U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

1 

54–494 PDF 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

111TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2010

111–40 

AL QAEDA IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA: 

A TICKING TIME BOMB 

A REPORT 

TO THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 21, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


seneagle
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 

1. Al Qaeda Reconstituted ....................................................................................... 4 

Background ....................................................................................................... 5 

A Continuing Threat in Pakistan .................................................................... 7 

2. Yemen: Exploiting Weaknesses .......................................................................... 8 

A Multifaceted Threat to U.S. Interests ......................................................... 9 

Al Qaeda Transformation Underway in Yemen ............................................. 9 

A History of Violence and Extremism ............................................................ 11 

3. Somalia: Failure Breeds Extremism .................................................................. 13 

Alliance or Not, a Specific Threat to Americans Exists ................................ 15 

State Failure Offers Further Opportunities for Terrorists ........................... 16 

4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 16 

No Direct Connection Between al-Shabab and Somali Pirates ........................... 18 

(III)

(v) 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, January 21, 2010. 

DEAR COLLEAGUE: This report by the committee majority staff is 

part of our ongoing examination of Al Qaeda’s role in international 

terrorism. U.S. and allied operations over the past several years 

have largely pushed Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and Iraq. Many 

of those fighters traveled to the tribal region on the Pakistani side 

of the border with Afghanistan. But ongoing U.S. and Pakistani 

military and intelligence operations there have made it an increasingly inhospitable place for Al Qaeda. Consequently, hundreds-or 

perhaps even thousands-of fighters have gone elsewhere. New Al 

Qaeda cells or allied groups have sprung up in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and perhaps most importantly in Yemen and Somalia. 

These groups may have only an informal connection with Al 

Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan, but they often share common goals. 

Al Qaeda’s recruitment tactics also have changed. The group seeks 

to recruit American citizens to carry out terrorist attacks in the 

United States. These Americans are not necessarily of Arab or 

South Asian descent; they include individuals who converted to 

Islam in prison or elsewhere and were radicalized. This report relies on new and existing information to explore the current and 

changing threat posed by Al Qaeda, not just abroad, but here at 

home. 

Sincerely, 

JOHN F. KERRY, Chairman. 

(1) 

AL QAEDA IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA: 

A TICKING TIME BOMB 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the offshoot of Osama bin 

Laden’s terrorist network operating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, 

has evolved into an ambitious organization capable of using nontraditional recruits to launch attacks against American targets 

within the Middle East and beyond. Evidence of its potential became front-page news after a young Nigerian trained at one of its 

camps in Yemen tried to blow up a passenger aircraft bound for 

Detroit on Christmas Day. 

For American counter-terrorism experts in the region, the Christmas Day plot was a nearly catastrophic illustration of a significant 

new threat from a network previously regarded as a regional danger, rather than an international one. The concern now is that the 

group has grown more dangerous by taking advantage of the weakened central government in Yemen, which is struggling with civil 

conflicts and declining natural resources. These experts have said 

they are worried that training camps established in remote parts 

of Yemen by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are being 

run by former detainees and veteran fighters from Afghanistan and 

Iraq and used to instruct U.S. citizens who have immigrated to 

Yemen to marry local women or after converting to Islam in American prisons. 

Law enforcement and intelligence officials told the Committee 

staff in interviews in December in Yemen and other countries in 

the region that as many as 36 American ex-convicts arrived in 

Yemen in the past year, ostensibly to study Arabic. The officials 

said there are legitimate reasons for Americans and others to study 

and live in Yemen, but they said some of the Americans had disappeared and are suspected of having gone to Al Qaeda training 

camps in ungoverned portions of the impoverished country. Similar 

concerns were expressed about a smaller group of Americans who 

moved to Yemen, adopted a radical form of Islam, and married 

local women. So far, the officials said they have no evidence that 

any of these Americans have undergone training. But they said 

they are on heightened alert because of the potential threat from 

extremists carrying American passports and the related challenges 

involved in detecting and stopping homegrown operatives. 

The staff interviews were conducted just before the failed Christmas Day plot. The ability of Al Qaeda to expand beyond its core 

members by recruiting non-traditional adherents was one of the 

lessons drawn by counter-terrorism experts from the failed attempt 

to blow up the aircraft. The suspected bomber was a Nigerian man, 

2 

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 23, who had overstayed an education 

visa in Yemen by several months and had undergone explosives 

training at one of the remote Al Qaeda camps. His father, a respected retired banker and former Nigerian government official, 

had warned the U.S. embassy in Nigeria about his son’s growing 

radicalism and disappearance while in Yemen, but Abdalmuttallab 

was able to use a U.S. visa to board the flight in Amsterdam with 

a bomb sewn into his underwear. He was overcome by passengers 

and crew members as he tried to detonate the device and has been 

indicted by a federal grand jury in Michigan on charges of attempted murder and attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. 

The Yemeni origins of the bomb plot, the Nigerian homeland of 

the accused bomber, and the flight path from the Netherlands underscored the fact that American counter-terrorism efforts cannot 

focus exclusively on a single country or region and that an attack 

could come from anywhere. These concerns are deepened by growing evidence of attempts by Al Qaeda to recruit American residents 

and citizens in Yemen, Somalia and within the United States. 

What is required is a measured, strategic assessment of the threats 

that exist today, wherever they originate. 

In important ways, the United States is safer than it was before 

the attacks of September 11, 2001. Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked effectively at home and abroad to 

disrupt threats and heighten vigilance. U.S. intelligence and military officials agree that Al Qaeda’s capacity to carry out large-scale 

terrorist operations has been significantly degraded. Its financial 

and popular support is declining and U.S. and allied operations 

have killed or captured much of Al Qaeda’s leadership, with the notable exceptions of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Polls 

show that support for the organization has weakened among Muslims because of its harsh tactics, including repeated suicide attacks 

that have killed thousands of innocent civilians in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries. 

The U.S. military has largely pushed Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and Iraq. While the military efforts should be praised, they 

have not eliminated the threat. Many fighters affiliated with Al 

Qaeda and other militant groups have taken refuge across the Afghan border in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Authority, 

which remains a major safe haven. At the same time, intelligence 

and counter-terrorism officials said hundreds and perhaps thousands of veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have relocated to other places, primarily Yemen and Somalia. 

While Al Qaeda’s short-term goals remain the same-to bring 

down a U.S. airliner, to push U.S. and NATO troops out of Afghanistan, and to attack a broad range of targets worldwide-its methods 

have changed in response to American successes against the core 

organization. Many groups acting under Al Qaeda’s banner are 

only loosely affiliated with the leadership. More often, they raise 

their own money and plan and execute attacks independently. 

Operational decisions are routinely made at the local level, rather 

than by bin Laden or Zawahiri. 

Despite these changes, there are common elements that serve as 

warning signals to U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism officials. 

3 

For example, Yemen and Somalia have a core of trained militants 

who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both Yemen and Somalia 

have weak central governments that exercise little or no control 

over vast swaths of their own territory and forbidding, harsh terrains that would make it virtually impossible for U.S. forces to operate freely. They have abundant weapons and experience using 

them on the battlefield. Government cooperation with American 

counter-terrorism efforts has historically been spotty and portions 

of both populations are hostile to the United States. 

In Yemen, the limited reach of the central government and 

changes in the country’s demographics have permitted extremists 

to thrive. In addition to AQAP, Yemen confronts a tribal revolt in 

the north of the country, a secessionist movement in the south, and 

rising poverty rates. The country’s foreign minister, Abu Bakr alQiribi, recently acknowledged that the rebellion and secessionist 

movement had distracted the government from going after Al 

Qaeda in the last year. 

AQAP, the primary terrorist group in the country, is closely 

linked to Al Qaeda. The local affiliate is led by a Yemeni militant 

who was involved in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in which 17 

American sailors were killed. He was among 23 Al Qaeda fighters 

who escaped from a Yemeni prison in February 2006, reportedly 

with help from security officials. The group’s deputy is a Saudi citizen who was released from Guantanamo in November 2007. After 

completing a Saudi government-sponsored rehabilitation program, 

he slipped south into Yemen and returned to militancy. 

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih has promised that his security services will track down members of Al Qaeda and there has 

been considerable cooperation between U.S. intelligence and military units and their Yemeni counterparts. But Salih’s government 

angered Washington by releasing militants who claim to have renounced violence, including some former Guantanamo detainees 

and one of the masterminds of the Cole bombing. In early January, 

President Obama reflected these concerns when he suspended the 

release of further Yemeni detainees from Guantanamo, where they 

comprise about half the remaining population. 

Al Qaeda also is expanding its presence across the Gulf of Aden 

in Somalia. U.S. counter-terrorism officials told the Committee 

staff they fear American citizens are being recruited in Somalia for 

terrorist operations. They pointed to several Somali-Americans arrested in Minnesota in early 2009 after returning from fighting 

alongside al-Shabab, which is the dominant militant group in Somalia and has close ties to Al Qaeda. Officials also expressed concern about two dozen Americans of Somali origin who disappeared 

in recent months from St. Paul, Minnesota; similar disappearances 

have been reported in Ohio and Oregon. The vast majority of Somali-Americans has been alarmed by these developments and cooperated in investigations. 

While most of our counter-terrorism resources are rightly focused 

on Afghanistan and Pakistan, the potential threats from Yemen 

and Somalia pose new challenges for the United States and other 

countries fighting extremism worldwide. The prospect that U.S. 

citizens are being trained at Al Qaeda camps in both countries 

deepens our concern and emphasizes the need to understand the 

4 

1 ‘‘To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East,’’ by Scott Atran, New York Times, December 13, 2009. 

nature of the evolving dangers. President Obama has pledged to 

strengthen our relationship with the Yemeni government through 

increased military and intelligence cooperation. Addressing emerging dangers in Yemen and elsewhere in the region constitutes a 

vital national security interest, and this report is intended to provide information that will help guide us in that mission. 

1. AL QAEDA RECONSTITUTED

Al Qaeda has been battered around the world since its attacks 

on the United States on September 11, 2001. The group is facing 

dwindling financial and popular support and difficulty working 

with other extremists around the world. U.S. and allied operations 

against Al Qaeda have killed or captured many of the organization’s leaders, while the majority of Muslims around the world are 

repulsed by its methods. 

The U.S. military has pushed Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan. Similar U.S. success in Iraq has forced hundreds of fighters out of that 

country. As a result, the bulk of Al Qaeda fighters have relocated 

to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Authority, along its 

border with Afghanistan. Large numbers have relocated to other 

parts of the world, including Yemen and Somalia. 

Despite setbacks, Al Qaeda is not on the run. The group has expanded its recruitment efforts to attract non-traditional followers 

and adapted its operations. U.S. law enforcement authorities told 

Committee staff they believe that as many as three dozen U.S. citizens who converted to Islam while in prison have traveled to 

Yemen, possibly for Al Qaeda training. As many as a dozen U.S. 

citizens who married Muslim women and converted to Islam also 

have made their way to Yemen. In some cases, Al Qaeda recruits 

have come from moderate backgrounds, like would-be Christmas 

bomber Omar Faruq Abdulmutallab, whose father is one of Nigeria’s most highly-respected bankers and a former government minister. 

While goals have remained unchanged, the methods with which 

Al Qaeda tries to accomplish those goals have changed. Many 

groups linked to Al Qaeda are only loosely affiliated and act on 

their own. 

That said, recent history demonstrates that several factors bind 

Al Qaeda members together. The first is friendship forged on the 

battlefield. Arabs who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan call themselves ‘‘Afghan alumni.’’ Thousands went to Yemen after the Soviets’ defeat and were welcomed as heroes. Many of them fought 

again side-by-side in southern Yemen during that country’s civil 

war in 1994. The second is discipleship. Most young Yemeni Al 

Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the 

September 11 attacks said they had decided to make jihad against 

the United States only after being prodded into doing so by the 

imams in their villages. Third are family and tribal ties, although 

this same dynamic can work against it in Somalia. Arabs have historically married across tribes-and even nationalities-to cement alliances and power, and Al Qaeda benefits from this trend. Somalis, 

however, have tended to be a more insular society.1

5 

2See Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl, and Seth Rosen, ‘‘Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy 

to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism,’’ Center for a New American Security, June 2009, p.10. 3 ‘‘Remarks by Michael E. Leiter, Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center,’’ at The 

Aspen Institute, April 9, 2009. 4For more, see ‘‘Men Accused of Unrelated Bomb Plots in Ill., Texas,’’ Associated Press, September 24, 2009. 

Background 

Over the past eight years, Al Qaeda has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11 attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against 

the Soviets, with a leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians and bin Laden, a Saudi of Yemeni descent. Most of the organization’s plots either emanated from—or were approved by—the 

leadership. 

The Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Due to pressures 

from U.S. and international intelligence and security organizations, 

it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical 

movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of 

independence. The leadership, headed by bin Laden and Zawahiri, 

is thought to be in the mountainous border region of northwest 

Pakistan, where it continues to train operatives, recruit, and disseminate propaganda.2 But Al Qaeda cells or affiliated groups in 

Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, North Africa, and Southeast Asia now represent critical players in the larger movement. Some cells receive 

money, training, and weapons; others look to the leadership in 

Pakistan for strategic guidance, theological justification, and a 

larger narrative of global struggle. Michael E. Leiter, Director of 

the National Counter Terrorism Center, said in an April 2009 

speech that the trajectory of Al Qaeda is ‘‘less centralized command 

and control, no clear center of gravity, and likely rising and falling 

centers of gravity, depending on where the U.S. and the international focus is for that period.’’ 3

The Al Qaeda network today also is made up of semi-autonomous 

cells which often have only peripheral ties to either the leadership 

in Pakistan or affiliated groups elsewhere. Sometimes these individuals never leave their home country but are radicalized with the 

assistance of others who have traveled abroad for training and indoctrination. The July 2005 London bombers are an example of 

semi-autonomous actors in the Al Qaeda universe, as is Najibullah 

Zazi, an Afghan living in Denver who was charged in September 

2009 with conspiring to carry out bombings in the United States. 

The London bombers, radicalized in the UK, sought training in 

Pakistan before returning home to carry out their attacks. Similarly, Zazi reportedly was radicalized in the United States before 

traveling to Pakistan for training. 

Another category of today’s Al Qaeda movement is selfradicalized individuals, who lack any connection to the larger network but accept Al Qaeda’s theological arguments and strategic aspirations. One example is Michael C. Finton, arrested in September 

2009 in Illinois on charges of attempting to use a weapon of mass 

destruction.4 Finton, 29, converted to Islam while serving in an Illinois prison from 1999 to 2005 for robbery and battery charges. According to a court affidavit, he traveled to Saudi Arabia in March 

6 

5 ‘‘Remarks by John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism,’’ at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 6, 2009. 6 ‘‘Testimony of Michael Leiter at hearing ‘Eight Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist 

Threat to the Homeland,’ ’’ before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, September 30, 2009. 7 ‘‘Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation,’’ before the 

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 30, 2009. 8 ‘‘Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence,’’ Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 12, 2009. 9William Maclean, ‘‘Al-Qaida’s Money Trouble,’’ Reuters, June 15, 2009. 

10 ‘‘Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence,’’ Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 12, 2009. 

2008. An undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation agent posing 

as a low-level Al Qaeda operative met with Finton in the months 

leading up to his September arrest. The officer provided him with 

a van containing materials he said were explosives. Finton then 

parked the van outside a federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois, 

where he was arrested. There is no evidence that Finton underwent Al Qaeda training or conspired with others, like Zazi and the 

London bombers did. 

Despite Al Qaeda’s transformation in recent years, its strategic 

objectives remain the same: to attack the United States and governments seen as supporting the Americans. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, told the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 

an August 2009 speech that ‘‘Al Qaeda has proven to be adaptive 

and highly resilient and remains the most serious terrorist threat 

we face as a nation.’’ 5 The U.S. intelligence community assesses 

that Al Qaeda is ‘‘actively engaged in operational plotting and continues recruiting, training, and transporting operatives, to include 

individuals from Western Europe and North America,’’ according to 

Leiter’s testimony in September 2009 before the Senate Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.6

Thanks in large part to the actions of the U.S. government, Al 

Qaeda and its leadership in Pakistan are under tremendous pressure. U.S. military and intelligence operations have reportedly degraded the leadership’s capacity for conducting external operations 

and raising funds.7 Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2009 that Al Qaeda ‘‘today is less capable and effective than 

it was a year ago.’’ 8

Though Al Qaeda affiliated groups have carried out numerous 

deadly terrorist attacks over the past two years, the leadership in 

Pakistan has demonstrated limited operational effectiveness during 

that same time span. In part because of the loss of top commanders 

and continued pressure from U.S. intelligence activities and those 

of foreign partners, Al Qaeda has been unable to orchestrate successful large-scale attacks. There is also some evidence that Al 

Qaeda is struggling to retain recruits and raise funds. In June 

2009, the group’s leader in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, released an audio message asking for money because Al Qaeda members were short of food, weapons, and other supplies. 9

The Al Qaeda movement faces perhaps an even larger challenge 

in the form of a legitimacy crisis within Muslim communities. According to Blair, the United States has ‘‘seen notable progress in 

Muslim opinion turning against terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.’’ 10

Muslim populations worldwide, some of which approved of Al 

7 

11Murad Batal Al-Shishani, ‘‘Jordanian Poll Indicates Erosion of Public Support for Al 

Qaeda,’’ Terrorism Focus, Vol. 3, No. 6, February 14, 2006. 12 ‘‘CIA Chief Says Bin Laden in Pakistan,’’ Reuters, June 11, 2009; ‘‘Al Qaeda’s Global Base 

is Pakistan, Says Petraeus,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2009. 13See, for example, ‘‘Qaeda’s Zawahiri Urges Pakistanis to Join Jihad,’’ Reuters, July 15, 2009. 14See http://www.dni.gov/press—releases/20070717—release.pdf. 15 ‘‘U.S. Missile Strikes Take Heavy Toll on Al Qaeda, Officials Say,’’ Los Angeles Times, 

March 22, 2009; ‘‘Al Qaeda Seen as Shaken in Pakistan,’’ Washington Post, June 1, 2009; ‘‘Al 

Qaeda Weakened as Key Leaders are Slain in Recent Attacks,’’ Associated Press, September 19, 

2009. 

Qaeda’s actions in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, appear to have 

turned against the movement. The killing of innocent Muslims in 

Iraq and Pakistan, as well as the bombing of three hotels in 

Amman, Jordan in November 2005, produced a significant backlash. For example, a poll conducted by Jordan University’s Center 

for Strategic Studies a month after the Amman bombings showed 

that only 20 percent of the population viewed Al Qaeda as a ‘‘legitimate resistance group,’’ down from 67 percent in 2004.11 Over the 

past two years, several prominent religious scholars and former Al 

Qaeda associates-including Saudi fundamentalists Sheikh Salman 

al-Awda and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, one of Al Qaeda’s original 

spiritual leaders—have spoken out against the indiscriminate tactics and ideology. 

A Continuing Threat in Pakistan 

U.S. officials remain concerned that Al Qaeda terrorists maintain 

bases and training camps in Pakistan and that the group appears 

to have increased its influence among the myriad Islamist militant 

groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Bin 

Laden and Zawahiri are believed to be hiding in northwestern 

Pakistan, along with most other senior operatives.12 Al Qaeda leaders have issued statements encouraging Pakistani Muslims to ‘‘resist’’ the American ‘‘occupiers’’ in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to 

fight against Pakistan’s ‘‘U.S.-allied politicians and officers.’’ 13 A 

2007 National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the 

United States concluded that Al Qaeda ‘‘has protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including a 

safe haven in [Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas], 

operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.’’ 14

Islamabad reportedly has remanded to U.S. custody roughly 500 

Al Qaeda fighters since 2001, including several senior operatives. 

U.S. officials say that drone-launched U.S. missile attacks and 

Pakistan’s pressing of military offensives against extremist groups 

in the border areas have meaningfully disrupted Al Qaeda activities there while inflicting heavy human losses.15 The August death 

of Al Qaeda-allied Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, reportedly caused by a U.S.-launched missile, may have thrown 

Islamist militants in western Pakistan into disarray. Some analysts worry, however, that successful military operations are driving Al Qaeda fighters into Pakistani cities where they will be harder to target and, fueling already significant anti-American sentiments among the Pakistani people. The Pakistani military has conducted successful counter-insurgency campaigns to wrest two parts 

of the country from Pakistani Taliban control, the Swat Valley and 

8 

16 ‘‘Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,’’ by Jeremy Sharp, Congressional Research Service, page 8. 17 ‘‘Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,’’ by Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 102, September 2009. 18 Ibid. 

South Waziristan. Still militants continue to use some of the rugged tribal areas as bases of operations. 

It is clear that there is a significant Al Qaeda threat in Pakistan. 

But there are significant Al Qaeda populations in Yemen and Somalia, too. As Al Qaeda members continue to resist U.S. and Pakistani forces along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, some of their 

comrades appear to be moving to Yemen and Somalia, where the 

political climate allows them to seek safe haven, recruit new members, and train for future operations. 

2. YEMEN: EXPLOITING WEAKNESSES

There are parallels between Pakistan and Yemen, according to 

U.S. counter-terrorism officials, military leaders, and policymakers. 

Both have become havens for significant numbers of Al Qaeda 

fighters formerly active in Afghanistan. Both have weak central 

governments that have difficulty controlling vast swaths of their 

own territory and populations that are often hostile to the United 

States. 

The weak central government and alarming socioeconomic 

changes in Yemen have provided opportunities for terrorist groups 

to build and maintain a presence. The government’s counter-terrorism efforts are further hobbled by the conflicts in the northern 

and southern parts of the country. 

Overall, Islamic extremist groups are not strong enough to topple 

President Salih’s regime-he has co-opted several already-but they 

are capable of successfully striking a high value target, such as a 

foreign compound or an oil installation. On September 17, 2008, 

the Al Qaeda affiliate attacked the entrance of the U.S. Embassy 

in Sana’a, killing 11 people. Six of the attackers also died. Observers note that despite such a brazen attack, Yemeni militants failed 

to breach the U.S. Embassy’s outer layer of security and killed 

mostly Yemeni civilians rather than U.S. Embassy personnel. Nevertheless, media coverage may have been enough to satisfy the perpetrators, as the U.S. State Department soon after the attack announced that it would, for the second time in a year, authorize the 

departure of all nonessential personnel from Sana’a.16

Yemen exhibits several traits that worry counter-terrorism and 

intelligence officials. Worsening socioeconomic trends have the potential to overwhelm the Yemeni government, further jeopardizing 

domestic stability and security across the region. Yemen’s oil-the 

source of over 75 percent of its income-will run out by 2017, and 

the country has no apparent way to transition to a post-oil economy.17 More worrisome is the rapidly depleting water supply. 

Shortages are acute throughout the country, and Sana’a may become the first capital city in the world to run out of water.18 The 

country’s water is being consumed much faster than it is being replenished. A large amount of Yemen’s water consumption is devoted to the irrigation of qat, a semi-narcotic plant habitually 

chewed by an estimated 75 percent of Yemeni men. Qat is blamed 

9 

19 Ibid. 20 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/ 

2002rank.html?countryName=Yemen&countryCode=ym®ionCode=me&rank=4#ym, January 

12, 2009. 

for decreasing productivity, depleting resources, and contributing to 

the poverty that leaves nearly half the population earning less than 

$2 per day.19 The country also faces one of the world’s highest population growth rates, 3.4 percent a year, which strains the government’s ability to provide services and contributes to an illiteracy 

rate of more than 50 percent.20

A Multifaceted Threat to U.S. Interests 

U.S. diplomats and law enforcement officials say that a significant threat to U.S. interests could come from American citizens 

based in Yemen. Most worrisome is a group of as many as three 

dozen former criminals who converted to Islam in prison, were released at the end of their sentences, and moved to Yemen, ostensibly to study Arabic. U.S. officials told Committee staff that they 

fear that these Americans were radicalized in prison and traveled 

to Yemen for training. Although there is no public evidence of any 

terrorist action by these individuals, law enforcement officials told 

Committee staff members that several have ‘‘dropped off the radar’’ 

for weeks at a time. U.S. law enforcement officials said they are 

on heightened alert because of the potential threat from extremists 

carrying American passports and the related challenges involved in 

detecting and stopping homegrown operatives. 

Another concern is a group of nearly 10 non-Yemeni Americans 

who traveled to Yemen, converted to Islam, became fundamentalists, and married Yemeni women so they could remain in the country. Described by one American official as ‘‘blond-haired, blue eyedtypes,’’ these individuals fit a profile of Americans whom Al Qaeda 

has sought to recruit over the past several years. Most of them reside in Sana’a. 

Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born imam who reportedly was the spiritual advisor of Major Nidal Hassan, a U.S. Army officer accused 

of murdering 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas in November 2009, 

currently resides in Yemen. U.S. law enforcement officials told 

Committee staff that Awlaki counsels young Muslim fundamentalists to ‘‘continue jihad’’ and to ‘‘fight the Crusaders.’’ Although 

Awlaki has not yet been accused of a crime, U.S. intelligence and 

military officials consider him to be a direct threat to U.S. interests. 

Meanwhile, according to U.S. law enforcement officials, 34 members of Al Qaeda who came to Sana’a from Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Iraq, and Guantanamo and who registered with the Yemeni government as Al Qaeda members, live in the immediate vicinity of 

the U.S. Embassy. These Al Qaeda fighters, upon registering their 

affiliation with the Yemeni government, promised to refrain from 

all terrorist activities. 

Al Qaeda Transformation Underway in Yemen 

In January 2009, Al Qaeda militants in Yemen announced that 

the group’s Saudi and Yemeni ‘‘branches’’ were merging under the 

banner of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Saudi 

10 

21 According to a number of sources, the leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen is a 32-year-old former 

bin Laden secretary named Nasir al Wuhayshi. Like other well-know operatives, Wuhayshi was 

a member of the 23-person contingent who escaped from a Yemeni prison in 2006. Wuhayshi’s 

personal connection to bin Laden has reportedly enhanced his legitimacy among his followers. 

After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, he escaped through Iran, but was arrested 

there and held for two years until he was deported to Yemen in 2003. See, Gregory D. Johnsen, 

‘‘Al Qaeda in Yemen Reorganizes under Nasir al-Wuhayshi,’’ Terrorism Focus, Volume 5, Issue 

11, published by the Jamestown Foundation, March 18, 2008. 22 According to one Saudi commander, ‘‘We have killed or captured all the fighters and the 

rest have fled to Afghanistan or Yemen. . . . All that remains here is some ideological apparatus.’’ See, ‘‘Saudis Retool to Root Out Terrorist Risk,’’ New York Times, March 22, 2009. 23 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Media Roundtable with CIA Director Leon E. Panetta,’’ press 

release, February 25, 2009. 24 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Policy on Afghanistan , Pakistan, 

Statement of David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, 111th Congress, April 

1, 2009. 

extremists had carried out a wave of terrorist violence that swept 

Saudi Arabia from 2003 through 2007, but they were driven south 

to Yemen after a crackdown. AQAP is led by a Yemeni militant21

who in 2006 escaped from a Yemeni prison along with 22 other Al 

Qaeda fighters, reportedly with help from Yemeni security officials. 

One of his deputies is a Saudi citizen who was repatriated to Saudi 

Arabia from Guantanamo in November 2007 and returned to militancy after completing a rehabilitation course in Saudi Arabia. 

Some counter-terrorism experts suggested that the presence of 

Saudi militants in Yemen indicates that Al Qaeda’s presence in the 

kingdom has been significantly hampered by Saudi security forces 

and that they have gone to Yemen because of its more permissive 

environment.22

In recent months, AQAP has threatened to attack Yemeni oil facilities and the soldiers protecting them, Western interests in 

Yemen, and foreign tourists. In March 2009, AQAP suicide bombers killed four South Korean tourists and their local Yemeni guide 

near the city of Shibam. A week later, they carried out a second 

attack against a convoy of South Korean officials who had traveled 

to Yemen to investigate the murders. Some analysts suggested that 

AQAP may have received assistance from a source inside the security forces in order to carry out a bombing against a well-guarded 

foreign delegation on its way from the country’s main airport. 

In 2009, several high ranking U.S. intelligence and defense officials suggested that Yemen was becoming a failed state and consequently a more important theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations. In February 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta said he was 

‘‘particularly concerned with Somalia and Yemen. Somalia is a 

failed state. Yemen is almost there. And our concern is that both 

could become safe havens for Al Qaeda.’’ 23 A few months later, 

DNI Director Blair stated that ‘‘Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist 

battleground and potential regional base of operations for Al Qaeda 

to plan internal and external attacks, train terrorists, and facilitate 

the movement of operatives.’’ In his April 2009 testimony before 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, Commander of U.S. Central 

Command General David H. Petraeus said, ‘‘The inability of the 

Yemeni government to secure and exercise control over all of its 

territory offers terrorist and insurgent groups in the region, particularly Al Qaeda, a safe haven in which to plan, organize, and 

support terrorist operations.’’ 24

In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in April 2009, Michael Leiter, director of 

11 

25 ‘‘Al Qaeda Focuses on Yemen as Launchpad: U.S.,’’ Agence France Presse, September 30, 

2009 26 ‘‘Qaeda Makes Rare Public Appearance at Yemen Rally,’’ The Washington Post, December 

21, 2009. 27 ‘‘Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,’’ by Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 102, September 2009. 

the National Counterterrorism Center, remarked ‘‘We have witnessed the reemergence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 

with Yemen as a key battleground and potential regional base of 

operations from which Al Qaeda can plan attacks, train recruits, 

and facilitate the movement of operatives . . . We are concerned 

that if AQAP strengthens, Al Qaeda leaders could use the group 

and the growing presence of foreign fighters in the region to supplement its transnational operations capability.’’ 25

U.S. diplomats and western press reports indicate that Al Qaeda 

has grown bolder in Yemen in the past year. In late December 

2009, Al Qaeda militants made a rare public appearance in southern Yemen, telling an anti-government rally that the group’s war 

was with the United States, and not with the Yemeni army. AlJazeera television showed footage of the militant addressing the 

crowd while an armed comrade stood by as a bodyguard. Both were 

unmasked.26 Also in late 2009, Yemeni government officials said 

that Al Qaeda was responsible for a daring armored car robbery in 

Aden, which netted $500,000. No arrests have been made. 

American concerns have been reflected in stepped-up cooperation 

with the Yemeni military and security services. In December, the 

deputy director of the CIA, Stephen Kappes, visited the capital for 

consultations. After the Christmas Day bomb plot, President 

Obama announced that the United States would increase its training and equipping of Yemen’s security forces. 

A History of Violence and Extremism 

Christopher Boucek, a fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, recently wrote that, ‘‘Islamist extremism in 

Yemen is the result of a long and complicated set of developments. 

A large number of Yemeni nationals participated in the anti-Soviet 

jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s. After the Soviet occupation 

ended, the Yemeni government encouraged its citizens to return 

and also permitted foreign veterans to settle in Yemen. Many of 

these Arabs were integrated into the state’s various security 

apparatuses. As early as 1993, the U.S. State Department noted in 

a now-declassified intelligence report that Yemen was becoming an 

important stop for many fighters leaving Afghanistan. The report 

also maintained that the Yemeni government was either unwilling 

or unable to curb their activities. Islamist activists were used by 

the regime throughout the 1980s and 1990s to suppress domestic 

opponents, and during the 1994 civil war Islamists fought against 

southern forces.’’ 27

Al Qaeda’s first known attack took place in 1993 in Aden. After 

several serious attacks in the early 2000s, including on the USS 

Cole and the French oil tanker MV Limburg, Yemen experienced 

a brief period of calm. Analysts believe this was the result of a 

short-lived ‘‘non-aggression pact’’ between the government and extremists and enhanced U.S.-Yemeni counter-terrorism cooperation. 

By 2004, however, a generational split by younger extremists, 

12 

28 ‘‘Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,’’ by Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 102, September 2009. 29 Convicted USS Cole bomber Jamal al-Badawi, for example, was arrested and convicted on 

terrorism charges related to the attack, and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He escaped twice, 

allegedly with the help of Yemeni security officials, surrendered twice, and then given conditional release. Despite protestations from the United States, the Yemeni government has refused to extradite Badawi to stand trial. He is currently free in Yemen. 30On August 27, 2009, AQAP operative Abdallah Hassan al-Asiri, pretending to surrender to 

Saudi authorities, detonated a bomb hidden in his undergarments and made of pentaerythritol 

tetranitrate, or PETN, while in the presence or Prince Muhammad bin Nayif. Asiri spent weeks 

negotiating his false surrender and was invited, as other penitent ex-militants, to meet the 

prince during a Ramadan fast-breaking event. He bypassed some airport inspections because he 

was flown from southern Saudi Arabia on the princes own jet and was not required to change 

clothes nor thoroughly searched before he met the prince. US officials meanwhile said that 

Omar Faruq Abdalmutallab also tried to detonate a PETN bomb sewn under his undergarments. Abdulmutallab told US law enforcement authorities that he obtained the materials in 

Yemen. 

radicalized in part by the global Sunni Islamist revival and the 

U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, led to the emergence of a group not interested in negotiating with what it viewed as an illegitimate and unIslamic government in Sana’a. Several prison escapes of experienced and dangerous operatives further energized this younger faction, which launched a new campaign of violent attacks against oil 

facilities, foreign residents and tourists, and government security 

targets. 

Western targets in Yemen would make attractive targets for a 

resurgent Al Qaeda. Recent counter-terrorism measures in Saudi 

Arabia forced extremists to seek refuge elsewhere and analysts 

have observed a steady flow relocating to Yemen’s under-governed 

areas.28 Saudi authorities recently released a list of 85 most-wanted terrorism suspects, 26 of whom are believed to be in Yemen, including eleven Saudis who had been detained at Guantanamo. 

For the central government, the Houthi rebellion in the north 

and the secessionist movement in the South represent threats to 

the survival of the state. Al Qaeda has attacked Yemeni government interests in the past, and Al Qaeda figures in the country 

have made public statements opposing the government. Senior 

Yemeni officials say frequently that their country is working with 

allies, including the United States, to fight terrorism. But U.S. officials complain that the Yemeni government often does not appear 

serious about the Al Qaeda threat because a number of high-profile 

suspects have either been released from custody or have escaped 

from Yemeni prisons. U.S. government officials describe Yemeni cooperation on counter-terrorism issues as ‘‘episodic at best.’’29

Weapons and explosives from Yemen, where gunrunners operate 

with impunity, often find their way to Somalia and have been 

traced to attacks in Saudi Arabia, including explosives employed in 

a Riyadh bombing and assault rifles used in an attack on the U.S. 

consulate in Jeddah. More recently, a Saudi national who had been 

living in Yemen, attempted to assassinate Prince Muhammad bin 

Nayif Al Saud, the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister and Director of 

Counter-terrorism, by detonating a bomb concealed in his undergarments. The device was similar to the bomb used by Omar Faruq 

Abdulmutallab in his attempt to blow up a Northwest Airlines 

flight on Christmas Day.30 U.S. law enforcement officials said both 

men received their training in Yemen. 

The U.S. government is aware of Yemen’s needs, both in counterterrorism and in economic security. The Obama administration reVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:00 Jan 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\YEMEN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
13 

quested-and Congress authorized-more than $50 million in economic and military aid, $35 million in development assistance, 

$12.5 million in foreign military financing, and $5 million in economic support funds. This represents an increase of more than 200 

percent. 

3. SOMALIA: FAILURE BREEDS EXTREMISM

Al Qaeda’s tentacles reach deeply into Somalia and conditions 

similar to those in Yemen make it possible for the organization to 

extend its influence in the archetype of a failed state just across 

the Gulf of Aden from Arabian Peninsula. The threat from Al 

Qaeda and from its Somali affiliate, al-Shabab, is increasing. The 

administration has worked with the Somali president, Sheikh 

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton 

praised him last summer as the ‘‘best hope’’ for his country in 

many years. The Obama administration has decided to bolster 

Sharif’s embattled government by providing money for weapons 

and helping the military in neighboring Djibouti train Somali 

troops. Counter-terrorism may be our primary reason for increasing 

cooperation with Somalia, but the engagement must reach beyond 

those narrow goals in order to control the spread of Al Qaeda and 

its message. As Senator Russ Feingold told the Senate last August, 

U.S. policy should be rooted in a ‘‘serious, high-level commitment 

to a sustainable and inclusive peace.’’ 

U.S. diplomats, law enforcement officers and intelligence officials 

in the region said that a key concern is Somalia’s open, virtually 

defenseless border with Djibouti. The only official border crossing 

is at the village of Loyada, a dusty and impoverished outpost in the 

desert, where as many as 200 refugees per day arrive from Somalia 

and Ethiopia, most on their way to Yemen and the Gulf. The 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office in Djibouti 

reports that there are 10,000 Somali refugees there, with another 

80-100 additional refugees processed every week. The Djiboutian 

government refuses to allow single men from Somalia into the 

country, fearing infiltration by al-Shabab or Al Qaeda. 

The United States has provided Djibouti with technical assistance to help improve the Loyada crossing, but authorities said 

more money is needed to secure the facility and to improve security 

at other crossings farther out into the desert. The border is utterly 

porous and easily breached, and Djibouti needs cameras and radar 

for the Coast Guard, as Loyada sits only a kilometer inland from 

the Red Sea. Djiboutian officials told Committee staff that their 

government has no resources to patrol either the land or sea border, even though at low tide refugees can easily walk through the 

salt marsh undetected. 

Furthermore, U.S. diplomats say that a coherent system is needed to share information on the movement of dangerous people 

across the border. A Committee staff member watched at least 50 

people cross the border on a recent visit to Loyada, only about a 

third of whom had a passport or any other documentation. A man 

with an Iraqi passport was turned back by a Djiboutian immigration official who said that no Iraqi national had any reason to be 

in the area in the first place. The Djiboutian immigration official 

told a Committee staff member that he had recently turned away 

14 

31 ‘‘In the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More,’’ by Bronwyn Bruton, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2009, pages 79–96. 32 Ibid. 

two Somali-Americans with U.S. passports, fearing that they were 

al-Shabab. He added that the pair could easily have walked a kilometer or two into the desert and crossed into Djibouti without 

being detected, as many people do. 

Americans attempting to cross from Somalia into Djibouti apparently is not unusual. The official told Committee staff that a significant number of Western passport holders, including Americans, 

have tried to cross illegally between Djibouti and Somalia in the 

past year. Recently, two Somali-Americans were arrested while trying to transit Djibouti on their way to Somalia for what the immigration official said was terrorist training. Both were prosecuted 

and jailed in Djibouti for illegal entry. U.S. officials add that Somali-Americans are taught techniques for avoiding detection by the 

FBI once they make their way to al-Shabab training camps. 

Officials in the region said that one of their major worries is that 

Al Qaeda is trying to take advantage of its Somali-American recruits by establishing a larger presence in Somalia and plotting attacks on the United States or American targets. Bronwyn Bruton, 

a Somalia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), underscored those worries recently in Foreign Affairs, writing that ‘‘one 

of Washington’s primary concerns about Somalia is that Al Qaeda 

may be trying to develop a base in the country from which to 

launch attacks against Western interests. Counter-terrorism officials also worry that more alienated members of the Somali diaspora might embrace terrorism. Somali-Americans were arrested in 

Minnesota in early 2009 after returning from fighting alongside alShabab, an extremist group associated with Al Qaeda, and in late 

August 2009, several Somalis were arrested in Melbourne for planning a major suicide attack on an Australian army installation.’’ 31

U.S. intelligence analysts have argued since the mid-1990s that 

Somalia is fundamentally inhospitable to foreign jihadist groups. Al 

Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous organization in 

Africa, but its foothold in Somalia has probably been facilitated by 

the involvement of Western powers and their allies. In fact, according to Bruton, the terrorist threat posed by Somalia has grown in 

proportion to the intrusiveness of international policies toward the 

country.32 Al-Shabab originally emerged as a wing of militant 

youths within the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the group that controlled much of Somalia prior to the country’s December 2006 occupation by Ethiopian forces in cooperation with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was struggling with the 

ICU for power. 

In the mid-1990s, Islamic courts began to emerge around the 

country, especially in the capital of Mogadishu. The absence of central authority in Somalia created an environment conducive to the 

proliferation of armed factions and a safe haven for terrorist 

groups. The three terrorists suspected of the 1998 attacks against 

the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2002 attacks 

in Mombasa, Kenya, used Somalia to recruit, train, hide, and 

smuggle weapons. 

15 

33 Ibid. 34Statement of Ken Menkhaus, ‘‘Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable U.S. Strategy Toward Somalia,’’ before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, May 20, 2009. 35 ‘‘Peacebuilding Amid Terrorism: Fragile Gains in Somalia,’’ by Andre Le Sage, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch #1594, October 27, 2009. 36 ‘‘U.S. Mulls Striking Somali Terrorist Training Camps,’’ Comments by Michael Leiter, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, April 20, 2009. 

CFR’s Bruton states that Ethiopia’s occupation of Somalia, which 

was meant to oust the ICU, had a dangerous, albeit unintended 

consequence. ‘‘By then, the ICU had exhausted most Somalis’ patience, and it dissolved, its leaders scattering in southern Somalia 

or fleeing to Eritrea. Ethiopia was forced to occupy Mogadishu to 

prop up the .TFG, and its presence ignited a complex insurgency.’’ 33 The U.S.-backed occupation also fueled anti-Americanism 

in the country.34 Bruton continues that ‘‘Responding to these developments, jihadists from the Middle East and as far away as Malaysia arrived to help al-Shabab. They brought with them suicide 

bombings and sophisticated tactics such as remote-controlled detonations. By the time Ethiopian forces withdrew in early 2009, alShabab’s influence had spread. 

Alliance or Not, a Specific Threat to Americans Exists 

Only two of al-Shabab’s leaders have pledged fidelity to Osama 

bin Laden, but some young Al Qaeda fighters who trained in Afghanistan have moved to southern Somalia to train Somalis in alShabab camps there. In return, al-Shabab has provided these Al 

Qaeda trainers with bodyguards, according to Ethiopian government officials. 

Estimates of the number of Al Qaeda fighters in Somalia by 

American and African officials vary widely, from a low of 20 to a 

high of 300. African officials told the Committee staff that there 

has been a marked change in al-Shabab’s tactics over the past five 

years, as the Somalis have adopted Al Qaeda’s more lethal strategies. 

Al-Shabab and Al Qaeda appear to be cooperating closely in their 

administration of the training camps in southern Somalia, notes 

CFR’s Bruton. ‘‘Some of these are reserved for imparting basic ideological precepts and infantry skills to newly enlisted Somali militia 

members, while others provide more advanced training in guerilla 

warfare, explosives, and assassination. The latter camps have become a magnet for foreign fighters coming from the Somali diaspora, other African countries, or the Middle East.’’ 35

Michael Leiter of the National Counterterrorism Center argues 

that al-Shabab’s training camps are solely Somalia-focused, and 

that the group does not have goals beyond Somalia’s borders.36 AlShabab certainly has launched terrorist attacks, but only against 

domestic opponents in the Somaliland and Puntland regions of Somalia. The Somali-American suicide bomber attacked a Somali opponent of al-Shabab, rather than western interests in Somalia. U.S. 

law enforcement officials contend, however, that al-Shabab would 

hit US or other Western targets outside of Somalia if it could. 

Leiter recently told Congress that al-Shabab has sent dozens of 

Somali Americans and American Muslims through training conducted by Al Qaeda. At least seven already have been killed in 

16 

37 ‘‘The Threat from Somalia,’’ The Washington Post, November 2, 2009. 38 ‘‘Al-Shabab,’’ by Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, February 

27, 2009. 

fighting in Somalia.37 Last summer, Al-Shabab released a video 

pledging cooperation with Al Qaeda. The video used an American 

spokesman and showed footage of a training camp featuring a 

former University of South Alabama student. 

Western diplomats also expressed concern about a possible rise 

in violence against U.S. and other Western interests in Sweden because of that country’s growing Somali population. Sweden accepts 

1,000 Somali refugees per month, according to western diplomats, 

and nearly all of those refugees at least initially settle in Gothenburg, Sweden’s second largest city. The diplomats reported that 

pro-al-Shabab refugees in 2009 drove moderates out of the city’s 

largest mosque and took control of its administration. Law enforcement officials believe that the pro-al-Shabab refugees are heavily 

involved in recruiting for the group, and they are encouraging new 

recruits to return to Somalia for training. These same officials estimate that there are currently 40 Swedish citizens in al-Shabab in 

Somalia. 

State Failure Offers Further Opportunities for Terrorists 

One of Somalia’s most serious problems is the lack of all but rudimentary government and civil society. As a result, even basic 

services like education are not available for many Somalis. Consequently, many parents send their children to Islamic schools or 

mosques for their education. But madrassas and mosques offer a 

very limited curriculum, and they tend to be fundamentalist in nature because they are financed by al-Shabab and the Saudi government. Djiboutian authorities complained that while most Gulf 

States build schools and hospitals in east Africa and send food and 

medicine to the region, the Saudi government builds mosques and 

sends Qurans. 

Analysts point out that in many areas al-Shabab is the only organization that can provide basic social services, such as rudimentary medical facilities, food distribution centers, and a basic 

justice system rooted in Islamic law. Western diplomats fear that 

al-Shabab will continue to win converts by providing services similar to the way Hamas found success in the Gaza Strip. 

Experts strongly caution that there is little the United States can 

do to weaken al-Shabab. The United States has launched air 

strikes to target high-level members of al-Shabab it believes have 

links to Al Qaeda. But experts say these air strikes have only increased popular support for al-Shabab. In fact, they argue that two 

of the only actions that could galvanize al-Shabab and increase its 

support within Somalia are additional air strikes by the United 

States, or a return of Ethiopian troops.38

4. CONCLUSION

Terrorism is a tactic that can be defeated, but doing so represents a challenge of extraordinary proportions and a commitment 

to progress that will sometimes be slow. There are several steps 

that the United States can take, internally and in concert with forVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:00 Jan 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\YEMEN.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
17 

eign governments, to make terrorist operations more difficult, particularly in places like Yemen and Somalia, where the threat appears to be growing. 

First, U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic officials 

must cooperate closely to discern the terrorist threat, including 

that posed by Americans, and to address that threat. Information 

sharing is the most important component of this cooperation. The 

failed Christmas Day bomb plot demonstrated what can happen 

when U.S. government agencies fail to act on or disseminate information quickly and efficiently. 

Second, U.S. government cooperation with foreign partners must 

be redoubled across the counter-terrorism spectrum: Informationsharing, counter-terrorism and law enforcement training, and border control are all areas where allies will benefit from cooperation. 

Foreign partners are often the first line of defense: Djiboutian border patrol agents turn away suspect immigrants, Yemeni police 

raid an Al Qaeda safe house, or an alert immigration officer stops 

a suspicious traveler at an airport in Europe. But as the Christmas 

Day bombing attempt proved, one breakdown in the system can be 

disastrous. 

Finally, a viable counter-terrorism strategy must take into account the fact that terrorism is not created in a vacuum, and its 

causes must be addressed. The U.S. government must engage foreign partners on issues such as literacy, high birth rates, economic 

development, and human rights. All countries concerned must understand the dangers of attempting to solve the complex problem 

of terrorism through a one-dimensional military approach. The solution also lies in steady progress toward helping governments in 

conflict zones like Yemen and Somalia provide a sense of hope and 

a plausible vision of the future for their people. 

18 

No Direct Connection Between al-Shabab 

and Somali Pirates 

Western diplomats and military officials agree 

that currently there is no direct connection between 

al-Shabab and Somali pirates, due primarily to clan 

and tribal differences. The pirates hail almost 

exclusively from Somalia’s Majourteen clan, Issa 

Musa subclan, which are based in Puntland and 

Somaliland, in the central and northern parts 

of the country. Al-Shabab, however, is made up of 

Somalis of various clans from Mogadishu and 

southern Somalia that are not related to the 

Majourteen. Ethiopian academics describe alShabab as ‘‘an opportunistic organization. Shabab 

speaks to southern Somalis by using nationalist 

rhetoric and money.’’ Most of the raiders and their 

backers on land are involved in piracy solely for the 

money. Al-Shabab, on the other hand, is ‘‘not as 

xenophobic as the northerners. They welcome 

foreign fighters, who they call ‘Muslims.’ They don’t 

make any differentiation by nationality. Al-Shabab 

doesn’t even have its own flag.’’ 

There is, however, an indirect connection. In the 

past year, the pirates have begun operating out 

of southern ports controlled by al-Shabab. This 

is a new development in 2009, according to U.S. 

diplomats. Pirates simply pay a ‘‘user fee’’ to 

al-Shabab for use of the ports. 

Æ