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[Senate Prints 111-37]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

111th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
 1st Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                     111-37
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
                         STRIKING THE BALANCE:
                  U.S. POLICY AND STABILITY IN GEORGIA

                               __________

                             A R E P O R T

                                 TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                             First Session

                           DECEMBER 22, 2009

                                     

                  U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
53-985                    WASHINGTON : 2009
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman        
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California            BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware          JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
                  David McKean, Staff Director        
        Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director        

                              (ii)        
?

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v

Introduction.....................................................     1

Background.......................................................     2

Analysis.........................................................     4

    Security Assistance..........................................     4

    Breakaway Regions............................................     6

    Early Warning and Maritime Security..........................     8

Recommendations..................................................     8

Conclusion.......................................................     9

                               Appendixes

Appendix I.--Meetings With Individuals in Georgia and Washington, 
  DC.............................................................    11

Appendix II.--U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 1992-2009..............    12

Appendix III.--U.S. Security Assistance and Training in Georgia..    14

                                 (iii)

                                     

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                 Washington, DC, December 22, 2009.
    Dear colleague: From October 26 to November 1, 2009, I 
directed my Senate Foreign Relations Committee professional 
staff member for European Affairs, Marik String, to travel to 
Georgia to evaluate U.S. security assistance and policies to 
promote regional stability. During the trip, staff met with 
U.S. embassy and senior Georgian national security officials, 
as well as with monitors from the European Union and other 
international donors.
    In the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict between 
Georgia and Russia, the United States pledged $1 billion in 
assistance to Georgia to alleviate the humanitarian suffering 
of the Georgian people and assist in rebuilding the Georgian 
economy. As this infusion of post-conflict assistance is 
concluded, the United States must develop a long-term policy 
for moving Georgia towards Euro-Atlantic institutions, while 
averting a renewal of armed conflict. Even as the Obama 
administration pursues a more productive relationship with 
Russia on arms control, nuclear security, Iran, Afghanistan, 
and other issues, we must raise the profile of diplomatic 
efforts to mitigate deep tensions that remain between Georgia 
and Russia.
    Russia's 2008 foray into Georgia seriously damaged 
Georgia's military capacity, and Russian threats to sanction 
entities engaging in arms deals with Georgia have left it 
unable to procure many defense articles, even as some NATO 
allies explore unprecedented military sales to Russia. The 
United States, too, has not provided lethal defense articles to 
Georgia since the 2008 war but has focused instead on the 
intellectual aspects of defense reform such as doctrine and 
training. As Georgia continues reforms in the direction of 
Euro-Atlantic institutions, the United States and NATO allies 
must reconcile a policy that leaves a dedicated NATO partner 
unable to provide for its basic defense requirements. These 
efforts will be most effective if they are undertaken on a 
multilateral basis. The Alliance must come to grips with the 
reality that Georgia will require coordinated security support 
from America and European nations for some years to come.
    This staff report examines how the United States can enlist 
greater diplomatic support among NATO partners for a 
coordinated strategy on Georgia, which includes regional arms 
sales, non-use of force agreements, and confidence building 
measures in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It also explores how 
addressing these interrelated sources of insecurity on a 
multilateral basis could benefit the Russian Federation.
    Given the role of Congress in reviewing assistance 
proposals for Georgia, I am hopeful that this report can 
provide useful background and advance policy avenues in support 
of stability and political progress in Georgia and the entire 
region.
        Sincerely,
                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                    Ranking Member.

                         STRIKING THE BALANCE:
                  U.S. POLICY AND STABILITY IN GEORGIA

                              ----------                              

    From October 26 to November 1, 2009, minority professional 
staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee travelled to 
Georgia to assess the security situation and U.S. foreign 
assistance provided since the August 2008 conflict with Russia. 
Staff met with U.S. embassy officials as well as senior defense 
and national security officials from the Georgian Government, 
opposition leaders, international donors, members of the NGO 
community, think-tank representatives, and international 
monitoring officials. At the direction of Senator Richard 
Lugar, the purpose of the visit was to:

   Assess the $1 billion assistance package pledged to Georgia 
        following the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict;

    Investigate the mix of security assistance provided to 
        Georgia prior and subsequent to the 2008 conflict;

   Examine the security situation with regard to the breakaway 
        enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and

   Generate policy recommendations for advancing stability in 
        Georgia and the region.

