U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

31–450PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 6, 2018

Serial No. 115–171

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or www.govinfo.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

PAUL COOK, CALIFORNIA, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State .... 8

The Honorable Peter Bodde, Coordinator, Health Incidents Response Task 

Force, U.S. Department of State ......................................................................... 10

Brian M. Mazanec, Ph.D., Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 23

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Paul Cook, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten and the Honorable Peter Bodde: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 12

Brian M. Mazanec, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: 

Department of the Navy letter ............................................................................ 52

Congressional Research Service report .............................................................. 53

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Paul Cook, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee 

on the Western Hemisphere ................................................................................ 57

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Cook (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. COOK. All right. A quorum being present, the subcommittee 

will come to order. 

I would like to now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Today we meet to consider the U.S. policy toward Cuba, a Communist country with a repressive regime that continues to actively 

restrict freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and to 

harass and jail Cuban citizens who seek freedom. 

As expected, even with the recent rise of the new President who 

is not named Castro, nothing has changed. Just this week, Martha 

Sanchez from Ladies in White was sentenced to 4 years in prison 

for peacefully protesting against the regime. Miguel Diaz-Canel 

took office without a vote from the Cuban people. Raul Castro continues to hold considerable sway over the government decisions, 

and the national assembly endorsed a new constitution in July that 

retains the same authoritarian political system and reinforces the 

Communist Party’s control. 

Cuba maintains close relations with Russia and China, providing 

these actors with influenced platforms to form an anti-American 

agenda. Additionally, Cuba meddling in Venezuela and Nicaragua 

has contributed to increased repression and the mass exodus of refugees throughout the region. 

In June 2017, President Trump announced change in the U.S. 

policy toward Cuba with the issuance of the National Security 

Presidential Memorandum. This action rolled back key parts of the 

Obama administration’s failed Cuban policy, tightened restrictions 

on U.S. tourism to the island, restricted the flow of money to the 

Cuban military intelligence and security service, and continued 

U.S. support for the Nation’s private small business sector in Cuba. 

The Trump administration has continued U.S. support for democracy and human rights in Cuba and in calling for the release of political prisoners. Multiple efforts exist to support the critical work 

of human rights defenders on the island, communicate independent 

news to the Cuban people through the Office of Cuban BroadVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:06 Dec 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\090618\31450 SHIRL
2

casting, and increase internet connectivity with the State Department’s internet task force. And I fully support these actions. 

However, given the state of Cuban destabilization activities in 

the region, and subsequent migration flow is an increasing regional 

instability throughout the hemisphere, I believe it is in U.S. national interest to work more with regional partners to curb the 

Cuban regime’s ability to wreak havoc on its people and on the region. 

The U.S. should also continually update the list of 180 prohibited 

Cuban entities and individuals announced last year to further prevent U.S. financing to Cuban regime elements, reestablish the 

Cuban medical professional parole program allowing Cuban medical professionals forced into modern-day slavery by the Cuban regime to apply for parole status in the United States, and to continue efforts to combat intelligence operations and covert activities 

with the Russians and Chinese, advocate for the return of U.S. fugitives from Cuba such as Joanne Chesimard, and address outstanding U.S. property claims. 

However, overshadowing all these issues are the unexplained 

health incidents that the State Department has assessed were targeted attacks on 26 U.S. diplomats and several Canadian Government personnel serving in Havana. The Cuban regime failed in its 

international obligation to protect diplomats in Cuba, and for that 

it must be held accountable. I am further concerned about the fact 

that we have yet to determine the cause or perpetrator of the attacks. 

The Cuban Accountability Review Board, known as the ARB, was 

submitted to Congress last week. It found that the Department’s 

security systems and procedures were adequate, but significant vacancies and challenges with information sharing existed in the Department’s response to the attacks. 

Similarly, the Government Accountability Office, the GAO, 

issued a recent report at the request of chairman emeritus RosLehtinen and this subcommittee that found that the Department’s 

policies, procedure, process, and internal communications delayed 

the Cuban ARB from starting its work by 8 months. 

The Department’s leadership, whether in a combined or acting 

role, is responsible for the safety and security of Americans serving 

overseas at U.S. missions. Twenty-six Americans are injured in the 

service to their country, some of them severely. In today’s hearing, 

I also want to examine the Department’s response to these attacks, 

its provision of care for U.S. personnel, and its plans to improve 

the significant management gaps that the GAO found. 

In conclusion, I believe the Trump administration’s caution in 

staffing the U.S. Embassy in Havana is essential and prudent until 

we can determine the cause of these attacks and effectively mitigate it. While this decision clearly has an impact on Embassy operations and objectives in Cuba, that pales in comparison to the risks 

associated with putting more Americans in harm’s way unnecessarily. 

With that, I am going to turn to the ranking member for his 

opening remarks. I just want to make one final comment in that 

we have had a busy morning, and we met with the foreign minister 

from Colombia, and we had 15 members in attendance for that. I 

3

want to thank everybody that was on this committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, including the ranking member. We had a 

very, very productive session. 

This is ambitious today because we are going to have an open 

hearing and then we are going to go down to the sealed chamber, 

the secret chamber known as the SCIF. But in between that, we 

have a vote—or we have a number of votes, I don’t know how 

many, but they are looking at, military time, I think it is about 

1500, 1515. 

So with that, I think I have rambled long enough, and I will turn 

to my good friend, the ranking member. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cook follows:]

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Chairman Paul Cook 

Opening Statement 

Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

"U.S. Policy Toward Cuba" 

Thursday, September 6th in Raybum Room 2172 

Today, we meet to consider U.S. policy toward Cuba, a Communist country with a 

repressive regime that continues to actively restrict freedom of expression, association, and 

assembly and to harass and jail Cuban citizens who seek freedom. As expected, even with the 

recent rise of a new president who is not named Castro, nothing has changed. Miguel Diaz-Canel 

took ofilce without a vote from the Cuban people, Raul Castro continues to hold considerable sway 

over government decisions, and the National Assembly endorsed a new constitution in July that 

retains the same authoritarian political system and reinforces the Communist Party's control. Cuba 

maintains close relations with Russia and China, providing these actors with influence platforms 

to foment an anti-American agenda. Additionally, Cuban meddling in Venezuela and Nicaragua 

has contributed to increased repression and the mass exodus of refugees throughout the region. 

ln June 2017, President Trump announced a change in U.S. policy toward Cuba with the 

issuance of the National Security Presidential Memorandum. This action rolled back key parts of 

the Obama Administration's failed Cuba policy, tightened restrictions on U.S. tourism to the 

island, restricted the flow of money to the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services, and 

continued U.S. support for the nascent private, small business sector in Cuba. The Trump 

Administration has continued U.S support for democracy and human rights in Cuba and in calling 

for the release of political prisoners. Multiple efforts exist to support the critical work of human 

rights defenders on the island, communicate independent news to the Cuban people through the 
5


31450c-2.eps

Otlice of Cuba Broadcasting, and increase Internet connectivity with the State Department's 

Internet Task Force, and I tully support these actions. 

However, given the stakes of Cuban destabilization activities in the region and subsequent 

migration flows and increasing regional instability throughout the hemisphere, I believe it is in the 

US. national interest to work more with regional partners to curb the Cuban regime's ability to 

wreak havoc on its people and on the region. The US should also continually update the list of 

ISO prohibited Cuban entities and individuals announced last year to further prevent US financing 

to Cuban regime elements, reestablish the Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program allowing 

Cuban medical professionals forced into modern-day slavery by the Cuban regime to apply for 

parole status in the US., continue etl'orts to combat Cuban intelligence operations and covert 

activities with the Russians and Chinese in the region, advocate for the return of US. fugitives 

from Cuba, such as Joanne Chesimard, and address outstanding US. property claims. 

However, overshadowing all these issues, are the unexplained health incidents that the 

State Department has assessed were targeted attacks on 26 U.S. diplomats and several Canadian 

government personnel serving in Havana. The Cuban regime failed in its international obligations 

to protect diplomats in Cuba, and for that, it must be held accountable. I am further concerned 

about the fact that we have yet to detennine the cause or perpetrator of the attacks. The Cuba 

Accountability Review Board (ARB) was submitted to Congress last week. It found that the 

Department's security systems and procedures were adequate, but significant vacancies and 

challenges with infonnation-sharing existed in the Department's response to the attacks. Similarly, 

the Government Accountability Otlice (GAO) issued a recent report at the request of Chairman 

Emeritus Ros-Lehtinen and this Subcommittee that found that the Department's policy, procedure, 

process, and internal communications delayed the Cuba ARB from starting its work by eight 
6


31450c-3.eps

months. The Department's leadership- whether in a confirmed or Acting role- is responsible for 

the safety and security of Americans serving overseas at U.S. missions. 26 Americans are injured 

in the service to their country, some of them severely. 

In today's hearing, I also want to examine the Department's response to these attacks, its 

provision of care for U.S. personnel, and its plans to improve the significant management gaps that 

the GAO found In conclusion, I believe the Trump Administration's caution in statllng the U.S 

embassy in Havana is essential and prudent until we can determine the cause of these attacks and 

e±Iectively mitigate it While this decision clearly has an impact on embassy operations and 

objectives in Cuba, that pales in comparison to the risks associated with putting more Americans 

in harm's way unnecessarily. With that, I turn to Ranking Member Sires for his opening remarks 

and look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

### 
7

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman Cook, for holding this hearing. 

And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. 

Though U.S. policy toward Cuba has varied over the last few 

years, it is important that any policies considered take into account 

the fact that the Cuban Government has done nothing to garner 

the trust of the Cuban people or the international community over 

the last 50 years. 

This administration spoke of supporting human rights in Cuba, 

yet their proposed cuts to democracy assistance suggests that this 

is just another example of an underdeveloped policy that has not 

fully been thought through. The Cuban people have been suffering 

for far too long under the Castro regime, and many risk their lives 

every day to fight for the basic freedoms. The United States must 

continue to stand with the Cuban people and urge their government to respect the rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech, 

assembly, and proceed with free and fair elections. 

The feigned transition of power that occurred in Cuba this April 

was nominal, and we should not be under any illusions about who 

really holds the seat of power in Cuba. Miguel Diaz-Canale was 

hand picked to succeed Raul Castro, who retains control of both the 

Communist Party and the military. Raul Castro continues to lead 

from the shadows leaving no room for any meaningful reform. 

In addition to Cuba’s sordid history of human rights abuses, the 

nation continues to maintain relationship with questionable state 

actors and support corrupt regimes such as Venezuela’s Maduro 

and Nicaragua’s Ortega. With a proven pattern of despicable and 

dubious behavior, we should ensure that any policy toward Cuba 

does not readily offer major concessions to the Cuban Government. 

I look forward to hearing from this administration. And thank 

you again, Chairman, and thank everyone for being here today. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

Before I recognize you to provide your testimony, I am going to 

explain the lighting system in front of you. This is not just for you, 

it is for me, because I will mess it up. My staff will get mad at me. 

You each will have 5 minutes to present your oral statement. 

When you begin, the light will turn green. When you have a 

minute left, the light will turn yellow. When your time has expired, 

the light will turn red, unless we lose the electricity. I ask that you 

conclude your testimony once the red light comes on. 

After our witnesses testify, members will have 5 minutes to ask 

questions. I urge my colleagues to stick to the 5-minute rule to ensure that all members get the opportunity. If we don’t have that 

many members, we have a tendency to go back if people want to 

ask additional questions, and that is based upon what is going on. 

Our first witness to testify today will be Ambassador Kenneth 

Merten, the Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Previously, Ambassador 

Merten served as the Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia and 

Haiti. He also served as Deputy Executive Secretary to former Secretary of State Clinton and earlier to Secretary Rice. His overseas 

assignments have been in France, Belgium, Germany, and Haiti. In 

Washington, he served in the State Department’s Operations Center as well as the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. 

8

Our second witness to testify is Ambassador Peter Bodde, Coordinator for the Health Incidents Response Task Force at the U.S. Department of State. Previously, the Ambassador served as Ambassador to Libya, Tunisia, and Nepal, and retired from the Department in 2017. He returned from retirement in February 2018 to 

chair the Cuba Accountability Review Board, known as the ARB, 

and now the Health Incidents Task Force. He has had multiple 

overseas assignments in Iraq, Malawi, Pakistan, Nepal, Germany, 

India, Denmark, Bulgaria, Guyana, and Washington. Ambassador 

Bodde served in the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Administration. 

Our last witness to testify, the Acting Director for International 

Affairs and Trade at the U.S. Accountability Office, GAO. At GAO, 

Dr. Mazanec was responsible for a portfolio focused on international security. He also worked in the GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management team. 

We are also joined by Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, the medical director 

in the Bureau of Diplomatic Services at the U.S. Department of 

State, as well as Mr. Todd Brown, the Assistant Director for Countermeasures in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State. Dr. Rosenfarb and Mr. Brown submitted written testimony and will sit on the panel to provide answers to many of the 

questions we hope will be asked. 

Ambassador Merten, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENNETH H. MERTEN, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU 

OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. The microphone. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Oh, sorry. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, 

and distinguished members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to speak about the administration’s policy toward Cuba 

and the attacks against our diplomats, our colleagues in Havana. 

I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from Health 

Incidents Response Task Force, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Bureau of Medical Services, and with a representative of the GAO. 

Thanks for your concern for the safety and security of our diplomatic personnel in Havana, which is the Department’s top priority. 

I will begin today by providing an overview of the Department’s 

work to implement President Trump’s June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum strengthening the policy of the 

United States toward Cuba. And we will refer to that as the NSPM 

going forward, I think. I will then turn to my colleague from the 

Health Incidents Response Task Force, Ambassador Bodde, who 

will speak on the health attacks. I ask that the Department’s written statement be entered into the record. 

The NSPM emphasizes advancing human rights and democracy 

in Cuba, reaffirms the economic embargo and the statutory ban on 

tourism to Cuba, and aims to ensure U.S. engagement benefits 

Cuban people and strengthens the Cuban private sector. It also 

maintains bilateral engagement on issues critical to U.S. national 

9

security and the public health and safety of the U.S. The Department of State has worked diligently to put this policy into action. 

First, despite our reduced staffing, the Department monitors 

human rights developments in Cuba and actively engages with 

members of the Cuban civil society in Havana, in Washington, and 

elsewhere. We use international fora to work with regional and 

like-minded partners to share these concerns and coordinate our 

respective approaches. 

The Department and USAID also continue to administer U.S. 

Government funded programs to promote democracy and support 

critical work of the human rights defenders on the island. Despite 

the Cuban Government’s refusal to engage with us on human 

rights through a formal dialogue, we regularly speak out against 

the regime for repression and abuse, and raise these concerns directly with the Cuban Government. 

Second, on November 8 of last year, the Department published 

its Cuba restricted list. The Departments of Commerce and Treasury made regulatory changes on that same day to generally prohibit direct financial transactions with any of the 180 entities and 

subentities on this list. These changes redirect economic activity 

that once supported the Cuban military toward the Cuban private 

sector and the Cuban people. 

Third, the Department convened a task force to examine the 

technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet 

access in Cuba. The Cuba Internet Task Force held its first meeting on February 7, and follow-on subcommittee meetings are taking 

place to develop recommendations on, one, the role of the media 

and unregulated flow of information to Cuba, and, two, expanding 

internet access in Cuba. The Task Force will review these recommendations and prepare a final report for the Secretary of State 

within a year. 

The Department will continue to promote a stable, prosperous, 

and free country for the Cuban people, even with reduced staff at 

Embassy Havana. In fact, that is the main reason we are maintaining our presence there, so we can make continued progress toward 

those goals. 

Before turning to Ambassador Bodde, I would like to emphasize 

upfront that the investigation into the health attacks is ongoing. 

There is still much we do not know, including who or what is behind the injuries to our colleagues. 

With that, I yield the microphone to my colleagues to discuss this 

further, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Before I turn it over to Ambassador Bodde, I have to apologize 

for mispronouncing his name. When I first read this, I thought, 

well, anyone who is related to Cheyenne Bodie—and anyone here 

that is young, leave the room, because you never heard of that 

show. But it was one of my favorite shows, and I was obviously intimidated by anybody named Bodde or related to Cheyenne. 

So with that crazy introduction, Ambassador, the floor is yours. 

10

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER BODDE, COORDINATOR, HEALTH INCIDENTS RESPONSE TASK FORCE, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BODDE. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

before you on the Department of State’s efforts to coordinate a 

multiagency response to the unexplained health attacks that have 

affected some members of Embassy Havana’s diplomatic community. 

I would like to speak about two challenges outlined in the Department’s written statement. First, the challenge of responding to 

these attacks on our personnel with so many significant unknowns 

and the challenge of providing the best long-term care for our impacted personnel. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, my experience over the 

past 7 months serving first as the chair of the Cuba Accountability 

Review Board and now overseeing daily coordination of the Department and interagency activities leading the Health Incidents Response Task Force has given me an in-depth look into how the Department has responded to these attacks on our diplomatic community. 

As you know, 26 individuals associated with Embassy Havana 

have incurred medically confirmed unexplained symptoms and 

health effects since the Department first became aware of these attacks on December 30, 2016. Reported acute symptoms have included dizziness, headaches, tinnitus, fatigue, visual problems, ear 

complaints, hearing loss, and difficulty sleeping. Many of the affected personnel later developed other symptoms, including cognitive problems and imbalance walking. 

While the Department first became aware of these health complaints and an increase in Cuban harassment in late December 

2016, it was not until months later, after highly specialized medical 

testing was performed and analyzed by experts, that we began to 

understand the spectrum and severity and confirm the extent of 

the health effects. That confirmation indicated that these incidents 

went beyond routine harassments previously experienced by our 

diplomats in Havana. 

As Secretary Pompeo briefed the broader House Foreign Affairs 

Committee on May 23, the Department has also determined that 

on May 18, a single individual in Guangzhou, China, was found to 

have medical findings that were consistent with those of affected 

U.S. Government personnel in Cuba, although we are unable to say 

whether the cause is likely the same. 

Let me be clear, the Department does not currently know the 

mechanism for the cause of the injuries, the source, or the motive 

behind the attacks in Cuba or when they actually commenced, yet 

throughout this unprecedented situation, from the first reported 

health complaint through the confirmation of the onset of adverse 

related medical symptoms, U.S. Government medical professionals 

have insured that competent and professional care has been provided to our impacted personnel. They collaborate closely with the 

medical centers of excellence, such as the University of Pennsylvania Center for Brain Injury and Repair, the Walter Reed NaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:06 Dec 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\090618\31450 SHIRL
11

tional Military Medical Center, and the National Institute of 

Health. 

We have also asked the Centers for Disease Control for their expertise to better understand what transpired in Havana. In order 

to ensure that our affected personnel have access to long-term 

workers’ compensation coverage, the Department also works closely 

with the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation 

Programs. 

When we found potential gaps in the ability to care for those affected under current authorities, we began discussing with other 

agencies in the White House possible legislative language, which 

we will share for your consideration once we have an interagency 

consensus, to make sure our impacted diplomats and their families 

receive the care they deserve without incurring personal financial 

burden. We are also establishing a new position solely responsible 

for the longer term outreach in assistance to impacted personnel. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sires, in conclusion, I want 

to assure you that we continue our effort to leverage all governmental, medical, investigative, intelligence, and scientific capabilities to address the most pressing questions surrounding these attacks. Your support remains a key element to our success. Congressional interest is crucial as we work diligently to identify and to 

understand the mechanism for the cause of the injuries, the motive 

behind these attacks, and the identity of the perpetrators. 

I am pleased to take your questions. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Ambassadors Merten and Bodde 

follows:]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

STATEMENT 

OF 

KENNETH MERTEN 

PRINCIPAL DEPlJTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS 

AND 

AMBASSADOR PETER W. BODDE 

HEALTH INCIDENTS RESPONSE TASK FORCE 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMPISHERE 

HEARING 

ON 

lJ.S. POLICY TOWARD ClJBAAND HEALTH ATTACKS 

SEPTEMBER 6, 2018 
13


31450a-2.eps

Chainnan Cook, Ranking Member Sires, and distinguished members of the 

Committee: 

Thank you for the opporttmity to speak about the Administration's policy 

towards Cuba, and the attacks against our diplomats in Havana. The Department 

of State is represented by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere, the Health Incidents 

Response Task Force, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the Bureau of 

Medical Services. 

We thank you for your concern for the safety and security of our diplomatic 

personnel in Havana. As you know, that continues to be the Department's top 

priority. We appreciate the opportunity to provide an overview ofthe 

Department's work to implement President Trump's Jtme 16,2017, National 

Security Presidential Memorandum, Strengthening the Policy ofthe United States 

Toward Cuba (NSPM), and to discuss the Department's efforts to coordinate a 

multi-agency response to the tmexplained attacks that have affected some 

members of Embassy Havana's diplomatic community. We ask this written 

statement be entered into the record. 

The National Security Presidential Memorandum 

The NSPM emphasizes advancing human rights and democracy in Cuba, 

reaffirms the economic embargo and the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba, and 
14


31450a-3.eps

aims to ensure U.S. engagement benefits the Cuban people and strengthens the 

Cuban private sector. It also maintains bilateral engagement on issues critical to 

U.S. national security and the public health and safety of the United States, such 

as law enforcement cooperation, disaster preparedness, and migration, especially 

the retum of Cuban nationals with tlnal orders of removal. Over the past year, 

the Department of State has worked diligently to put this policy into action. 

Human Rights and the Cuban People 

First, despite our reduced staffing, the Department monitors human rights 

developments in Cuba and actively engages with members of Cuban civil society 

in Havana, in Washington, and beyond. In April, then-Acting Secretary John 

Sullivan met with Cuban independent civil society leaders on the margins of the 

Summit of the Americas in Lima, Peru to reaffirm support for the Cuban people 

and applaud the work of activists in promoting a more open, free, and prosperous 

future for their country. During the country's Universal Periodic Review at the 

UN Human Rights Council in May, we denounced the m1democratic nature of the 

recent leadership transition and called attention to Cuba's abysmal human rights 

record. We have used such international fora to work with regional and likeminded partners to share these concerns and coordinate our respective approaches. 
15


31450a-4.eps

The Department and USATD also continue to administer U.S. governmentftmded programs to promote democracy and support the critical work of human 

rights defenders on the island. Despite the Cuban government's refusal to engage 

with us on human rights through a fornml dialogue, we regularly speak out against 

the regime for repression and abuse and raise these concems directly with the 

Cuban government. Our public condemnation of Cuba's oppressive tactics have 

resulted in some successes. Enviromnental activist Ariel Ruiz Urquiola and human 

rights defender Jose Daniel Ferrer were released from arbitrary detention in July 

and August respectively after the Department called out the Cuban government for 

silencing independent thinkers who peacefully criticize authority in Cuba. 

Support for Cuba's Economy 

Second, on November 8 of last year, the Department published its "Cuba 

Restricted List." As directed by the NSPM, this list identities entities and subentities with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit 

Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel at the expense of 

the Cuban people or private enterprise. The Departments of Commerce and the 

Treasury made regulatory changes that san1e day to generally prohibit direct 

financial transactions with any of the 180 entities and sub-entities on this list. 

These changes redirect economic activity that once supported the Cuban military 
16


31450a-5.eps

toward the Cuban private sector and Cuban people. The Cuba Restricted List is a 

living docmnent, and we will continue to review it periodically as new 

information becomes available. 

Cuba and the Role of Technology 

Third, the Department convened a task force to examine the technological 

challenges and opportunities for expanding intemet access in Cuba. Consistent 

with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Cuba lntemet Task Force held its 

first public meeting on February 7, and follow-on subcommittee meetings are 

taking place to develop recommendations on 1) the role of media and unregulated 

flow of information to Cuba and 2) expanding internet access in Cuba. Both 

subcommittees are meeting with relevant experts, stakeholders, and the public to 

prepare and submit a report for the task force's consideration by late summer 

2018. The task force will review these recommendations and prepare a tlnal 

report for the Secretary of State within a year. Unless extended by the President, 

the task force will complete its work by June 2019. 

Promoting Stability and Prosperity 

As directed by the NSPM, and in coordination with other relevant agencies, 

the Department also: 1) reviewed democracy programs in Cuba to ensure they 
17


31450a-6.eps

align with the criteria set forth in the LIBERT AD Act; 2) provided a report to the 

President detailing the Cuban regime's human rights abuses against the Cuban 

people and its lack of progress towards a "transition government" as described in 

the LIBERT AD Act; 3) provided a report to the President on bilateral 

engagement with Cuba to ensure it advances U.S. interests; 4) took a stand at the 

UN against Cuban anti-embargo propaganda; and 5) continues to work with the 

Department ofHomeland Security to discourage dangerous, unlawful migration 

that puts Cuban and American lives at risk. 

The Department will continue to deliver on President Trump's commitment 

to promote a stable, prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people, even with 

reduced staff at Embassy Havana. 

Background on the Health Attacks 

As you know, twenty-six individuals associated with Embassy Havana 

have incurred medically confim1ed unexplained symptoms and health effects since 

the Department first became aware of these attacks on December 30,2016. 

Reported acute symptoms have included dizziness, headaches, tinnitus, fatigue, 

visual problems, ear complaints and hearing loss, and difficulty sleeping. Many of 

the affected personnel later developed other symptoms, including cognitive 

problems and imbalance walking. 
18


31450a-7.eps

Timeline of the Department's Response: "Significant Unknowns" 

While the Department first became aware of these health complaints and an 

increase in Cuban harassment in late December 2016, it was not until months later, 

atler highly specialized medical testing was perfom1ed and analyzed by experts, 

that we began to understand the spectrum of severity and confim1 the extent of the 

health effects. That confirmation indicated that these incidents went beyond 

routine harassment previously experienced by U.S. diplomats in Havana. 

As Secretary Pompeo briefed the broader House Foreign Affairs Committee 

on May 23, the Department had also detennined on May 18 that a single individual 

in Guangzhou, China, was fmmd to have medical findings that were consistent 

with those of affected U.S. government personnel in Cuba, although we are unable 

to say whether the cause is likely the same. 

Let us be clear. The Department does not currently know the mechanism for 

the cause ofthe injuries, the motive behind these attacks in Cuba, when they 

actually conunenced, or who is responsible. 

Commitment to Long-Term Support for Affected Personnel 

Yet throughout this unprecedented situation, from the first reported health 

complaint through the confirmation of the onset of adverse related medical 
19


31450a-8.eps

symptoms, U.S. government medical professionals have ensured that competent 

and professional care has been provided to our impacted personnel. They 

collaborate closely with medical centers of excellence such as the University of 

Pennsylvania's Center for Brain Injury and Repair, the Walter Reed National 

Military Medical Center, and the National Institutes of Health. We have also asked 

the Centers for Disease Control for their expert involvement in understanding what 

transpired in Havana. In order to ensure our affected persmmel have access to 

long-term workers' compensation coverage, the Department also works closely 

with the Department ofLabor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs. The 

Administration is currently reviewing existing authorities being used to respond to 

the injuries and the extent to which coverage gaps exist to make certain our 

impacted diplomats and their families receive the care they need and deserve 

without incurring unwarranted personal financial burden. We also are establishing 

a new position solely responsible for longer-term outreach and assistance to 

impacted personnel. 

Our colleagues serving at embassies and consulates are among our 

government's most valuable assets. First and foremost, they are responsible for 

protecting American citizens and their interests overseas and successfully 

advocating for America's national security and foreign policy. The protection of 
20


31450a-9.eps

U.S. government employees serving abroad and their accompanying family 

members is the Department's highest priority. 

Cuba and the Travel Advisory System 

In keeping with our mandate to protect U.S. citizens abroad, the 

Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs launched an improved Travel Advisory 

system in January 2018. The Travel Advisory Program provides objective security 

information to permit U.S. citizens to make their own informed travel decisions. 

Cuba was given a Level 3 status, "reconsider travel," in part because attacks 

reportedly occurred at locations that may be frequented by private U.S. citizen 

residents and travelers. On August 23, the Department revised the Travel 

Advisory for Cuba to a Level 2, "increased caution," after undertaking a thorough 

review of the risks to private U.S. citizen travelers in Cuba and considering the 

U.S. Embassy in Havana is now able to provide all routine and emergency services 

to U.S. citizens. 

The Cuba Accountability Review Board 

While the mechanism of injury, the identity of the perpetrators, and the 

motive behind the attacks remain unknown, we have an obligation to ensure that 
21


31450a-10.eps

we continue to seek out the perpetrators, the motives and the means behind these 

attacks. 

To that end, in January 2018, then-Secretary Tillerson asked Ambassador 

Bodde to lead an independent Accountability Review Board (ARB) to review, 

among other things, the extent to which the medical conditions were security 

related, whether the security systems and security procedures were adequate, and 

whether the security systems and procedures were properly implemented. 

The ARB interviewed 116 individuals, including affected personnel, and 

traveled to Cuba. The ARB completed and submitted its report to Secretary 

Pompeo on June 7. Following completion of the ARB, the Deputy Secretary asked 

Ambassador Bodde to coordinate the daily operations of the Health Incidents 

Response Task Force- a body the Deputy Secretary stood up at the Secretary's 

request in May- to coordinate the U.S. government response to the health 

incidents. In this position, Ambassador Bodde helps to put into practice important 

ARB recommendations as quickly as possible, as well as better organize the 

Department's leadership and the interagency to continue to support our people and 

figure out who and what is causing these injuries. The Secretary accepted all of 

the ARB's 30 recommendations and the Department is well on its way in 

implementing them, with more than half of the reconunendations already 

completed. 
22


31450a-11.eps

Importance of Congressional Interest 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sires, we want to assure you that we 

continue our efforts to leverage all govemmental, medical, investigative, 

intelligence and scientific capabilities to address the most pressing questions 

surrounding these attacks. Your support remains a key element to our success. 

Congressional interest is crucial as we work diligently to identity and understand 

the mechanism for the cause ofthe injuries, the motive behind these attacks and the 

identity ofthe perpetrators. We also look forward to working with you as we 

fulfill our conunitment to stand by those impacted members of the diplomatic 

commtmity. 
23

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Dr. Mazanec, before I recognize you, I want to make sure you 

don’t have any relatives that made westerns circa 1950, but after 

looking at you I don’t think that is obviously relevant. 

Mr. MAZANEC. No, sir, I do not. 

Mr. COOK. Please, if you would testify now. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN M. MAZANEC, PH.D., ACTING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MAZANEC. Thank you. 

Good afternoon Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires, distinguished members of the subcommittee, and staff. Thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss GAO’s work on the Department of State’s response to the health incidents in Havana, Cuba. 

As you are aware and as was just mentioned, since late 2016, 

U.S. personnel and their families in Havana have experienced incidents associated with unusual sounds or auditory sensations that 

resulted in serious injuries. 

The unprecedented and unexplained nature of these incidents 

created some management challenges for State, as it responded 

and continues to respond. It is important to identify and address 

these challenges in order to help State improve security programs 

and practices at all overseas posts. 

First, I will be discussing our July 2018 report, which was released yesterday, on State’s process for convening an Accountability 

Review Board, or ARB. Second, I will be discussing our preliminary 

observations on three key management challenges related to the 

unexplained nature of the incidents. 

On the first topic, we found that State does not have policies to 

ensure that its office is responsible for initiating a process for convening an ARB is made aware of incidents that may meet the ARB 

criteria. 

The responsible office, State’s Office of Management Policy, 

Rightsizing, and Innovation, or M/PRI, starts the incident vetting 

process as soon as it becomes aware of a potentially qualifying incident. However, M/PRI relies on informal communication to identify 

such incidents. 

With regard to the situation in Havana, other State offices began 

responding to the incidents in January 2017; however, M/PRI was 

not made aware of the incidents until 8 months later in mid August when a former M/PRI official contacted the office after seeing 

media coverage of the incidents. 

Officials from the responding State offices told us it was unclear 

whether the incidents met the criteria for convening an ARB, and 

thus, they did not inform M/PRI. However, it is not the role of 

State offices to evaluate whether the incidents meet ARB criteria 

before reporting them to M/PRI. 

If M/PRI is not aware of incidents, it cannot initiate State’s ARB 

incident vetting process. This puts State at risk of not meeting 

statutory timeframes for convening an ARB and, most importantly, 

could result in State being less able to improve security at overseas 

posts. 

24

In our report, we recommended that State revise its policies to 

improve communication to M/PRI of incidents that may meet ARB 

criteria. 

The second topic I would like to discuss today is our preliminary 

observations from our broader ongoing review of State’s response to 

the incidents in Cuba. To date, we have identified three key management challenges related to the unexplained nature of the incidents. 

The first management challenge relates to mitigating risk to U.S. 

personnel given the unknown nature of the incidents. Because the 

Department does not have definitive answers on the cause or 

source of the attacks, it has not been able to comprehensively reduce the risk of injury to personnel. Instead, State has taken other 

actions to mitigate risk, such as ordering the departure of family 

members and nonemergency personnel in Havana and directing all 

posts to review and, if necessary, revise their emergency action 

plans. 

The second management challenge we identified is caring for affected personnel and family members. State officials have made it 

clear that caring for affected individuals is their top priority. However, State has faced multiple issues in providing this care. For example, the Bureau of Medical Services, MED, lacked authority for 

domestic medical evacuations to send individuals to the University 

of Pennsylvania for evaluations and care. This issue was addressed 

just last week when State delegated full authority for domestic 

medevacs to MED. 

The third and final management challenge I want to highlight is 

State’s communication with internal and external stakeholders. As 

mentioned earlier, State had issues ensuring M/PRI was in the loop 

as the incidents initially occurred. Externally, State also experienced difficulties in communicating with other departments and 

agencies in responding to these incidents. 

As Ambassador Bodde noted, the ARB has completed its work. 

The ARB identified some of the same challenges I just mentioned, 

and State has also established the Health Incidents Response Task 

Force in May to direct the multiagency response to the incidents. 

Both of these efforts are resulting in changes that may address 

some of these management challenges. 

As GAO continues its broader review, we will be examining the 

ARB’s findings and State’s ongoing response. 

Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires, and members of the 

subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mazanec follows:]

25


31450b-1.eps

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. ET 

Thursday, September 6, 2018 

GA0·18·695T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on the 

Western Hemisphere, Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, House of 

Representatives 

REPORTED INJURIES 

TO U.S. PERSONNEL IN 

CUBA 

Preliminary Observations 

on State's Response and 

Management Challenges 

Statement of Brian M. Mazanec, Acting Director, 

International Affairs and Trade 
26


31450b-2.eps

Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of 

State's (State) response to the health incidents in Cuba. Since late 2016, 

U.S. government personnel and their families in Havana, Cuba, have 

experienced incidents associated with acoustic or sensory phenomena. 

These individuals suffered serious injuries, including brain damage and 

hearing loss. In June 2018, the Secretary of State noted that the precise 

nature of the injuries and the cause had not yet been established. As of 

August 2018, State reported that 26 individuals had suffered from medical 

conditions believed to be connected to the incidents in Havana. 1 State is 

generally required by law to convene an Accountability Review Board 

(ARB) in any case of serious injury, loss of life, or destruction of property 

at, or related to, a U.S. mission abroad. 2 

My testimony today summarizes (1) our July 2018 report, which was 

released today, on State's process for convening an ARB, in which we 

noted that State faced a challenge in ensuring that its responsible office is 

aware of incidents that may meet criteria for convening an ARB; 3 and (2) 

preliminary observations on State's management challenges related to 

the incidents in Cuba, which are part of our broader ongoing work 

reviewing State's response. For our July 2018 report, we analyzed 

relevant federal laws and State policies to understand State's 

responsibilities in convening an ARB. We also analyzed internal State 

communications-such as diplomatic cables-and congressional 

testimony by State officials on these incidents. In addition, we interviewed 

cognizant officials from various State entities involved in the response to 

the incidents in Cuba. For more information on our scope and 

methodology, see our July 2018 report. 

We developed our preliminary observations on management challenges 

related to the incidents in Cuba through our review of State 

documentation and interviews with cognizant State officials here in 

Washington, D.C., with embassy officials during our fieldwork in Havana, 

1

State reported that a s1m1lar 1nc1dent occurred m Guangzhou, China, 1n May 2018. 

2

22USC §4831 

3GAO, Reported Injuries to US Personnel in Cuba State Should Revise Policies to 

Ensure Appropriate Internal Communication of Relevant Incidents, CA0-18-G1G 

(Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2018) 

Page 1 GA0-1B-695T 
27


31450b-3.eps

Background 

Cuba; and with affected personnel and family members. We provided a 

draft of this statement to State for technical comment and sensitivity 

review and addressed its views in the body of our statement where 

appropriate. 

We conducted the work on which this statement is based from November 

2017 to August 2018, in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We are 

continuing our broader review of State's response and plan to conclude 

that work at a later date. 

According to State, the incidents in Havana, Cuba, began in late 2016 

and continued until the most recent confirmed incidents in May 2018. As 

a result of the incidents, on September 29, 2017, State ordered the 

departure of family members and non-emergency personnel from 

Havana, Cuba, to minimize the number of U.S. personnel and family 

members at risk of exposure to harm. State made the reduction in staffing 

levels permanent on March 5, 2018, leaving the embassy with the 

minimum personnel necessary to perform core diplomatic and consular 

functions. State's bureaus of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Diplomatic 

Security, and Medical Services, among other State entities, support the 

U.S. Embassy in Havana by providing advice and guidance on policy, 

security, and other issues. 

Federal law generally requires State to convene an ARB within 60 days of 

incidents that result in serious injury at, or related to, a U.S. mission 

abroad, but the Secretary of State can determine that a 60-day extension 

is necessary. According to State policy, State's Office of Management 

Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI) is in charge of the process to 

vet potentially qualifying incidents, known as the incident vetting process, 

and to determine whether to form the committee that would recommend 

to the Secretary of State whether to convene an ARB. An ARB seeks to 

determine accountability for such incidents and promote and encourage 

improved security programs and practices at U.S. missions abroad. 

Page2 GA0-1B-695T 
28


31450b-4.eps

State Does Not Have 

Policies That Ensure 

the Office 

Responsible for 

Initiating the Process 

for Convening an 

ARB Is Aware of 

Potentially Qualifying 

Incidents 

As noted in our July 2018 report, State's ARB policy does not ensure that 

the office responsible for the incident vetting process-M/PRI-is made 

aware of incidents that may meet the ARB statute criteria, such as those 

that occurred in Cuba and were associated with injuries to U.S. 

personnel. 4 According to State's Foreign Affairs Manual (F AM), M/PRI is 

in charge of the incident vetting process and makes an initial 

determination as to whether to form the committee that would recommend 

to the Secretary of State whether to convene an ARB. 5 According to State 

policy, as soon as M/PRI becomes aware of potentially qualifying 

incidents, M/PRI will start the process for considering whether the incident 

warrants an ARB. M/PRI relies on informal communication to identify 

potentially qualifying incidents to begin the vetting process because State 

does not have a policy, procedure, or process for internal communication 

of such incidents to M/PRI, according to State officials and our analysis. 

As illustrated in the figure below, other State entities began responding to 

the incidents in early 2017, but M/PRI was not made aware of the 

incidents until mid-August 2017, when a former M/PRI official contacted 

the office after seeing media reports. M/PRI officials said they typically 

become aware of potentially qualifying incidents when such incidents are 

discussed internally or widely publicized. 

5

Department of State, 12 FAM 032. If M/PRI decides the ARB statute cntena are not 

applicable, M/PRI will not1fy committee members in wr1ting, providing a summary of the 

1nc1dent and an explanation as to why the criteria do not apply If any member of the 

committee disagrees, M/PRI Will convene the committee. 

Page3 GA0-1B-695T 
29


31450b-5.eps

Figure 1: State's Office Responsible for the ARB Process Became Aware of Incidents in Cuba after Media Reports in August 

2017 

The United States expels two • 

Cubandiplomalsloreflectaslmilar I' 

loss of U.S. personnel in Havana. ~ 

Based on e. valuat10_ns by externa.l medical 1 ,I 

experts. State idenhfies 16 U.S personnel 

who exhibit :;:~~i=t~: :~~~~~ si~~~~on~s~ : 

State officials meet W1lh Cuban f I I State's Office of Management. 'i' 

off1cials in Havana and Wash1ngton, 1 I tr Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation I D.C. c1t1ng Vienna Convention I becomes aware of the mc1dents m 

requirements to provide for the ! Cuba after media reports and 

secunty of diplomats. -t +- begms 1ts incident vettmg process + Nov. 

2

J

16 

D ! Jan I F M A 

2

o'

17 

M i J ! J I Aug 

~~~-"'"§i97:aa[(n-CideQ!i:a'\$~~_i$i\1Sffi91iWO~~--::::::,:::::_:_::::~:··'"'"'"'~~ 

OAOanalys1sofagencydata 1 GA0-115-6%T 

Note Accordmg to the Department of State's (State) Fore1gn Affairs Manual, the Off1ce of 

Management Pol1cy. Rightsizing. and Innovation is responsible for leading the mc1dent vetlmg 

process to evaluate whether 1nc1dents meet Accountability Rev1ew Board (ARB) statute cntena 

Officials from the responding State entities, including the bureaus of 

Western Hemisphere Affairs, Diplomatic Security, and Medical Services, 

said it was unclear whether the incidents met the criteria for convening an 

ARB and they did not inform M/PRI of the incidents. However, we found 

that the FAM and other guidance do not instruct State entities to evaluate 

whether incidents meet the ARB criteria before reporting such incidents to 

M/PRI. According to the FAM, M/PRI will call a Permanent Coordinating 

Committee meeting to review incidents that either meet the ARB statute 

criteria or where the applicability is questionable. 6 The committee will, as 

quickly as possible after an incident occurs, review the available facts and 

recommend to the Secretary whether to convene an ARB. M/PRI initiated 

State's incident vetting process in August 2017, the Permanent 

Coordinating Committee met in September and November 2017 to 

discuss the incidents in Cuba, and the Secretary convened an ARB on 

January 12, 2018. As a result of the incidents in Cuba, M/PRI officials told 

us they realized that they may not be aware of all incidents that may 

612 FAM 032 1(e)(2)-(3) 

Page4 GA0-1B-695T 
30


31450b-6.eps

State Has 

Encountered 

Management 

Challenges Related 

to the Incidents in 

Cuba: Preliminary 

Observations 

involve injury to U.S. diplomats. M/PRI has taken some steps-such as 

being added to internal distribution lists that inform recipients of events 

occurring at diplomatic posts-to address this issue. 

If M/PRI is not aware of incidents, it cannot initiate State's ARB incident 

vetting process. This situation puts State at risk of not meeting statutory 

time frames for convening an ARB and could result in State being less 

able to improve security programs and practices at other U.S. diplomatic 

posts. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for 

internal communication to achieve the entity's objectives and note that 

management should document responsibilities through policy. 7 We 

recommended that State revise its policies to define responsibilities for 

internal communication to M/PRI of incidents that may involve injury, loss 

of life, or destruction of property to ensure incidents are promptly vetted 

for ARB consideration. State concurred with our recommendation and 

said it will improve its processes for ensuring effective internal 

communication. 

Regarding our broader ongoing review of State's response to the 

incidents in Cuba, we have developed some preliminary observations 

regarding three key management challenges related to the unexplained 

nature of the incidents-specifically, (1) mitigating the risk to U.S. 

personnel posed by the unexplained incidents, (2) caring for affected 

personnel and family members, and (3) communicating within State and 

with external stakeholders. On May 23, 2018, State established the 

Health Incidents Response Task Force to direct the response to these 

and other challenges. The task force includes interagency partners, such 

as the Departments of Health and Human Services (including the Centers 

for Disease Control), Commerce, Justice, Defense, and Energy, among 

others. As part of our ongoing work, we will continue to evaluate State's 

evolving response to the incidents and gather additional information 

regarding these, and other, potential challenges. 

7GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, G.A.0-14-704C 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014), pnnc1ples 12 and 14 

PageS GA0-1B-695T 
31


31450b-7.eps

Mitigating Risk to U.S. 

Personnel Posed by 

Unexplained Incidents 

Caring for Affected 

Personnel and Family 

Members 

According to State officials, as of July 2018, the unknown nature of the 

incidents limited State's ability to comprehensively mitigate the risk of 

injury to personnel in Havana and elsewhere. 8 According to State, 

because the department does not have definitive answers on the cause 

or source of the attacks, it has been unable to recommend a means to 

mitigate exposure. Instead, on September 29, 2017, State ordered the 

departure of family members and non-emergency personnel in Havana, 

Cuba, to minimize the number of U.S. personnel and family members at 

risk of exposure to harm. Although the cause had not been identified, in 

July 2018, State directed all diplomatic posts to review and, if necessary, 

revise their emergency action plans to incorporate new protocols for 

responding to health incidents. 9 As of August 2018, State reported 

assessing over 500 personnel at seven diplomatic posts for medical 

issues related to the unexplained incidents. According to State officials, 

most of the people assessed had no reported symptoms, findings, or 

reported exposure to an incident. As of August 23, 2018, personnel 

traveling to Havana, Cuba, are required to undergo a medical 

assessment, to establish a baseline to help determine if someone were to 

suffer injuries as a result of an incident, according to State officials. We 

are continuing to examine this issue as part of our ongoing work. 

State officials have reported that caring for affected personnel and family 

members is their top priority; however, we have identified multiple issues 

related to State's provision of care for affected U.S. personnel. 

Domestic medical evacuations. In late August 2017, State began 

referring embassy personnel and family members to the University of 

Pennsylvania for detailed evaluations and care-including individuals 

who had been previously determined to have been affected and 

individuals who had reported recent exposures. However, some 

embassy personnel had already departed Cuba for the United States 

81n June 2018, Secretary Pompeo stated that the prec1se nature of the InJUries and 

whether a common cause ex1sted had not yet been established Because the cause of the 

1nc1dents rema1ns unknown, State off1c1als told us that there may need to be an additional 

1nvest1gat1on after State has a better understanding of the cause of the Incidents 1n order 

to 1dent1fy additional ways of m1t1gatmg the r1sk to U.S personnel at diplomatic posts U S. 

agenc1es are in the process of attempting to determine the prec1se nature and cause of 

the 1nc1dents, but have not reached any conclusions, according to State officials 

9

State, New Protocol to Assist Posts IM"len Faced lMth Potential Unexplained HealthSecunty Incidents, 18 STATE 71614 (Washmgton, D.C July 13, 2018) 

Page6 GA0-1B-695T 
32


31450b-8.eps

Communication within 

State and with Other 

Stakeholders 

for a variety of reasons. 10 State officials had to request special 

authority to conduct medical evacuations from domestic locations 

because they normally only transfer patients from Cuba back to the 

United States for care, and not from one location within the United 

States to another. According to State officials, when requested, 

domestic medical evacuations were quickly authorized, and on August 

28, 2018, State delegated authority for domestic medical evacuations 

to State's Medical Director. 

Excused absences for ongoing treatment. According to State officials, 

affected personnel qualify for excused absences to receive treatment. 

However, we were told that some affected personnel were having 

difficulty obtaining approval for such excused absences. We are 

currently examining this issue. 

Long-term care. Because of the unknown cause of the incidents and 

undetermined long-term effects, State may need to provide long-term 

care to the affected personnel and family members. As of August 

2018, the department was exploring how to optimally address 

coverage for longer-term health care needs and had encouraged 

affected personnel to file workers' compensation claims with the 

Department of Labor, according to State officials. 

We will continue to follow up on these and other issues related to caring 

for U.S. personnel during the course of our ongoing work. 

State had difficulties in communicating with internal and external 

stakeholders. For example, as mentioned earlier, State bureaus did not 

communicate the occurrence of the incidents to M/PRI when they initially 

occurred so that the ARB incident vetting process could commence. 

Externally, State also experienced difficulties in communicating with other 

departments and agencies in responding to the incidents. 11 To address 

these communication challenges, the recently established Health 

Incidents Response Task Force said it holds two weekly meetings, one 

10Through September 2017, some embassy personnel had departed Cuba for the United 

States for reasons mcludmg Humcane Irma, bemg affected by the 1nc1dents, and routme 

departures 

11We have previously identified areas where State has had difficulty communicating with 

other agencies. We found that several factors can 1nh1b1t the t1mely communication of 

threat 1nformat1on to non-State personnel at embass1es GAO, Diplomatic Security State 

Should Enhance fts Management of Transportation-Related Risks to Overseas US 

Personnel, c.:;AC-"17-"!24 (Washington, D.C: Oct 4, 2016). 

Page7 GA0-1B-695T 
33


31450b-9.eps

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(102988) 

with internal State stakeholders and one with external stakeholders. The 

new protocols include guidance to help improve State's internal and 

external communication should incidents occur elsewhere in the future. 

We will continue to follow up with State on these communication issues. 

On August 30, 2018, the Secretary submitted a report to Congress on the 

ARB that was convened on January 12, 2018. The report outlined the 

ARB's recommendations and actions taken in response. According to an 

August 30, 2018, State fact sheet on the ARB's findings, the ARB has 

identified some of the same challenges we have identified to date. We 

intend to review the ARB's findings as part of our ongoing review. 

We are continuing our broader review of State's response to the incidents 

and will be following up on these topics, among others. 

Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, 

please contact Brian M. Mazanec, Acting Director, International Affairs 

and Trade, at (202) 512-5130 or rnazanecb@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions 

to this testimony are Judith McCloskey (Assistant Director), Ashley Alley, 

Debbie Chung, Christopher Hayes, and Brandon Hunt. In addition, 

Thomas Costa, Mary Denigan-Macauley, Neil Doherty, Justin Fisher, and 

Joseph Kirschbaum made technical contributions to this testimony. 

PageS GA0-1B-695T 
34


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36

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

In the questions that come out right now, I think you are going 

to hear, I don’t know, at least from me, we are somewhat bewildered, frustrated. You know, this goes back quite a while ago. 

When it first happened, we had some classified hearings on it, and 

no one could figure out what was going on. Ironically enough, I had 

a meeting where a number of us that were in Ottawa, and we were 

talking about trade and stuff like that, but I asked the same questions, since you had some folks from your Embassy that were involved in this. I am not saying we didn’t get a straight answer, but 

I am still bewildered as to the origin of this. 

Obviously, the staff there was cut down quite a bit because of the 

safety concerns, and I am always somewhat worried about the people that are in precarious positions throughout the world. I think 

sometimes we kind of forget about how dangerous it is, and my 

own personal experiences are going back to Iran when that hostage 

situation when they seized—the Ayatollah Khomeini, 400 days, it 

was really a mess. I can go discuss different countries and what 

have you. 

The question I have is from a medical standpoint. Do you have 

any fingerprints on this who is responsible? 

We even heard allegations that the Russians might be involved, 

and this and that. And so at least from my standpoint, we have got 

a lot of—what happened on this? Because I am worried about the 

Ambassadors, but I am more worried about the families and everyone else that can be innocent bystanders to something like this. 

And we will have a policy if we can just figure out what is going 

on. 

Anybody want to address that rather long question? 

Doctor? Sure. 

Dr. ROSENFARB. Sir, I can speak from the medical perspective. 

We are frustrated as well. We know the accumulation of medical 

knowledge tends to be a very deliberate process. I can only speak 

to what we are trying to do to find out what caused the injuries. 

You know, as you read previously, the symptoms people presented with were vague, very common symptoms. It took some time 

to figure out that they were connected. When we put the information together, they appeared to be similar to the symptoms and 

findings you would see in a traumatic brain injury or a head concussion, but obvious head trauma. So we had to kind of work backwards and find out what could cause that. 

We identified the University of Pennsylvania and other locations 

to see our people, to do thorough evaluations, but still there is no 

obvious mechanism we know of that could cause that injury. The 

experts are exploring a number of possibilities. 

Mr. COOK. Yeah, and we will talk about that. 

Anything in the literature on this? Obviously, there is papers all 

the time, I am not saying this is going to be in the New England 

Journal of Medicine or what have you, but kind of like football injuries and don’t let your son or your children get involved in this. 

There is nothing in the medical literature at all that—because it 

was on the front pages, it was big news there for a while, and no 

speculation from a medical standpoint? 

37

Dr. ROSENFARB. There is nothing in the old medical literature. 

Again, this is kind of what we are seeing as a unique syndrome. 

Probably you can’t even call it a syndrome. It is a unique constellation of symptoms and findings but with no obvious cause. There is 

a lot of speculation in the media. We prefer not to talk about speculation. All I know is the experts who have examined the patients 

are doing everything they can to determine, you know, where the 

injuries occurred, what part of the brain, and what possibly could 

cause it. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

I am going turn it over to the ranking member for his questions. 

Mr. SIRES. Chairman, I am going to let our ranking member of 

the Foreign Affairs Committee go first because I know he has 

things to do. So, Eliot? 

Mr. COOK. I am going to apologize. I didn’t see the ranking member hiding out down there. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Ranking Member. Participating in these Western Hemisphere Subcommittee hearings always feels like coming home, since I was the 

chair for a number of years about a decade ago, and so it is a pleasure to be here. 

I wanted to raise a few really important questions. Last month, 

I asked the Congressional Research Service to prepare a report for 

me on the impact of staff reductions at the U.S. Embassy Havana. 

I ask unanimous consent that this report be inserted into the 

record. 

Mr. COOK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Because of the Cuba health incidents, our Embassy staff has 

been drastically reduced from 50 Americans to 18. As a result, we 

are less able to process Cuban refugees, monitor human rights, and 

assist U.S. travelers. So no matter where one stands on Cuba policy, I think we can all agree on the importance of a functioning 

U.S. Embassy in Havana. It is essential to find a balance of protecting our diplomats and asserting our national interests. 

In December, Chairman Royce and I sent a letter to the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention urging them to take a leading 

role in investigating the health incidents that affected U.S. personnel in Cuba. I think it is a no-brainer that as our Nation’s top 

experts on health threats, the CDC should be at the forefront of 

this investigation, with the appropriate experts deployed in Havana. 

I was pleased that the ARB recommended, and I quote, that the 

Department engage the CDC to undertake a comprehensive medical study of the symptoms and clinical findings related to the incidents in Cuba. So I am pleased that the CDC is finally involved, 

but I am concerned and, frankly, perplexed that it has come so 

late. 

On August 16, my staff met with CDC investigators working on 

the Cuba health incidents, and they were on day four of their work. 

You heard that right. It is a year and a half after the first incidents 

took place, the CDC is only now just getting started. 

So I would like to ask Dr. Rosenfarb and Ambassador Bodde, 

could you explain why it took so long for the CDC to get to work 

38

on the Cuba health incidents? And why, on the other hand, did the 

CDC start their work on the confirmed China incident immediately? 

Dr. ROSENFARB. Sir, I would like to just reinforce that it has 

taken time to understand the extent of the symptoms and findings 

and injuries. You know, right now, in retrospect, we know what 

you know. Injuries happened to folks, but way back when these 

things first started appearing in December 2016 and over the 

course of the next several months, it wasn’t evident at that time. 

And then our first and foremost goal was to provide care to those 

people who were injured and do assessments. And we accomplished 

that over the next several months, from January 2017 going forward. 

Once we felt we had people properly cared for in the fall of 2017, 

we began talking to CDC. We met with CDC informally a number 

of times in the fall of 2017, and that led to a formal request from 

the Department to CDC in December 2017 for their active assistance. And we have been very happy with CDC to this point. They 

have been great partners, and we hope to benefit from their work 

going forward. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, let me ask you, Dr. Rosenfarb, because I certainly appreciate your efforts to treat the victims of the health incidents and to get to the bottom of what happened both in Cuba and 

in China. So I wanted to ask you about an article that was recently 

brought to my attention. 

I understand that the physician who first treated affected U.S. 

personnel was Michael Hoffer, a former military doctor, now at the 

University of Miami. A Time magazine article from June 2011 by 

Dr. Hoffer stated, and I quote:

‘‘A U.S. military doctor deployed in Iraq subjected troops 

suffering from traumatic brain injuries to treatment with 

an unapproved drug in which he had a financial stake that 

may have harmed them, Pentagon investigators report.’’

The article goes on to site an extensive Pentagon Inspector General report on this incident, and CBS News reported, and I quote, 

that investigators found the study did not use standard military 

concussion assessments on the soldiers, possibly resulting in substandard care. 

Doctor, have you reviewed these articles or the report of the Inspector General before Dr. Hoffer was brought on to treat U.S. Embassy personnel? And have you received these documents since 

then? 

Dr. ROSENFARB. I am aware of some of that. When this started 

to unfold back in early spring 2017, we, members of the U.S. Government medical team, reached out initially to Johns Hopkins University to try and figure out who would be the best placed person 

to see our personnel. 

If you recall, initially, the thoughts were that this was some sort 

of acoustic attack. The symptoms initially appeared to be localized 

to the acoustic, the ear system. We reached out to Johns Hopkins. 

There was a recommendation to go to Dr. Hoffer because of his experience in the military treating brain injuries at the University of 

Miami. 

39

So the first patients back in April and May 2017 were assessed 

by Dr. Hoffer. Subsequently, when we determined that it really 

probably was not localized to the acoustic system, it was more kind 

of a broader brain injury process, that is when we made efforts to 

find a center of excellence for brain injury and repair, and University of Pennsylvania was then identified, and patients have gone 

there since. 

Mr. ENGEL. But doesn’t it seem a bit strange that our diplomats 

suffering from concussion-like symptoms would be sent to a doctor 

who apparently did not use standard concussion assessments? Isn’t 

that strange? 

Dr. ROSENFARB. At the time, we felt he was the best qualified 

person, the recommendation we received, to do the initial evaluation. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. Thank you. 

If anyone else wants to comment. 

Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Congressman 

Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have heard words like Socialist, Communist, authoritarian, represses and abuses its citizens basic freedoms or freedoms that we 

would take for granted in the United States of America. And upon 

reflection, that sounds a lot like China, but here we are talking 

about Cuba. And I would submit there is a major difference, of 

course, between China and Cuba, and that is that China is a significant geopolitical rival, perhaps a foe. Certainly, China is having 

a significant military buildup and is threatening in ways that Cuba 

is not. I would reference the South China Sea and what is happening there as but one example. 

So with that all as a backdrop, the question is this: Should 

American foreign policy treat Cuba differently than how we treat 

China, with whom we have over $400 billion in trade going back 

and forth? And if we should treat Cuba differently than we treat 

China, why? If not, why not? 

Ambassador Merten, could you please take that first, and we will 

just work our way across to Ambassador Bodde and then Dr. 

Mazanec. And if Dr. Rosenfarb or Mr. Brown want to chime in too, 

that would be fine, but I don’t know if this is an area of expertise 

for you. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sure. Thanks for the question. I think in 

our analysis, the situation in China regarding our employees there 

compared to the situation in Cuba, they are very different. I think 

we would see them, and Ambassador Bodde can speak to this in 

greater detail, but I think we see them as sort of apples and oranges. 

We have 26 cases of people who have very, very similar symptoms, who have very similar effects. It seems to have really been 

targeted exclusively at our Embassy colleagues. The situation in 

China, to the best of my knowledge, we have one employee who has 

demonstrated similar symptoms. I don’t think our medical experts 

at this point are prepared to say it is the exact same situation that 

40

our colleagues in Cuba have been subjected to. So I think there is 

a fundamental difference we see, at this point anyway, in the cases. 

I will let my other colleagues talk. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, perhaps my question wasn’t clear. While certainly dozens of Americans suffering some kind of injury that we 

have not been able to define as to cause, it has to be something 

taken into account. I am thinking of a much bigger question, and 

the question is America’s relationship with China versus relations 

with Cuba, the nature of the government, the repression of rights, 

Communists, Socialists, whatever adjectives you want to use. 

So should we treat Cuba any different than we treat China? Because it seems that we treat China in a very favorable way relative 

to how we as Americans treat Cuba. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Again, sir, you know, I am familiar with 

the case, our dealings with China, only as far as they touch this 

case. I have never served in China. I am not an expert. I am not 

an expert on East Asia. My experience in our dealings with China 

is limited really to this case mostly, and I don’t see, because we see 

them as very different cases, that you can really make a comparison. 

I don’t disagree with you that China is a competitor certainly in 

the region. They are doing some things that we don’t find necessarily a positive in the region, but I think, you know, in terms 

of our discussion with Cuba on this issue that we have been talking 

about thus far here today, I can’t really say any more than I have 

already said. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, does anyone have an opinion on how we 

should be treating Cuba, given the way in which we treat other 

geopolitical rivals? It could be China. It could also be Russia. It 

could be any number of nations. 

Ambassador Bodde, do you? 

Ambassador BODDE. Sir, that is really outside my area of expertise. My feeling is that Ambassador Merten has made it clear. For 

this particular incident, we see them as two separate entities. In 

terms of how we treat Cuba, that is really a question of our overall 

Cuba policy. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Let me drop the comparison then. Should 

we treat Cuba more friendly or more harshly? 

Ambassador BODDE. I defer to my colleague from WHA for that. 

Ambassador MERTEN. I mean, I think we always have to evaluate our relations with countries based on the whole of our relationship. We have a long history over these past many years with 

Cuba. We have a large expat group from Cuba who lives in this 

country, many of whom experienced firsthand the depredations of 

the Cuban regime. They have made those their concerns and their 

interests very clear, not only to us at the State Department, but 

I am sure also to many of you here in Congress. Again, I am not 

an expert on Asia. I can’t speak to the details. 

Mr. BROOKS. I wasn’t asking about Asia. My question was strictly limited to Cuba. 

Ambassador MERTEN. But I think, you know, we have a policy 

on Cuba, which was dictated by the National Security Presidential 

Memorandum. We are enacting that policy. We believe it is appropriate. We believe it is correct. We believe we are doing the best 

41

we can to hold the Cuban regime accountable for lack of democracy 

and human rights abuses. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If we are promoting democracy in Cuba, we are trying to, why 

are we cutting some of these programs that provide money to the 

Cuban democracy effort? 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. First of all, as I 

noted in my opening comments, we are seeking to promote human 

rights and democracy in Cuba. We have been asked to do that by 

the NSPM. I will not pretend that the reduction in our staffing has 

made that task easier. It has not. Nevertheless, we believe we can 

remain engaged with human rights activists and pro-democracy activists in Cuba. 

In terms of funding specifically, as I understand it, there has 

been a global cut in these types of funding, so we haven’t singled 

out Cuba in particular. But this very much remains a priority for 

our colleagues at the Embassy and for us at the State Department. 

Mr. SIRES. You know, I wanted to add that maybe we treat Cuba 

differently because—I am sorry but my colleague left—they were 

actually putting nuclear weapons 90 miles away from Florida, and 

they have 30,000 people, 30,000 people in Venezuela controlling security apparatus in Venezuela. Now they have people in Nicaragua 

that are now starting to control the Nicaragua people. I just had 

a group of Nicaraguans in my office telling me that the people that 

were doing the torturing were the Cubans. And he was able to 

come to the United States and now he is going to be a voice for 

Nicaragua. 

So there is a long history here of a lot of things that this regime 

has been wanting to destroy this country and many of its efforts. 

They have been players in many other places. 

The other question that I have, you have a list of 180 entities associated with the Cuban military that you have that the State Department maintains. Are you considering updating that list? Because one of the things that I know, that the money that comes 

from Cuba basically is through tourism, but now the tourism has 

been taken away and put under the military. So, basically, tourism 

money goes to the military. So are you updating the list? And what 

has the effect been of this restricted list to the Cuban economy engagement? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sure. Yes, the list is a living document. 

The list wasn’t put together and closed. We review it periodically 

with our interagency partners based on new information that we 

get. 

I agree with you, the goal behind the Cuba restricted list that 

you are talking about was to do our utmost to ensure that elements 

of the Cuban state, particularly the ministry of defense, the Cuban 

military, wasn’t benefiting or profiting from particularly American 

tourists that are American people that happen to be visiting Cuba 

for a variety of reasons. 

42

So we hope to be channeling their activities in Cuba to the private sector, to B&Bs, that type of thing, small family private-sector 

run operations and, therefore, depriving the Cuban military of a 

source of income. I am not aware that we have done a quantitative 

analysis of the effect of that thus far. It is something we should 

probably do, but our belief is that it will have an impact on denying 

funding that would otherwise go to the Cuban state. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. This program that we had with doctors 

that the Cuban Government uses to send to different countries in 

lieu of payment to Cuba, some of these doctors have asked for asylum in some of these places. That program is gone, isn’t it? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I am not aware, sir. I can’t answer that. 

I will have to take that back and get you an answer. 

Mr. SIRES. Ambassador, do you know if it is gone, that program? 

Ambassador BODDE. I am sorry, sir. I am not aware. We will 

have to take that back and get an answer. 

Mr. SIRES. Anybody that is aware of this? Because there used to 

be doctors that would ask for asylum and we would grant it to 

them. 

Ambassador MERTEN. I don’t know that we have granted any 

asylum cases. I will have to go check on that. 

Mr. SIRES. Lately, you mean? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I don’t know that we ever have. I do know 

that there have been Cuban doctors who have been present in a 

number of countries. I was a master in Haiti. There were a number 

of Cuban doctors who were present there. I am not aware that any 

of them, certainly while I was there, ever asked for asylum, but, 

again, we will look into that and get an answer back to you. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I appreciate 

you all being here. 

I am from Florida. I represent the Third Congressional District, 

and we have gone down to Miami often to meet with the Cuban 

American population. And I want to build on that question that my 

colleague, Mr. Sires, brought up about the 180 individuals. That 

was a question that they brought up, so if you can get us that information of the individuals or businesses in Cuba that are blocked 

from doing business with the U.S., that would be very helpful so 

that we can put pressure on the appropriate entities and help 

make that come to fruition. And can you provide an update of 

where things stand regarding U.S. property claims? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sure. And we can get you that list, I believe, of Cuban entities that are on the list. If you or any of your 

colleagues or constituents are aware of other entities you believe——

Mr. YOHO. We have some. 

Ambassador MERTEN [continuing]. Please send that on to us. 

Mr. YOHO. We will send that on to you. 

Ambassador MERTEN. We will investigate and have a look. 

Regarding property claims, this has been one of our chief issues 

in terms of dealing with the Cuban Government. There are a lot 

of people who are now living in the United States, who have had 

43

property expropriated by the Cuban Government. We have laws, I 

believe, if I am not mistaken, under the Libertad Act, to punish 

folks who were caught trafficking in such properties. And certainly 

it is a major issue in terms that we want to see resolved with the 

Cuban Government. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, and this goes back to poor foreign policy. We 

should never have gone down this road without having this stuff 

worked out in the very beginning from the previous administration. 

To open up, you know, travel and going in there like everything is 

okay without having these things negotiated was a big, big mistake 

and a failure in foreign policy. 

I have got people from Florida and all over the United States, basically, that had businesses down there, they have ports, cruise 

ships are going in there, and there are family ports that these families got their property confiscated from, and the Cuban Government’s making a ton of money off of this illegal property. And for 

us to open up the borders or open up negotiations and relationships 

with them without having this worked out in the beginning was a 

terrible mistake in foreign policy, and this is something now we are 

trying to reel back. And once you let the toothpaste out of the tube, 

it is hard to get it back in and, unfortunately, we are here. 

So how do you move forward from this point? I mean, you look 

at the situation of the Cuban people today, they are no better off 

than they were 30 years ago, are they? Anybody want to claim they 

are? No. 

And so we are trying to build a democracy, and I am all for Radio 

Marti. We have been down to Miami, we have seen the broadcast 

studio, we have done interviews down there, and it is a great, it 

is a great tool to spread the message of liberty and freedom, which 

everybody in the world really wants and desires, yet you have got 

a Communist regime in there that is just not allowing that. So we 

can give pockets of that, and I think we should continue to do that, 

but boots on the ground. I think we need to relook at how we do 

things down there. 

Does anybody have any ideas of what would be outside of the box 

that you are able to talk about? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sir, I would be happy, my colleagues from 

the Cuba desk, would be happy to have some discussions with you. 

I am not going to speculate here on possible policy avenues. I don’t 

think it would be appropriate for me to do that. 

Mr. YOHO. Anybody else here? No? No takers. 

Okay. How about vacancies at the State Department? I know it 

was talked about a little bit, the lack of the confirmed leadership 

at the State Department impacted by State Department’s response 

to the targeted attacks in Havana. Where are we at with the people 

that should be put into place and they are being held up or not 

being confirmed? 

Ambassador BODDE. Sir, I am chairman of the ARB. We looked 

at this very issue, and one of the things we found when we were 

looking at it was that virtually everyone involved in responding to 

this crisis was acting in an acting capacity. It was the view of the 

Accountability Review Board that perhaps might have slowed down 

the response, that people didn’t feel they had the necessary auVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:06 Dec 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\090618\31450 SHIRL
44

thorities to do the jobs they had to do. That is one of the recommendations the Accountability Review Board made. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. And then let me just touch on the doctors in 

Cuba. President Obama, I thought, did us a great favor by getting 

rid of the wet-foot/dry-foot policy. We have got people down in, 

again, Florida. We saw the refugees coming over in boats, but when 

he got rid of the wet-foot/dry-foot policy, that virtually stopped. 

And I thought he did that for the betterment of America and 

keeping the Cubans safe from crossing that strait, but what we 

found out, he did that to appease the Castro regime, to keep his 

doctors from coming over here. Because the doctors that they farm 

out to the rest of world bring in about $18 billion of revenue to the 

Cuban Government. So he did this to better off the Cuban Government, not the Cuban people or our foreign policy, and I think it is 

another shameful thing that that administration did. 

And with that, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Congresswoman Kelly. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Ambassador Merten, when President Trump announced his intent to cancel President Obama’s deal with Cuba, one of the stated 

aims of his new approach was to support the Cuban people. The 

policy curbed travel to and trade with Cuba and almost immediately the impact was clear: Cancellations at private bed and 

breakfast, restaurants that were accustomed to flocks of foreign patrons now empty, large tour groups set to hire a private classic car 

chauffeur service began receiving cancelations of their contracts. 

Of President Trump’s rhetoric and restrictive travel, regulations 

resulted in ambiguity, I would say, that caused U.S. travel to Cuba 

to drop by as much as 40 percent in the first part of 2018. Less 

independent travel means less revenue for Cuba’s entrepreneurs 

who have risked so much for the chance to determine their economic future, many of which catered to those U.S. travelers. One 

restauranteur quoted by The Washington Post cites a 70 percent 

dip in business compared with the year prior. 

The stated intent of the policy was to help the Cuban people, but 

they don’t feel supported. And you kind of have been asked this before, but what changes do you plan to enact to carry out the policy 

stated intent to truly help the Cuban people? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thank you for the question. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the NSPM not only reaffirms our 

embargo on Cuba, but also maintains the statutory ban on tourism. 

People who go to Cuba under one of the broad licenses given by the 

Treasury Department are not really, strictly speaking, supposed to 

be there as tourists. 

Our goal is to deny the Cuban regime, particularly the Ministry 

of Defense and Cuban military, a stream of revenue that they had 

had before. There may be some collateral effect of this in that fewer 

people may be going, and fewer people going means less business 

to some of these private sector entities, which we certainly do want 

to see helped and we do want to see them thrive. But in an economic system where the incentives are, for lack of a better term, 

corrupted as they are in Cuba because you have the state which 

45

is really involved in virtually every aspect of the economy, it is 

hard to do both of those things simultaneously. 

So I understand your concern, but I hope I have explained the 

policy point on that. 

Ms. KELLY. I understand it is hard to do both at the same time. 

But I guess in a way it seems like, at least for a little while, there 

was some economic development, people were more than surviving 

but thriving, and now, we pulled that back. So I wonder how we 

look in their minds also. 

You said in your statement that the Cuba Internet Task Force 

should be receiving a report by late summer, so I assume any day 

now. What are the Cuban Government’s plans for expanding internet access? 

Ambassador MERTEN. We have had some discussions on this. Obviously, from our point of view—I shouldn’t say obviously—from 

our point of view, one of the key tools that the regime has used 

against the Cuban people is control of information. And one of our 

goals is to increase internet penetration in that society. We believe 

this will ultimately be not only to the good of the Cuban people but 

to the good of society at large, which will expose them to a world 

that doesn’t have controlled information. 

So we’re going to continue to beaver away at this. This is not 

going to be an area where we are going to see success from today 

to tomorrow. But I think, you know, constant pressure on them 

from us, from other partners, and increasing demands from the 

Cuban people will be able to see us over time, see some success in 

this area. 

Ms. KELLY. You are scheduled to complete your work by June 

2019 with this. Is there any danger that another country can step 

in and take advantage where we haven’t been able to step in? 

Ambassador MERTEN. You know, you have about exceeded my 

knowledge on this particular subject. I am happy to take that back 

and get back to you with an answer, but I don’t want to mislead 

you. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson, 21⁄2 minute question, then we are going to adjourn. 

Mr. WILSON. My goodness. Well, thank you, Chairman Cook. 

And, Secretary Merten, I am really grateful that I see a bipartisan concern here, Congressman Sires and Congressman Yoho, 

and that is the relationship that exists between the Cuban people 

and their government, and in particular, the economic system 

where the Cuban military actually controls a phenomenal percentage of whatever enterprises. We didn’t call them businesses. What 

percentage does the military control? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I don’t know that off the top of my head, 

sir. We can get back to you on that. 

Mr. WILSON. It was my understanding it was a very high percentage and that whatever funding goes to the enterprise actually 

is to benefit the Cuban military and the oppression of the people 

of Cuba, not for what would be perceived as possible. 

Also, in Cuba, when American tourists go there or tourists from 

around the world who have always gone there, they have never 

been barred from visiting the totalitarian state. But the people who 

46

are at the enterprises, like a resort, a hotel, or whatever, have confiscated property from somebody else—what currency are the workers paid? Are they paid in Cuban currency or are they paid in U.S. 

dollars, or do they receive some type of script? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I may be wrong, sir, I can remember back 

in the 1990s, they used to be paid in dollars, but I believe that has 

changed. They are now paid in some sort of Cuban currency, I believe. 

Mr. WILSON. And it is really not a currency that can be used anywhere except at the company store, again, to keep the people oppressed. And it is really sad to me that anyone who would go there 

would think that they might be promoting some level of freedom 

and democracy when they are not. 

A final question. Dr. Mazanec, in regard to your written testimony, ordering the personnel to be moved from Havana, is that 

still your view that that was correct to do, in light of the attacks? 

Mr. MAZANEC. Thank you, sir. So that was one of the preliminary 

observations we had in terms of the way the State Department has 

had to respond. Because of the unknown nature of the incidents, 

they have had to mitigate risks. And you are correct, one of the 

ways they did so was by the order of departure and then the reductions that were made permanent this spring. I think that is something that we will continue to look into as we complete our ongoing 

work and evaluate the response. 

Mr. WILSON. We appreciate all of your service. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Real quick, Mr. Espaillat, I will give you 11⁄2 minutes, 

and then we are going to adjourn to the SCIF for the classified setting. And you can have 10 minutes, sir. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. A GAO report and an Accountability Review 

Board report also referred to the events in Cuba as incidents. Ambassador Merten, was this an incident or an attack, one of the two? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I think the State Department and Secretary Tillerson have come to the belief that what happened in 

Cuba is an attack, because all the information we have seen is that 

it seems to be targeted specifically at our Embassy and one other 

Embassy that we know of, Canada’s, employees, diplomats. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Ambassador Bodde, incident or attack? 

Ambassador BODDE. The State Department has come to the position that they were attacked, sir. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Dr. Rosenfarb, an incident or attack? 

Dr. ROSENFARB. I agree with Ambassador Bodde. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Mr. Brown? 

Mr. BROWN. I put in the category of attack based on we have 26 

injured Americans. Those attacks do not seem to extend outside the 

diplomatic community. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Dr. Mazanec, an incident or an attack? 

Mr. MAZANEC. Sir, we deferred and used the language that the 

State Department did in our report. But I think this issue emphasizes the importance of the Department addressing some of the 

communication challenges we identified so they can make these determinations as promptly as possible. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

47

Real quick, pursuant to committee rule 7, the members of the 

subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements be included. Without objection, the hearing record will be open for 5 

business days to allow statements and other things. 

We are going to adjourn down to the SCIF. It will be upon conclusion of votes. 

This meeting is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Paul Cook (CA-08), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You arc respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing ofthe Committee on F orcign Affairs to be held 

by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and 

available live on the Committee \Yebsite at hrtp://y,-'\Y\v.Fore1P"nAftb.1r-s house_fYU\} 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday. September 6. 20 I R 

2:00p.m. 

U S. PolicY Toward Cuba 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten 

Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

l11e Honorable Peter Bodde 

Coordinator 

Health Incidents Response Task Force 

U S. Department of State 

Charles Rosenfarb, M.D 

Medical Director 

Bureau of Medical Services 

US. Department of State 

Mr. Todd Brown 

Assistant Director tOr Countem1easures 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

U S. Department of State 

Brian M. Mazanec. Ph.D. 

Acting Director 

International Atiairs and Trade 

US. Government Accountability Office 

By Direction of the Chairman 
51

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SURCOMMITTFE ON _______ 11_e_JJ_'e_st_e~_·11_H_e_m_isJ_' e_re_' ______ HEARING 

Day_---=1.:.:1t.:.:u::._r::.:'"::.:h"'t.l_' __ Date September 6, 2018 Room, ___ ~2:c:lce7~2 ___ _ 

Sta•·ting Time _ __,2'-':"-00!~Jl~""'"'----Ending Time -~3-_.:-"1"-0t"''J"'I/'--

Recesses [ __ I L___to __ ) L___to __ ) L___to __ )( __ to_) L___to __ )( __ to __ ) 

Presiding Mcmhcr(s) 

C!tainuau Cool• 

Check all oftlte following tfwt IIJlJ!(J'.' 

Open Session 0 Executive ~sed) Session D 

Tele,·ised U 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

"l! .. \~. Policy Tmvartl Cuba" 

SIJRCOMMITTRR MRMRRRS PRESENT: 

Electronically Rccord£!!_ftapcd) []] 

Stenographic Record l:LJ 

C/wirmrm CrJIJk, Ranking Member Sires, Rep. Broofr.;; Rep. Yoho, Rep. Kelly, Rep. E.sprd/1(1/, Rep. C(lsfro 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with ern *if they are not members of filii committee.) 

Rep. H11ge!, Rep. Wilson 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes m NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include Jifle, agency, departmenl, or organization) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List mty statements submittedfor the record.) 

Clwirmrm Cook QFRs 

Rep. Engel SFRs 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

01' 

TIME ADJOURNED __ J_:_IO_.'f!_FI_I_ 
52

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

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53

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK


31450e-1.eps
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9onqressionai R;::eSo;'e;::arc;c"-11 o;See:AV-"i"'ce'-----·----

In early March 2018, the State Depattment began a permanent staftlng plan at the U.S. Embassy in 

Havana, opemting it as an "unaccompanied post" without family members. The cltange took place 

because the temporary "ordered departure" status fort he embasS)' had reached its maximum allowable 

clays ( 180 days is the maximum days allowed for ordered departure, after which staff must be reassigned 

or sent back to their post). According to the State Department, "tile embassy will continue to operate with 

the minimum personnel necessary to perform core diplomatic and consular functions, similar to the level 

of emergency staffing maintained during ordered departure. 1'-l 

Impact of Diplomatic Staff Reduction on Emlmssy Oflcrations and Activitics:5 

According to U.S. Embassy Havana oftlcials, before the ordered departure, the embassy's U.S, staff was 

over 50, but as a result ofthc change in status the State Department has set the level of emergency staftlng 

at a maximum of 18, a reduction of about two-thirds. In early August 2018, however, the embassy had a 

staftlng level of 14, with several ofthnse positions tilled hy Foreign Setvicc Ofticct·s (FSOs) on 

temporary duty (TDY) or retired FSOs employed on an intermittent basis through the Reemployed 

Annuitant/\VAE (When Actually Employed) Program. Several months earlier, in April 20 1&, the embassy 

l'eportedly had only 10 diplomats, accOl'ding to the ltfiami Herald.6 

Because of the reduction in U.S. staft; US, ofllcials maintain that those oft1cers at post often wear two or 

tlll'ee hats in tenus ofre.spnnsihilities. For example, the current Deputy Chief of Mission is serving as 

Acting Chal'ge d' Affai•·es and also oversees the embassy's I'Liblic Affairs Section. The Political Section 

used to have several omcers covering economic and political issues, in eluding human rigl1ts, but due to 

the staff reduction, there is only one official heading the section. 

A challenge fm· embassy opemtions is that most positions al'e limited to a one-yea.· tour of duty, making it 

dift1cult for the continuity of operations and familiarity with working in Cuba7 While the use of locallyemployed statT (LES) abroad often enhances the continuity of operations at overseas posts as FSOs begin 

and end tours of duty, managing and training LES in Cuba (of which there are between200 and 300) is 

more challenging with a limited U.S. staff overseeing operations. Contributing to the challenge is that as 

an unaccompanied post, Eligible Family Members (EFMs) are not available to serve as locally-employed 

staff at the embassy; before the ordered departure, tl1e embassy employed about 14 EFMs. Overseeing the 

upkeep and maintenance of 45 residences is also a challenge with so few U.S. stat[ The embassy is 

reluctant to give up unoccupied residences because there is no guarantee that 1hey would get them back in 

the future and because the cost of bringing new housing up to appropriate standards in Cuba is high. 

Visa Processiug, The stall reduction at the U.S. Embassy in Havana led to a suspension of almost all visa 

pweessing at the embassy. Most Cubans applying for nonimmigrant visas are required to apply at another 

U.S. embassy or consulate overseas. Exceptions include those applying for diplomatic or official visas 

and those with a life-threating medical condition requiring treatment in the United States.' The suspension 

of most nonimmig•·ant visa processing has increased the costs for Cuban musicians, dancers, and other 

artists who now have to travel io a tllitd c{)untry to apply for a nonimmigrant visa if they want to perform 

in the United States; as a result} some have cancelled tours in the United States. 9 The suspension has also 

4 U.S. Departmellt of State, "End of Ordered Departure at U.S. Emba:;sy Havana.," Marclt 2~ 2018. 

$This section is bas~d in pnrt 011 meetings with U.S. ofllcirnls nttl1e "U.S. Embassy~ Hnvnna, Cuba, Augmt 5-8, 201&. 

6 l'vllmi Whitefield, ''U.S, Dmbassy ht Cuba: Diplomatic Populations I 0,11 Miami Ilerald, April6, 2018. 

7 One~ytm and muc'"omp;;mie(ltuurs me 1wt tmcommu11 in the fofdgu Servic-e in su·c:,llle~l higlHhnmt posts. 

8 U.S. Embassy in Cubn, Nonimmigmnt Visas, at https://cu.uscmbassy.gov!Yisas/nonimmigrmtH·isas~2/ 

9"for example. the internationally~ known Cuban drmce company, I,izt AlfGnso Dance Cuba, cancelled its Filll201 1 tour in the 

United State-S. Other trips cancelled illcluded a Cltban theater company that had been i1tvjtcd to perform at an inh;rnaliotml 

test ivai in Cl1icago1 Cuban chefS wl1o hud hwited to participate in a cooking competition in Florida, and the National S,ymphony 

of Cuba, whicl1luul phmned a U.S. tour in 2019. See: Isabel Albee, "Cuba's Cullma! :Sector Slammed by Partial Closure of U.S. 
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made it more <lifflcult for Cubans visiting family in the United States and for Cuban cuenlapropislas 

(private sector wmkers) traveling to the United States to bring back inputs for their businesses. In 2013, 

the United States had begun granting multiple entry visas~ good for five years~ for Cubans vbiling the 

United Slates. As lhose visas expire; Cubans will need to lrm:cllo a third country to request a new vba if 

they wam to vi>it tile United Stales. 

Because of the staff reduction in Havana, the processing of immigrant visa applications and interviews 

initially was transferred to tile U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Columbia, brtllllen beginning April 1, 20!8, was 

transferred to the U.S. Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana. In June 2018, the National Visa Center in 

Porlsmmtlh~ New Hampshire began scheduling Cuban immigrant visa interviews ut the embas3y in 

Guyana. 10 Guyana does not require a visas for Cubans entering the country, as Colombia did, which 

makes it easier for Cubans to travel there for immigrant visas. Even before the State Department 

transferred Cuban immigrant processing to Guyana, the country had become a popular destination for 

Cubans going there to shop. The cost oftraveling to Guyana, however, reportedly is high, with !lights in 

1 he $700 to $1 ,200 mnge. ll 

In a !994 bilateral migration accord with Cuba, the Vnited States committed to issue 20,000 travel 

documents annually. I! met that commitment in FY20 17, but the embassy staffreduclion has negatively 

affected the ability ofthe United States to meet its commitment in FY20!8. The State Department 

acknowledged inApril20l$ that it would not he able to issue 20,000 travel document~ for this fiscal 

year. u A review of preliminary statistics of immigrant vi;SttS issued in the first nine months ofFY20 I R 

through June 20 IS show~ that less than 4~000 irnmigrant visas were granted to Cuban nationals. 1:1 

Since the staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, information posted on the website of the U.S. 

Embassy in Havana has stated that the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) me determining arrangements for processing applications under the Cuban Fmnily Reunification 

Parole Program (CFRP), a program administered by DHS's U.S. Citi7enship and Immigration Services 

(LISC!S). 14 The CFRPwas established in 2007 by USClS to help the United States meet its annual 

obligation under the 1994 U.S.-Cuba migration accord." Staff reduc.tions have also led USCIS to suspend 

operations al its fle1d oflice in Havana. Accotding to U.S, Etn.bassy Havana ofllcials, in past years, amund 

75% of the immigrant travel documents issued fi:w Cuban nationals annually were issued under the CFRP. 

In October 2017, State Department oftici~lls indicated that they would work with DHS to ensure 

continued operation oft he CFRP, but no plans have been annmmeed since then. 16 Given that a mqjority of 

immigrant travel documents issued for Cubans are fi·om the CFRP program, it could be dift1cult for the 

United States to reach the annual 20,000 target level without the CFRP program being reactivated and 

without USCJS reestablishing its presence at the embassy. 

Emba).sy,"Huffitlgfon PI)Sl, Ntwemher 2. 2017; and "Visa Dlfiicu!tic.<; Force Cuhan Symphony to CanceiO.S. Tour," A~sociated 

Press, April4, 2018. ' 

10 U.S. EmbDssy in Cubn, fmmigrant Vi~as, at https://cu.usembassy.gov!Yism>/immigrant,..vi~HISI 

n Doreen Hemlock, ''Cubm1s Are Flocking to Guyana for Economic l{easollS- but Thet-ejs a Twist,'1 Miami Jlerald, June 28. 

2018. 

12 U.S. Dcpartnlcnt of State, "C11ban Compliance with the l'vHgratlon Accords, (October 20 I 7 to March 201 S)/' report to 

Congress,Aprill2j2018, 

13 Visa statistics are availttble from the Staie Department's Bureau of Consular A fl:1tirs at https:://traveLstate.gov/contentitravellcn/ 

legal/visa-hm'O/visa·slntistics.html. 

I.J< U.S. Embnssy in Ct1ba, Frequently Asked Questions, at https://cn.nscmbassy.gov/frequently-asked-qucstions/, 

15 For ba'Ckgrmmd on the CFRP pwgmnt, sec USC1S, '"The Cuban FamHy Reunification Pmulc Program/' at 

https:!/www.uscls,gov/hunmnitnritm/llmmmitarinn~paroh:/ruban-farnily~reunifknfkm-parole-progr.am 

16 Nora Gllmez Torr~s~ ';U.S. Will ~bintain the Family Hemtitica!ion Progt·am JOr Cubanst Miami Herald, October 12, 2017. 
56

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RejilgeePJ'ocessing. According to U.S. of!lcials, the stafTreduction at the U.S. Embassy inllavana also 

led to the closure of the Refugee Section that had administered the U.S. RefltgeesAdmissionProgram in 

Cuba, and the embassy is not accepting any new applications Ol' pl'Ocessing re!itgee cases. The. section 

was run by the State Departmenfs Bureau ofPoptllation, Refugees and Migration (PRM) ln conjunction 

with USCIS and the Oft1ce of Refugee Resettlement of the Department of Health and Human Services. 

Embassy oftlcials estimate that it would take 2 to 3 years to restart operations in Havana. As a result, no 

Cubans have been admitted to the United States as refugees since September 2017. In FY2017, at least 

177 Cubans were admitted to the United States as refugees. 17 

Ametkan Citizen Sen•ice.'f, Because of the staff reduction, tlte U.S. Embassy h-1 Havana suspended 

rouliueAmt:ricau Citizen ser,,iccs in Cuba, including first time passport applications, routine passport 

renewals, and authentication services, As oflate September 2017, the U,S. Embassy has been only able to 

provide emergency a~sistanct:- to U.S. citizens in Cuba.H As noted by U.S. embassy oilicials, those U.S. 

oftlcials remaining have had the inct·eased burden of often serving as duty oflkers oulskk normal 

business hours. 

On tlte Gmmu! Reporting mul Outrellcfl. The staff reduction at the embassy has made it more difllcult 

for U.S. diplomats to cover significant economic and pol !tical developments in Cuba, including outreach 

to civil society and human rights activists. \Vfth 1ecent developments such as a new Cuban president, new 

regulations on Cuba's private. sectm~ and the Cuban government embarking on a process to update the 

country's constitution, U.S. policymakNs may benefit fl'om a fully staffed embassy with the abillty to 

analyze these and other ongoing developments in Cuba. 

Not having FSOs focused on the human rights situation also potentially diminishes the ability of the State 

Department to 1mderstand the situation on the ground and report on breaking developments. For example 

before the statTreduction, the embassy's Political Section had two statTmembcrs focusing on lmman 

rights. 

Becm1se of the drawdoWti in staft; the embassy has not conducted trips to monitorthe Cuban 

government's treatment of returned migmnts. Last year, before the drawdown, embassy staff conducted 

monitoring trips within Havana, met and spoke to retumed migmnts, and also spoke by phone with 

at'Otmd additiot1alretmned migmnts outside of Havana. Before the stalfreduction, the embassy also 

maintained open hours for Iepatriated migrants to visit the Refugee Section to mport any mistt·eatment~ 

but, as noted above, the Retitgee Section was closed because of the statlreductian. 19 

17 This nmnber reflc~ts F¥2017 ::;t<.tti:rtics through Svptemb~:r 11 2017. S~;t:: U$ D~pattmen! of Stale, '·Cuban Compliance with 

tlJe Migration t\-ccords, (March 2017 to September 2017)," reportt{) Congress, October 18, 2017. 

13 U.S. Emb<~ssy in Cubn, U.S, CiliJen Sen'ic:es~ at https://ctwscmbassy.gov/n-s-dtizcn-scr''iccs/. 

19 U.S. Depatllnenl of State, "Cubun Compliance \vith the !'.,Iigration Accords, (Octuber 2017 to Murch 2018),'' report to 

Congress~ April 12~2018, 
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Chairman Paul Cook 

Questions for the Record 

WHJ;;M Hearing: "US. Policy Toward Cuba" 

September6, 2018 at 2:00p.m. in Rayburn Room 2172 

TO: Mr. Kenneth Merten (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs) 

(I) Title TV of the Cuban Libertad Law: Title TV ofthe 1996 Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act 

requires that ifthe Secretary of State determines there is trafficking by a foreign entity in the confiscated 

property of an American in Cuba, then he or she shall revoke the visas of company officers and their 

families. li1 May 2018, Bloomberg reported that a Turkish company, Global Ports Holding_ signed a 

deal with the Cuban government to upgrade the docks in Havana to boost tourist traffic to Cuba. 

However, those docks were confiscated ±rom a U.S. company without compensation (Cuba Claim 

#2492). Similarly. a Chinese company. China CommLmications Construction Company (CCCC) and 

its subsidiary China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), reportedly are upgrading the port in 

Santiago de Cuba, another property confiscated without compensation from its rightful owner (Cuba 

Claim #1231). li11ight of these potential violations of Title IV of the Cuban Libcrtad Law, how arc you 

approaching these issues and the penalties on officers of those companies? 

Merten: The Department takes all allegations of potential trafficking in confiscated property under 

Title TV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERT AD) Act of 1996 seriously. The 

Department continues to gather and review infom1ation on potential tra±Iicking in confiscated property 

and will take the appropriate action consistent with Title IV of the LIBERT AD Act. 

(2) U.S. Propcrtv Claims: There arc reportedly 5,913 U.S. claims for expropriated properties valued at $1.9 

billion. Can you provide an update of where things stand regarding tl1is issue? 

Merten: The resolution of claims for expropriated properties is a priority for the Department. The 

United States and Cuba have met three times since December 2015 to discuss claims. Most recently. 

in Havana in January 20 17_ the delegations exchanged views on technical details and methodologies 

regarding outstanding claims. Outstanding U.S. claims include claims of U.S. nationals that were 

certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, claims related to unsatisfied U.S. court 

judgments against Cuba, and claims held by the United States Govennnent. \Ve continue to press the 

Cuban government on this issue and at the last Bilateral Commission meeting with Cuba on June 14 

proposed scheduling an additional round of talks. We arc working to identify dates for this round of 

discussions. 

(3) Moncv Lam1dcring- Odcbrccht Scandal: Have you seen any evidence that Cuban govcnnncnt o±Iicials 

directly participated in the Odebrecht money laundering operation° 

Merten: l11c Department of State is aware ofOdcbrccht investments in Cuba_ specifically at the Maricl 

Speci<1l Economic Development Zone. We <1re not <!ware of the Cub<1n govemmenfs direct 

participation in Odebrechfs money laundering operation. The Cuban goven1ment's economic 

practices arc opaque and difficult to account ±or. 

(4) North Korea Ties: Have you seen any evidence that the Cuban government has strengthened ties with 

the North Korean government within tl1e last six months? 
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Merten: In recent months, senior North Korean diplomats and Workers' Party leaders have visited 

Cuba for meetings with Cuban leaders. Most recently. in late August, top Cuban leaders met with highranking North Korean official Choe Ryong Hae. Media report Choe discussed ways to improve the 

countries' bilateral relationship. 

(5) Cuba Restricted List: How many times has the Cuba Restricted List maintained by the State Department 

been updated in the Federal Register since the November 20 17 regulations took effect0 Are there any 

plans to update the list of individuals or businesses in Cuba that arc blocked from doing business with 

the U.S." 

Merten: The Cuba Restricted List is a living document. We continue to review it periodically as new 

infonnation becomes available. The Department has not yet published any updates to the Cuba 

Restricted List in the Federal Register since we originally published the list. 

(6) U.S. Assistance to Cuba: From FY96 to FY18 Congress appropriated around $344 million in funding 

for Cuba democracy efforts. In FY 18, Congress appropriated $20 million for Cuba. For FY 19, Trump 

requested $10 million for democracy and civil society assistance in Cuba. What arc the Trmnp 

Administration's top priorities for democracy assistance to Cuba? Hovv· is democracy assistance under 

the Administration different, if at all, from past Administrations" 

Merten: T11e Administration's Cuba policy armounccd in the J nne 2017 National Security Presidential 

Memorandum, '·Strent,1:hening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba'' makes clear our 

continued support of democracy and human rights on the island and the United States' intention to 

demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people in the face of a repressive regime. The Department and 

USATD continue to administer U.S. government-funded programs to promote democracy-building 

efforts and support the critical work of human rights defenders on the islm1d. These progrmns aim to 

assist and support independent civil society in Cuba. by giving independent nongovernmental 

organizations and individuals tools to build their organizational capacity and effectiveness, providing 

training on international laws ar1d advocacy, supporting civic initiatives that offer concrete policy 

altematives to the Cubm1 people, and facilitating the free flow of infonnation to, from, and within the 

island. 

(7) State Sponsor ofTerrorism: In 20 15, the Obama Administration rescinded Cuba· s designation as a State 

Sponsor of Terrorism. This announcement vvas a reversal of longst:'lnding U.S. pohcy and ignored 

Cuba's relations with Russia, its continued support for rogue regimes, and its record of systemic human 

rights abuses. Is the T mmp Administration reconsidering re-designating Cuba a state sponsor of 

terrorism? 

Merten: Cuba's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation was rescinded in 2015 after careful review of 

all available evidence. which led to the State Department" s assessment that Cuba met the statutory 

criteria for rescission. As a matter of law, in order for any country to be designated as a State Sponsor 

of Terrorism. the Secretary of State must determine that the country "s govemment has repeatedly 

provided support for acts of intenmtional terrorism. \Vhile \Ve continue to have significant concerns 

ar1d disagreements with a wide rm1gc of Cuba's policies. the Secretary has not detcm1ined that the 

govcnunent of Cuba has repeatedly provided support for acts of intemational terrorism since its 2015 

State Sponsor of Terrorism designation rescission. The Department of State consistently reviews and 

evaluates available information and intelligence ±rom a variety of sources on Cuba. 

(8) U.S. Fugitives: Cuba has long harbored fi.1gitives wanted in the U.S., including Jomme Chesimard. who 

has been on the FBl"s '"Most Wanted Terrorist List"' for the 1973 murder of a New Jersey State Police 

otlicer. What efforts has the Trump Administration taken to resolve this issue? 
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Merten: Facilitating the return offugitives is one of this Administration's top priorities in our bilateral 

engagement with Cuba. T11c Department of State. in conj m1ction with the Department of J usticc and 

other relevant agencies. actively engages \Yith the Cuban goven1ment on fugiti-ve issues through our 

bilateral Law Enforcement Dialogue and associated technical exchanges. Through this dialogue, we 

continue to press the Cuban govemment to retum these fugitives. We continue to work with relevant 

U.S. agencies and the Cuban govemment to push for the return of individuals like Chesimard so they 

can face justice in the United States. The most recent U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue was held 

on July 10. 2018. Although Chesimard is still at large. the United States is benefiting from ongoing law 

enforcement cooperation with the Government of Cuba, which has produced tangible achievements on 

fugitive returns. In August, at the request of U.S. federal authorities, Cuban authorities detained a U.S. 

citizen and domestic terrorist suspect on the FBI Most Wanted Domestic Terrorist List traveling 

through Cuba on the way to Russia and returned him to U.S. custody, where he is now facing federal 

charges. 

(9) Trademark Registration Issue: Under the Obama Administration, a trademark registration was granted 

to Cubaexport, an entity owned by the Cuban government, for Havana Club mm, which was based on 

a trademark and business that was previously confiscated by the Cuban regime. Under the Obama 

Administration. the State Department reviewed the Treasury Department's OFAC license application 

for the trademark registration renewal and suggested that a change in foreign policy towards Cuba 

allowed the approval of an OFAC license tor this action. Previously, the Bush Administration had 

denied an OF AC license for this exact san1c application. and the trademark registration should have 

expired for lack of renewal 10 years prior. What is the Trump Administration's position on this 

trademark registration issue? Has the to reign policy towards Cuba remained the same so that this action 

should not be reviewed? 

Merten: The Department of State has not taken any position on ownership of the Havana Club 

trademark. which I understand is the subject of ongoing litigation. At this time. there is no action 

pending before the Department of State related to the Havana Club trademark. For further inforn1ation 

regarding licensing issues. we defer to the Department of the Treasury. 

(10) BBG- Ofl:ice of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB): From FY84 to FYIS, Congress appropriated about 

$882 million in broadcasting radio and television programming to Cuba. The Trump Administration's 

FYI9 request is for almost $13.7 million. \\tl1at mechanisms have been most effective in reaching the 

Cuban public? How is OCB programming adapting to modem methods for dissemination of 

infon11ation? 

Merten: We defer to the Office of Cuba Broadcasting regarding information on its mechanisms for 

outreach and levels of success. Separately. the Department rigorously seeks to reach the Cuban people 

through a variety of means. including through our public diplomacy programs and social media 

messaging. The Embassy and U.S. diplomats based in Washington regularly meet with Cuban 

intellectuals, activists and dissidents to discuss the conditions in Cuba and U.S. policy initiatives. The 

Department issues policy statements and support for Cuban activists on social media. including through 

social media accounts belonging to Embassy Havana, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Wcstcm 

Hemisphere A±Tairs, the Bureau of Human Rights. Democracy, and Labor, and Spanish -language 

accounts managed by the Miami Media Hub. Whenever possible, the Department strives to include 

independent Cubans in the International Visitor Leadership Program and in educational exchanges such 

as the Humphrey Fellowship. Through its democracy and human rights programs, the Department 

supports a robust portfolio of programs that facilitate the free flow of infonnation to. from. and within 

the island using both online and traditional media. 
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(11) Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program: In 2017, the Obama Administration cancelled the 

program that allowed Cuban medical personnel ;\110 were forced to work abroad by the Cuban 

government to apply for parole in the U.S. What is the Tnnnp Administration's stance on this policy, 

and is there any consideration of reinstating it? 

Merten: The Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program (CMPP) was created in 2006 to provide an 

avenue for Cuban medical professionals to travel to the United States, since at the time exit controls 

limited their departure except on medical missions. In 2013, the Cuban govemmcnt lifted travel 

restrictions for a majority of Cubans, eliminating the principal basis for this program. On January 12, 

2017, the United States and Cuba sigued the Joint Statement under which the United States agreed to 

end the CMPP. T11e State Department and Department of Homeland Security have no current plans to 

restore this program. 

(12) State Response to GAO Report: GAO found that internal communication failures and State's 

policy, procedure, and process led to a delay in the convening of the CubaAccmmtability Review Board 

(ARB) by nearly eight months. In response to GAO's recommendation, what steps is State taking to 

revise its policies to ensure that State-s Office of Management Policy_ Rightsizing_ and Innovation 

(M/PRI) is aware of all potential incidents'' 

Merten: T11e Department's Foreign A±Iairs Manual (FAM) outlines an incident vetting process, which 

the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing_ and Innovation (M/PRI) coordinates. T11e Department 

is currently modifYing the FAM to more clearly articulate standard operating procedures and policies 

for intemal communication in cases that involve injury_ loss oflitc, or destruction of property. In such 

cases_ M/PRI will ensure incidents arc promptly evaluated to detcm1inc whether Accountability Review 

Board (ARB) statute criteria apply. 
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Chairman Paul Cook 

Questions for the Record 

WHJ;;M Hearing: "US. Policy Toward Cuba" 

September6, 2018 at 2:00p.m. in Rayburn Room 2172 

TO: Dr. Brian Mazanec (Government Accountability Office) 

(I) Caring for Affected Persom1el & Familv Members: In your written testimony. you identified multiple 

issues related to State· s provision of care for affected U.S. personnel. including a need for special 

authority for domestic medical evacuations, ditliculty for some U.S. personnel to obtain approval for 

excused absences for ongoing treatment related to the attacks in Havana. and long-tem1 care challenges. 

Are there any new legislative authorities needed to address these challenges 0 How do you recollllllend 

Congress support the Department in its efforts to address these issues and prioritize the care of its 

people? 

Mazanec: As discussed in GA0-18-695T, we have identified multiple issues related to State's provision 

of care for affected U.S. personnel. but our review of State's response to the incidents in Cuba is ongoing. 

We are continuing to follow up on these and other issues related to caring for U.S. personnel during the 

course of our ongoing work. At this time. we have not detcm1incd that any new legislative authorities arc 

needed. but we continue to gather information about the cause and c±Tects of these challenges. If we 

conclude th<It new legisbtive <Iuthorities would assist State in <1ddressing these ch<IIlenges or identifY other 

ways for Congress to support State in its e±lorts to care ±or its personneL we will incorporate those matters 

±or congressional consideration as part of our forthcoming report on this issue. 
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