About the Report

The Afghanistan National Police is Afghanistan’s front line of 

defense against insurgency and organized crime. Yet despite 

nearly $10 billion in international police assistance, the Afghan 

police are riddled with corruption and incompetence and are 

far from the professional law enforcement organization needed 

to ensure stability and development. This report details the 

past failures and current challenges facing the international 

police assistance program in Afghanistan. It draws conclusions 

about the prospects for current programs and offers 

recommendations for corrective action. The report urges that 

the international community’s approach to police assistance 

expand to embrace a comprehensive program for security 

sector reform and the rule of law. 

The report is based on a conference titled “Policing 

Afghanistan,” which was hosted by the United States Institute 

of Peace’s Security Sector Reform Working Group on May 27, 

2009. It draws on the author’s participation in numerous 

Afghanistan-related conferences, interviews, workshops, and 

study groups; on his two visits to the country; and on an 

extensive review of the literature on the Afghanistan police 

development program. The report also reflects the work of the 

author’s talented research assistant, Madeline Kristoff.

The report’s author, Robert M. Perito, is a senior 

program officer in the Institute’s Center for Post-Conflict Peace 

and Stability Operations. Perito directs the Institute’s Security 

Sector Governance Project and its Project on Lessons Learned 

in Peace and Stability Operations. 

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 227 August 2009

© 2009 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

The Afghan National Police 3

Key Reasons for ANP Shortcomings 6

Recent Efforts to Address ANP Shortcomings 9

Conclusions and Recommendations 13

Robert M. Perito 

Afghanistan’s Police

The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform

Summary

•	 In seven years, the Afghan National Police forces have grown to 68,000 personnel, with 

a target end strength of 86,000. The ANP includes the uniformed police force, which is 

responsible for general police duties, and specialized police forces, which deal with public 

order, counternarcotics, terrorism, and border control. 

•	 Despite the impressive growth in numbers, the expenditure of $10 billion in international 

police assistance, and the involvement of the United States, the European Union, and 

multiple donors, the ANP is riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan 

citizens, control crime, or deal with the growing insurgency. 

•	 The European Union has replaced Germany as the lead partner for police reform, but the 

United States has the largest police program, which is directed by the U.S. military. Putting 

soldiers in charge of police training has led to militarization of the ANP and its use as a 

counterinsurgency force. 

•	 Using improperly trained, equipped, and supported ANP patrol men as “little soldiers” has 

resulted in the police suffering three times as many casualties as the Afghan National Army. 

Police are assigned in small numbers to isolated posts without backup and are targeted by 

the insurgents. 

•	 Beyond funding the Taliban, the explosion in Afghan narcotics production fueled widespread corruption in the Afghan government and police. Drug abuse by police officers 

became increasingly common as did other forms of criminal behavior. 

•	 Challenges facing the ANP were further compounded by a proliferation of bilateral police assistance programs that reflected the policing practices of donor countries. These efforts often 

were not coordinated with the larger U.S. and EU programs, creating confusion for the ANP. 

•	 The Obama administration has acknowledged the importance of the police and announced 

its intentions to expand and improve the ANP as a key part of its plan for stabilizing Afghanistan. It should do this as part of a broader international community approach to police assistance that embraces a comprehensive program for security sector reform and rule of law. 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2

Introduction

From a standing start in 2002, Afghanistan’s National Police (ANP) forces have grown to 

68,000, with a target end strength of 86,000 personnel. The ANP includes several distinct 

entities operating under the direction of the Interior Ministry. These police forces include 

the Afghan Uniform Police, which is responsible for general police duties, and four specialized police organizations: the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan 

Border Police, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and the Counter Terrorism Police. While this growth in the size and responsibilities is impressive, the ANP has 

failed to fulfill its mandate to uphold the rule of law, protect Afghan citizens, and meet 

the country’s security needs, including controlling the borders and narcotics production 

and defeating the Taliban-led insurgency. Speaking in Brussels at a German Marshall Fund 

Conference on March 21, 2009, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke characterized the 

ANP as “inadequate,” “riddled with corruption,” and the “weak link in the security chain.” 

Holbrooke said that fixing the police would be a key part of the Obama administration’s 

plan for stabilizing Afghanistan.1

The starting point for rebuilding the Afghan police was the Agreement on Provisional 

Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending Re-establishment of Permanent Institutions signed 

by representatives of the Afghan people on December 5, 2001, in Bonn, Germany.2 The Bonn 

Agreement, as it is more generally known, established an Afghan Interim Authority to run 

the country and provided the basis for an interim system of law and governance. In annex I, 

it called for the deployment of an international military force to maintain security in Kabul. 

In response, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of December 20, 2001, authorized the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for six months to assist the new 

Afghan government.3 ISAF deployed in January 2002 and by summer had 5,000 troops from 

nineteen countries. Its responsibility was limited to providing security in the capital where 

it conducted routine patrols with local police. ISAF’s purpose was to provide a “breathing 

space” during which the Afghans could create their own security forces and judicial system. 

ISAF was separate from the U.S-led Operation Enduring Freedom, which operated along the 

Pakistan border and focused on destroying the Taliban and al-Qaeda.4

The United Nations sought to limit international involvement in Afghanistan and to 

encourage the Afghans to assume responsibility for their own political reconciliation, economic reconstruction, and security. Under the leadership of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, 

the UN mission in Kabul advocated a “light footprint,” a euphemism for minimal international oversight and material assistance. This strategy was particularly apparent in the 

international community’s attempt to ensure internal security and assist the Afghan police.5

Indeed, the Bonn Agreement did not provide a role for the United Nations in monitoring or 

training the Afghan police, and the Security Council did not authorize a UN Police mission 

there. According to the Bonn Agreement, responsibility for maintaining security throughout 

the country rested with the Afghans.6

International donors set aside a comprehensive security sector reform program in favor 

of a “lead nation” donor support framework adopted at a Group of Eight (G8) donors’ conference held in Geneva in 2002. The security sector was divided into four pillars with one lead 

nation assigned to each pillar to oversee and support reforms. Under this plan, the United 

States was assigned responsibility for the military; Germany, the police; Italy, the judiciary; 

and Britain, counternarcotics. The framework was meant to ensure burden sharing, but 

assignments were made with little attention to expertise, experience, or resources, and 

there was no mechanism to ensure a coordinated approach to reform efforts. Some donors 

presumed the Afghan government would assume an oversight role despite its obvious shortfalls in required capacity. 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. 

Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, 

Nev. • Kerry Kennedy, Human Rights Activist • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor 

of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Va. • Judy Van 

Rest, Executive Vice President, International Republican 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

Members Ex Officio

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State • Robert M. 

Gates, Department of Defense • Ann E. Rondeau, Vice 

Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University •

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of 

Peace (nonvoting)
3

Once engaged, international donors, including the United States, regressed into train–

and–equip programs that focused on rapidly improving the operational effectiveness of 

Afghan security forces but that largely ignored improving the effectiveness of management 

and governance structures. There was no effort to create a coherent and integrated framework for security sector reform. None of the donors focused on the need to strengthen the 

one Afghan institution—the Interior Ministry—that would be responsible for overseeing 

and supporting the Afghan police. At the time, the Interior Ministry lacked basic administrative systems for personnel, procurement, and logistics and the ability to oversee police 

operations. The German police assistance mission, however, assigned only one adviser to it 

in 2003. The initial failure to dedicate sufficient effort to the reform of the Interior Ministry 

stifled efforts to remake the Afghan National Police.7

The Afghan National Police

In the 1960s and 1970s both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 

Republic worked in Afghanistan to provide police development assistance. During the Soviet 

intervention, the Afghan police were organized based on the Soviet model with a two-track 

system of career officers and short-term conscripts who served for two years as patrolmen 

as an alternative to joining the military. Officers were educated at a police academy; conscripts were untrained and often mistreated by their superiors. The police were militarized 

and included a light infantry force. During the subsequent civil war among mujahideen 

commanders and the period of Taliban rule, there was no national civilian police force in 

Afghanistan.8 By 2002, there were, however, an estimated 50,000 men working as police, 

but they were untrained, ill equipped, illiterate (70–90 percent), and owed their allegiance 

to warlords and local commanders and not the central government. Many were former mujahideen whose experience of acting with impunity prepared them poorly to serve as police in 

a democratic society. A few professional police officers remained from the Afghan National 

Police of the Soviet period, but their training and experience were also inappropriate for 

the new order.9

Officials in the Afghan Interim Authority, particularly Interior Minister Mohammed Yunus 

Qanooni, recognized that international assistance would be required to create a new Afghan 

National Police. The Afghan Interim Authority wanted to create a new professional police 

service with educated officers and trained career noncommissioned officers and patrolmen. 

Based upon the positive experiences with German police assistance prior to the Soviet 

intervention, the Afghans welcomed Germany’s selection as the lead nation for training and 

equipping the Afghan police. Germany’s goal was to create an ethnically balanced force that 

was familiar with human rights standards and modern police methods and capable of operating in a democratic society.10 Given Afghanistan’s size and population, creating a national 

police force represented a far greater challenge than anything the international community 

had attempted in peace operations in Haiti and the Balkans.

The Germans developed an initial plan for training the Afghan police based upon the European model of creating a police academy that would provide a university-level education for 

officers and a shorter academic program for noncommissioned officers.11 The Germans committed $70 million toward renovating the police academy in Kabul, provided eleven police 

instructors, refurbished Kabul police stations, and donated fifty police vehicles. The first 

team of German police advisers arrived in Kabul on March 16 and the German Coordination 

Office was opened on March 18, 2002. The Coordination Office supervised the reconstruction of the police academy, which formally reopened on August 22, 2002, with 1,500 officer 

cadets enrolled in a five-year program.12 The academy also offered a three-month recruit 

course for 500 noncommissioned officers.13 According to Interior Minister Mohammed 
4

Qanooni, the Interim Authority’s goal was to create a police force of 70,000 officers.14 The 

German approach would have taken decades to train a police force of that size. 

The U.S. Police Assistance Program

The United States did not challenge the German approach to police training as inappropriate 

for Afghanistan. Instead, in 2003, the United States took the more diplomatic tack of creating a separate program to provide “in-service training” to those who were currently serving 

in police roles. The U.S. State Department established a police-training center in Kabul to 

provide in-service training for Afghan police currently serving in the capital. The Kabul site 

served as a prototype for seven regional training centers that were constructed around the 

country. The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs (State/INL) led the U.S. police assistance program, but training center construction, 

instructor recruitment, and project management was contracted to the DynCorp International Corporation, which had played a similar role in the Balkans.

At the initial facility in Kabul, three American and six international instructors—plus 

Afghan staff—handled training. Trainees were selected by the Afghan Interior Ministry and 

were not vetted by U.S. program administrators.15 The program offered three core courses 

based upon a curriculum that was used at the Police Service School in Kosovo. The courses 

included an eight-week course in basic police skills for literate, noncommissioned officers 

and patrolmen, a five-week course for illiterate patrolmen, and a fifteen-day Transition Integration Program for policemen with extensive experience. The training centers also offered 

a two- to four-week course in instructor development. The U.S program greatly accelerated 

the number of Afghan police that received some training, with the total number reaching 

71,147 by July 2007.16

The quality of the training received by the majority of the graduates of the U.S. program 

is open to question. In Afghanistan, contract instructors faced a formidable challenge. 

Trainees had little or no previous classroom experience. They sat on hard benches for hours 

a day in prefabricated classrooms that baked in the summer and froze in the winter, listening 

to instructors who spoke in English and poorly trained Afghan translators unfamiliar with 

police terminology. Few of the American instructors were professional police trainers and 

there was little or no use of adult-learning techniques. Because more than 70 percent of the 

Afghan trainees were illiterate, most of those trained received only the fifteen-day program. 

The inability of recruits to read and write inhibited their ability to absorb information and 

learn basic police skills, such as taking statements from witnesses, writing incident reports, 

and maintaining records.17

Trainees did not remain at the training centers long enough to absorb much detail or the 

ethos of democratic policing through contact with the instructors. The U.S. training program 

also failed to provide the type of follow-on field training that had been a constant feature 

of similar U.S. programs in Panama, Haiti, and the Balkans. Afghan trainees were returned 

to their place of origin with no follow-up to determine whether they were applying their 

training or to account for the uniforms, equipment, and weapons that were issued at the 

end of the training period. Many were assigned to static guard duty or reduced to serving 

under untrained and corrupt leaders who possessed little understanding of the role of police 

in a democratic society.18

In addition to problems with training, the international police assistance program suffered from a lack of agreement on overall strategic objectives and coordination between 

the U.S. and German programs, as well as poor leadership from the Afghan Interior Ministry, 

which supervised the police, and inadequate funding. In May 2002, the UN Development 

Program established the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to enable donors 

The quality of the training 

received by the majority of the 

graduates of the U.S. program is 

open to question.
5

to contribute funds for police salaries. By 2004, only $11.2 million of the $65 million 

requested had been contributed. Failure to provide funding meant that the Afghan government could not support the deployment of national police outside the capital. Even in Kabul, 

Afghan police went unpaid for months, a situation that resulted in petty corruption that 

undermined public confidence. Increasingly, the public regarded the Afghan National Police 

with a mixture of fear and disdain.19

The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan

In 2005 the U.S. government transferred responsibility for the U.S. police assistance program from the Department of State to the Department of Defense, following the lead of 

the U.S. police assistance program in Iraq. Implementation was assigned to the Combined 

Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which also had responsibility for training the Afghan National Army (ANA). Within CSTC-A, responsibility for training was assigned 

to the Task Force Police Directorate, while responsibility for reforming the Interior Ministry 

went to the Police Reform Directorate. Although CSTC-A had overall responsibility, State/

INL retained contract management authority for police training, mentoring, and Interior 

Ministry reform. State/INL also continued to provide civilian police trainers and advisers 

through its contract with DynCorp International.20

As in Iraq, transferring responsibility to the Defense Department infused manpower and 

financial resources but did little to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. police assistance 

program. In December 2006, a joint report by the inspectors general of the State and 

Defense Departments found that U.S.-trained Afghan police were incapable of conducting 

routine law enforcement and that American program managers could not account for the 

number of ANP officers on duty or for the whereabouts of vehicles, equipment, and weapons provided to the Afghan government. The report noted that the official Afghan figure 

of 70,000 trained police officers was inflated and that only about 30,000 were actually on 

duty and able to carry out police functions. The report faulted the failure to establish a fieldtraining program that could mentor graduates from the regional field training centers and 

keep track of equipment. Despite the $1.1 billion that the United States had spent on police 

assistance in Afghanistan to that date, the report noted that the program was understaffed, 

poorly supervised, and ineffective.21

In November 2007, CSTC-A sought to correct for deficiencies in the U.S. police training 

program by launching a new training initiative called Focused District Development (FDD), 

which aimed at enhancing ANP capabilities by training all uniformed police in a single 

district at one time as a unit. While the district police were in training, a highly skilled 

Afghan National Civil Order Police unit replaced them, providing a model of effective police 

performance for local citizens. The program was designed to counter the ineffectiveness 

of the previous approach under which newly trained police returned to their previous duty 

stations to serve under untrained and corrupt superiors. Under the FDD program, an advance 

team of U.S. military and civilian police advisers conducted a pretraining assessment in the 

district, noting the level of police performance, the relationship between the police and the 

population, economic and transportation infrastructure, and the threat level from criminals 

and insurgents. The entire district force was brought to a regional training center, where it 

received basic training for all untrained recruits, advanced training for police with previous 

experience, and management and leadership training for officers. The unit was then redeployed to its district under the supervision of a U.S. police mentoring team.22

The training program included seven weeks of instruction in military tactics, weapons 

use, survival strategies, and counterinsurgency operations and one week of training in 

basic police skills. While in training, the police received new uniforms and weapons, vetted 

As in Iraq, transferring 

responsibility to the Defense 

Department infused manpower 

and financial resources but 

did little to improve the 

effectiveness of the U.S. police 

assistance program.
6

leadership, and increased salaries. The instructors who delivered the training returned with 

the police unit to its district and remained there until the completion of the program. The 

embedded mentoring team included two civilian police advisers, four military support personnel, and a six-member military security force. The mentoring team was able to work with 

individual officers, establish personal relationships, and provide role models that supported 

the training. The team provided the Afghan police with continuing on-the-job training and 

assessed the unit’s progress toward independently conducting police operations. Units were 

evaluated on a variety of competencies, including equipment accountability, formal training, crime handling procedures, and use of force. Initially the mentoring teams engaged in 

intensive training, but they later pulled back to providing oversight as the Afghans exhibited 

greater competence in conducting operations.23

By January 2009, police in fifty-two of Afghanistan’s 365 police districts were undergoing 

the FDD process. CSTC-A initially projected that the entire training cycle would take up to 

nine months. Only four of the first seven units trained reached proficiency in ten months, 

and it appeared that most units would require more than nine months to complete the 

training cycle. In addition, CSTC-A lacked the additional 1,500 military support and security 

personnel required to staff the hundreds of district and provincial training teams needed 

to complete the training of all Afghan police by the target date of December 2010. In April 

2009, President Barack Obama announced the imminent deployment of 4,000 additional 

soldiers to train Afghan military and police forces. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Admiral Michael Mullen, stated that the trainers “were at the heart of building Afghanistan 

security forces as quickly as possible.”24

Key Reasons for ANP Shortcomings

Despite the overall U.S. expenditure of $6.2 billion on assistance to the Afghan police, a 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in June 2008 noted that while the ANP had 

grown to nearly 70,000 personnel, no ANP units were rated by CSTC-A as fully capable of 

performing their mission and nearly two-thirds of ANP units received the lowest capability 

rating. The major reasons for this shortfall in performance were judged to be the inability of 

the U.S. military to provide more than 32 percent of the required military mentors (although 

540 of 551 civilian police mentors were present); the failure of the ANP to receive, maintain, 

and account for critical equipment, including weapons, vehicles, and body armor; widespread corruption; and consistent problems with pay and administrative support.25 Beyond 

these specific shortfalls in the U.S. police assistance program, the failure to develop an 

effective Afghan police force was also due to the explosion of opium production and narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan and to increasing attacks by insurgents. 

An Explosion of Narcotics Trafficking

By 2004, opium cultivation had spread from traditional growing areas in the south to all 

of Afghanistan’s thirty-two provinces. By 2006, Afghanistan had become the world’s largest producer of opium, accounting for 92 percent of global production. Income earned 

by farmers, middlemen, processors, traffickers, and drug exporters equaled two-thirds of 

Afghanistan’s legal gross domestic product. Revenue from opium sales financed a pervasive 

expansion of the country’s already well-organized criminal networks, which stretched into 

Pakistan and other neighboring states. It also strengthened the power of tribal leaders, warlords, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other Islamist extremists opposed to the government.26

Starting in 2002, the Afghan government with the assistance of the UN Office of Drug 

Control put in place the basic legal and institutional framework for a counternarcotics 
7

program. In January, President Hamid Karzai issued a presidential decree outlawing production, trafficking, and abuse of narcotics. In October a Counter Narcotics Directorate was 

created as part of the National Security Council. In May 2003 a national drug control strategy was adopted, and in October a modern narcotics control law was enacted. Under the 

“lead nation” approach, Great Britain assumed responsibility for directing counternarcotics 

activity. While well intentioned, Britain’s initial efforts suffered from limited funding and 

inexperience and, in some cases, were counterproductive.27

Although Britain maintained the “lead nation” title, the United States emerged as the 

largest international donor and leading force in Afghanistan’s counternarcotics effort, providing $782 million in assistance during fiscal year 2005 for law enforcement, crop eradication, and alternative livelihood programs.28 One major U.S. initiative involved the creation 

of several specialized counternarcotics police forces. The CNPA was established in late 2004 

to conduct investigations and carry out law enforcement. It included a National Interdiction 

Unit, which conducted raids throughout Afghanistan. Other Interior Ministry counternarcotics entities included the Central Eradication Planning Cell, which provided intelligence, and 

the Afghanistan Eradication Force, which conducted on-the-ground destruction of poppy 

fields. Separate from the CNPA was the Afghanistan Special Narcotics Force, which reported 

directly to the president and interior minister and carried out interdiction missions against 

high-value targets.29

The counternarcotics effort had only a limited impact on Afghan opium and heroin production, which hit record levels in 2007. It fell by 6 percent in 2008, but this was largely 

due to drought and large stockpiles. In its 2008 Afghanistan Opium Survey, the UN Office 

of Drugs and Crime reported that Afghanistan remained the world’s largest producer of illicit 

drugs. The report noted that the seven southwestern provinces that formed the Taliban’s 

base of operations accounted for 66 percent of Afghanistan’s opium production, an increase 

over the preceding year. According to the executive director of the UN Office of Drugs and 

Crime, the Taliban annually earned $200 million to $400 million through a 10-percent tax 

on opium growers and drug traffickers operating in areas under their control. In exchange, 

the traffickers are allowed a free hand to run their illicit trade.30 The link between the 

insurgency and the drug trade was demonstrated in May 2009 in Helmand province, when a 

four-day battle that killed sixty insurgents also resulted in the confiscation of 101 tons of 

heroin, opium, and hashish, the largest drug seizure by U.S. and Afghan forces to date.31

Beyond funding the Taliban, the revenue from opium production fueled widespread corruption affecting all levels of the Afghan government, including ministers and members of 

parliament. Afghans believed almost universally that Interior Ministry officials, provincial 

police chiefs, and members of the ANP were involved with the drug trade. This belief was 

based on widespread reports of senior Interior Ministry officials accepting large bribes for 

protecting drug traffickers and for “selling” senior provincial and district police positions 

to persons engaged in drug trafficking.32 A combination of local loyalties, links to criminal 

networks, low or no pay, and a residual culture of impunity contributed to endemic corruption in the ANP.

In many communities, ANP officers were viewed as predatory and a greater threat to 

security than the Taliban. For many Afghans, the police were identified with demands for 

bribes, illegal taxes, and various kinds of human rights violations. They were also known to 

use house searches as an opportunity to shake down the occupants and steal their possessions. Corrupt police practices were felt most directly by the poorest members of society: 

taxi and truck drivers, traders, small businessmen, and farmers. High levels of corruption 

and a culture of impunity severely undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government and 

further eroded public support for the police.33

The counternarcotics effort had 

only a limited impact on Afghan 

opium and heroin production, 

which hit record levels in 2007.
8

Drug use by police was increasingly common, particularly in drug-producing areas, such 

as Helmand province. According to Britain’s Foreign Office, an estimated 60 percent of 

the Afghan police in Helmand used drugs, which undermined security and contributed to 

official corruption. This problem was also prevalent nationwide. British narcotics experts 

reported that 16 percent of Afghan police tested positive for narcotics use in 2008.34

Other types of criminal activity and corruption were prevalent within the police. It was 

not uncommon for police officers to “buy” their positions by paying bribes to superiors for 

unjustified promotions and for assignments that provided opportunities to extort truckers 

and merchants and engage in smuggling. Embezzling official funds and stealing gasoline for 

sale on the black market was also common. Police officers engaged in selling their weapons 

and ammunition to criminals and the Taliban. It was common for police chiefs to pad their 

roles with “ghost” officers and pocket their salaries and to skim money from payrolls and 

funds for operations.35

A Resurgent Taliban

The initial decision to restrict ISAF’s mandate to patrolling Kabul meant that UN officials 

and other international assistance providers were also largely restricted to the capital and 

were unable to function in other areas of the country. At the same time, extremist groups—

such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Hezb-i-Islami—were able to establish themselves, recruit 

followers, and rebuild their organizations in sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan. 

In 2004, when these insurgent groups returned to Afghanistan in force, little had been 

done to establish central government presence outside the capital and to rebuild the border 

regions. Afghans living in these critical areas were not committed to the central government 

or the U.S.-led coalition and had little reason to resist the insurgents.36

Over the next three years, insurgent activity increased both in the tempo of attacks and 

the ability to operate throughout the country. As Operation Enduring Freedom doubled its 

forces in 2005, the Taliban shifted their tactics from attacking coalition forces to targeting 

Afghan civilians and representatives of humanitarian organizations. By 2007, the Taliban 

increasingly relied on terrorism, ambushes, and small-unit attacks, conducting more than 

140 suicide bombings, including many in Kabul. The Taliban were most active, however, in 

their traditional strongholds in the south where the central government remained weak and 

unable to provide governance and public services.37 In 2008, public opinion polls showed 

that Afghans considered the absence of public security, including insurgent attacks, criminal robberies, abductions, murders, and tribal violence, as the primary problem facing the 

country.38

Afghan National Police officers who worked and lived in their communities formed 

the front line of defense against terrorism and the insurgency and bore the brunt of the 

violence. Aside from their inadequate police training, ANP officers were ill equipped and 

poorly led. They were also used inappropriately as a fighting force against heavily armed 

insurgents.39 As one Afghan police officer was quoted as saying, “Firing rockets is not the 

job of police officers.”40 ANP officers accompanied coalition and ANA patrols and were 

expected to operate as “little soldiers” helping to seize and hold territory and prevent the 

return of the Taliban. According to the Interior Ministry’s National Internal Security Strategy, 

coalition forces, ANA, and the ANP “continue to wage war against armed groups.” Police were 

used to man isolated checkpoints and to establish a government presence in rural villages. 

Operating in small groups with no means of communication and no backup, the police were 

no match for insurgent groups that targeted ANP convoys, checkpoints, and bases.41

The cost of using police in a combat role for which they were never intended was 

extremely high. According to the U.S. Defense Department, some 3,400 Afghan police were 
9

killed or wounded between January 2007 and March 2009. Police combat losses during 2008 

were three times larger than those of the Afghan National Army, with the police suffering an 

average of 56 officers killed per month.42 A Canadian officer characterized the Afghan police 

as “cannon fodder” in the fight against the Taliban because they were placed in vulnerable 

positions without proper training, equipment, or force protection.43 In early 2009, the 

ANP had an annual attrition rate of 20 percent from combat losses, desertion, disease, and 

other causes. If that rate were to continue, the equivalent of the entire police force would 

have to be replaced in five years, which raises questions about the possibility of building a 

competent and stable police organization.44

Recent Efforts to Address ANP Shortcomings

The failure of the Afghan National Police to provide security and its overall shortfall in 

performance has led the United States to pursue alternative approaches to countering the 

insurgency at the local level, including first through the creation of the Afghan National 

Police Auxiliary (ANPA) and later through the Afghan Public Protection Force Program (AP3). 

It has also led the international community to increase its involvement in police assistance 

programs and its efforts to reform the Interior Ministry.

The Afghan National Police Auxiliary

In late 2006, the United States authorized the creation of the Afghan National Police 

Auxiliary, a quick-fix effort to help address the growing Taliban insurgency in southern 

Afghanistan. Under this plan, provincial governors could recruit 11,271 men from 124 

high-risk districts in 21 provinces into the ANPA, a militia force intended to reinforce the 

ANP. The purpose of the ANPA was to man checkpoints and perform community policing 

functions, freeing the ANP for counterinsurgency operations. Recruits received five days of 

classroom instruction on the Afghan constitution, ethics, and police techniques and five 

days of weapons training. Each recruit was then given an AK-47 assault rifle, a standard ANP 

uniform, a $70 dollar monthly salary, and a one-year contract. Since ANPA members were 

locally recruited, they were vulnerable to factional control and manipulation. Despite initial 

assertions that ANPA recruits would be thoroughly vetted, many were thought to be Taliban 

agents and nearly all were members of forces loyal to provincial power brokers.45

The creation of the ANPA was widely criticized for reversing the effects of the 2005 

Disband Illegally Armed Groups program, which disarmed and demobilized gangs that served 

local power brokers by reconstituting and legitimizing tribal militias and groups loyal to 

powerful warlords. The ANPA was also challenged by regular ANP officers, who questioned 

why the ANPA received the same salary and wore the same uniform as professional policemen but had far less training and did not owe allegiance to the national government.46

Some 8,300 ANPA members received training by July 2007, but incompetence and ineffectiveness of the force resulted in its being disbanded in May 2008.47

The Afghanistan Public Protection Force Program

Despite the failure of the ANPA program, the idea of creating village self-defense forces 

surfaced again in January 2009 in the form of the Afghanistan Public Protection Force 

Program. Members of this guard force were recruited by tribal shuras (councils) to defend 

their villages against Taliban insurgents that had infiltrated their areas. The program began 

as a pilot project in Wardak province, a primary route for infiltrating insurgents and suicide 

bombers into Kabul. Known as “Guardians,” the first local recruits patrolled roads and communities in districts around the provincial capital of Maidan Shahr. The program was run by 
10

CSTC-A, which provided Kalashnikov rifles and two weeks of training by U.S. Special Forces. 

Training included concepts related to the rule of law, respect for human rights, discipline, 

and military tactics. Participants received the equivalent of a $100 per month, plus $25 for 

food. The Guardians were given radios and cell phones so they could call for backup from 

U.S. troops if challenged.48

AP3 was part of an integrated and sequenced program to improve security that included 

(1) the deployment of U.S. troops that were part of the “surge” of U.S. forces into Afghanistan; (2) the training of locally based ANP officers under the FDD program and their interim 

replacement with ANCOP constabulary; (3) the recruitment of an AP3 cadre; and (4) the provision of development assistance from the Commanders Emergency Response Fund (CERP). 

Districts that cooperated with the program were eligible for an additional $500,000 in CERP 

funds as an incentive to participate in the program. AP3 recruitment began positively in 

Wardak’s northern, ethnic-Tajik districts but met resistance in southern, ethnic-Pashtun 

districts that had kinship ties to the Taliban.49

The AP3 program was based loosely on the tradition in some parts of Afghanistan of 

raising village militias know as arbakai. The program also appeared to be modeled on the 

successful “sons of Iraq” program in Iraq through which the U.S. military funded former 

Sunni insurgent fighters who had turned against al-Qaeda.50 Although the initiative reportedly came from the Afghan government, a number of Afghan officials criticized the program 

for diverting resources and undermining efforts to create a professional national police 

force. Afghanistan’s ambassador to Washington, Said Jawad, told the BBC that the plan was 

risky and could backfire. Jawad noted that Afghan tribal structures had been weakened by 

decades of conflict and that the plan could strengthen warlords and criminals.51 Members 

of parliament from various areas warned that arming tribal factions could encourage a civil 

war. A parliamentarian from Wardak province noted that the Soviets had created village 

self-defense forces with disastrous results for his region.52

International Training and Mentoring Programs

The expanded challenges faced by the Afghan police were accompanied by a proliferation 

in the number of countries participating in the international police assistance program. On 

June 17, 2007, the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) formally replaced 

Germany as the “key partner” for police assistance. Initially, EUPOL contained 160 police 

officers led by a German police general. The arrival of a group of highly experienced European police officers promised to provide needed expertise and leadership for the police 

assistance effort.53 By fall 2007, however, EUPOL was already mired in controversy. The 

first EUPOL commander resigned after three months, as the result of a dispute with the 

EU’s special envoy to Afghanistan. EUPOL had difficulty in establishing working relations 

with the NATO-led ISAF. European publics were unenthusiastic about their forces serving in 

Afghanistan. There was also a problem with differing goals for the program among member 

states. European police were slow to deploy, with many EU member states balking at honoring commitments for personnel. Although EUPOL’s authorized strength was 400 members, it 

had only 218 police officers on the ground by May 2009.54

EUPOL’s mission was to monitor, mentor, and advise the Afghans on establishing a civilian law enforcement organization rather than to directly train Afghan police personnel. As 

a result, EUPOL members were located at the Interior Ministry in Kabul and in provincial 

capitals where they were quartered with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Many 

EUPOL officers functioned as members of their national PRTs, although they filled personnel 

slots that were designated for EUPOL. Lack of physical infrastructure and “force protection” inhibited EUPOL expansion into areas where security was not guaranteed. In 2009, 
11

the European role in Afghan police assistance was complicated by the creation of the NATO 

Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A), which offered the promise of NATO military protection for European police but required that they serve within a military command structure. 

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner recommended that the European Gendarmerie 

Force (EGF), a multinational constabulary force with military status, deploy to Afghanistan 

to provide training. This offered the prospect of another group of European police advisers 

operating under yet another mandate.55

In addition to the European Union, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, and other coalition partners conducted police assistance programs. Police training and mentoring teams from these 

countries were assigned to their respective PRTs, where they conducted training and provided equipment and technical assistance. These bilateral efforts, which varied in size, were 

not always coordinated with the larger U.S. and EU programs. In general they stressed the 

importance of community policing and taught civilian police skills, but they also reflected 

differing national policing philosophies and practices, adding an another level of confusion 

to an already bifurcated program. 

Italy’s contribution to the Afghan police assistance effort began in 2002 when a platoon of Italian carabinieri that was part of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom began 

training Afghan police. In 2005, carabinieri training operations were shifted to the Italian 

PRT in Herat and augmented by a contingent from the Guardia di Finanza (financial police). 

In Herat, the Italians provided training for the Afghan National Civil Order Police and the 

Afghan Border Police and customs officers. With the arrival of EUPOL, Italy provided the 

deputy commander and contributed an additional twenty officers from the carabinieri and 

Guardia di Finanza. Italy was the third largest contributor of police to EUPOL.56

For Canada, police assistance was provided within the framework of an overall effort to 

improve Afghan governance and rule of law through the activities of its PRT in Kandahar 

province. The Afghan Interior Ministry did not have the capacity to exercise oversight in 

Kandahar, nor could it provide pay and logistical support to the insufficient number of police 

in the province. As a result, Canada provided mentoring, training, equipment, infrastructure, 

and salary support. Canadian police officers stationed at the PRT trained ANP in basic civilian police skills, including crime scene investigation, evidence collection, and management 

skills, building on the training provided through the U.S.-led FDD program. In addition, 

Canadian military police, operating as part of Canadian military-led Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (POMLTs), provided military survival skills training and mentoring to ANP 

officers located in police substations in remote and dangerous areas. Canada built defensive 

structures for the police and provided office furniture and police equipment for police stations. Since most ANP officers lived at their stations, Canada provided bedding and kitchen 

implements to improve living conditions and boost morale. Canada supported literacy training for police conducted in police stations by trainers from the Afghan Education Ministry. 

It also provided salary support through contributions to the UN Law and Order Trust Fund 

for Afghanistan.57

Like the Canadians in Kandahar, the British in Helmand province administered their 

police assistance program through their PRT. The British focused on augmenting the largely 

military training Afghan police received in the U.S. FDD program by providing training that 

emphasized civilian police skills and the role of police in the community, particularly in 

resolving disputes and providing police services. In addition, Britain assigned senior police 

advisers (some accredited to EUPOL) to the provincial police chief and to district police 

chiefs and their senior staffs. Also, like the Canadians, British Military Police Mentoring 

Teams offered basic survival training to Afghan police at isolated police stations and accompanied Afghan police on patrol.58 On the national level, Britain continued to play a role 
12

in developing the CNPA. It also provided advisers on criminal investigation and narcotics 

interdiction to the CNPA. 

Interior Ministry Reform Efforts

Efforts to reform Afghanistan’s Interior Ministry lagged far behind those to train and 

equip the Afghan police. In 2008, CSTC-A reported that the Interior Ministry lacked a clear 

organizational structure, chain of command, and lines of authority; the ability to perform 

basic management functions, particularly in personnel, procurement, and logistics; and an 

overall strategy for police operations and development. The ministry also suffered from 

endemic corruption, low accountability, and reduced institutional capacity at all levels. 

Institutional reform efforts, which began in earnest in 2005, were routinely resisted or 

thwarted by political interference, often from the highest levels of the Afghan government. 

In December 2008, CSTC-A, major donors, and Interior Ministry officials agreed on a plan 

for restructuring the ministry to improve efficiency and reduce corruption, but implementation of the plan was delayed by political resistance through the spring of 2009. Ministry 

reform also suffered from a lack of coordination between international donors and advisers. 

Senior ministry officials received conflicting advice from mentors from different countries. 

A plan to coordinate the work of international advisers was approved in January 2009, but 

implementation proved problematic.59

The most significant achievement of the Interior Ministry reform process began in 2006 

with the launch of a reform of rank and pay structures of the ANP. The program aimed to 

(1) reorganize the ANP rank system, which was extremely top heavy, by reducing the 

number of senior officers; (2) introduce a merit-based recruitment and promotion system 

by replacing the system of promotions based on bribery and personnel affiliations; and 

(3) improve the pay scale and delivery of salary payments to police in the field.60 By 2009, 

the program had reduced the ANP officer corps from 17,796 officers to 9,018, with a reduction in the number of generals from 319 to 159 and colonels from 2,712 to 310 and an 

increase in lieutenants from $4,000 to $6,000. The police wage scale was also adjusted to 

align with the cost of living and salaries paid to the Afghan military. Wages for captains 

increased from $78 per month to $250; for colonels, from $92 to $550; and for major generals, from $103 to $650. A program of background checks on ANP officers was instituted, but 

the identity and actual number of ANP personnel remained unclear. LOTFA data indicated 

that there were 78,541 personnel on Interior Ministry and ANP payrolls, but by November 

2008 UN validation teams had issued only 47,400 identification cards in a process that was 

hampered by a lack of ANP cooperation.61

To reduce corruption, the reform program created mechanisms so police could be paid in 

the field through direct electronic transfers. Nearly all ANP were enrolled in the electronic 

payroll system, and 60 percent applied to have their salaries directly deposited into their 

bank accounts.62 Participation was restricted by a lack of banks, particularly in rural areas. 

The program did reduce opportunities for the skimming of officers’ wages by senior officers 

and other forms of corruption. The program was far less successful in creating a meritbased system for recruitment, promotions, and assignments and reducing the influence of 

corruption, factionalism, and tribalism in these areas. Efforts by the Karzai government to 

intervene in the rank reduction and vetting process were mitigated but not entirely repulsed 

by counter pressure from the United States and the donor community. This experience 

highlighted the need both for continuing reforms and for rigorous oversight by international 

donors of future promotions and assignments for senior officers.63

Efforts to reform Afghanistan’s 

Interior Ministry lagged far 

behind those to train and equip 

the Afghan police. 
13

Conclusions and Recommendations

Afghanistan is saddled with a weak and corrupt government, a narco-dominated economy, 

and a virulent insurgency. The Obama administration’s strategy for the Afghan police is to 

increase numbers, enlarge the “train and equip” program, and engage the police in the 

fight against the Taliban. This approach has not worked in the past, and doing more of the 

same will not achieve success. It is also inconsistent with the stated intention of the new 

U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, to make protecting 

Afghan civilians the first priority of American forces and to adjust U.S. military tactics 

accordingly.64 Brig. Gen. Lawrence Nicholson said his marines in Helmand province would 

protect Afghan civilians from the Taliban and help restore government services rather than 

mount hunt-and-kill missions against insurgents.65 Certainly, the ANP should receive the 

same assignment.

Focusing the ANP on controlling crime and protecting civilians would also close the 

existing gap between the United States and its allies. European donors view U.S. efforts to 

militarize the Afghan police as a mistake and counter to Washington’s professed intention 

to promote democracy and the rule of law. European police assistance missions are already 

attempting to correct for U.S. militarization of the ANP by providing training (albeit limited 

and poorly resourced) in civilian police skills. Europeans believe that only by creating a 

professional law enforcement agency that will control crime and secure Afghan society can 

the Afghan government establish its legitimacy and gain the allegiance of its own people. 

Police are an effective weapon against insurgency, but not when they are trained as “little 

soldiers” and sent out as easy targets for the insurgents. The role of police in successful 

counterinsurgency efforts is to establish relations with the public, protect citizens against 

violence, and work as a component of the criminal justice system along with effective 

courts and prisons. Only by preparing the ANP to perform this role can the international 

police assistance program accomplish its objectives of creating a stable, prosperous, and 

democratic Afghanistan.66

To create an effective and professional police force in Afghanistan, the United States 

should take the following steps:

Use the ANA to fight the Taliban. Fighting heavily armed insurgents is a task for the 

military, both the ANA and coalition forces. Once areas are cleared, the job of the police is 

to hold and to build rapport with local citizens. The role of the military is to provide force 

protection for the police, which should not be placed in situations where they are isolated 

and unable to call for backup. There may be areas where the police cannot be deployed until 

they can operate with reasonable safety. This adjustment of roles is fundamental if the 

police are to succeed in performing their proper functions.

Train police, not soldiers. The FDD program appears to provide an effective format for vetting, training, equipping, and mentoring Afghan police. The content of the curriculum and 

the balance between civilian police and military advisers needs to be adjusted to emphasize 

civilian police skills and the relationship between civilian police and their communities. The 

curriculum for this program needs to be coordinated and standardized with EUPOL and the 

other donor countries so that the training and mentoring provided to the ANP is consistent 

and in accordance with a common approach agreed to by the Afghans. Agreement on a 

common curriculum would provide a practical answer to the basic question about the role 

and mission of the ANP. 
14

Expand the Afghan Constabulary. Prior to the Soviet intervention, the Afghan police were 

divided between a civil police that performed law enforcement functions and a constabulary 

(gendarmerie) that was responsible for maintaining public order, operating in rural areas, 

combating banditry, and patrolling the border. The Afghan National Civil Order Police reflect 

this tradition and have served effectively in districts where they are used to replace police 

that are sent for FDD training. The ANCOP have a high level of literacy (75 percent), receive 

four-months of training (versus two months for regular police), and are viewed as a national 

force in that they may serve anywhere and are not tied to a locale or local leader. Efforts 

should be made to retain members of this force, which suffers from high levels of attrition, 

and expand it to take on operations in contested areas. If deployed, the European Gendarmerie Force could assist with this effort. 

Reform the Interior Ministry. Afghanistan’s police cannot operate effectively without the 

supervision and support of the Interior Ministry. International efforts to reform the ministry started late and have made insufficient progress. This is an area in which the European 

Union has a comparative advantage based upon its experience with preparing countries for 

EU membership. This expertise should be employed in Afghanistan.

Improve the criminal justice system. Police cannot perform effectively in the absence 

of the other two parts of the criminal justice system—courts and prisons. In Afghanistan, 

efforts to improve courts and prisons have lagged behind the massive expenditures on 

improving the police. There is a need to rebalance this effort by taking a comprehensive 

approach to reforming the criminal justice sector as a whole. This may involve imaginative 

programs to combine elements of the traditional and formal legal process, but it is essential 

to establishing the rule of law. 

U.S. rhetoric about expanding the Afghan National Security Forces blurs the critical 

distinction between police and military.67 Sending additional troops to provide military 

training for the ANP will not enable the police to play their essential role in controlling 

crime, protecting Afghan citizens, providing intelligence gained from close associations 

with the community, and increasing the legitimacy of the Afghan government. In the words 

of former Interior Minister Ali Jalali, “Civilian police should be deployed in the country’s 

cities, towns, and villages with the sole purpose of enforcing the rule of law. Their work 

will allow the Afghan government to develop legitimacy and the space to help the country’s 

population.”68 Continued misuse of the police as auxillaries to the ANA and coalition forces 

will only reduce the likelihood of creating sustainable security in Afghanistan. 
15

Notes

1. James Neuger, “Corrupt Afghan Police Targeted in U.S. Policy, Holbrooke Says,” Bloomberg News, March 21, 2009, 

URL=www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=auJx_dJa9TGg (accessed July 5, 2009).

2. For the full text of the agreement, see URL=unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.

pdf (accessed July 5, 2009).

3. For the full text of the resolution, see United Nations, “Security Council Authorizes International Security Force 

for Afghanistan” (press release SC/7248, December 20, 2001), URL=www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7248.

doc.htm.

4. Moira Shanahan, “Security in Afghanistan: The International Security Assistance Force,” Peace Operations 

Backgrounder, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., June 2002, URL=www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/

Publications/Detail/?ots591=CAB359A3-9328-19CC-A1D2-8023E646B22C&lng=en&id=31139 (accessed July 5, 

2009).

5. Liz Panarelli, “The Role of the Ministerial Advisor in Security Sector Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains,” 

Peace Briefing, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., April 2009, URL=www.usip.org/resources/

the-role-the-ministerial-advisor-in-security-sector-reform-navigating-institutional-terrai (accessed July 5, 2009).

6. See URL=unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf (accessed July 5, 2009). 

7. Mark Sedra,“Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan: Transition Under Threat, 

ed. Geoff Hayes and Mark Sedra (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008) 193–96. 

8. Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, Issues Paper Series 

(Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2007), URL=www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_

docman&task=doc_download&gid =523 (accessed July 5, 2009).

9. Tonita Murray, “Police-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Civil Security Reform,” International Peacekeeping

14, no. 1 (January 2007): 108–26. 

10. United Nations, “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for 

International Peace and Security,” S/2002/278-A/56/875, 9–12, March 18, 2002, URL=www.un.org/documents/

ga/res/44/a44r015.htm (accessed July 5, 2009).

11. Amnesty International, “Afghanistan: Police Reconstruction Essential for the Protection of Human 

Rights,” March 12, 2003, URL=www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA11/003/2003 (accessed 

July 5, 2009).

12. Government of Germany, in a closed session briefing attended by author, National Defense University, 

Washington,D.C., September 16, 2002. 

13. U.S. State Department official, interview by author, April 14, 2002. 

14. Doug Struck, “National Police Force Sought in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, Washington, D.C., February 5, 2002, 

URL=pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/105187240.html?dids=105187240:105187240&FMT=ABS&F

MTS=ABS:FT&date=Feb+5%2C+2002&author=Doug+Struck&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=A.0

8&desc=National+Police+Force+Sought+in+Afghanistan%3B+Recruits+Would+Hail+From+All+Provinces (accessed 

July 5, 2009).

15. Sedra, “Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan,” 201–02.

16. Ibid.

17. Murray, “Police-Building in Afghanistan.”

18. James Glanz and David Rohde, “Panel Faults US Trained Afghan Police,” New York Times,

December 4, 2006, URL=www.nytimes.com/2006/12/04/world/asia/04police.html (accessed 

July 5, 2009).

19. Laurel Miller and Robert Perito, Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, Special Report No. 117 (Washington, 

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, March 2004), URL=www.usip.org/resources/establishing-rule-lawafghanistan (accessed July 5, 2009).

20. Wilder, Cops or Robbers?

21. Inspectors General, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, “Interagency Assessment of 

Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness,” Department of State Report No. ISP-IQO-07-07, Department of 

Defense Report No. IE-2007-001, November 2006, URL=www.dodig.osd.mil/inspections/Index.htm (accessed 

July 5, 2009).

22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan Security: US Programs to Further Reform 

Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan 

Cooperation,” GAO-09-280, March 2009, URL=www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf (accessed 

July 5, 2009).

23. “Policing Afghanistan: A Meeting of the Security Sector Reform Working Group” (conference, United States 

Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., May 27, 2009). 

24. Gerry Gilmore, “Trainers Critical to Obama’s New Afghan-Pakistan Plan, Mullen Says,” American Forces Press 

Service, March 27, 2009, URL=www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53688 (accessed July 5, 2009).

25. Charles Johnson, Jr., “Afghanistan Security: US Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges 

and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” Statement before the House Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, June 18, 2008, 

URL=nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2006 (accessed July 5, 2009).

26. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey 2006 (Kabul: UNODC and Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics, September 2006), URL=www.unodc.org/

pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf (accessed July 5, 2009).

27. Miller and Perito, Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan. 

28. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security 

Situation Threatens US Goals,” GAO-07-78, November 15, 2006, URL=www.gao.gov/new.items/d08883t.pdf

(accessed July 5, 2009).

29. Inspectors General, “Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness.” 
30. Colum Lynch, “Afghan Opium Production Falls, Despite Problem Provinces,” Washington Post, August 27, 2008, 

URL=pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/1542546491.html?dids=1542546491:1542546491&FMT=AB

S&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Aug+27%2C+2008&author=Colum+Lynch+-+Washington+Post+Staff+Writer&pub=The+Wa

shington+Post&edition=&startpage=A.8&desc=Afghan+Opium+Production+Falls%2C+Despite+Problem+Provinces

(accessed July 5, 2009).

31. Sabrina Tavernise, “U.S. and Afghan Forces Seize Biggest Drug Cache to Date,” New York Times, May 24, 2009, 

URL=www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/world/asia/24afghan.html (accessed July 5, 2009).

32. Seth Jones et al., “Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? US Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and 

Transitioning Regimes” (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), URL=www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG550/

(accessed July 5, 2009).

33. Bilal Sarway, “Bribery Rules on Afghan Roads,” BBC News, July 7, 2008, URL=news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_

asia/7519189.stm (accessed July 5, 2009).

34. Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, “60 pc of Helmand Police Use Drugs,” February 18, 2009, URL=www.

abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/02/18/2495328.htm (accessed July 5, 2009).

35. Richard Oppel, Jr., “Corruption Undercuts Hope for Afghan Police,” New York Times, April 8, 2009, URL=www.

nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/asia/09ghazni.html (accessed July 5, 2009).

36. James Dobbins, “Toward a More Professional Approach to Nation Building,” in US Peace Operations Policy: A 

Double-Edged Sword? ed. I. Johnstone (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 

37. Gen. J.L. Jones and Amb. T.R. Pickering, Afghanistan Study Group Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for the 

Study of the Presidency, January 30, 2008), URL=www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf

(accessed July 5, 2009).

38. Jones et al., “Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform?”

39. Ali Jalali, “The Future of Security Institutions,” in The Future of Afghanistan, ed. J. Alexander Thier (Washington, 

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 28. 

40. Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “US Helps Afghans Assume Control of Local Security,” National Public Radio, June 2, 

2009, URL=www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104796412 (accessed July 5, 2009).

41. “Policing Afghanistan.” 

42. GAO, “Afghanistan Security,” 6. 

43. Wilder, Cops or Robbers? 

44. “Policing Afghanistan.” 

45. Sedra, “Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan.”

46. Wilder, Cops or Robbers? 

47. Murray Brewster, “NATO Disbands Afghan Auxiliary Police,” Canadian Press, May 15, 2008, URL=www.paherald.

sk.ca/index.cfm?pid=13&cpcat=world&stry=131141063 (accessed July 5, 2009).

48. Al Pessin, “US Looks at Iraq-Style Community Policing for Afghanistan,” VOA News, December 25, 2008, 

URL=www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-12/2008-12-24-voa49.cfm?CFID=214208832&CFTOKEN=5018554

5&jsessionid=de303bfd5ba5f4a17247313ae3c302f39144 (accessed July 5, 2009).

49. Matt Sherman, adviser, 10th Mountain Division, interview by author, June 19, 2009. 

50. Nelson, “US Helps Afghans Assume Control of Local Security.” 

51. Martin Vennard, “US Afghan Tribe Plan Risky,” BBC News, January 14, 2009, URL=news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_

asia/7828611.stm (accessed July 5, 2009).

52. Pamela Constable, “Resistance to US Plan for Afghanistan,” Washington Post, January 16, 2009, URL=www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/15/AR2009011504198.html (accessed July 5, 2009).

53. International Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report No. 138 (Kabul/Brussels: ICG, August 31, 

2007), URL=www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5052 (accessed July 5, 2009).

54. Sedra, “Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan.”

55. “Policing Afghanistan.”

56. Frederiga Bindi, “Europe’s Problematic Contribution to Police Training in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution, May 

4, 2009, URL=www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0504_afghanistan_bindi.aspx (accessed July 5, 2009).

57. “Policing Afghanistan.”

58. Piet Biesheuvel, UK police adviser, interview by author, June 11, 2009. 

59. “Policing Afghanistan.” GAO, “Afghanistan Security.” 

60. Sedra, “Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan.”

61. GAO, “Afghanistan Security.” 

62. Ibid.

63. “Policing Afghanistan.”

64. “McChrystal: Job 1 is Protect Civilians,” Associated Press, June 25, 2009, URL=www.military.com/news/article/

mcchrystal-job-1-is-protect-civilians.html (accessed July 5, 2009). 

65. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Marines Launch New Afghan Mission,” Washington Post, July 2, 2009, URL=www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/02/AR2009070200832.html?hpid=topnews (accessed 

July 2, 2009).

66. Andrew Legon, “Ineffective, Unprofessional and Corrupt: The Afghan National Police Challenge,” E-notes, Foreign 

Policy Research Institute, June 5, 2009, URL=www.fpri.org/enotes/200906.legon.afghannationalpolice.html

(accessed July 5, 2009).

67. Bruce Reidel, “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and 

Pakistan,” March 27, 2009, URL=www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_

final.pdf (accessed July 5, 2009).

68. Jalali, “The Future of Security Institutions,” 32. 

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