2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

No. 2-19-0798 

Order filed February 13, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re J.C., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

) of Winnebago County. 

) 

) No. 18-JA-279 

) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Honorable 

Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ryan C., ) Francis M. Martinez, 

Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Schostok and Hudson concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit due to his repeated incarceration 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition, the court’s finding 

that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in J.C.’s best interest was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirmed. 

¶ 2 Respondent, Ryan C., appeals from the trial court’s orders finding him unfit and 

terminating his parental rights. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Respondent is the father of J.C., who was born July 28, 2017. On August 27, 2018, the

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a hotline report alleging inadequate 

supervision of a minor. J.C.’s mother, Jasmine P., was found unconscious in her car with J.C. in 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 2 -

the backseat. J.C. was sweaty and dehydrated, and Jasmine was arrested for child endangerment, 

driving under the influence, and driving with a revoked license. Jasmine admitted to using heroin 

the previous day, and she had a history of substance abuse. At the time that J.C. was taken into 

DCFS custody, respondent was incarcerated. 

¶ 5 On August 29, 2018, the State filed a two-count neglect petition for J.C., and the petition 

also sought termination of respondent’s parental rights. The petition alleged two counts that 

respondent was unfit under section 1(D) the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)): (1) 

J.C. was in the custody or guardianship of DCFS, respondent was incarcerated at the time of the 

petition, and his repeated incarceration for criminal convictions prevented him from discharging 

his parental responsibilities (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(s) (West 2018)); and (2) respondent was depraved 

(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2018)). 

¶ 6 A DCFS service plan filed on October 23, 2018, provided that respondent needed to attend 

available services while incarcerated, such as for substance abuse, counseling, anger management, 

domestic violence, and parenting. An integrated assessment filed the same day provided that 

respondent had not been interviewed prior to completion of the report, as he had been incarcerated 

since May 2017. It further noted that he had never had personal contact with J.C., that his parole 

date was set for May 20, 2019, and that he had a history of incarceration on drug related convictions 

since 1995. The assessment’s prognosis was poor for respondent’s reunification with J.C. within 

12 months. The prognosis was based on his current incarceration and the likelihood of future 

criminal behavior supported by his history of drug-related incarcerations.

¶ 7 Beginning March 15, 2019, the court began an expedited combined hearing on the neglect 

and unfitness allegations. Molly Giese testified for the State as follows. She was a foster care case 

manager, and she had been assigned to J.C.’s case from around August 2018 until October 2018. 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 3 -

Respondent was incarcerated for the duration of her work on J.C.’s case. Respondent was unable 

to provide food or clothing for J.C., and he was unable to care for or comfort him. Respondent 

was also unable to bathe him, take him to doctor appointments, or provide him a home. During 

her time on the case, he was unable to provide monetary support for J.C., and he had no visitation 

with the child. The reason respondent was unable to do any of these things was because of his 

incarceration. J.C.’s foster parent provided for his daily care.

¶ 8 Tiffany Wasilewski also testified as follows. She was an adoption specialist, and she was 

assigned as J.C.’s caseworker since October 2018. During her time as his caseworker, respondent 

was incarcerated. Due to his incarceration, he was unable to provide J.C. with food, clothing, 

comfort, or financial support. Respondent had asked for visitation with J.C., but he had not had 

any visitation. 

¶ 9 The State also introduced documentary evidence at the hearing, including six certificates 

of conviction for respondent. People’s exhibits 7 through 12 were for respondent’s following 

convictions, respectively: a June 26, 2009, conviction for unlawful delivery of a look-alike 

controlled substance; a February 24, 2010, conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled 

substance; a November 1, 2012, conviction for the same; a March 14, 2014, conviction for 

unlawful delivery of a controlled substance; a January 31, 2017, conviction for unlawful 

possession of a controlled substance; and a May 31, 2017, conviction for aggravated battery of a 

pregnant person. 

¶ 10 The hearing was continued to May 21, 2019, where respondent testified as follows. He had 

recently been released from prison on May 17, 2019, after 24 months’ detention. He had been in 

contact with Wasilewski while he was incarcerated, including to discuss possible family 

placements for J.C. He had given her some names to contact for placement. After he completed 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 4 -

an integrated assessment, he received a service plan. His service plan recommended services for 

substance abuse, anger management, domestic violence, and parenting classes. The only service 

he was able to complete during his incarceration was the parenting class. He inquired about the 

other services, but he was unable to engage in them, either because he did not hear back about the 

service or because he would have been released before the service could be completed. After his 

release, he began looking for providers for his remaining services. On cross-examination, 

respondent admitted that his most recent conviction for aggravated battery against a pregnant 

woman was for a battery against Jasmine while she was pregnant with J.C. 

¶ 11 On June 27, 2019, the trial court adjudicated J.C. neglected, and it also found respondent 

unfit on both counts. For count one (repeated incarceration), the court explained that respondent 

had been in custody for the entire time of J.C.’s life until his recent release. The court was 

“certainly glad [respondent was] out.” It found, however, that his most recent incarceration had 

denied him the ability to parent J.C. for the entirety of the minor’s life: respondent had been 

unable to support J.C., to comfort him, or to engage in normal parental responsibilities. Turning 

to count two (depravity), the court found that respondent had over three felony convictions, with 

two convictions entered within the last five years. Moreover, the court did not find any evidence 

of rehabilitation to overcome the presumption of depravity arising from his convictions. Rather, 

it heard “aspirations” that respondent planned to rehabilitate himself. It noted he had a long history 

of felony convictions, including the most recent conviction for domestic violence, which

demonstrated an “acceleration of anti-social behavior.” 

¶ 12 The case proceeded to a July 15, 2019, combined dispositional and best interest hearing. 

Wasilewski, the adoption specialist, testified at the best interest hearing as follows. J.C. and his 

foster mother were “very bonded towards each other.” The foster mother’s home was safe and 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 5 -

appropriate for J.C., and she was willing to adopt him. J.C had relationships with his foster 

mother’s parents, sisters, niece, and nephew. Respondent had begun visitation with J.C. after he 

was released from prison, but to her knowledge, he had never met J.C. prior to his release. By the 

time of the hearing, respondent had had two visitations with J.C., and he interacted appropriately

at the visitations. At first during their visitation, J.C. was “standoffish,” but he later warmed up 

to respondent. After their second visit, J.C. gave respondent a hug. 

¶ 13 Wasilewski continued that respondent had completed a parenting class during his 

incarceration, but he was unable to complete his other services before his release. At the time of 

the best interest hearing, respondent was engaged in substance abuse and anger management 

services. Respondent had also provided Wasilewski with relatives to contact for possible 

parenting placements, but none were willing to take the placement. Wasilewski further testified 

that it was in J.C.’s best interest to terminate parental rights.

¶ 14 Respondent also testified at the best interest hearing as follows. He currently resided in 

Aurora with extended family. He did not have a job at the time of the best interest hearing; his 

family supported him. After his release from prison, he was electronically monitored, and he was 

supposed to be monitored until July 17, 2019. He was allowed normal movement from 8 a.m. to 

2 p.m. on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. He believed there was room for J.C. at his current 

residence, and his extended family that he lived with supported his reunification with J.C. Since 

his release, he had pursued additional services. He was able to begin substance abuse and anger 

management services because Medicaid covered them, but he was unable to afford domestic 

violence services.

¶ 15 On August 13, 2019, the trial court delivered its decision. It found that termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was in J.C.’s best interest. In support, it found that J.C. was clearly 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 6 -

bonded to and integrated with his foster parent, and the foster parent was willing to provide 

permanence for him in a safe and stable environment. J.C. was also integrated with the foster 

parent’s extended family. The foster parent had been responsible for J.C.’s well-being and 

continued to be responsible. The court set J.C.’s plan to adoption. Accordingly, the court ordered 

respondent’s parental rights terminated. 

¶ 16 Respondent timely appealed. 

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 Respondent makes three arguments on appeal: (1) the State failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that he was unfit to parent J.C. because of his repeated incarcerations; (2) the 

State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was unfit to parent J.C. due to 

depravity; and (3) the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of 

his parental rights was in J.C.’s best interest. We address his arguments in turn. 

¶ 19 A. Unfitness – Repeated Incarceration

¶ 20 Respondent first argues that the State failed to prove unfitness based on his repeated

incarceration. Respondent admits that he was incarcerated at the time J.C.’s neglect petition was 

filed and that he was previously incarcerated for felony convictions. He argues, however, that his 

incarceration did not prevent him from discharging his parental responsibilities. He argues that

many services recommend for him were not available while he was incarcerated, but after his 

release, he pursued anger management and substance abuse counseling. Respondent asked to have 

visitation with J.C. while incarcerated, and he began to have visitation with J.C. after his release. 

Respondent cites In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340 (2005), to support his contention that his efforts 

after his release from prison overcame his prior shortcomings and demonstrated that he was no 

longer the same person he was before.
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 7 -

¶ 21 The State responds that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that respondent’s 

repeated incarceration prevented him from discharging his parental responsibilities. It points to 

respondent’s six felony convictions from 2009 to 2017. The convictions included felony 

possession of a controlled substance, felony unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, and 

felony aggravated battery of a pregnant person, with that person being J.C.’s mother, Jasmine. 

While it concedes that respondent has made some efforts with respect to parenting, the State argues

his efforts do not equate with an ability to discharge his parental duties. The State concludes that, 

at best, respondent’s efforts show that he might be able to discharge his parental duties at some

point in the future, if he successfully completes all his service plan requirements. 

¶ 22 We reject respondent’s argument. Under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 

405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)), the involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. 

In re Nevaeh R., 2017 IL App (2d) 170229, ¶ 17. In the first step, the State must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 

50/1(D) (West 2018)). Id. We will reverse a finding of unfitness only if it is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Id. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite 

conclusion is clearly evident. Id. 

¶ 23 Under section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act, a parent is unfit if (1) the “child is in the 

temporary custody or guardianship of [DCFS],” (2) “the parent is incarcerated at the time the 

petition or motion for termination of parental rights is filed,” (3) “the parent has been repeatedly 

incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions,” and (4) “the parent’s repeated incarceration has 

prevented the parent from discharging his or her parental responsibilities for the child.” 750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(s) (West 2018); see In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d at 355 (addressing the four elements of 

section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act). Respondent does not dispute the first three elements, 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 8 -

conceding that J.C. was in DCFS custody, that respondent was incarcerated at the time the State 

filed its neglect petition that also sought termination of his parental rights, and that he had a history 

of repeated incarcerations. The only element respondent disputes is the fourth element. 

¶ 24 In analyzing whether repeated incarceration has prevented a parent from discharging 

parental responsibilities, we consider the overall impact repeated incarceration has had on the 

parent, “ ‘such as the diminished capacity to provide financial, physical, and emotional support for 

the child.’ ” In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d at 356 (quoting In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 421 (2001)). 

Under section 1(D)(s), we may consider incarceration that predates the child’s birth if it has 

impeded the parent’s ability to obtain appropriate life skills or to provide the child with care and 

support. Id. Relevant evidence may include social worker testimony about whether the parent 

provided a stable home or financial and emotional support in the first few years of the child’s life. 

Id. Section 1(D)(s)’s relevant time period begins with the parent’s incarceration and continues until 

the time the termination hearing is conducted. Id. at 358. 

¶ 25 Here, the trial court’s finding of unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. The record is clear that respondent’s repeated incarceration included the time when J.C. 

was born, and he was not released from prison until after the combined neglect and unfitness 

hearing had begun on March 15, 2019. He was released only four days prior to the hearing’s

continuance on May 21, 2019. Thus, respondent’s most recent incarceration denied him the ability 

to exercise his parental responsibilities for effectively the entire relevant statutory period in this 

case, that is, from the time J.C. was born until the trial court’s consideration of the unfitness 

allegations. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d at 358 (under section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act, 

courts must consider how incarceration has affected a person’s ability to parent throughout the 

period from when the person went to jail until the court considers the fitness allegations). Although 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 9 -

respondent may have made later efforts toward parenting J.C., such as attending visitation and 

enrolling in anger management and substance abuse classes after his release from prison, those 

efforts were made after the fitness hearing concluded and therefore were beyond the relevant 

statutory timeframe. 

¶ 26 In addition, respondent was not employed at the time of either the unfitness hearing or the 

best interest hearing, and he had been unable to complete all his recommended services while in 

prison. Even at the time of the best interest hearing, which took place about two months after the 

unfitness hearing, respondent testified that he was electronically monitored and therefore able to 

have normal movement only three days a week between the hours of 8 a.m. and 2 p.m., which 

affected his ability to gain employment.

