GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, House 

of Representatives 

DEPOT 

MAINTENANCE 

Improved Strategic 

Planning Needed to 

Ensure That Army and 

Marine Corps Depots 

Can Meet Future 

Maintenance 

Requirements 

September 2009 

GAO-09-865 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That 

Army and Marine Corps Depots Can Meet Future 

Highlights of GAO-09-865, a report to the Maintenance Requirements

Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee 

on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

The Army and Marine Corps 

maintenance depots provide 

critical support to ongoing military 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and are heavily involved in efforts 

to reset the force. The Department 

of Defense (DOD) has an interest in 

ensuring that the depots remain 

operationally effective, efficient, 

and capable of meeting future 

maintenance requirements. In 2008, 

in response to direction by the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), the Army and the Marine 

Corps each submitted a depot 

maintenance strategic plan. Our 

objective was to evaluate the 

extent to which these plans provide 

comprehensive strategies for 

meeting future depot maintenance 

requirements. GAO determined 

whether the plans were consistent 

with the criteria for developing a 

results-oriented management 

framework and fully addressed 

OSD’s criteria. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

direct the Army and Marine Corps 

to update their plans to ensure that 

they provide a comprehensive 

results-oriented management 

framework, fully address the 

criteria established by OSD, and 

mitigate and reduce uncertainties 

in future workload. In its written 

comments on a draft of this report, 

DOD concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

The depot maintenance strategic plans developed by the Army and Marine 

Corps identify key issues affecting the depots, but do not provide assurance 

that the depots will be postured and resourced to meet future maintenance 

requirements because they do not fully address all of the elements required 

for a comprehensive, results-oriented management framework. Nor are they 

fully responsive to OSD’s direction for developing the plans. While the 

services’ strategic plans contain mission statements, along with long-term 

goals and objectives, they do not fully address all the elements needed for 

sound strategic planning, such as external factors that may affect how goals 

and objectives will be accomplished, performance indicators or metrics that 

measure outcomes and gauge progress, and resources required to meet the 

goals and objectives. Also, the plans partially address four issues that OSD 

directed the services, at a minimum, to include in their plans, such as logistics 

transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, 

and capital investment. Army and Marine Corps officials involved with the 

development of the service strategic plans acknowledged that their plans do 

not fully address the OSD criteria, but they stated that the plans nevertheless 

address issues they believe are critical to maintaining effective, long-term 

depot maintenance capabilities. 

The Army’s and Marine Corps’ plans also are not comprehensive because they 

do not provide strategies for mitigating and reducing uncertainties in future 

workloads that affect the depots’ ability to plan for meeting future 

maintenance requirements. Such uncertainties stem primarily from a lack of 

information on (1) workload that will replace current work on existing 

systems, which is expected to decline, and (2) workload associated with new 

systems that are in the acquisition pipeline. According to depot officials, to 

effectively plan for future maintenance requirements, the depots need timely 

and reliable information from their major commands on both the amounts and 

types of workloads they should expect to receive in future years. Depot 

officials told us that the information they receive from their major commands 

on their future workloads are uncertain beyond the current fiscal year. 

Officials cited various factors that contribute to these uncertainties, such as 

volatility in workload requirements, changing wartime environment, budget 

instability, and unanticipated changes in customer orders. 

In addition, depot officials said that they are not involved in the sustainment 

portion of the life cycle management planning process for new and modified 

systems. No clear process exists that would enable them to have input into 

weapon system program managers’ decisions on how and where new and 

modified systems will be supported and maintained in the future. Unless they 

are integrated in this planning process, these officials said, the depots will 

continue to have uncertainties about what capabilities they will need to plan 

for future workloads and what other resources they will need to support new 

and modified weapon systems. View GAO-09-865 or key components.

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-865 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 5 

Strategic Plans Lack Elements Needed to Position the Depots to 

Meet Future Maintenance Requirements 8 

Conclusions 18 

Recommendations for Executive Action 18 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22 

Appendix II Army and Marine Corps Depot Actions to Improve 

Productivity 24 

Appendix III Trends in Army and Marine Corps Depot Workforce 

Levels 27 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 31 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34 

 

Tables 

Table 1: Army and Marine Corps Depots and Principal Work 

Performed 6 

Table 2: Assessment of Results-Oriented Management Planning 

Elements within the Army and Marine Corps Depot 

Maintenance Strategic Plans 10 

Table 3: Assessment of OSD-Identified Issues within the Army and 

Marine Corps Depot Maintenance Strategic Plans 12 

Table 4: Results of Selected Army Depots’ Process Improvements, 

Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 25 

 Depot Maintenance
Table 5: Results of Selected Marine Corps Depots’ Process 

Improvements, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 26 

Figures 

Figure 1: Army Depots’ Workforce by Category, Fiscal Years 1999 

to 2008 28 

Figure 2: Marine Corps Depots’ Workforce by Category, Fiscal 

Years 1999 to 2008 29 

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Page ii GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Page 1 GAO-09-865 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 17, 2009 

The Honorable Solomon Ortiz 

Chairman 

Honorable J. Randy Forbes 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Army and Marine Corps maintenance depots support combat readiness by 

providing repair and manufacturing capability that is needed to keep 

weapon systems and other equipment in good working order. The depots 

have provided critical support to ongoing military operations and are 

heavily involved in efforts to reset the force.1

 The organic maintenance 

capability provided by the depots also helps to fulfill requirements under 

Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which directs the Department of Defense (DOD) 

to maintain a core logistics capability and limit the percentage of annual 

funding that may be used for depot maintenance performed by 

contractors.2

 Given the important role of the depots in sustaining a ready 

force and fulfilling Title 10 requirements, DOD has an interest in ensuring 

that the depots remain operationally effective, efficient, and capable of 

meeting future maintenance requirements. At the same time, DOD has 

been relying on contractors to support many of its weapons systems and, 

in 2001, identified performance-based logistics as its preferred support 

strategy.3

 Prior to the onset of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

DOD’s increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance 

1

Resetting the force involves repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing equipment in 

preparation for future military operations. 

2

Under 10 U.S.C. § 2464, DOD is required to identify and maintain within governmentowned and operated facilities a core logistics capability, including the equipment, 

personnel, and technical competence required to maintain weapon systems identified as 

necessary for national defense emergencies and contingencies. In addition, 10 U.S.C 

2466(a) requires that not more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding made 

available to each military department be used for private sector performance. 

3

Performance-based logistics, which evolved from the more general concept of 

performance-based contracting, refers to the purchase of performance outcomes (such as 

the availability of functioning weapon systems) through long-term support arrangements 

rather than the purchase of individual elements of support—such as parts, repairs, and 

engineering support. 

 Depot Maintenance
 

support—coupled with declining budgets, downsizing, and consolidations 

as a result of previous Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) 

decisions—had led to a decline in depot-level maintenance workloads and 

contributed to the general deterioration of capabilities at military depots. 

The depots subsequently experienced a surge in workload as a result of 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, they installed protective 

armor for trucks and repaired battle-damaged equipment. 

