STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and 

is the strategic level study agent for issues related to national security and 

military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic 

studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning and policy for joint and combined 

employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having 

strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the 

larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special 

or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and 

topically-orientated roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick reaction 

responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army 

to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in 

national security policy formulation.
TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCIES

AND THE ESCALATION OF REGIONAL 

CONFLICT:

LESSONS FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Idean Salehyan

March 2010

The views expressed in this report are those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of 

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or 

the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute 

(SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided 

they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize 

operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. 

Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and 

sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of 

furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not 

be copyrighted.

Visit our website for other free publication 

downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
ii

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College 

External Research Associates Program. Information on this 

program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.

army.mil, at the Publishing tab.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be 

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are 

available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination free 

of charge. Hard copies of this report may also be ordered from 

our homepage free of charge. SSI’s homepage address is: www.

StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail 

newsletter to update the national security community on the 

research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and 

upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter 

also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research 

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please 

subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.

mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-427-9
iii

FOREWORD

Many contemporary insurgencies are characterized 

by militant groups that span national boundaries, 

benefitting from sanctuaries in neighboring states. 

Such groups complicate traditional counterinsurgency 

operations and have the potential to spark conflict 

between states. While some countries have engaged in 

cooperative strategies to contain transnational violence, 

many neighbors have been drawn into prolonged 

conflict over the issue of foreign sanctuaries.

In this monograph, Dr. Idean Salehyan examines 

several recent transnational insurgencies and their 

implications for regional relations. While the majority 

of cases resulted in an escalation of conflict between 

neighbors, in some instances countries have been 

able to construct successful border security regimes. 

This monograph discusses these patterns of conflict 

and cooperation. Additionally, detailed analyses of 

the relations between Rwanda and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, as well as India and its 

neighbors, are offered to shed light on positive and 

negative dynamics.

Importantly, Dr. Salehyan uses past cases of 

conflict and cooperation over transnational militancy 

to underscore the current issues facing Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Looking ahead to the eventual reduction 

of foreign troops in these countries, this monograph 

assesses prospects for regional stability and offers 

concrete policy advice for decisionmakers.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

IDEAN SALEHYAN is an Assistant Professor of 

Political Science at the University of North Texas. He

is also a Fellow at the Robert S. Strauss Center for 

International Security and Law at the University of

Texas at Austin, a Research Associate at the John 

Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies at 

Southern Methodist University, and a Research 

Associate at the International Peace Research Institute, 

Oslo, Norway. Dr. Salehyan has been a visiting 

scholar at the University of Essex, the Swiss Federal 

Institute of Technology—Zürich, and the International 

Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway. His research 

interests include civil and international conflict, 

forced migration, and the relationship between natural resources and armed conflict. Dr. Salehyan is 

the author of Rebels Without Borders: Transnational 

Insurgencies in World Politics (Cornell University Press, 

2009). In addition, he has published numerous articles 

in journals such as the American Journal of Political 

Science, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict 

Resolution, the Journal of Peace Research, the Journal 

of Politics, and World Politics. Currently, he is part of 

a research project which examines the relationship 

between climate change, resource scarcity, and political 

unrest in Africa. Dr. Salehyan holds a Ph.D. in Political 

Science from the University of California, San Diego.
v

SUMMARY

Many contemporary insurgencies pit governments 

against rebel organizations that span international 

boundaries, find sanctuaries in neighboring states, and 

receive support from rival governments. Because the 

military and police forces of recognized governments 

must respect international boundaries, militant 

groups often use border regions to their advantage 

as they seek safe havens in which to operate. Rebel 

groups with foreign sanctuaries are quite common as 

conflicts in Turkey, Colombia, Liberia, India, Sudan, 

and elsewhere attest. Current conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have demonstrated the difficulties in 

confronting transnational rebel groups, as relations 

with neighboring states may pose challenges for 

security forces.

Once transnational rebels have established 

themselves on foreign soil, the conflict ceases to be 

a wholly domestic one and necessarily draws in 

regional governments. Traditional counterinsurgency 

strategies can only go so far in containing the threat 

as foreign soil is off limits to security forces. This 

threatens to change the dynamic of the war and lead to 

an escalatory process which encompasses neighboring 

states. The problem of cross-border militancy has the 

potential to raise tensions in the region, and even lead 

to a full-blown war between governments. 

At times, states will use coercive bargaining against 

their neighbors to press them to evict rebel units on 

their territory. Troop movements along the border, 

cross-border strikes against rebel bases, and direct 

confrontations with the armed forces of the neighboring 

state can be used, among other tactics, to increase 

pressure on the rebel host. At other times, states may 
vi

devise cooperative strategies to police their borders 

and launch joint operations against militant groups. 

Doing so requires clear lines of communication and 

effective coordination of military action. Finally, states 

can simply neglect the problem. Rather than direct 

confrontations or active cooperation, some states may 

find that they are unwilling or unable to engage their 

neighbors and will let the problem fester, perhaps for 

years. Gaining an understanding of best and worst 

practices in dealing with transnational insurgencies is 

critical for confronting 21st century militant groups.

This monograph examines all major rebel 

organizations active since 1990 to determine patterns 

of conflict and cooperation over transnational militant 

groups. Groups such as the Kurdish Workers’ Party, 

the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, and the 

Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, among 

others, are included in the analysis. The most common 

outcome was for transnational insurgencies to escalate 

into direct interstate disputes. More often than not, 

states fail to communicate effectively to design joint 

counterinsurgency strategies, which in turn lead to 

direct interstate hostilities. In many of these conflictual 

cases, one or both states deliberately provided 

sanctuary and assistance to rebel organizations, 

indicating preexisting interstate frictions. Many rebel 

groups took actions that provoked interstate clashes 

and turned simmering rivalries into full-scale wars. 

While conflict over transnational rebellions was 

more common, states can and do cooperate to manage 

these threats. States recognizing a common problem 

along their border may engage in constructive dialogue 

and common counterinsurgency strategies, which help 

to preserve friendly relations. For instance, Iran has 

agreed to cooperate with Turkey on border security 
vii

issues. India has also cooperated with its neighbors over 

insurgencies in its north eastern provinces. However, 

effective border regimes have been relatively rare. 

Another set of countries have had militant groups 

operating along their borders, but have chosen to 

simply ignore the problem. In many of these instances, 

the problem of transnational militancy is compounded 

by states that are too weak to respond adequately to the 

problem—on either side of the border. State weakness 

led to paralysis in confronting the problem at hand and 

has often resulted in a collapse of central authority.

To illustrate how transnational insurgencies can 

escalate into international conflicts, and how states 

may cooperate on security issues, this monograph 

takes a deeper look at the relations between Rwanda 

and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as 

the relations between India and its neighbors to the 

east. Following the 1994 genocide, the new Tutsiled regime in Rwanda faced considerable challenges 

from a growing Hutu insurgency based in Zaire, 

later renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(DRC). The presence of a Hutu rebel force in the 

DRC led Rwanda to invade its neighbor twice: first to 

unseat President Mobutu Sese Seko and install what 

it thought would be a friendly regime, then to attack 

the newly instated Kabila government. However, this 

latter invasion drew in forces from many African states, 

cost millions of lives, and ultimately failed. After an 

agreement signed in 2002, Rwanda and the DRC, with 

help from the UN, have transformed their relationship 

into a more cooperative one and have taken steps to 

limit cross-border violence.

Since independence, India has grappled with 

several low-level insurgencies in its North Eastern 

provinces, particularly Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, 
viii

Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. Although rebels 

from Assam and elsewhere in northeast India have 

benefitted from sanctuaries in several states, Bhutan 

became an especially important safe-haven for rebels. 

After years of failed negotiation attempts to persuade 

rebels to leave, on December 15, 2003, the Royal 

Bhutanese Army (RBA) began major operations against 

Indian insurgents on their territory, with considerable 

assistance from India itself. This offensive was the 

RBA’s first military action in 140 years. Pointing to 

the successful bilateral cooperation with Bhutan, India 

called on other governments in the region to do their 

part in combating transnational militancy and began 

working with Myanmar and Bangladesh to plan similar 

operations. India has sought a strategy of engagement 

with its neighbors and has successfully coordinated 

actions with militaries in the region. 

Moving beyond past cases, this monograph 

also sheds light on current dilemmas facing Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and their allies and neighbors. The 

continuing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan 

will present considerable challenges for the United 

States and its allies for at least the next decade. A 

counterinsurgency strategy has been implemented, 

which places the emphasis on protecting civilians, 

building trust, and providing services—all important 

steps. Nonetheless, both insurgencies exhibit 

considerable transnational elements that complicate 

matters and necessitate building strong bonds with 

neighboring countries to contain militancy as well as 

prevent disputes arising between states.

Iraq’s most pressing concern with respect to 

transnational insurgency relates to the presence of 

Kurdish militants from Turkey, namely the Kurdish 

Workers’ Party (PKK), on Iraqi soil, although Iranian 
ix

militants also operate inside Iraq. In Afghanistan, the 

spread of Taliban militancy to Pakistan threatens to 

destabilize the entire South Asia region. As foreign 

forces begin to scale-back their presence in these 

countries, it is vital that effective border security 

regimes are established to contain, if not eliminate, 

transnational rebel violence and prevent the escalation 

of regional conflict.

In this monograph, concrete policy recommendations are offered to the foreign policy community. 

First, states must find the right balance between local 

and central government security capacity. Local forces 

in border regions—such as the Kurdish Peshmerga 

and the Pakistani Frontier Corps—are often better 

able to confront security challenges, but must be better 

integrated into the government’s force structure. 

Second, states must improve coordination between 

security forces, especially between units along the 

border. This involves traditional counterinsurgency 

forces, but also local police officials, customs agents, 

border patrol forces, and so on. Third, countries should 

enhance mechanisms for intelligence sharing. Current 

intelligence sharing institutions are in place, but must 

be strengthened and expanded upon. Finally, countries 

must promote diplomacy and commercial exchanges 

in the region. Cooperation must include more than 

exchanges among security forces, but also be backed 

by robust diplomatic measures and the linking of 

societies through trade and commerce.

1

TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCIES

AND THE ESCALATION OF REGIONAL 

CONFLICT:

LESSONS FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Many contemporary insurgencies pit governments 

against rebel organizations that span international 

boundaries, find sanctuaries in neighboring states, and 

receive support from rival governments. For instance, 

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 

poses a major threat to the Colombian government 

and has maintained bases across the North Andean 

region.1 Likewise, rebel groups from the Sudanese 

region of Darfur equip and train their fighters in 

neighboring Chad. U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Afghan forces have faced 

serious difficulties in combating the Taliban as 

militants straddle the border with Pakistan.2 These 

examples reveal the limitations that modern states 

operating under international legal constraints 

face when conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) 

operations. Because the military and police forces of 

recognized governments must respect international 

boundaries, militant groups often use border regions 

to their advantage as they seek safe havens in which 

to operate. The ability to establish foreign sanctuaries 

is aided by transnational ethnic communities that 

span borders, by hostile foreign governments that 

deliberately provide support to insurgent groups, 

and by weak neighboring states that cannot control 

their borders.3 Violence also frequently leads to mass 

refugee migration into neighboring countries, which in 

turn benefits militant groups as they find supplies and 

recruits among refugee camps, particularly when such 

camps are poorly administered and guarded.4
2

Transnational insurgency is not a new phenomenon. 

While the current conflict in Afghanistan is complicated 

by the cross-border nature of the Taliban, Pashtun 

tribal loyalties, and possible links to elements within 

the Pakistani state, similar features were also present 

during the period of Soviet occupation. In decades 

past, militant groups such as the Palestine Liberation 

Organization (PLO), the Nicaraguan Contras, and the

Khmer Rouge operated in border regions where they

could flee from government offensives. Militant 

activities, moreover, are not limited to the immediate 

neighborhood; groups such as the Kurdish Workers 

Party (PKK) and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have 

mobilized activities and gathered funds from diaspora 

across the globe. What is new is the declining 

importance of distance in conducting transnational 

operations. Modern communications, mobile phones, 

internet sites, and so on, help to link militant groups 

and their supporters abroad through dense networks 

of informational exchange in ways that were 

previously unimaginable. These changes also mean 

that contemporary insurgencies can more easily link 

with criminal organizations and tap into illicit markets 

for financing.5 This has clearly helped transnational 

groups such as al-Qaeda finance their activities and 

coordinate activities and rally supporters in multiple 

countries.6

Despite these technological advances, battlefield 

operations must still be conducted in close proximity 

to one’s target. Therefore, rebel organizations will seek 

out sanctuaries in neighboring countries, where they 

can train their fighters, stockpile resources, and find a 

degree of safety from attack. Once transnational rebels 

(TNRs) have established themselves on foreign soil, 

however, the conflict ceases to be a wholly domestic one 
3

and necessarily draws in regional governments. This 

threatens to change the dynamic of the war and lead to 

an escalatory process which encompasses neighboring 

states. The problem of cross-border militancy has the 

potential to raise tensions in the region, and even 

lead to a full-blown war between governments. For 

instance, Rwanda has invaded neighboring Zaire/the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on numerous 

occasions to fight Hutu militant groups and punish 

its neighbor for providing support to these groups; 

similarly, Israel invaded Lebanon in the 1980s and 

again in 2006 in order to strike at TNRs such as the 

PLO and Hezbollah. 

The purpose of this monograph is to better 

understand interstate conflict and cooperation over 

transnational insurgency. While Rwanda’s invasion of 

the DRC presents an example in which states came to 

blows over the issue of cross-border militancy, some 

countries have agreed to cooperate on the issue. India, 

for instance, has constructively engaged its neighbors 

to contain violence in its northeastern states. While 

sporadic attacks continue to occur, India has worked 

with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar (Burma) to 

deal major blows to insurgent groups and limit their 

growth. Thus, this analysis asks: Why do transnational 

insurgencies sometimes lead to interstate disputes? 

Why do states sometimes successfully cooperate in 

COIN operations on both sides of the border? What 

lessons can be learned from best and worst cases from 

the past? Importantly, this monograph will apply some 

of these lessons to current operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq, where the Taliban and Kurdish insurgents 

(respectively) threaten regional relations. After the 

United States reduces its forces in these troubled areas, 

how can trust and cooperation among neighbors be 
4

established so that insurgent groups do not foment 

hostility?

UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL 

INSURGENCY

The defining feature of modern nation-states is that 

they have the legitimate authority to use force within 

their sovereign territory. This coercive force is used to 

maintain law and order, enforce contracts, protect lives 

and property, and to deter violent challengers. Yet, this 

power is also defined by the state’s given territorial 

borders. The police and military forces of a state have 

no authority outside of their jurisdiction. For instance, 

countries often do coordinate military and police efforts 

to catch and extradite fugitives, but coordinating such 

efforts creates transaction costs, raises the potential 

for miscommunication, and impedes action more 

generally.

Civil wars and insurgencies are unlikely to emerge 

if the state can successfully monitor and control 

subversive elements.7 Some states are exceptionally 

weak and cannot effectively police their jurisdiction. 

Many African states, for example, lack the ability to 

project force across their entire territory;8 likewise, 

the Pakistani state has long been unable to control 

its western tribal regions. While poor state capacity 

can provide the space needed for insurgents to find 

domestic safe havens, all states, even relatively strong 

ones, are constrained by their borders. Some countries 

are fortunate enough to be blessed by good geography 

and find themselves in neighborhoods that are 

relatively democratic, prosperous, and well-governed. 

Other countries are located in neighborhoods that 

are plagued by weak states, international rivalries, 
5

and governance failures.9 “Bad neighborhoods” 

can facilitate insurgencies by providing militants 

transnational sanctuaries where they can operate in 

relative safety.

TNRs present a series of challenges for normal 

COIN operations. According to well-accepted 

thinking on COIN,10 government forces must be able 

to accomplish three interrelated tasks: (1) clear an area 

of insurgents through the appropriate use of military 

power and bolstered by adequate intelligence; (2) hold 

the area and be able to protect civilian populations 

from continued attacks; and (3) win over the “hearts 

and minds” of the population by providing services 

and well-functioning institutions and by building 

trust. Thus, COIN operations entail both the kinetic 

use of force as well as efforts to build governance. 

TNRs complicate this picture in a number of ways. 

First, insurgents located across the border are more 

difficult to strike. Crossing the border through the 

movement of troops, violation of airspace, or even firing 

munitions violates the sovereignty of the neighboring 

country and international legal prohibitions on the use 

of force. Offensives against rebel strongholds are more 

difficult to conduct since the neighbor will protest 

against violations of its sovereignty and perhaps 

respond with strong countermeasures. Second, 

according to COIN doctrine, military forces must 

be able to gather good intelligence on the insurgent 

organization and their movements. In combating 

transnational groups, the state lacks a dense network 

of informants; the ability to patrol the area; and 

extensive knowledge of local customs, languages, and 

traditions. It is more difficult to gather intelligence on 

the external operations of the insurgency. Third, COIN 

requires building effective governance institutions and 
6

providing social services in areas that are cleared by 

state security forces. Clearly, the state cannot govern 

in areas where it lacks the sovereign authority to do 

so. Thus, even if the state is willing or able to conduct 

limited cross-border strikes on insurgent bases, this 

will not be sufficient to neutralize the threat since 

the vital task of holding territory and winning over 

populations cannot be achieved on foreign soil. For 

these reasons, previous research has shown that 

transnational rebellions are more likely to become 

protracted insurgencies.11 States are much less likely to 

defeat TNRs or to be willing to negotiate a settlement 

with them, since they cannot be assured that peace 

treaties will result in the demobilization of externallybased fighters.

In addition to these added difficulties for COIN 

operations, transnational militancy can lead to 

conflicts between states. The nature of such conflicts 

will depend on the type of host involved. First, some 

rebel hosts deliberately support their neighbor’s 

insurgent movements as a means to undermine their 

foreign enemies. Rival neighbors will often empower 

an insurgency as an alternative to the direct use of 

force. Iran and Iraq, for example, ended direct warfare 

in 1988, but continued to attack one another indirectly 

by providing arms and sanctuaries to insurgent 

groups. In such cases, transnational rebel sanctuaries 

are indicative of preexisting hostilities between states, 

but they can heighten tensions and provoke escalatory 

dynamics that result in direct clashes between official 

militaries. For example, hot pursuit raids across the 

border to chase rebels may lead to clashes with border 

guards and spark an interstate war. Moreover, support 

for an insurgent force may lead the target state to 

launch retaliatory action against the rebel sponsor to 
7

coerce it to cease such support. Second, weak states 

can become reluctant hosts to insurgent movements 

because they cannot effectively control their border 

regions.12 Foreign insurgents are likely to be seen as 

another country’s problem, and diverting resources 

away from more pressing domestic concerns, including 

suppressing domestic groups, will be seen as too costly. 

In these cases, new hostilities may arise between rebel 

host and home countries. The home government will 

object to the establishment of TNR sanctuaries and will 

demand that the host evict rebels from their soil; the 

host state may be unwilling or unable to comply with 

these demands, provoking disputes between states. 

Thus, weak neighboring states may be drawn into 

conflicts against their will by TNR groups in border 

areas.

While current thinking on COIN operations 

emphasizes the appropriate use of force in addition 

to building governance, the discussion above points 

to a third element in transnational counterinsurgency: 

diplomacy. Conflicts entail “triangular,” three-actor 

bargains between the rebels, the target government, 

and the host state. Domestic efforts to fight militants 

are unlikely to succeed without bargaining with 

governments in the region and coordinating efforts 

among states. Rather than unilateral efforts, joint 

strategies must be adopted. However, states often 

fail to effectively engage their neighbors, and as 

a result, transnational rebellions often provoke 

tensions between governments. Cross-border attacks, 

troop mobilization near the border, and inadvertent 

spillovers have the potential to spark major diplomatic 

rifts and possibly violent clashes. For instance, in 2008, 

Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia experienced a 

major diplomatic row after cross-border COIN opera-
8

tions by Colombia violated Ecuador’s territory. After 

these attacks on the FARC, both Ecuador and Venezuela 

put their armed forces on alert and moved troops near 

the border, risking a war.13 As will be demonstrated in 

the next section, TNR activities will more often than not 

provoke militarized hostilities between countries; but 

in some cases, countries may be able to forge alliances 

to counter the threat. Examining case evidence may 

reveal patterns in cooperative and conflictual relations 

over TNRs.

TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCIES AND 

INTERSTATE CONFLICT

 The presence of cross-border militant groups will 

undoubtedly internationalize domestic insurgencies 

and lead to tacit or explicit bargains between 

neighboring states over how to deal with the problem. 

At times, target states will use coercive bargaining 

against their neighbors to press them to evict rebel 

units on their territory. Troop movements along the 

border, cross-border strikes against rebel bases, and 

direct confrontations with the armed forces of the 

neighboring state can be used, among other tactics, 

to increase pressure on the rebel host. At other times, 

states may devise cooperative strategies to police their 

border and launch joint operations against militant 

groups. Doing so requires clear lines of communication 

and effective coordination of military action. Finally, 

states can simply neglect the problem. Rather than 

direct confrontations or active cooperation, some states 

may find that they are unwilling or unable to engage 

their neighbors and will let the problem fester, perhaps 

for years.
9

To understand these patterns, Tables 1, 2, and 3 

present a listing of cases where TNR groups spanned 

national boundaries. This list contains information 

on TNRs that were active during the 1990s and 2000s 

and that made extensive use of neighboring territory.14

This implies that the group conducted major sustained 

operations in neighboring countries, rather than 

had limited or sporadic access to external bases. As 

such, it misses some high-profile cases, such as the 

FARC bases in Ecuador, but it does capture several 

significant insurgencies such as the Southern Sudanese 

insurgency, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, 

and the PKK. The rebel origin state, the host state, 

and the name/affiliation of the rebel organization are 

given. In addition, using data from the Correlates of 

War project,15 newspapers, and secondary materials, 

information on the relationship between states is 

given. The interstate relationship is listed as conflictual 

if there were direct, state-to-state militarized activities 

between official armed forces. These include threats to 

use force, minor skirmishes, small-scale lethal violence 

between states, and full-blown hostilities with many 

casualties. The relationship is listed as cooperative if the 

countries agree to joint counterinsurgency operations 

and border security programs. Finally, if there were 

no significant conflictual or cooperative events, the 

relationship is listed as neutral. 
10

Table 1. Conflictual Cases.

Origin Host Name Rebels

Burundi DR Congo

National Council for the Defense of Democracy 

(CNDD), CNDD-FDD (Forces for the Defense of 

Democracy - FDD)

Burundi Tanzania CNDD, CNDD-FDD, Palipehutu, Palipehutu-FNL

(National Forces of Liberation - FNL)

Cambodia Thailand Khmer Rouge, others

DR Congo/

Zaire Rwanda

Democratic Alliance for the Liberation of the 

Congo (AFDL), Rally for Congolese Democracy 

(RCD)

DR Congo/

Zaire Uganda RCD, RCD-ML, Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

Eritrea Sudan Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement

Ethiopia Eritrea Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, 

Oromo Liberation Front

Guinea Liberia Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea

India Pakistan Kashmiri Insurgents

Iran Iraq Mujahedeen e Khalq, Kurdish insurgents

Iraq Iran Kurdish insurgents, Supreme Council for the 

Islamic Revolution in Iraq

Iraq Turkey Kurdish insurgents

Israel Lebanon Hezbollah

Israel Syria Hezbollah

Liberia Guinea Liberians United for Reconciliation and 

Democracy

Myanmar Thailand Karen groups, other ethnic insurgents

Rwanda DR Congo/

Zaire Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda

Senegal GuineaBissau Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance

Sudan Eritrea Sudan's People's Liberation Army

Sudan Ethiopia Sudan's People's Liberation Army

Sudan Uganda Sudan's People's Liberation Army

Turkey Iraq Kurdish Workers Party

Turkey Syria Kurdish Workers Party

Uganda DR Congo/

Zaire

Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), West Nile 

Bank Front (WNBF)
11

Table 2. Cooperative Cases.

Table 3. Neutral Cases.

Origin Host Name Rebels

Burundi Rwanda Palipehutu, Palipehutu-FNL

India Bangladesh Northeastern insurgent groups

India Bhutan Northeastern insurgent groups

India Burma Northeastern insurgent groups

Iran Turkey Kurdish insurgents

Turkey Iran Kurdish Workers Party

Origin Host Name Rebels

Chad Libya Movement for Democracy and 

Development

Chad Niger Movement for Democracy and 

Development

Chad Nigeria Movement for Democracy and 

Development

Guinea Sierra Leone Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea

Liberia Burkina Faso National Patriotic Front of Liberia

Liberia Cote d'Ivoire National Patriotic Front of Liberia

Liberia Sierra Leone Ulimo-J

Rwanda Uganda Rwandan Patriotic Front

Senegal Gambia Movement of Democratic Forces of 

Casamance

Sierra Leone Liberia Revolutionary United Front

Turkey Greece Kurdish Workers Party
12

First, let us examine the conflictual cases. As can 

be seen the modal, or most common, outcome when 

TNRs are present is direct confrontation between 

states. Thus, it is very common for transnational 

insurgencies to escalate into direct interstate disputes. 

It is important to note, however, the nature of the 

relationship between rebel host and home countries. 

In many of these conflictual cases, one or both states 

deliberately provided sanctuary and assistance to 

rebel organizations. The insurgency was supported by 

hostile foreign powers as another tool to impose costs 

on their rivals, so it cannot be said that cross-border 

militant activities were the sole cause of poor relations 

between states; rather, externally supported rebels are 

a symptom of regional rivalries. Nonetheless, rebel 

organizations—often acting independently of their 

hosts— may take actions that provoke interstate clashes 

and threaten to turn simmering rivalries into full-scale 

wars. For example, the government of Zaire (later the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo) supported Hutu 

rebels from Rwanda, who would later come to form 

the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR). 

In response, the Rwandan government, alongside 

Congolese rebel factions, invaded the DRC twice to 

remove the ruling regime. While the first invasion 

successfully toppled the government of Mobutu Sese 

Seko, the second invasion failed to unseat Kabila as 

states across Africa sent in troops, sparking a regional 

war.16 In another instance, in 2006 Israel launched 

extensive strikes on Lebanese territory in retaliation 

against Hezbollah militants, who were launching 

rockets across the border and who had captured 

Israeli soldiers. This significantly threatened to further 

deteriorate regional relations, especially as Syria voiced 

strong support for Hezbollah, which it had long aided.
13

A full-scale war nearly broke out in the mid-1990s 

between the African nations of Sudan and Eritrea over 

mutual recriminations over support for insurgent 

groups. Sudan accused Eritrea of supporting the 

Sudanese People’s Liberation Army; for its part, 

Eritrea accused Sudan of supporting militant Islamist 

groups—notably, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad—that 

were attempting to overthrow the government of 

Isaias Afwerki. Diplomatic relations were suspended 

in 1994, and tensions mounted in July 1996 as two 

Sudanese soldiers were killed near the border with 

Eritrea.17 For several months, a pattern emerged in 

which cross-border raids by rebel organizations were 

followed by verbal attacks condemning the other state 

for harboring militants. Then in December, following 

a spate of attacks, the Sudanese government placed 

Kassala State, on the border with Eritrea, on maximum 

alert. In January 1997, Sudanese rebels launched 

several significant attacks in the border region and 

clearly had the backing of Eritrean President Afwerki, 

who remarked in an interview, “Since the opposition 

represents the Sudanese people’s will, certainly the 

Eritrean government and people will stand by the 

opposition. . . .”18 The interstate nature of this conflict 

became more direct in 1998, when the Eritrean press 

reported that Sudanese government forces attacked 

several villages within Eritrea. In March, Eritrean 

forces launched artillery attacks on the Sudanese 

villages of Awad, Galsa, and Hadra, followed by a 

June 19 attack on Sudanese border posts.19 Similar 

cross-border violence between Sudan, Eritrea, and 

various rebel groups continued throughout 1998 

and early 1999; these attacks mainly consisted of air 

and artillery strikes, but troop deployments near the 

border threatened more extensive operations. Yet, the 
14

two countries were able to avert further escalation of 

the crisis in May 1999 after they signed an agreement 

in Qatar and agreed to restore diplomatic relations. In 

the agreement, they formally agreed to halt support for 

one another’s rebel organizations.20 Mutual suspicion 

continued for some time, but the crisis did not again 

threaten to erupt into a full-scale war.

While it was clear that militant groups attacking 

Israel, Rwanda, Sudan, and Eritrea were deliberately 

backed by governments in the region, in other cases, 

TNRs can spark new hostilities between states. In 

other words, transnational nonstate actors can draw 

countries into conflicts that are not of their choosing. 

For example, relations between Myanmar and Thailand 

have sometimes been tense as ethnic insurgents 

(especially Karen and Shan groups) conducted major 

operations across the border. Thailand maintained 

relations with Myanmar after the military violently 

suppressed the democracy movement in the late 

1980s. Although the Karen National Union and other 

separatists were based on Thai territory, Thailand’s 

attitude towards the insurgency was one of neglect 

rather than direct support.21 Nonetheless, Thailand 

fiercely defended its sovereignty on several occasions 

when Myanmar’s military attempted to strike at rebel 

positions on the Thai side of the border. In one instance 

in February 1992, Thai aircraft fired warning shots at 

Burmese soldiers who had crossed the border to attack 

a Karen rebel outpost.22 Similar clashes occurred in 

1995 near the Thai village of Mae Sot. 

Despite border tensions, Thailand continued a 

policy of “constructive engagement” with the military 

junta in Myanmar, and pressed the Association of 

South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to do the same, 

eventually winning (in 1997) a place for Myanmar in 
15

the regional bloc.23 However, in 2001 and 2002 tensions 

increased over a string of attacks across the border. 

In February 2001, about 200 Myanmar troops entered 

Thailand to attack ethnic Shan rebels. Clashes with 

Thai forces ensued near the town of Mae Sai, killing at 

least 20 soldiers and civilians. After the attack, Thailand 

sealed its border.24 Another round of clashes ensued 

in June 2002 after Myanmar attacked Shan rebels on 

the Thai side of the border, prompting an exchange of 

artillery fire.25 The Thai military was on high alert and 

issued a statement that: “Artillery shells have landed 

on Thai territory, endangering the lives of villagers. 

. . . As long as the Burmese government continues 

to suppress the ethnic minority groups and refuses 

to embrace democracy, the fighting will continue 

and Burma will continue to mistrust Thailand.”26

Cooperative gestures later that year helped to diffuse 

the situation. Although a full scale war was averted, 

these incidents demonstrate how neighbors—despite 

attempts to maintain good relations—can be drawn 

into conflict by cross-border militancy.

While conflict over transnational rebellions is more 

common, states can and do cooperate to manage these 

threats. States recognizing a common problem along 

their border may engage in constructive dialogue and 

common counterinsurgency strategies, which help 

to preserve friendly relations. For instance, Iran and 

Turkey have each been faced with Kurdish insurgent 

groups seeking an independent homeland. While 

Turkey has found Syria and Iraq to be uncooperative, 

Iran has agreed to cooperate with Turkey on border 

security issues. Relations between Turkey and Iran 

have not always been cheery, although the two states 

have at least in principal agreed to cooperate on border 

security. A joint-security commission was established 
16

in 1992 and several high-level diplomatic meetings were 

held between the two countries in 1993, culminating 

in a security protocol in which procedures for sealing 

of the border were developed.27 Following additional 

talks in 1994, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel 

remarked, “. . . friendly relations and close cooperation 

between Turkey and Iran will serve regional peace and 

stability.”28 Then in 1995, after a string of PKK attacks, 

Iran and Turkey agreed to a joint “sandwich operation” 

to drive rebels out of their bases.29

Relations soured over the next several years as 

Turkey complained that Iran was not taking strong 

enough measures against the insurgents. Mutual 

recriminations and suspicion threatened to scuttle the 

joint security regime altogether. Yet, as demonstrated 

in October 2001, bilateral relations eventually improved 

when Iran captured and handed over three PKK 

militants.30 Then in June 2003, clashes between the PKK 

and Iranian soldiers erupted near the border, resulting 

in eight Iranian soldiers killed.31 Since mid-2003, Iran’s 

military has scaled up direct operations against the 

PKK and has handed over several rebels to its Turkish 

counterparts. The two governments also engaged in 

talks over the status of Iraqi Kurdistan and common 

security interests in northern Iraq. A further security 

agreement was reached in December 2006, where both 

sides agreed to cooperate on drug smuggling across 

the border, cooperation in fighting Kurdish insurgents, and maintaining regular communications.32

Thus, while Iran and Turkey continue to have disagreements about several issues, they do recognize 

a common threat along their border. Joint security 

cooperation—in effect since 1992—has not always 

proceeded smoothly, although the two countries have 

made a concerted effort to maintain good relations on 

this issue.33
17

Another set of countries have had militant groups 

operating along their borders, but have chosen to 

simply ignore the problem. Some of these rebel groups, 

such as Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front 

(RUF), are explicitly backed by foreign powers. Other 

groups, such as Chad’s Movement for Democracy and 

Development (MDD) which was active in the early 

1990s, operated from neighboring states, but did not 

receive significant external support. Because the rebel 

target state is not willing or able to cooperate with 

neighboring states, and is similarly unable to put direct 

pressure on rebel hosts through threatening retaliation, 

the problem can fester for years. This can allow the 

rebels sufficient time to “incubate” themselves and 

grow into a formidable force, threatening the stability 

of their origin country and the region more generally. 

In such a manner, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic 

Front of Liberia, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 

and the RUF were able to depose ruling regimes or 

cause the state to fail. Thus, in many (but not all) of 

these instances, the problem of transnational militancy 

is compounded by states that are too weak to respond 

adequately to the problem—on either side of the 

border.

Are there more general patterns that emerge from 

Tables 1-3? As was discussed above, conflict over 

cross-border insurgent activity seems to be the most 

common outcome. What more can be said about these 

conflictual cases? First, the majority of cases where 

conflict emerged over TNR activities were those in 

which the neighboring state deliberately backed the 

insurgency. Often times, support for insurgents was 

a reciprocal strategy, where each state backed rebels 

from the other. In such a manner, the DRC and Rwanda, 

Eritrea and Sudan, Iran and Iraq, Guinea and Liberia, 
18

and Sudan and Uganda, each supported insurgents 

from the other state. In these cases, support for rebel 

organizations was either used as a substitute for the 

direct use of force, where the conflict was entirely 

delegated to TNRs; or, it was a complement to the use 

of force, where states used rebels in conjunction with 

their own troops. Thus, interstate hostility precedes 

rebel support, but rebel support in turn causes 

international tensions to escalate and can spark fullblown conflicts. 

Second, many international conflict events are 

initiated by the relatively stronger party responding 

to their TNRs based in weaker neighbors. States 

with stronger militaries and more competent state 

apparatuses often launched attacks against weak hosts 

who could not prevent such strikes. Thus, Rwanda 

invaded the DRC, Israel attacked Lebanon and Syria 

over Hezbollah activities, Turkey used or threatened 

force against Iraq and Syria, and Senegal violated the 

border with Guinea-Bissau in pursuit of rebels. These 

weak states are unable to prevent foreign incursions 

into their territory, are more sensitive to coercive 

bargaining by external actors, and moreover, are less 

able to evict rebels on their own. Therefore, they invite 

attacks by their stronger neighbors, both against the 

militant group as well as against the host state. These 

were also the most likely to escalate to extensive battles 

and troop incursions on neighboring territory, as in 

the Israel/Lebanon, Rwanda/DRC, and Turkey/Iraq 

cases. 

Finally, another set of cases involved a relatively 

weak state confronted by rebels, where the state 

attempted limited actions across the border, but 

was repulsed by a stronger host state. For instance, 

Thailand responded to Cambodian and Myanmarese 
19

troop movements along their frontier by issuing 

threats and amassing its own forces near the border. 

Tanazania took strong prophylactic measures against 

Burundian cross-border strikes against rebels. In these 

cases, stronger neighbors took steps to protect their 

sovereignty from border violations by weaker rebel 

origin states, but these were less likely to erupt into 

large-scale violence.

The limited instances of cooperation mostly involve 

rebel groups that are perceived to be common threats 

to both countries. In the mid to late 1990s, Rwanda 

and Burundi cooperated against Hutu extremist 

groups threatening the Tutsi-dominated regimes 

of both states. These neighbors cooperated against 

Hutu militants on both sides of their border as well 

as against Hutu groups based inside the DRC. Iran 

and Turkey, as discussed above, both faced threats 

from Kurdish insurgents. Although their relationship 

has sometimes been rocky, they have established a 

border security regime to counter militancy. Finally, 

India, South-Asia’s regional power, has worked 

with neighboring states in the northeast to deal with 

transnational militancy, crime, and drug trafficking, 

which negatively affects all countries in the region. At 

times, India has used its power and influence in the 

region to persuade reluctant neighbors to cooperate 

on security affairs, but commonly-faced threats have 

certainly engendered a willingness to coordinate 

efforts. India’s cooperation with its neighbors will be 

dealt with in more detail below.

Finally, the handful of cases in which states have 

merely let the problem simmer without significant 

conflict or cooperation reflect a dominant pattern 

where both states are simply too weak to act decisively. In the West African region, neighboring states 
20

harbored the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, but 

the Liberian government under Samuel Doe was so 

ineffectual and corrupt that it could hardly offer any 

resistance. When Liberia began backing the RUF in 

Sierra Leone, the government there quickly crumbled, 

not allowing it time to respond to this externallysupported threat. The Rwandan government under 

Juvenal Habyarimana was similarly unable to either 

challenge the Ugandan government head-on, or find 

a cooperative solution to cross-border attacks by the 

Rwandan Patriotic Front. Therefore, in many of these 

“neutral” cases, the affected government(s) was too 

paralyzed to take any meaningful action against the 

insurgents or the states that harbored them. In another 

case, Greece harbored PKK militants fighting Turkey—neither state can be considered weak. However, 

while Turkey repeatedly condemned Greece for 

providing shelter to the PKK, significant military 

action was not taken. Both countries possessed a 

sufficient deterrent so that they prudently avoided 

escalatory dynamics that could lead to war, and their 

joint membership in NATO imposed some constraints 

on their behavior.

RWANDA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 

OF THE CONGO

To illustrate how transnational insurgencies can 

escalate into international conflicts, and how states can 

eventually come to cooperate on security issues, it is 

useful to examine a case in greater depth. Following 

the 1994 genocide, the new Tutsi-led regime in 

Rwanda faced considerable challenges from a growing 

Hutu insurgency based in Zaire, later renamed the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Rwandan 

Patriotic Front—which began its assault from bases in 
21

Uganda—was able to put an end to the genocide and 

topple the Hutu regime in Kigali in July 1994. This new 

government, led by Paul Kagame, transitioned from a 

rebel force to the ruling party relatively quickly and 

turned to the difficult task of rebuilding Rwanda’s 

economy, establishing effective state institutions, and 

pursuing justice for the horrible massacre of Tutsis as 

well as Hutus who did not go along with the killings. 

This effort was made all the more difficult by an 

emerging rebel force along Rwanda’s border with 

Zaire. Following the genocide, hundreds of thousands 

of Hutu refugees, along with former officials responsible for orchestrating the massacres, fled into neighboring countries. In contrast to states like Tanzania, 

which limited militant activities within the camps, 

Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko actively encouraged 

these refugees to organize themselves into a fighting 

force and retake Kigali.34

Mobutu had faced political challenges from a 

domestic Tutsi minority in the eastern provinces of 

Zaire and was friendly toward the former Rwandan 

government. Therefore, he allowed the former 

Rwandan armed forces (ex-FAR) to maintain their 

weapons and organize into an insurgent force within 

the refugee camps. These militants, along with their 

local counterparts, first moved against Tutsis within 

Zaire in an effort to establish safe havens near the 

border from which to launch a reinvasion. Moreover, 

they were effective in diverting humanitarian aid—

intended for legitimate refugees—toward militant 

activities. These activities did not go unnoticed by 

humanitarian actors on the ground. As Shahyar Khan, 

the United Nations (UN) representative to Rwanda, 

proclaimed: “We are sitting on a volcano . . . we must 

separate the wolves from the sheep.”35 Nonetheless, 
22

the international community failed to demilitarize the 

refugee camps and according to estimates, some 40,000 

fighters were based in Zaire, mainly around the town 

of Goma.36 In 1995 and 1996, the ex-FAR conducted 

several strikes across the border, attempting to establish 

a toehold within Rwandan territory. The RPF-led state, 

although still in its infancy, was able to repulse these 

attacks, but it was still unprepared to launch extensive 

military campaigns on the Zairean side of the border.

Human rights violations against Zairean Tutsis 

and attacks across the border intensified in 1996, 

alarming the government in Kigali, which feared a 

renewed genocide and which was convinced that the 

international community was unwilling to respond to 

the state of insecurity along the border.37 In response to 

the growing threat, Rwanda decided to take decisive 

action in order to protect Zairean Tutsis, debilitate 

the Hutu insurgency across the border, and remove 

Mobutu from power. Therefore, cross-border TNR 

activities led to a Rwandan military operation across 

the border in Zaire, not only to attack rebel positions, 

but also to directly confront the state which provided 

sanctuary.

Zaire’s vast territory, over 2 million square kilometers, made it impossible for Rwanda to act on its 

own to unseat the government in Kinshasa, located in 

the west. Therefore, it adopted a two-pronged strategy. 

First, Rwanda armed and supported Zairean rebels. In 

the beginning, Rwanda armed local Zairean Tutsis to 

defend themselves against attacks. By November 1996, 

this group, aided by the Rwandan Army, was able to 

capture the town of Goma.38 Yet, because the Tutsis 

were a small minority within Zaire and would not have 

broad domestic support, Rwanda enlisted Laurent 

Kabila—a member of the Luba tribe—to lead a popular 
23

insurgent army, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for 

the Liberation of Congo (ADFL). Kabila had fought an 

unsuccessful campaign against Mobutu in the 1960s, 

but with Rwandan help was able to lead the ADFL to 

several early victories against the Zairean army. Second, the Rwandan army conducted a large-scale 

invasion of Zaire’s eastern provinces, notably, North 

and South Kivu. Rwanda relentlessly attacked Hutu 

rebels based in the Mugunga refugee camp near 

Goma, along with smaller camps. These attacks 

cut off humanitarian aid to the refugees and forced 

thousands—militants and civilian refugees alike—

to disperse. By the end of 1996, the major camps had 

been cleared, and an estimated 700,000 refugees were 

repatriated back to Rwanda.39 The rebels were in a 

state of disarray and the Zairean military was crippled 

by the invasion.

The ADFL pushed westward with their offensive 

and rapidly gained strength as thousands, dissatisfied 

with Mobutu’s corrupt rule, welcomed the rebel’s 

advance. Moreover, Mobutu was increasingly isolated 

in the international community as his erstwhile 

Cold-War Western allies abandoned him. His army, 

which bore little loyalty to the regime, often refused 

to fight. Owing to these factors, the Rwandan-backed 

ADFL took Kinshasa on May 17, 1997, and renamed 

the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Mobutu was forced to flee the country and died of 

cancer soon thereafter. Thus, a transnational insurgent 

group prompted Rwanda to invade its neighbor, 

oust the incumbent regime, and install a government 

believed to be friendly. What began as an insurgency 

pitting the Tutsi-led state against a Hutu rebel force 

quickly escalated to a major war between Rwanda and 

Zaire.
24

Rwanda had bet on Kabila to be a reliable ally 

and to prevent the reestablishment of Hutu rebel 

bases on Congolese territory. However, it soon 

became apparent that Kabila had little loyalty toward 

his Rwandan supporters, and took several steps to 

distance himself from his former patrons. He faced 

considerable domestic criticism that Rwanda was 

meddling in Congolese affairs.40 Critics pointed to 

the sizeable presence of Tutsis in the armed forces 

and a large contingent of Rwandan “advisors” in 

Kinshasa. To placate detractors, Kabila expelled all 

Rwandan troops in July 1998 and dismissed Tutsis in 

his military.41 In addition, while the ex-FAR militants 

suffered a major setback, they were not completely 

defeated. Still forming his new government, Kabila did 

little to prevent these rebels from organizing. By mid 

1998, they had regrouped into a new rebel force named 

the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) with a 

force of roughly 15,000.42

In response to ALIR attacks and Kabila’s 

unwelcome policies, Rwanda prepared for a second 

offensive. The logic was similar to the previous one: 

disarm Hutu rebels across the border and install a 

regime that would prevent future cross-border attacks. 

This time, Rwanda focused on supporting Congolese 

Tutsis and backed the Rally for Congolese Democracy 

(RCD). Uganda joined this effort as it was similarly 

plagued by cross-border militant groups. In August 

1998, Rwandan forces reinvaded the DRC, fighting 

alongside their allies: the RCD, Uganda, and Burundi. 

However, in contrast to the international contempt 

for Mobutu, Kabila’s supporters came to his defense. 

A major continental war erupted pitting the DRC and 

its supporters—most notably, Angola, Chad, Namibia, 

and Zimbabwe—against Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, 
25

and the RCD. This conflict would become the deadliest 

since World War II, with an estimated five million 

dead due to violence, disease, and malnutrition.43

In what has been termed the Second Congo War, 

Rwanda was not able to repeat its swift success. Rather, 

it became embroiled in a bitter, protracted conflict. 

Rwanda’s second invasion of the Congo lead to UN 

Security Council resolutions condemning the violation 

of Congolese sovereignty, and marginalized it on the 

continent. Moreover, the RCD would end up splitting 

into two factions, with Rwanda supporting one and 

Uganda supporting the other. By mid-1999, it became 

clear that Rwanda could not win a military victory, 

and the belligerents agreed to a cease-fire on July 10 

in Lusaka, Zambia. The Lusaka Accord called for an 

end to hostilities, the withdrawal of all foreign forces 

from the DRC, the disarmament of illegal militias, 

and the invitation of a UN Peacekeeping force. This 

UN force, termed the UN Organization Mission in 

Congo (MONUC) was created on November 30 and 

was tasked with overseeing the peace agreement. 

However, MONUC was powerless to stop the violence, 

and fighting quickly resumed between Rwanda, the 

DRC, and armed nonstate militias. Neither side was 

willing to comply with the Lusaka agreement as each 

mistrusted the other and MONUC could not offer 

credible security guarantees. Moreover, the Rwandan 

Hutu rebels had regrouped and reconstituted themselves as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 

Rwanda (FDLR). As long as these rebels were still 

active, Rwanda promised to continue its operations in 

the DRC.

Unexpectedly, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by 

one of his bodyguards in January 2001, and his son, 

Joseph Kabila, took over as head of state. The younger 
26

Kabila pledged his commitment to peace,44 although 

he moved slowly in disarming the FDLR. In May and 

June, the FDLR launched a major offensive, termed 

Operation ORACLE DU SEIGNEUR, in an attempt to 

capture Rwandan territory. Although this offensive 

failed, it further strained relations between Kigali and 

Kinshasa. Rwanda accused the new DRC leadership 

of continuing the policy of supporting the Hutu rebels 

hiding in the east.

Rwanda and the DRC were at an impasse. They 

could not achieve their objectives by military force 

alone. Rwanda was not capable of disarming the FDLR 

unilaterally because trying to round up insurgents on 

foreign territory—particularly in an area as large as 

the DRC—was bound to be a futile effort. The younger 

Kabila, moreover, had to deal with the more pressing 

task of rebuilding state institutions and containing 

dozens of militias that had formed across the DRC. 

Therefore, the parties agreed to talks once more, 

mediated by South African President Thabo Mbeki. 

In these talks, the DRC demanded a withdrawal of 

foreign troops while Rwanda sought credible promises 

that the DRC would go after the FDLR. As President 

Kagame stated, “the disarmament and repatriation 

of [Hutu militias] based in Congo is still the most 

important problem.”45 On July 20, 2002, in Pretoria, 

South Africa, Rwanda and the DRC signed a new 

accord, renewing their pledges of peace and security 

cooperation. The Pretoria Accord called for a timetable 

for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, the eviction 

of FDLR forces, and a neutral third party comprised 

of South African and MONUC observers to verify 

compliance. 

In accordance with its treaty obligations, on 

September 24 the Congolese government officially 
27

banned FDLR activities, stating that its members, “. . 

. are declared persona non grata and invited to leave 

the territory within 72 hours.”46 Following through 

with these threats, the DRC launched a string of 

attacks against the FDLR, including a significant 

strike at the Kamina rebel camp. These offensives only 

had limited military success, however, and failed to 

impose significant costs on the rebels. But politically, 

they demonstrated the DRC’s seriousness in expelling 

militants, while at the same time revealing its inability 

to act on its own. Therefore, the UN Security Council 

adopted a series of resolutions in 2003 and 2004 to 

significantly increase MONUC’s troop size and permit 

it to use Chapter VII peacekeeping powers to directly 

engage militant groups in the DRC, augmenting local 

capacity. With Rwandan troops positioned along the 

border to prevent FDLR incursions, the DRC and 

MONUC launched several coordinated strikes against 

FDLR bases in the eastern provinces.47 Because of 

this pressure and feeling that its days as an effective 

fighting force were limited, in 2005 the FDLR sought 

compromise and offered to abandon its armed struggle 

in exchange for recognition as a legitimate political 

party48—Kigali flatly rejected this demand.

Further exemplifying this renewed cooperation in 

central Africa, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda issued a 

joint statement setting a September 30, 2005, deadline 

for FDLR disarmament and repatriation.49 The deadline 

came and went without FDLR action, and so, MONUC 

and Congolese forces followed through on their threats 

and launched a major operation to clear the Virunga 

National Park of militants.50 Clashes between DRC/

MONUC troops and the FDLR continued in 2006 and 

2007. Although this effort did not completely defeat 

the rebel force, it left them marginalized and incapable 

of significant new attacks on Rwandan territory itself.
28

Despite these positive steps, relations between 

the two countries were temporarily strained as Tutsi 

commander General Laurent Nkunda led a significant 

militia in the eastern DRC—the National Congress 

for the Defense of the People (CNDP)—which was 

responsible for a series of atrocities. Nkunda claimed 

that his forces were there to protect Congolese Tutsis 

from attacks by the remnants of the FDLR, although 

he has been accused of serious war crimes including 

systematic rape, torture, and the use of child soldiers.51

Because of his former ties to the RPF, it was widely 

believed that Nkunda worked in close collaboration 

with Rwandan authorities. As Nkunda escalated 

attacks in 2008, relations between the DRC and Rwanda 

became tense and efforts at security cooperation 

threatened to unravel.

However, this outcome was averted as the DRC 

and Rwanda engaged in the most significant joint 

operations to date. In December 2008, the DRC 

agreed to allow Rwandan troops to cross the border 

and participate in coordinated action against the 

FDLR as well as the CNDP. Reports indicated that 

in January 2009, approximately 5,000 Rwandan 

troops crossed the border and established positions 

in North Kivu province.52 A battalion of Rwandan 

infantry, alongside Congolese forces, proceeded 

toward Nkunda’s headquarters near Rutshuru and 

arrested him on January 23 as he attempted to escape 

to Rwanda.53 With Nkunda neutralized, the DRC and 

Rwanda moved against FDLR militants. On February 

11, Rwandan radio announced that joint operations 

had destroyed the FDLR’s main bases, including their 

headquarters at Masisi;54 a few days later, several FDLR 

commanders surrendered to advancing troops.55 By 

late February, after the 1-month operation, Rwandan 
29

forces began to withdraw back to their side of the 

border, feeling satisfied with progress against the 

FDLR. Congolese Defense Minister Charles Mwando 

Nsimba commented that the campaign, “shows that 

Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo can 

construct a common future in peace and with respect 

of the sovereignty of each.”56

Although the FDLR has not been completely 

destroyed, it has been significantly weakened after 

this joint offensive and will not likely be able to 

challenge the Rwandan armed forces in the near 

future. Such measures demonstrate that broad 

security cooperation—even between bitter rivals—can 

emerge to deal with TNR activities and violence along 

the border. Rwanda/DRC cooperation to confront 

the FDLR, along with other militants in the region, 

enhanced the internal security of both countries as 

well as diffused regional tensions.

SECURITY COOPERATION AND INDIA’S 

NORTH-EASTERN INSURGENCIES

Some states have effectively engaged in cooperation 

with neighbors to avert regional tensions and contain 

insurgencies; it is important to examine one particular 

case in greater depth. Since independence, India 

has grappled with several low-level insurgencies 

in its northeastern provinces, particularly Assam, 

Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram, Manipur, and 

Nagaland. These regions are ethnically distinct and 

geographically isolated from the rest of India. They 

have also faced demographic pressures, particularly 

as Bangladeshi immigrants have competed with locals 

for employment. With some 200 tribal groups in this 

region, a patchwork of insurgencies operates in the 

area. In recent years, the most significant of these 
30

have included the following: in Assam, the United 

Liberation Front of Assam and the National Democratic 

Front of Bodoland; in Nagaland, the National Socialist 

Council of Nagaland; in Tripura, the All Tripura Tribal 

Front and the National Liberation Front of Tripura; in 

Manipur, the People Liberation Army, and the United 

National Liberation Front. In addition to these, several 

dozen more insurgent groups and criminal bands 

operate in the area. These insurgent movements have 

a wide variety of economic and social aims, but at the 

most general level, they seek to win a greater degree 

of autonomy from the Indian state.57 Although none 

of these ethnic rebels in the northeast have risen to the 

size and military effectiveness of the insurgencies in 

Kashmir and Punjab, they do pose significant threats 

to India’s security, economy, and social relations. 

India has responded to these threats with a mix of 

development projects, federal restructuring, political 

concessions, and counterinsurgency operations. These 

COIN operations are conducted by regular security 

forces as well as through paramilitary forces such as 

the Assam Rifles, the Central Reserve Police Force, and 

the Border Security Force.58

The Assamese insurgency is the deadliest and bestknown. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 

emerged out of political movements in the 1970s and 

1980s, which opposed Bangladeshi illegal immigration 

into the region. Many Assamese saw this migration as 

threatening their culture and way of life, not to mention 

economic opportunities. While some Assamese groups 

sought a political solution to the region’s problems and 

participated in regional elections, the ULFA, which was 

formed on April 7, 1979, rejected negotiations with the 

government and adopted the more extreme demand 

of independence. Over time, the ULFA would come to 
31

focus primarily on the independence issue, rather than 

illegal immigration.59 The UFLA became especially 

active in the 1990s and reached an estimated strength 

of somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000 fighters. The 

conflict has killed an average of 50-100 people per year 

since 1990.60

To complicate matters, another ethnic group 

from Assam, the Bodos, have also fought for 

greater independence from India. The Bodos have 

demanded greater autonomy for Bodoland, economic 

opportunities, and recognition of their Christian 

identity. In the late 1980s, several Bodo insurgent 

movements emerged, with the most notable being 

the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).61

The NDFB has been more extreme than other groups 

in its demands, rejecting negotiated settlements and 

deliberately attacking civilians; it seeks nothing short 

of complete independence of Bodo regions. During 

the 1990s and 2000s the group has killed a few dozen 

per year, and it reached an estimated troop strength of 

3,500 at its peak.62 It has also been significantly involved 

in extortion, smuggling, and other criminal activities. 

Figure 1 displays all insurgent-related violence in 

Assam since 1992, involving all groups. In total, over 

7,000 people have been killed, including insurgents, 

security forces, and civilians.

Although rebels from Assam and elsewhere in 

northeast India have benefitted from sanctuaries in 

several states, Bhutan became an especially important 

safe haven for ULFA and NDFB.63 Bhutan is a small 

country, with a population of less than one million, 

sandwiched between India and China. The 1949 Treaty 

of Friendship between India and Bhutan assured the 

independence of the Bhutanese kingdom, but held
32

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal.

Figure 1. Persons Killed in Insurgent-Related 

Violence in Assam.

that Bhutan would accept Indian guidance on foreign 

policy matters. Relations between the two were largely 

friendly, and India served as Bhutan’s most important 

trading partner, accounting for the majority of the 

kingdom’s trade.

Major Indian military offensives in the early 1990s, 

coupled with an India-friendly regime in Bangladesh 

where rebels had been hiding, forced the ULFA 

and NDFB across the porous border into Bhutan.64

However, militarily weak Bhutan chose to ignore the 

problem as long as the rebels did not pose a threat 

to Bhutanese citizens, and the costs of eviction were 

perceived to be high. India made repeated requests for 
33

permission to attack the rebels, but the kingdom was 

not willing to allow violations of the border.65 Instead, 

beginning in the late-1990s Bhutan decided to enter into 

negotiations with the rebels in order to persuade them 

to leave, or at least reduce their presence. This would 

not be an easy proposition since the ULFA and NDFB, 

along with a smaller group known as the Kamtapur 

Liberation Organization (KLO) had roughly 3,000 

fighters located in 30 camps.66 Despite the kingdom’s 

pleading, the rebel organizations were not prepared to 

give up their strategically important bases in Bhutan, 

especially since the government demonstrated its 

unwillingness to use force. As one observer noted, 

Bhutanese foot-dragging, “...presented a considerable 

threat to the excellent and close relationship between 

Bhutan and India.”67 In addition to growing Indian 

pressure, by 2000, the rebel presence had jeopardized 

the safety and security of Bhutanese citizens and 

there was a growing recognition that the sovereignty 

of the kingdom itself was at stake. As Yashey Dorji, 

of Bhutan’s foreign ministry, would later state: “The 

rebels’ continued presence was becoming a direct 

threat to Bhutan’s security and sovereignty.”68

In May 2003, the Bhutanese government demanded 

that Indian militant groups vacate their camps by 

June 15 and began to raise a counterinsurgent force. 

However, the deadline came and went without action 

by the ULFA, the NDFB, or the KLO. In response, 

Bhutan began consultations with India over next 

steps.69 After years of failed negotiation attempts, on 

December 15, 2003, the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) 

began major operations against Indian insurgents on 

Bhutanese territory, with considerable assistance from 

India itself. This offensive, termed Operation ALL 

CLEAR (OAC), was the RBA’s first military action 
34

in 140 years. In addition to Bhutan’s military efforts, 

the Indian army provided logistical support, medical 

evacuations, and positioned its forces along the 380 

kilometer border to capture militants trying to reenter India.70 The two countries also agreed to allow 

Indian forces into Bhutan, provided the latter gave the 

green light to do so,71 although this provision proved 

to be unnecessary. Within a few days of the operation, 

Bhutan had succeeded in capturing several senior 

rebel leaders;72 over the next several weeks, Bhutan 

succeeded in killing or capturing several hundred 

additional rebels. Prisoners were quickly handed over 

to Indian authorities to await trial. By the end of the 

year, the RBA destroyed all of the major rebel camps 

and was conducting mop-up operations to locate 

remaining rebels in hiding. By mid-January, after 

neutralizing more than 650 rebels, OAC was declared a 

victory. Pointing to the successful bilateral cooperation 

with Bhutan, India called on other governments in 

the region to do their part in combating transnational 

militancy, and began working with Myanmar to plan 

similar operations.73

Rather than cross-border militancy becoming a 

contentious issue in the bilateral relationship and 

escalating regional hostilities, relations between 

Bhutan and India were strengthened as the result of 

robust security cooperation. Indeed, on February 

8, 2007, the two nations renewed and revised their 

friendship treaty. While the revised treaty asserted 

Bhutan’s independence and sovereignty, it also 

pledged that, “Neither government shall allow the 

use of its territory for activities harmful to the national 

security and interest of the other.”74 Thus, while TNRs 

can prove to be a sore point between many countries, 

India and Bhutan found ways to deal with this mutual 

threat and preserve positive ties.
35

India has also pressed other countries in the 

region to help combat border insecurity. For instance, 

in September 2006, India and Myanmar held talks 

regarding the activities of insurgent groups along the 

border as well as problems such as arms smuggling.75

Indian Home Secretary V.K. Duggal remarked that 

the talks have “further deepened the understanding 

between the two countries on security, drug trafficking, 

and effective border management.” 76 On October 2, it 

was reported that the two countries had launched joint 

operations along the border, particularly to hit ULFA 

bases and training camps inside Myanmar. 77 Over the 

next several months, India provided Myanmar with 

arms while the two countries worked on enhancing 

border security. In one notable instance of security 

cooperation, in November 2007, Myanmar reportedly 

destroyed several ULFA bases on its soil.78 India has 

also put pressure on Bangladesh to assist in border 

security measures and joint COIN operations. After 2 

days of talks in 2004 in Dhaka, Bangladesh, the two 

countries vowed to work closely on security matters 

and coordinate activities on their respective sides 

of the border.79 However, despite pledges to step up 

security measures, Bangladeshi progress in combating 

crime and militancy along the border remained slow. 

On February 9, 2009, the two countries met again 

to sign pacts on economic issues and promised to 

improve cooperation on countering insurgencies.80 

Implementation of robust security measures remains a 

problem, however, as internal problems in Bangladesh, 

including a mutiny by border guards, prevented 

progress on the deal.

India’s northeastern insurgencies span national 

boundaries as militant groups benefit from porous 

borders with neighbors and sanctuaries in unguarded, 
36

remote terrain. However, in contrast to other cases, 

such as the Rwanda/DRC case discussed above, 

India has sought a strategy of engagement with its 

neighbors and has successfully coordinated actions 

with militaries in the region. The example of joint 

COIN operations with Bhutan serves as a particularly 

noteworthy instance of security cooperation. While the 

insurgent threat has not been completely eliminated, 

friendly relations with neighbors have been preserved. 

For this reason, full-scale clashes between government 

forces seem highly unlikely.

