# C_2012165EN.01002102.xml

| 9.6.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 165/21 |
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9.6.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 165/21

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Action brought on 5 March 2012 — USFSPEI and Loescher v Council

(Case T-119/12)

2012/C 165/37

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicants: Union syndicale fédérale des services publics européens et internationaux (USFSPEI) (Brussels, Belgium) and Bernd Loescher (Rhode Saint Genèse, Belgium) (represented by: A. Coolen, J.-N. Louis, É. Marchal and D. Abreu Caldas, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | annul Council Decision 2011/866/EU of 19 December 2011 concerning the Commission’s proposal for a Council Regulation adjusting with the effect from 1 July 2011 the remuneration and pension of the officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied thereto; |
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annul Council Decision 2011/866/EU of 19 December 2011 concerning the Commission’s proposal for a Council Regulation adjusting with the effect from 1 July 2011 the remuneration and pension of the officials and other servants of the European Union and the correction coefficients applied thereto;

| — | order the Council to pay the applicant Loescher, as well as other officials and servants of the European Union, arrears in remuneration and pensions to which they are entitled from 1 July 2011 onwards, together with default interest from the date those arrears were due, at the rate laid down by the ECB for its main refinancing operations, increased by two percentage points; |
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order the Council to pay the applicant Loescher, as well as other officials and servants of the European Union, arrears in remuneration and pensions to which they are entitled from 1 July 2011 onwards, together with default interest from the date those arrears were due, at the rate laid down by the ECB for its main refinancing operations, increased by two percentage points;

| — | order the Council to pay the USF and the applicant one Euro by way of symbolic compensation for the non-material damage suffered through the wrongful act in the form of the adoption of Council Decision 2011/866/EU of 19 December 2011; |
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order the Council to pay the USF and the applicant one Euro by way of symbolic compensation for the non-material damage suffered through the wrongful act in the form of the adoption of Council Decision 2011/866/EU of 19 December 2011;

| — | order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs. |
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order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on pleas in law alleging:

| — | first, breach of Articles 64, 65 and 65a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, Articles 1 and 3 of Annex XI thereto, infringement of the principles of sincere cooperation and coherence flowing from Article 4(3) TEU and the principle of legitimate expectations and the obligation stemming from the adage patere legem quam ipse fecisti and |
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first, breach of Articles 64, 65 and 65a of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, Articles 1 and 3 of Annex XI thereto, infringement of the principles of sincere cooperation and coherence flowing from Article 4(3) TEU and the principle of legitimate expectations and the obligation stemming from the adage patere legem quam ipse fecisti and

patere legem quam ipse fecisti

| — | second, breach of the Council’s Decision of 23 June 1981 setting up the tripartite concertation by failing to ensure that the points of view of the staff and the administrative authorities were in fact made known to the Member States’ representatives before the adoption of the contested decision. |
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second, breach of the Council’s Decision of 23 June 1981 setting up the tripartite concertation by failing to ensure that the points of view of the staff and the administrative authorities were in fact made known to the Member States’ representatives before the adoption of the contested decision.

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