In response to direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD),4

 both the Army and the Marine Corps developed depot 

maintenance strategic plans for their military depots and, in 2008, 

submitted them for review to DOD. The intent of these strategic plans, 

according to the OSD criteria, is to ensure the depots are postured and 

resourced to meet future requirements. Our objective was to evaluate the 

extent to which their plans provide a comprehensive strategy for meeting 

future depot maintenance requirements. In addition, we obtained 

information on depot productivity improvements (see app. II) and on 

workforce trends between fiscal years 1999 and 2008 (see app. III). This 

report is one in a series of reviews focusing on DOD’s logistics and 

maintenance operations. In April 2008, we briefed your office on the 

preliminary results of our work on the military departments’ depot capital 

investments. In July 2008, we reported on the increased carryover work 

occurring at the five Army depots.5

 In December 2008, we reported on the 

implementation and impact of performance-based logistics arrangements 

on weapon system support costs.6

 In May 2009, we reported on DOD’s 

efforts to establish the required core capability for fielded, new, and 

modified systems.7

 

4

OSD outlined the military services’ depot maintenance strategic planning responsibilities 

in its Report to Congress. See Department of Defense, Depot Maintenance Strategy and 

Implementation Plans, part I-21 through I-24 (Washington, D.C. March 2007). This 

document established OSD criteria for the services’ strategic plans. 

5

GAO, Army Working Capital Fund: Actions Needed to Reduce Carryover at Army 

Depots, GAO-08-714 (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2008). 

6

GAO, Defense Logistics: Improved Analysis and Cost Data Needed to Evaluate the Costeffectiveness of Performance Based Logistics, GAO-09-41 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 

2008). 

7

GAO, Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish Core Capability at 

Military Depots, GAO-09-83 (Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2009). 

Page 2 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

In conducting our work, we analyzed the services’ depot maintenance 

strategic plans to determine if they were consistent with criteria for 

developing a comprehensive results-oriented management framework and 

addressed OSD’s criteria for developing a strategic plan. We discussed 

these plans with officials from the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. To 

gain further perspective on the plans and related issues that affect the 

depots’ posture for meeting future maintenance requirements, we visited 

the Army’s five maintenance depots (Anniston, Corpus Christi, 

Letterkenny, Red River, and Tobyhanna) and both of the Marine Corps’ 

maintenance depots (Albany and Barstow). We also obtained data on the 

depots’ workload and workforce trends, as well as information on actions 

aimed at improving depot productivity. Although each of the military 

services was required to submit its depot maintenance strategic plan to 

OSD, we decided to focus our initial work on the Army’s and Marine 

Corps’ plans because of these services’ significant role in supporting 

overseas contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As agreed with 

your offices, we plan to report separately on the Air Force and Navy depot 

maintenance strategic plans. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 through 

September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more detailed 

description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I. 

The depot maintenance strategic plans developed by the Army and Marine 

Corps identify key issues affecting the depots, but do not provide 

assurance that the depots will be postured and resourced to meet future 

maintenance requirements because they do not fully address all of the 

elements required for a comprehensive, results-oriented management 

framework. Nor are they fully responsive to OSD’s direction for 

developing the plans. Specifically, while the services’ strategic plans 

contain mission statements, along with long-term goals and objectives, 

they do not fully address all the elements needed for sound strategic 

planning, such as external factors that may affect how goals and objectives 

will be accomplished, performance indicators or metrics that measure 

outcomes and gauge progress, and resources required to meet the goals 

and objectives. Also, the plans partially address four issues that OSD 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

directed the services, at a minimum, to include in their plans—logistics 

transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce 

revitalization, and capital investment. For example, the plans do not 

provide clear time frames or actions for addressing these issues. Army and 

Marine Corps officials involved with the development of the service 

strategic plans acknowledged that their plans do not fully address the OSD 

criteria, but they stated that the plans nevertheless address issues they 

believe are critical to maintaining effective, long-term depot maintenance 

capabilities. OSD has decided to wait until completion of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review in 2010 before asking the services to modify or update 

their strategies. Additionally, we found that the Army’s and Marine Corps’ 

plans are not comprehensive because they do not provide strategies for 

mitigating and reducing uncertainties in future workloads that affect the 

depots’ ability to plan for meeting future maintenance requirements. Such 

uncertainties stem primarily from a lack of information on (1) workload 

that will replace current work on existing systems, which is expected to 

decline, and (2) workload associated with new systems that are in the 

acquisition pipeline. According to depot officials, to effectively plan for 

future maintenance requirements and acquire the necessary capabilities 

(including workforce skills, equipment, and infrastructure), the depots 

need timely and reliable information from their major commands on both 

the amounts and types of workloads they should expect to receive in 

future years. Depot officials told us, however, that the information they 

receive from their major commands on their future workloads is uncertain 

beyond the current fiscal year. Officials cited various factors that 

contribute to these uncertainties, such as the volatility in workload 

requirements: changing wartime environment; budget instability, including 

the timing of and heavy reliance on supplemental funding; and 

unanticipated changes in customer orders. In addition, depot officials said 

that they are not involved in the sustainment portion of the life cycle 

management planning process for new and modified systems. Depot 

officials also said that no clear process exists that would enable them to 

have input into weapon system program managers’ decisions on how and 

where new and modified systems will be supported and maintained in the 

future. These decisions profoundly affect the depots’ future workload 

plans. Unless the depots are integrated in the life cycle planning process, 

these officials said, the depots will continue to have uncertainties about 

what capabilities they will need to plan for future workloads and what 

other resources they will need to support new and modified weapon 

systems. As a result of these deficiencies in their strategic plans, the Army 

and Marine Corps may lack assurance that their depots are postured and 

resourced to meet future maintenance requirements. 

Page 4 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

We are recommending that the Army and Marine Corps update their depot 

maintenance strategic plans to ensure that they (1) fully address all 

elements needed for a comprehensive results-oriented management 

framework; (2) fully address the four specific issues OSD directed the 

services to include in their plans; and (3) include goals and objectives 

aimed at mitigating and reducing future workload uncertainties, and 

integrate the depots’ input into the sustainment portion of the life cycle 

management planning process. In its written comments on a draft of this 

report, DOD concurred with all three of our recommendations. 

The Army and Marine Corps maintain organic depot maintenance 

capabilities that are designed to retain, at a minimum, a ready, controlled 

source of technical competence and resources to meet military 

requirements. In fiscal year 2008, DOD budgeted about $5.6 billion for the 

five Army and two Marine Corps maintenance depots and maintained a 

workforce of about 26,000 personnel at these facilities.8

 Depot-level 

maintenance and repair involves materiel maintenance or repair requiring 

the overhaul, upgrading or rebuilding of parts assemblies and 

subassemblies, and testing and reclamation of equipment as necessary, 

regardless of the source of funds for the maintenance or repair or the 

location at which the maintenance or repair is performed.9

 Army and 

Marine Corps depots work on a wide range of weapon systems and 

military equipment, such as combat vehicles, aircraft, and communications 

and electronics equipment. Each of the services’ depot-level activities has 

been designated as a Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence in the 

recognized core competency of the designee, pursuant to Section 2474 of 

Title 10, U.S Code. Table 1 describes the principal work performed at each 

Army and Marine Corps depot. 

Background 

 

8

Includes permanent government personnel, temporary workers, and contract workers. 

9

Depot-level maintenance and repair also includes all aspects of software maintenance 

classified by DOD as of July 1, 1995, as depot-level maintenance and repair, and interim 

contractor support or contractor logistics support, to the extent that such support is for the 

performance of service as described above. Depot-level maintenance and repair does not 

include the procurement of major modifications or upgrades of weapon systems that are 

designed to improve program performance or the nuclear refueling of an aircraft carrier; 

however, a major upgrade program covered by this exception could continue to be 

performed by private or public sector activities. Depot-level maintenance also does not 

include the procurement of parts for safety modifications, but does include the installation 

of parts for that purpose. 