CURRENT DILEMMAS IN IRAQ AND 

AFGHANISTAN

The continuing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan 

will present considerable challenges for the United 

States and its allies for at least the next decade. A 

COIN strategy has been implemented that places the 

emphasis on protecting civilians, building trust, and 

providing services—all important steps. Nonetheless, 

both insurgencies exhibit considerable transnational 

elements that complicate matters and necessitate 

building strong bonds with neighboring countries in 

order to contain militancy as well as prevent disputes 

arising between states. It is unclear whether U.S. 

public opinion will allow for significant troop presence 

in either country—particularly in combat roles—for 

extended periods of time. As the United States reduces 

its footprint in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is essential that 

these countries have the capacity to govern effectively 

on their own. One often neglected element of this 

overarching goal is the need for the Afghan and Iraqi 

governments to establish diplomatic and military 

understandings with neighboring states so as to 

establish robust, sustainable security cooperation.
37

Iraq’s most pressing concern with respect to 

transnational insurgency relates to the presence of

Kurdish militants from Turkey, namely the Kurdish 

Workers Party (PKK), on Iraqi soil. The PKK was 

founded in the late 1970s and demands an independent 

Kurdish state. This goal is shared by Iraqi Kurdish 

factions—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and 

the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK)—as well as 

by Iranian Kurdish movements, although relations 

between these various groups have often been 

hostile.81 Although the PKK is designated as a terrorist 

organization by the U.S. Government, it maintains 

bases in northern Iraq, where the Kurdistan Regional 

Government (KRG) has proven unwilling or unable to 

restrict cross-border attacks. The transnational nature 

of the PKK is nothing new, and Turkey conducted 

COIN raids across the border during the Saddam 

Hussein era. However, continued attacks by the PKK 

on Turkish forces have been a major sticking point 

in Iraqi-Turkish-U.S. relations. Unable to persuade 

the KRG or Baghdad to limit PKK activities, Turkey 

launched significant air and ground operations on 

Iraqi territory in early 2008.82 Following these raids, 

Iraq and Turkey signed a border security agreement, 

which sought to diffuse some of the tensions arising 

from cross-border attacks.83 However, a series of strikes 

by the PKK in late 2008 and early 2009 led to renewed 

demands that the Iraqi central government, the KRG, 

and the United States do more to contain its activities.84

While these disputes with Turkey are well-known, 

Iran also has concerns about militants in Iraq. Iranian 

Kurdish rebels operating under the banner of the Party 

of Free Life of Iranian Kurdistan (PJAK) hide in the 

remote mountains of northern Iraq, and the Iranian 

government has attacked its bases across the border 
38

on several occasions.85 Recently, in May 2009, battles 

broke out in the Iranian province of West Azerbaijan, 

and subsequently, Iranian military aircraft hit PJAK 

targets on the Iraqi side of the border.86 Although the 

PKK and PJAK are distinct entities targeting different 

countries, Iran and Turkey have been cooperating in 

battling both groups. In addition to Kurdish rebels, 

Tehran has concerns over the continued presence of 

anti-Iranian, Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) supporters on 

Iraqi territory, 3,000 of which were housed at Camp 

Ashraf north of Baghdad. The MEK was welcomed by 

Saddam Hussein as a tactic to strike at Iran, but the 

post-Hussein Iraqi government has taken recent steps 

to dismantle their camps.87 Although the MEK seem to 

be neutralized for now, they may attempt to regroup 

in the future. To complicate matters further, the U.S. 

and Iraqi governments are worried that Iran provides 

assistance to Shiite fighters who subscribe to a radical 

Islamist agenda. Thus, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq all have 

concerns over the continued presence of transnational 

militant organizations.

Unless effective protocols are established to deal 

with border security issues, as U.S. troop levels begin 

to come down, Iran, Turkey, and perhaps other states 

in the region may be tempted to engage in stronger 

actions against militants on Iraqi soil. A fragmented 

Iraqi government with little control over its territory and 

sympathetic Kurdish populations in the north would 

be sufficient ingredients for the continued operations 

of TNRs in Iraq. A weak Iraqi state, with insufficient 

deterrent capabilities, would also invite cross-border 

attacks by its neighbors, or more extensive violations 

of its sovereignty, to combat insurgent movements. 

The continued presence of foreign militants on Iraqi 

soil, coupled with an ineffective government in 
39

Baghdad, would threaten the existence of a sovereign, 

independent Iraq.

In Afghanistan, the spread of militancy to Pakistan 

threatens to destabilize the entire South Asia region. 

Following the ouster of the Taliban government in 

Kabul, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have regrouped 

across the border in Pakistan. The new insurgency is 

aided by Pashtun tribal loyalties spanning the border, 

historical ties going back to the anti-Soviet resistance 

launched from inside Pakistan, little to no government 

presence in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas (FATA), and difficult terrain.88 Further hindering 

progress in dealing with the issue on the Pakistani side 

of the border are issues such as: internal bickering between rival political factions, a military posture focused 

overwhelmingly on India, and alleged links between 

elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 

agency and the Taliban. Under the administration 

of President Pervez Musharaff in Pakistan, relations 

between neighbors were icy. Afghan President Hamid 

Karzai barely hid his animosity toward the Musharaff 

government, remarking that, “The state of Pakistan 

was supporting the Taliban, so we presume that if there 

is still any Taliban, that they are still being supported 

by a state element.”89 Worryingly, on a number of 

occasions in 2007, Afghan and Pakistani forces clashed 

while patrolling the border. In April 2007, Pakistani 

forces fired on Afghan troops as they were removing a 

barbed wire fence in Barmal district.90 Then on May 13, 

2007, reports indicate that up to seven Afghan troops 

were killed in the Kurram region by Pakistani forces 

claiming that they were attacked first.91 These events 

underscore the difficulties that arise when effective 

protocols for patrolling the border are not in place.

Since the establishment of an elected, civilian 

government in Pakistan, the Taliban have gathered 
40

strength inside that country. Pakistani Taliban factions, 

led by Beitullah Mehsud until his recent death, have 

threatened the stability of the Pakistani state itself. 

While Afghan Taliban factions continue to launch 

deadly assaults on Afghan and NATO forces, the 

Pakistani Taliban has struck beyond the border 

regions, taking territory in Swat and Buner. In addition, a separatist movement in the Pakistani region 

of Balochistan has been gathering steam and killed 

several dozen in early 2009.92

It is clear that Afghanistan and Pakistan are no 

longer facing a “unidirectional” insurgency with 

militants focusing their attention on targets in 

Afghanistan; rather, these neighbors share a common 

threat as a porous, poorly controlled border region 

serves as a sanctuary for militants attacking both states. 

As such, there have been a number of positive recent 

developments. The Pakistani government and military 

increasingly view the insurgency as a Pakistani—not 

just Afghan/NATO—problem, and have engaged in 

major battles against the Taliban, driving them out of 

the country’s interior. The Pakistani public seems to 

support efforts to crack down on Islamist militancy; 

many are also willing to take direct action against the 

Taliban, as evidenced by the establishment of village 

defense forces.93 In addition, the Obama administration 

and the new military leadership in Afghanistan, 

under the command of General Stanley McChrystal, 

have come to focus on the Taliban/al-Qaeda threat 

as a regional, rather than purely Afghan issue. NATO 

allies have also stressed the importance of dealing with 

Pakistan in an effective manner.94 Nonetheless, the 

situation remains fragile, and tensions could rise again 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly given 

the eventuality of reduced foreign troop presence.
41

While the Pakistani state has had trouble dealing 

with insurgents, the Afghan security forces are still 

considerably weaker than their counterparts across 

the border. TNRs will seek safe haven in the “weakest 

link,” and the NATO presence in Afghanistan has 

denied the Taliban/al-Qaeda extensive safe havens 

outside of the border regions. Nonetheless, it is entirely 

plausible that as NATO troop levels come down, 

militants will find Afghanistan to be the regional weak 

link. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban factions, along 

with Baloch separatists, and perhaps other militant 

groups in the South Asia region, may come to find 

safe havens within Afghanistan’s territory if a power 

vacuum is left by the withdrawal of foreign troops. 

Thus, if the Afghan military is deterred from engaging 

in extensive cross-border operations by its stronger 

neighbor, Pakistan will not face similar constraints in 

violating Afghan territory. If Pakistani militants come 

to find strongholds in a weak Afghan state, Pakistan 

may be tempted to strike.

MOVING FORWARD IN IRAQ AND 

AFGHANISTAN

The transnational insurgencies in Iraq and 

Afghanistan are similar in many respects, but also 

exhibit important differences that cannot be ignored 

when developing appropriate policies to contain 

violence. First, both regions contain ethnic groups that 

straddle national boundaries and that have broadly 

similar agendas. While no one organization speaks for 

the group as a whole, Kurdish people in Iraq, Iran, and 

Turkey all aspire to a common homeland, or at least 

significant autonomy and the recognition of cultural 

rights. The Taliban is similarly aided by transnational 
42

Pashtun loyalties and sympathetic populations on 

both sides of the border. One notable difference, 

however, is that the Kurds are a minority in all of the 

countries they inhabit, while Pashtuns are a dominant 

force in Afghanistan. All states in the Iraq theater 

oppose a unified Kurdish state, but some Pashtun 

leaders in Afghanistan have expressed a desire for a 

greater “Pashtunistan.” A Pashtun-dominated state 

in Afghanistan with irredentist ambitions vis-à-vis 

Pakistan would clearly irk Islamabad.95

Second, in both regions there are large swaths 

of territory that are not controlled by recognized 

governments. The Iraqi government in Baghdad 

does not control the KRG, particularly as the Kurdish 

Peshmerga is the dominant security force in the north. 

In Afghanistan, the state is still far too weak to police 

its entire territory and it relies on NATO forces to maintain control, although pockets of space remain lawless. 

In the border regions of Pakistan, particularly the 

FATA, the central government has never enjoyed full 

control. Rather, it relies on paramilitary forces—the 

Frontier Corps (FC)—largely drawn from Pashtun 

tribesmen from the FATA to maintain security. These 

forces are paid by the Pakistani military, but their 

loyalty and effectiveness have often been questioned.96 

In contrast to Iraq, where neighboring states are 

relatively strong, the Taliban insurgency benefits from 

ungoverned areas on both sides of the border and it 

strikes at both states. Iraqi Kurdish regions serve as 

bases for Turkish and Iranian rebels; the situation is 

far more complex in Afghanistan and Pakistan where 

fragmented insurgent groups—under the catch-all 

label of the “Taliban”—strike at both states and benefit 

from sanctuaries on both sides of the border. Cobbling 

together local and central government forces in order 
43

to secure border regions is essential but will prove to 

be difficult.

What can be done to prevent cross-border militancy 

from escalating to an international conflict among 

neighbors? In an ideal world, these insurgencies 

would be brought under control before U.S. and 

NATO troops withdraw or reduce levels. Turkey and 

Iran would find appropriate accommodations with 

Kurdish groups, and the Taliban insurgency would 

be contained on both sides of the border through a 

combination of kinetic operations and negotiations 

with moderates. However, while every effort should 

be made to find solutions to these conflicts quickly, 

the more likely scenario is that some militant factions 

will continue to operate after foreign troops pull out. 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and governments in the region will 

face lingering violence and will be largely on their 

own to deal with the problem. While the United States 

and its coalition partners have placed considerable 

emphasis on improving security forces and governance functions in both countries, far less attention has

been paid to establishing diplomatic links with neighboring countries. Improving communication between 

neighbors and coordinated efforts to secure border 

regions are crucial to preventing transitional insurgencies from escalating to regional conflicts. Although 

the details must be worked out in close coordination 

with other actors in the region, a general strategy 

should focus on the following elements.

Find the Right Balance between local and Central 

Government Security Capacity. 

It is clearly important to build the capacity of 

the central governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan to secure their borders, patrol their territory, 
44

and prevent the movement of insurgents, arms, 

and contraband. These governments must establish 

appropriate migration controls, customs enforcement, 

counternarcotics operations, and border surveillance 

capabilities. It is also important to improve security 

forces so as to confront insurgents, protect civilian 

populations, and provide critical services to 

communities in the border region. 

All of these elements of COIN operations are wellknown and need not be reiterated here. Strengthening 

core government functions is essential, but these 

countries have a history of weak state control in border 

regions and it is unlikely that the central government 

will be able to operate effectively in these areas anytime soon. In Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government 

and Peshmerga forces have a considerable degree of 

autonomy from the central state. In Pakistan, the tribal 

regions are dominated by local leaders rather than the 

central government. Thus, it is essential that the Kurdish 

Peshmerga and forces in the FATA be on board with the 

central government’s agenda to secure border regions. 

To this end, the United States and Pakistan have been 

working together to strengthen the Pakistani Frontier 

Corps (FC), which is largely drawn from Pashtun tribal 

areas. Pakistan has received approximately $100 million 

in assistance for establishing training centers, raising 

new units, and providing equipment to the FC. Efforts 

have also been made to professionalize the Kurdish 

Peshmerga. These steps are important because central 

government forces have little legitimacy in these areas 

and the locals drawn from ethnic communities have 

better information about events in the area and can 

more effectively communicate with their counterparts 

across the border. As George Gavrilis argues, “border 

authorities vested with administrative autonomy, and 

the ability to interact with their counterparts on the 
45

other side will tend toward cooperation in order to 

manage the shared boundary.”97

There are risks to such a strategy, however. 

Strengthening forces such as the FC and Peshmerga 

can potentially backfire unless these groups are wellintegrated into an overarching security agenda and 

force structure. While local forces can sometimes be 

more effective than the central government in policing 

their respective areas, their loyalty to the state may be 

questionable. The Peshmerga operate independently 

from the Iraqi Army, and relations between these 

forces and the central government have been tense, 

even hostile at times.98 Pakistan’s FC has often been 

treated as an untrustworthy second-class force, 

earning less pay than regular Pakistani units and being 

commanded by regular army officers. There have also 

been questions of loyalty since the FC is drawn from 

the same regions that harbor the Taliban. The Iraqi, 

Pakistani, and Afghan governments will be hesitant 

to bolster local forces if these groups threaten to pose 

problems in the future. 

To build trust, local security forces and populations 

in these regions must feel that their livelihoods and 

well-being are inextricably linked to that of the country 

as a whole. That is, they must come to believe that 

remaining loyal to the central government promises 

greater rewards than autonomy. To do so, it is important 

that local units, while retaining their local roots, be 

integrated as full partners in the regular military 

structure. Soldier’s pay, equipment, and advancement 

opportunities to senior ranks should be directed by the 

central government (rather than subnational units), 

and the leadership should be rewarded for meritorious 

service to the country as a whole. Pay grades and ranks 

should be equivalent to units in regular forces, and be 

afforded the same prestige and status. It is also vital 
46

for local forces to be consulted in strategic planning 

sessions, joint operations should be encouraged, and 

training be conducted in such a way so as to foster a 

common esprit de corps. More broadly, it is important 

to foster commerce and cultural exchanges between 

the center and peripheral regions so as to create greater 

interdependence and trust. The central government 

must also be seen as providing vital services such as 

roads, schools, hospitals, and so on, to these regions to 

foster a common national spirit.

Improve Coordination between Security Forces, 

Especially between Units Along the Border. 

While it is essential to place more troops and border 

security forces along the frontier, misunderstandings 

and tensions may arise unless there is cooperation 

among such forces. Here we can distinguish between 

COIN operations and normal policing. When actively 

engaging militant groups, particularly along the 

border, it is important that officers are apprised 

of what their counterparts on the other side of the 

boundary are doing. Troop movements along the 

border can potentially be threatening to the other 

side, provoking countermeasures, and it must be clear 

that these are intended to target insurgents rather 

than being hostile acts. Forces on the other side of the 

border may also be encouraged move to positions so as 

to intercept fighters fleeing the combat area. Whenever 

possible, coordinated “pincer” operations should be 

conducted on both sides of the border so as to squeeze 

militants out of strategic areas. Importantly, protocols 

must be established for hot-pursuit raids across the 

border. These should delineate when and under what 

circumstances security forces can cross the border 
47

in pursuit of militants, how far they can move, the 

duration of these operations, and the point of contact 

for authorizing them.

In addition, border guards, immigration officials, 

customs agents, and police forces must be able to 

cooperate with similar entities on the other side of the 

border, coordinate actions, and share intelligence.99 

These agencies must be encouraged to share information on smuggling routes, wanted persons, illegal 

activities, and so on. In addition to high-level meetings 

between heads of agencies, it is also important that 

local agents on both sides of the border be in close 

contact with one another, hold joint training exercises, 

and take steps to foster trust. Finally, countries in the 

region must develop understandings and protocols for 

the extradition of criminals and terrorist suspects. In 

short, coordination among law enforcement can be as 

important as coordinating military operations. As Metz 

writes, “Law enforcement should replace the military 

as the primary manager of a mature counterinsurgency 

campaign.”100

As an encouraging sign, meetings are currently 

being held to discuss security matters in both the Middle 

East and South Asia. These consultations should be 

encouraged and deepened. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 

NATO hold regular meetings under the framework of 

the Tripartite Commission. Similarly, Iraq, Turkey, and 

the United States held meetings as part of the Trilateral 

Commission for Countering Terrorism;101 while this 

effort fizzled, the three countries have recently agreed 

to more regular meetings to discuss security issues.102 

Beyond high-level meetings of military officers and 

civilian leaders, however, it is important that units on 

the ground establish effective, direct communications 

on a day-to-day basis. Forces that are responsible for 
48

the everyday business of securing border regions 

must be able to directly access one another and build 

confidence in order to effectively counter cross-border 

crime and militancy and prevent tensions from arising 

between the states.

With respect to the Afghan-Pakistan border, it is 

absolutely essential that the countries come to a final 

settlement concerning their border. The Durand Line, 

established by the British colonial administration, has 

never been fully accepted as the international border, 

particularly as Pashtun leaders see it as arbitrarily 

dividing the Pashtun people. Without a clear 

demarcation of the border and mutual recognition 

of its legitimacy, misunderstandings will inevitably 

arise about appropriate political jurisdictions, 

troop movements, governance, and so on. A treaty 

establishing Afghanistan’s borders once and for all, 

and with broad acceptance by various leaders and 

factions, is an essential undertaking that must be 

completed before foreign forces leave.

Enhance Mechanisms for Intelligence Sharing. 

Coordination of COIN operations on both sides 

of the border will require that all states in the region 

have access to information about the activities of 

insurgents, terrorists, and criminals. Intelligence 

sharing in an open and timely manner is critical to 

defining and countering common threats. For many 

years, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Iraq 

and its neighbors were reluctant to provide detailed 

information to one another. Such secrecy can only 

serve to deepen mistrust and seriously hinders the 

effective targeting of militant groups.
49

In a positive development, in 2007, NATO forces, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan announced the creation 

of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). 

The mission of the JIOC is to enable joint campaign 

planning, and is capable of 24-hour operations. It is 

essential that the JIOC be seen by all sides as achieving 

concrete goals and fostering deeper cooperation 

between Afghan and Pakistani forces. Any remaining 

wrinkles for the sharing information must be ironed 

out. Most importantly, institutions such as the JIOC 

must continue to be viable even after foreign forces 

begin to withdraw. While it is likely that NATO 

forces will continue to play a pivotal role in providing 

intelligence to both countries for some time and will 

provide some support for coordinated operations, 

governments in the region must be encouraged to take 

ownership of intelligence sharing efforts.

Intelligence sharing must also be enhanced among 

Iraq and its neighbors. Here there has been greater 

reluctance to act as the KRG may be hesitant to provide 

Turkey with information about Kurdish militants. In 

addition, Iran has not been particularly helpful in 

engaging in intelligence sharing with other countries 

in the region; yet, obstacles to effective communication 

run both ways. While Iran and Turkey view regional 

militancy as a common threat and have engaged in 

intelligence sharing, U.S. and Iraqi forces have yet 

to establish contacts with Iran in a meaningful way. 

Clearly, there is a history of animosity between Iran, 

Iraq, and the United States. Nonetheless, common 

ground can be found on the issue of preventing crossborder attacks and the escalation of regional hostilities. 

Establishing a mechanism for Iraq and its neighbors 

similar to the JIOC in Afghanistan/Pakistan, and 

ensuring its long-term viability is an important step 

forward.
50

Promote Diplomacy and Commercial Exchanges in 

the Region. 

The military efforts, detailed above, should be 

seen as a complement to continued diplomatic and 

commercial exchanges among actors in the region. 

Meetings between heads of state, foreign ministries, 

ministries of commerce and trade, and so forth, must 

be held on a regular basis, all with an eye towards 

preventing inevitable conflicts of interests and lowlevel clashes in border zones from escalating to a major 

conflict. Thus, civilian leadership at the highest levels 

is critical for diffusing potential tensions that arise 

from cross-border militant groups. These contacts have 

been going on for some time and must be sustained, 

even after foreign forces leave. Nevertheless, one 

critical player in the region has been on the sideline: 

Iran. Both Afghanistan and Iraq share borders with 

Iran and Iran has historically played an important role 

in both countries. Iran has at times not been seen as 

a helpful partner in the region. Current disputes over 

Iran’s nuclear program, a history of mistrust between 

Iran and its neighbors, internal unrest following Iran’s 

disputed election in June 2009, and several decades 

of hostility between Iran and the United States all 

contribute to difficult environment for effective 

diplomacy. Nonetheless, all actors in the region, 

including Iran, have an interest in curtailing crossborder militancy and in preventing an escalation of 

violence in the region. Therefore, while agreement will 

not be found on all issues, Iran must be brought to the 

bargaining table on the important matter of curtailing 

insurgencies in the region.
51

Finally, commercial exchanges among actors in the 

region can help to bind states in a common purpose 

and deepen interdependence among neighbors. 

Shared commercial interests and preserving growth 

through trade and investment can play a positive role 

in fostering cooperation on security matters. Turkey, 

for instance, has taken steps to promote trade and 

investment, deepening its economic ties with northern 

Iraq. Trade between Turkey and Iraq has averaged $5 

billion per year. The Kurdistan region has benefitted 

from Turkish-financed construction projects and 

services, and it consumes $1 billion worth of Turkish 

goods per year. In addition, Turkish oil exploration 

companies have signed contracts with the KRG to 

develop fields inside the region, and Turkey provides 

vital pipelines for Iraqi oil.103 Projects such as this have 

gone a long way in cementing good relations between 

Turkey, the KRG, and Iraq in general and provide a 

strong incentive to cooperate on security matters. 

Through robust commercial ties, the KRG may come 

to understand that limiting the PKK is in its long-term 

self-interest. Commercial links between Iraq and other 

countries in the region, as well as Afghanistan and its 

neighbors can similarly help to bind these country’s 

futures together.

CONCLUSION

Transnational insurgent groups exploit limitations 

on government power and authority by strategically 

placing themselves outside of the state’s reach. They 

make the best efforts at counterinsurgency more 

complex by increasing the transaction costs that 

governments face when they deal with their neighbors. 

Often times, cross-border fighting between rebels 
52

and the state sour regional relations and can prompt 

escalatory dynamics that lead to clashes between 

neighbors. Rival neighbors use rebel organizations 

as an alternative to the direct use of force, but these 

groups can provoke interstate violence. Weak rebel 

hosts can be drawn into conflicts with their neighbors 

because they are unable to prevent rebel access or 

incursions by other states.

However, states can and do cooperate on border 

security matters to prevent the escalation of conflict. 

Learning from these examples can provide lessons 

for today’s challenges. Promoting clear lines of 

communication, sharing intelligence, and establishing 

border cooperation regimes can go a long way in both 

countering violent groups and preserving friendly 

relations between states. Thus, effective diplomacy is 

critical to preventing the escalation of regional crises.

Iraq, Afghanistan, and their neighbors and allies 

will certainly confront transnational violence for some 

time to come. As foreign forces begin to withdraw it is 

essential that agreements with neighbors are struck so 

as to establish appropriate coordination mechanisms 

and border security regimes. Such steps will help to 

limit insurgent movements and preserve stability in 

neighborhoods that have long been plagued by conflict. 

ENDNOTES

1. Gabriel Marcella, War Without Borders: the Colombia-Ecuador 

Crisis 2008, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2008.

2. Vikram Jagadish, “Reconsidering American Strategy in 

South Asia: Destroying Terrorist Sanctuaries in Pakistan’s Tribal 

Areas,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 3, March 2009, 

pp. 36-65.
53

3. Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders: Transnational 

Insurgencies in World Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

2009.

4. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee 

Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.

5. Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, pp. 29-32.

6. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: 

The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2001.

7. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, 

and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, 

pp. 715-35; Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, 

MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978.

8. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons 

in Authority and Control, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2000.

9. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, All International Politics is Local: 

the Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization, Ann 

Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002.