                              Introduction

    Despite extraordinary economic commitments by the United 
States and international community, comprising over $4.5 
billion since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, 
Georgians convey an acute sense of insecurity. No international 
observers or non-governmental organizations have been granted 
access to South Ossetia, only a 45 minute drive from Tbilisi. 
Russian troops, instead of withdrawing to pre-war positions and 
reducing troop strength to pre-war levels as the French-
brokered 2008 ceasefire requires, are constructing permanent 
bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
    As a result of Russian diplomatic pressure and threats to 
restrict commercial ties with entities selling defense articles 
to Georgia,\1\ the Georgian military has been unable to 
replenish much of its military capacity that was eviscerated in 
the war. While U.S. instruction in military doctrine and advice 
on institutional reform continues apace, even the United 
States, under substantial Russian diplomatic pressure, has 
paused the transfer of lethal military articles to Georgia, and 
no U.S. assistance since the war has been directly provided to 
the Georgian Ministry of Defense. Consequently, Georgia lacks 
basic capacity for territorial defense, and stability along the 
administrative line with South Ossetia has been achieved 
largely through a delicate political balance facilitated by 
unarmed monitors from the European Union Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ In January 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev asked his 
government to ``restrict or cut military-technical and military-
economic cooperation'' with entities providing weapons to Georgia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The current state of affairs in Georgia has left the United 
States and allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in a tenuous situation. The Obama Administration,\2\ the 
United States Congress,\3\ and NATO Heads of State\4\ have 
expressed support for Georgia's integration within NATO. 
Nonetheless, Georgia has lacked the influence to acquire many 
capabilities that form the basis of territorial defense 
planning. Meanwhile, certain NATO allies are exploring 
unprecedented military agreements with the Russian 
Federation.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Eurasian Affairs Philip H. Gordon, ``Georgia: One Year After the August 
War,'' hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 4, 
2009.
    \3\ See NATO Freedom and Consolidation Act of 2007, which became 
law (P.L. 110-17) on April 9, 2007.
    \4\ See Declaration of Heads of State and Government, Summit of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bucharest, Romania, April 3, 2008.
    \5\ For example, France has approved the sale of a Mistral-class 
amphibious assault ship to Russia, reportedly one of the largest 
military sales ever from a NATO country to Russia. Mistral-class ships 
can carry landing barges, tanks, and helicopters, providing littoral 
combat capability. Russian Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy has boasted that 
in the 2008 conflict with Georgia, ``a ship like that would have 
allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, 
not 26 hours, which is how long it took us.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Failing a coordinated, NATO-led strategy for security 
assistance in the region, allies run the risk of disturbing an 
already fragile political balance and engendering an excessive 
nationalization of Georgian defense policy. In the longer-term, 
a continuation of the status quo appears to ensure that Georgia 
will not only have difficulty providing for its own territorial 
defense needs but remain susceptible to the internal strife and 
external manipulation that often accompany such national 
insecurity.
    This report assesses the role the United States has played 
in stabilizing the situation in Georgia since the 2008 conflict 
and offers policy recommendations on how the United States and 
international community can avert renewed violence in the 
region.

