### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 09 -0 00 39 -C R

______________________________ THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V. CODY JOE P OSEY, Appellee

On Appea l from the 6th J udicial District Court

L amar County , Texas Trial Court No. 20829

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Moseley2 O P I N I O N I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY I n J uly 2006, Cody

J oe Posey

was c onvicted of c riminally neg lige nt homicide in association with a fatal traff

ic ac cident whe rein drivingwhile intox icated ( DWI ) wa s not a fa ct o r. The jury fo un d th a t th e a

uto mob ile dr ive n b y Pos e y in the c omm iss ion of that off e ns e wa s use d as a d e a dly

wea pon. The jury

assessed punishment at two y ear s' imprisonment, but recommende d that the sentenc e be probated. I n October 2008, the State moved to re voke Posey ' s community supervision based on the commission of a new of fense (DWI ) and f

or Posey ' s failure t o perf

orm the re quired

c omm un ity se rv ic e . T he tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th e Sta te ' s a lle g a tio ns to b e tr ue , s e nte nc e d Po se y

to twenty -two months' c onfinement a nd, in his oral comments, left o p en t h e possibility of shock

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on . O n Jan

ua ry 7, 20 09 , Po se y

fi le d a mot ion re quest in g sh oc k c omm

un ity supervision, and the trial court g rante d that motion after a hear ing at which the State ar g ued the tria l court wa s without the authority to order shoc k community supervision. Th e State a

pp e a ls the tr ia l c ourt's or de r gra nti ngPos e y ' s mo tio n f

or sh oc k c omm

un ity supervision. T h e St a te c o n te n d s th a t t h e tr ia l c o u r

t r e v e r s ib ly

e r r e d b y ar r e s ti n g o r mo d if y in g the judgme nt revoking community supervision by

suspending the execution of Posey ' s sentence and by pla c ing hi m on

sh oc k c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on . In r e sp on se to t he State ' s c on te nti on s, Pos e y fi rs t raises the issue of the State' s rig ht to appeal this order under Art icle 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and, conse quently , this Court's jurisdiction to hear the appea l. T EX . C ODE C R IM .3

P R OC . ANN . art 44.01 (Ve rnon S upp. 2009). As to t he mer its of the State' s appea l, Posey responds that he wa s elig ible for shoc k community supervision. The State a sks the Court to rever se and

rema nd the matters to the tria l court wit h instructions to reinstate the jury ' s orig inal two-y ear sentenc e, rather than the twenty -two-month sentenc e imposed by the trial cour

t upon revoc ation of community supervision since the twenty -two-month sentenc e is be low the minimum puni shment for

a t h i r d

- d e g r e e f

e l o n y. Cr iti c a l to an und e rs tand ingof the iss ue s in

thi s matte r i s the re c og nit ion that un de r A rt ic le 42 .1 2 o f t

he Te xas C od e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure , th e re are so me of fe ns e s f or wh ic h c omm

un ity supervision ca

n be g rante d by a judge only if it ha s been rec ommended by a jury . T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art 42.12, § 4 (V ernon Supp. 2009). II. AN AL YSI S A. The State's Right to Appeal; This Court's Jurisdiction to Hear It Pos e y argue s th a t th e State la c ks statut or y a uth or ity to b ri ngthi s a

pp e a l. It r e lie s p ri mari ly

on State v. Ramirez , 62 S.W .3d 356 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.), in which the court addre ssed a f

actua lly simil ar situation and dismissed the S tate' s appea l afte r having c oncluded that Article 44.01 of

the Texas Code of C riminal Procedur e did not authorize the State to appe al the trial court' s order

of shock c ommunity

supervi s i o n . I n Ramirez , a jury orig inally

rec ommended

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on fo r Ra mir e z a ft e r he ple a de d g uil ty to se xua l ass a ult of a c hil d, an o ff

e ns e for whic h initial community supervision was available only upon the re commendation of a jury

. Id.4

a t 35 6– 57 ; see T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art 42.12, § 3 g(a )( 1 )(H) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). The tr ia l c ourt re vo ke d th a t c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on and se nte nc e d Ramir e z to fo ur y e ars ' imp ri so nme nt. Ramirez , 62 S.W .3d at 356. Ramirez timely filed a motion for shock community

supervision and the trial cour

t gr anted that motion over the State' s objection. Id. at 357. The State ma intained that the tr ia l c ourt

la c ke d th e a

uth or ity to g ra nt s ho c k c omm un it y su per vis ion sin c e Se c tio n 3 g wo uld have r ender ed Ramirez inelig ible for judg e-or dere d initial communit y supervision. Id. T h e C o r p u s C h r i s t i co u rt , h o we v er , n ev er re ac h edt h e i s s u e c o n ce rn i n g t h e t ri al j u d ge's authority to impose shock community supervision when Sec tion 3g would have disallowed the trial court fr om orderinginitial communit y supervision. See id. at 358. I nstead, the Corpus Christi court conclude d that the State lacke d the authority to appea l the trial court's o rder g ranting shock community

supervision. Noting the State' s limi ted rig ht of appe al, it continued: The State must invoke one of the spec ific instance s in which the L eg islature has g r an te d it th e r ig h t to a

p p e al. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 44.01. The State has not invoke d a specific statute in this case ; the only applicable g round is the State' s rig ht to appeal " a sente nce in a case on the g round that the sentenc e is illeg al." T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 44.01(b) . There fo re , the State may only appea l thi s ca se if the tr ia l c ourt ' s o rd e r g ra nti nga pp e lle e sh oc k c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on is an illeg al sentenc e. Id. at 357. I t concluded, c orre ctl y , t h at community supervision is not a sentenc e or e ven par t of a sentenc e. Id. at 3 5 8 (q u o t i n g Ex parte W illiams , 6 5 S. W. 3 d

6 5 6 , 6 5 7 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p . 2 0 0 1 )). There fore , it concluded, Ar ticle 44.01(b) did not author ize the State to appea l the trial court' s order5

g ranting the m otion for shock community supervision. The Ramirez court c oncluded it was w ithout jurisdiction to hear the a

ppeal a nd dismiss ed it for wa

nt of jurisdiction. 62 S.W .3d at 358. The Corpus Christi court agai n ad d re ssed the State' s authority to appea l an orde r g ranting shock community

supervision in I

n r e S ta tee xr e l. D e Leon , 89 S.W .3d 195 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, orig

. proce eding ). The De Leon court acknowledg ed it s previous holding in Ramirez , bu t e xpla ine d th a t th e State on ly a dv anc e d th e " ill e g a l se nte nc e " pr ov isi on of Ar tic le 44 .0 1( b) a s a basis for its authority

to appea l. Ag ain, at issue in De Leon wa s th e su bs tanti ve qu e sti on

be fo re us : whether the t ri al cour

t can or der shoc k community supervision to a def

endant who w ould not be el i gi b l e f o r i n i t i al j u d ge- o rd er ed co m m u n i t y s u p er v i s i o nb ec au s e S ec t i o n3 g l i m i t edt h e t ri al co u rt 's authority to so gr ant. See id. at 196. Once ag ain, the Corpus Christi court did not address this substantive question. See id. The State had sought mandamus relief, requesting that the court direc t the trial cour t to vacate its order g ra nti ngthe mot ion fo r s ho c k c omm un ity su pe rv isi on sin c e the tr ia l c ourt

did no t ha ve the a uth or ity to order c ommunity

supervision under the circ umstances in De Leon

. Id. at 195–96. The Corpus Christi court concluded that the State c ou ld have appea led the order g ranting the def endant' s motion for sho ck comm unity

supervision under A rticle 44.01' s provision relating to the arr est or modification of a judg ment. See id. at 196. Since the State had an adequate reme dy at law, the c ourt denied manda

mus relief. See id. at 197.We note that on Marc h 11, 2009, the Texas Court of C ri m i nal Appea ls gr anted a petition 1 on the following issue in Dunbar : "Did the Court of Appea ls err i n h o l d ing that the State did not wa ive the ir

ri g ht t o a pp e a l by no t obje c tin g to t he tr ia l c ourt

pla c ingthe pe tit ion e r o n c omm un ity superv is io n at th e ti me t he co urt ord eredsh ockcom mu ni ty superv is io n? " State v. Dunbar , No . PD -1 71 3- 08 , 2 00 9 Te x. Cr im. Ap p. L EX I S 36 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. Mar. 11 , 2 00 9) . T he State is in no dang er he re of

having waived a

ny err or as s o c ia

ted with order ing shoc k community supervision; it m a de an e xten siv e , c og e nt a rgum ent th a t th e tr ia l c ourt c ou ld n ot g ra

nt s ho c k c omm

un ity supervision here and noted that it would be a ppealingthe dec ision. 6 The B eaumont cour

t concluded that the State was a uthorized to appeal such a n order in Sta te v. Dunbar , 269 S.W .3d 693 (Tex. A pp.—Be aumont 2008, pet. g rante d). Citi ng and siding with the 1 Corpus Christi court's position in De Leon , the B e a umo nt co ur

t con c lud e d the State ha d the ri g ht t o appea l a trial cour

t's or der g ranting a motion for shock co m m u n i t y supervision: "B eca

use a

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on or de r a rr e sts or m o d i fi e s a

jud g me nt, Ar

tic le 44 .0 1( a )( 2) a

uth or ize s th e State to app eal a sh ock com mu ni ty su perv is io n o rder ." Id. at 6 9 5

. W e agr ee wi t h t h e B ea u m o n tco u rt 's

rea ding of

Article 44.01( a)( 2). Af t er re ad i n g Ramirez , De Leon , and Dunbar in conjunction with Article 44.01, we c onclude that th e State po sse sse s th e ri g ht t o a pp e a l th e tr ia l c ourt ' s o rder grant ingsh oc k c omm un ity supervision in this case pursua nt to Article 44.01(a )(2) , re l at i ng to the arr est or modification of judgme nt. Having deter

mined that the State does have t he abilit y to appea l and we, there fore , have jurisdiction to review this order , we move to the next question: whether the State is c orre ct in that the trial court did not have the authority to g rant shock community supervision when a

n aff irmative deadly wea pon finding rende red Posey ineligible f

or judg e-or dere d initial communit y supervision. Th a t is , if the tr ia l c ourt

wa s w ith ou t a

uth or ity to g ra

nt P os e y c omm un ity su pe rv isi on or ig ina lly

(i n7

light of the aff

i rm ative dea dly

wea pon finding ), wa s the trial cour t authorized to order shoc k community supervision afte r i t revoke d the i nitial jury -re commended c ommunity supervision and

s e n t e n c e d P o s e y t o c o n f i n e m e n t ? B. Trial Court's Authority to Order Shock Comm uni ty Sup ervision 1. Appli cable law Section 6 of Article 42.12 g overns shoc k community supervision: Continu ing Court Jurisdi ction in Fe lony Cases Se c . 6. (a ) F or the purp os e s of thi s se c tio n, the jur isd ic tio n of a c ourt in which a se ntence requiringim p ri s onment in the instit utional divisi on of the Te x as Depa rtment of C riminal J ustice is imposed by the judg e of the court shall continue for 180 day s from the date the execution of the sentenc e ac tually beg ins. Bef

ore the e xp ir atio n o f 1 80 da

y s f ro m th e date the e xec uti on of the se nte nc e a c tua lly

be g ins , the judg e of t h e co u rt that imposed such sentenc e may on his own motion, on t he motion of the attorney

repr esent i ng the state, or on the written motion of the defe ndant, s u s p en d further execution of the sente nce a nd place the def

endant on community

supervision under the terms and c ondition s o f t h i s article , if in the opinion of the judge the defe ndant would not be nefit from further imprisonment and: (1) the defendant is otherwise eligible for community supe rvision un de r th is a rti c le ; and ( 2 ) t h e d e f

e n d an th a d

n e v e r b e f o r e b e e ni n c ar c e r a t e d

i na p e n i t e n t i ar

y s e r v i n g a s e n t e n c e f

o r a f e l o n y. (b ) Whe n th e de fe nd ant o r t he a tt orney

re pr e se nti ngthe state fi le s a written motion requesting suspension by th e j u d ge of f

urther e x ecution of the sentenc e and pla ceme n t o f the def endant on c ommunity

supervision, and whe n reque sted to do so by

the judg e, the c lerk of the court shall re q u es t a co p y of the defe n d ant's rec ord while imprisoned fr om the instit utional divisi on of the Te x as Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice or, if the defe ndant is c onfined in county jail, from the s h er i ff

. Upon re ceipt of suc h reque st, the instit utional divisi on of the Te x as8

Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice or the she riff sha ll forwar d to the judge , as soon as possible, a full and c omplete copy of the de fenda

nt's r ecor d while impris o n ed or confine d. When the defe ndant files a written motion requesting suspension of furthe r e xec uti on of the se nte nc e and

placement on

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on , h e sh a ll imm e diate ly

de liv e r o r c a

us e to b e de liv e re d a

tr ue and c or

re c t cop y of the mot ion

to the offic e of the attorney

repr esenting the state. (c) The judg e may

deny the m otion without a hearing but may not gr ant the motion without h o l d i n g a hea ring and providing the attorne y repr esenting the state and the defe ndant the opportunity to present e vidence on the motion. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 6 (V ernon Supp. 2009) ( emphasis adde d). Section 3 of Article 42.12 g ives fair ly broad a uthority to the t ri al j u d ge to order initial community supervision. Some of the authority which Section 3 g iveth to the trial judge , Section 3g take th a wa y fr om t he tr ia l ju dg e . T he re le va nt l imi ta tio n h e re is a s f

oll ow s: Limit ation on Ju dge-Order ed Com m uni ty Sup ervision S e c . 3 g . ( a ) T h e p r o v i s i o n s o f S e c t i o n3 o f

t h i s art i c l e d o n o t a

p p l y:

. . . . (2 ) to a

de fe nd ant w he n it

is sho wn that

a de a dly we a po n a s d e fi ne d in Section 1.07, Penal Code, wa s used or ex hibited during the commi ssion of a fe lony offe nse or dur ing immediate flig ht theref rom, and that the defe n d ant used or e xhibi te d th e de a dly

we a po n o r w a s a

pa rt y to t he of fe ns e and kn e w that a

de a dly weapon wo uld be us e d o r e xhibi te d. On an a ff ir ma tiv e fi nd ingun de r t

his subdivision, t he trial c ourt shall enter the finding in the j udg ment of the c ourt. On an aff irmative finding that the dea dly wea pon was a firea rm, the cour

t shall enter that fi nd ingin i ts j ud g me nt. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 3g(Ve rnon Supp. 2009). Sections 3 and 3g , then, ar e

rea d in conjunction to arrive at the undisputed conc lusion that the trial court may n o t o rder initial9

community

supervision upon a felony conviction i n which there was an af firmative de adly -we apon finding . The que stion here is more spe cific: Af ter jury -orde red c ommunity supervision is revoke d, may the trial cour

t order shoc k community

supervision in light of ( or despite) an af firmative f

inding that a dea dly

wea pon was used in the c ommissi on of the off ense? 2. P lain me anin g of the statute: "oth erwise eligible . . . un der this artic le" Th is c a se tur

ns on the int e rp re ta tio n a

nd a pp lic a tio n o f the fo llo wi ng ph ra se fo un d in Ar tic le 42 .1 2, Se c tio n 6 (a )( 1) : " the de fe nd ant is oth e rw ise e lig ibl e fo r c omm un ity su pe rv isi on un de r t his article ." T he Te x as Gove rnment Code requires that the pl ain m eaningof phra ses within a statute be

o u r g uide in interpre ting a statutory provision: "Words and phra ses shall be re ad in context and

con st rued accor di ng to th e rul es o f gramm ar an d co mm on us age . " See T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 311.011 (Ve rnon 2005). Courts must also presume that the L eg islature int en d ed that eff ect be g iven to the entire statute. T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 31 1. 02 1( 2) (V e rn on 20 05 ); see Ex

pa rte Fo rwa rd , 2 5 8 S

. W

. 3 d

1 5 1 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ex pa rte A us tin , 7 4 6 S. W. 2 d 2 2 6 , 2 3 6 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ) ( Clin ton , J., c on c ur ri ng ). Pos e y

po int s o ut t

hat A rt icl e 42 .1 2 e nc omp a sse s a ll kinds of communi ty service ; he then argues t hat i f the L eg islature would have intended that shock

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on no t be a va ila

ble to him in thi s sit

uatio n, it wo uld have re fe rr e d s pe c if ic a lly to e lig ib il it y

un de r S e c tio ns 3 a

nd 3gde a lin g sp e c if

ic a lly wi th j ud g e -o rd e re d in iti a l c omm un ity supervision. Since it does not, he continues, refe renc e to " under this ar ticle" should be rea d to mean "if Posey is eligible f

or any kind of community supervision" under a ny part of A rticle 42.12. Posey10

ma int a ins tha

t si nc e he ha d b e e n p lace d o n c omm un ity su pe rv isi on or ig ina lly , h e wa s o bv iou sly elig ible for c ommunity

supervision. Sh o c k c o mm u n it y s u p e r v is io ns e r v e s to " s u s p e nd f

urther execution of the sentenc e," and jur isd ic tio n to g ra

nt s ho c k c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on c on tin ue s f or 18 0 d ay s after

th e d a te th e e x ecution of the sente nce be g ins. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art
. 42 .1 2, § 6( a ) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e se two fac ets indicate that shock commun i ty supervision is a consider ation for the tr ial court in the period of time e lapsing afte r a jury has been dismiss ed. They also sug g est that elig ibilit y for Sec tion 6 ( sh oc k c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on ) d oe s have a

te mpo ra l c on sid e ra

tio n. Th a t is , th e ind ivi du a l mu st be elig ible for c ommunity supervision at that ti me . Fur ther, Sec tion 6 refe rs spec ifically to the

a uth or ity of " the jud g e of the c ourt " to or de r sh oc k c omm un ity su pe rv isi on , makin g it c le ar t hat on ly the jud g e —n ot t

he jur y —c an or de r s ho c k c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on . N oth ingin A rt ic le 42 .1 2 w ou ld sug g est otherwise

. Wit h these c ontext ual notes i n mind, we read "other wise elig ible" in Sec tion 6 as requiring that a de fe nd ant m

us t be " oth e rw ise e lig ibl e " fo r j ud g e -o rd e re d c omm un ity su pe rv isi on a t th e tim e community

supervision is considere d, bring ing us ba ck to Sections 3 an d 3 g, d ealing with judg eorder ed community

supervision. Under

Section 3g , Posey

(havingbeen pr eviously

found to have committ edan o ff

en s e u s i n g a d ea d l y

we ap o n ) i s i n el i gi b l e f

o r j u d ge- o rd er edco m m u n i t y supervision. By ref err ing to " this article ," Section 6(a) (1) encompasses the entirety of Article 42.12, including the authority and limitations i n place with respec t to judge- order ed community supervision.This fairly g ener al proposition came up in a contex t differ ent t han the one at issue. Since, 2 the Hudson court c oncluded, a person adjudg ed g uilty of an off ense c an, in theory , be inelig ible for "or dinary " judg e-or dere d community supervision, but could still b e e li g ib le f or def err ed adjudication community

supervision under A rticle 42.12, the tria l court had not m i s i n fo rm ed the de fenda nt by discussing possible e ligibility for c ommunity

supervision. 772 S.W .2d at 181. 11 Pos e y a lso c ha

ra c te ri zes thi s a s a ma tte r of re ins ta tin g the jur y -a warded co mm un ity supervision. An attempt to do so confuse s the differ ing ty pes of community supervision. All ty pes of community

super v i s i o n wi thin Article 42.12 ar e indepe ndent of one another in the sense that althoug h a def

endant may

be elig ible under the statute for one for m of community

supervision, he may be ineligible under another. See Hu ds on v . S tat e , 772 S.W .2d 180, 181 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 1 4 t h Di s t
. ] 1 9 8 9 , p et
. re f'd ) (c i t i n g State ex re l. Vance v . Hatten , 600 S.W .2d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 1980) (or ig. pr ocee ding) ). Article 42.12 does not specific ally addre ss reinstateme nt of jury -orde red

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on by a jud g e fo llo wi ngre vo c atio n o f that com mun ity su pe rv isi on . Ins te a d, its provisions create diffe rent ty pes of c ommunity

s u p e r v is ion. At the outset, Posey was prope rly

place d on initial communit y s upervision by the jury ; the judge could not have done so beca use of the exis tence of the a ffirmative finding of a de adly wea pon. That initial co mmunity supervision, ho we ve r, wa s r e vo ke d in

lig ht o f P os e y ' s v iol a tio ns of the c on dit ion s of that jury -o rd e re d c omm un ity

su pe rv isi on . Sh oc k c omm un it y supe rv isi on

is a n e nti re ly dif fe re nt b e a st, c on te mpl a tin g that a de fe nd ant s pe nd

so me tim e in c on fi ne me nt, re qu ir ingc e rt a in f ind ing s b y

the tr ia l c ourt be fo re it i s order ed, and involving cer tain proce dures that must be followe d to br ing the matter befor e the tria l12

c ourt . A ft e r r e vo c a tio n a

nd se nte nc ing , Po se y

wa s su bje c t to the ru le s and

lim itatio ns a

pp lic a ble to shock community

supervision, one of those limit ations being that it can only be orde red by

a judg e. Th e pla in l angua g e of

Ar ticle 42 .1 2, Se c tio n 6 , r e a d in c on jun c tio n w iththe re st o f " thi s

art ic le ," su

pp or ts the c on c lus ion

that th e tr ia l c ourt

la c ke d the a

uth or ity to or de r s ho c k c omm un ity supervision here , when Posey was other

wise inelig ible for judge -orde red c ommunity supervision. This conclusion is also supported by case law. 3. Cases concerning the tr ial court's authority to ordershock com m uni ty sup ervision

a. State ex rel. V

ance v. Hatten We have r eviewe d Vance , 600 S.W .2d at 828. Aspec ts of Vance could be rea d t o s u p p ort the c on c lus ion

that c ourt s mu st m a int a in a de fi nit e dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n th e tr ia l ju dg e ' s a uth or ity to g rant initial community

supervision and authority to gr ant shock c ommunity supervision. Id. at 830. The fo rm er v ersion of Article 42.12 (in e ffe ct when Vance was de cided) specific ally prohibited shock community

supervision for a

defe ndant convicte d of cr iminal homicide, rape , or robbe ry . Id.

a t 82 9. Th e re su lt o f h a vin g sp e c if ic lim itatio ns on

the aut ho ri ty to i mpo se sh oc k c omm un ity supervision had the odd e ffe ct of c reating a situation in which a trial cour t co u l d g rant initial community

supervision, but could not g rant shock c ommunity supervision. Id. at 830. Ac kn ow le dg ingthat it

mig ht b e be tte r t o a llo w the tr ia l c ourt to h a ve the same a

uth or ity wi th respe ct t o both initial community supervision and shock community supervision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls ulti mately reje cted this rea ding in lig ht of the plain mea ning of the statute:13

Ce rt a inl y , it may be argue d th a t un de r t he e nti re sc he me of

Ar tic le 42 .1 2, su

pr a , it is de sir a ble that the tr ia l c ourt have the a uth or ity to g ra

nt " sh ock com mu nity supervision" in any

case in which it had the author ity to gr ant " initial" probation. Howeve r, this is not t he languag e of the statute. Id. So, under t h e fo rm er ve rsion of Article 42.12, the cour t rea d and maintained a

distinction be tw e e n th e tr ia l c ourt ' s a uth or ity to g ra nt i nit ia l or

" re g ul ar" commun ity

su pe rv isi on and its authority to gr ant shock c ommunity supervision. See id. Howeve r, the re levanc e of Vance ' s sp e c if ic ho ldi ngto t

he ins ta nt c ase is m ini ma l si nc e Se c tio n 6 of the c ur re nt A rt ic le 42 .1 2 r e pr e se nts a sig nif ic ant an d nota

ble c ha ng e fr om the ve rs ion in ef fe c t at the tim e that Vance was decide d. Gone

are the sp e c if

ic lim itatio ns re la tin g to the tr ia l c ourt ' s a uth or ity to g ra nt s ho c k c omm

un ity supervision. I n lieu of the for mer wording is the phrase "otherwise eligible . . . unde r this article." See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 6(a )(1)

. Although the version of Article 42.12 studied in Vance was quite diff ere nt than the cur

rent

ve rs ion by inc lud ingse pa

rate , in de pe nd e nt l imi ta tio ns o n s h o c k c o mm u n i t y s u p e r v i s ion , w e may

sti ll rely on Vance for more g ener al propositions. One is the focus on the plain meaning of the statute: [T] he statute must be construe d as it is written by the leg islature; it cannot be a dded to b y c o u rt s ; n o r i s i t t h e d

u t y o f t h e c o u rt s t o s u

p p l y o m i s s i o n s i n a

la w o r t o question t h e wisdom there of. The c ourts, having no leg islative powers, ma y not enlar g e or a lter the plain meaning of statutory lang uag e. Wording in statutes is to be g ive n it s li te ra l in te rp re ta tio n w he n th a t w or din g is c le arl y un a mbi g uo us . Id. (citations omitted). Another importa nt aspec t of Vance is the notion that differe n t t y pes of community

supervision should be kept as distinct ideas. O f cour se, this position becomes something14

of a ba lancingact be cause , under th e cur rent ve rsion of Article 42.12, elig ibilit y for shoc k community

supervision makes r efe renc e to " otherwise e ligible" under A rticle 42.12. We see how the Texas Court of Criminal Appe als deals with this specific languag e in Au sti n , 746 S.W .2d 226.

b. Ex p arte

Aust in I n Au sti n , the cour t gra n ted habe as re lief to a de fenda nt after the State violated the plea ag ree ment. Id. a t 22 9. Au sti n h a d p le a de d guil ty to atte mpt e d mu

rder pu rs ua

nt t o a ple a ba rg a in under which he was to be g rante d shock community supervision. See id. at 226–27. The a g ree ment

was a pproved by

the trial cour

t. Id. at 227. Howeve r, t he par ties discovere d afte r he e ntere d his plea that du e to t

he a ff ir ma tiv e fi nd ingin t

he jud g me nt t hat Aus tin ha d u se d a

de a dly we a po n in commission of his off

ense, he was ineligible for shock community supervision. Id. a t 22 9. B e c a us e the State' s part of the plea ba rg ain could n o t t h er efor e be pe rfor med, the Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls ordere d the conviction set a side and re manded the c ause f or a ne w trial. Id. at 229–30. Noting that Article 42.12 unde rw en t reor g anization in 1985, the Tex as Court of Criminal Appea ls was fa ced w ith interpretation of the "othe rwise e ligible" l an gu age , which re mains in the

cu rr en t v er s ion of Article 42.12. Id. a t 2 2 8

. A p p ly in g a le g is lati v e s c h e me s im il ar to th e c u r

r e nt

ve rs ion of Ar tic le 42 .1 2, the c ourt

c on c lud e d a s f

oll ow s: [ U]pon the entry

of an a ffirmative finding of a de adly wea pon in the judgme nt the applicant wa s not eligible for "regular" probation by the t rial court and the trial court was without " power " to g rant the same. I f applica nt was not eligi b l e fo r "regular" probation because of the affirmative finding, .

. . then he wa s not eligible f or shock pr ob a tio n . . . be c a

us e he c ou ld be g ra

nte d s ho c k p ro batio n o nly if he wa s " oth e rw ise elig ible for pr obation under this ar ticle."I ndeed, a number of state ca ses have cited Au sti n for t h e p ro p o s ition that ineligiblity for 3 jud g e -o rd e re d in iti a l c omm un ity su pe rv isi on e qu a ls i ne lig ibi lity

fo r s ho c k co mmunit y supervision. He ath v . S tat e , 8 17 S.W. 2d 33 5, 33 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Rudnick v . S tat e , No. 03-02-00767-CR, 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 7392 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug . 29, 2003, pe t. r e f' d) (m e m. o p. , n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bl ica tion) ; Br

y an t v . S tat e , 9 7 4 S. W. 2 d

3 9 5 , 3 9 8 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. re f' d). At lea st one fede ral c ourt has also done so: [Sec tio n] 3gof

art ic le 42 .1 2 p roh ib its the imp os iti on of jud g e -o rd e re d c omm

un ity supervision based on the convicted of fense . Austin was convicte d of one of the o ff en s es

— aggr av at edro b b ery

— fo r w h i ch co m m u n i t y

s u p er v i s i o ni s p rohi bited. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 3g (a) (1)( F) (West 1998). Thus, in light of his ineligibility

for c ommunity

supervision, [t he defenda nt] was a lso ineligible for "sho ck p rob ati on ." See Ex pa rt e Au stin , 746 S.W .2d 226, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Au sti n v . Coc k

re ll , N o . 3 :0 1

- CV

- 2 2 3 6

- L , 2 0 0 2 U

. S. D is t. L E X I S 7 5 5 8 , a t * 1 0 n . 7 ( N

. D

. T e x. Apr. 26, 2002). 15 Id. at 229 (citations omitted). Au sti n , there fore , makes it clea r that a de fenda

nt who, by

application of Section 3g, i s ineligible for judge- order ed communit y supervision is not "othe rwise e ligible" for shock community

supervision. 3

c. State v. Dunbar Our sis ter court came to the same c onclusion in Dunbar

. Dunbar was orig inally

place d on defe rre d adjudication community supervision by

the trial cour

t. Dunbar , 269 S.W .3d at 694. The State mov e d to a dju dic a te , a nd the tr ia l cou

rt c on vic te d Dun

ba r of ind e c e nc y wi th a ch ild by c on ta c t, an off ense unde r Section 21.11(a )(1) of the Te x as Penal Code, a n offe nse listed under Sec tion 3g of Article 42.12 w hich would re nder D unbar ine ligible f or initi a l j u d g e - o r d ere d community supervision (as the a ffirmative deadly wea pon finding does in the instant case ). Id. The trial c ourt imposed a16

sentenc e of four y ear s, but later g rante d Dunbar ' s motion for shock community supervision. Id. at 695. Th e B e a

umo nt c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt la cked th e a

uth or ity un de r S e c tio n 6 to

o rd er s h o ckco m m u n i t y

s u p er v i s i o nb as edo nt h e l i m i t at i o n s o u t l i n edi nS ec t i o n3 g: Her e, the tria l court' s power to g rant shock c ommunity supervision was not invoked be c a us e a s a ma tte r o f l aw D un

ba r w a s n ot e lig ibl e fo r j ud ge-ord ered c omm un ity supervision afte r conviction and im position of sentence for an offense under Sec tion 2 1

. 1 1 (a)(1) of

the Penal Code. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 4 2

. 1 2, § 3g (a) (1)( C). Under t h e express terms of Ar ticle 42.12, § 6(a ), Dunba r wa s not eligible f

or jud g e -o rd e re d c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on on Febr ua ry 14 , 2 00 8. Th e re fo re , A rt ic le 42 .1 2, § 6 (a ) did no t a

uth or ize the tr ia l c ourt to mod if y the jud g me nt a ft e r i t be c a me final. We hold that the trial cour t lacked the authority to suspe nd the execution of the sentenc e and pla ce D unbar on shoc k community supervision. Id. at 696. Ag ain, we note that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has a g ree d to review Dunbar , but its review is limited only

to the waiver arg ument prese nted i n that case . We also note some fa ctual distinctions between the instant ca se and Dunbar . Dunbar was fir st placed on de fer

red a djudication community

super vision; under defe rre d adjudication community service , he would not have y et bee n found g uilty

of any offe nse. When Dunbar

was convicted upon t he State' s motion t o adjudicate , she beca me i nelig ible for judge- order ed communit y supervision, either shock community supervision or otherw ise. See id. a t 69 6. A j ur y ne ve r r e com mende d a

ny ty pe of c omm un ity su pe rv isi on in Dunbar , th e on ly

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on be ingjud g e -o rd e re d. Ne ve rt he le ss, Dunb ar w a s p ro pe rl y17

place d on defe rre d adjudication communit y supervision. The B eaumont cour t rec og nized that an

e nti re ly dif fe re nt se t of

c ri te ri a wa s at w or

k w he n a dif fe re nt t y pe of c omm un ity su pe rv isi on is considere d. When those criter ia set out in Section 6 came into play , she was ineligible fo r j u d g eorder ed comm u n ity

supervision as a r esult of the natur e of he r convic tion and the application of S ec t i o n3 g. So, even though some f

actua l disti nctions may

be dra wn, Dunbar ' s rea soning is instructive. He re , Po se y

wa s p ro pe rl y

pla c e d o n c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on by the jur y . W hen that c omm

un ity

su pe rv isi on wa s r e vo ke d a

nd P osey wa s se nte nc e d to imp ri so nme nt, dif fe re nt r ule s w e re in operation: thos e of Sec tion 6 relating to shock community super v i s i on. The plain mea ning of Section 6 implies the application of Section 3glimit ations on judge -orde red c ommunity supervision. Th e a ff ir ma tiv e de a dly -w e a

po n f ind ingre nd e re d Po se y

ine lig ibl e fo r jud ge- or de re d c omm un ity supervision. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 3g (a) (2). We find g uidance in Au sti n and Du nb ar t o c o n c l u d e t h a ta s a r e s u l to f t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e a d l ywea pon f in d in g , th e tr ia l ju d g e d id n o t h a v e th e a u th o r it y to g r an t Po s e y ' s mo ti o n f o r shock

commu n i t y s u p ervision. We sustain the State' s point of error . Section 6 of Article 42.12 did not authorize the trial cour

t to modify

the judg m en t af

t er it became final; the trial cour t lacked the author ity to s us pe nd

fu rt he r e xec uti on

of the se nte nc e by

pla c ingPos e y

on sh oc k c omm

un ity supervision. Havingconclude d that the trial cour t was not authorized to suspend the sentenc e, we now continue to addr ess issues con ce rni ng that sentenc e. More specific ally , we must resolve a18

conflict be tween the leng th of sentence ora lly pronounce d and the diff

eringleng th of sentenc e set out in the written judg ment. C. Se nt e nc ing Iss ue At the hea

ring on the S t ate's motion to revoke c ommunity supervision, it appea

rs there exis ted an impre ssion that the offe nse for which Posey

was c onvicted wa s a state- jail felony

when, in f act, the aff

irmative deadly -we apon finding raised the offe nse to a third-deg ree felony

. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1 2

. 3 5 (c )( 1 ) ( Ve rn o nS u p p . 2 0 0 9 ), § 1 9

. 0 5 (b ) ( Ve rn o n2 0 0 3 )

. S o , al t h o u gh some appa

rently believed the appropr iate ra ng e of punishment wa s 180 d ay s t o t wo y ear s, it was actua lly two to ten y ear s. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . §§ 12.34, 12.35 (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). 1. Report er's Re cord v. Cler k's Record Af te r h a vin g fo un d th e State ' s a lle g a tio ns in its mot ion to re vo ke c omm un ity su pe rv isi on to be true , the trial cour

t orally pronounce d a sente nce of twenty -two months, expressly reje cting the two-y ear sentenc e asse s s ed by

the jury . The orig inal judgme nt of conviction indicate s the corr ect punishment rang e of two to ten y ears , h o we v er , and the jury was c harg ed on that ra ng e of punishment. The written judg ment revokingcommunity supervision like wi s e shows a two-y ear sentenc e. There is a

n obvious conflict betwe en the se ntence the trial cour t orally pronounce d and the judg ment it signed. As a g ener al rule, when t he oral pronounce ment of sentence and the writt en judg ment differ , the ora l pronounce ment controls. Ex parte Husk ins , 176 S.W .3d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);For this reason, it is likely

that Posey

would not be entitl ed to such relief at any rate since 4 the er ror at issue appea

rs to be more in the ca t ego ry of judicial er ror a nd, there fore , outside the purview of

a nunc pr o tunc orde r. See Ex parte Ric h , 194 S.W .3d 508, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (" The e rror

that occur

red in Applica

nt's se ntencingwas more than a c lerica l mist ake that can be corr ecte d by

a nunc pro tunc motion and order be cause it resulted from judicia l re as o n ing or deter mination.). 19 se e als o E

xp a r teTh o m

p s on , 2 7 3 S.W .3d 177, 178 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (when or al pronounce ment o f s entenc e and the written judg ment vary , the ora l pronounce ment controls and

wr itt e n ju dg me nt c an b e c or re c te d via nunc pr o tun c ). A nunc pr o tun c jud g me nt is a pp ro pr ia te to

corr ect c lerica l error s in a judg ment. A cler ical er ror is one " in which no judicial re asoning

con tr ib ut ed t o [ it s] ent ry , an d for so me reas on [ was ] no t ent ered of reco rd at th e pro per t im e." Sta te v. Bates , 8 89 S.W. 2d 30 6, 30 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); State v. Dudley , 223 S.W .3d 717, 721–22 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 2 00 7, no pe t.) ; se e als o T EX . R. A PP . P. 23.1, 23.2. Nunc pro tunc orde rs ar e not appropr iate to addr ess " judicial err ors," err ors that ar e the pr oduct o f j u d i ci al reasoning or deter mination. Bates , 8 89 S.W. 2d a t 30 9; Dudley , 223 S.W .3d at 722. 4 2. Can the trial court do that? I f the trial c ourt revoke s community supervision, it may impose the s entenc e assessed at the punis hme nt h e ari ngor

it m ay re du c e the se nte nc e that wa s su sp e nd e d at th e punis hme nt h e ari ngif it determines that to do so would serve the best intere sts of society and the def endant. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 23 (V ernon Supp. 2009). How ever , the trial cour t is not authorized, in fac t, is ex pressly

direc ted not , to reduc e the sentence below the minimum sentence available for the orig inal offe nse:20

I f community supervision is revoke d afte r a hear ing under S ection 21 of this ar ticle, the jud g e may

pr oc e e d to dis po se of

the c a se a s if th ere had be e n n o c omm un ity supervision, or if the judg e dete rmines that the best intere sts of society and the defe ndant would be se rved by a shorter term of c onfinement, re duce the term of confinem en t orig inally

assessed to a

ny term of c onfinement not less than the minimum presc ribed for

the offe nse of whic h the def endant wa s convicted. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt . 4 2. 12 , § 23 (a ); see Cla

pp e r v . S tat e , 5 6 2 S. W. 2 d

2 5 0 , 2 5 2 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. [Pan e l O p. ] 197 8) (c on c lud ingthat tri al c ourt e xce e de d it s a

uth or ity by a tte mpt ingto reduc e appe llant's punishment to a ter m less than the minimum pre s cr i b ed fo r the offe nse and ref orming sentenc e to show the ter m of imprisonment at five y ea rs as o rig inally imposed and pr ob a te d u

po n c on vic tio n) . We re ite rate that the or ig ina l judg me nt of c on vic tio n in

20 06 a c c ur a te ly ref lected the proper

classification of the offe nse and the proper rang e of punishment of two to ten y ear s. Every

thing e lse in the cler

k' s reco rd i s co n s i s t en t with this . I t is only the trial cour

t's or al pronounce ment upon revoc ation that deviates f rom the two-y ear

sentenc e orig inally

imposed by

the jury , a sentenc e which fits w ithin the punishment ra ng e of the crime of

which Posey

was c onvicted. S i n ce the twenty -two-month sentenc e that wa s orally pronounce d fell below the minimum punishment for the third-de g ree felony offe nse of whic h Posey

was found guilty , the trial cour t was not authorized to make such a reduc tion. 3. Is this an appeal of the twenty-two-m onth sentence? Posey maintains that this is sue should have be en, but was not, ra ised in a separ ate appea l by the State . We no te that th is i ssu e , unli ke the sh oc k c omm un ity su pe rv isi on iss ue a bo ve , d oe s r e la te to a n il le g a l se nte nc e , a

nd the State may have be e n a uth or ize d to a

pp e a l that se nte nc e un de r A rt ic le21

44.01(b). See Mi

ze ll v . S tat e , 1 19 S.W. 3d

80 4, 80 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ) ( " A s e nte nc e that is outside the maxi mum or minim um rang e of puni s h m en t i s unauthorized by law and the ref

ore illega l.")

. Posey points out that the oral pronounce ment of the twenty -two-month sentenc e was made on November 21, 2008, and the State is fa r outside the twenty -day

window in which it could have filed a notice of appe al with respe ct to the sentenc e. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 44.01(d)

. Th e Te xas C ourt

of Cr imi na l App e a ls d e c lin e d to ta ke a sim ila r a c tio n in

Mi ze ll : Appellant ther efor e asks this Court to reimpose an illega l sentenc e-- a sentence that has no leg al eff

ect- -bec ause the State failed to f ile a notice of appea l. T his we ca nnot do. Appellant appe aled his convictions and theref ore the court of a

ppeals ha d jurisdiction over the two c ases. A tr ial or a p p el l ate c ourt which other wise has jurisdiction over a c riminal conviction may alway s notice and c orre ct an illeg al sentenc e. 11 9 S. W.3 d at 806

. As the Ho us ton F ourt e e nth

c ourt e xpla ine d, the re is n o a

uth or ity that di re c ts a court to reform a leg al written judg ment to refle ct an illeg al ora l pronounce ment. Se e Tuf e le v . S tat e , 130 S.W .3d 267, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

4. Va r ian c e be twe e n t he or al p r ono unc e m e nt and wr it te n j udgm e nt We arrive then at the f

acts that we have a

n oral pronounc ement of an il leg al sentenc e and a written judg ment that ref

lects a punishment within the appr opriate rang e. Application of the g ener al rule would require that we direct t he im position of an illega l sentence , an ac t which the Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls has ref used to do. See Mi

ze ll , 1 19 S.W. 3d

a t 80 6. We h a ve take n th at same stance and re cog nized this situation a s one in which the g ener al rule r eg ardingoral pronounc ement

and wr itt e n ju dg me nt d oe s n ot a pp ly . We will no t dir e c t the imp os iti on of an il le g a l se nte nc e . T his22

is not an issue proper

for r efor mation but is, i nstead, a matter of a

varia nce be tween the oral pronounce ment and the wr itten judgment. See Ri be lin v . S tat e , 1 S.W .3d 882, 885 (Tex. App.—For t W o rth 1999, pet. re f' d). We must determine whe ther the e rror was ha rmful. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 44 .2 (b ); Ri be lin , 1 S

. W

. 3 d at 8 8 5

. T h at i s , we m u s td et er m i n e w h et h er t h e v ar i an ce af

fe ct edP o s ey 's

su bs tanti a l r ig hts

. Nothing in the r ecor d sug g ests that Posey pleade d true to the State' s alleg ation based on an

a g re e me nt t

hat th e tw o- y e ar se nte nc e or ig ina lly imp os e d wou ld be re du c e d to tw e nty -t wo mon ths ; his plea of true prec eded the oral pronounc ement by the trial judge

. Fur

ther, the written judg ment is within t he leg al ra

ng e of punishment and the two-y ear sentenc e is, in fac t, the absolute minimum term of imprisonment for a third-deg ree felony . Fur ther, the Te x as Cod e of Crimi nal Proce dure provides that " [t ]he sentence serve d shall be base d on the i nformation contained i n the judg ment." T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.01, § 1 (Ve rnon 2006). We conc lude that the var iance betwee n the unenf orce able or al pronounc ement and the written judg ment did not aff ect Posey ' s substantial ri g hts

. III . CO NC LU SION We c on c lud e tha

t th e a ff ir ma tiv e de a dly -w e a

po n f ind ingre ndere d Po se y

no t " oth e rw ise eli gibl e for

com mu ni ty

superv is io n u nd er [ Art icl e 42 .1 2] ." See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt
. 42.12, § 6(a) (1). In light of the deadly -we apon finding, S ection 3g(a )(2) would have pr evente d the tr ia l ju dg e fr om o rd e ri ngc omm un ity su pe rv is io n. S in ce Sec tio n 6 (a )( 1) re fe rs to " thi s art ic le ," it23

would encompa ss Section 3g (a) (2)' s limit ation on judge -orde red c ommunity supervision. The tria l court, then, e rre d by

concludingthat Posey

was " otherwise e ligi b l e" for c ommunity supervision under A rticle 42.12 a

nd, there fore , should not have orde red shoc k community supervision. As the written judgme nt sta nds, it r efle cts the proper sentenc e. To the extent that P osey invites this C ourt to ref

orm the written judg ment to refle ct the illeg al ora lly -pronounc ed twenty -twomonth sentence , we de cline. The trial court wa s not authorized to reduce the sentenc e to a term that fe ll b e low the a pp lic a ble ra ng e of punis hme nt. We ca nn ot an d w ill no t e nd or se the un e nf or c e a ble oral pronounc ement of a n illega l sentence . We vacat e the trial court' s order g ranting shock

c omm un ity su pe rv isi on , r e ins ta te the No ve mbe r 21, 20 08 , ju dg me nt r e vo kin g Pos e y ' s c omm un ity

su pe rv isi on and se nte nc inghim

to t wo y e ars ' c on fi ne me nt, and re mand the c a se to t

he tr ia l c ourt

wi th specific instructions to carr y out the two-y ear

sentenc e re flec ted in the written judg ment.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: September 16, 2009 Date D ecide d: October 20, 2009 Pub lis h