material in front of you that we have given out 

to the committee. 

I will read it to you. This is regard to the F–22, ‘‘analysis also 

showed that while we have adequate air-to-air capability, we also 

need a significant amount of fifth generation air-to-ground capability.’’ 

It may be that I am not quite clear as to what the implications 

of the phrase ‘‘fifth generation’’ are. The reason I am asking is 

there is no mention of the F–22’s air-to-ground capability, particularly with regard to the Joint Direct Attack Munitions, the JDAMs, 

or the Small Diameter Bombs, the SDBs, which I believe fulfill that 

air-to-ground capability. 

Now it may be that you are saying that you need more than that 

but it goes unmentioned. I just want to make sure, do you consider 

that the F–22 air-to-ground capability—did you consider that when 

you were talking about the Tactical Air (TacAir) decisions with regard to the question of air-to-air capability and air-to-ground capability? I want to make sure that I am on the right page here. 
13 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. When I wrote that statement, of course, I 

had assistance. It came primarily from conversations on the joint 

air dominance study that has been shared with members of the 

committee’s staff as I understand it. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. AHERN. And it has a force mix of F–22s and F–35s and it 

was a stressing scenario where there was both air-to-air and airto-ground targeting if you will, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. AHERN. And the essence that I took away—but I will be glad 

to come back and revisit it and I think maybe I should—was the 

F–22 is predominately the air-to-air dominance—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. AHERN [continuing]. And the JSF was predominately, but I 

am not saying exclusively, the air-to-ground. I would, I am sure 

there are other intricacies of the study that I failed to ask. When 

I wrote it that was what was on my mind from my familiarity with 

that study. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Yes, not so much to get into an argument about it, but I want to—because one of the advantages of the 

F–22, at least the way it is presented to me, is it does have that 

capability with air-to-ground. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, and in my oral statement I mentioned, and 

I am sure that my compatriots from the Air Force today would also 

talk about the modernization of the F–22 through the Future Years 

Defense Plan (FYDP) and beyond that it is exactly in the—part of 

it is exactly in the areas that you are talking about. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. We don’t have to pursue further. 

Thank you very much. 

I will go first then to Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ahern, I think that you said in your testimony that you had 

concluded that with better management of your in-theatre assets 

that you could meet the Army’s demand for light cargo planes with 

just 38 planes rather than the 78 that the original studies said 

they needed. 

I believe that the original study said that the Army needed 78 

of these planes and then since the Air Force also had a need for 

light cargo planes it was decided, against Air Force wishes is my 

understanding, that the Air Force should join this program. 

It should be a joint procurement and that the number of planes 

that the Air Force needed for their responsibilities were yet to be 

added to the 78 that the Army needed. And my question, sir, is 

what study can you cite that indicated that not only did we not 

need the 78 that the original study said the Army needed, and 

whatever additional airplanes the Army needed which, sorry, the 

Air Force needed which had not yet been added to that procurement? 

That now you could meet both needs with just 38 aircraft. I 

might remind you then at least three prior hearings here we have 

asked the witnesses, ‘‘Was there a study that indicated that the 

original need for 78 could now be reduced to 38?’’ 

And each one of them told us with some conviction that they 

knew of no such study. Was there in fact a study, sir, that they 
14 

did not know about that you cited when you made the claim that 

you had decided you could now meet the needs of the Army with 

just 38 planes? 

Mr. AHERN. I am not—I think my statement, I would have to go 

back and read it is that the requirement for the current submission 

was 38 aircraft, but that there was an intent to study the full 

range of the requirements in-theatre in conjunction with the Air 

Force taking on that mission. 

But that there was an indication that there were assets in-theatre that could support that time-sensitive, mission-critical timesensitive demand, sir. I did not—I do not want to say that the 38 

is lying flat forever. My understanding is that is the initial request 

and that will be studied during the QDR to determine if that is the 

right amount. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, I have your statement here, ‘‘The decision to 

reduce the JCA procurement from 78 to 38 aircraft was made after 

considering a full range of options that included procuring as many 

92 Joint Cargo Aircraft and as few as zero.’’ 

I believe this study was made prior to the present surge in Afghanistan. I think it would be hard to argue that the requirements 

are now less than they were then. And I might remind you that 

the Air Force had yet to add their need to the 78 documented need 

for the Army. 

Sir, this is just one of a number of different instances where we 

believe that the number that is requested in the budget does not 

represent the need, but represents rather what can be afforded. 

Are we wrong? 

Mr. AHERN. Not from what I understand is the way the budget 

was constructed, sir. But I would like to take your question and get 

back to you with the analysis that was done to get to the original 

force structure for the JCAs and the work that has been done subsequently. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Is there anybody who believes that the in-theatre 

Iraq and Afghanistan need is now less than it was then? See we 

are kind of confused as to why an earlier study would validate a 

need of 78, which did not include the Air Force’s need, and now 

just because there is less money available suddenly the need in an 

expanded requirement is less than half of the original need, considerably less than half when you include the yet-to-be-determined 

number of planes that the Air Force would need. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Is this just a statement to justify this without any 

study to confirm it? 

Mr. AHERN. No, sir, not on my behalf, not on the Department’s, 

as again—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Then there was a study you are telling us? 

Mr. AHERN. I am saying as part—there certainly have been studies previously. I need to take that question forward as the program 

was taking shape in determining the number for this year, sir, I 

would like to take that question. But my understanding was that 

with that came a commitment to look at the puts and takes, the 

additions and the subtractions, as part of the QDR. 

If there were more as the Air Force took over the mission from 

the Army, that the 38 was the right number for the fiscal year 
15 

2010—or, excuse me, for this initial commitment, but going forward 

it certainly could be changed. But there was a recognition that 

there were C–130’s in-theater that could support that mission with 

the Air Force taking it on from the Army. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, in the prior hearings I don’t think anybody 

said that 38 was the right number. They all said that they knew 

of no reason, no study that would reduce the required number from 

78 to 38. In fact, there was a repeated statement that we are going 

to procure at least 38. 

Are we to imply from that that this is still under discussion in 

the Department? That you have not yet reached a final decision as 

to what the needed number is? 

Mr. AHERN. As I understand it, yes, sir, that is true. As the Air 

Force and the Army—and I will defer to my Air Force brethren on 

my left—as the Air Force takes on the mission from the Army in 

that specific area, as they develop their concept of operations and 

their plans, yes, sir, I would expect that that number of JCAs 

would change. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 115.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We will pursue this, then, Mr. Ahern, okay, 

in time to come. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Mr. Marshall is next, to be followed by Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ahern, I want to 

pick up where Mr. Bartlett left off. 

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), at our request, did a 

study of lift and in its study considered 36 different mixes. The 

study’s unclassified report published March 13th of this year seems 

to indicate that for low-intensity conflicts, the wars that we are in 

right now and we think probably we will be in for the foreseeable 

future, the right mix of lift includes not 38, but my recollection is 

98 JCAs. 

Now, obviously, you can vary that in lots of different—you know, 

you could make a number of different changes, but there is a big 

difference between 38 and 98, and I—the reason, I think, the administration is hearing so many concerns from Congress, it is not 

just Mr. Bartlett and myself, it is many others, with regard to 

JCAs. We have been listening to the JCA pitch now for a number 

of years. 

It is very credible, and it is supported by independent studies. 

Now, with regard to independent studies, generally, sir, the 2005 

mobility capability study came up with 292 as the lowest permissible figure for strategic lift and, lo and behold, that is precisely 

what the Pentagon decided to adopt. 

Now that 2005 study was one that many of us thought was fatally flawed because those conducting the study were required by 

the Department of Defense (DOD) to assume certain things that 

anybody, with a wit of sense and a knowledge of history, would 

conclude aren’t going to come true. And if those things don’t come 

true, then the figure would be higher than 292. 
16 

So in your opening remarks and in your written statement, the 

suggestion that there is nothing out there that indicates to us that 

perhaps the total lift needs to be beyond 292, I am talking about 

C–17s and C–5As—C–5s, pardon me, is not true. 

We don’t know the exact number, but we do know that it is well 

above 292 just based on that study. And one thing that concerns 

me is that the mobility capability requirements study (MCRS) you 

say in here, an early indication from the MCRS analysis suggests 

thus and such. 

To my knowledge, this committee has not been privy to the 

MCRS analysis nor to any, you know, early peek into that analysis 

and some here worry that the analysis may be driven too much by 

a need to reach the right answer. 

So we would like to know a little bit more about how that analysis is being conducted and how independently the judgment is 

being made from senior officials who are concerned about bottom 

line numbers and whether things are affordable. 

Could you describe that process and the independence of whoever 

it is that is involved in doing the MCRS from a directive that a certain result needs to be obtained and you just need to find out how 

to get us to that result? 

Mr. AHERN. Sir, I would like to take that question. I definitely 

talked to Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)—I was familiar with the MRCS studies from my work earlier with the C–5. And 

when one of the questions that came to me was to look at airlift, 

I went to the PA&E to see where they stood on the MCRS 2016. 

They gave me an overview of what they were doing and provided 

me the thinking that I wrote up. 

In the detailed work on the study, sir, I didn’t ask them that 

question. I would like to ask them that question and get back to 

you on that. 

Mr. MARSHALL. That is certainly okay with me. You know, we 

need to be very comfortable that whoever is conducting this study 

is actually trying to determine what the requirements are as opposed to coming up with a formula that will reach a result, which 

has effectively already been dictated. You know, that is backwards. 

If it is bad news, it is bad news. If it is bad news for the Department, if it is bad news for the country we need to hear that bad 

news. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 115.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Ahern, I assure you, as you can tell, 

members of this committee do their homework and they also listen 

to what is presented to them by the Pentagon over time. Sometimes, you know, be careful what you wish for 1 year because somebody on this committee will remember you wished for it and then 

if the wish changes, there has to be some accounting for it. 

The main reason that we are pushing as hard as we are right 

now is we are getting into markup stage pretty quick here and we 

are going to try and stay on a schedule with regard to the 2010 

defense bill and, hopefully, the appropriations that go with it, to 
17 

try and finish on time. That is the goal of, I think, all sides here. 

This is not a partisan issue. 

So that is the reason we are pressing as much as we are, to try 

and get some answers or some perspective that will help us make 

the decisions. So we will be following up particularly on this joint 

cargo—or the cargo aircraft, I think, is going to be a key element 

in the decisions we have to make. 

Mr. Hunter has returned, so I think I said it was Mr. Coffman, 

but it will be Mr. Hunter next. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First to General Johns, I think, that is who I am—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Kissell, excuse me, Mr. Hunter, Mr. 

Kissell will follow Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. I think I am addressing this to General Johns. 

With our stable of bombers we have right now, and this could be 

an easy yes or no, does any air defense system in the world give 

you pause with our ability to strike deep? 

General JOHNS. Sir, right now I believe we can accomplish the 

missions set before us. As we looked at the Next Generation Bomber and the future of long-range strike, we look to the future to say 

how can we ensure that the combatant commanders and leaders of 

our Nation have the ability to hold any target at risk and strike 

it and resolve it, as they need to be? 

So I think we are good right now, but again that is why the discussion in the QDR, as we go through that, as to what does the 

future hold in these? 

Mr. HUNTER. Is there anything that you see being worked up 

right now that would give you pause in five years or 10 years, 

based on our current fleet? 

General JOHNS. No, sir, I am comfortable within that timeframe 

for sure. 