                               Background

    Spanning the political fault lines of Europe and Asia, 
Georgia and the nations of the Caucasus have prospered and 
suffered for centuries as a result of imperial rivalry. The 
United States has developed a close partnership with Georgia 
since its independence in 1991 and has provided $1.67 billion 
in foreign assistance dollars from 1992 to 2009, the largest 
amount to any country in the South Caucasus (see Appendix II). 
After President Mikheil Saakashvili and a cadre of Western-
oriented officials came to power in 2004, Georgia has sought to 
burnish its position not simply as a strategic ally but as a 
reform-minded, democratic one.
    Within the former Soviet Union, nearly all armed conflict 
that has occurred since 1991 has been in the Caucasus. Georgia, 
in particular, has struggled with separatist movements and 
irredentist claims of outside powers. Following conflict with 
separatist regions in the early 1990s, tensions escalated again 
during the tenure of President Saakashvili, whose overtures for 
new negotiation frameworks were rebuffed by de facto separatist 
authorities. War was again sparked in August 2008 between 
Georgia and Russia, constituting the first extra-territorial 
use of force by Russia since the demise of the Soviet Union.
    On August 26, 2008, Russia formally recognized the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, breaching core 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act; \6\ only Nauru, 
Nicaragua, and Venezuela have followed suit. Notably, Russian 
attempts to secure broader recognition at meetings of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (comprised of Russia, China 
and Central Asian nations) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization have been unsuccessful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Helsinki Final Act, Questions Relating to the Security of 
Europe, 1(a)III states that parties ``shall regard as inviolable all 
one another's frontiers . . . and therefore they will refrain now and 
in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will 
also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of 
part or all of the territory of any participating State.'' Questions 
Relating to the Security of Europe, 1(a)IV states that ``participating 
States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the 
object of military occupation . . . or the object of acquisition by 
means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or 
acquisition will be recognized as legal.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The conflict left Russian relations with the West at a 
post-Cold War nadir. Ambassadorial and ministerial contacts at 
the NATO-Russia Council were suspended for the remainder of 
2008; then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also asserted 
that Russia was ``more and more becoming the outlaw in this 
conflict.'' In September 2008, the Bush administration withdrew 
from Congressional consideration the U.S.-Russia Agreement for 
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
    In response to hostilities that decimated the Georgian 
economy and military,\7\ the United States pledged $1 billion 
in aid over a two-year period. The assistance package has 
addressed the acute humanitarian needs of internally-displaced 
persons; sorely-needed projects focusing on economic growth; 
and the building and reform of public institutions. The 
Congressional Notification for the last tranche of $242 million 
was transmitted on December 7, 2009. In order to mollify 
Russian concerns and target pressing humanitarian needs, no 
lethal defense items have been provided to Georgia since the 
2008 conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ According to the World Bank's Joint Needs Assessment, the 
conflict caused $394.5 million in damage in Georgia and reduced its 
economic growth for 2008 from 9 percent to 3.5 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several months after the war, Georgia was buffeted by 
another political force: the Obama administration's 
announcement of a ``reset'' in U.S. relations with the Russian 
Federation. Given the deteriorated state of Russian-Georgian 
relations that has taken on extremely personal dimensions, this 
change in U.S. policy has had the potential to drastically 
affect the direction of U.S. policy towards Georgia.
    In outlining the mutual U.S.-Russian interests that will be 
pursued as part of its new policy towards Russia, senior 
administration officials have mentioned the fight against the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the opening of an 
alternate supply distribution network through Russia; nuclear 
security and non-proliferation; and Iran. While administration 
officials have repeated that U.S.-Georgian relations will not 
suffer as a result of a ``reset'' in policy, statements reflect 
the sentiment that the administration expects disagreements 
over the situation in Georgia to persist.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Vice President Joseph Biden noted at the Munich Security 
Conference in February 2009 that ``We will not agree with Russia on 
everything. For example, the United States will not recognize Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as independent states. But the United States and 
Russia can disagree and still work together where our interests 
coincide.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After meetings in Moscow in October, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton asserted that the United States ``will help the 
Georgian people to feel like they can protect themselves.'' The 
focus of U.S. assistance has been on intellectual issues like 
doctrine and personnel management, as well as ongoing training 
of Georgian troops to deploy in Afghanistan. The situation in 
Georgia is being addressed in Geneva through Status Conference 
Meetings with delegations from Georgia, Russia, the United 
States and representatives from de facto Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian authorities.