Page 5 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

Table 1: Army and Marine Corps Depots and Principal Work Performed 

Army depot Location Principal work 

Anniston Anniston, Alabama Wheeled and tracked vehicles such as the M88 and M1 tank and 

components 

Corpus Christi Corpus Christi, Texas Rotary wing aircraft such as the AH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinook, and UH-60 

Blackhawk 

Letterkenny Chambersburg, Pennsylvania Air defense and tactical missiles such as the Patriot, Hawk, Avenger, 

Multiple Launch Rocket System, and Sidewinder, as well as mobile electric 

power generation equipment 

Red River Texarkana, Texas Bradley Fighting Vehicle, tactical wheeled vehicles, Patriot Missile 

Recertification, rubber products, Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the 

Small Replacement Excavator 

Tobyhanna Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance systems, as well as electronics, avionics, and missile 

guidance and control systems 

Marine Corps depot Location Principal work 

Albany Albany, Georgia Military ordnance, secondary components, engineering, electronic, and 

communications equipment, custom armor kits, and major end items such 

as the Assault Amphibious Vehicle, Light Vehicle System, and High Mobility 

Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

Barstow Barstow, California Radar systems, heavy mobility equipment, communications systems, diesel 

engines, wheeled and tracked vehicles, and weapon systems such as the 

Light Armored Vehicle, Hercules Armed Recovery Vehicle, Logistics Vehicle 

system, and a variety of components and subassemblies 

Source: GAO analysis of Army’s and Marine Corps’ depot locations and principal work. 

During the late 1980s and the late 1990s, Army and Marine Corps 

maintenance depots—like other DOD depots—were significantly 

downsized as a result of reductions in the armed forces and DOD’s 

decision to outsource many logistics activities, including depot 

maintenance, to the private sector. These downsizing efforts contributed 

to decreased workloads at the depots and diminished their capability, 

reliability, and cost effectiveness for supporting requirements for legacy 

systems; it also reduced their opportunities to acquire work for new and 

modified weapon systems. The downsizing also affected the depots’ ability 

to obtain investments in facilities, equipment, and human capital to 

support their long-term viability and to ensure that they remained a key 

resource for repair of new and modified systems. As a result, DOD’s 

depots had become facilities that primarily repaired aging weapon systems 

and equipment. In 2003, Army and Marine Corps depots experienced an 

increase in workload, stemming from overseas contingency operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. Contributing to this increase were efforts to reset 

systems such as the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, the M1 

Abrams Tank, and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, as well as work related to 

Page 6 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

armor fabrication and the armoring of systems such as the Medium 

Tactical Vehicle Replacement. Despite the increase in workload, the Army 

and Marine Corps lacked direction from DOD on a department wide 

strategic depot plan that clarified the future role of the military depots. We 

reported in April 2003 that the services and DOD had not implemented 

comprehensive strategic plans for defense maintenance to revitalize or 

protect the future viability of their depot facilities, equipment, and 

workers. 10 In that report, we recommended that the services develop 

depot strategic plans that are linked to the services’ missions and 

objectives, and that DOD develop a strategic plan that provides guidance 

and a schedule for identifying long-term capabilities to be provided in 

government-owned and -operated plants. 

The House Armed Services Committee has previously encouraged DOD to 

develop a comprehensive strategy to ensure that the depots are viably 

positioned, and that they have the workforce, equipment, and facilities 

they need to maintain efficient operations to meet the nation’s current and 

future requirements.11 In March 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics approved the DOD Depot 

Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans, which articulated OSD’s 

strategy and plans for ensuring that the department’s organic depot 

maintenance infrastructure is postured and resourced to meet the national 

security and management challenges of the 21st century. The plan also 

specified that each military service was responsible for conducting 

strategic planning for depot maintenance that focused on achieving DOD’s 

strategy. OSD required the services to submit the results of their strategic 

plans no later than 6 months after the publication of DOD’s plan. In March 

2007, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 

Readiness modified this requirement to have each service submit either its 

published depot maintenance strategic plan, or a report describing the 

process being used to develop its strategic plan, and a target date for 

completing the plan by September 1, 2007. The Army and Marine Corps 

finalized and submitted their strategic plans to OSD in 2008.12 In addition, 

 

10GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure 

Viability of DOD’s Civilian Industrial Workforce, GAO-03-472 (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 

2003). 

11H.R. Rept. No. 108-106, p. 304 (2003), H.R. Rept. No. 109-452, p. 296 (2006). 

12The Army submitted its strategic plan to OSD in June 2008, and the Marine Corps 

submitted its plan in March 2008. 

Page 7 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

the Army developed an implementation plan to accompany its strategic 

plan. The Marine Corps did not produce an implementation plan. 

While the depot maintenance strategic plans developed by the Army and 

the Marine Corps identify key issues affecting the depots, they do not fully 

address all of the elements required to achieve a results-oriented 

management framework, and they are not fully responsive to OSD’s 

direction to the services for developing their plans. Furthermore, these 

plans do not address uncertainties in workload that affect the depots’ 

ability to plan for meeting future maintenance requirements. Finally, they 

do not show whether and how the depots will have a role in planning for 

the sustainment of new and modified weapon systems. As a result of these 

deficiencies in their strategic plans, the Army and Marine Corps may lack 

assurance that their depots are postured and resourced to meet future 

maintenance requirements. 

Strategic Plans Lack 

Elements Needed to 

Position the Depots to 

Meet Future 

Maintenance 

Requirements 

Strategic Maintenance 

Plans Do Not Fully 

Address All the Elements 

That Are Needed for a 

Results-Oriented 

Management Framework 

The Army’s and the Marine Corps’ depot maintenance strategic plans do 

not fully address all of the elements that are needed for a comprehensive 

results-oriented management framework. In addition, the plans are not 

fully responsive to OSD’s direction to the services for developing these 

plans. Our prior work has shown that organizations need sound strategic 

management planning in order to identify and achieve long-range goals 

and objectives. We have identified critical elements that should be 

incorporated in strategic plans to establish a comprehensive, resultsoriented management framework.13 A results-oriented management 

framework provides an approach whereby program effectiveness is 

measured in terms of outcomes or impact, rather than outputs, such as 

activities and processes. The framework includes critical elements such as 

a comprehensive mission statement, long-term goals and objectives, 

approaches for accomplishing goals and objectives, stakeholder 

involvement, external factors that may affect how goals and objectives will 

be accomplished, performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and 

 

13GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003); Military 

Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to 

Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004); and Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework 

Needed to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts, GAO-06-232 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 

31, 2006). 

Page 8 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

measurable, resources needed to meet performance goals, performance 

indicators or metrics that measure outcomes and gauge progress, and an 

evaluation plan that monitors the goals and objectives. OSD also directed 

the services to include many of the elements in their depot maintenance 

strategic plans. Specifically, the OSD criteria stated that each military 

service’s plan should include a comprehensive mission statement, general 

goals and objectives (including outcome-related goals and objectives), a 

description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved, metrics 

that will be applied to gauge progress, key factors external to the 

respective service and beyond its control that could significantly affect the 

achievement of their general goals and objectives, and descriptions of the 

program evaluations used in establishing, monitoring, or revising goals and 

objectives, with a schedule for future program evaluations. Furthermore, 

OSD directed the services to address a number of specific issues in their 

strategic plans, including logistics transformation, core logistics capability 

assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment. OSD wanted 

the services, at a minimum, to address these four issues because it 

believed they were critical to ensuring the depots would be postured and 

resourced to meet future requirements. 

Based on our evaluation of the Army’s and Marine Corps’ depot 

maintenance strategic plans, we found that the plans partially address the 

elements for a results-oriented management framework. While the 

services’ strategic plans address key issues affecting the depots and 

contain mission statements, along with long-term goals and objectives, 

they do not fully address all the elements needed for sound strategic 

planning. Elements not fully addressed in the strategic plans are 

• Approaches for accomplishing goals and objectives; 

• Stakeholder involvement in developing the plan; 

• External factors that may affect how goals and objectives will be 

accomplished; 

• Performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable; 

• Resources required to meet performance goals; 

• Performance indicators or metrics that measure outcomes and gauge 

progress of the goals and objectives; and 

• An evaluation plan that monitors the goals and objectives. 

Table 2 summarizes, based on our evaluation, the extent to which the 

Army and Marine Corps depot maintenance strategic plans address the 

strategic planning elements needed for a comprehensive results-oriented 

management framework. 

Page 9 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

Table 2: Assessment of Results-Oriented Management Planning Elements within the Army and Marine Corps Depot 

Maintenance Strategic Plans 

Results-oriented management 

framework planning element Army plan Marine Corps plan 

Comprehensive mission statement Addressed: The plan contains a mission 

statement that defines the Army’s role and 

responsibility to support the Depot 

Maintenance Enterprise by providing 

resources, skills, and capabilities to sustain life 

cycle readiness of the warfighter’s weapon 

systems and equipment worldwide in a reliable 

and efficient manner. 

Addressed: The plan contains a mission 

statement that says the Marine Corps mission 

is to maintain optimum depot level capability 

required to ensure readiness in peacetime, 

sustainment in wartime, and reset after conflict 

or contingency. 

Long-term goals and objectives Addressed: The plan identifies three primary 

goals and nine objectives that will be used to 

support the Army’s Depot Maintenance 

Enterprise. For example, one of the long-term 

goals and objective is to use the Army Force 

Generation to drive depot maintenance 

operations and update policies and regulations 

governing depot maintenance priorities as 

required to support the transforming Army. 

Addressed: The plan identifies four major 

goals including, aligning maintenance 

operation metrics with warfighter outcomes, 

identifying and sustaining requisite core 

maintenance capability, sustaining a highly 

mission capable, mission-ready maintenance 

workforce, and ensuring an adequate 

infrastructure to execute assigned 

maintenance workload. There is also a list of 

objectives that are aligned with each major 

goal. 

Approaches for accomplishing goals 

and objectives 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

contains Army-wide actions that the service is 

undertaking for each of the strategic goals, but 

it does not fully describe the operational 

processes, skills and technology, human 

capital information, a schedule for significant 

actions, and other resources required to meet 

the goals and objectives. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

provides statements on what the Marine Corps 

plans to do for each goal, but it does not 

contain specifics on how the service plans to 

carryout these plans or time frames for 

completing the actions. 

Stakeholder involvement in 

developing the plan 

Partially addressed: For example, while the 

plan identifies individual stakeholders, it does 

not discuss their involvement in the planning 

process. 

Partially addressed: For example, while the 

plan identifies individual stakeholders, it does 

not discuss their involvement in the planning 

process. 

External factors that may affect how 

goals and objectives will be 

accomplished 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

refers to factors, such as the Quadrennial 

Defense Review, that could affect the 

achievement of the general goals and 

objectives and the need to update the plan. It 

does not address those external factors that 

contribute to the loss of legacy work, or the 

lack of new work the depots are not receiving 

as a result of not having capability and 

infrastructure improvements. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

does address changes in force structure, the 

introduction of new weapon systems and 

modifications to legacy systems, but the plan 

does not address factors such as sustaining 

sufficient depot workload for the depots when 

current workloads decline. 

Performance goals that are 

objective, quantifiable, and 

measurable 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

has stated goals but does not show how 

outcomes will be measured. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

has stated goals, but do not contain any 

means to measure outcomes. 

Page 10 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

Results-oriented management 

framework planning element Army plan Marine Corps plan 

Resources needed to meet 

performance goals 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

and action plan references the Army Materiel 

Command Human Capital Plan for workforce 

needed for the depots. But it does not contain 

specifics on how the Army intends to carry out 

these actions or time frames for completing 

the actions and the human capital plan does 

not specify time frames for completing the 

human capital plan. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

does address the need for sustaining a highly 

capable, mission-ready maintenance 

workforce. However, the plan does not contain 

specifics on how the service will carry out 

these actions or time frames to address these 

areas. 

Performance indicators or metrics 

that measure outcomes and gauge 

progress of the goals and objectives 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

contains some metrics that are being used to 

measure the performance of a specific goal or 

objective. However, it does not contain all the 

metrics that provide a measure for determining 

how well each of the actions is helping to meet 

the goals and objectives. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

contains metrics for two of the goals including 

what will be used for measuring each 

objective. However, it does not specify how 

often they will measure or how and when they 

will report the results. 

Evaluation plan that monitors the 

goals and objectives 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

contains some planned monitoring, but it does 

not provide a schedule for future program 

evaluations. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

contains some planned monitoring. However, 

it does not provide a schedule for future 

program evaluations. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army and Marine Corps depot maintenance strategic plans. 

The Army’s and Marine Corps’ depot maintenance strategic plans partially 

address logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance, 

workforce revitalization, and capital investment—the four issues that OSD 

directed each service, at a minimum, to include in their plans. Table 3 

summarizes, based on our evaluation, the extent to which the Army and 

Marine Corps depot maintenance strategic plans discuss these four issues. 

Page 11 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

Table 3: Assessment of OSD-Identified Issues within the Army and Marine Corps Depot Maintenance Strategic Plans 

OSD-identified issues to be 

addressed in the military service 

depot maintenance strategic 

plans Army plan Marine Corps plan 

Logistics transformation Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

makes statements that the Army intends to 

address the role/capabilities envisioned for their 

depots. However, the actions within the plan are 

broad and unclear and do not state when the 

actions will be complete. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

does provide actions for potential 

organizational changes such as study the 

feasibility of constructing limited, forward 

deployed temporary repair facilities from the 

Maritime Propositioning Force. However, the 

plan does not contain a discussion on how or 

when they plan to take these actions. 

Core logistics capability assurance Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

states the Army has not been following policy on 

maintaining a core logistics capability, but 

addresses the need to improve policy and 

procedures to identify core capabilities. The plan 

and accompanying implementation action plan 

does not contain metrics to fully measure 

progress. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

does mention core requirement including 

source of repair decisions. The statement in 

the plan is very general and does not explain 

how the Marine Corps plans will be responsive 

to the regulations and directives on core 

requirements. 

Workforce revitalization Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

does cite the need for the workforce to change 

with the changing mission needs and meet future 

core capability while maintaining flexibility. 

However, the plan does not contain a timeframe 

for completing the actions. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

states actions, such as the need to have 

information on projected retirements. The plan 

does not contain a discussion on how or when 

the Marine Corps plans to take these actions. 

Capital investment Partially addressed: For example, the plan has 

an objective that addresses updating the 

infrastructure by identifying military construction 

projects required to modernize organic depots 

and update the Capital Investment Plan. 

However, neither the plan nor the accompanying 

implementation plan identifies a method for 

prioritizing needed investments or projected 

funding. 

Partially addressed: For example, the plan 

appears to address the capabilities that Marine 

Corp intends to provide through its planned 

investments. However, the plan is vague and 

provides no strategy on how the Marine Corps 

plans to implement the investments. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army and Marine Corps depot maintenance strategic plans. 

Army and Marine Corps officials involved with the development of the 

service strategic plans acknowledged that their plans do not fully address 

the OSD criteria, but they stated that the plans nevertheless address issues 

they believe are critical to maintaining effective, long-term depot 

maintenance capabilities. An official in the Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff of the Army, G4, 14 who was involved with the Army’s depot 

 

14G4 is the acronym for the Army’s logistics branch. 

Page 12 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

maintenance strategic plan acknowledged that the Army’s plan does not 

fully address OSD’s criteria. According to this official, the Army’s plan 

focuses on issues of greatest priority to the service’s depots. The official 

added that the OSD criteria lacked clear and specific instructions to the 

services. According to an official in the Marine Corps’ Logistics Plans, 

Policy, and Strategic Mobility Division who was involved with that 

service’s depot maintenance strategic plan, the Marine Corps’ plan was 

intended to be only an overarching outline and was not intended to 

provide the detailed “nuts and bolts” that would be needed for 

implementation. The Army and Marine Corps have not updated their 

strategic plan since initially submitting them to OSD in 2008, and since that 

time neither service has received notice from OSD that its plan did not 

meet OSD’s criteria or should be revised and updated. An OSD official in 

the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 

Readiness told us that although the services’ strategic plans are not 

completely responsive to OSD’s direction, they represent a good first start 

on developing a strategic plan. Although OSD plans to require the services 

to update their plans, this official told us that OSD would wait until after 

completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review. That review is to be 

completed in early 2010. According to the OSD official, it would be 

counterproductive to ask the services to update their strategic plans in 

2009 and then update them again following the Quadrennial Defense 

Review.15

Strategic Plans Do Not 

Address Uncertainties in 

Workload That Affect the 

Depots’ Ability to Plan for 

Meeting Future 

Maintenance Requirements 

The Army’s and Marine Corps’ depot maintenance strategic plans do not 

provide strategies for mitigating and reducing uncertainties in future 

workloads that affect the depots’ ability to plan for meeting future 

maintenance requirements. These uncertainties stem primarily from a lack 

of information from the depots’ major commands on workload that will 

replace current work on legacy systems, which is expected to decline, as 

well as workload associated with new systems that are in the acquisition 

pipeline (which is discussed further in the next section of this report). 

Workload uncertainties hinder effective planning for meeting future depot 

maintenance requirements because workload is a key driver in planning 

 

15DOD officials also noted that the department is sponsoring an on-going study on future 

depot capability, in response to section 322 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417 (2008). The study, among other 

things, will contain a quantitative analysis of the post-reset depot capability required to 

provide life cycle sustainment of military legacy systems and new systems and military 

equipment. 

Page 13 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

for the necessary capabilities such as workforce skills, equipment, and 

infrastructure. Depot officials said that these resources require significant 

lead times to develop and put in place to effectively respond to the 

customers’ needs. In the absence of timely and reliable data on future 

workloads, the depots’ efforts to identify and develop needed capabilities 

and to conduct workforce planning may be adversely affected. 

The depots’ major commands generate workload projections from 

workload forecasting systems and are based on past history and 

discussions with customers about workload planned for the depots. The 

Army uses the Army Workload and Performance System as a tool for 

projecting future workloads, coordinating personnel requirements, 

managing resources, and tracking performance. The Marine Corps use the 

Principle End Item Stratification Module within the Material Capability 

Decision Support System to determine its depot level maintenance 

requirements. Army and Marine Corps guidance identifies workload as a 

key planning factor for supporting the expected life of a materiel system. 

For example, Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy, 

states that a depot maintenance capability will be established and 

sustained on the basis of workload generated by those weapon systems 

and materiel that is essential to the completion of the Army’s primary roles 

and mission. The Marine Corps’ Depot Level Maintenance Program guide 

establishes general guidelines for planning workloads for the depots. 

Although the services have guidance, systems, and processes for workload 

planning, depot officials told us that the workload forecasts they receive 

from their major commands are unreliable beyond the current fiscal year. 

Officials cited various factors that contribute to workload uncertainties, 

such as the volatility in workload requirements; changing wartime 

environment; budget instability, including the timing of and heavy reliance 

on supplemental funding; and unanticipated changes in customer orders. 

Depot officials also cited other factors such as delayed work returning 

from theater and workload cancellations. Depot officials told us that they 

were not in a position to address these factors on their own, and that 

reducing or mitigating future workload uncertainties would require 

substantial involvement of the service headquarter organizations and 

major commands that are responsible for managing the depots. Officials at 

the TACOM Life Cycle Management Command,16 one of the commands 

that support two Army depots, said that they too had difficulty forecasting 

 

16Formally known as the Tank Automotive and Armaments Command. 

Page 14 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

workload flowing to the depots because of factors that were outside their 

control, such as technology development and surge requirements. Marine 

Corps Logistics Command officials said that they are currently 

implementing an enterprise-level maintenance program that focuses on 

how to better identify future year requirements. 

Army and Marine Corps depot officials expressed particular concern that 

they lacked information on workloads that might replace some of their 

current work on legacy systems that is expected to decline due to various 

factors, including a drawdown of U.S. forces resulting from a decline in 

combat operations in Iraq and from the 2005 BRAC decisions. For 

example, Anniston Army depot’s work on the M1 Abrams tank fleet is 

projected to decrease from about 6,000 tanks to 2,500 tanks by fiscal year 

2013, as a result of the Army’s projected decline in demand. In addition, 

the 2005 BRAC decision is expected to reduce future workload at the 

Marine Corps’ Barstow depot by about 30 percent by fiscal year 2011, 

when BRAC is fully implemented.17 Moreover, Army and Marine Corps 

officials noted that the surge in workload resulting from operations in Iraq 

could be masking a decline in traditional organic depot work that occurred 

during this operation. Furthermore, these officials expressed concern that 

they lack information on workload associated with new and modified 

systems in the acquisition pipeline that will require future maintenance 

support at the depots. Depot officials also said that they are not involved 

in the sustainment portion of the life cycle management planning process 

for new and modified systems. Army Aviation and Missile Command 

officials said that the life cycle sustainment planning process is a 

responsibility of the program manager. While the command is 

operationally aligned with the program manager and plays a significant 

role in deciding how weapon systems will be supported, they do not 

include the depots in this planning process. 

Both the Army’s and the Marine Corps’ depot maintenance strategic plans 

recognize that forecasting workload is important to the depots. However, 

while the Army’s strategic plan notes the need to identify sufficient work 

for its depots, it does not explain how or when the Army will take steps to 

develop more reliable forecasts or take other steps that could reduce or 

mitigate depot workload uncertainties. The Marine Corps’ strategic plan 

also mentions workload estimating, stating that the Marine Corps plans to 

 

17Barstow used fiscal year’s 2003 actual workload and fiscal years’ 2004 and 2005 estimated 

workloads as its base to quantify the potential loss of work. 

Page 15 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

forecast depot maintenance workload with sufficient lead time to allow it 

to analyze the required depot capabilities. However, the strategic plan 

does not specify how the depots will be involved in this process, how this 

process will be accomplished, or who is going to be held accountable to 

ensure that this process is performed. 

The Plans Do Not Address 

Whether and How the 

Depots Will Have a Role in 

Planning for the 

Sustainment of New and 

Modified Weapon Systems 

Neither the Army’s nor the Marine Corps’ strategic plans address whether 

and how the depots will be integrated into the sustainment portion of the 

life cycle management planning process for new and modified weapon 

systems. During this process, weapon system program managers plan for 

how and where a new or modified system will be supported and 

maintained in the future—decisions that have a profound impact on 

planning future depot workload and related infrastructure, capital 

investments, and workforce requirements. According to depot officials, 

they are not involved in the program managers’ planning because no clear 

process exists that would enable them to have input. 

The department’s overarching acquisition guidance, DOD Directive 

5000.01,18 states that the program manager shall be the single point of 

accountability for accomplishing program objectives for total life-cycle 

systems management, including sustainment. While program managers are 

required to assign work to the depots to maintain core capabilities, they 

have no formal requirement to include the depots in the sustainment 

planning process to determine how a weapon system will be supported. In 

prior reports, we have noted that program managers often make decisions 

to contract out the repair of new and modified systems without 

considering the impact of these decisions on the requirement to maintain 

core capability for essential systems in military depots.19 Our recent report 

on core depot maintenance indicates that shortcomings in DOD’s 

acquisition guidance and its implementation have resulted in DOD 

program managers not identifying and establishing required core 

capability at military depots in a timely manner—capability that will be 

 

18DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, November 20, 2007. 

19GAO, Depot Maintenance: Key Unresolved Issues Affect the Army Depot System’s 

Viability, GAO-03-682 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003), and Defense Maintenance: 

Sustaining Readiness Support Capabilities Requires a Comprehensive Plan, GAO/01-

533T (Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2001). 

Page 16 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

needed to support future maintenance requirements for new and modified 

systems.20

The depots’ lack of involvement in life cycle management planning limits 

their ability to influence how weapon systems being acquired by their 

service will be sustained, and also plan for and develop capabilities they 

will need to support these systems in the future. For example, even though 

Red River Army depot is designated as the primary repair facility for 

Bradley Fighting Vehicles, depot planners stated that they were not 

involved in the Army’s life cycle management planning process to decide 

which facility would have full capability to perform the test and repair 

work on the newer model of the Bradley A3. As a result, this depot 

received minimal work associated with this weapon system, while the 

majority of this work—including the testing on the turret and the major 

overhaul of the system—went to a private contractor. 

According to depot officials, including the depots in the sustainment 

portion of the life cycle management planning process cannot be achieved 

without full participation and coordination between the sustainment and 

acquisition communities, and without consistent communication between 

the services’ major commands and the depots during the process of 

determining how new and modified systems will be sustained. The Army 

Materiel Command’s Industrial Base Strategic Plan notes the importance 

of developing a process that provides closer interface between the 

acquisition and sustainment communities to ensure that future weapon 

system requirements are matched with organic sustainment capabilities 

early in the acquisition process.21 Also, the Marine Corps Logistics 

Command’s Alignment and Integration Strategic Plan emphasizes the 

importance of this command to assist program managers with the planning 

and execution of total life cycle management responsibilities for their 

weapon systems.22 Without a clear process to integrate the depots in the 

sustainment portion of the life cycle management planning process, the 

depots cannot determine what capabilities are needed to plan for future 

workloads and what other resources are needed to support new and 

modified weapon systems. 

 

20GAO-09-83. 

21U.S. Army Industrial Base, Strategic Plan, April 2006. 

22United States Marine Corps Logistics Command, Alignment and Integration Strategic 

Plan, February 2008. 

Page 17 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

The Army and Marine Corps face some challenges to ensure that their 

maintenance depots will remain operationally effective, efficient, and 

capable of meeting future maintenance requirements. The increased 

reliance on contractor support for weapon systems, including contractor 

support provided through performance-based logistics, and the continuing 

uncertainties about workload, increase the risk that the depots may not be 

postured and resourced to meet future requirements. These issues, if not 

addressed, could adversely affect materiel readiness and future depot 

operations and potentially lead to equipment shortages and delays in 

meeting the combatant commander’s requirements. While strategic 

planning is a valuable management tool to help mitigate the challenges 

facing the depots, the Army and Marine Corps plans as currently written 

are not comprehensive enough for this purpose. The plans do not fully 

address all the elements needed for a results-oriented management 

strategy or the specific issues that OSD directed each service, at a 

minimum, to include in their plans. Furthermore, until the services address 

problems caused by workload uncertainties, the depots will continue to 

have difficulties planning for future maintenance requirements. Regarding 

workload uncertainties for systems that have yet to enter the defense 

inventory, without a clear process for integrating the depots into the 

sustainment portion of the life cycle management planning process, the 

depots may continue to lose key opportunities to develop needed 

capabilities that would enable them to provide depot level maintenance 

support for new and modified systems. 

To provide greater assurance that the military depots will be postured and 

resourced to meet future maintenance requirements, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army and the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the following three actions to 

update the depot maintenance strategic plans: 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Fully address all elements needed for a comprehensive results-oriented 

management framework, including those elements partially addressed in 

the current plans-—such as the approaches for accomplishing goals and 

objectives, stakeholder involvement, external factors that may affect how 

goals and objectives will be accomplished, performance goals that are 

objective, quantifiable, and measurable, resources needed to meet 

performance goals, performance indicators used to measure outcomes and 

gauge progress, and an evaluation plan that monitors goals and objectives. 

• Fully address the four specific issues of logistics transformation, core 

capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capitalization, 

consistent with OSD criteria provided to the services. 

Page 18 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

• Develop goals and objectives, as well as related strategic planning 

elements, aimed at mitigating and reducing future workload uncertainties. 

As part of this last effort, the Army and Marine Corps should develop a 

clear process for integrating the depots’ input into the sustainment portion 

of the life cycle management planning process for systems in the 

acquisition pipeline. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all 

three of our recommendations to provide greater assurance that the 

military depots will be postured and resourced to meet future 

maintenance requirements. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in 

appendix IV. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

The department concurred with our first two recommendations to direct 

the Army and the Marine Corps to update their depot maintenance 

strategic plans to fully address all elements needed for a comprehensive 

results-oriented management framework, and fully address the four 

specific issues of logistics transformation, core capability assurance, 

workforce revitalization, and capitalization, consistent with OSD criteria 

provided to the services. DOD stated that they will reiterate and 

incorporate these recommendations into the next update of the strategic 

plan. While this is a step in the right direction, DOD did not indicate what 

steps, if any, it plans to take to ensure that the Army and Marine Corps will 

also incorporate these recommendations into their depot maintenance 

strategic plans. Therefore, DOD may need to take further action by 

following up with the Army and Marine Corps to ensure that they fully 

incorporate these recommendations into their depot maintenance 

strategic plans. 

DOD also concurred with our third recommendation to direct the Army 

and Marine Corps to develop goals and objectives for mitigating and 

reducing future workload uncertainties and integrate the depot’s input into 

the sustainment portion of the life cycle management planning process. 

DOD stated that the Army has initiated several actions to mitigate and 

reduce uncertainties in projecting future depot workload and to ensure 

viability of the depot workforce. DOD said that the Army has established 

integrated product teams to address core workload shortfalls and 

developed an action plan and the resources and time line required to 

transfer sufficient workload from the original equipment manufacturers to 

the applicable Army depot to meet core requirements. In addition, DOD 

said that the Army has begun to develop policy that would require review 

of Core Logistic Assessments / Core Depot Assessments and Source of 

Page 19 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

Repair Analyses during the milestone decision review process, and to 

develop a comprehensive training package for export to program 

executive officers and program managers, Life Cycle Management 

Commands, and depots. While these are positive steps that would help to 

improve future workload planning, these steps focus on addressing core 

requirements and do not fully address the need to mitigate and reduce 

workload uncertainties or to include the depots’ input into the 

sustainment portion of the life cycle management planning process for 

systems in the acquisition pipeline. We continue to believe the depots will 

have difficulties planning for future maintenance requirements until the 

services develop solutions for mitigating and reducing uncertainties across 

the full range of the depots’ workloads. We also continue to believe that 

without a clear process for integrating the depots into the sustainment 

portion of the life cycle management planning process, the depots will 

continue to lose key opportunities to develop capabilities that would 

enable them to provide depot-level support for systems in the acquisition 

pipeline. The department reiterated its plan to incorporate our 

recommendations into the next update of the strategic plan. As we stated 

above with regard to our first two recommendations, DOD may need to 

take further action by following up with the Army and Marine Corps to 

ensure that they fully incorporate this recommendation into their depot 

maintenance strategic plans. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, the 

Navy, the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 20 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. If you or your staff 

have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or 

solisw@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 21 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To evaluate the extent to which the Army’s and Marine Corps’ strategic 

plans provide a comprehensive strategy for meeting future depot 

maintenance requirements, we assessed the Army’s April 2008 Depot 

Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan, and the Marine Corps February 

2008 Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan to determine if they are consistent 

with the criteria for developing a comprehensive results-oriented 

management framework as indicated in GAO’s prior work on strategic 

management plans. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

required all the services to prepare and submit such plans to them, we 

decided to focus our work on the Army’s and Marine Corps’ plans because 

of their significant roles in supporting overseas contingency operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. We also determined if the Army’s and Marine Corps’ 

strategic plans for depot maintenance fully addressed the criteria for 

developing a strategic plan specified in the Department of Defense (DOD) 

March 2007 Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans. 

Furthermore, we determined if the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness assessed the services’ depot 

management strategic plans and provided follow on actions to ensure the 

plans meet their criteria. In addition, we reviewed and addressed issues 

regarding uncertainties in projecting future workloads, which is necessary 

for effective depot planning. We also interviewed depot management 

officials to determine the depots’ participation in the sustainment portion 

of the life cycle management planning process to effectively plan and 

prepare for future maintenance work and related capabilities. 

To gain further perspective on the services’ efforts to plan for the future of 

the depot maintenance facilities, we interviewed and obtained 

documentation from officials at Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; 

Headquarters Marine Corps, Arlington, Virginia; Marine Corps Systems 

Command, Quantico, Virginia; and Marine Corps Logistics Command, 

Albany, Georgia. We also visited, interviewed, and obtained 

documentation from officials at the Army’s five maintenance depots that 

perform organic level maintenance at Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, 

Alabama; Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas; Letterkenny 

Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; Red River Army Depot, 

Texarkana, Texas; and Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania. 

In addition, we visited, interviewed depot officials and obtained 

documentation from the Marine Corps’ two maintenance depots that 

perform organic level maintenance at Maintenance Center Albany, Georgia 

and Maintenance Center Barstow, California. Furthermore, we obtained 

data and information on actions aimed at improving depot productivity at 

the Army and Marine Corps depots and data on the depots’ workforce 

Page 22 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

trends from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2008. We determined that 

the data used were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted 

this performance audit from August 2007 through September 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 23 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix II: Army and Marine Corps Depot Appendix II: Army and Marine Corps Depot Actions to Improve Productivity 

Actions to Improve Productivity 

Both the Army and Marine Corps depots have reported actions they have 

taken to improve their productivity. The depots have reported that they 

have improved their maintenance operations’ productivity and efficiency 

through the use of several process improvements including Lean, Six 

Sigma, Value Stream Mapping, and Theory of Constraints. They report that 

such improvements have allowed them to identify and reduce or eliminate 

unnecessary work-related functions and other impediments that created 

restrictions or “bottlenecks” in their production processes and have 

resulted in increases in the number of weapon systems or other 

components processed, reductions in repair cycle times,1

 and reductions 

in the cost of production. The Army2

 and Marine Corps3 have issued a 

policy and a guidebook, respectively, aimed at improving the depots’ 

repair processes, including information on assessing the depots’ progress 

in making, sharing, and sustaining improvements and in measuring overall 

productivity. We questioned depot officials about the data associated with 

these improvements and relied on their professional judgment concerning 

the adequacy and reliability of the data. 

Table 4 shows information reported by the Army depots on the results of 

initiatives to improve the repair process for selected weapon systems—

one from each of the five Army depots. The Army depots generally assess 

the results of their productivity improvements based on increases in the 

number of units produced, reductions in repair cycle times, and reductions 

in production costs. The third column shows the period during fiscal years 

2004 through 2007 in which the initiative was implemented. The fourth 

column shows the average reduction in repair cycle time expressed in 

days, and the fifth column shows this reduction expressed as a percentage 

by which repair time was reduced. The final column shows the estimated 

cost reduction or savings that the Army depots reported for the period. 

Army depot officials told us that there is limited sharing of lessons learned 

or cross application among the depots and that increased sharing and 

cross application could contribute to additional reductions in repair days 

and cost savings or cost avoidances. 

 

1

Repair cycle time is the average number of days that is required to repair a weapon system 

or a major component. 

2

Department of the Army, Policy Letter-—U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) Continuous 

Process Improvement (CPI) Policy, January 3, 2006. 

3

United States Marine Corps Continuous Process Improvement Guidebook, December 21, 

2007. 

Page 24 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix II: Army and Marine Corps Depot 

Actions to Improve Productivity 

Table 4: Results of Selected Army Depots’ Process Improvements, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 

Depot Weapon system Fiscal years 

Repair cycle 

reduction (days)

Repair cycle 

reduction 

(percentage) 

Estimated cost 

reduction/savings 

(millions of dollars)

Anniston Field Artillery Ammunition 

Vehicle 

2004 to 2006 3 8.6% $2.50 

Corpus Christi UH-60 Tail Rotor Blades 

Processes 

2006 to 2007 7 35% $3.90 

Letterkenny High Mobility 

Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle Recap 

2005 43 73% $5.20 

Red River High Mobility 

Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle Recap 

2004 to 2006 3 75% $3.90 

Tobyhanna Firefinder Antenna 

Transceiver Group 

2004 to 2007 15 12% $0.02

Source: GAO analysis of selected Army depots’ process improvements. 

Table 5 shows information reported by the Marine Corps depots on the 

results of initiatives to improve the repair process for selected weapons 

systems repaired at its two depots for fiscal years 2004 through 2007. The 

Marine Corps depots generally assess the results of their productivity 

improvements based on reductions in repair cycle times. The second 

column shows the average number of days taken for the repair cycle in 

fiscal year 2004, the baseline year before the depots initiated their process 

improvement initiatives.4

 The third column shows the average number 

days the depots reported for repair cycle time in fiscal year 2007, after 

implementing process improvement initiatives. The fourth and fifth 

columns show the reported reduction in repair time expressed as number 

of days and the percentage by which repair time was reduced. The Marine 

Corps depots generally do not either capture or report cost savings or cost 

avoidances resulting from such improvements. A Marine Corps official 

responsible for managing the results of the depots’ improvement told us 

that some of the reductions in repair days were achieved by using 

overtime and multiple shifts. The official also told us that there is limited 

sharing of lessons learned or cross application among the depots and that 

increased sharing and cross application could contribute to additional 

reductions in repair days and in cost savings or cost avoidances. 

 

4

Reductions are measured against operations that existed prior to implementation of 

Theory of Constraints (TOC). 

Page 25 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix II: Army and Marine Corps Depot 

Actions to Improve Productivity 

Table 5: Results of Selected Marine Corps Depots’ Process Improvements, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 

Depot/weapon 

system 

2004 average repair 

cycle 

(days) 

2007 average repair 

cycle (days)

Reduction in repair cycle 

(days) 

Percentage 

reduction

Albany: 

MK-48 100 38 62 62%

MK-15 Trailer 71 5 66 93%

MK-17 Trailer 53 10 43 81%

M970 Refueler 86 4 82 95%

M149A2 Water Trailer 49 19 30 61%

M88 Tank Retriever 89 31 58 65%

Barstow: 

LAV 25 180 96 84 47%

LAV Anti-Tank 182 145 37 20%

M970 Tanker 129 104 25 19%

MK-14 Trailer 152 39 113 74%

Source: GAO analysis of selected Marine Corps depots’ process improvements. 

Page 26 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix III: Trends in Army and Marine Appendix III: Trends in Army and Marine Corps Depot Workforce Levels 

Corps Depot Workforce Levels 

Workforce levels for the Army and Marine Corps depots have been 

increasing along with the workloads since fiscal year 2003. The depots 

have accommodated the surge in workload by hiring primarily temporary 

and contract employees. Depot officials told us they hired temporary and 

contract workers in lieu of permanent government workers due to 

uncertainties about the duration of the overseas contingency operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. The depots plan to reduce temporary and contract 

labor as workload related contingency operations decreases. Although 

uncertainties about future workload inhibit their workforce planning, we 

found that the depots’ workforce strategic planning addresses anticipated 

personnel and skill gaps. For example, while the workloads have 

increased, the depots have been able to maintain a skilled workforce. In 

addition, with a large percentage of depot workers becoming eligible to 

retire over the next 5 years, some of the depots are working with local 

community colleges to provide specialized programs focused on skills 

needed by the depots. 

The Army and Marine Corps depots’ workforce was relatively stable from 

fiscal year 1999 though fiscal year 2002. The depots report that the 

increase in workload associated with the Global War on Terrorism 

(GWOT) began during fiscal year 2003. Before GWOT, the total depot 

workforce was more than 89 percent permanent government employees, 

but at the end of fiscal year 2008 permanent government employees made 

up only 62 percent of the total depot workforce. After remaining relatively 

constant from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2002, total workforce 

increased from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2008, along with the 

increases in workload associated with GWOT. From fiscal year 2003 

through fiscal year 2008, the Army depots’ workforce increased by 106 

percent and the Marine Corps’ by 99 percent. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate 

these changes in the Army’s and the Marine Corps’ depots’ workforces 

from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2008. 

Page 27 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix III: Trends in Army and Marine 

Corps Depot Workforce Levels 

Figure 1: Army Depots’ Workforce by Category, Fiscal Years 1999 to 2008 

Total workforce

Contract

Temporary

Permanent

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of workers

Source: GAO analysis of Army depots’ workforce data.

Fiscal year

Note: Excludes data on the part-time workforce, which constitutes a small proportion of the total 

workforce. 

Page 28 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix III: Trends in Army and Marine 

Corps Depot Workforce Levels 

Figure 2: Marine Corps Depots’ Workforce by Category, Fiscal Years 1999 to 2008 

Total workforce

Contract

Temporary

Permanent

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of workers

Source: GAO analysis of Marine Corps depots’ workforce data.

Fiscal year

Note: Excludes data on the part-time workforce, which constitutes a small proportion of the total 

workforce. 

The trends reflected in figures 1 and 2 show marked changes in the 

composition of the Army’s and Marine Corps’ depots’ workforces since 

fiscal year 2003. The largest increases have been in the number of 

temporary workers and contract labor hired in lieu of permanent staff. As 

GWOT continued and the workload continued to increase, the depots 

continued to hire more temporary and contract workers to accommodate 

the increased workload. The depots plan to reduce the number of 

temporary and contract workers as they employ GWOT-related workload 

decreases. 

As figures 1 and 2 illustrate, in fiscal year 2008, 37 percent of the Army 

depots’ workforce and 48 percent of the Marine Corps depots’ workforce 

were comprised of temporary and contract workers. Specifically, 

temporary workers represented about 15 percent of the Army depots’ 

workforce and 25 percent of the Marine Corps depots’ workforce. 

Page 29 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix III: Trends in Army and Marine 

Corps Depot Workforce Levels 

Contract workers represented about 22 percent of the Army depots’ 

workforce and about 23 percent of the Marine Corps depots’ workforce. 

We have previously reported that the depots may face challenges that 

could inhibit effective strategic workforce planning.1

 These challenges 

include the high average age of workers, difficulty in maintaining depot 

viability if large numbers of eligible skilled workers retire, and lack of an 

available source of trained and skilled personnel. The Army and Marine 

Corps depots’ have reduced the average age of their permanent workers. 

For fiscal year 2008, the age of permanent workers in the Army’s depots 

averaged 45, and the age of permanent workers in the Marine Corps’ depot 

averaged 46. Since fiscal year 1999, the average age of the Army’s 

permanent depot workers has decreased by 9 percent, while that of the 

Marine Corps’ has decreased by 12 percent. Depot officials attributed this 

reduction to the retirement of older permanent workers; the availability of 

younger, qualified applicants; and in-house training programs. 

The depots have developed workforce strategic plans that address current 

and anticipated personnel and skill gaps. These plans include maintaining 

a mix of personnel with the skills and capabilities needed to satisfy 

current workload requirements. According to Army and Marine Corps 

depot officials, permanent, skilled workers are readily available. Further, 

the depots forecast a high rate of retirement eligibility in the next 5 years, 

and they are taking steps to address the potential loss of skilled personnel. 

According to Army data, 34 percent of the Army’s permanent depot 

workforce will be eligible for retirement in fiscal year 2013. According to 

Marine Corps data, 43 percent of the Marine Corps’ permanent depot 

workforce will also be eligible for retirement in fiscal year 2013. Both 

services’ depots track and monitor personnel who may be eligible to retire 

soon, considering their skills in order to address potential skill gaps in the 

future workforce. Both Army and Marine Corps depots address this 

potential loss of personnel and skills in their workforce strategic plans, 

and they have instituted various types of recruitment and training 

programs designed to attract and train workers. 

 

1

GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure 

Viability of DOD’s Civilian Industrial Workforce, and GAO-03-472 (Washington, D.C.: 

April 30, 2003). 

Page 30 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-09-865 Depot Maintenance
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 34 GAO-09-865 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Julia Denman and Tom Gosling, 

Assistant Directors; Larry Bridges; John Clary; Joanne Landesman; 

Latrealle Lee; Katherine Lenane; and Christopher Watson made key 

contributions to this report. 

 Depot Maintenance 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(351073) 
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