NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANTHONY ELADIO RAMOS, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

MARK DINELL, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0133 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2019-004608

The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Anthony Eladio Ramos, Phoenix

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Connie T. Gould, Lindsey Gilman

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

FILED 1-14-2021
RAMOS v. DINELL, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Anthony Ramos appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his 

first-amended complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In December 2018, the Arizona Corporation Commission 

investigated Ramos’s securities activities and moved for a temporary order 

to stop his activities. The Commission alleged that Ramos had engaged in 

securities fraud by making false or misleading statements when offering 

securities to an Arizona resident. The following month, Ramos filed an 

answer, his affirmative defenses, and a third-party petition against the 

Commission and three of its employees alleging several counts of fraud and 

vicarious liability. His third-party petition was dismissed for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief could be granted.

¶3 In July 2019, Ramos sued the Commission, the three 

employees he identified in his third-party petition, added a fourth 

employee to the lawsuit, and filed his first-amended complaint alleging 

several counts of fraud. He also moved for an injunction against each 

defendant. The Commission moved to dismiss the lawsuit because Ramos 

did not serve its employees with a notice of claim before suing it and the 

employees, the first-amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted, and the complaint failed to state a claim for 

injunctive relief. The Commission attached an affidavit from its executive 

director and affidavits from each of its employees attesting that they had 

not been served with a notice of claim A.R.S. § 12–821.01 required.

¶4 Ramos then moved to file a second-amended complaint and 

attached five notices of claim with certificates that they were served in 

September 2019. After oral argument—for which Ramos failed to appear

—the trial court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss and denied 

Ramos’s motion to file a second-amended complaint as futile. Ramos timely 

appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶5 Ramos argues that the notice of claim statute does not apply 

to the Commission and that the Commission never adopted the statute. He 

further contends that even if the notice of claim statute does apply to the 

Commission, it does not apply to special actions or injunctions. We review 

the trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss de novo. Cleckner v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Health Services, 246 Ariz. 40, 42 ¶ 6 (App. 2019). When the trial court 
RAMOS v. DINELL, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

considers evidence outside the complaint, we treat the motion to dismiss as 

one for summary judgment, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(d), which we also review de 

novo, Jackson v. Eagle KMC, L.L.C., 245 Ariz. 544, 545 ¶ 7 (2019). 

¶6 Persons with claims against a public entity or public 

employee must file claims with that public entity or public employee within 

180 days after the cause of action accrues. A.R.S. § 12–821.01(A). A public 

entity includes the Commission. See A.R.S. § 12–820(7) and (8) (defining 

public entity to mean any state, commission, or department). Likewise, each 

of the Commission’s employees are public employees. See A.R.S. 

§ 12–820(1) and (6) (defining public employees as public entity employees, 

officers, and directors). Because the Commission is a public entity and its 

employees are public employees, A.R.S. § 12–821.01 applies and Ramos was 

required to serve a notice of claim before suing the Commission and its 

employees.

¶7 Ramos argues next that even if the notice of claim statute 

applies, he did not discover the liable parties until April 2019, and took 

corrective action within the required time. “[A] cause of action accrues 

when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows 

or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or 

condition that caused or contributed to the damage.” A.R.S. § 12–821.01.

¶8 Ramos knew who the potentially liable parties were in 

January 2019. At that time, Ramos filed a third-party petition against the 

Commission and three of the four Commission employees that he sued in 

this action, alleging similar fraud claims. Ramos’s cause of action accrued 

in January 2019, and he was required to serve a notice of claim on the 

Commission and its employees by July 2019. See A.R.S. § 12–821.01(A). 

Therefore, his September 2019 notice of claim was untimely and the trial 

court properly granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss.

¶9 Ramos contends that the cause of action against the fourth 

Commission employee—who was not listed in the third-party petition

—did not accrue until April 2019. Even if the notice of claim served on that 

employee in September 2019 was timely, the notice was defective because 

it did not demand a specific settlement amount other than stating that “the 

amount is the amount that has already been demanded from you in said 

matter.” See Yahweh v. City of Phoenix, 243 Ariz. 21, 23 ¶ 8 (App. 2017) (claim 

is barred if notice of claim does not contain valid settlement offer and the 

amount demanded in the complaint does not satisfy this requirement). By

October 2019, the notice of claim deadline passed. The trial court properly 

granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss and denied Ramos’s motion 
RAMOS v. DINELL, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

to file a second-amended complaint as futile. See Stair v. Maricopa Cty., 245 

Ariz. 357, 366 ¶ 37 (App. 2018) (amendment need not be granted if futile).

¶10 The trial court also properly dismissed Ramos’s claim for 

injunctive relief. While a request for injunctive relief need not satisfy the 

notice requirements of A.R.S. § 12–821.01(A), State v. Mabery Ranch, Co., 

L.L.C., 216 Ariz. 233, 245 ¶ 53 (App. 2007), the complaint must still set forth 

well-pleaded facts and not mere conclusory statements, Cullen v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419 ¶ 7 (2008). Ramos did not respond to the 

injunctive relief section of the Commission’s motions to dismiss and he does 

not argue on appeal that he stated a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. And in his first-amended complaint Ramos did not specify the 

harm that was caused by the Commission or its employees; he merely asked 

that the trial court grant him relief enjoining the Commission and its 

employees from “any further acts against Plaintiff.” Ramos therefore failed 

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the trial court 

properly granted the Commission’s motion. 

CONCLUSION

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.