                                Analysis

    Georgian national security officials remain deeply wary of 
the Obama administration's recalibration of U.S.-Russian 
relations and still view Russian troops as an existential 
threat to the Georgian state. As one senior Georgian defense 
official noted, ``we hear the same words [from the Obama and 
George W. Bush administrations], but how deep in practical 
terms the U.S.-Georgian relationship will be is still vague.'' 
Other Georgian officials expressed the view that the current 
administration appears unsure as to what shape U.S. policy in 
Georgia will take. When pressed on this point, however, 
Georgian officials conceded that they have seen only modest 
tangible changes in the United States commitment to Georgia.
Security Assistance
    One such tangible change has been in the realm of security 
assistance. Staff met with U.S. and Georgian security 
assistance officials in Washington, D.C. and Tbilisi to assess 
past and current U.S. security assistance programs in Georgia. 
As detailed below (see Appendix III), U.S. train-and-equip 
programs have undergone several iterations in Georgia, but 
since the 2008 conflict, senior Department of Defense and 
security assistance officials have reported that no lethal 
assistance has been provided through Section 1206, Foreign 
Military Financing, or Foreign Military Sales.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ According to staff interviews and testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. See testimony of Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow, 
``Georgia: One Year After the August War,'' hearing of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, August 4, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States has developed close military-to-military 
cooperation with Georgia since its independence in 1991.\10\ 
U.S.-Georgian security cooperation has been an especially sore 
point in Russia's relationship with Georgia, even though 
enhanced cooperation began during the term of former Georgian 
President (and former Soviet Foreign Minister) Eduard 
Shevardnadze and was initially focused on addressing threats of 
terrorism raised by Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The United States has not been the only NATO country to 
develop enhanced security cooperation with Georgia. For example, France 
has funded a military training center in the mountainous area of 
northern Georgia, which France reportedly pressured Russian forces not 
to destroy during the 2008 conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the 2008 conflict, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin asserted that the United States had been ``arming 
Georgians to the teeth.'' More recently, Russian officials have 
alleged that renewed military assistance has been ``under the 
guise of humanitarian aid'' \11\ and that Georgia's ``military 
potential is much higher today than last August.'' \12\ While 
some senior Russian Government sources assert that the United 
States is in the midst of replenishing Georgia's military 
potential, other officials single out only third countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin.
    \12\ Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, 
General Nikolai Makarov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given this fusillade of accusations, the United States must 
move forward in a highly transparent manner, in coordination 
with our European and NATO allies, in order to dispel 
misinformation and to lessen any risk of miscalculation. If the 
United States does alter the mix of assistance being provided 
to Georgia, a multilateral and transparent strategy will assure 
others that regional stability is the ultimate concern.
    U.S. defense officials were quick to point out how U.S. 
security assistance programs had been crafted to avoid 
augmenting Georgia's force-on-force or territorial defense 
capacity due to Russian concerns. Although equipment and 
training provided nominally for one mission cannot be 
completely walled off from potential utility in other types of 
missions, the bulk of U.S. security assistance has been focused 
on efforts to train agile, counter-terror personnel to deploy 
away from Georgian soil. These programs have been focused on 
preparing Georgian troops to deploy in support of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and NATO's International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Georgia has been one of the highest per capita contributors of 
troops to coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, having deployed 
over 7,500 troops to OIF and 800 troops to ISAF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Enhanced cooperation began in 2002 with the initiation of 
the Georgian Train-and-Equip Program (GTEP) to enhance Georgian 
counter-terrorism capacity to address the threat posed by 
Chechen rebels, who had taken refuge in Georgia's Pankisi 
Gorge. Prior to GTEP, the Russian military had reportedly 
pressured Georgia to allow Russian troops to pursue these 
rebels into Georgia. GTEP foreclosed this possibility, allowing 
Georgia to subdue the rebels with its own military capacity. 
This program consisted of an 18-month, $64 million investment 
to train around 2,000 light infantry soldiers and a small 
number of police and border guards and equip them with small 
arms and communications gear.
    GTEP was used as a basis for the Georgian Sustainment and 
Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), which provided another 
$159 million from 2005-2008 to continue to train three brigades 
of 2,000 soldiers to deploy to OIF in support of coalition 
activities. Apart from training, items provided included anti-
IED devices, radios, and other equipment. Troops deployed 
gained skills in counter-insurgency, traffic and entry-point 
control and base camp security. According to Department of 
Defense officials, regular briefings on GTEP and GSSOP were 
offered to the Russian military.
    In total, four brigades were trained under GTEP and GSSOP. 
At the time hostilities broke out between Georgia and Russian 
forces in South Ossetia on August 7, 2008, one brigade was in 
Iraq, two were in Georgia, and a fourth Georgian brigade was 
being trained for deployment to Iraq by approximately 80 U.S. 
servicemen. Pursuant to a prior agreement for the United States 
to provide transport for Georgian troops to and from Iraq, the 
United States airlifted the 1,800 Georgian soldiers back from 
Iraq on August 10 and 11. Thus, during the peak of hostilities 
with Russia, Georgia's most capable forces, constituting over 
one-fifth of Georgia's active armed forces, were not present in 
Georgia.
    GSSOP was augmented by $6.5 million in Section 1206 funds 
for FY 2007 to conduct ``combined military operations with the 
U.S. Armed Forces.'' \14\ Funds provided for Harris Falcon II 
radios and spare parts, Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement 
Systems (MILES) for tactical engagement simulation, and 
training by U.S. contractors. These programs supported the 
deployment of 850 soldiers to support OIF. In FY 2008, an 
additional $11.5 million in Section 1206 funding was authorized 
to train and equip Georgian special forces. HF/VHF 
communications equipment, ground sensor systems, Humvees, and 
training teams were provided with these funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\  Inspectors General, U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. 
Department of State, ``Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 
Global Train and Equip Program,'' August 31, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since the 2008 conflict, the profile of U.S. assistance has 
changed dramatically. Of the $1 billion package, no funding has 
been provided to the Ministry of Defense. No lethal defense 
equipment has been provided, either through Section 1206, 
Foreign Military Sales, or Foreign Military Financing. U.S. 
defense officials noted that training of Georgian special 
forces has also ceased. While Georgian defense officials have 
requested information on the availability and prices for anti-
tank and air defense articles, they have been told that those 
sales will not go forward at this time. In fact, Georgian 
officials argue that they are under a de facto arms embargo and 
are having great difficulty procuring any lethal defense items, 
which they attribute to Russia's threat of sanctions against 
any entities participating in such sales. Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Alexander Vershbow has explained this policy as a 
``phased approach'' that is meant to ensure that assistance is 
not ``counterproductive to our goals of promoting peace and 
stability in the region.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow, ``Georgia: One Year After the 
August War,'' hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 
4, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 31, 2009, United States forces began training 730 
Georgian soldiers for deployment to NATO's ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan using $24 million in Coalition Readiness Support 
Program (CRSP) funds. The first deployment departed on November 
16, 2009. According to senior U.S. defense officials, any 
equipment used for training must be taken out of Georgia after 
training is completed, and a Section 1206 proposal has been 
submitted so that non-lethal training equipment can remain in 
country.
Breakaway Regions
    While Abkhazia has enjoyed relative autonomy and greater 
economic prospects due to its Black Sea coastline, South 
Ossetia has had close ethnic and political links to the Russian 
district of North Ossetia with fewer opportunities for economic 
development. Georgian troops fought to suppress movements for 
greater autonomy in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1990-1992 and 
1992-1993, respectively, after which cease-fires were 
concluded. In Abkhazia, the United Nations Observer Mission in 
Georgia (UNOMIG) was given a mandate to observe cease-fire 
implementation, as well as the peacekeeping force comprised of 
soldiers from the Commonwealth of Independent States. In South 
Ossetia, the OSCE Mission in Georgia was provided a mandate for 
monitoring joint peacekeeping forces. Due to Russian 
opposition, both missions were ended following the 2008 
conflict.
    On August 26, 2008, Russia formally recognized the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and international 
telephone access codes have reportedly been changed from 
Georgian to Russian. Only Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have 
followed suit in recognizing the independence of the enclaves.
    While several humanitarian organizations and NGOs have 
received access to Abkhazia, staff was informed that none have 
been active in South Ossetia at the time of the visit. South 
Ossetia's de facto authorities demand that any aid groups enter 
the enclave from the north through Russia, but doing so would 
jeopardize the organization's relationship with Tbilisi. 
International donors, NGO representatives, and U.S. assistance 
officials noted that Tbilisi is still struggling to formulate 
policies towards the breakaway enclaves with regard to access 
of multinational and humanitarian organizations. The United 
States and international donors should continue to dedicate 
expertise to assist Georgian authorities in the development of 
a policy reintegration, while continuing to emphasize that any 
attempt to solve the situation militarily would be disastrous.
    The European Union Monitoring Mission for Georgia, present 
in Georgia since October 1, 2008, has approximately 225 unarmed 
monitors in country, which is slightly fewer than the number of 
military and police monitors present under UNOMIG and the OSCE 
prior to the 2008 conflict. The EUMM was created through a 
memorandum of understanding with the Georgian Government.
    While the EUMM's mandate is to monitor the ``withdrawal of 
Russian and Georgian armed forces to the positions held prior 
to the outbreak of hostilities,'' EUMM, in practice, monitors 
solely the Tbilisi-side of the administrative boundary line 
with South Ossetia and has no access, apart from satellite 
imagery, to the Russian-controlled enclave. Although Russia has 
no formal agreement with EUMM, monitoring officials noted that 
EUMM's presence has been welcomed by Russia as EUMM conducts 
inspections of Georgian police and military installations; EUMM 
has been effective in dispelling Russian assertions of Georgian 
troop build-ups near the administrative boundary line.
    Before the war, approximately 2,000 Russian 
``peacekeeping'' troops were stationed in Abkhazia and 1,000 in 
South Ossetia. Although the French-brokered peace plan requires 
Russian troop strength to return to pre-war levels, monitoring 
officials note that Russia maintains troops well above those 
levels. Despite its role in conferring Russian citizenship to 
ethnic Ossetians in Georgia by distributing passports before 
the war and its heavily armed forces serving without UN or 
multilateral mandates, Russia continues to insist that its role 
in South Ossetia is one of dispassionate peacekeeper, 
tantamount to the EUMM. Russia has relied in part on the 
argument that Russian agreements for Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Mutual Assistance with Abkhazia and South Ossetia trump 
other international obligations and allow de facto authorities 
to request the number of Russian troops they see fit. Hence, 
there is no international group present in South Ossetia at 
this time apart from the Russian Federation.
    EUMM not only lacks physical access to South Ossetia but 
has no direct line of communication with de facto authorities; 
its only hotline is directly to Moscow. In October 2009, over a 
dozen wood collectors were arrested by de facto authorities for 
straying across the administrative boundary from the Tbilisi-
administered side. This and similar incidents have been 
attributed to unclear boundary markings and disparate maps. In 
this case, the hotline was used, and escalation was avoided, 
but EUMM officials noted that they do not have high confidence 
that more time-sensitive crises can be handled efficiently 
without direct lines of communication to de facto authorities.
Early Warning and Maritime Security
    Senior Georgian national security officials reported that 
the Russian military destroyed all military and civilian radars 
in the 2008 conflict. While some radars have been replaced, 
these are allegedly designed for civilian use and ill-suited 
for early warning. Hence, Georgia reportedly still cannot 
monitor all of its airspace, and even the airspace that is 
covered by radar lacks early warning capabilities.
    Through the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement 
(GBLSE) and Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
programs, the United States has provided direct assistance to 
the Georgian Coast Guard for capacity building (the Coast Guard 
and Navy have been merged into one service since the 2008 war), 
focusing on radars and other infrastructure. Funds totaling 
$850,000 have been dedicated to repairing the fleet, dredging 
the Poti Coast Guard base, and overhauling two U.S. donated 
patrol boats. GBSLE has also built maritime radar stations in 
five locations to detect and interdict illicit traffic and 
materials, provide search and rescue capacity, and monitor 
maritime activities. The stations allow monitoring of the full 
coast from Turkey to Russia.

                            Recommendations

    It has been one year since the first tranche of the $1 
billion pledge arrived in Georgia to alleviate the most 
pressing humanitarian needs of the Georgian population. As the 
situation in Georgia transitions from post-conflict, the United 
States Government must grapple with the challenge of charting a 
long-term policy. This policy must be closely informed by the 
territorial and defense challenges that Georgia is facing 
today.

    The United States Government should:

   Work with NATO allies in crafting a comprehensive, 
        transparent approach to security assistance and 
        military sales in the region. While Georgia has 
        encountered great difficulty in procuring equipment 
        from NATO countries to provide for its basic 
        territorial defense needs, some allies have pursued 
        significant military deals with Russia that could upset 
        the military balance. A transparent and multilateral 
        approach to security assistance would aid in dispelling 
        conspiracies in Russian media and preclude an excessive 
        nationalization of Georgian defense policy.

   Place the internationalization of the situation in South 
        Ossetia high on its agenda with the Russian Federation 
        and within the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE, two 
        venues where Russia has wielded its veto to prevent an 
        international presence in Georgia. Currently, neither 
        humanitarian aid organizations nor EUMM monitors have 
        physical access to South Ossetia. Greater transparency 
        must be brought to both the activities of the Russian 
        Federation in South Ossetia and the plight of South 
        Ossetian citizens affected by the 2008 conflict.

   Encourage the opening of direct lines of communication 
        between EUMM authorities and de facto authorities 
        within South Ossetia. Russia has insisted that all such 
        communications are channeled through Moscow. Following 
        a number of border incidents in recent months, such a 
        step would build confidence, while reducing the risk of 
        miscalculation in an administrative boundary area where 
        tensions remain high.

   Work towards facilitating a non-aggression pact between 
        Georgia and Russia. The French-brokered peace plan 
        contains a clause on the non-use of force, but Russia 
        has insisted that this clause was binding only between 
        Georgia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and 
        South Ossetia and that Russia, like France, was a mere 
        mediator to the conflict.

   Continue to explore avenues for confidence-building 
        measures between the parties to the conflict, including 
        in the energy and water sectors, where mutual reliance 
        on both sides of the administrative boundaries could be 
        furthered, as well as youth and business exchange 
        programs.

   Assist the Georgian Government in setting forth a 
        reintegration strategy for the breakaway enclaves, 
        including issues of access to multinational 
        corporations, humanitarian aid organizations, etc. Such 
        efforts should include finding workable definitions of 
        humanitarian assistance so that ostensible humanitarian 
        aid is not used in other sectors like institution 
        building. U.S. and international officials must 
        continue to emphasize that attempts to solve the 
        situation militarily would be disastrous.

                               Conclusion

    Even as the Obama administration seeks to develop more 
productive ties with the Russian Federation on other national 
security challenges, tensions in Georgia remain high, and 
mutual suspicion risks tipping the balance towards renewed 
conflict. The United States must garner greater support among 
NATO and EU partners for crafting a long-term strategy towards 
the region that aims to reassure all parties to the conflict.
    Particularly in the realm of security assistance, such 
coordination is critical. While Georgia finds itself under a de 
facto arms embargo, other NATO allies are pursuing record 
military deals with the Russian Federation. Georgia has become 
an exceptional contributor to international security through 
its contributions to missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A 
strategy to enable Georgia to similarly provide for its own 
territorial defense will require close cooperation with NATO 
allies to preserve stability in the region.
    An internationalization of monitoring and humanitarian 
activities in these enclaves would bring transparency to a 
situation where miscommunication and extremist appeals threaten 
to reignite armed conflict. Given that Russian arguments 
concerning its role in Georgia have relied heavily on 
international law, the United States and our partners must also 
not be reluctant to continue to highlight Russia's own failures 
to meet its international legal obligations.
    Addressing these interrelated sources of insecurity on a 
multilateral basis would also benefit Russia by reducing the 
risk of miscalculation, preventing Georgia from excessively 
nationalizing its defense policy, and reconditioning Russia's 
international image. Even the development of niche military 
capacity in countries like Georgia can promote shared interests 
with the Russian Federation in combating terrorism that has 
spilled from the North Caucasus, promoting stability in United 
Nations-mandated missions, and interdicting hazardous weapons 
and material.
    The United States must continue to emphasize that economic 
and political development in the former Soviet sphere is not a 
zero-sum endeavor and that the development of confident, 
prosperous nations on Russia's periphery can create more 
effective partners for Russia as well as the West. A 
coordinated strategy with European allies will assist in 
maintaining a peaceful balance and forging more productive 
relationships throughout the South Caucasus.

                          A P P E N D I X E S

                              ----------                              

           Appendix I.--Meetings With Individuals in Georgia 
                           and Washington, DC

U.S. Officials

    Ambassador John Bass, United States Ambassador to Georgia

  Jock Conly, Mission Director, United States Agency for 
        International Development

  Other Country Team members

  Ambassador John Tefft, former United States Ambassador to 
        Georgia

  Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
        State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

  Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
        Stabilization, Department of State

  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense

  Millennium Challenge Corporation

  Office of the Coordinator of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia

Georgian Officials

  Ekaterine Zguladze, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs

  Irakli Porchkhidze, Deputy Secretary, National Security 
        Council

  Vasil Sikharulidze, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President, 
        former Minister of Defense

