IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

WILLIAM BURROWS,

Defendant Below–

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below–

Appellee.

§

§ No. 101, 2019

§

§ Court Below–Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. No. 1507008924 (N)

§

§

§

§

Submitted: May 17, 2019

Decided: July 8, 2019

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, William Burrows, appeals the Superior Court’s denial of 

his motion for correction of sentence. The State has moved to affirm the Superior 

Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Burrows’ opening 

brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) The record reflects that Burrows pled guilty to one count of sexual 

solicitation of a child and one count of rape in the fourth degree on March 7, 2016. 

Following a presentence investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Burrows to an 
2

aggregate of forty years of Level V incarceration, suspended after fifteen years for

decreasing levels of supervision. Burrows did not appeal.

(3) On July 18, 2016, Burrows filed a motion for modification of sentence

under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b). The Superior Court denied the motion, 

noting that it considered Burrows’ convictions far too serious to warrant a sentence 

modification. Burrows did not appeal.

(4) On February 12, 2019, Burrows filed a motion to correct an illegal 

sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). The Superior Court denied the 

motion, finding that the motion was time-barred because it was filed more than 

ninety days after the imposition of the sentence; the sentence remained appropriate 

for the reasons stated at sentencing and no modification or reduction thereof was 

warranted; and that the sentence, while in excess of the range established by the 

Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”), was nonetheless 

authorized by law. This appeal followed.

(5) We review the denial of a motion for correction of sentence for abuse 

of discretion.1 To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the claim 

de novo.

2

 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double jeopardy, 

is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is 

 

1 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).

2

Id.
3

internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain 

as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.3 

On appeal, Burrows argues his sentence is illegal because it impermissibly exceeded 

the SENTAC guidelines and because it violated double jeopardy principles. 

(6) Although the Superior Court considered Burrows’ motion as a motion 

to modify under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b),

4

the Superior Court addressed 

Burrows’ argument that his sentence is illegal and rejected it. We agree. Burrows 

contends the Superior Court should have sentenced him within the SENTAC 

guidelines because he admitted guilt, showed remorse, and had no prior criminal 

history. But it is established Delaware law that a defendant has no legal or 

constitutional right to appeal a sentence authorized by statute simply because it does 

not conform to the sentencing guidelines established by SENTAC.

5 Generally, 

appellate review of a sentence ends upon a determination that the sentence fell within 

the statutory limits specified by the General Assembly.6 Here, Burrows pled guilty 

to one count of sexual solicitation of a child, a Class B felony7for which the statutory 

 

3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).

4 Burrows filed his motion as a motion for correction of illegal sentence under Rule 35(a). A 

motion for correction of illegal sentence may be filed at any time and is not subject to the ninetyday limitation period of Rule 35(b). 

5 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992).

6

Id.

7

11 Del. C. § 1112A(h) (“Sexual solicitation of a child is a class B felony if the defendant meets 

in person or attempts to meet in person with the child for the purpose of engaging in a prohibited 

sexual act.”).
4

maximum sentence was twenty-five years of Level V incarceration8and one count 

of fourth degree rape, a class C felony9for which the statutory maximum sentence 

was fifteen years of Level V incarceration.10 Because Burrows’ sentence does not 

exceed forty years of Level V incarceration, we find no merit to Burrows’ contention

that the Superior Court imposed an illegal sentence.

(7) Burrows’ argument—raised for the first time on appeal—that his 

sentence violated double jeopardy principles is also unavailing. Because Burrows 

did not present this argument below, this Court ordinarily will not entertain it.11 

Nevertheless, there is no substantive merit to Burrows’ double jeopardy argument. 

Double jeopardy “protects defendants ‘against multiple punishments for the same 

offense.’”12 That is, double jeopardy prohibits the State from punishing the 

defendant twice for the same conduct—the same offense. To determine if “there are 

two offenses or only one,” this Court asks, “whether each [offense] requires proof 

of a fact which the other does not.”13 Under that test, Burrows’ argument fails 

because sexual solicitation of a child and rape in the fourth degree are separate and 

 

8

11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2).

9

11 Del. C. § 770.

10 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(3).

11 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 

review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 

and determine any question not so presented.”). 

12 Parker v. State, 201 A.3d 1181, 1184 (Del. 2019) (quoting Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 559, 603 

(Del. 2003)). 

13 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 229, 304 (1932). 
5

distinct crimes; they have different elements, punish different criminal conduct, and 

a defendant can commit one without necessarily committing the other.

14

 That is 

what occurred here. Burrows committed sexual solicitation of a child by using an 

electronic device to ask a child to engage in a prohibited act.15 That offense was 

completed before he later sexually penetrated the child.16 The fact that the two are 

connected—i.e., the solicitation was used to place the child in a situation where 

Burrows could sexually penetrate her—does not mean they are the same offense. 

The Superior Court’s imposition of a separate punishment for each crime thus did 

not violate principles of double jeopardy.17

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice 

 

14 Compare 11 Del. C. § 1112A (establishing that “[a] person is guilty of sexual solicitation of a 

child if the person, being 18 years of age or older, intentionally or knowingly: (1) Solicits, requests, 

commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause any child to engage in a prohibited sexual 

act; or (2) Uses a computer, cellular telephone or other electronic device to communicate with 

another person, including a child, to solicit, request, command, importune, entice, encourage or 

otherwise attempt to cause a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act.”), with id. § 770(a) 

(establishing that “[a] person is guilty of rape in the fourth degree when the person: (1) 

Intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with another person, and the victim has not yet reached 

that victim’s sixteenth birthday . . .”). 

15 Exhibit B to State’s Motion to Affirm (May 17, 2019). 

16 Id. 

17 Cooper v. State, 2019 WL 494139, at *2 (Del. Feb. 7, 2019).