Mr. HUNTER. Got you, thank you. Next, to switch gears here, 

General Darnell, I think is the right general here, can you tell us 

about how the Air Force—because this is something that I talk to 

everybody about, is that the Golden Hour in Afghanistan, we didn’t 

have it. We weren’t meeting that standard, and I know Secretary 

Gates said he is on it, and that was one big thing he was pushing 

for. 

Can you tell us what the Air Force is doing with rotary wing aircraft in terms of casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) in Afghanistan? 

General DARNELL. I would be happy to, Mr. Hunter. We have deployed more aircraft forward. We have quadrupled the number of 

Air Force combat search and rescue aircraft that are forward. What 

we are finding is we are flying in an environment which it doesn’t 

really matter whether it is counterinsurgency or whether it is high 

end, asymmetric, they both involve very kinetic situations. 

One advantage the Air Force has is we trained to the high-end 

mission in combat search and rescue. We outfit the aircraft appropriately, forward-looking infrared (IR), weather mapping, as well as 

we have personnel on board, which—pararescue in particular, as 

well as gunners who are prepared to defend the aircraft. 
18 

Mr. HUNTER. Are you dual-hatting combat search and rescue rotary wing aircraft for search and rescue and for MEDEVAC, 

CASEVAC? 

General DARNELL. We are. 

Mr. HUNTER. And would you say that the majority of your search 

and rescue fleet in Afghanistan is being used for MEDEVAC, 

CASEVAC purposes to meet that Golden Hour standard right now? 

General DARNELL. Yes, that is accurate. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay, so let me switch over to Mr. Ahern. Is it 

wise, do you think, that the Secretary stopped the CSAR-X program, the acquisition of that, when it seems to me like the Air 

Force is pressed right now to perform MEDEVAC, CASEVAC because of the lack of ability for the other services to provide it for 

themselves, in that kind of environment. Mr. Ahern. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, I understand the question, but I need to 

take it. I am not in—I don’t understand exactly the—I understand 

the question, but I am frankly not able to address it. I will take 

it. 

Mr. HUNTER. Generals, did any of you up there want to address 

this, the fact that you are canceling your search and rescue when 

you don’t have enough birds to provide dedicated MEDEVAC, 

CASEVAC birds, while at the same time providing search and rescue birds, because you have to have search and rescue all over? 

Wherever you are flying anything you have to have that ability. 

And I would think that you would want dedicated search and 

rescue and not have to dual hat, not have to say, hey, we are not 

going to go pick up these guys because you are able to do it, because you have gunners and you have the ability to do it, in a kinetic firefight situation, which a search and rescue would be or a 

MEDEVAC would be, but would you want the ability to have 

enough airplanes to do it—to do either one or to do both at the 

same time? 

General DARNELL. Mr. Hunter, I will tell you, as far as numbers 

are concerned, we were looking for 141. Our intent, though, was 

not to separate out the missions themselves. We would still be 

happy to perform MEDEVAC, if required. And as I pointed out earlier, I think in the Secretary’s comments regarding a joint program, 

I think he is looking for a utility aircraft that just about any service can fly. 

Our point in the Air Force is we are the only service that trains 

to these kinetic situations and working well with other combat support aircraft. And I will give you a good example. We just had a 

pickup about 50 miles north of Bastian. It was a young Marine in 

a vehicle that was hit by an improvised explosive device (IED). 

It was not a very simple scenario. It was a scenario that we 

trained to in our weapons school at Nellis, we had F–15s and B– 

1s involved dropping GBU–38s. The combat search and rescue aircraft that flew in, the crew was experienced in working in that 

kind of environment, did not have time to wait until the scenario 

calmed down. 

They went in, in the middle of the firefight basically, and picked 

this young Marine up. The response from the Marine doctors was 

he would not have survived had they not done that. 
19 

So it is our point in the combat search and rescue mission is we 

train to it, we equip to it—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I am not arguing that you aren’t the best equipped 

to do it. 

General DARNELL. Right. 

Mr. HUNTER. My argument is do you want the ability to do both, 

and I am out of time. Thank you very much. 

General DARNELL. And we can do both, and I understand your 

point. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, we are going to have to pursue this also, 

General Darnell. You can see the questions here need to be answered. What we have right now, to follow up just momentarily, 

Mr. Kissell, before we get to you, and you need to get back not just 

to Mr. Hunter but to us on this, Mr. Ahern. 

And you, General Darnell, because the requirement aside, as I 

said in my remarks, all we have from Secretary Gates right now 

is they are supposed to be more realistic requirements, whatever 

they are—I think Mr. Hunter has pretty well enunciated what they 

are—and, if acquired have a joint service program. 

We have got other situations where services are being severed 

from that and they become an exclusive service. Now, it may be 

that the joint—because of the nature of, say, the rescue helicopter, 

both for MEDEVAC purposes and other rescues, or as Mr. Hunter 

said, simultaneous. It may be that this requires joint, but all we 

have is the assertion and there are clear legislative implications for 

us in that. So we need to get something definitive pretty quick. 

I don’t mean to—I hope I have amplified correctly here. 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. So this is not an academic question. This 

is something that is in real-time decision making for us, right? 

Mr. HUNTER. The reason why is because the Marine Corps might 

be meeting the Golden Hour. The other areas might not right now. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Because you don’t have enough birds there. You 

don’t have the right personnel to do it. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. So let us—you don’t have to come 

further today, but if you can put that into the mix of discussion you 

have in getting back to us, we would be grateful. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 116.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Kissell and then Mr. Coffman will—— 

Mr. Kissell will yield to Mr. Massa, and then Mr. Coffman will 

be next. 

Mr. MASSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Kissell. 

Generals, collectively, my personal appreciation on behalf of those 

I represent in the United States Congress for all you do, both in 

the acquisition and operational side. 

However, I take the microphone today for the record to express 

a truly troubled point of view over not only what I have heard in 

this hearing, but what I have heard over a long series of hearings 

that frankly—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Eric, excuse me. Can you speak a little more 

into the mike? Lift the mike up a little bit maybe? There you go. 
20 

Mr. MASSA. I am very troubled. I am very troubled because 

throughout the course of this hearing and the courses of hearings 

that I have had the opportunity to sit it over the past several 

weeks, I have heard, and I will put this as candidly and yet as professionally as I can, a series of testimonies that can only lightly be 

described as incredible Pentagon doubletalk. 

When I have a series of general officers appear before this committee, and I parenthetically tell you that I am not a military expert. I am a country guy from western New York State. 

But when I continuously hear people tell me that we can do more 

with less, that the number of airframes available to afford deployed 

commanders, that commitments and requirements that were absolute just a year ago, can be erased with a fluke of a phrase saying, 

‘‘We don’t need them anymore.’’ 

That somehow the United States Air Force is willing to say we 

need to upgrade the F–22 fighter, which arguably by the testimony 

of those who have appeared before us is the absolute air dominant 

aircraft today. 

While we are accepting incredible risk in the procurement of an 

airplane that in my opinion and historical analysis will tell you will 

never be delivered along the timeframes currently being discussed 

today, that is the F–35, I scratch my head in bewilderment. 

We in the United States Congress are burdened with the reality 

of a long historical knowledge, and while those who come in front 

of us change and rotate and may never come back again, we sit 

here and listen over and over and over again to program after program after program, which I guarantee you today will not deliver 

as you have testified this afternoon. 

The F–35 and the numbers at the prices that you have discussed 

today simply will not happen. It won’t. And I suggest for the record 

that you know it, and we know it, and the people that sent you 

over here know it. 

And yet last year with equal passion and forcefulness, your contemporaries appeared before the people of the United States of 

America and said, ‘‘We absolutely must have this tactical airlift aircraft. We absolutely must have a dual engine procurement strategy 

for the F–35.’’ 

And now, we sit here and we are told ‘‘Well, absolutely not. It 

is not necessary. We are going to do it through some incredible 

force of magic where fewer airframes will deliver more ordnance, 

more combat flexibility and more operational capability to the generals and admirals at sea and ashore for our forces deployed.’’ 

And gentlemen, I am sorry. More cows back on my dairy farms 

don’t give us more milk. It just doesn’t happen that way. If it is 

an issue of funding, then the Pentagon should come before this 

committee as a representative of the people’s will and say ‘‘We are 

getting shortchanged and we need to document this.’’ 

If it is not an issue of funding, then someone needs to look at 

me and say, ‘‘You know, we really got it wrong last year.’’ Blatantly, either out of omission or commission, but by golly, how 

about some straight talk for the American people instead of a 

whole bunch of five-sided Pentagon jargon. 

I just register for the record the fact that I am deeply concerned 

about the veracity of the testimony that I have heard, not only at 
21 

this committee and this hearing, but in all of the acquisition hearings. I close my statement and have no questions, but it is awful 

hard for me to take some of this seriously at this time. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Massa. 

Mr. Coffman. Mr. Coffman, you can have 1 minute more. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a question on the 

Airborne Electronic Attack programs, you may have covered this. 

General Darnell, with the B–52 stand-off jammer program cancelled in December of 2005 and without a core component jammer 

program, which was also cancelled this year, how will the Air Force 

compensate for the lack of this capability? 

General DARNELL. Mr. Coffman, we look at Airborne Electronic 

Attack as—there are several different elements associated with it. 

We are looking at a concept of operations (CONOPS) right now 

where expandable jammers, which have thus far tested very well 

and have done very well, as in a close jamming capability. 

We also look at the fact that the Active Electronically Scanned 

Array (AESA) radars, the electronic scan radars in both F–35 and 

F–22 are going to have the capability to deal with that environment as well. We have made a commitment to upgrade the EC– 

130. 

I will be honest with you, that is—my son flies EC–130’s, so I 

am painfully aware of all of the challenges that we have had with 

that program, and we are looking very closely to ensure that sustainability is met. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Johns, what is the long-term Air Force 

strategy for Airborne Electronic Attack? 

General JOHNS. Sir, it is to continue with the programs that General Darnell talked about and look at the balance between what 

can you do stand-off, what do you need to do in a penetrating environment, because if you are forced to stand-off at greater distances, 

then is the effectiveness of a stand-off capability reduced? 

So we are going through the discussion to say where is the trade 

between penetrating capability for—stand-in jamming versus 

stand-off jamming and that is continuing to go beyond what General Darnell has talked about to the future of how we migrate the 

systems from where we are today. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, very much. 

Ms. Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To be followed by Mr. Bishop. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank the witnesses today for your service and for being here. As you probably 

know, yesterday we had Secretary Donnelly and General Schwartz 

in our full committee hearing. And I was happy to hear about their 

genuine concern for an issue that I think is important to the Air 

Force, the military in our country, which is the transition to renewable energy. 

So I was really pleased to see that we are heading in the right 

direction and the Air Force has certainly been a leader in that regard and looking forward to seeing more in terms of the successes 
22 

at Nellis Air Force Base, down in areas like Davis-Monthan Air 

Force Base, AZ (D-M) and Luke, for example. 

But the other area that I was less happy to hear about, and I 

am sorry that Congressman LoBiondo is not here at the moment, 

because he has really been a leader in this area, is the fighter recapitalization for the Air Guard. 

This is an issue that many Members of Congress are concerned 

about right now and as you continue to come before us, we are 

going to continue to really press you all to get some hard answers. 

Our Air Guard is really approaching a precipice. In the past, the 

Air Force has told the Guard and this committee that there is a 

plan for fighter recapitalization. 

Last week when we asked Secretary Gates, he said we needed 

to wait a few more months and yesterday, General Schwartz asked 

us to be patient. Well, now we have essentially waited several 

years and we have been patient. So have our Guardsmen. 

But I think about the 162nd Air National Guard unit in Tucson, 

which is the largest Air Guard wing in the country. It is the largest 

international schoolhouse for the F–16 and under current plans the 

162nd will lose its aircraft in just six years. 

At 15 of the Guard’s 23 fighter wings, the fighter aircraft will become unflyable in the next 10 years. And in just eight years, 80 

percent of all Air National Guard aircraft will become unflyable. 

And looking at that waterfall chart, I am sure you have seen it, but 

I can give you a copy if you haven’t, it is a pretty scary scenario. 

By 2017, aircraft assigned to Air Guard units in Alabama, Texas, 

Colorado, Iowa and Indiana will all be unflyable. Under current 

plans, the Air National Guard, the sole guarantor of our Nation’s 

air sovereignty, will have no aircraft left to defend our Nation’s 10 

largest cities. 

So there is really no ambiguity in these numbers. There is no 

mystery. Given the looming impact of the shortfall in the Guard 

community and the dangers that this gap will have on our overall 

Nation’s security, I believe that this issue is too perilous to ignore. 

Secretary Gates last week said that the future for many Guard 

units will be the Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). And simply, I couldn’t disagree more. 

I won’t believe that our Air Guard units can defend our Nation 

with an aircraft that cannot operate in its own airspace. We cannot 

perform the defense of our homeland with unmanned drones. 

So I am curious if you all can be more precise, if you can give 

us a specific date when we will have the plans, and if you can talk, 

again, very specifically, about the Air Forces’ vision for recapitalizing and modernizing the Air Guard. 

Not all at once. 

General DARNELL. Congresswoman Giffords, our chief spoke yesterday about F–22 upgrades. He spoke about the Golden Eagle upgrades as well for—and I am talking specifically to Air Sovereignty 

Alert (ASA). Two units of the 18 have upgraded and are upgrading 

to F–22. We have four that will be Golden Eagle equipped. We 

have 15 equipped. And then the remaining 12 will depend somewhat on the 35 ramp. 

Right now, we have 80. If we could find the money to get to 110 

it would certainly make that problem a lot easier to solve. The 
23 

Chief also spoke about some of the Guard units are going to have 

to open the aperture just a little bit on missions and I think he was 

just being very honest. 

And I know General Johns has got a couple of things he wants 

to add as well, but in the ASA side of the house, as I spoke to in 

a committee hearing previously, which you attended, we and DOD 

will ensure that combatant commander requirements for defense of 

the Nation are met whether it is with Air National Guard aircraft 

or a combination of active duty. 

That is not the intent right now. The mission is an Air National 

Guard mission and our intent—it is predominately an Air National 

Guard mission. Our intent is to keep it that way. 

General JOHNS. Ma’am, regarding the recapitalization effort, the 

waterfall chart that you talk about says if I fly the aircraft 300 

hours a year, by the time it gets to 8,000 hours that is when we 

think that the aircraft will no longer be useful. And I think that 

is the genesis of the chart. 

So we are working through that. For example, the Tucson unit 

itself, the Tucson unit is key. Look at all the training they do globally. I mean, and as we sell more F–16s to the world, their support 

and importance continues on. 

Now they do some of the training with other nations’ aircraft. 

Okay, we understand that, plus we have a lot of organic aircraft 

that are there. So the mission and our commitment for them continuing on is there. 

So the question is as we look at the total requirement, how do 

we flow the active duty aircraft to the Guard unit? How do we 

make sure, as General Darnell said, the ASA mission is key? We 

will never defer from the mission and the defense of our homeland. 

So we are working through that, but again there are many moving pieces as we look at all the different Guard units around the 

country and to see where is the best alignment as we go forward 

to make sure that every morning when they get up and they put 

this Air Force uniform on, that they are proud to serve their Nation and proud to serve their Air Force and that is what we are 

striving to. 

And I feel, well because my son is a Guardsman, so I get that 

every night. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. So, General Johns, in terms of a specific date 

when we can really sit down and look at the plan, can you give 

us—you know, you talked about plans that are developing and also 

when I think about whether or not it is feasible under any scenario 

that a contractor can produce or the Air Force can procure enough 

F–35s to fill the needs, I mean is that something that we can see 

in the next couple of weeks? The next couple of months? 

General JOHNS. Ma’am, I would like to if I could make a condition. I would like to get through the QDR to see what is the national requirement, the Air Force requirement, and then come back 

to you with that overarching, you know, approach and then say 

how does it waterfall and cascade throughout the Air Force? 

So I would say in the fall, and I apologize. If I could give you 

a specific date I would, but I don’t want to offer something and not 

be able to deliver on it. So it would be in the fall. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. In the fall. 
24 

General JOHNS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. September timeframe? 

General JOHNS. Ma’am, probably more toward November timeframe. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Late fall. Early winter. 

General JOHNS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. All right. Well, we are looking forward to working 

with you. 

General JOHNS. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. This is obviously a very serious issue and, you 

know, we have some patience, but we are kind of running out of 

patience. 

General JOHNS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. It is very important. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 115.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I have six questions I would like to get 

through and then one for Chairman Abercrombie afterwards. 

So—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Delighted. 

Mr. BISHOP. General, well, I am assuming Darnell, first. I want 

to talk about the 250 planes that will be retired, if I could. 

The 388th Wing is one of, if not the first, one of the first that 

was blended with the 419th Reserves. The question I have is the 

primary aircraft authorization (PAA) assumes that there will be 

about 24 planes retired from the 388th in some way. 

Was consideration of the integration of the Reserve and—sorry I 

am giving this feedback here. Was integration considered as you 

went through coming up with how many planes would be retired 

from that particular group? 

Does this in some way mess up future integration problems when 

you have the chance of taking planes away from a wing like that? 

General DARNELL. Mr. Bishop, I am not exactly sure what you 

are driving at, but I think we did look very closely at that. 

Mr. BISHOP. I guess the bottom line, was integration a consideration when you came up with the number of planes that would be 

taken out? 

General DARNELL. Yes, it was. And obviously if there had been 

no probability of success, we wouldn’t have done that. 

Mr. BISHOP. Can I also ask, and this may be going deeper in the 

weeds than at this level we should do. As you are looking forward 

to how you reshape these things, are you gaining some flexibility? 

A retired general said you had to have 24 planes in a squadron. 

It couldn’t happen with anything less. 

Are you going to give some flexibility to Air Combat Command 

maybe if the wing lead is to try and say if maybe a squadron could 

be dealt with, with fewer than 24? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. In fact, we currently have many of 

our units that are 18 PAA versus 24. 

Mr. BISHOP. Yes, that would be very helpful because if, for example, a squadron was simply lopped and then you had deployment. 

You had a squadron tasked. That would have a negative impact obviously on the training ability for those kind of wings to do that 
25 

kind of work. I would hope that that would be one of the options 

that were there. 

As we retire more F–16s who have been carrying so many of the 

sortie missions, are we not putting more pressure on the existing 

ones? We are already well past the design capacity of these planes. 

By having fewer planes out there, are we not making those that 

remain even more stressed as we go through the needs of the Air 

Force? 

General DARNELL. Sir, we acknowledge that when you have 

fewer tails that you are going to fly—with the same requirements, 

you are going to fly more hours on the remaining aircraft. We have 

not—at this point we have not reached a point where that is of concern to us. We are looking at extending the life of the airplane to 

8,000 hours. 

Currently, the F–16 was originally designed for four. We are 

going to do fatigue testing, which will start within the next yearand-a-half on the F–16 to give us some sense for whether we need 

to, for instance, Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) the airplane. 

And there are pros and cons associated with the SLEP. I am not 

saying that is the absolute right thing to do, but we are going to 

start fatigue testing on the F–16s, just as we are currently doing 

on the F–15. 

Mr. BISHOP. If I could skip with an unfair question on F–22s for 

just a second. If 187 is now the accurate number, was there a new 

study that was found to validate Secretary Gates’ conclusion that 

that was the right number or is this a byproduct of money? 

General DARNELL. Sir, I am not aware of a new study. Mr. Ahern 

may be able to speak to that, but as—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Maybe—I am sorry. I think you just answered the 

question and you did it very well. And maybe one of the things I 

could tell to Chairman Abercrombie is when Secretary Gates was 

here, we talked about here—he talked about how this had to be a 

zero sum game within the defense budget. 

And cannibalizing another area of defense for another area of defense doesn’t make a whole heck of a lot of sense. This should not 

be a zero sum game within this particular budget area, which was 

not the question I had for you. The question was that wonderful 

statement—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. For purposes of perspective however, I agree 

with you. 

Mr. BISHOP. I think we both agree and we both realize the problems we are up against in trying to change that. I just want to 

know if wishes were horses, we would all be riding. Is that a copyrighted statement? Or is that something—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If wishes—— 

Mr. BISHOP [continuing]. I could be using? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If wishes. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is what I said. If wishes were horses, we would 

all be riding? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. So I can start using that or have you copyrighted 

it. I don’t—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No. 
26 

Mr. BISHOP [continuing]. Want to have to contribute to your campaign for—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It comes from my mother, and my mother 

was a very generous-hearted person. 

Mr. BISHOP. Gentlemen, I appreciate your service here. I also 

think the Air Force is underfunded. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If wishes were F–22s, we would all be flying 

apparently. 

Mr. BISHOP. Then I will pray for more wishes tonight in some 

particular way. Thank you for what you are doing. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. I am—Mr. Hunter, we have a couple of minutes left out of the first round before I get to my questions, and I understand you had something you wanted to go a little further in and so did Mr. Marshall so we have probably got 

three or four minutes. And then Mr. Kissell gave his time away. 

But we will go to Mr. Hunter and then Mr. Marshall. And if 

there is any time left we will give Mr. Kissell a shot, and then I 

have a few questions, and we will go to a second round. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

I asked General Schwartz this, and I would like to ask you also. 

AC–130’s, the AC–130 gunship that is still what it is called right, 

the AC–130 gunship, when I was in Fallujah in 2004 the AC–130 

would circle, and that would be the time for us to go out, resupply 

the guys, get our own resupply, do whatever we had to do because 

the bad guys just hid. 

They didn’t want to be out, and they could hear it. And that was 

it, I mean it was amazing. And as you know it is not an every night 

occurrence that the AC–130 flies for you. 

And I know it is a special operations asset as it is now, but I am 

sure that other units that aren’t specialized, that aren’t necessarily 

Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or Marine Corps Forces 

Special Operations Command (MARSOC) assets, regular Marine 

Corps infantry units, if there is such a thing, they are all fantastic 

in the Marine Corps, infantry units, but there is 10th Mountain, 

certain Ranger groups, they would love to have an asset like that. 

Has it been looked at to provide that asset? Because I know that 

there is money in here to upgrade AC–130 and maybe to have more 

but has it been looked at, to acquisition some more for the regular 

guys so you have enough pilots and you have enough aircraft to be 

able to put them in Regional Command (RC) South, for instance, 

even if a more specialized group in RC East wants it, too, at the 

same time. Or a different agency wants to use it? I mean has it 

been thought about at all? 

General DARNELL. Mr. Hunter, I am not aware of any, right now 

of any expressed concern on the part of SOCOM or Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) that we don’t have adequate 

numbers and can’t—— 

Mr. HUNTER. No, I am saying you have plenty for them. I am 

talking about different war fighters, the ones that aren’t SOCOM 

or MARSOC, or more just the regular Marine Corps, regular Army. 

I am talking about them because I have had questions asked of me 

by ground commanders, combatant commanders, ‘‘Wow, it would 

sure be nice to have this.’’ If they had one thing—in fact, I have 

asked them ‘‘If you could have one thing what would it be?’’ 
27 

General DARNELL. Yes. 

Mr. HUNTER. ‘‘AC–130 gunship.’’ Or—go ahead. 

General DARNELL. Our CONOPs right now with the AC–130 does 

not mean that they are dedicated strictly to SOCOM. I mean it is 

we have a lot of the strictly conventional units, you know, and I 

will speak to Army, quite frankly—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But they get to use it when the other guys aren’t 

if there is not a SOCOM or other agency requirement that night 

then the other guys get to use it. I mean that was the position we 

were in. We got to use it when it wasn’t being used—— 

General DARNELL. Right. 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. Because you didn’t have enough. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Could you look into it? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You have got the question. 

General DARNELL. We are speaking to the tyranny of numbers, 

and I understand the points you are getting at. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, well, it is a good follow on to what Mr. 

Bishop’s point was, is that we are going to have to take into account when we make our recommendation, we are going to try and 

do this from the point of view of strategy and strategic interests as 

opposed to budget per se. 

Obviously we are not going to be reckless with that. We may 

have to do reallocations within what we get. We obviously have to 

talk, Mr. Skelton and Mr. Murtha, et cetera, and to the ranking 

members as well. 

But that is what we are trying to get at. We are trying to get 

the right mix, the right way, right now. 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And if you could give at least a perspective, 

you are not expected to usurp Secretary Gates’ prerogatives or anything of that nature. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 116.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We will go to Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When Ms. Giffords 

pursued her line of questioning concerning National Guard, and I 

wanted to ask the gentlelady if she would yield me some time so 

that I could jump in, but her time had already expired. And so I 

couldn’t. 

The line of questioning reminded me of some conversations that 

I had about four or five years ago with some Naval National Guard 

Air units. And evidently Guard unit was deployed to the Roosevelt 

and conducting missions off the Roosevelt along with active duty. 

And the Navy graded landings, graded the performance of the 

maintenance teams, et cetera. 

And the Guard unit—it should come to no surprise to the Air 

Force guys, and you will hear why—but the Guard unit was far 

and away superior to the active duty units in those measurable 

characteristics. And I think we can all generally agree that, typically, a 40-year-old pilot’s judgment is likely to be better than a 25- 

year-old or 28-year-old pilot’s judgment, certainly experience is 

there. That is generally true of Guard units. 
28 

And what really struck me was that these Navy guys were saying, ‘‘You know, the Air Force gets this. The Air Force understands 

that a very valuable asset for the Air Force is its Guard units, with 

experienced pilots, experienced mechanics. Don’t have to pay as 

much and, frankly, in performance with the exception,’’ they said, 

‘‘of taking Gs, in certain circumstances a younger pilot is a better 

choice. 

But other than that across the board everything you would be 

looking for, and frankly when I fly I kind of like see a lot of gray 

hairs in the cockpit, everything you are looking for you get from 

Guard units, more so than you do from active duty units. 

And where, you know, the constant lament where the Army is 

concerned whenever the Army is, you know, this JCA thing or 

other things, the Army will constantly point out that, ‘‘Gosh, you 

know who we have flying our planes. We have got warrant officers, 

and they have got some gray hairs, and they are pretty dry behind 

the ears, and their performance as a result is going to be better on 

average.’’ 

And so I just add to what Ms. Giffords was saying that Air Force 

doesn’t need to lose sight of the credit that Air Force has gotten 

from others over the years, recognizing that a valuable asset here 

are these Guard units with their experience, with their crews. 

And also by the way on the Roosevelt trip, the Guard units, the 

maintenance teams for the Guard units were the ones that kept all 

the planes flying. And the Guard units had their older planes, they 

had older platforms, many more hours on them, the Guard units 

were supplying the active duty units with planes to fly. 

That is how good they are so we obviously just need to keep an 

eye on that and make sure that we take advantage of that asset, 

the asset of the individuals. That is all I wanted to say. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, and well said at that. 

Mr. Kissell, did you have something you would like to pursue? 

Mr. KISSELL. Mr. Chairman, just one question. General 

Shackelford, if you could answer this, to go to a phrase earlier discussed, if wishes were F–22s would we wish for F–22s that had 

ground capabilities? Because I had not heard of this approach until 

today as a matter of fact. 

And I am just wondering, are we just looking for a justification 

for the F–22s? Obviously they are a superior fighter, are we just 

trying to find a way to say, ‘‘Okay, we are using them for something.’’ Is this really a good purpose for using them? 

General SHACKELFORD. Mr. Kissell, thank you very much for the 

question. If I may I would like to point out that the F–22 has had 

a basic air-to-ground capability from the beginning that would be 

two 1,000 pound bombs carried internally which is the mode of operation for the F–22. 

The mission of the F–22 is largely in the air-to-air arena but we 

use the term air dominance. And air dominance goes beyond pure 

air-to-air to countering advanced surface-to-air missile systems 

using weapons like the Joint Direct Attack Munition or the Small 

Diameter Bomb. 

As we have looked at the F–22 as it has originally come off the 

production line, we have wanted to expand its air-to-ground capa-
29 

bility to bring these newer weapons into play. And this results in 

what I would call a pre-planned product improvement program. 

This is what is otherwise called modernization of the F–22, 

which brings in incremental additional air-to-ground capability 

that is tied both to going from the 1,000 pound JDAM to up to 

eight Small Diameter Bombs, with the ability to self-target by an 

upgrade to the radar that allows grand mapping. 

The original radar was optimized for air-to-air. But an upgrade 

to the radar, which allows us to do ground mapping of sufficient 

accuracy that we can self-target these Global Positioning System 

(GPS)-guided weapons. And to go beyond simply dropping one at a 

time to dropping multiples by taking advantage of better integration of the avionics. 

So the F–22 uses these weapons in the suppression or really destruction of enemy air defense role for the advanced Integrated Air 

Defense System that is optimized to fly against with its high-altitude, super-cruise, low-signature capabilities. 

So that it can in effect take down some of those higher threat 

systems before other forces come along. So that has been part of 

the philosophy for the F–22 for at least the last seven or eight 

years and is now working its way into the baseline for the system 

through these incremental modernization upgrades. 

Mr. KISSELL. Will we able to use that capacity with support for 

our ground troops? 

General SHACKELFORD. That capacity would certainly be available for support for the ground troops were it called for by the combatant commander. Now the F–35 has similar capabilities in larger 

numbers with better air-to-ground sensors optimized for air-toground, optimized for more persistent air-to-ground role, additional 

internal fuel, additional weapons load, particularly after you get 

past the few days of a high threat conflict into something where 

you can put external stores on the F–35. 

And in effect the F–35 would be the weapons system of choice 

for that type of support of ground forces type of mission. But the 

F–22 would be capable of doing it, too. 

Mr. KISSELL. And when would the F–35 be available? 

General SHACKELFORD. The Air Force initial operational capability comes along in the 2013 timeframe. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman very much. I also 

wanted to compliment you on going through your opening statement and the detail that you did to help clarify the situation we 

are in. And gentlemen, thank you for being here. Thank you for 

your service to our country. 

I apologize that I had to leave for part of this. I know that a couple of my colleagues, Congressman Marshall and Congressman Giffords, brought up a topic that is near and dear to me. And I apologize if I am covering some repetitive ground. 

But through hearings from Secretary Gates and every opportunity we have had, we can’t quite get an answer of what is going 
30 

to happen with our Air Guard units if the F–35 slips. We have got 

a QDR coming up. 

We understand that there is a lot that is hinging on that. There 

is always a reason why we can’t get an answer. If you are looking 

at a cost benefit analysis, everything I have seen suggests that the 

Air Guard is some of the best bang for the buck that the United 

States of America gets anywhere. 

So we should in fact be doing anything and everything we can 

to ensure that we don’t have any slippage. And I just—I mean, I 

don’t understand if we have a two- or a three-year shift to the 

right, which is not too farfetched on the F–35 that what do we do? 

We have Air Guard units that have jets that you can’t put online 

because just the airframes can’t take it. What do we do? When do 

we get an answer of what the plan is? I don’t know, General 

Darnell, if you want to take a shot at that? 

General DARNELL. Congressman LoBiondo, I answered a question, a similar question earlier to Congresswoman Giffords, and I 

will speak to the ASA portion of this, and I will allow General 

Johns to carry it from there. 

We, obviously as General Schwartz said, we are converting of the 

18 alert sites, two are going to be F–22 equipped, four F–15 

equipped with Golden Birds and then the remaining 12 are a question right now. 

We are fatigue testing an F–15 and fatigue testing the F–15 fleet 

to see if we can extend the airplane out further. We are looking at 

right now 12,000 hours for the F–15 to see if that is achievable. 

Some might be concerned about the long drawn issues we had 

before. We are doing inspections every 400 flight hours on the aircraft to ensure that we are not getting ourselves in a situation that 

could be just as catastrophic as that Guard mishap at St. Louis. 

And thus far, the inspections are not—have not been concerning 

at all. In fact, we are finding we are being overly conservative. 

When we are able to complete the structural testing on the F–15 

as well as the F–16, which we are going to do, and I know a lot 

of your ASA units, particularly there in Atlantic City, are F–16, 

then our intent is to try to get out the 8,000 hours with the airplane. 

We will know how realistic that is after the fatigue testing is 

complete and should be able to at that point, give us some sense 

for whether a SLEP or a combination of SLEP and new aircraft are 

required. 

Now obviously, those answers are going to be a lot further out 

than you would prefer. I know Congresswoman Giffords in talking 

with General Johns, General Johns committed to her that we 

would like to be able to come back to you with a plan by November 

of this year and that is what we intend to do. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, I certainly hope so and—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, General, I am sorry but that is not responsive to Mr. LoBiondo’s question. Maybe you will need some 

time on it. What I mean by responsive is to understand what you 

said, I think we all do. 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But the question was—is what is your plan? 

Do you have a plan and what is it with—if this F–35 slippage takes 
31 

place or any of the other slippages take place with regard to the 

real-time necessities of having the Air Guard readiness addressed? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. And I ended my statement with—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because if you say November, that doesn’t do 

us any good with this markup that we are coming into. 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. Well, I will allow General Johns to 

add, but I am not aware of a definitive plan right now. 

General JOHNS. Sir, regarding the plan, the chart that has been 

used, the waterfall chart—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In other words, what do you want us to do? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. Right now as we go through 2010, I am 

comfortable to say we are going to go through 2010 and be okay. 

There is time for us to effect whatever outcome we need to do as 

we look at the F–35 coming onboard, as we look at the aggregate 

requirement for fighter attack platforms for our Nation that the Air 

Force provides. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But the problem with that, General, is that— 

I am sorry, I am taking a little of Mr. LoBiondo’s time here but 

we have talked about this, he and I for quite a bit, and we can do 

this together. 

The problem here is is that we don’t have any projection from 

you past next year. I mentioned that in the beginning of my remarks, which is the ordinary way that we do this. If fact, I think 

it is legally required of us. 

And what we are expected to—the way Mr. Skelton is expecting 

us to recommend to the full committee is what is the—what are the 

likely requirements that we are going to have in terms of funding 

in numbers, the numbers of airframes and funding requirements 

for the future? 

If we don’t have a plan, we can’t give it to them. I understand 

what you are saying tactically speaking or budget year speaking 

that, well, we can get through 2010 and then we are going to take 

it up. 

But I can’t give Mr. Skelton and the rest of the committee that 

answer. Am I correct, Frank, where we are going? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. You are exactly on the mark. 

General JOHNS. I apologize that we aren’t going through the rest 

of the FYDP and that is the situation we are in is—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is that because of the quadrennial review? 

Every time we don’t get an answer, they bring up the quadrennial 

review. This is going to be, I think, my fifth one. They are useless. 

They are utterly useless. 

I came in to this thing when I was a rookie, and I came on this 

committee, I thought, oh, this is going to be a General Powell who 

is going to be a 96 percent—he could have told us we were all going 

to get those horses and wishes would come true and everybody 

would have believed it. 

He had I think a 96 percent approval rating and the other 4 percent were going to be committed, so he could have done anything 

but that quadrennial review was a bunch of words on paper that 

never went anywhere. And every other one that has come in has 

been the same. 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. 
32 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I can’t go to—really, honestly, we can’t go to 

Mr. Skelton and say we are depending on the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, because we would all have to sit here and pretend that we 

thought that was going to mean something. 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. So my comment to come back to you, 

and I apologize was—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You don’t have to apologize. 

General JOHNS. Toward November, toward the end of the review, 

we will take whatever information is available to us as—and I 

apologize, doesn’t help you for 2010, but then formulate that as to 

what is the best way to go forward to one, we insure that we always defend our Nation, two, that we ensure that we get maximum—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, can you—if you can give us, give Mr. 

LoBiondo and give us your best guesstimate as to what a plan 

would be to address the Guard question, the Guard readiness question, then we will try to incorporate it and what we will do and 

make our best judgment on it. 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, if I might just for a moment, let 

me put a little bit different spin on all this than the critically important perspective that the chairman has put on it. On Saturday, 

I had an opportunity to go into the 177th. No ribbons, no cameras, 

no hullabaloo. 

There were a group of Air Guard young men and women who 

just, I got together with to answer some questions, just to tell them 

thanks. Again, we were completely—wasn’t anything that was any 

media event. And they were an incredibly motivating young group 

of people. The questions that I got from more than one, and actually a number of them was, ‘‘Do I have a future in the Air Guard?’’ 

Now, if we get into this territory, and I assured them that they 

did, I don’t think the Air Force is prepared to not have an Air 

Guard. And if you have got young people who are so incredibly talented, so incredibly motivated that they are not doing what their 

peers are doing on weekends off and playing, but they are serving 

their Nation, and they are questioning whether they made the 

right decision, this is a problem. 

They know some of what is going on here. They don’t know all 

the details, and I want to encourage them. I want to thank them. 

I don’t want to mislead them. And at some point we are going to 

have something tangible that these young men and women can be 

assured that they have made the right decision. 

And whether it is the 177th that I represent or pick any other 

unit that is out there, that it is critically essential to the homeland 

security of the United States and to the national defense of our 

country, so this is getting down to a real personal level. And I did 

not expect those questions, Mr. Chairman. 

I expected some of the other questions, some of the general questions, but when they said, ‘‘Gee, we are really wondering if we 

made the right decision, can you assure us?’’ So, you need to be 

thinking about this as well as we come up with something that I 

can say to them that is credible. Mr. Chairman, thank you very 

much. 
33 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are welcome. Mr. Marshall has the last 

comment, and then I know Mr. Ahern is looking forward to our dialogue. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Continuing along the same line, sounds to me 

like the Department has decided to retire platforms that largely 

will be replaced by the F–35, that the Department has a notion of 

the ramp-up for the F–35 that may be overly optimistic. 

That is certainly the perception we are getting from the testimony that we have heard and the comments that we have gotten 

from industry and the history so far with the development of the 

F–35. And Mr. Sullivan would have some expertise to be able to 

comment on that. 

So it sounds to me like the retirement part of this is sort of tied 

to the development of the F–35 on a certain schedule and at the 

moment you are simply not able to answer some of these questions 

concerning the impact of retirement on some of these guard units 

and other matters. 

It seems to me that perhaps we are getting a little bit ahead of 

ourselves with regard to retirement, just as we may be getting a 

little bit ahead of ourselves with regard to actually acquiring a 

whole bunch of these F–35s, in the sense that we haven’t even finished our development testing. 

But we are certainly getting ahead of ourselves with retirement 

when your testimony is, if I understand it correctly, that many of 

these platforms don’t need to be retired. They—we can continue to 

use them for a while. Don’t know how long. But we are going to 

go ahead and test and make sure they are safe and we can continue to use them. 

So maybe the wiser course here is for you to suggest to us how 

we might, in our bill, not just take what you proposed which is the 

authority to retire 250, but ramp up retirement. The idea is that 

ultimately we will get to 250, but we don’t get to 250 until you 

have shown us how there is actually feasibly going to be platforms 

available so that there is not an unacceptable interruption in the 

availability of platforms for these Guard units and others. 

In other words, it is not just 250, trust us. It is yes 250, but it 

is on a certain schedule that assumes certain things about the development of the F–35, failing which, we halt retirements so that 

there isn’t a gap that is caused by some sort of problems with the 

development of the F–35 that we can’t anticipate right now. 

And frankly, what we have heard so far is that the F–35 development is not going to proceed at the rate that we would like to see 

it proceed. There is history that certainly suggests that. 

So perhaps you all could suggest to us some sort of schedule that 

is—where the two are tied together. And I frankly think the committee would be a lot more comfortable with this and giving the authority to retire if there were a link and a stepped-up schedule. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. You don’t have to answer that question. 

That is a suggestion and I would iterate it as well that perhaps we 

can put some language together which will be in the bill, not in the 

report, about this, to be able to address that. Thank you, all. 

Mr. Ahern, I would like to take my turn now and go through a 

few things if we can. I have a letter here, which I don’t believe you 
34 

have, to Secretary Gates in April with regard to the Joint Strike 

Fighter program and the funding for the alternate engine. That is 

okay, you needn’t look for it. I don’t believe you have it. I am just 

referencing it for you. 

I suspect it is wandering around in the vicinity of Secretary Lynn 

at the moment, I should imagine. I am not so concerned that it— 

Mr. Bartlett and I sent this letter six weeks ago, that it hasn’t been 

answered because of the obvious changes that have taken place in 

the Department with the inauguration of a new president and a 

new—the wheel turning in perhaps even another direction at the 

time. 

However, last year before this subcommittee, then Secretary 

Young committed to us to obligate the authorized and appropriated 

funding for the Joint Strike Fighter alternate engine. Contrary to 

that commitment, and that was a commitment and it was commanded, if you will, by the defense bill on a bipartisan basis. We 

don’t do things in this committee where at all possible on a partisan basis, and I would say that is true 99 percent of the time. 

Contrary to that commitment, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not released the fiscal year 2009 funding for advance procurement. Now as I say, this is a letter, this is a copy of the letter 

which I will be happy to send to you, but take my word for it. It 

is simply asking why advance procurement funding had not been 

released. 

Are you sufficiently aware of the situation to be able to say to 

us today, what is the status of that funding? 

Mr. AHERN. The funding—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We are still in this fiscal year after all, and 

there is still time to get this moving and under way—— 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. That—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Over and above the projection for 

2010 about the alternate engine. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. That money was not released because there 

was not procurement funding follow planned for the eventual procurement of the engines for which that advance procurement was 

planned. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I was afraid that that was going to be your 

answer. I wasn’t trying to trap you, but you realize the logic of 

what you just said. It means that we are not going to fund anything that doesn’t have exactly that. 

I can see General Johns swallowing hard right at the moment 

because that means you can’t do any long-range planning. All the 

rest of what we talked about today, we don’t have—exactly the 

same situation prevails for these other platforms. 

Mr. AHERN. By that I mean in for other platforms—or for most 

situations, Advanced Procurement (AP) is followed by or there is 

identified funding in the FYDP, and there was a FYDP at that 

time. There was the fiscal year 2009 FYDP, which was—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Nice try, Mr. Ahern, but you understand that 

you don’t—we have just discussed here in other venues exactly the 

same situation. Does that mean we shouldn’t do—you are not going 

to release funding for any of these other, in these other directions? 

Mr. AHERN. I am not sure that the—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You don’t have the—— 
35 

Mr. AHERN. This is a unique—this sounds like a unique case to 

me, at least at the time that it came up, the AP in 2009. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will repeat what I said in the beginning. 

‘‘We have just received the details of the fiscal year 2010 budget 

request. The request did not include any information or data regarding plans, programs, or budgets for fiscal year 2011 and beyond.’’ 

There are a number of requests for advanced procurement in 

there. We don’t know what is going to be procured. We don’t 

know—just what you just said. You said you can’t release the funding for the alternate engine because we don’t have what we just 

don’t have for everything else. 

Mr. AHERN. I take your point. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am not trying to push you in a corner. 

Mr. AHERN. No. Yes, sir. I am not perceiving—I take your point, 

sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

Mr. AHERN. I was addressing the specific—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If you don’t want to do it—— 

Mr. AHERN [continuing]. Replacement of the AP 2009. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All I am saying is Secretary Gates doesn’t 

want to do it, or Mr. Lynn or whoever, then say so. I don’t want 

to have somebody tell me, ‘‘Well, we don’t have everything worked 

out in 2011 and beyond,’’ and I say, ‘‘We don’t have anything else 

worked out for 2011 and beyond either.’’ 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, I understand that. I was addressing the specific case of the 2009 AP for the second engine. I understand what 

you are saying. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay, because at some point, we are going to 

have to put this in the bill or something. I would like to have the 

opportunity maybe to sit down with you, if you are going to make 

the recommendation or somebody else, the Secretary for that matter, and talk about this alternate engine. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I think we can work it out so that it is not 

in addition to and that we are not in a position for somebody to 

win, somebody else has to lose. I think if we look at this in terms 

of some reallocation of funding, some reallocation of—or reconsideration of numbers, with regard to advanced procurement with the 

F–35 and so on, that this could be worked out on a reasonable 

basis. 

The thing that drives me in this is the GAO—does everybody 

have the same material we have? I have got the—anyway, we 

can—I will provide them to you. Okay, you do have the backup 

slide here. This is the F–15 and Joint Strike Fighter engine programs compared in terms of this engine difficulty that occurred and 

the timeframe. 

I mean, when I look at this, it makes my heart beat faster because I don’t want to chair or recommend to the subcommittee or 

the full committee funding and policy that I have trepidation it is 

not going to be able to be fulfilled. 

That is why we are trying to do the alternate engine or the competitive engine. We are not trying to get into a contest of wills with 
36 

the Secretary, or most certainly not with the Air Force. We are trying to make this succeed. 

I hope it is clear that the motivation here is to make sure that 

you get the Joint Strike Fighter that you want to have in all of its 

permutations, all of its iterations, if you will, that works and that 

maximizes the opportunity for it to work in a timeframe that, in 

turn, maximizes your opportunity to carry out its strategic requirements, the long-term necessities that you have outlined for us. 

The amount of money is not that great comparatively, and if we 

work this right, I think we can do this and still accommodate everybody. As we are well aware, the numbers change all the time. 

Two hundred and thirty-one becomes 187, you know, 98 becomes 

38, or 92 becomes 38, that kind of thing. 

So I am just putting on the table for your consideration, that let 

us not get off into arguments about definitions of advanced procurement funding and so on. Let us figure out how we can do this. 

I believe you are going to find a very strong school of thought in 

the Congress for funding the alternate engine. Let us not make this 

barbed wire that people have to throw themselves on. Let us talk 

about it in a way to see whether we can accommodate everybody’s 

interests. 

The fact is that about almost 70 percent of the alternative engine 

development cost has already been obligated, and I think it is 

worth the investment, and I hope that the Secretary will give us 

the opportunity to perhaps have a little discussion about whether 

or not that makes sense. 

I can send some other questions on to you, but in that context, 

then maybe I can ask General Darnell and General Shackelford— 

this is not news to you about the ‘‘Great Engine War’’ and so on. 

I take it you are all familiar with it, right? 

General DARNELL. I am familiar with it, yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Did you have to go through some of it yourselves? 

General DARNELL. We both were flying at the time. I was flying 

F–15s at the time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay, so is my—I hope you will agree that 

my recitation, my summary recitation of what happened during the 

1970’s and so on was correct. I am not trying to create a myth here. 

That is the information I have is that these difficulties were encountered. And I am not saying that it is necessarily an analogy, 

but it is a parallel situation I want to avoid if I can. That is the 

reason. 

Were you involved when the F–15 engines had to be shuttled 

around because of the readiness problems and the maintenance 

problems? 

General DARNELL. Mr. Chairman, I was flying F–15s at the time 

when that was going on, yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. In terms of long range or maybe, General Shackelford, you are the more appropriate person to ask here, 

in terms of acquisition cost. Has the general recitation here about 

acquisition cost increases reflect the realities that you have encountered? Are those numbers real? 

General SHACKELFORD. And sir, you are referring to the cost of 

the engines? 
37 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Changes—yes, the cost changes and so on 

with regard to the F–35 over and above the engine? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. What I would like to comment 

on, sir, with respect to the engines is that the comparison of cost 

increases for the F135 versus the F136, not really an apples-to-apples comparison. As you are aware—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am sure they are not. 

General SHACKELFORD. Right. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I didn’t—if you thought I was making an apples-to-apples comparison I apologize. That was not the intention. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir, I understand. Just to point out 

that there are other items in the F135 funding line that aren’t directly part of the engine technology itself, the— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, that is right. 

General SHACKELFORD [continuing]. Common equipment, the 

common exhaust system and whatnot, which is part of that cost increase, as well as the redesign on the aircraft as a result of STOVL 

weight problems here a few years ago. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

General SHACKELFORD. As we look at—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am well aware that the weight problems 

created its own—you can—I can draw a parallel there to the Presidential helicopter. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Just weight problems alone caused—which I 

don’t know, as a layperson I certainly anticipated. I can say that 

with some authority, because I got the transcript out of even our 

closed briefings and closed discussions that we had, to make sure 

I wasn’t dreaming up that, oh, yes, I knew all that or I brought 

that up, and then it turned I was dreaming that I did or only 

wished that I had said it. 

But even to myself, not an aeronautical engineer or a pilot, it 

was clear to me, you start changing the weight around in some significant way, you are going to change everything that has to do 

with design and flight testing and everything else because it 

changes the physics. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I will send you some questions, General 

Shackelford, if it is okay, with regard to your prepared statement 

on the cost of the alternate engine through fiscal year 2015, because there are some differences that occurred there—I mean from 

information we got in the past—so I am trying to get an accounting 

for that, okay? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Take a look at it, so that I have the right 

numbers in mind. Right now, just for background information, 

there is three flight test aircraft delivered to date. If you have different information, you stop me, okay. 

Three flight test aircraft delivered to date, 10 flight test aircraft 

in the works, 28 production aircraft authorized and appropriated 

through fiscal year 2009, and 30 aircraft in fiscal year 2010 request, 10 for the Air Force; is that all accurate? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay, very good. 
38 

General SHACKELFORD. I am sorry, sir, did you say all for the Air 

Force, the 30? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ten. 

General SHACKELFORD. Ten of them are for the Air Force. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ten, right. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General SHACKELFORD. Thirty total. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Sullivan, you were inches from a clean 

get away, the Joint Strike Fighter procurement plan including the 

international purchases would increase—would—can these numbers be correct? Would increase from 17 to 32 aircraft from fiscal 

year 2009 to 2010? Is that—are you familiar with that number? 

Does that make sense to you? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Fiscal year 2009 to 2010? Yes, that is correct, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I am looking for some flexibility here 

as we go forward in terms of possible reallocation of funding. To 

the best of your judgment, Mr. Sullivan, and the best of your capacity to answer, is there an industry or government standard regarding preferred year-over-year increases in production and what factories affect the preferred rate of increase? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. In terms of—you are referring to the speed in 

which they ramp up their production rate? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, is there some kind of formula that 

you—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don’t know of any. I don’t think there is any industry standard or anything like that, but there are formulas that 

they use that are based on learning curve analysis. 

And I think that on the Joint Strike Fighter program probably 

the learning curves were more steep and are less steep now, as 

they reexamine where they are in the program, because they don’t 

know as much as they thought that they would know at this point, 

I guess, is kind of a rambling answer but that is the best way I 

can say it. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would that have something to do—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They miscalculated the learning curve at the outset, and they have adjusted them now, and as a result they are getting a lot of cost increases due to, you know, they are having to 

add labor hours to the estimate. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And this is not beyond normal expectation 

right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No this is not—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. This is not an easy deal. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is not an easy deal. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I made an analogy today, again, in layman’s 

terms, I mean this is not a simple V8 engine. You know, put in the 

1955 Chevy right? This is a V12 with a whole computer set. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To have to be dealt with right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, in fact if you wanted to make—if you 

wanted to compare it to the auto industry or something, the auto 

industry or some industry that is high volume pretty much knows 

what they are doing. 
39 

They have learning curves as well but it is based on really, you 

know, actual data, and they don’t change much so they can do 

learning curve analysis, figure out what the first one is going to 

take to build, figure out what the millionth one is going to take to 

build because they know what their learning will be—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. See compared to the F–15 this F—the Joint 

Strike Fighter is an incredibly more sophisticated, and the demands on this airframe are going to be infinitely greater. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, I think one of the points that we have been 

trying to make the past several years and are making again this 

year, is that the Joint Strike Fighter is so complex that those 

learning curves are harder to come by. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sure. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, one of the beauties of the F–15 and the 

F–16 was that they were kind of an incremental approach to developing the aircraft. They bit off a little bit of capability at a time 

so their learning curves were much steeper than what the Joint 

Strike Fighter is. 

The Joint Strike Fighter has well overestimated from the outset 

how much learning they would accomplish at this point. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So in that context then you were critical, others were critical of the management plan approved in 2007 which 

reduced the Joint Strike Fighter development flight tests in order 

to replenish the management reserves. 

You raised concerns about the cutback in flight testing, and implications for finding and resolving those performance problems. I 

think you have already stated some of the specific concerns that 

you had with the plan and the time. 

How do you regard that now? I think you have stated it in general terms but how do you regard the question of flight tests, assets 

and planning right now with regard to the time table for that that 

at least is implied in the 2010 proposal with regards to increase 

production, et cetera? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We—right now we think that the mid-course risk 

reduction plan that they undertook last year, that the schedule as 

a result of that and where they are today is still is very risky. 

If you look at the test program itself, flight test, no white space 

in there. There is no room for error. There is very little time to do 

the flight testing, bring the data back, do the analysis, discover, 

trial and error, things like that. 

They have a—it is a very, very aggressive schedule now to complete flight testing and they have reduced—of course they have reduced the resources that they were going to have by two aircraft. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Johns, what is the reason for that? 

Why? What is a necessity is it because numbers were put on paper 

years ago or that there is some—is it policy driven? That we want 

to get this in the air so—we want to get it to our people, and so 

we just write down the number and say well, we are going have 

to do that? 

Why not take longer to do the testing or build that in? You are 

the long-range guy that is why I am asking you. 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. As we look at it I am going to defer this 

to General Shackelford because it is part of the acquisition strategy, but how do you manage—— 
40 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. He was just looking at you by the way, saying 

I hope he defers this over to me. I can’t wait. 

General JOHNS. We are dear friends, but sir, again the whole 

point is how do you manage that as you said the white space, the 

concurrency to come up with a successful program? So let me 

go—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The point, the reason I am asking it is in 

some of—maybe you folks don’t know me as well, but we are not 

looking here to trap anybody or anything we are just looking to 

be—how can we be helpful and make it work? 

And if you are told, you know, something we really wanted to do 

this, and we really had our hearts set on doing this but you know 

what? The schedule is working out differently because getting a 

hold of the physics of this thing and the testing patterns and so 

on this is not a—this is not a Model A Ford we are dealing with, 

and we are going to have to take more time. 

Nobody is going to get upset with you. We will just have to figure 

out how we do this and get appropriate funding. Am I making 

sense? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir and before I defer to General 

Shackelford, but as we tested the F–15 again we had technology, 

we had an industrial base—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, right. 

General JOHNS. And it has since moved along so to say well this 

is more sophisticated, but so is our industrial base and the ability 

to handle it. So I can’t say, you know—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Fair enough. 

General JOHNS. Here is some growth in that area. 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, if you will indulge me for a second 

I will go back a little bit—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will. 

General SHACKELFORD [continuing]. In history to when we were 

starting out with the F–35 program there was an understanding 

there was going to be a great deal of concurrency in the program. 

Typically that comes along as you balance the needs of the test 

program versus the contractors’ need to man up to a certain level 

and then have efficiency within their manning that goes from 

building developmental aircraft into production aircraft and that is 

often what leads to several annual buys of low rate initial production as you are trying to move into the production profile that you 

would like to get to. 

Within the context of looking at the F–35 as the recapitalization 

focus for the various more legacy weapon systems, in order to bring 

that weapon system on quickly the desire has been to ramp quickly 

up in the production profile such that we could come down whatever learning curve exists. 

Also, to reach a more economic order quantity, if you will, to get 

the unit cost down as we are buying them from year to year. So 

there are competing pressures to complete that development and at 

the same time get into production. 

To mitigate that type of concurrency on the F–35 program a 

great deal of upfront investment was made in design tools for instance such that we have at this point in time a greater level of 
41 

confidence in the design of the aircraft than we would have for legacy systems go back to F–16 or F–15 days. 

As we look at where we stand in production right now the 

change traffic is stabilizing. The build process as noted by Mr. Sullivan has found some issues, not the least of which came along 

when the issue of the design of the wing root was discovered to be 

an issue a couple of years ago and led to a redesign. 

But as we have gone through the last six months or so of getting 

these aircraft stabilized into production, and these are the development aircraft, we are seeing a greater level of maturity, a better 

level of fit as the parts go together. 

The maturity of the physical aircraft gives us reason to believe 

that we are going to get beyond the production issues cited by Mr. 

Sullivan fairly quickly. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General SHACKELFORD. When you move over to the software side 

about 74 percent complete for the entire weapon systems software 

at this point in time with the sensors and that software flying on 

the cooperative avionics test bed. 

Or in the, granted, very elaborate laboratory infrastructure that 

was put together for the program, also that we could have greater 

confidence earlier that moving forward with production would be a 

reasonable risk. 

In the annual production buys as we go through the low rate initial production the program has to meet certain entrance requirements that are entrance criteria that are established by the defense acquisition executive. 

These would be key things that he doesn’t give them permission 

to press ahead with the negotiation of the contract for the next production lot unless they have chinned the bar, so to speak, on certain technical characteristics, the STOVL engine would be an example of that. 

That was part and parcel of that delay, but got us to the point 

where the confidence of those who are closest to the program is 

high enough that they believe they have reasonable risks in terms 

of pressing forward with the further work in that area. 

So the whole program was built with that philosophy in mind 

and that sets it aside really from legacy programs realizing that 

those legacy programs are 30 or 40 years ago, that the state of the 

art in technology now is better. Certainly there is risk, but to the 

extent that we can identify where that risk is and do the best we 

can to mitigate it, that is folded into the program plan for F–35. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is fine. Thank you. Mr. Sullivan, in your 

statement you highlight the—what I presume is still a fact, that 

the DOD plans to use cost reimbursement type contracts for the 

procurement of the production aircraft. Is that still the case? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. All right, I believe the Department strategy is still 

to—the aircraft that have been procured so far are under cost reimbursable and I think it would go as much as 273 aircraft through 

Lot 7, whatever that is I believe that is on—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is your understanding, Mr. Ahern? 

Mr. AHERN. No, sir, it is not. I work very closely with General 

Shackelford and the rest of program office, and I am quite con-
42 

fident that we will be moving toward fixed price incentive fee contracts in Lot 5 or no later than 6. 

I can’t amplify very well on what General Shackelford has said 

about the way this program is run, and I don’t want to give you 

the impression that I sleep well every night knowing nothing else 

is going to happen to the JSF. 

But there are really good indicators of this carefully orchestrated 

program that was based on that upfront investment that really focused on very sophisticated design tools and modeling. 

And an example of that that comes to mind is as Mr. Sullivan 

said the STOVL has just finished the pit test, and is en route, and 

will be en route to Pax River to actually go through the landings. 

That pit test turned out to be just slightly better than the model. 

No issues with it at all, that is in the—with the engine down, and 

that is a real credit to the model. 

There is another example of it. They have just finished some of 

the static testing on one of the ground aircraft, and I believe the 

phrase is it was going to 150 percent of its design, and it turned 

out to go to where the model said it would be. 

The three aircraft that are flying now, the last time I asked anyway, they are running about 75 percent returning to the ground 

without any discrepancies on them at all. So in comparison to my 

experience, and just to put it in context, I was a naval aviator in 

the 1960’s and the 1970’s and in the 1980’s. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. AHERN. We didn’t have anything comparable to this. It is not 

to say that we don’t have challenges in the JSF going forward, but 

the rate that we are on, and as I pointed out the Secretary, just 

did add aircraft to the plan going forward. 

The rate that we are using going forward year-over-year is .75 

more, which seems to be an achievable rate that goes to what General Shackelford and General Johns said. We want to get down the 

learning curve as fast as we can, and we are progressing in that 

fashion because I checked this. 

I mean that is one of my jobs. They will ripple out one cost or 

pull out two costs or pull out three, and our challenge is to the program and to Lockheed Martin to bring those costs down, and it is 

happening. 

And we will continue on that line but to follow—to answer the 

first question no, sir, we are going toward fixed price incentive 

probably in Lot 5 or Lot 6. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

Mr. AHERN. Well, if—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. With regard—I am sorry. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. If you—if they are going to a fixed price by Lot 

7 that would be at least 273 aircraft that they are going to procure 

in a cost reimbursable environment. When you procure aircraft in 

a cost reimbursable environment it is tacit acknowledgement, if 

you will, that they don’t know how much the aircraft are going to 

cost. That means they could not negotiate with the contractor a 

fixed price. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So from a financial point of view, accountability point of view then it is we who assume the risk there. 
43 

Mr. SULLIVAN. But as the government assumes all—most all of 

the financial risk on that and the—this is not uncommon in Low 

Rate Initial Production (LRIP), you know, you can buy under cost 

reimbursement as many as 10 percent of an aircraft buy. 

However on this program, the only reason we raised this is because 10 percent of this program is a significant number of aircraft 

that, you know, not only do you not understand the cost yet but 

they have not been flight tested. 

You have got two percent of the flight tests done, and we understand that the program has done a significant amount of work to 

reduce risks in ground testing and with all of the labs they have. 

And we applaud that, and we think that that is good, but flight 

testing is flight testing. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It has also been paid for. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is on—it has also been paid for. That is right. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. One of the reasons that has taken place is 

that it was funded. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is right. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To do exactly that. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And it has reduced risks but we still believe you 

fly before you buy. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So you are in a position where you have as many 

as 300 aircraft that the government is going to take ownership of— 

no idea how much they are going to cost and whether they are 

going to work. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I don’t necessarily even object to that by the 

way. I am not citing that as if that is some kind of a showstopper 

for this. That doesn’t necessarily bother me because if it is the defense of the Nation, and you get what you want to get out of it, 

then maybe that is the price you pay, so that doesn’t necessarily 

disturb me. 

But can I ask, then, any of you or perhaps Mr. Ahern, I am 

sorry, do you want to take—— 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, and I don’t want to be argumentative with 

my friend, Mike. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I don’t know whether you heard what I said 

that I don’t necessarily object to that. I am not raising the cost reimbursement. Maybe—that is fine with me if that is what it takes 

in order to get the plane done. 

Mr. AHERN. I think it is very important that we get the fixed 

price contracts. It is in a—not only in this program, but in every 

program in our portfolio—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. When you can. 

Mr. AHERN. As soon as you know well enough on the cost—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Mr. AHERN. You need to yes, sir, and I think—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sure. 

Mr. AHERN [continuing]. By Lot 5 and that is—I apologize for 

whispering behind me. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No, no, it is all right. 

Mr. AHERN. I was just thinking the 270 number and I think we 

will be in the fixed price for the jets and the 135 around Lot 5. 
44 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Even so it is a considerable amount of 

money. Yes, sir? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Just briefly, I mean this was one of the recommendations that we made in our report in March was—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. That they report to the Congress 

the—they have to analyze the risk that is involved here and write 

a report that shows their path to getting to a fixed price contract. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, we share your opinion on that. It is not 

necessarily in and of itself bad. It is an indicator though that this 

program’s costs are still not yet—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If in order to get it right, yes, if in order to 

get it right it requires cost reimbursement that is, you know—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You present—you are the professionals. You 

are the ones that have to make those recommendations, and your 

people have to fly these planes. I mean in the end human beings 

are going to be doing the testing, and you have the responsibility 

for putting them into those planes along the way. 

And nobody wants to be reckless about it. In some respects the 

reason I am—this is a predicate to what I want to say about or ask 

about the competitive engine. What is your assessment of the competitive engine over and above whether we should have it or not. 

What is your assessment about the progress of the competitive engine? 

Is that also making progress? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, from what I understand it is making 

progress. It is—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It is not an orphan in other words? 

Mr. AHERN. No, sir it is not an orphan. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You guys are paying close attention to it? 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely, because you all—the Congress has appropriated a significant amount of money, and we have put a significant amount of money into the 136 engine, and it is absolutely 

making progress. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. So—— 

Mr. AHERN. And it is not an orphan. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right. So, okay, my point here, I guess, would 

be as you move toward the time when you can get a fixed cost, because your confidence level is that high, I am hoping that you will 

conclude or that the Secretary will conclude that perhaps if we continue along with the alternate engine it is not an expense which 

is excess, and it is one that is reasonable within the present cost 

reimbursement universe as we move toward something fixed. 

Just appreciate it if you would take it into account and perhaps 

take another look? That is the—— 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir, and I take that responsibility seriously. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am sure you do. 

Mr. AHERN. It is part of my job and right now—because it was 

involved in the 2007 study and familiar with what the IDA did and 

the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) study and of course 

the GAO study. 
45 

And I looked at it again this year. Not only for this hearing but 

in the budgeting since—overall, and it remains, although there has 

been additional investment in that second engine, the compelling 

business case to make that upfront investment to garner the benefits down in the competition area, down in the intangibles, is still 

not there, sir, that I can see. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, and I appreciate that. Although you— 

and by way of full disclosure I have never—I have said publicly 

and privately in many contexts that a business case, per se, in the 

ordinary understanding of what a business case is doesn’t apply 

where defense is concerned. And that is not a criticism of what you 

just stated, so much as it is a perspective that I hold. 

I believe the people of the United States will pay for their defense, and if that requires—precisely because it does involve the 

strategic interests of the country, as well as the military personnel 

expected to carry out the necessary requirements of implementing 

that—those strategic interests or their pursuit. 

If that takes more funding than it would to build a city bus, or 

for that matter a commercial airliner, as opposed if something—if 

an airframe or an instrument of the Air Force requires more spending in order to maximize our capacity to produce what we want to 

produce, I think we are willing to pay for it. 

So I never—at least in my own approach to this committee, I 

have never tried to operate as if it was my dad’s food brokerage 

business writ large. It—I believe that there is another element to 

it with regard to our obligations, our constitutional obligations as 

a committee to fund the military of the United States that may involve expenditures that under ordinary circumstances General Motors or Chrysler, if they are still in business, would be doing. 

So I understand what you are saying, but from a policy perspective it may be that I ask you once again then, that that is not necessarily the first consideration that I have in my recommendations. 

I think what we are doing, or our attempt here, is to supplement 

and complement what you are doing, and that that was in line with 

what the Air Force had in mind, at least through the first 10 years 

of this project’s existence. 

And there is a feeling, or a thought, in the committee that the 

change from having the alternate engine as part of the budget picture had more to do with budget considerations than it did with 

strategic considerations, or even requirements and acquisition considerations that was part of the driving force. 

You know, you don’t have to comment on that one way or the 

other. I am just giving you an observation that has reflected in the 

opinions that I get from members in the committee. So I have my 

constituency here also that I have to address. 

The bottom line for all of us is, is we want to provide the best 

possible foundation financially and, in terms of defense policy as 

written in the defense bill, for you to be able to carry out your very 

important mission, which I know all of you are completely devoted 

to. 

Mr. Bartlett, you are the, as usual, the essence of patience and 

forbearance. At this stage do you have anything else? Or I think 

we can bring the events to a close. 
46 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to spend just a moment if I might to help clarify for those who might be listening to 

this hearing or reading it in the future, as to why we, in a budgetconstrained world, have been pursuing the development of two 

brand-new fighter aircraft. 

Could you tell us for the record the fundamental differences between the Joint Strike Fighter and the V–22 that made it seem 

necessary that we—I am sorry, the F–22, made it seem necessary 

that we develop both of these planes that may not be clear to the 

casual observer? 

General DARNELL. Mr. Bartlett, I will take a stab at that. Sir, 

the F–22 is designed, really, to be our air dominance aircraft when 

you compare the two. It has an air-ground capability and quite 

frankly—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. By air dominant you mean that it could contend 

in a aerial fight with the best aircraft in the world? 

General DARNELL. Not only that, sir, but it can—it is also designed to penetrate IADs—an Integrated Air Defense System. 

Mr. BARTLETT. And why is it better than the Joint Strike Fighter 

in doing that? 

General DARNELL. Sir, it is primarily because of its speed is the 

biggest reason. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Its speed would enable it to outrun missiles that 

were fired at it? 

General DARNELL. Sir, if you choose to disengage from a target 

area, yes, it allows you to do that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. And how about altitude? 

General DARNELL. It can super cruise at very high altitude, 

which the F–35 cannot. Now, when you look at the F–35, though, 

I think General Shackelford really covered it pretty well earlier. I 

mean it is meant to be persistent in a battle area. It has got sensors on it that the F–22 does not for air-to-ground. That is what 

it is designed to do. It is an exquisite platform that has capabilities 

that the F–22 doesn’t have. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Where in the world might we need the increased 

air dominance of the 22, certainly not in Afghanistan and Iraq? 

General DARNELL. No, sir. It is designed for a high-end scenario. 

It is designed for a major combat operations that might involve 

peer competitors. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Who in the world builds aircraft that are competitive with the Joint Strike Fighter and the 22? 

General DARNELL. At this point, no one. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The—a recent Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary Roche, told us that the best fighter aircraft in the world was 

the latest SU version, and I think there has been one since then. 

General DARNELL. Sir, the—he may be speaking to the SU–35. 

I am not sure what he is speaking to—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. That is the number? Okay. 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. Which does not have the stealth characteristics; it is not even close. Now, both the Chinese and the Russians are working on a fifth, what we call a fifth generation aircraft 

with the stealth characteristics that we have in F–22 and F–35. 

There—is it still—and I would have to bring one of my intelligence 
47 

folks in to give you an accurate estimate, but in my opinion they 

are not close to fielding either one of those aircraft yet. 

Mr. BARTLETT. So in terms of penetration, we still are dominating. What about in terms of speed and maneuverability and—— 

General DARNELL. In terms of speed and altitude we are still 

dominant. In terms of maneuverability I think, quite frankly, with 

the SU–35 the margin is closing, but the F–22 is still a much more 

agile and maneuverable aircraft. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The 35 is a competitive aircraft? Some would say 

in some respects a superior aircraft. That is what the Secretary 

told us. He was wrong? 

General DARNELL. Sir, he may have been alluding to our fourth 

generation capability in our current F–15 fleet. Frankly, I think it 

is equal or superior to that aircraft. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay, so until the 35 and 22, the Russian plane 

was probably superior? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. At least equal or superior. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. And they are now developing a new plane 

that will again challenge us for the next generation. 

General DARNELL. That is under development, yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. Thank you very much. That would be interesting, Mr. Chairman, to get on the record why we should be developing in this budget-constrained world two fighter aircraft. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. When you say the Russian plane, if I can follow just for a moment, the Russian plane and/or the Chinese variation, in what way—what do they mean by a next generation or 

fifth generation, whatever generation it is for them, is that in 

terms of speed, in terms of distance that it can fly, in terms of maneuverability, what—on all fronts? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. If they were to build a fifth generation compatible or comparable aircraft, they are striving to have 

the same capabilities we do with our fifth generation capable aircraft, so speed and stealth being the primary attributes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What about distance? What distance can they 

fly, and how do you differentiate the, by the way, the F–22 and the 

F–35? 

General DARNELL. The SU–35, which is not one I consider fifth 

generation, but it is the best they have got, has a range which exceeds our current F–15 and F–16 fleet. I think it would be—I think 

the range would be comparable with our fifth generation aircraft 

F–22 and F–35. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. When we say range, by the way, I want to 

make sure does that depend on whether—how much fuel is being 

used? What is being required of the plane? I mean if it is one thing 

that just goes up in the air and flies as long as it can—— 

General DARNELL. Right. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. That is different than going up 

and maneuvering. 

General DARNELL. Right. And internal capacity, I mean, they 

build very large aircraft. Their fighter aircraft tend to be—have 

gotten bigger over the years and their internal capacity has increased as a result. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So, with that projection, the F–22, now, if 

there are things you can’t talk about just say so. 
48 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But again, because this is for the record as 

Mr. Bartlett says and so people can understand it, then finally does 

the—compared with what they are doing how do your projections 

of what you think you can talk about with regard to either the Chinese or the Russians or whoever it may be, how does the development projected as you understand it compare to the F–22 and the 

Joint Strike Fighter? 

General DARNELL. The—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Presuming the Joint Strike Fighter is able to 

succeed in all its iterations? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. I think quite frankly, sir, and again 

we can have our intelligence folks come over and talk to you—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is a separate issue. I am asking you professionally in terms of what you think those planes can do. 

General DARNELL. Yes, I don’t—as far as their fifth generation 

capability, they are probably double-digit years away from equaling 

our capability. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. The reason I go into that in some detail, just to amplify a bit Mr. Ahern, that is what I meant about 

the business case. I don’t think that this is a business case. I understand why the Secretary might want to make that point or you 

would make that point because you are trying to be prudent with 

dollars. 

I mean that is—I take that as a given. I don’t think that our people in the Pentagon that are profligate in that regard and don’t 

show any concern in that respect. And perhaps some of the arguments that have been made in public or with regard to particular 

platforms in the past because there have been failures or missteps 

or a combination of these factors, where it made it seem there was 

waste or indifference to it. 

I don’t think that is the case here and that is certainly not the 

position that we are taking. My point simply is if that is whatever 

it takes to accomplish what General Darnell has been describing in 

general terms then that is what we have to do. 

And so if in order to accomplish that we have to expend funds 

that wouldn’t fit an ordinary case about what is the most efficient 

way of doing something, sometimes the most efficient way of accomplishing something, especially like the Joint Strike Fighter 

which you are going to—its variations are going to be asked to do 

different things, right? 

That is an extraordinarily complicated, detailed and lengthy 

process that is going to require a whole lot of cooperation and 

teamwork to get accomplished. So we are well aware of that and 

we want to try to maximize your opportunity to accomplish that as 

soon as possible. 

But more importantly the correct way, the way you are comfortable with professionally and saying, ‘‘Yes, I would like to be in 

that plane. I am comfortable in that, and I feel totally comfortable 

in asking someone who has to accept my orders to take that plane 

and do what needs to be done.’’ So that is the whole motivation. 

On that note I thank you very, very much for your candidness. 

And by the way, Mr. Ahern, thank you for being as straightforward 

today in a lot of these areas where you said you would be getting 
49 

back to us. We appreciate that because that means the questions 

are being taken seriously and the implications are understood. 

We want to be partners in this. This is not a contest, I can assure you. And I hope that by—and in short order we will be able 

to put together a defense bill we can all look to and be proud of. 

Thank you very much, everybody. Aloha. 

[Whereupon, at 5:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 20, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 20, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 20, 2009 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. AHERN. Prior to the Milestone C decision on JCA on May 30, 2007, the Air 

Force and the Army conducted independent fleet demand assessments. The initial 

results were that the Army identified a need for 75 JCAs to support its Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/MC) airlift requirement and to replace its aging C-23 

fleet. PA&E validated the Army’s requirement analysis but needed to wait for the 

Air Force to complete its analysis supporting a potential Service requirement for 40 

aircraft. It was decided at Milestone C that the Army and Air Force acquisition programs would be combined with the initial mission of supporting the Army’s validated TS/MC cargo movement and an initial procurement of 78 JCAs (the current 

Service programmed quantities of 54 Army and 24 AF aircraft). Subsequent analysis 

by the Air Force did not identify additional Air Force missions, beyond the Army’s 

TS/MC mission, which would have supported additional Air Force JCAs. 

The Army’s TS/MC airlift requirement remains unchanged. What has changed is 

how the Department will address the Army’s requirement. The Department has internally examined its current utilization of its fleet of 400+ C-130 aircraft and determined that the Army’s requirement can be met through the use of a smaller number 

of JCAs and the Air Force’s vast fleet of C-130s. 

The Department determined that the Air Force can properly meet the Army’s TS/ 

MC airlift requirements with a JCA fleet size on par with the current C-23 fleet 

along with having ownership of the mission. The FY2010 JCA budget decision is not 

one of ‘‘what we can afford,’’ but instead one of how we can best utilize the assets 

already inherent in the Department. [See page 15.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL 

Mr. AHERN. The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis & Program Evaluation 

(OSD(CAPE)) are co-leading the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study— 

2016 (MCRS). TRANSCOM is outside of OSD and is therefore independent of those 

officials charged with making critical decisions about resource allocations. 

OSD(CAPE) has the statutory authority and responsibility to provide independent 

analysis and advice and may communicate its views directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense without obtaining the approval or concurrence of any other official within the Department. 

The primary objective of the MCRS is to identify the mobility capabilities and requirements needed to support the National Defense Strategy into the next decade. 

The study is being conducted in a transparent and collaborative fashion by a team 

which includes representatives from the military Services, Joint Staff, Combatant 

Commanders, and other stakeholders. The team has been charged with applying analytical rigor to determine actual mobility requirements and has not been directed 

toward a set of pre-determined results. 

Oversight committees of stakeholders at the O-6, 1-star, and 3-star levels, have 

routinely met to review study progress. [See page 16.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

General JOHNS. Homeland defense is DoD’s first priority and the Air Force is committed to the ASA mission now through the long term. As you know, long term recapitalization of the fighter and tanker fleet requires many years. Within the funding available, the Air Force must maximize the life of the existing aircraft until they 

can be replaced. All of the options to ensure the ASA mission remains viable are 

dependent on the life expectancy of these airframes. 

The Air Force, in conjunction with DoD, is currently developing plans to ensure 

we can meet the combatant commander’s requirements for the defense of the Nation—whether it is with Air National Guard aircraft or in combination with active 

duty assigned aircraft. There are many moving pieces as we look at all the different 

Air National Guard units around the country to determine the best alignment of our 
116 

limited resources. We anticipate an update from the Quadrennial Defense Review 

regarding national requirement, and subsequently, the Air Force’s requirement for 

this critical mission. [See page 24.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

General DARNELL. Combat Search and Rescue is the most demanding of all of the 

personnel recovery missions and it remains very important to the Department. 

CSAR-X was to provide an enhanced capability to conduct long-range penetration 

missions for personnel recovery in combat scenarios. All services and the U. S. Special Operations Command currently possess a wide spectrum of complementary personnel recovery capabilities. A deep penetration mission to recover downed crews in 

a medium-to-high threat environment requires complex planning and joint implementation, if not a joint solution. 

Since this mission drives many of the CSAR-X requirements, it is imperative we 

reassess the mission in the context of joint force capabilities. Development of single 

service solutions with single purpose aircraft, requires additional consideration especially regarding joint force capability needs for personnel recovery. 

The results of the reconsideration will be used to develop the FY11 budget request. [See page 19.] 

General DARNELL. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) provides 

forces to the Joint Force Commander via a classified Air Tasking Order (ATO) process that is separate from the general purpose ATO. When there is not an existing 

SOCOM requirement for AC-130s, the aircraft are put on ground or air alert to respond to ground force commanders’ request for air support. Responding to each request individually, the Air Operations Center considers the proximity, availability 

and capabilities of combat aircraft in the Area of Responsibility, and tasks the optimal aircraft to respond. 

In order to increase the availability of gunship-like capabilities to ground forces, 

US Special Operations Command and the Air Force intend to modify all 12 MC130Ws with a Precision Strike Package that will include ISR/targeting sensors, a 

medium-caliber gun, and Special Operations Stand-Off Precision-Guided Munitions 

(SOPGMs) through an effort called DRAGON SPEAR. These modifications will convert the MC-130Ws into multi-mission aircraft capable of mobility, day/night precision fires, and armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. [See page 27.] 

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