  Nikoloz Vashakidze, Deputy Defense Minister

  Dimitri Gvindadze, Deputy Minister of Finance

Other Individuals

  Ambassador David Smith, Director, Georgian Security Analysis 
        Center

  Irakli Alasania, Chairman, Our Georgia-Free Democrats Party

  Representatives from local and international NGOs

  Representatives from the European Union Monitoring Mission

  Representatives from the European Commission

  Representatives from the International Monetary Fund

  Representatives from the World Bank

  Representatives from the United Nations Development Programme

  Representatives from the International Organization for 
        Migration

                                              Appendix II.--U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 1992-2000 (Part I)
                                                              ($ millions, by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         1992         1993         1994         1995         1996         1997         1998         1999         2000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGIA
  Economic Growth..................       0.94         1.79        11.94         7.81        10.14        10.12        33.85        32.61        35.26
  Governing Justly & Democratically       0.21         2.04         4.11         3.08         4.28         5.37        16.66        15.68        20.50
  Humanitarian Assistance..........       0.53        22.95        32.60        34.98         6.35         8.52        24.23        14.47        21.04
  Investing in People..............       0.15         0.44         0.95         0.80         0.60         1.00         3.75         5.30         4.04
  Peace & Security.................       0.00         2.80         0.00         0.10         0.60         0.79        19.47        21.39        28.30
    GEORGIA TOTAL..................       1.83        30.02        49.60        46.77        21.97        25.79        97.95        89.45       109.13
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Does not include $315 million supplemental Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriation for Georgia under the Disaster Relief and Recovery Supplemental
  Appropriations Act, 2008 (Division B, P.L. 110-329)
**Does not include $242 million supplemental AEECA appropriation for Georgia under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32)

                                        Appendix II.--U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 2001-2009 & FY 92-09 (Part II)
                                                              ($ millions, by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  2001        2002        2003        2004        2005        2006        2007        2008         2009       FY 92-09
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGIA
  Economic Growth............     41.17       33.45       32.09       26.84       35.26       27.54       23.39       18.54        20.69        403.41
  Governing Justly &              12.89       21.75       19.79       12.57       13.79       13.92       12.59       13.73        15.40        208.36
   Democratically............
  Humanitarian Assistance....     12.30       14.18       11.05        2.00        1.90        2.12        1.84        1.84         2.46        215.37
  Investing in People........      0.00        0.00        0.00       10.88       11.90        7.98        7.16        8.24         7.88         71.05
  Peace & Security...........     29.00       21.93       24.24       20.15       23.38       15.94       13.25        7.71         5.56        234.60
    GEORGIA TOTAL............     95.36       91.31       87.17       72.43       86.23       67.49       58.23       50.06*       52.00**    1,132.79
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Does not include $315 million supplemental Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriation for Georgia under the Disaster Relief and Recovery Supplemental
  Appropriations Act, 2008 (Division B, P.L. 110-329)
**Does not include $242 million supplemental AEECA appropriation for Georgia under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32)

                                                                 Appendix III.--U.S. Security Assistance and Training in Georgia
                                                                                          ($ millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                 Georgia                                         International
                                                              Foreign                        Georgia Train   Sustainment and     Coalition         Foreign          Military
                                                              Military       Section 1206      and Equip        Stability        Readiness      Military Sales   Education and        Total
                                                          Financing (FMF)                        (GTEP)         Operations    Support Program     Deliveries        Training
                                                                                                             Program (GSSOP)       (CRSP)                        Program (IMET)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2002.................................................         55.5               --             64.5               --               --              3.6             .889            124.5
FY 2003.................................................          6.9               --               --               --               --              9.8             1.18            17.88
FY 2004.................................................           12               --               --               --               --              7.3                1             20.3
FY 2005.................................................         11.9               --               --               --               --             11.5              1.4             24.8
FY 2006.................................................         11.8               --               --               60               --             10.5             1.26            83.56
FY 2007.................................................          9.7              6.5               --               28               --               25             1.15            70.35
FY 2008.................................................            9             11.5               --               71               --             72.3             .799            164.6
FY 2009.................................................           11               --               --               --               --               --             1.15            12.15
  Total FY 2002-2009....................................        127.8               18             64.5              159               --              140              8.9              518
  FY 2010 (request).....................................           16               --               --               --               24               --                2              43
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense

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