¶ 27 Finally, the trial court’s decision was supported by the testimony of social workers. At the 

unfitness hearing, Giese testified that due to respondent’s incarceration, he was unable to provide 

J.C. with comfort or support, including food, clothing, and shelter. Wasilewski, who was J.C.’s 

caseworker after Giese, echoed her testimony. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding of unfitness 

due to repeated incarceration was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 28 B. Unfitness - Depravity 

¶ 29 Respondent also argues that the State did not prove his unfitness due to depravity. 

However, a circuit court does not need to find more than one basis for unfitness (In re Addison R., 

2013 IL App (2d) 121318, ¶ 35), and we have already held that its finding on the first count of

unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we do not address

respondent’s argument on the second count of unfitness. 

¶ 30 C. Best Interest
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 10 -

¶ 31 Respondent’s final argument is that the State did not prove that the termination of his 

parental rights was in J.C.’s best interest. He cites Wasilewski’s testimony that, by his second 

visitation with J.C., the child was showing signs of affection for respondent. He also argues that, 

due to his incarceration, he could not have played any role in the circumstances giving rise to J.C.’s 

neglect petition, and there were no allegations that respondent endangered J.C.’s safety. 

¶ 32 The State responds that Wasilewski testified that J.C. was very bonded with his foster 

mother and integrated with her extended family. J.C.’s foster mother was willing to adopt him, 

which would provide him permanence and a safe and stable environment. The State continues that 

while respondent was not directly responsible for the conditions that brought J.C. into DCFS’s 

custody, his incarceration prevented him from intervening on J.C.’s behalf or providing custodial 

care. 

¶ 33 We reject respondent’s argument. After the State has proved parental unfitness, as it did 

here, it must then prove termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Nevaeh R., 2017 IL 

App (2d) 170229, ¶ 17. At the best interest hearing, the focus shifts to the child, and the issue is 

no longer whether parental rights can be terminated but whether they should be terminated. In re 

D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). That is, at a best interest hearing, “the parent’s interest in 

maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home 

life.” Id. 

¶ 34 In making a best-interest determination, the Act sets forth the following factors the trial 

court is to consider in light of the child’s age and developmental needs: (a) the physical safety and 

welfare of the child; (b) the development of the child’s identity; (c) the child’s background and 

ties; (d) the child’s sense of attachments; (e) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (f) the child’s 

community ties; (g) the child’s need for permanence; (h) the uniqueness of every family and child; 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 11 -

(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and (j) the preferences of the persons 

available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). In addition, the court may 

consider the nature and length of the child’s relationship with his present caretaker and the effect 

that a change in placement would have on his emotional and psychological well-being. In re 

Nevaeh R., 2017 IL App (2d) 170229, ¶ 27. The trial court need not explicitly reference each factor, 

and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court in affirming its decision. 

Id. We will reverse a best-interest finding only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

or is an abuse of discretion. In re Nevaeh R., 2017 IL App (2d) 170229, ¶ 17.

¶ 35 Here, the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in J.C.’s 

best interest was supported by Wasilewski’s testimony. She testified that J.C. and his foster mother 

were “very bonded towards each other.” Wasilewski continued that the foster mother was willing 

to adopt J.C., and he had relationships her parents, sisters, niece, and nephew. As for possible 

parenting placements, respondent had provided Wasilewski with relatives to contact, but none 

were willing to adopt J.C. Wasilewski further testified that it was in J.C.’s best interest to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights. 

¶ 36 In contrast with the foster mother, respondent had been incarcerated for almost the first 

two years of J.C.’s life and therefore had been unable to provide him with care or support. 

Moreover, his incarceration was due to a battery against J.C.’s mother while she was pregnant with 

J.C. Respondent had visited with J.C. only twice since his release, and he had not yet completed 

all his services. He was currently unemployed and was living with extended family. Given these 

facts as well as Wasilewski’s testimony, the trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights 

was in J.C.’s best interest was not against the manifest weight of the evidence or an abuse of 

discretion. 
2020 IL App (2d) 190798-U 

- 12 -

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Winnebago County circuit court. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.