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51–023 PDF 2010

S. Hrg. 111–233 

NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: IMPLEMENTING A 

NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE WORKFORCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 30, 2009 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

RONALD W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

LISA M. POWELL, Chief Counsel and Acting Staff Director 

JOEL C. SPANGENBERG, Professional Staff Member 

JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, Minority Staff Director 

BENJAMIN B. RHODESIDE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009 

Nancy H. Kichak, Associate Director, Strategic Human Resources Policy Division, U.S. Office of Personnel Management ....................................................... 4 

Major General William A. Navas, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired), Executive Director, National Security Professional Development Integration Office ............... 6 

Ronald P. Sanders, Ph.D., Associate Director of National Intelligence for 

Human Capital, and Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence ................................................... 7 

Hon. Bob Graham, Former Senator from the State of Florida, and Chairman, 

Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism ............................................................................................... 21 

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Guiding Coalition Member, 

Project on National Security Reform .................................................................. 23 

James R. Thompson, Ph.D., Associate Professor, and Head, Department of 

Public Administration, University of Illinois-Chicago ...................................... 25 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Graham, Hon. Bob: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63 

Kichak, Nancy H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 

Navas, Major General William A., Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73 

Sanders, Ronald P., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Thompson, James R., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85 

APPENDIX 

Article titled ‘‘Disease and Terror,’’ submitted for the record by Mr. Graham .. 88 

Questions and Responses for the Record from: 

Ms. Kichak with attachments ......................................................................... 90 

General Navas .................................................................................................. 104 

Mr. Sanders ....................................................................................................... 107 

Mr. Graham ...................................................................................................... 109 

Mr. Pickering .................................................................................................... 112 

Mr. Thompson ................................................................................................... 115 

(1) 

NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: 

IMPLEMENTING A NATIONAL SECURITY 

SERVICE WORKFORCE 

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. I call this hearing of the Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee to order. 

I want to say aloha and welcome to our witnesses, and thank you 

so much for being here today. I should tell you that I was just notified that we expect to have a vote soon, so we will go as far as we 

can, and possibly there might be a short recess and we will continue. So, in the meantime, let me give my opening statement. 

Today’s hearing, ‘‘National Security Reform: Implementing a National Security Service Workforce,’’ will examine the need to invest 

in strengthening the Federal civilian and national security workforce and proposals to do so. 

Recruiting, retaining, and developing the next generation of national security employees is critically important both to our current 

operations and in light of the impending Federal retirement wave 

that we expect. Half of the Department of Defense civilians will be 

eligible to retire within the next few years. About 90 percent of 

senior executives governmentwide will be eligible to retire within 

10 years. We must ensure that the Federal Government is able to 

attract the best and brightest national security workers. As these 

workers rise to more senior levels in government, we must also prepare them to work across agency lines in confronting the complex 

challenges that they will probably face. Such a rotation program 

should have a strong focus on training and mentoring participants 

so they get the most from their experiences. 

2 

There are several elements that I believe are critical to developing world-class national security employees, which I hope the 

witnesses will address today. 

The first key element is rotational programs to improve government coordination and integration. A number of events this decade 

have demonstrated the need for greater coordination and integration. These include the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and the reconstruction operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military already has a Joint Duty 

program which has fostered unified effort across military organizations. Likewise, developing a rotation program for civilians in national security positions can improve coordination and support a 

more unified effort across government. 

I am a strong supporter of rotational programs. In 2006, my 

amendment to start a rotation program within the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) became part of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. This program is supporting integration and coordination efforts within DHS, but we can benefit 

from an even broader, interagency focus on the national security 

workforce. 

Two interagency rotation programs have been created in recent 

years. The Intelligence Community’s Joint Duty Assignment Program was set in motion by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004. Today, joint duty rotational assignments 

and a leadership development program generally are required for 

IC employees to be eligible for promotion above the GS–15 level. 

The other rotation program is part of the National Security Professional Development Program created by an Executive Order in 

2007. This program envisions the participation of a broad array of 

national security workers at a number of Federal agencies. 

Another key element needed to better develop the national security workforce is a stronger student loan repayment program. Student loan repayments help the Federal Government to attract the 

best and brightest to government service and to encourage advanced education in relevant fields. The current Federal student 

loan repayment program has been underused, if you can imagine 

that, in part because agencies must balance funding loan repayments for its employees against other priorities. Current operations 

often are prioritized over investing in the long-term development of 

employees. However, recent trends show that agencies are beginning to understand the importance of this valuable recruitment 

and retention tool. We must make sure agencies prioritize investing in this workforce and that they have funds to do so. 

Similarly, national security fellowships to support graduate students could help the Federal Government attract and develop national security leaders. Fellowships could be targeted to help fill 

critical national security skills gaps, for example, by focusing on 

graduate students pursuing studies in foreign languages, science, 

mathematics, engineering, and international fields. Fellowships 

could also be used to help current Federal employees obtain the 

skills needed to meet our national security requirements. 

Finally, agencies should be required to improve their strategic 

workforce planning to ensure that they have the workforce needed 

to meet national security objectives. 

3 

In 2003, I introduced a bill that would have addressed all of 

these key elements to building a stronger national security workforce, the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act. Many of the 

proposals I have outlined were contained in that bill. I hope that 

today’s hearing will provide additional information that will be useful in the introduction of a similar bill that builds upon the 

changes that have taken place since then. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today as we explore 

how we can build a stronger, more integrated national security civilian workforce. 

Now I would like to call on our Ranking Member, Senator Voinovich, for his opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, reforming the Federal Government’s human capital management has been one of my highest priorities as Chairman and now Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and I am thankful for the partnership the two of us 

have forged to tackle these issues which affect the Federal Government’s most critical asset—its people. I suspect that there is not 

two ranking members or chairmen that have been at something as 

long as we have, and I am glad we have because, in order to get 

change, it takes a while. 

In preparing for today, I was reminded of the March 2001 hearing I chaired on the national security implications of the human 

capital crisis. The panel of distinguished witnesses that day included former Defense Secretary Jim Schlesinger, a member of the 

U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century. Secretary Schlesinger concluded, ‘‘As it enters the 21st Century, the 

United States finds itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis 

of competence in government. The maintenance of American power 

in the world depends on the quality of the U.S. Government personnel, civil and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in the personnel area to ensure that the United States can 

meet future challenges. It is the Commission’s view that fixing the 

personnel problem is a precondition for fixing virtually everything 

else that needs repair in the institutional edifice of the U.S. national security policy.’’ 

Eight years later, a great deal of action has been taken to improve the human capital management for our national security 

agencies, and we are daily building momentum for future reform. 

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we reassigned personnel, redistributed resources, and reorganized agencies 

in order to make the security of our homeland our top national priority. I am not sure that I would have done it the way we did, but 

that is the way we did it. 

We created the Department of Homeland Security. Overall, the 

intelligence community implemented many recommendations from 

the 9/11 Commission. The dangers and opportunities of our international environment require us to renew our human capital efforts. Creating a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for 

the benefit of the American people depends on a highly skilled naVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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1The prepared statement of Ms. Kichak appears in the Appendix on page 35. 

tional security workforce held accountable for their individual performance. 

The Bush Executive Order establishing the National Security 

Professional Development Program (NSPD) provides us with a road 

map for improving collaboration between our national security 

agencies through individual development, better enabling our government to carry out what I like to refer to as ‘‘smart power.’’ 

I look forward to hearing the initial results of the National Security Professional Development Program from our witnesses. It is essential that Federal agencies have all the tools necessary to recruit, 

hire, train, and promote individuals with the right competencies. 

The new Administration gives us the opportunity to find solutions that reinforce our commitment to the individual employee. I 

look forward to an engaging discussion with our witnesses as we 

consider whether additional workforce reform is necessary to meet 

our national security mission. 

I thank the witnesses for being here. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 

Both of us welcome our first panel of witnesses to the Subcommittee today. They are: 

Nancy Kichak, Associate Director for the Strategic Human Resources Policy Division at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management; 

Major General William Navas, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired), Executive Director of the National Security Professional Development Integration Office; 

And Dr. Ronald P. Sanders, Associate Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital at the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence. 

As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in 

all witnesses, so I ask each of you to stand and raise your right 

hand. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the 

Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

Ms. KICHAK. I do. 

General NAVAS. I do. 

Mr. SANDERS. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let it be noted in the record that the 

witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

I want our witnesses to know that your full written statements 

will be placed in the record, and I would also like to remind you 

to keep your remarks brief, given the number of people testifying 

this afternoon. 

Ms. Kichak, will you please proceed with your statement? 

TESTIMONY OF NANCY H. KICHAK,1 ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

Ms. KICHAK. Thank you. Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich, I appreciate your invitation to be here today to discuss national security professional development. We must do everything 

we can to strengthen the government’s capacity to protect the 

5 

American people. This includes continually looking at ways to improve the ability of the Federal agencies to work across organizational boundaries to protect our Nation and advance our national 

security interests. We, at the Office of Personnel Management, 

stand ready to do all we can to support this vital initiative. 

The effort to promote national security professional development 

began in May 2007, with Executive Order 13434, which sought to 

‘‘promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions,’’ in Executive 

Branch agencies so that these professionals would be equipped to 

carry out coordinated national security operations with their counterparts in other Federal agencies and in non-Federal organizations. It directed the creation of a National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals for achieving this objective. 

Once the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals was issued, the Executive Steering Committee developed 

a NSPD Implementation Plan. Federal agencies, in turn, developed 

their own implementation plans based on the National Strategy 

and the Implementation Plan. 

Executive Order 13434 charges the Director of OPM with leading 

the establishment of a national security professional development 

program that provides for interagency and intergovernmental assignments and includes professional development guidelines for career advancement. To facilitate that development, OPM issued a 

recommended technical qualification for selection into the Senior 

Executive Service positions that are designated as national security 

professional positions. The qualification is for demonstrated ability 

to lead interagency, intergovernmental activities, or comparable 

cross-organizational activities. 

OPM held two forums on the recommended technical qualifications in December 2008 and January of this year. We cosponsored 

these sessions along with the NSPD Integration Office and shared 

with the agencies a template for implementing the new qualification and provided an opportunity for detailed discussion of implementation approaches and issues. Agencies were then required to 

develop their own policies for implementing the qualification where 

appropriate. 

OPM also has a broad oversight role regarding human resources 

policy related to the implementation of the order. We recognize 

that the competencies that national security professionals need to 

have will vary for each mission area and organization. Therefore, 

the particular agencies that employ these individuals should, in 

large measure, determine the content of their training and program 

implementation. OPM is responsible for ensuring that training 

policies, as well as other human resources policies, comply with applicable laws and regulations, and that the NSPD effort is administered consistently within and across agencies. For example, we 

want to make sure that training opportunities do not result in preselection of job candidates. 

OPM has supported national security professional development 

in other ways as well. For example, we continue to contribute to 

the development of web content for the NSPD website, and we participate in the National Security Education and Training Consortium. The Consortium is a network of Federal education and trainVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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1The prepared statement of General Navas appears in the Appendix on page 38. 

ing organizations that support the development of national security 

professionals, including by making recommendations for training 

and educational courses that should be available. 

We are prepared to provide ongoing policy support regarding the 

selection, training, and development of national security professionals and related matters. This issue is likely to remain one of 

critical importance to the Federal Government and the American 

public for a very long time. 

Thank you again for inviting me, and I will be happy to answer 

any questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Kichak. Now we will 

hear from General Navas. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR.,1 U.S. 

ARMY (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTEGRATION OFFICE 

General NAVAS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding 

this hearing today to discuss the important issue of strengthening 

our Nation’s national security workforce. I also want to take this 

opportunity to acknowledge Dr. Sanders’ and Ms. Kichak’s contributions to the National Security Professional Development Program as members of the Executive Steering Committee during the 

past year. 

The National Security Professional Development Program 

(NSPD) was established in 2007 by Presidential Executive Order 

13434 to promote and enhance the development of national security 

professionals in 17 Federal agencies. The program was designed to 

facilitate and integrate professional development education, training, and interagency experience opportunities for individuals who 

have national security responsibilities. Let me state at this time 

that the current Administration strongly supports the intent of this 

program and is considering its way ahead. Although I am prepared 

to discuss the history of the program, it would be premature for me 

to speculate on how this program will be configured or implemented in the near future. But please know that serious discussions have been ongoing, and once decisions are made, I will be 

more than happy to provide the Subcommittee with an update on 

the program. 

Mr. Chairman, as this Subcommittee well appreciates, our Nation must be able to rely upon a national security workforce with 

the knowledge, training, and interagency experience to see the big 

picture, to connect the dots, to coordinate effectively, and to act decisively. We need to develop professionals who can operate across 

agency boundaries and understand how the combined efforts of 

multiple organizations are necessary to leverage all of the elements 

of national power and influence. That is precisely why the National 

Security Professional Development Program was established, and I 

am pleased to say that this effort is already underway, although 

there is much more to be done. 

Executive Order 13434 of May 2007, signed by President George 

W. Bush, made it the policy of the United States to promote the 

education, training, and experience of current and future profesVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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1The prepared statement of Mr. Sanders appears in the Appendix on page 48. 

sionals in national security positions across the Federal Government. A National Strategy expanding on the direction of the Executive Order was approved by President Bush in July 2007. An Executive Steering Committee, comprised of the Secretaries or Directors—or their designees—of 17 designated Federal agencies and departments provide oversight for program implementation. The Executive Steering Committee, which reports to both the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council, is responsible 

for coordinating cross-agency integration and implementation of 

the program. 

In September 2008, a program implementation plan was developed by the Executive Steering Committee and was approved by 

the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Departments and agencies have developed their own implementation plans. 

During the first year of program implementation, significant 

progress has been made, and this sets a good foundation upon 

which the program needs to build. In addition to the departments 

and agencies developing and executing their program implementation plans, there are many other important steps that have been 

taken which are highlighted in my written statement, and I would 

be glad to discuss them during the question-and-answer period. 

Despite the challenges, I remain optimistic about the future of 

the program and our government’s ability to lead the national effort to build the national workforce necessary to protect the Nation 

in the 21st Century. The current Administration is in strong agreement with the overall intent of the program and is developing a 

way ahead to build on past successes while charting new directions 

where necessary. 

The Administration looks forward to working closely with you in 

a collaborative fashion to help build upon and improve this critical 

program for advancing the vital interests of our Nation. 

I welcome any questions that the Subcommittee might have, 

thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. May I call now on Dr. Sanders. 

TESTIMONY OF RONALD P. SANDERS, PH.D.,1 ASSOCIATE 

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR HUMAN 

CAPITAL, AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CHIEF HUMAN 

CAPITAL OFFICER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. SANDERS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to testify at today’s hearing on creating a national security workforce, and I would also like to thank you and Senator 

Voinovich for your strong, sustained leadership in this area. It is 

my pleasure to update the Subcommittee on the implementation of 

the intelligence community’s Civilian Joint Duty program, which 

may serve as a model for developing a national security workforce. 

Per your letter of invitation, I will discuss the implementation of 

that program, including its associated challenges in the broader 

context of the National Security Professional Development InitiaVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8 

tive, and offer some recommendations based on our experiences in 

that regard. 

As you know, human capital policies are among the most powerful levers available to an institution intent on transforming its culture, and the IC is certainly no exception. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has led the design, development, and implementation of a number of ground-breaking strategic human capital initiatives with this particular end in mind. 

The Joint Duty program is one of these. It is essential to the community’s transformation and the creation of a culture of collaboration that is critical to our national security. 

Our program is mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). It authorizes the Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the rotation of IC personnel amongst 

its agencies by making ‘‘joint‘‘—that is, interagency—duty a condition of promotion to certain positions specified by the DNI. Indeed, 

Congress specifically said that the DNI was, to the extent practicable, ‘‘to duplicate joint [military] officer management policies established by . . . the Goldwater Nichols . . . Act of 1986.’’ 

Goldwater-Nichols was arguably the most sweeping reform of our 

Nation’s military since the National Security Act of 1947, and as 

the impetus for military jointness—it required a joint assignment 

as a prerequisite for flag rank—it serves as our philosophical, conceptual, and intellectual foundation. 

Like Goldwater-Nichols and Executive Order 13434, our Civilian 

Joint Duty program is intended to ensure that as a minimum, the 

approximately 100,000 IC professionals, managers, and executives 

come to know firsthand, through one or more extended interagency 

rotational assignments, the entire intelligence enterprise to build 

and leverage the collaborative networks that will support its mission. Although joint duty assignments are strictly voluntary, we 

have issued IC-wide regulations that say that by October 1, 2010, 

some form of joint duty experience will be a prerequisite for promotion to almost all of the IC senior civilian positions. The crosscutting challenges of today’s IC demand nothing less. 

Thus, we share the same goals as Executive Order 13434, and 

our program has given us a head start in achieving them. However, 

in so doing, we have had to grapple with a host of complex implementation and operational issues. Difficult enough in their own 

right, they have been made even more complicated by the complex 

interagency framework in which we operate. Professor Jim Thompson on your second panel calls this a ‘‘federated model.’’ Thus, as 

a community of 17 agencies in six different Cabinet departments, 

we have had to collaboratively develop criteria for receiving joint 

duty credit; procedures for advertising, applying for, nominating, 

and selecting joint duty candidates; a process for granting waivers 

and claims; and policies governing how employees on joint duty assignments are to be fairly evaluated and considered for permanent 

promotion while away from their home agency. We have also had 

to establish procedural protections and oversight mechanisms to 

ensure that no one is discouraged or penalized from accepting a 

joint tour. 

Now, 3 years since the first of these regulations was issued, our 

Civilian Joint Duty program continues to enjoy the strong support 

9 

of our senior leadership as well as the vast majority of our employees. We estimate that well over 3,000 employees are currently on 

some type of joint assignment, with another 3,000 plus having completed one over the last several years. Over 500 senior positions 

now require joint duty as a prerequisite, with several hundred 

more to be covered this fall. No waivers have been requested to 

date, and only about a dozen positions—civilian physicians—have 

been exempted from the requirement. However, we are still in our 

infancy, and the program remains fragile. 

As we help pave the way for NSPD, I would offer some hard-won 

lessons learned over the last 3 years. 

First, this requires strong, unequivocal senior leadership commitment. Senior agency leaders need to own the program. It cannot be 

seen as an HR program. 

Second, any government-wide rotation program should be flexible. Given the diversity of missions and organizations in the Federal Government, one size cannot fit all. 

Third, it is imperative that the detailed enabling policy and program infrastructure be addressed, including all of the myriad administrative details outlined in my written statement. Without 

those details, broad policy pronouncements will not go very far. 

And, finally, those details must be built collaboratively, with all 

the stakeholders involved. Here again, Professor Thompson has 

documented the advantages as well as the challenges of such an 

approach. 

The IC Civilian Joint Duty program remains one of the DNI’s top 

priorities, and we are pleased to note that in September 2008, Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government recognized it with 

one of its coveted Innovations in American Government Awards. 

However, the Subcommittee should note that the program is but 

one part of a comprehensive 5-year human capital strategy that is 

intended to renew and replenish our workforce, integrating and 

transforming the IC’s organizations and cultures to support our 

vital national security mission. That strategy also includes innovations in recruiting, including a proposed Intelligence Officer Training Corps based on a program originally sponsored by Senator Graham, who is also part of the second panel. 

These will all ensure that we have a pipeline of capable, committed professionals to meet our mission critical needs. It also includes other human capital innovations that are detailed in Professor Thompson’s report. 

In conclusion, I would note that the success of the National Intelligence Strategy depends on our people. It requires nothing less 

than dedicated intelligence professionals who are ‘‘enterprise’’ in 

orientation, integrated and joint in action, able to lead and leverage 

collaborative networks that are the IC’s connective tissue. Our 

Joint Duty program is a cornerstone of that effort. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. I am going to call for a 

brief recess, and we will be right back. Senator Voinovich will probably call us back to order for questions. We are in recess. 

[Recess.] 

10 

Senator VOINOVICH [presiding]. The Chairman asked me to reconvene the meeting and start the questions, and so here we go. 

Again, thank you for being here today. 

This is a question to all of you, and it gets back to a question 

I first asked when I came to the Senate, and I sent out a letter to 

12 agencies, and I asked them, ‘‘How much money are you spending on training?’’ And 11 came back and said they did not know. 

One came back and said, ‘‘We do know, but we will not tell you.’’ 

In order to do the job that we want you to do, you have to have 

the people to get the job done. Do you have money earmarked for 

training in your respective budgets? And has it been adequate for 

you to do the job that we have asked you to do? 

Mr. SANDERS. Senator, I will speak for the agencies and elements 

of the intelligence community. Since our inception 4 years ago, 

almost to this day, we have had three Directors of National Intelligence, and they are all on the same page that you are. They understand the importance of human capital. They have all invested 

heavily in human capital generally and in training. I cannot share 

budget numbers with you because as you know they are classified, 

but I can tell you that we invest millions and millions in language 

training. Director Blair has just committed substantial funds, in 

the millions of dollars, for our Joint Leadership Development program. 

The intelligence community has been blessed with senior leaders 

that understand you have to invest for the long-term development 

of the workforce. 

Senator VOINOVICH. General Navas. 

General NAVAS. Senator, our office, as you are aware, is an office 

that does not control any funding or resources and basically promulgates policy and provides oversight on how the departments 

and agencies execute that policy. 

Having said that, we need to have an analysis of the requirements—the training educational requirements. That is a function 

for the National Security Education and Training Consortium and 

its board of directors to advise the Executive Steering Committee. 

Once those requirements are established for participating agencies to reprioritize their budgets and give a higher priority to the 

development of their national security professionals. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Have you done that? 

General NAVAS. No, sir, not at this time. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Kichak, OPM has lots of things to do. 

Have you had the resources that you need to do the job we have 

asked you to do? 

Ms. KICHAK. I think that I am going to answer that question not 

just for national security professional development, which is just 

now getting off the ground, at least as far as this initiative is concerned, but what we are seeing now in the HR community that we 

are working with that enough resources are not being devoted to 

the development of human resources staff in the offices, that we believe that training needs a lot more attention to develop the kind 

of folks that are needed to recruit and retain the next generation 

of Federal employees. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Have you done an analysis of what it is that 

you think the agencies you are working with need in terms of reVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

sources to do the job that you think that they need to do? And if 

you have, have you communicated it to OMB? 

Ms. KICHAK. We have not put a dollar figure on that. We have 

done some analysis of the kind of training we think is lacking, and 

as you know, we have a new Director who is turning his attention 

to that. And so I would expect those conversations will happen in 

the future. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Now, this is kind of a follow-up for you, General Navas. Your testimony discusses the development of additional 

training programs for agency leaders, and given the current size of 

the workforce, short-term stimulus hiring needs, retirement projections, and resource constraints, will our national security leaders 

be able to access this training? Do we need to increase the number 

of national security personnel to build a training float, as recommended by several witnesses on our second panel? It is the same 

thing we have in the State Department today. They need additional 

people so that they can move people off the job they are doing for 

training, and at the same time have enough to fulfill the other responsibilities that they have. 

General NAVAS. Yes, Senator. The issue of the float is a valid 

one, and if you look at the experience in the military, one of the 

reasons that the joint duty assignment and the joint professional 

military education has been successful is that the armed service 

have that float. They call it different, but it is about a 10-percent 

element that they have to send individuals to school, to assignments outside their parent organization and still not jeopardize 

their ability to execute their functions. 

We are not at that level of flexibility in our civilian workforce, 

and at some point a combination of interagency exchanges, and an 

opportunity to provide additional slots to the agencies to be able to 

send some of their people to these assignments. In the case of some 

of the smaller agencies, you may need to have a combination of the 

space and also the dollars to be able to execute that. In the smaller 

agencies the funding becomes critical. 

That is one of the issues that has been discussed in the Executive Steering Committee as a way forward. Initially, we were concentrating on the senior executive level, SES National Security 

Professionals. We have been able to leverage some of the existing 

courses there. For example, the Army has been conducting a program for their senior executive development, and they have been 

very gracious in providing additional slots that we offer to the 

member agencies at no cost except for the travel, per diem, and the 

individual’s salary. These are short courses that have been conducted, and the individuals that have participated have found very 

valuable. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. How often do you talk with OPM about 

it? I just said does OPM think they have the resources to get the 

job done you are supposed to do. Ms. Kichak said she does not 

think that resources are there that people have been able to do it. 

Have you been discussing that? Because your job is to make sure 

this thing gets done, isn’t it? 

General NAVAS. Yes, sir. And like I mentioned, Ms. Kichak is a 

member of the Executive Steering Committee. She has been participating with us, with the other representatives of the 17 agenVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
12 

cies, one of which is Dr. Sanders here as the representative of the 

ODNI. 

The issue is establishing those requirements, which have not yet 

been established. Once the requirements are established, then the 

agencies and departments need to prioritize their existing funds. 

That is an internal function of the Secretaries and Department 

heads to do as they submit their budgets. 

Mr. SANDERS. Senator, if I may, you missed my eloquent statement, but we have about 6,000 people who have already completed 

or who are on interagency joint duty assignments in the intelligence community as we speak. We have found that our large 

agencies have enough inherent float in just the dynamics of their 

workforce that they have not needed to budget for additional positions. But for the smaller agencies, we have created a bank of positions, and DEA and others have used them to support joint duty 

assignments because they are literally too small to be able to absorb the loss of a person going off on interagency assignment. They 

use that bank to be able to backfill. 

So we have been able to blend the large agencies who can absorb 

it with the small ones who cannot to make the system work. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So your observation should be that Dr. 

Sanders is doing the job he is supposed to do? 

Ms. KICHAK. Well, my observation was for HR professionals 

throughout the Federal Government, not specifically national security professional development. We have been looking at the standup of this program and the rotational assignment, and we see 

much of what is here is a very robust training program, not that 

there does not need to be supplemental training, but I was not 

speaking just to the national security professional development. 

And, yes, I would observe that what ODNI is doing is robust training. 

Senator VOINOVICH. General Navas, the National Security Professional Development Plan was due September 2008. The December 2008 report indicates the plan was still in progress. When is 

the plan going to be finished? 

General NAVAS. Sir, the Implementation Plan was published and 

approved by the Assistant to the President for National Security 

and for Homeland Security, and it is being implemented. Subsequent to that, the agencies developed their implementation plans. 

This is a living document that will probably be revised and adjusted, but we have a plan in place. The agencies are executing to 

that plan. The plan calls for identifying who are the national security professionals in each of these 17 agencies. 

We have identified about 14,000 national security professionals 

within the 17 agencies, GS–13 and above, of which 1,200 of them 

are SES’s. The numbers for the intelligence community are classified and are not included within this group. 

The second requirement that we had for the plan was that the 

identified national security professionals would take two online 

courses. Those who had a national response framework or a domestic function would take the FEMA online course on the National 

Response Framework. Then we conducted a series, in conjunction 

with FEMA and Homeland Security, of orientation, lessons learned 

and best practices sessions, using the model of Hurricane Katrina 

13 

as the training vehicle. Admiral Thad Allen came and spoke to us. 

Christine Wormuth from the CSIS presented her paper on ‘‘Beyond 

Goldwater-Nichols,’’ and then we had several sessions from which 

the participants developed a set of keys to success to dealing with 

in interagency cooperation. 

Subsequently, with the help of the Naval Postgraduate School, 

we developed a similar module for those nontraditional national security agencies on the basics of national security, the Organization 

for National Security, the roles and functions of the different departments, etc. 

Senator VOINOVICH. This is all online? 

General NAVAS. Online, through a national security professional 

development web portal. 

Senator VOINOVICH. How long has that been in being? And have 

you measured its effectiveness? 

General NAVAS. Sir, the initial NRF was placed in the Web portal around June of last year. The agencies have reported their individuals taking the course. The other module was put online around 

September of last year. The agencies are monitoring that. 

One of the issues—and it could be a measure of effectiveness— 

was the response that we have had to the forest fires and the response that we have had to the catastrophe of the bridges in the 

Twin Cities showed some improvement in the interagency coordination. 

We stood up the Web portal, as Ms. Kichak said. This is an initiative that is being funded through OPM and OMB through existing programs. And we have continued developing the requirements 

for orientation and training. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Has there been any kind of effort made to 

inquire from the people that are taking the training about whether 

or not they think it is any good and whether they feel it is good 

for their professional development? Is it relevant stuff, or is it 

something they are just looking at and saying, ‘‘I have got to do 

this because they told me we have to do it’’ and, ‘‘Who needs this?’’ 

General NAVAS. We did a survey of the participants after the 

four sessions. We had some very good returns. Both modules also 

have a feedback function. It is tracked internally by the agencies. 

We have a master task list and a self-assessment scorecard that is 

produced and reported to our office on a quarterly basis by the 

agencies on how they are tracking the implementation tasks. 

Now, one of the issues raised by Dr. Sanders is the concept that 

‘‘one size does not fit all.’’ Not all agencies are the same, not all 

have the same missions. So it is more of facilitating and assisting 

the agencies. Ultimately the responsibility of developing their national security professionals rests with the individual departments 

and agencies. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I just think it is a good idea to get the 

folks that are there, particularly if it is kind of a same plan for a 

lot of them, to have them come back and sit down and share with 

you whether or not they think the training they are receiving is 

relevant to the job that they are doing. 

Do you get that kind of feedback at all from your people, Dr. 

Sanders? 

14 

Mr. SANDERS. Senator, I will go one step further. In my view, 

this is one of the things that is essential to making a broader program work. We actually incorporate these interagency leadership 

skills in our employees’ appraisals. So the training is a means to 

an end. Our workforce needs to be equipped and to perform better 

in an interagency context. 

In the IC, we have defined the entire intelligence community, not 

just pieces and parts but the whole IC, as requiring those interagency competencies. So we have built it into our employee appraisals. We have built it into our senior officer appraisals. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So the thing is they have to take the courses 

as part of their performance evaluation. 

Mr. SANDERS. The courses, the assignments, and then they have 

to actually demonstrate the behaviors on the job. That is the bottom line. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And from your point of view, the fact that 

they have had the training, that they are growing in their job, and 

you see the results of that training and the performance of the 

functions you have asked them to undertake. 

Mr. SANDERS. Well, again, if you will permit me, I will broaden 

the response. We have seen far more collaborative interagency cooperation and teamwork in the intelligence community since the 

advent of the IC Joint Duty program. I think our senior leadership 

gets it. Our newer employees—we have more than 50 percent of 

the IC with 5 years or less of service—get this. And our most recent employee climate survey results say that now upwards of 84 

percent of our workforce understands that these kinds of skills are 

essential to our mission. 

And so training is an important part of it. In my view, the most 

important part is this interagency assignment where you go walk 

a mile in another agency’s shoes. But it is the combination of all 

those things as well as being evaluated on it that will really make 

something like this work. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Kichak, General Navas, the Executive 

Order charged the Director of OPM with leading the establishment 

of this program, and I think all of us know that the person that 

headed it up was Clay Johnson. And just for the record, do you 

agree that the M in OMB should be the person that should be the 

orchestra leader and the quarterback on it? And does that person 

have enough time to do the work that is necessary here to provide 

that leadership? 

Ms. KICHAK. I cannot assess whether that is the appropriate person to chair the organization or not. I would say two things. 

Because this is a national security professional development effort, I think that the leadership does have to have a role in national security because the training has to be and the development 

of employees has to be focused on national security. And I think 

OPM needs to have a strong role in it because these are, after all, 

employees and they need the oversight that OPM can give on these 

issues. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So you think the way it has worked is appropriate? 

Ms. KICHAK. Well, of course, that is all under discussion, as Secretary Navas said, but I think that the folks at the Homeland SeVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
15 

curity Council and the National Security Council have a valid interest in making sure the leadership reflects their oversight. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator Akaka is back. One of the things 

you talked about in your testimony is that the program has not 

been administered consistently within and across agencies. And 

what I would like to know would be what agencies could use additional guidance and oversight. And it gets back to what I asked you 

before, doing an inventory of whether they have got the resources 

to do the job. 

Ms. KICHAK. We think that each agency, because of their varying 

missions, needs to administer the training differently. The training 

for each mission could be different. We do not have any agencies 

identified who have not done a good job based on their mission. We 

only want to recognize that each agency has differing needs in this, 

and they need to have the flexibility to pick the training and administer the training appropriate for their employees and their 

mission. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I would sure like to—how many of the 

agencies that were out there would have a national security dimension in them. You say 17 agencies. 

Ms. KICHAK. Seventeen. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Dr. Sanders has got a little cluster there, 

and that—not a little. It is a pretty big cluster, and real important. 

But the fact is that you have got a thread that runs through all 

of them, and it is, I think, a little easier to move and expedite some 

of these things as contrasted to different agencies, as you point out, 

that have different roles. So the challenge there, it seems to me, 

is a lot more formidable maybe in Dr. Sanders’ area. And it sure 

would be comforting to me to have a real analysis of that, of where 

they are, and try and see if we cannot up the priority that is being 

given to this. 

Ms. KICHAK. Well, when we had the training sessions for all of 

the agencies on how to develop some of their job descriptions to 

take account of the technical qualification, all agencies participated, and I believe all agencies did their implementation plan. We 

were there. We worked with all of them. It is just that some agencies have a handful of folks working on this, where in other agencies, this is a much bigger part of their mission. 

Senator VOINOVICH. They are different agencies, but the fact of 

the matter is to get into dotting the I’s and crossing the T’s. Another suggestion—and maybe you have done it already—has Dr. 

Sanders or any of his people ever been asked to look at what is 

going on in some of these agencies and perhaps evaluate them and 

suggest how they might be helped, and maybe you might even have 

some resources that you could make available to them or tell them 

where to go? 

Mr. SANDERS. I have viewed that as our role in the Executive 

Steering Committee. We have been at this 3 years, and we have 

been through the struggles, and we have been able to share a lot 

of lessons learned with Secretary Navas and Ms. Kichak and the 

rest of the members of the Executive Steering Committee. 

The notion of creating or requiring some sort of interagency assignment as a requisite for SES promotion, OPM and Secretary 

Navas’ office sponsored a workshop, and my staff was instrumental 

16 

in putting that together because, again, we had established that requirement a couple of years ago and were familiar with how it 

could be phased in. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So the fact of the matter is that you are 

pitching in and trying to help them because you—— 

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK, good. 

General NAVAS. Sir, if I may, what we are trying to do is a transformational process—to create a culture of collaboration among 

these national security professionals to cut across the vertical 

stovepipes and to be able to operate as a national security professional across these agencies. 

The idea is to have an understanding through the training and 

education of what that means and then having the experience of 

having participated in the interagency. That should be the ultimate 

goal. 

Now, we have 17 agencies at various levels, very mature, the 

Foreign Service Corps in the State Department, the intelligence 

community since the inception of the office of the ODNI; Department of Defense in the military side first, but still making great 

progress in the civilian; Department of Homeland Security. They 

have come together, 22 agencies. They have a robust internal system. 

The other nontraditional, if I could use that term, agencies like 

Department of Commerce, Department of Interior, they are taking 

baby steps. What is encouraging is that they all banded together, 

and they produced a common Implementation Plan that they share. 

So they are mentoring each other. The larger agencies are also 

doing that. 

So I think that this is a program that we need to build from the 

bottom up, because at the end of the day our goal is to have this 

culture of national security, writ large. You can see what is happening today with the pandemic flu. It involves immigration, diplomacy, health, border. I mean, it is the whole of government. 

So that is what we are striving for. But this is not easy. We have 

a national security system vintage 1947 that operates like a regulated steel mill. And today our enemies act like franchises, so we 

need to be flexible enough to operate in that environment. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. Senator Akaka, I have had almost 20 minutes, so it is all yours. [Laughter.] 

Senator AKAKA [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator 

Voinovich. 

Ms. Kichak, as you know, in 2003 I introduced the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act. Among other provisions, that bill included an enhanced student loan repayment program with a specified funding stream. The existing student loan repayment program, 

although growing in use by agencies, is still hindered by agency 

budget limitations. The current economic crisis may increase the 

demand for the student loan repayment program while decreasing 

agencies’ flexibility to provide program funding. 

What is OPM doing to ensure that agencies are providing adequate funding for this program? 

Ms. KICHAK. What we are doing on student loan repayment is, 

unfortunately, we are not helping them with their funding, but we 

17 

are helping them with the administration of their programs. We 

are reporting on the use of student loan repayment and its effectiveness. We are continuing to educate agencies on the use of it. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, as you probably know, in 2007, over 6,000 

employees participated in that program, and the future seems to 

indicate that we need to expand this program as much as we can. 

Dr. Sanders, the IBM Center for the Business of Government Report identified a concern by some agencies that those who serve in 

joint duty assignments might be disadvantaged with respect to promotions upon their return. What steps has the IC taken to overcome this concern? 

Mr. SANDERS. We have taken three steps. First, as I said earlier, 

we have built these interagency competencies into employee and 

senior officer appraisals, and we also evaluate our senior executives 

on how well they are promoting the program. 

When an employee is on joint duty, in the past they were evaluated by their home agency, even though they had left. That disadvantaged many, so one of the major rule changes we instituted 

was that for the last 3 years now, as an employee is off on an interagency assignment, the gaining agency does the evaluation. That 

is where they are contributing. That is who evaluates them. That 

is who gives them their performance bonus. 

Permanent promotions remain with the home agency, but we 

have set up a very rigorous oversight mechanism. We collect quarterly statistics to enforce a policy that says employees who are or 

have been on joint duty must be promoted at rates comparable to 

their peers. Again, a lesson learned from the military. So every 

quarter, we look at promotion rates, how many people with joint 

duty have been promoted, how many without, how many total vacancies have been filled, and we are doing a pretty good job of 

maintaining that parity. 

The third requirement, of course, is that we are phasing in the 

mandatory prerequisite for joint duty to be promoted to senior executive rank. So that is the ultimate acid test here. 

We already have several hundred positions covered. Come October 1, 2010, virtually all of the senior positions in the IC—and by 

the way, we have five different senior services in the IC: The regular SES, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, two senior services in the Department of Defense, and the FBI–DEA SES. But all of those agencies and all 

those agency heads have said we are going to come together on this 

requirement and make this a mandatory prerequisite. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, I am glad to hear that the move is in that 

direction. 

General Navas and Ms. Kichak, the Project on National Security 

Reform recommends the creation of a National Security Fellowship 

Program to recruit and train highly qualified individuals for national security service in areas such as science, technology, language, and culture. 

Do you agree that a National Security Fellowship Program, as 

described by PNSR, would be an effective recruitment and retention tool? 

General NAVAS. Sir, we have been working together with PNSR 

and particularly with their Human Capital Working Group, and I 

18 

would say that the way our Executive Order and our strategy as 

established today would be compatible with such a program, and 

in the future I hope that would still be the same case. 

Ms. KICHAK. Yes, I believe that such a program would be a good 

tool to recruit people with difficult-to-find skills, certain languages, 

etc. So I concur. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

General Navas, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management 

and Budget issued the NSPD Implementation Scorecard in December 2008. The Departments of Homeland Security, Health and 

Human Services, and Agriculture had a number of tasks that had 

not yet been completed. 

What mechanisms are in place to ensure that these departments 

complete those tasks? 

General NAVAS. Sir, as we mentioned earlier, the departments 

and agencies are responsible for the implementation. The Executive 

Steering Committee, and assisted by the Integration Office, provides guidance and support. We monitor that and assist the agencies, and we had a system, the scorecard has a green-amber-red, 

where amber was a task not completed by the time that the implementation plan specified, but there was a reason for it, and there 

was a time to be completed where it did not affect the overall program. In those very few instances where there was a red was that 

not completing the task by the time expected would have an adverse impact, and those were very few, and most of them have been 

resolved. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for that. 

Dr. Sanders, in your testimony you mentioned that, as part of 

their annual inventory of all senior IC positions, each agency involved may exempt senior positions from the joint duty requirement. According to policy, this may happen in narrowly focused 

areas of the IC. 

How are you ensuring that agency use of this exemption is as 

narrow as intended? 

Mr. SANDERS. The approval of exemptions, as well as the approval of waivers in individual promotion actions, resides exclusively with the Director of National Intelligence or, for DOD agencies, his Director of Defense Intelligence, Under Secretary Clapper. 

So only two people in the intelligence community can approve those 

exemptions. 

And I might add that, to our agencies’ great credit, while we anticipated a fair amount of requested exemptions, for example, for 

some of our very highly technical positions, senior crypt analysts 

and the like, our agencies only asked for a dozen exemptions out 

of a couple of thousand senior positions, and those exemptions involved highly specialized medical professionals and physicians. So 

less than one-hundredth of 1 percent of the IC senior position population has been exempted. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Kichak, it is important that we recruit and 

retain employees to support our national security efforts, of course. 

Has OPM or the Chief Human Capital Officers Council performed 

a skills gap analysis focused on the national security workforce? If 

so, what were the results? 

19 

Ms. KICHAK. We have not performed a skills gap analysis specifically for that community. We have been working with that community for certain hiring flexibilities for certain occupations that they 

have identified, but we have not, nor do I think we would be permitted to because of some of the security issues, been able to do 

an assessment of employees needed for the mission of some of the 

security agencies. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Sanders, the IBM report observed that IC 

professionals in one element may not have the specialized skills 

needed to succeed in another element. This may be a challenge for 

the IC in its rotation program. 

What have you done to enhance training and mentoring to mitigate skill gaps that may emerge in the rotation programs? 

Mr. SANDERS. We have done a number of things, but let me just 

recommend one that has, I think, really been key to our success to 

date. 

There are lots of mechanical things you can do to measure skill 

gaps and close them, build them into your training budgets. We do 

all of those things. But when Ambassador Negroponte, the first Director of National Intelligence, issued the first regulations creating 

the program, he also commissioned our agencies’ Deputy Directors 

as a Leadership Development Council, and he gave them the power 

to oversee all of this. They are the ones that actually run the agencies. They are the chief operating officers of our agencies. And as 

I said in my testimony, to me the single most important element 

of success is that this be owned by senior leaders. They are the 

ones that set the requirements. They are the ones that are going 

to invest in the future. If it is seen as an HR program, its chances 

of success are diminished. 

That is why I think it is important that OPM and OMB maintain 

the partnership that they have within NSPD—OPM to help with 

the policy piece of it, but ultimately it is OMB and bodies like the 

President’s Management Council that will make NSPD a success, 

just as our Leadership Council of Agency Deputy Directors has 

been key to our success in the intelligence community. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Sanders, you testified that 3,000 IC employees currently serve on some type of joint duty assignment, and that 

is encouraging to know. However, you state that application rates 

for joint opportunities posted on the ODNI website remain low. 

Why do you believe this is? And are you doing anything to address that? 

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, sir, we are. We are doing two things. 

First, with respect to joint duty postings—and these are individual positions that are filled ad hoc—we have expanded our 

website. We are about ready to unveil an unclassified version of it 

because the website we have now is only on our high side, our classified system, and the agencies of the IC that do not have access 

have found it difficult to see the vacancies and the postings. 

But, actually, I think a more powerful too in this regard is what 

we are loosely referring to as ‘‘joint manning documents.’’ The National Counterterrorism Center, for example, when it was stood up, 

literally said it was intended to be a joint organization, the IC’s 

version of a combatant command in DOD. And they went to the individual agencies and said, CIA, you owe us X number of intelVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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ligence analysts, FBI, you owe us Y number of intelligence analysts; build that into your staffing plans so that year in and year 

out you furnish your best and brightest to us on rotation—not filling the individual jobs ad hoc but filling them through a regular 

rotation built into the agency staffing plans. 

We have found that to be very successful and, in fact, that is 

emerging as the principal way of filling joint opportunities rather 

than through ad hoc individual postings. So that is one of our lessons learned, again, that we have passed on to OPM and OMB. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

General Navas, you state in your testimony that the criteria for 

identifying and designating a position as a national security professional position is set at the department and agency level. How well 

does this work? Do agencies have any reason to underreport their 

national security professional positions? 

General NAVAS. Sir, as we mentioned, the determination of the 

mission of the different departments and agencies is an evolving 

issue. It is very clear in the traditional national security agencies, 

like the Department of Defense, Department of State, the intelligence community. The other agencies sometimes struggle with defining and visualizing what their role is in the national security environment, and then determining who are the individuals that 

would be performing these functions. 

The Executive Order established a broad enough definition that 

the agencies used; that the report we got was that in the 17 agencies we have at the GS–13 and above level about 14,000 national 

security professionals. 

Now, this is a number that is continously revised as agencies better define their mission. As we progress and start conducting exercises, training and education, and developing scenarios (for example, Project Horizon) that should inform the agencies, and thus get 

a much more granular picture of who are the national security professionals are. Right now the 14,000 that I mentioned; if we could 

just get them to this training, education, and professional development opportunities—that would be a major, significant, progress 

towards our goal. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much for your responses. 

It will be helpful to this Subcommittee, and I want to thank you 

for being here today and wish you well in your future work. We 

have so much more to do, but we are going to have to work together to do it. 

I want to welcome the second panel. It is good to have you here 

with the Subcommittee. 

Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism. 

Hon. Thomas R. Pickering, Guiding Coalition Member of the 

Project on National Security Reform. 

And Dr. James R. Thompson, Associate Professor and Head, Department of Public Administration at the University of Illinois-Chicago. 

Welcome to all of you, and as you know, it is the custom of this 

Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so I would ask all of you 

to please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the 

21 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on page 63. 

testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I do. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let it be noted for the record that 

the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

I just want the witnesses to know that your full written statements will be placed in the record, and I would also like to remind 

you that your remarks should be brief given the number of people 

that we have as witnesses. 

So, Senator Graham, it is good to have you, and will you please 

begin with your statement? 

TESTIMONY OF HON. BOB GRAHAM,1 FORMER SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, 

PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Voinovich. It is an honor to be back on this side of the table. 

[Laughter.] 

You have indicated that our full statement will be entered into 

the record, so I would like to summarize my comments around four 

points. 

First, our Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism has found that this issue of 

a weapon of mass destruction being used someplace in the world 

is real. This is not a fanciful concern, and the consequences are 

grave. 

Second, it is not only an important issue, it is an urgent issue. 

The next 5 years, in our judgment, will be a critical time in terms 

of our efforts to mitigate this potential problem. 

Third, the good news is that there are steps that can be taken 

which would have the effect of reducing the probability of a weapon 

of mass destruction being used. 

And, fourth, the role of the Congress is critical and central to 

mitigate the risk of a WMD attack. 

I would like briefly to elaborate on those four points. 

The Commission had three principal findings: First, that the 

United States is increasingly vulnerable to a weapon of mass destruction attack, and that we are less secure today than we were 

10 years ago. Our Commission was composed of nine persons—five 

Democrats, four Republicans, each of whom had backgrounds in 

areas such as the Congress, the Executive Branch, the military, the 

intelligence services, and academic areas relevant to this topic. It 

was our unanimous conclusion that our margin of safety is eroding. 

Second, it was also our unanimous conclusion that it is more 

likely than not that there will be a weapon of mass destruction 

used somewhere in the world before the end of 2013. So we now 

have less than 5 years before the window that we found was a 

probability of use of a weapon of mass destruction. Shortly after 

our report was issued in early December 2008, the Director of NaVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
22 

1The article submitted by Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on page 88. 

tional Intelligence made a statement which was very consistent 

with that probability. 

And, third, that it is more likely that the weapon of mass destruction will be a biological rather than a nuclear weapon. 

We think that this current example of the swine flu epidemic and 

the concern that it has created helps frame the importance of this 

issue. This epidemic, as of 11 o’clock this morning, had approximately 100 reported and confirmed deaths in Mexico. The Mexican 

Government has ordered the suspension of all non-essential activities, including all schools, which contain 33 million students. All 

restaurants and bars have been closed. All retail stores have been 

closed. All museums, movie theaters, and outdoor sporting events 

have been suspended. That is what has happened with this event. 

Imagine if this had been a biological terrorist attack which had not 

killed a hundred people, but had killed thousands or tens of thousands of people. Imagine what the reaction would be in the country 

in which it occurred and around the world. We think this matter 

is urgent, that time is not on our side. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask to submit for the record a 

piece which is going to appear in the next issue of Newsweek Magazine called ‘‘Disease and Terror,’’ written by Dr. D.A. Henderson, 

who is the Dean Emeritus of the School of Public Health at Johns 

Hopkins.1

In this very informative and, frankly, frightening article, Dr. 

Henderson states that the central driver to attacks is the increasing interconnected world in which we live. As the world becomes 

smaller, the impacts of catastrophic events are more significant 

than what in the past would have seemed to be sufficient distance 

away; a geographical level of protection no longer is the case. 

I think this urgency of time is particularly important for the two 

areas that you have identified for today’s hearing, issues of agency 

collaboration and the development of a national security workforce. 

There are steps which can be taken to reduce the probability of 

an attack. These steps can be found in the Commission’s recommendations. 

First, under the category of the national security workforce, the 

U.S. Government should recruit the next generation of national security experts by establishing programs of education, training, retraining, and joint duty, all with the goal of creating a culture of 

interagency collaboration, flexibility, and innovation. The intelligence community should expedite efforts to recruit and streamline 

the hiring process for people with language capability and cultural 

backgrounds, especially those coming from an ancestry in the regions of the world from which our greatest threats are now emanating. 

Second, to improve interagency cooperation, there should be a 

policy change in the area of sharing of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and terrorism intelligence. This should be a top 

priority for the intelligence community. An acceleration of these efforts is necessary to assure that analysts and collectors receive consistent training and guidance on handling sensitive and classified 

information. 

23 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Pickering appears in the Appendix on page 73. 

Third, we need to address the weakening science and technology 

base in our nuclear science and biotechnology programs. Secretary 

of Defense Gates recently commented on the state of science at our 

most important National Laboratory, Sandia, in New Mexico. He 

stated that half of our scientists at Sandia—the laboratory that is 

primarily responsible for our nuclear program and supporting our 

efforts in Russia through the Nunn-Lugar program—are over 50 

years of age, and many of those under 50 have limited, or no involvement, in the design and development of a nuclear weapon. 

Within the next several years, three-quarters of the workforce in 

nuclear engineering at the National Laboratories will reach retirement age. We have an urgent need to begin to rebuild this workforce. 

The President was requested by our Commission within 180 days 

of taking office to present to the Congress an assessment of 

changes that are needed in existing legislation to enable the intelligence community to carry out its counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, and weapons of mass destruction counter terrorism missions. I would urge this Subcommittee to ensure that the Administration is fully aware of this suggested timetable and to be able to 

present you with such recommendations before the August recess. 

The final point is the fact that the Congress must play a central 

role in order to change the intelligence community. There is a natural resistance to change within any bureaucracy. It is going to 

take the actions by this Subcommittee and your counterparts in 

other areas affected by this challenge to see that real reform is 

achieved. 

I would like to conclude by asking the question that one of our 

former colleagues, Sam Nunn, has asked, and that is, ‘‘On the day 

after a weapon of mass destruction goes off someplace in the world, 

what are we going to say that we did in order to have avoided that 

now reality?’’ That is the question that all of us are going to have 

to face if and when it occurs. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Graham. 

And now we will hear from Ambassador Pickering. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING,1

FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND GUIDING COALITION MEMBER, PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM 

Ambassador PICKERING. Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich, thank you for inviting me here to speak today to you on national security workforce issues. They are at the heart of comprehensive national security reform. 

The Project on National Security Reform is grateful for this Subcommittee’s initiative in addressing national security workforce 

issues, including its past efforts with S. 589. Evidence of the importance of workforce reform can be found in the government’s experience in Goldwater-Nichols. Title 4 of the Act, which addressed joint 

personnel policies and added training, education, and joint assignment requirements for career advancement, was essential to proVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
24 

ducing the unified and joint workforce capabilities of the Defense 

Department. 

Many talented employees devote their lives to assuring America’s 

security. Their achievements occur, however, despite rather than 

because of the system’s human capital policies, programs, and procedures. Many reforms are needed involving structural, process, 

knowledge management, visioning, strategic planning, and resource 

management decisions and issues. Developing a national security 

workforce, however, will begin to create the culture and capabilities 

needed for other changes to occur. In essence, people are central. 

I want to talk about the current human capital challenges and 

then the solutions that we propose. The system does not hire, train, 

educate, or develop the necessary workforce adequately to meet the 

requirements. It is unable to correctly allocate workforce capabilities. The cultures and interests of the departments and agencies 

trump the need for interagency collaboration. Leaders have not 

paid sufficient attention to building institutional capacity, nor have 

they paid sufficient attention to the interagency mission. 

Proposals for reform. What should we think about in terms of 

rectifying these problems? I would like to discuss eight of the principal proposals of the Project on National Security Reform for addressing these problems. 

First, develop a National Security Human Capital Strategy and 

an associated Implementation Plan. The strategy and the plan are 

necessary to align human capital capabilities with the national security system’s programs, needs, and priorities. These documents 

will define the tools, the capabilities, the core competencies, and 

the needs of the national security workforce. They will outline both 

the goals for the workforce and the means for achieving the goals. 

Second, create a Human Capital Advisory Board consisting of 

public and private sector experts on human capital and the national security system to advise the President and the National Security Council (NSC.) 

Third, enact career planning processes and require rotational assignments, joint duty. Career planning should be used to guide careers and to make position assignments and promotion decisions. 

National security professionals should also be required to fulfill extended assignments in departments or agencies other than their 

own. The workforce reform element of Goldwater-Nichols and the 

Foreign Service Officer tenure requirements serve as useful models 

in this area. 

Fourth, enact training and educational requirements. These are 

essential to ensure individuals know how to work with and to use 

all the government’s tools to develop and implement national security policy. Training should include both orientation to the system 

as well as continuing instruction on the system and how it operates. Training and educational requirements will assure professionals continue to develop their knowledge and talent and make 

government service more appealing. 

Fifth, create professional development programs. Potential programs include a national security fellowship, something I know you 

have already thought about a great deal, and a cadre of interagency professionals to lead the system. 

25 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson appears in the Appendix on page 85. 

Sixth, enact, enhance, and fund the National Security Education 

and Training Consortium. The consortium should consist of public 

and private sector educational institutions whose curricula should 

address the full range of national security issues and requirements. 

Seventh, provide tuition reimbursement and loan repayment 

plans to train foreign language speakers, assure technical expertise, and other needed competencies. Such programs should target 

both current and graduated students. 

And, eighth, build a professional float for personnel to enable career development opportunities. Many departments can barely 

meet their programmatic needs, which gives them little or no ability to incorporate systematic education, training, and career development opportunities in their programs. These opportunities will 

only succeed if the Congress authorizes and appropriates money for 

a civilian personnel float that will allow individuals to take advantage of these career development opportunities without having to 

pull people out of operational tasks with no replacements. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, these proposals will substantially improve the system and its ability to support and enable our national 

security workforce. The U.S. Government has a talented and dedicated national security workforce. They work incredibly hard and 

with unsurpassed dedication. Too much of their hard work is wasted by a dysfunctional system. Working longer hours and harder is 

no longer just the only answer. Our national security workforce deserves a better system. Our national security and survival, as Senator Graham has made crystal clear, requires a better system. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am submitting a full written statement for the record, and I am happy, obviously, to address any 

questions that you or your colleagues may have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ambassador Pickering. 

Now we will hear from Dr. Thompson. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. THOMPSON, PH.D.,1 ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, AND HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-CHICAGO 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on national security workforce reform. 

My colleague, Rob Seidner, who is also here today, and I wrote 

a report for the IBM Center for the Business of Government last 

year titled ‘‘Federated Human Resource Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence Community Model.’’ The report 

is about the intelligence community’s efforts to put into place a 

common human resource management framework across the entire 

community. That effort was driven by the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which directed the intelligence 

community to identify a set of common personnel human resource 

management practices. That law, in turn, was driven by the 9/11 

Commission report, which found a need for enhanced collaboration 

across the intelligence community and which determined that a 

common human resource management framework would contribute 

to enhanced collaboration within the community. 

26 

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has proceeded 

to drive a process whereby all the agencies within the intelligence 

community have participated in an effort to develop this framework. One of the most important elements of that framework is the 

intelligence community’s joint duty program, modeled after that in 

the armed services. 

It is too early to say definitively whether or not that program has 

been a success, but we think the early signs are auspicious. Most 

importantly, for the purpose of this discussion, we think there are 

some important things that can be learned by the national security 

community from what the intelligence community has experienced 

to date. 

First and foremost, I would like to re-emphasize a point made by 

Dr. Sanders in the first panel, which is that for a joint duty program to succeed, it is important that there be an infrastructure in 

place. For example, within the intelligence community, before they 

implemented the joint duty program, they put into place a common 

set of performance elements across all the intelligence agencies so 

that when a senior officer in one agency goes on temporary assignment in another agency, he or she knows that he or she is going 

to be appraised according to the same elements as in his or her 

home agency. 

Another issue is the ‘‘out of sight, out of mind’’ issue, which was 

referenced in the first panel. This refers to a concern by some intelligence officers that if they leave the agency for some period of 

time, they will be forgotten when opportunities for promotion come 

around. And so, as Dr. Sanders referenced, the ODNI has put into 

place an effort to monitor the promotion rates for those who are on 

joint duty as well as those who are not on joint duty. 

Also as referenced in the first panel, there is this issue of a personnel float. As the ODNI went around to the different agencies 

trying to encourage the officers to participate in the joint duty program, what they often heard was, ‘‘Well, my manager or my boss 

will not let me go,’’ because the boss, of course, driven by mission 

considerations, was reluctant to let the person go on joint duty. So 

it is important that there be a personnel float so that the agency 

can fill in behind these people that are on joint duty. 

Perhaps most importantly with regard to how the intelligence 

community has proceeded with its joint duty program is that the 

program was designed in a collaborative manner. Contrary to how 

things usually work in the Federal Government—where things are 

designed at the top and, by and large, imposed on the various 

agencies—in this case, because the ODNI was structured, without 

direct line authority over the individual agencies, the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence was forced to engage in a collaborative process with the agencies whereby they had to come to consensus on the elements of the joint duty program. And as we talked 

to the human capital officers in the different agencies, we found a 

great deal of support for the program, largely based on the fact 

that it had been a collaborative process and that they had all had 

an opportunity to contribute to its design. So we think that is an 

important element and something to be learned by the national security community as well. 

27 

But it is also important that there be a central entity promoting 

and pushing the process, which, of course, within the intelligence 

community was the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

itself. They were pushing the process. It is not quite clear within 

the national security community which entity would serve the purpose of making sure that the process moves and that the effort 

comes to successful fruition. 

One possibility would be, of course, the National Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee, which has already been created by Executive Order 13434. I have speculated in 

my testimony that one option that might be considered would be 

to actually allow the central management of the SES-ers within the 

national security community by this board, by the National Security Professional Development Executive Steering Committee. As it 

is now, the careers of these officials are, of course, managed by 

each individual agency. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Thompson. 

Senator Graham, in your testimony, you urged Congress to take 

the lead in reforming how we recruit, develop, and retain the national security workforce for the 21st Century. Congress previously 

has taken the lead in establishing joint duty programs for military 

officers and in the IC. In 2003, I introduced legislation that would 

have established a similar program for national security workers. 

Do you believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Act provides a good 

model for the establishment of an effective national security interagency rotation program? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, and I think the history of Goldwater-Nichols 

is also instructive. Prior to 1947, each of the major military 

branches had its own Cabinet-level Secretary. In 1947, the Department of Defense was established with a Secretary of Defense who 

essentially sat on top of what had been two organizations, but became three with the establishment of the Air Force. 

It took from 1947 until 1986 to make the conversion from that 

organizational chart to what Goldwater-Nichols provided for, which 

was organizing around the principle of regional combatant commands and requiring joint duty among the branches to staff those 

various combatant commands. I do not think that we have 30 years 

to wait to act on the issue that is before us. I think we have got 

to move with a far greater sense of urgency. 

Frankly, I am discouraged that your legislation, which has many 

very important components, was introduced in 2003 and we are 

now at April 30, 2009, talking about it as something that should 

be done rather than what we should be doing here which is evaluating how well it is being implemented. 

So I hope that you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Voinovich will 

continue with tenacity and, if necessary, aggressiveness to move 

this forward, because time is not our ally. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Ambassador Pickering, in your testimony you state that a National Security Human Capital Strategy and a National Security 

Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan would align national security goals through program execution. The National Security Council would likely provide this guidance. 

28 

How do you foresee the National Security Council working in 

partnership with the Executive Steering Committee, the interagency group charged with implementing this program? 

Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that 

these recommendations are predicated on another set of recommendations which recommend, in fact, that the National Security Council do for the country at large our strategy, our budgeting 

and programming guidance, so that, in fact, the agencies in the national security cluster of agencies would have a common effort. 

This would be done with the full participation of the agencies rather than a top-down dicta. 

Once we see, in fact, where an Administration wishes to go, we 

then have some better ideas of what personnel resources are required to be brought to bear to deal with those, and the personnel 

strategy would answer that question. Then, obviously, beyond that, 

which is policy, comes implementation. And we feel very strongly 

that an implementation plan would be required—again, with the 

full participation of the agencies. 

As the national intelligence establishment has shown us, in order 

to have buy-in, you have to have participation, and this is extremely important. But we all demonstrated in the past in many 

different ways that this can happen. And so this kind of an approach with planning incorporated at an early stage I think is an 

efficient way. And certainly the bodies that you mention would be 

very important players in this process. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Professor Thompson, in your report you identify the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Geospatial Intelligence 

Agency as agencies that have been able to work out the skills gaps 

among individuals rotating between agencies. 

Do you have any additional information about how those agencies were able to overcome these potential skills gaps? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not specifically have information on those two agencies. My general observation would be 

that at some level the job becomes predominantly one of leadership, 

and that leadership skills that are relevant in one context could 

also be relevant in another context. If one is a good leader within 

the CIA, presumably one can be an effective leader within the FBI 

or the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. 

So I think at the SES level we are predominantly talking about 

management and leadership skills that can, in fact, translate 

across agency lines. In some cases, there are issues relating to 

technical skills, but, in general, with possibly some exceptions, I 

think those kind of gaps can be overcome. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. We will have a second round. Senator Voinovich, your questions. 

Senator VOINOVICH. First of all, I would like to thank all of you 

for being here. I apologize I was not here, Senator Graham, at the 

beginning of your testimony. It is good to see you again. And, Ambassador Pickering, it is good to see you. And, Mr. Thompson, 

thanks for coming over. 

Mr. Thompson, you had a chance to hear Mr. Sanders talk about 

what they were doing at DNI, and he has 18 agencies that are 

under his jurisdiction. And I heard the testimony of Senator GraVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
29 

ham, and it did not seem to reflect what Dr. Sanders’ testimony 

was in terms of what they are doing over in his shop. I would like 

to get your observations on that. 

And I will also ask you, Senator Graham, when you were making 

the point about getting some of this stuff done, have you distinguished between what is being done in the 17 agencies outside of 

the DNI versus what they have been doing? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Again, our conclusion based on our interviews 

and the data that we collected was that, to a large extent, the effort within the IC has been substantially successful in terms of inducing a fairly significant level of interagency collaboration, at 

least on the human resource element of their efforts; and that, 

again, it is largely attributable to the fact that the ODNI was 

forced to engage in a fairly collaborative effort to design this new 

framework and to design these specific policies. 

As a result, there is a very substantial and significant level of 

buy-in by the individual agencies, which historically have been very 

autonomous and somewhat insular in their approach to human resource management. So the fact that we found as high a level of 

buy-in to the new framework as we did, I think, is an encouraging 

sign. The fact that it appears to have been sustained over the Presidential transition is also an encouraging sign because efforts like 

these, which otherwise induce resistance are often lost when there 

is a transition from one Administration to the next. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I am really pleased that Mr. Sanders 

is there and continuing. One of the things that happens around 

here is that when we take on transformation, and then it is 6 

months or 7 months before somebody else takes their place, and 

you lose the momentum that you have. Mr. Sanders, keep it up. 

Your observations—and I did not give you a chance—— 

Mr. GRAHAM. Senator, to answer your question, the answer is 

yes. In the report from our Commission called ‘‘World at Risk,’’ we 

identified the progress that has been made in the intelligence community as one of the most significant positive signs, and in many 

ways a road map for other agencies that needed to move aggressively in that direction. And I want to also say that, in addition to 

the reasons that Dr. Thompson has given for the ability of the intelligence community to achieve its success, do not overlook the 

value of having some very competent and capable people such as 

Dr. Sanders, running the systems. Our Nation is fortunate to have 

him in the position that he is occupying. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Senator Voinovich, could I make a couple of points on your question very briefly? 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Certainly there is no question at all, I 

think all of us agree that the intelligence community is a model 

that now should be spread to the rest of the national security group 

of agencies. I would also want to tell you with some humility that 

for the last 50 years, 60 years, our embassies have operated in an 

integrated way—not perfectly, but they have drawn from sometimes as many as 40 agencies. They have all been working under 

the authority of the ambassador. You provided for that here in the 

Congress. It has been extremely important. It is the first example, 

I think, of across-the-board national security working together arVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
30 

rangements. They have had their problems, but in many cases they 

have done extremely well. And obviously this critical question of 

leadership, willingness of agencies to cooperate and be part of a 

team has been a significant contribution to that kind of activity. 

The problem has been how do we get that in Washington. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, what you are saying to me—now, as I 

travel the country, that we have located people in the intelligence 

community at those places, which I guess has not happened in the 

past. What you are saying is a good idea. The one thing I am interested in—in fact, I brought to the attention of Secretary Clinton, 

is that the report from the Academy of Diplomacy on Foreign Affairs budget for the future, and she was before us today in Appropriations, and they are asking for $7.5 billion out of the supplemental to do some things, and one of the things in the report that 

was made, if you will recall, was that they needed enough people 

so that you could get a float in the State Department. And today, 

because of the lack of resources, that has not been available. 

It would seem to me that if we are going to deal with this problem the way we would like to, each of the agencies need to be 

looked at in terms of the human capital commitment that has been 

made in the agencies, and also whether or not you have some folks 

there that, when they leave, they are not being held there because 

their boss says, ‘‘We do not want you to go because if you go, we 

are not going to be able to get the job done.’’ And so it is going to 

take—when we had Ms. Kichak in here, somebody has to go in 

there in each of these agencies and examine it, where are you at, 

how many do you have, and what is the program. And I think that 

in DNI and what Mr. Sanders has done, it is a leadership thing. 

I have to tell you, Senator Graham, Senator Akaka and I, that 

is all we have been concentrating on over here, is human capital. 

I think that probably in the last 10 years we have made the largest 

change in Title 5 since 1978. But a lot of what needs to be done 

is part of leadership. And I know Clay Johnson seemed to be interested in it, but I would be interested in your observations about 

where do you get the leader that is going to make sure that this 

gets done. Where should that person be? And how should it be organized so that a year from now we can say that some significant 

progress has been made? 

Ambassador PICKERING. We have to start on this, I think, at the 

very top. The Project on National Security Reform, in fact, said 

that the President has clearly wanted—needs and wants to need to 

have the national security restructure reflect how and in what way 

the 21st Century provides the challenges. So I think it is very 

much at that level that you have to have it. The Cabinet Secretaries have to know that this is the kind of direction which people 

want to go. 

There needs to be, I think, great care in this process because the 

Cabinet departments and agencies have the funding and the personnel to carry out many of the implementation tasks. That cannot 

all be taken away from them and put into some other box where, 

in fact, then we have to come back to you and reinvent the entire 

government. But there is, I think, a crying need for training, for 

education, and, indeed, for preparation for people to work even 

more vigorously on an interagency basis, on a cooperative basis, on 

31 

a whole of government basis than we have seen. The intelligence 

community is leading the way across the intelligence community, 

and I think that the Defense Department has led the way within 

its own structures. Now is the time to bring the rest of the civilian 

portions of the government together and the national security cluster of issues to do everything we can to improve that efficiency. But 

I think it has to be something that the President has to say he 

wants. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, should it be out of OMB? 

Ambassador PICKERING. OMB has an important role because 

money lubricates all work in the government. And OMB does not 

run the President. The President runs OMB. And the President, I 

think, can make it very clear. I think cooperation between the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget 

is essential to make this happen, just as you have to bring in the 

key Cabinet departments. They have to be part of the answer to 

the problem. They do not become—if they do not, they become part 

of the problem. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. There has been a vote 

that has been called, and I would like to ask a final question on 

my side, and any final question you may have. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Go ahead. 

Senator AKAKA. I thank you very much for your testimonies. This 

question is to the three of you, and what I want to ask you to do 

is please list your top three recommendations for ensuring that we 

have a strong national security service workforce. 

Mr. GRAHAM. First, we need a clear set of what our expectations 

are. We still have a woefully deficient number of people in our national security agencies who can speak the languages of the regions 

of the world from which our greatest threats are coming, and who 

understand the history and culture of those regions. That is illustrative of a goal that must be clearly articulated and monitored by 

the Congress. Are we making progress in building the national security workforce we need? 

Second, we need to have a regular pipeline. I am a great advocate of the military’s ROTC approach where it is able to assure an 

adequate number of young men and women coming into the Officer 

Corps of all of our military services. I think we need something 

analogous to that for our other national security agencies. 

And, third, once we get people into these agencies, we need to 

understand the importance of maintaining and expanding their 

professional competencies. We were told in our Commission that 

the average military officer will spend as much as 25 percent of his 

or her time during their period in the military in some form of 

training. That percentage is dramatically lower for most of our 

other national security agencies. I think we need to try to use the 

military example as the point at which we are trying to move and 

assuring the continued professional development of the people that 

we have recruited and hired into our national security agencies. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Ambassador PICKERING. I will try to be brief because I think they 

reflect what Senator Graham has said. I think we first need to 

know what it is we have to do, and that obviously is a principal 

32 

question. Without knowing what it is we have to do, any reform 

will or will not get us there. 

Second, we need the plans and programs, many of which you, 

Mr. Chairman, and Senator Voinovich have already proposed, that 

are going to get us there—things like joint duty, which we know 

can work and has worked and will continue to work, much better 

training. 

I have in my career learned two languages from the bottom up, 

had one polished, and studied five more. And my feeling is that 

that kind of ongoing training and education is critically important. 

For the State Department and other agencies, they do not have 

enough positions to do training without pulling people out of the 

line. And everybody is either on the line or on training. And so we 

badly need help across, I think, the spectrum of national security 

agencies to find a way to provide for that. The State Department 

estimated they need 1,200 people—positions for 1,200 people adequately to do the training and the other rotational assignments 

that are critical. So the programs are very important. 

Then, finally, the funding. These are not big-dollar items. They 

are really critical items, and they involve investment in the long 

term, as Senator Graham has said. If you can teach somebody to 

speak a foreign language, you can use them for the rest of their 

lives in many different assignments centered around that capability. And, of course, we know we have still huge shortages. We 

had in Arabic, and it continues to be large. We have in many of 

the languages in the areas where the terrorist threat is larger, in 

Farsi, Persian, Urdu, and Hindi, and other languages where we 

can continue, I think, to expect troubles coming at us. 

And so funding programs and understanding where it is we want 

to go are my three top priorities. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I would actually focus more 

broadly, and I would focus on the structure of the SES itself, going 

beyond just the national security professional workforce, which is, 

I think, there is a general consensus that the SES has not achieved 

its original vision as put forth in the Civil Service Reform Act of 

1978, which is that it was intended to be a corps of generalist managers and executives whose careers would routinely take them 

across agency lines so they would get a broad perspective. It has 

never achieved that mission, and that is the case largely because 

the careers of these individuals are managed at the departmental 

level. 

So my first recommendation would be look at the option, which 

is what they do in Great Britain, whereby the careers of the senior 

executives are managed centrally, by a central body, of which OPM 

would have to be a part, maybe OMB or whatever, but to actually 

look at that model where the loyalty of these individuals is not so 

much to their individual agency but to the service, as a service. So 

they act in ways that induce interagency collaboration. 

So that would be my first recommendation, to look at the structure of the SES as a whole and at least contemplate the option of 

moving towards the British model. 

Then the other issue, of course, is that which Senator Voinovich 

has emphasized, which is training. We have systematically underVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:26 Jan 14, 2010 Jkt 051023 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51023.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
33 

invested in training in the Federal Government. I think having a 

more centralized model might facilitate expanded investment in 

training, at the Executive level as well as at subsidiary levels. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Senator Voinovich, any last comments or last questions? 

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator Graham, who in the Administration 

is going to read your report? I notice it is not a real big report, so 

somebody should be able to read that, I think, maybe in a couple 

of hours. 

Mr. GRAHAM. We briefed President Bush in December on this report. We met subsequently with Vice President-to-be Biden, who 

was given the point on this issue for the Administration. We have 

met with the leadership of both the House and the Senate, so I believe that the significance of this challenge has been heard by the 

people who have the greatest responsibility and opportunity to increase our level of security. 

Senator VOINOVICH. That is good news. Senator Akaka and I can 

talk about trying to figure out how we are going to quarterback 

this or oversight it to make sure that it gets done. I think the first 

test is going to be what the State Department does. It is going to 

be that—that will be the first test: What are they willing to do over 

there? And do they get it? I think they know they need more people, but we will see how they are doing. And Ms. Kichak was here, 

and I think we ought to have her come back and tell us exactly 

what her evaluation is in each of the departments and what needs 

to be done, because this stuff has all got to be reflected in somebody’s budget. 

Thank you very much for being here. We will follow up. 

Senator AKAKA. Again, let me say thank you very much to this 

panel. You have helped us. Your comments have been great. It will 

help this Subcommittee. I am planning to introduce legislation that 

provides effective tools to recruit, retain, and develop national security employees, and your responses will help us do that as well. 

The hearing record will be open for one week for additional statements or questions other Members may have. Again, thank you so 

much for your help to this Subcommittee. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(35) 

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