10. See U. S. Army and Marine Corps, The U.S. Army/Marine 

Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago, IL: University 

of Chicago Press, 2007. For a discussion of the evolution of 

insurgency and counterinsurgency, see Metz. 2007.

11. Salehyan, 2009.

12. George Gavrilis, The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries. 

Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

13. Marcela 2008; Simon Romero, “Troops Mass at Colombia 

Border,” New York Times, March 3, 2008. 
54

14. Research on these groups was conducted through 

extensive searches of newspaper archives, the Uppsala University 

Armed Conflicts Database, website www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/

search.php, and secondary sources. Admittedly, it is difficult to 

gather reliable information on clandestine activities of insurgent 

groups; therefore, some cases of external sanctuaries and crossborder violence may have been missed. Nonetheless, this list is 

a comprehensive account of high-profile, well-known cases of 

transnational insurgency.

15. In particular, their narratives on militarized interstate 

disputes contained information on hostilities over rebel activities, 

available from www.correlatesofwar.org. This served as a useful 

starting point for gathering further information through LexisNexis newspaper archives.

16. Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan 

Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe, New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2008.

17. El-Hassan, Yahya, “Sudan Reports Loss of Two Soldiers in 

Border Fighting,” Africa News, July 24, 1996.

18. MENA News Agency, “Eritrean President Says Country 

‘Duty Bound’ to Stand by Sudanese Opposition,” BBC Summary of 

World Broadcasts, January 27, 2997.

19. Suna News Agency, “Sudanese Army Spokesman 

Accuses Eritrea of Shelling Border Villages,” BBC Summary of 

World Broadcasts, March 9 , 1998. Deutsch Presse-Agentur, “Sudan 

Accuses Eritrea of Shelling Seven of its Border Posts,” June, 19, 

1998.

20. See “Eritrea-Sudan: Text of Agreement Signed in Qatar, 

5/4/99,” University of Pennsylvania, African Studies Center, 

available from www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_5499.html.

21. Myanmar often accused Thailand of assisting the 

insurgency, although the Thai government and the rebel 

organizations denied these allegations. No independent sources 

have confirmed Thai assistance to any Myanmarese rebel group.
55

22. Teresa Poole, “Thai Army Blocks Burmese Attack on Rebel 

Strongholds,” The Independent, February 17, 1992, p. 12.

23. Phar Kim Beng “Myanmar: ASEAN’s Thorn in the Flesh,” 

Asian Times, July 25, 2003.

24. James East, “Thai Troops Rushed North to Quell 

Skirmish,” The Straits Times (Singapore), February 12, 2001; Peter 

Alford, “Troop Build-up Sparks Border Closure,” The Australian, 

February 14, 2001, p. 8.

25. “Burma Border: Thai Villages hit by Mortar Fire, Bullets,” 

The Nation (Thailand), June 25, 2002.

26. “Radio Broadcasts: Military Takes Verbal Swipe at 

Burma,” The Nation (Thailand) ̧ June 27, 2002.

27. Kanal-6, TV. “Turkey: Border Security Agreement 

with Iran to Neutralize PKK Activities,” BBC Summary of News 

Broadcasts, August 3, 1993.

28. Turkish National News Agency, “President’s Visit to Iran: 

Demirel Elaborates on Agreements with Iran,” BBC Summary of 

World Broadcasts, August 1, 1994.

29. Deutsch Presse-Agentur, “Turkey, Iran to Coordinate 

Army Operations Against PKK,” June, 20, 1995.

30. Anatolia News Agency, “Iran Hands over Three PKK 

Members to Turkey,” BBC Monitoring Europe, October 31, 2001.

31. Anatolia News Agency, “Turkey: Kurdish Militants Kill 

Eight Iranian Soldiers in Border Clash,” BBC Monitoring Europe, 

June 28, 2003.

32. “Turkey, Iran Agree to Boost Cooperation in Fighting 

Terrorism,” BBC Monitoring Europe, December 5, 2006. Also see 

Omer Taspinar, “Turkey Eyes the Shia Crescent: Iran Clearly 

Seeks to Lure Turkey Away from its Traditional Moorings to the 

West, and the Kurds May be Just the Wedge it Needs,” Newsweek 

(International Edition), February 12, 2007, for an analysis of IranTurkey security cooperation.
56

33. More recently, Iran and Turkey signed a memorandum 

of understanding stating that, “the increase in some terrorist 

movements in the region damages both countries, and the most 

influential way to battle this outlawed problem is the exchange 

of intelligence and security cooperation,” Quoted in Giray 

Sadik, “Iran and Turkey Move Closer on Counter-Terrorism 

Cooperation,” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 5, Issue 16, 2008.

34. Lischer, 2006.

35. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, “Rwanda Faces New War 

Unless International Force is Sent, UN Aides Say,” New York 

Times, November 6, 1994, late edition, p. A12.

36. “Rwandan Refugees: Crime and Nourishment,” The 

Economist, April 1, 1995, p. 34.

37. Amnesty International, “Zaire: Amnesty International 

Condemns Human Rights Violations Against Tutsi,” Press Release, 

September 20, 1996; Prunier, 2008.

38. James McKinley, “Zaire Rebels Take a Town with the 

Help of Rwandan Army,” New York Times, November 2, 1996, late 

edition, p. A1

39. Allan Thompson, “700,000 in Mass Exodus from Zaire,” 

Toronto Star, November 16, 1996, p. A1.

40. Prunier, 2008, Ch. 5.

41. Minorities at Risk Database, "Assessment for Tutsis in the 

Dem. Rep. of the Congo,” Center for International Development 

and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, available 

from www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=49010. 

42. International Crisis Group, “North Kivu, Into the 

Quagmire? An Overview of the Current Crisis in North Kivu. 

International Crisis Group Kivu Report, No. 1, 1998.

43. Joe Bavier, “Congo War-Driven Crisis Kills 45,000 a 

Month—Study,” Reuters, January 22, 2008.
57

44. Christopher Wren, “Congo’s New Leader, at the UN, 

Pledges Talks with War Foes,” New York Times, February 3, 2001, 

late edition, p. A7.

45. Herve Bar. “Kigali, DR Congo to Discuss Border Security 

Cordon,” Agence France Presse, July 17, 2002.

46. “DR Congo Bans Rebel Group Upon Request by Bush,” 

Agence France Presse, September 25, 2002.

47. United Nations Organization Mission in the DR Congo 

website, available from monuc.unmissions.org.

48. “Rwandan Hutu Rebel Group Condemns Genocide, Says 

it Will Abandon Armed Struggle,” Agence France Presse, March 31, 

2005.

49. “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in Eastern Congo Given OneMonth Disarmament Deadline,” Agence France Presse, August 25, 

2005. 

50. “Rebels Targeted in DR Congo Park,” BBC News Online,

October 31, 2005.

51. “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda,” BBC News Online,

January 23, 1999.

52. “Alliance Pursues Offensive Against Rwandan Hutus in 

Congo,” Agence France Presse, January 25, 2009.

53. “DR Congo Rebel Chief Arrested,” Agence France Presse,

Jaunary 23, 1999.

54. “Joint Operation Destroys Hutu Rebel Bases: Rwanda,” 

Agence France Presse, February 11, 2009.

55. “Rwandan Hutu Rebel Commanders Surrender: Army,” 

Agence France Presse, Februry 13, 2009.

56. Rwanda Begins DR Congo Pull-out After Joint Operation,” 

Agence France Presse, February 25, 2009.
58

57. Lawrence Cline, “The Insurgency Environment in 

Northeast India,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 

2006, pp. 126-147. 

58. Namrata Goswami, “India’s Counter-insurgency 

Experience: the ‘Trust and Nurture’ Strategy, Small Wars and 

Insurgencies, Vol. 20., No. 1, March 2009, pp. 66-86.

59. Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of 

Nationality, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999; 

Cline 2006.

60. Uppsala University Armed Conflict Database, available 

from www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php.

61. Baruah, 1999.

62. South Asia Terrorism Portal, available from www.satp.org.

63. Rajesh Kharat, “Countering Insurgencies in South Asia: 

The Case of Indo-Bhutan Cooperation,” Paper presented at the 2006 

Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 

2006; Praveen Kumar, “External Linkages and Internal Security: 

Assessing Bhutan’s Operation All Clear,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 

28, No. 3, 2004; Arjit Mazumdar, “Bhutan’s Military Actions 

Against Indian Insurgents,” Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 4, JulyAugust 2005.

64. Stefan Priesner, “Bhutan in 1997: Striving for Stability,” 

Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 1998, pp. 155-160.

65. Mazumdar, 2005, p . 569.

66. Kumar, 2004, p. 391.

67. Mazumdar, 2005, pp. 569-570.

68. Rahul Bedi, “Bhutan Claims Victory Over Rebels,” The 

Irish Times. January 9, 2004, p. 9.

69. “Bhutan Timeline 2003,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 

available from www.satp.org.
59

70. Mazumdar, 2005, p. 575.

71. “India Keeps Option of Direct Involvement in Bhutan’s 

Anti-Insurgent Drive Open,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), December 

18, 2003.

72. “Bhutan Scores Unusual Success in Anti-Insurgent Drive,” 

The Telegraph (Kolkata), December 18, 2003.

73. Rahul Bedi, “Bhutan Claims Victory Over Rebels,” The 

Irish Times, January 9, 2004.

74. India Bhutan Friendship Treaty, available from www.

carnegieendowment.org/newsletters/SAP/pdf/march07/india_bhutan_

treaty.pdf. 

75. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “India to Discuss Insurgency 

Issue With Burma,” September 13, 2006.

76. Nagalim. NL News, "Nagas Persecuted in Myanmar 

Nagaland Post," September 17, 2006, available from www.

nagalim.nl/news/archive-092006.html

77. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “India, Burma Mount Joint 

Operations to ‘Root Out’ Assam Rebels,” October 2, 2006.

78. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Burma Begins Operation 

Against India’s North-Eastern Rebels,” November 16, 2007.

79. BBC News, “India, Bangladesh in Security Vow,” 

September 17, 2004.

80. Thaindian News, “India, Bangladesh to Jointly Fight 

Terror, Sign Two Pacts,” February 9, 2009.

81. Quil Lawrence, Invisible Nation: How the Kurd’s Quest for 

Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East, New York: Walker 

and Company, 2008.
60

82. Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation? International 

Crisis Group, Middle East Report, No. 81, November 13, 2008.

83. “Iraq, Turkey, Sign Border Security Pact,” CNN.com, July 

10, 2008.

84. Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Urges Iraq to Stop Kurdish 

Rebel Attacks,” The Washington Post, July 28, 2009.

85. Kenneth Timmerman, “Border Turmoil Tripwires,” The 

Washington Times, November 5, 2007, p. A14.

86. United Press International, “Iranian Soldiers, Kurds Killed 

in Battles,” May 13, 2009.

87. Charles Levinson and Yochi Dreazen, “Iraqi Troops 

Raid Iranian Dissident Camp, in Nod to Tehran,” The Wall Street 

Journal, July 29, 2009.

88. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until 

the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 41-77; Barnett R. 

Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, “From Great Game to Grand Bargain: 

Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, 

November/December 2008.

89. Carlotta Gall, “Karzai Says Pakistani Collusion Threatens 

Region,” New York Times, December 12, 2006.

90. South Asia News, “Clash Erupts Between Afghan, 

Pakistani Forces over Border Fence,” April 20, 2007.

91. Zeeshan Haider, “Up to 7 Afghan Troops Killed in Pakistan 

Clash,” Reuters, May 13, 2007.

92. BBC News, “Baloch Separatists Attack Traders,” BBC 

News Online, July 27, 2009.

93. Associated Press, “Pakistani Villagers Re-Create AntiTaliban Militia,” New York Times, July 30, 2009.

94. U.K. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 
61

Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, 8th Report of Session 

2008-09, July 21, 2009.

95. Selig Harrison, “Beware Pashtunistan,” Newsweek,

November 12, 2007.

96. Jayshree Bajora, “Realigning Pakistan’s Security Forces,” 

Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, June 18, 2009; Jagadish, 

2009, p. 41. 

97. Gavrilis, 2008, p. 6.

98. Kenneth Pollack, “The Battle for Baghdad,” The National 

Interest, September/October 2009.

99. Gavrilis, 2008.

100. Metz, 2007, p. 52.

101. International Crisis Group, 2008, p 3.

102. “Turkey-Iraq-US Tripartite Mechanism Meeting Held in 

Ankara,” Turkish Weekly, July 29, 2009.

103. International Crisis Group, 2008.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert M. Williams

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Idean Salehyan

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil