i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 7- 00 09 1- CV Gre g ory Kinney and Mar sha KIN NE Y , Ap pe lla nts
v . F loyd Ro ss P ALMER, Ind ivi du a lly and d/b /a Re na iss anc e Ho me s, Appellee Fr om the 224th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2003-CI -09279 Honora ble B arba ra H anson Ne llermoe, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini, J ustice ConcurringOpinion by : Rebecc a Simmons, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Justi ce

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J une 25, 2008 AFF I RMED Appellants, Gre g ory and Marsha Kinney , (“the Kinney s), appea l the trial court’s order s g ra nti ngpa rt ia l and fi na l summa

ry jud g me nts . We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. F ACT UAL AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND In a pp ro ximate ly

19 95 , Ro ss P a lme r ( “ Pa lme r” ) be g an c on str uc tin g a ho us e fo r his fa

mil y by subcon t ra ct i ng all stag es of the c onstruction. At the time, Palmer wa s not in the business of04
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- 2- constructinghouses for sa l e t o the g ener al public. Followingcompletion of the house in 1996, Palmer and his fa

mily moved in and re sided t h ere for ove r four y ear s. Duringthis period, Palmer lear ned of an d re p ai re d s ever al wate r leaks in the house. In 2000, Palmer sold the house to the Prestons, providing the m with a Seller’s Disclosure of Proper ty Conditi on Notice that disclosed the pr ior le aks . T he Pr e sto ns re ma in ed in th e ho us e fo r t wo y e ars and

the n s old

it t o th e Ki nn e y s. Some time after the Kinney s moved into the house, duringparticula rly heavy rain fa lls, they dis c ov e re d th a t th e ho us e le ake d. Th e Ki nn e y s d id n ot s ue the Pr e sto ns , w ho so ld t he ho us e to t

he m, but r a the r, Pa lme r, wh o, in a pp ro ximate ly 19 98 , ha d be g un c on str uc tin g re sid e nti a l ho me s fo r s a le to t he g e ne ra l pu

bli c . T he pr oc e dura l hi sto ry fo llo ws . J uly 23, 2003 The Kinney s file t h ei r First Amended Orig inal Petition, allegingviolations

of the DTPA, i n cl u ding br eac h of implied warr anties, misrepre sentation, failure to disclose, unconsciona bility , and viol ation of one of the “tie- in” consumer statutes. Marc h 5 , 2 00 4 Pa lme r f ile s a Mo tio n f or Sum mary

Judg me nt. J uly 14, 2005 The Kinney s file their Second Amended Orig inal Petition, addingclaims for

neg lige nt misreprese ntation and fra ud. Aug ust 8, 2005 The trial court g rants Palmer’s motio n , i n p ar t , ru l i n g that “[the Kinney s’]

claims based upon br eac h of wa rra nty and dec eptive tra de pra ct i ces a re dismiss ed with pre

judice.” Oc tob e r 31 , 20 05 Th e Ki nn e y s fi le the ir Th ir d Am end ed O ri ginal P eti ti on , all eging so le ly

neg lige nce, a

nd omitti ng any

mention of both the DTPA claims disposed of by the par tial summary

judgme nt and their previous claims for ne g lige nt misrepre sentation and fr aud. O c t o b e r 1 0 , 2 0 0 6 Pa lme r f ile s ase c on d M oti on f

o r S u m m ar

y Ju d g m e n t on the Ki nn e y s’ neg lige nce c auses of

action. Oc tob e r 31 , 20 06 Th e Ki nn e y s fi le the ir F ourt h Am end ed O ri ginal P eti tio n, a lle g ing so le ly

neg lige nce a

nd omitti ng any mention of bot h the DTP A claims disposed of by the par tial summary

judgme n t and their pr evious claims for ne g lige nt misrepre sentation and fr aud. November 14, 2006 The trial court g rants Palmer’s motion, ente ring a Final Summary J udg ment that dismiss ed the Kinne y s’ “r emainingclaim and c ause of action.” S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW04
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- 3- To obtain a tra ditional summ ary judgme nt, a par

ty moving f or summary

judgme nt must show that no g enuine issue of materia l f act exis ts a

nd that the party is e ntitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. T EX . R. C IV . P. 16 6a (c ); Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc . v. Johnson , 8 9 1 S. W. 2 d 6 4 0 , 6 4 4 ( T e x. 19 95 ); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In revie wing the g rant of a summary

judgme nt, we must indulge ever y rea sonable infe renc e and r esolve a ny doubts in favor of the re spo n dent. Johnson , 8 91 S.W. 2d a t 64 4; Nixon , 6 90 S.W. 2d a t 54 9. I n a dd iti on , w e mus t
assum e al l ev i d ence favorable to the responde nt is true. Johnson , 8 91 S.W. 2d a t 64 4; Nixon , 690 S.W .2d 548-49. A de fenda nt is entitl ed to s ummary judgme nt if the evide nce disprove s as a matter of law at least one element of t he plainti ff’ s cause of ac tion. Lear Siegler, Inc . v. Pe rez , 819 S.W .2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991). Once t h e m o v ant has e stablished a rig ht to summ ary judgme nt, the burden shifts to the respondent to present evidenc e that would raise a genuine issue of mater ial fac t. City of Houston v. Clear Creek

Basin Auth. , 589 S.W .2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).

D I S CUS S I ON The Kinne y s raise the following issues on ap p eal: 1) the trial court e rre d in gr anting the partial summary

judgme nt as to brea ch of implied wa rra nties and DTPA; and 2) the trial cour t erre d in gra nti ngthe fi na l summa

ry jud g me nt a s to ne g lig e nc e . H ow e ve r, be fo re re a c hin g th ese is su e s, we f irst addre ss the eff

ect of the Kinney s’ Four

th Amended Or igina l Petiti o n o n t heir c laims, and he nc e , th is a

pp e a l. 1. Can the Kinneys appeal t he tr ial court’s order granting Partial Summary Judgment as to their claims for Breach of Implied W arrant i es and DT

PA when these c laims were not alleged in the Kinneys’

Fourth Amende d Original Petition? When the trial court ruled on Palmer’s motion for summary judgme nt, the Kinney s’ Second Amended Petition constituted the live pleading
. Although this pleading asser ted claims for brea ch04
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- 4- of wa rra nties and violations of the DTP A, as well as neg lige nt misrepre sentation and fr aud, the tria l court rule d only

on the bre ach of

war ranties a nd dece ptive trade pra cti ces c laims. Howeve r, af ter the par tial summary

judgme nt was g rante d, the Kinney s amende d their petition twice, a nd alleg ed solely neg lige nce in their third and fourth amende d orig inal petitions. They now see k to appea l the trial court’ s order

g rantingPalmer par

tial summary

judgme nt as to the claims alleg ed in the ir Second Amended O rig inal Petition. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure65 An amende d petition adds to or withdraws f rom that which wa s previously pleade d to corre ct or to plead ne w matter, a

nd completely

repla ces and superse des the pre vious pleading . T EX . R. C IV . P. 6 2; J.M. Huber Corp. v. Santa Fe Ene rgy Res., I nc ., 871 S.W .2d 842, 844 (Tex. App.–Houston [14 th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) . Once a plea ding is amended a nd filed, all prior pe titions are superse ded and the previous plea ding “ shall no longe r be r eg arde d as a pa rt o f t he plea ding in the
rec ord of the c ause.” T EX . R. C IV . P. 6 5; se e als o B enn ett v. W oo d Co un ty , 200 S.W .3d 239, 241 (T e x. Ap p. –T yle r 2 00 6, no pe t.)
. Thus , a n ame nd e d p e tit ion

wh ic h o mit s c a

us e s o f a c tio n p re vio us ly alleg ed serve s to dismiss these claims from the amende d pleading
. J .M . H ub e r Co rp ., 871 S.W .2d at 844 (c iting Radelow-Gittens Real Prop. Mgmt. v . Pamex Foods , 7 3 5 S. W. 2 d

5 5 8 , 5 5 9
- 6 0 ( T e x. App.–Dallas 1987, writ ref ’d n
. r. e. ) (upholding summary judgme nt in favor of

defe ndant wher e amende d petition contained no cla ims ag ainst defe ndant)). An exception to the rule t h at al l p rior petitions are superse ded by the amende d pleading pr ov ide s th a t “ so me e rr or

of the c ourt in d e c idi ngup on the ne c e ssi ty of the ame ndme nt, or

oth e rw ise in supersedingit, be complained of, and exception be taken to the action of the court, or unle ss it be04
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- 5- nece ssary to look to the supersede d pleadingupon a question of limitation.” T EX . R. C IV . P. 6 5; see also Sosa v. Cent. Power &Light , 909 S.W .2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995) (re versingsummary judgme nt
on a superse ded petition). Howeve r, the pa rties do not contend that suc h an exception applies he re. Thus, [ ] the Kinney s’ Second Ame nded Or igina l Petiti on was not the live plea ding a t the time of the tr ia l c o urt ’ s e n tr

y o f i t s f i n a l s u m m ar

y j u d g m e n t , [h av i n g b e e ns u p e r s e d e d b y th e K i n n e y s’ F o urth A me n d e d O r ig in a l Pe ti ti o n ]; th e r e f o r e , it c an n o t b e r e g ar d e d a s p art o f th e r ecor d of the
cause . See T EX . R. C IV . P
. 6 3 , 6 5; id .; seeals o S os a , 9 09 S.W. 2d

a t 89 5; Randolph v. W

alker , 29 S.W .3d 271, 2 7 5 ( T e x . App.–Houston [14th Dis t.] 2000, pet. denied) (holding that a viable c omplaint on appea l is lost when, f

ollowing a

n alleg edly

err oneo u s ruling by

the trial cour

t on a claim, the plaintiff files an a

mended plea ding a

bandoningthe claim upon which the trial court r uled). Thus, by amendingtheir plea ding a nd eliminating the DTPA, neg lige nt misreprese ntation, and fr aud re fer ence s, the Kinney s abandone d those claims and have wa ived any err or conc erningthe trial court’s action in g ranting Palmer’s mot ion for partial summary judgme nt as to these cla ims. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 6 5; see also Ak in v. Santa Clara L and Co., Ltd. , 34 S.W .3d 334, 339 (Tex. App.–San Anton io 2 00 0, pe t. d e nie d) ; Randolph , 29 S.W .3d at 274-75. Acc ording ly , the Kinney s’ first issue is de nied. We tur n now to the Kinney s’ re maining issue. 2. Final Summary Judgm ent as to Negligence The Kinne y s’ F o u

r th Ame n d e d O r ig in a l P e ti ti o n

a ll e g e d th a t P a lm e r ’s neg lige nt construction, neg lige nt supervision of the construc tion, and neg lige nt inspection of the construc tion of the
r e s i d e n c e m a d e t h e s u

b j e c to f t h e i r l aw s u i tw e r e th e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f th e K i n n e y s ’ d am a g e s . In his moti on, Palmer ar g ued that he w as en titled to sum mary judgme nt on the Kinney s’ neg lige nce04
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T he K i nn ey s s ubs equen t l y wi t hdr ew t hei r al l ega t i ons of ment al an gu i s h f

or pr op er t y damage. 1

- 6- c a us e of a c tio n b a se d o n th e fo llo wi ng : ( 1) the Re sid e nti a l Cons tr uc tio n L ia

bil ity Ac t ( “ RCLA” ) i s the ex clusive remedy for the r ecove ry of dama g es ar ising fr om residential construc tion defec ts and Palmer wa s not a “c ontrac tor” unde r the Act; (2) Palmer , as the builder of his own home, owed no duty to the K inn e y s ; ( 3 ) th e “ e c o n o mi c lo s s r u le ” b ar s th e K inn e y s ’ r e c o v e r y un d e r th e th e o r

y of neg lige nce; a

nd (4 ) T ex as does not rec og nize a cause of ac tion for neg lige nt infliction of mental anguish; alternatively , the Kinney s have not suff ere d compensa

ble mental anguish. 1 Th e Ki nn e y s a sse rt

that th e tr ia l cou rt

e rr e d in g ra nti ngthe fi na l summa

ry jud g me nt a s to th e i r n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m s b e c a

u s e t h e R C L A d o e s n o tc o n f l i c tw i tho r

b ar s u c hana c t i o n . T h e K i n n e ys further argue that the “ trial court c ompound[ ed] its error by dependingupon its errone ous Partial Summary J udg ment to support its Final Sum mary J udg ment.” Howe ver, g iven our pre vious finding that th e Ki nn e y s h ave wa ive d is su e s w ithre sp e c t to the part ial su mma ry jud g me nt, we de c lin e to
a dd re ss t his late r a rgume nt. Texas Reside ntial Construction Li ability Act Th e RCLA a

pp lie s to “ (1 ) a

ny a c tio n to re c ov e r d ama g e s o r o th er r e lie f a ri sin g fr om a
c on str uc tio n de fe c t, e xce pt a

c la im f or pe rs on a l in

jur y , s ur viv a l, o r wro ng fu l de a th o r f or dama g e to g oo ds ; and (2) a

ny subsequent purc haser

of a r es i d en ce who files a c laim ag ainst a contra ctor.” T EX . P R OP . C ODE A NN . § 27 .0 02 (a ) ( Ve rn on Sup p. 20 07 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; Perry H omes v . Al wat tar i , 33 S.W .3d 376, 381-82 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2000, pet. denied) . The statute de fines
a “ c on tr a c tor ” a s f

oll ow s: (i) a builder , as def

ined by Section 401.003, contra cting with an owner for the construction or r epair

of a new residence , for the repa ir or alteration of or a n addition04
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- 7- to a n e xistin g re sid e nc e , o r f

or the c on str

uc tio n, sa le , a lte ratio n, add iti on , o r r e pa ir of an a ppurtena nce to a new or exis ting r esidenc e; (ii) any person c ontrac ting with a pur chase r fo r the sale of a new residenc e constructe d by

or on beha lf of that per son; or (iii) a per son contra cting with a n owner or the develope r of a c ondominium for the construction of a

new r esidenc e, for

an alter ation of or a

n addition to an exis ting resi d en ce , for r epair

of a ne w or e x isting re sidence , or for the construc tion, sale, alteration, addition, or repair of an a ppurtena nce to a new or exis ting r esidenc e; and

. . . in c lud e s: (i) an owner, of

fice r, direc tor, share holder, pa rtner, or employ ee of

the contra ctor; and (ii) a r isk rete ntion g roup re g istered unde r Article 21.54, I nsuranc e Code, that insure s all or any

part of a

con t ra ct o r’ s liability

for the c ost to repair a residential c on str uc tio n d e fe c t. T EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . § 27.001(2)( 5)(A) -(B ) (Ve rnon Supp. 2007)
. “B uilder” is fur ther de fined
a s th e fo llo wi ng : [A] ny person who, for a fix ed price , commission, fe e, wag e, or other c ompensation, sells, const ru ct s , or super vises or mana g es the c onstruction of, or c ontrac ts for the c on str uc tio n o f o r t

he su pe rv isi on or mana g e me nt o f t

he c on str uc tio n o f: (1 ) a ne w h ome ; (2) a materia l improvement to a home, other than an improvement solely to replac e or re pair a

roof of an existi ng home; or (3) a n improvement to the interior of an existi ng home whe n the cost of the w ork exceeds $10,000. T EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . § 401.003(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2007). Her e, althoug h Palmer “built ” t h e h o u s e in question, he doe s not fall within the statutory definition of “c ontrac tor” beca use he did not contra ct with e ither the Prestons or the Kinney s for the “construc tion or repa ir of a ne w re sidence , for the repa ir or alteration of or a n addition to an exis ting residenc e, or for the construction, sale, alteration, addition, or repair of an appur tenanc e to a ne w or exis ting r esidenc e.” See § 27.001(5)

. Fu rt h er, Palmer did not contrac t with the Prestons or the Kinney s “for

the sale of

a new residenc e construc ted by or on beha lf of that per son.” See id.04
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- 8- Howeve r, the RCL A does not cr eate a ca use of action, but only

pree mpts a cause of ac tion if a co n fl i ct arises be tween the RCL A and a ny other law , including the DTPA or a c ommon law
cause of ac tion. See § 2 7. 00 5; Sa n der s v. Constr. Equit

y, Inc

. , 4 2 S. W. 3 d

3 6 4 , 3 7 0 ( T e x. App.—B eaumont 2001, pet. de nied). In this c as e, ther e is no conflict; the RCL A simply does not apply beca use the statute r equire s both an “(1)
. . . action to re cover damag es or other

relief arising fr om a c on str

uc tio n d e fe c t, .
. . ; and (2 ) any su bs e qu e nt pur c ha se r of a re sid e nc e wh o fil e s a c la im ag ainst a contra ctor.” § 27.002(a)
. Havingdeter mined that the RCL A is inapplicable he re, w e turn now to the Kinney s’ neg lige nce c ause of action. Negligence To preva il on their neg lige nce c laim, the Kinney s were requ i red to show that ( 1) Palmer
ow e d th e ma d u ty , ( 2 ) P a l m e r

b r e a c h e d h i s d u ty , ( 3 ) P a l m e r ’ s b r e a c hp r o xi m a t e l y c a u s e d t he ir injuries, and (4) damag es re sulted from this breach. See M ission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 106 S.W .3d 705, 710 (Tex
. 2 0 03). The K inney s maintain that Palmer’s “duty of
rea sonable c onstruction” ar ose, not when he built the hou s e, b u t ra t h er when he sold it to the Pr e sto ns , w ho , in

tur n, so ld i t to the Ki nn e y s. Howeve r, to date, no Texas case has held that a person, not in the business of c onstructing homes for sa l e t o the g ener al public, who builds a home for himself, owes a

duty to subsequent purc h as er s o f t he house. The exis tence of a le g al duty is a question of law. SmithKli ne Be echam Corp. v. Doe , 903 S.W .2d 347, 351 (Tex. 1995). Prior ca ses alleg ing ne g lige nt construction have i n v o l ved “builder -vendor s,” def ined in Humber v . Morton , as one “ in the business of building or assembling houses desig ned for dwelling purposes” and upon completion, sold “ to members of the h o use-buy

ing public.” Humber v . Morton , 4 26 S.W. 2d 55 4, 55 5 ( Te x. 19 68 ); s e e a ls o G u p ta v.04
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- 9- Ritter Homes, Inc

. , 646 S.W .2d 168, 170 (Tex. 1983). Indeed, in Gupta, the court of a pp e a ls permitted a subse quent purchaser to sue a homebuilder for neg lige nce, f inding that “ a homebuilder contemplates sales of the home beyond the initial purchaser and . . . owe s a duty

to exercise ordina

ry
car e in t he construc tion of the home.” Gu pta v. Ritter Home

s, Inc
. , 6 3 3 S. W. 2 d

6 2 6 , 6 2 8 ( T e x. App.–Houston [14th Dis t.] 1982), af f ’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds , 646 S.W .2d 168 (Tex. 1983). Her e Palmer built the house f or himself and his fa

mily
. No evidenc e was prese nted that prior to or duringthe construc tion of the house Palmer was eng ag ed in the business of building houses f or sale to the g ener al public or that he conte mplated any thing other

than building a

house for himself. We f a il t o s e e , und e r t

he se sp e c if

ic fa c ts, ho w Pa lme r w ou ld o we a duty to [s ub se qu e nt p ur c ha se rs ] to have e x erc ised ordinar y car e [ ] in the construction of a house he built for himself. Acc ording ly , the trial cour t did not ab u s e it s d is c r etion in gr anting Palmer summary judgme nt as to the Kinney s’ claim for neg lige nce. C ONCL US I ON F ind ingno e rr or , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice