GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 

Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration Has 

Improved the Security 

of Reactors in its 

Global Research 

Reactor Program, but 

Action Is Needed to 

Address Remaining 

Concerns 

September 2009 

GAO-09-949 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 

National Nuclear Security Administration Has

Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global 

Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed to 

Address Remaining Concerns

Highlights of GAO-09-949, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National 

Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

Worldwide, about 165 research 

reactors use highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU 

can also be used in nuclear 

weapons, the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) 

established the Global Research 

Reactor Security (GRRS) program 

to make security upgrades at 

foreign research reactors whose 

security did not meet guidelines 

established by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

GAO was asked to assess (1) the 

status of NNSA’s efforts to secure 

foreign research reactors, (2) the 

extent to which selected foreign 

research reactors with NNSA 

security upgrades meet IAEA’s 

security guidelines, and (3) the 

extent to which NNSA coordinates 

the GRRS program with other 

countries and the IAEA. GAO 

reviewed NNSA and IAEA 

documents and visited five of the 

22 research reactors in the GRRS 

program, which were selected on 

the basis of when upgrades had 

been completed and because the 

reactors still possess HEU. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

to help NNSA improve security 

procedures and encourage the 

development of national security 

laws and regulations in countries 

with HEU-fueled research reactors. 

In commenting on this report, 

NNSA agreed with the findings and 

outlined the actions that it plans to 

take to address the report’s 

recommendations. 

As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of the 

22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of 

approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete physical security upgrades 

at the remaining reactors by 2010 at an additional cost of $6 million. Security 

upgrades that GAO observed during its site visits include heavily reinforced 

vaults to store HEU fuel, motion detector sensors and security cameras to 

detect unauthorized access, and fortified central alarm stations that allow onsite guards the ability to monitor alarms and security cameras and 

communicate with response forces. 

Foreign research reactors that have received NNSA upgrades where GAO 

conducted site visits generally meet IAEA security guidelines; however, in 

some cases, critical security weaknesses remain. At four of the five reactors 

visited, GAO identified security conditions that did not meet IAEA guidelines. 

For example, (1) at two reactors, no emergency response exercises had been 

conducted between the on-site guard force and off-site emergency response 

force, and one of these reactors lacked any formal response plans for 

emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel; and (2) personnel at one 

research reactor did not search visitors or their belongings before granting 

them access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present. 

Furthermore, the government agency charged with regulating the operation of 

one research reactor has neither developed safety and security regulations nor 

has the country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of 

nuclear facilities. NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories officials 

responsible for making security upgrades at these reactors acknowledged that 

these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security at these 

reactors. Although the officials stressed the importance of NNSA continuing 

to work with these countries, there are no specific plans to do so after 

security upgrades at the remaining reactors are completed in 2010. 

NNSA officials coordinate with foreign government research reactor 

operators to design, install, and sustain security upgrades. Because the GRRS 

program is a voluntary and cooperative program, in some cases, NNSA faces 

challenges obtaining foreign governments’ commitment to complete security 

upgrades in a timely manner. For example, progress to secure a research 

reactor in one country GAO visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years 

due to foreign government reluctance in accepting NNSA assistance and 

delays approving the designed security upgrades. Recently, NNSA has begun 

working with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to establish a sustainability 

program to help ensure the continued effectiveness of NNSA-funded security 

upgrades and to help research reactor operators implement security 

procedures. IAEA plans to conduct pilot programs at three research reactors 

in 2009 and then expand the program. NNSA will continue to support 

sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the completion of security 

upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010. View GAO-09-949 or key components.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Contents 

Letter 1

Scope and Methodology 4 

Background 5 

NNSA Has Improved the Security of Research Reactors and Plans 

to Continue Upgrading the Security of Additional Reactors 8 

Although Reactors We Visited Generally Met IAEA Guidelines, 

Some Security Weaknesses Remain That Could Undermine 

NNSA-Funded Upgrades 12 

NNSA Coordinates Security Upgrades with Other Countries and 

IAEA, but Additional Cooperation is Needed to Implement 

Security Procedures Provided for in IAEA Guidelines 15 

Conclusions 19 

Recommendations for Executive Action 20 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20 

Appendix I Comments from the National Nuclear Security 

Administration 22 

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 25 

Table 

Table 1: Foreign Research Reactors in the GRRS Program 7 

Figures 

Figure 1: Interior of a Soviet-Built HEU Research Reactor 6 

Figure 2: Newly Built Fortified Central Alarm Station at a HEU 

Research Reactor 10 

Figure 3: Upgraded Alarm Display and Closed Circuit Television 

Monitors Inside a Central Alarm Station at a HEU 

Research Reactor 11 
Abbreviations 

DBT Design Basis Threat 

DOE Department of Energy 

GRRS Global Research Reactor Security 

GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

HEU highly enriched uranium 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

LEU low enriched uranium 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Page 1 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 17, 2009 

The Honorable John F. Tierney 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security 

 and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight 

 and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Nuclear research reactors are used for research, training, and 

development in many scientific fields, including nuclear engineering, 

physics, and medicine. According to the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the 

Department of Energy (DOE),1

 there are about 165 operating research 

reactors worldwide that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel.2

Concerns exist that terrorists may target research reactors to steal HEU 

fuel for use in a nuclear bomb. As little as 25 kilograms of HEU are needed 

to construct a nuclear bomb. According to the 2007 National Intelligence 

Estimate on the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Homeland Security, al-Qaeda 

continues to seek materials for nuclear and radiological weapons and 

would not hesitate to use them. Furthermore, the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides guidelines for the safety and 

physical security of civilian nuclear reactors including research reactors, 

has determined that the threat of nuclear terrorism remains undiminished 

and has concluded that the consequences of a malicious act involving a 

nuclear explosive device would be catastrophic.3

 In a January 2009 

1

NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. 

No. 106-65 (1999), with responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, 

and naval reactors programs. 

2

HEU, which can be used in nuclear weapons, is uranium enriched in the isotope uranium235 to 20 percent or greater. In contrast, low enriched uranium, contains less than 20 

percent uranium-235. 

3

IAEA, an autonomous international organization affiliated with the United Nations, was 

established in Vienna, Austria, in 1957. The agency has the dual role of promoting the 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy by transferring nuclear safety and technical cooperation 

programs, and verifying, through its safeguards program, that nuclear materials subject to 

safeguards are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other proscribed purposes. 
 

strategic plan for reducing nuclear and radiological threats worldwide, 

NNSA stated that President Obama has identified preventing terrorists 

from acquiring nuclear or radiological weapons as the number one 

national security priority of his administration.4

Starting in 1953, through the Atoms for Peace program, the United States 

supplied research reactors and the fuel needed to operate them to many 

countries around the world. Similarly, the Soviet Union also assisted 

several nations in building research reactors and also supplied them with 

fuel. Nuclear technology was provided to these foreign counties in 

exchange for a commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. Initially, the 

research reactors supplied by the Atoms for Peace program used low 

enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which cannot be used in a nuclear bomb, 

but many reactors were gradually switched from LEU to HEU fuel. At the 

time many of these reactors were built, or subsequently converted to use 

HEU, LEU fuels were not capable of producing many of the desired 

conditions in research reactors. HEU fuel lasted longer and was less 

expensive over time than LEU fuel because the reactors did not need to be 

refueled as often. Because of concerns about the threats posed by the 

potential theft or diversion of HEU for use in a nuclear bomb, new, more 

effective LEU fuels have been and are being developed, which would allow 

research reactors to convert from HEU to LEU fuel. 

The purpose of DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is to 

protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material at civilian sites 

worldwide, including research reactors. Administered by NNSA, GTRI has 

three goals: (1) to convert research reactors and isotope production 

facilities from using HEU to using LEU, (2) to remove and dispose of 

excess nuclear and radiological materials, and (3) to protect high-priority 

nuclear and radiological materials from theft and sabotage. We reported 

on DOE’s progress in achieving the first two goals in 2004.5

NNSA seeks to achieve GTRI’s third goal at research reactors worldwide 

through its Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program, which is a 

 

4

NNSA, Global Threat Reduction Initiative Strategic Plan: Reducing Nuclear and 

Radiological Threats Worldwide (Washington, D.C., Jan. 22, 2009). 

5

GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of 

Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 30, 2004); and GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to 

Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United 

States and Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004). 

Page 2 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

voluntary and cooperative program that depends on countries accepting 

NNSA assistance to make security improvements. The GRRS program 

assesses security, designs security systems, and provides funding for 

security upgrades in order to protect vulnerable nuclear material at 

research reactors. These upgrades are needed to secure HEU fuel until 

permanent threat reduction solutions can be achieved, such as converting 

the reactors to LEU fuel and removing the HEU fuel. 

Each nation that possesses a research reactor is responsible for the 

security of its own research reactors. Since 1972, IAEA has provided its 

member states with guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear 

material, most recently in 1999.6

 These guidelines contain administrative 

and technical measures designed to prevent the sabotage of nuclear 

facilities and the theft or other unauthorized diversions of nuclear 

material. According to IAEA’s guidelines, a comprehensive physical 

protection system to secure nuclear material should include, among other 

things, 

• technical measures such as vaults, perimeter barriers, intrusion sensors, 

and alarms; 

• material control procedures; and 

• adequately equipped and appropriately trained guard and emergency 

response forces. 

According to IAEA’s guidelines, member states should ensure that their 

national laws ensure the proper implementation of physical protection and 

verify continued compliance with physical protection regulations. 

Although these IAEA guidelines are not binding on IAEA member states, 

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews applications for 

the export of nuclear material, including HEU fuel to foreign research 

reactors, to ensure that the recipient country’s physical security measures 

are at least comparable to IAEA guidelines for the physical protection of 

nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In addition, NNSA has adopted the 

IAEA guidelines as a tool to help it determine what security upgrades are 

necessary at research reactors in the GRRS program. Using IAEA’s 

 

6

IAEA, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC 225 Rev. 

4., (1999). 

Page 3 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

guidelines, NNSA has developed a GTRI Design Basis Threat (DBT)—an 

analysis of the number of adversaries that security forces may face and 

how the adversaries may be equipped—that the GRRS program uses to 

develop security upgrades at research reactors. Security upgrades are 

designed to assist guard forces at research reactors to implement an “alert 

and notify” strategy, which relies on off-site response forces to supplement 

on-site forces to contain, locate, and neutralize adversaries before they can 

successfully sabotage the reactor or steal nuclear material. The alert and 

notify strategy is not as stringent as the costly “denial” strategy, which is 

used primarily in settings where nuclear weapons or significant nuclear 

components are present. With a denial strategy, the security system and 

on-site guard forces must detect, delay, respond to, and defeat adversaries 

before they gain access to nuclear weapons or components. 

In January 2008, we reported on the security of research reactors in the 

United States that are regulated by NRC.7

 In response to your request, this 

report focuses on NNSA’s efforts to improve security of research reactors 

worldwide. Specifically, we examined (1) the status of NNSA’s efforts to 

secure foreign research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected research 

reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA’s security guidelines, 

and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates its GRRS program with 

other countries and the IAEA. 

To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant NNSA and IAEA policy, 

guidelines, and planning documents. For NNSA, we examined its 

Protection and Sustainability Criteria Document, which describes the 

DBT—the baseline threat for which security measures should be 

developed at research reactors in the GRRS program. In addition, we 

reviewed NNSA’s strategic plans for the GRRS program and work 

schedules for conducting and completing security work activities. We also 

met with NNSA officials responsible for implementing the GRRS program 

and with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) technical experts who 

provide assistance to NNSA in implementing the program. We also met 

with IAEA officials from IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security, Division of 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology, and IAEA’s Department of 

Safeguards. 

Scope and 

Methodology 

 

7

GAO, Nuclear Security: Action May Be Needed to Reassess the Security of NRC-Licensed 

Research Reactors, GAO-08-403 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2008). 

Page 4 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

We reviewed security upgrades at a nonprobability sample of five research 

reactors in five different countries—Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, 

Romania, and Serbia. This sample cannot be used to generalize findings 

from these countries to all countries in the program. We selected these 

reactors based upon whether the reactors still use or store HEU fuel and 

when NNSA had completed physical protection upgrades. Four of the five 

reactors had already received security upgrades, while work was ongoing 

at the fifth reactor. In the course of our work, we visited each of these five 

reactors to tour the facilities and inspect security upgrades that had been 

made or were in process. During our visits, we interviewed officials 

managing the reactors, on-site security officials, police, and other law 

enforcement officials responsible for responding to security incidents, as 

well as government officials responsible for regulating security at these 

reactors. At each of these reactors, we conducted interviews with a 

standard set of questions concerning the physical protection of the facility, 

the security upgrades that were being made, and the extent of the facility’s 

coordination with NNSA and IAEA. We also compared the security 

systems at the facilities with IAEA guidelines—particularly INFCIRC 225, 

Rev. 4, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. 

We also reviewed NNSA documents about each reactor, including reactor 

visit reports and vulnerability assessments. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Research reactors are generally smaller than nuclear power reactors, 

ranging in size from less than 1 megawatt to as high as 250 megawatts, 

compared with the 3,000 megawatts found for a typical commercial 

nuclear power reactor. In addition, unlike power reactors, many research 

reactors use HEU fuel instead of LEU. Although some research reactors 

have shut down or converted to LEU fuel and returned their HEU fuel to 

the United States or Russia, about 165 research reactors throughout the 

world continue to use HEU. NNSA efforts to convert reactors from HEU to 

LEU fuel use and return HEU fuel to the United States and Russia has led 

to the conversion of 57 reactors, the shutdown of 7 reactors, the return of 

HEU from 59 reactors, and the elimination of all HEU from 46 reactor 

facilities. NNSA plans to continue converting reactors and returning HEU 

Background 

Page 5 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

fuel to its country of origin. However, because it will take several years to 

convert reactors to LEU fuel use and return the HEU fuel, in the interim 

security needs to be ensured at these reactors. Figure 1 shows the interior 

of a research reactor in an Eastern European country that still uses 

Russian supplied HEU. 

Figure 1: Interior of a Soviet-Built HEU Research Reactor 

Source: Reactor Operator.

As NNSA and its predecessor agencies recognized the threat posed by the 

theft or diversion of nuclear materials—including HEU research reactor 

fuel—for nuclear weapons’ purposes, it initiated a number of efforts to 

address this threat. First, since 1974, DOE has supported a program to 

determine whether nuclear material provided by the United States to other 

countries for peaceful purposes is adequately protected. Managed by 

NNSA’s Division of Nonproliferation and International Security, this 

program prioritizes and selects facilities for physical protection 

assessment visits, leads such visits to determine if the facility meets IAEA 

guidelines for security, and, in the cases where the visited facility does not 

meet IAEA guidelines, makes recommendations to improve security. 

However, unlike the GRRS program, NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation 

and International Security does not fund or install security upgrades at 

Page 6 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

research reactors overseas. Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

DOE established the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 

program in 1995 to install improved security systems for nuclear material 

at civilian nuclear sites (including research reactors), naval fuel sites, and 

nuclear weapons laboratory sites in Russia and nations in the former 

Soviet Union. Third, prior to the establishment of NNSA, DOE established 

the GRRS program in 1993 to improve the security of research reactors 

that are in countries that NNSA considers in need of assistance, as well as 

research reactors in countries that are not included in other DOE/NNSA 

programs. As shown in Table 1, the GRRS program has identified 22 

research reactors in 16 different countries in need of assistance that are 

not included in other DOE/NNSA programs. Originally managed by 

NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, the GRRS 

program was transferred to the GTRI in 2005. The GRRS program is also 

beginning to provide security enhancements at research reactors located 

at universities in the United States, as requested by the Department of 

Homeland Security and the NRC. NNSA officials told us that they believe 

the decision to assist in upgrading the security of these reactors was based 

partly on our January 2008 report, which found potential security 

weaknesses at domestic research reactors regulated by NRC.8

Table 1: Foreign Research Reactors in the GRRS Program 

Country Reactor Fuel material 

Chile RECH-1, La Reina HEU 

Chile RECH-2, Lo Aquirre HEU 

Czech Republic LVR-15, NRIRez HEU 

Greece GRR-1, Demokritos HEU 

Hungary BRR HEU 

Indonesia RSG-GAS, Serpong HEU 

Indonesia TRIGA II, Bandung LEU 

Indonesia Kartini P3TM, Yogyakarta LEU 

Jamaica Slowpoke UWI CNS HEU 

Libya IRT-1 and IRT-1 CA, Tajoura HEU 

Mexico TRIGA MK-III (ININ), Salazar HEU 

Peru RP-0 LEU 

Peru RP-10l LEU 

 

8

GAO-08-403. 

Page 7 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

Country Reactor Fuel material 

Poland Maria, Swierk HEU 

Poland ZUOP (Eva spent fuel), Swierk HEU 

Portugal RPI HEU 

Romania TRIGA II, Pitesti HEU 

Romania VVR-s, Magurele HEU 

Serbia Vinca HEU 

South Africa SAFARI-1, Pelindaba HEU 

Turkey TR-2 Cekmece HEU 

Vietnam TRIGA Mark II, Dalat HEU 

Source: NNSA. 

Notes: (1) Two reactors in Indonesia and two reactors in Peru that use LEU fuel—which cannot be 

used to make a nuclear bomb but are potential targets of sabotage to release radioactivity into the 

area surrounding a reactor—have received security upgrades because of high levels of terrorist 

activities in regions where the reactors are located or because of their proximity to U.S. installations. 

(2) Subsequent to the installation of security upgrades by the GRRS program, NNSA has converted 

and removed all HEU from 4 reactors—GRR-1 in Greece, RPI in Portugal, Pitesti in Romania, and 

Magurele in Romania. 

As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of 

the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of 

approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete upgrades or remove all 

HEU prior to making upgrades at the remaining 4 reactors and to make 

further upgrades at some reactors where initial upgrades have already 

been made, spending an additional $6 million before ending physical 

security upgrades in 2010. For example, at one research reactor we visited, 

NNSA has already spent $760,000 on security upgrades and plans to spend 

$650,000 to pay for additional security upgrades, which will enable the 

facility to meet IAEA guidelines for security. NNSA also plans to spend an 

additional $378,000 for maintenance and sustainability of the security 

system at this facility over the next several years. NNSA is planning to 

complete all physical protection upgrades at GRRS reactors by the end of 

2010. 

NNSA Has Improved 

the Security of 

Research Reactors 

and Plans to Continue 

Upgrading the 

Security of Additional 

Reactors 

NNSA prioritizes its schedule for upgrading the security of research 

reactors depending on the amount and type of nuclear or radioactive 

material at the reactor and other threat factors, such as the vulnerability 

condition of sites, country-level threat, and proximity to strategic assets. 

To make security upgrades, NNSA works with Sandia security experts to 

assess security needs at reactor facilities, design security upgrades and 

systems, assists foreign reactor operators in making improvements, and 

review security upgrades once they have been made. With NNSA approval, 

Page 8 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

Sandia works with local firms specializing in installing security systems to 

make security upgrades. Security upgrades we observed during our visits 

to reactors in the GRRS program included, among other things, 

• construction of new, heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel; 

• installation of motion detector sensors and security cameras to detect 

unauthorized entry into reactor buildings and provide the ability to 

remotely monitor activities in those buildings; 

• replacement of glass entry doors with hardened steel doors equipped with 

magnetic locks and controlled by card readers or keypads; and 

• upgrades or construction of new fortified central alarm stations that allow 

on-site guards to monitor alarms and security cameras, and communicate 

with response forces.9

Figure 2 shows a newly built fortified central alarm station at a HEU 

research reactor. Figure 3 shows the upgraded alarm display and closed 

circuit television monitors inside a central alarm station at another HEU 

reactor. 

 

9

The purpose of the central alarm station is to monitor the employees, general public, and 

environment of the entire reactor complex. In addition, the central alarm station serves as 

a single, central contact during emergency situations. 

Page 9 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

Figure 2: Newly Built Fortified Central Alarm Station at a HEU Research Reactor 

Source: NNSA.

Reactor Building

Central Alarm Station 

Page 10 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

Figure 3: Upgraded Alarm Display and Closed Circuit Television Monitors Inside a 

Central Alarm Station at a HEU Research Reactor 

In addition, NNSA works with officials in countries included in the GRRS 

program to develop emergency plans and training exercises with on-site 

guard forces as well as local, regional, and national law enforcement 

agencies. For example, at one facility we visited, NNSA officials had 

worked with the reactor managers to develop emergency plans, and the 

managers routinely test these plans with different elements of the national 

emergency responders including the facility guard force, local police, 

regional police, and the national–level law enforcement including special 

assault teams. IAEA guidelines state that coordination between facility 

guards and off-site response forces should be regularly exercised. In 

addition, NNSA’s alert and notify strategy relies on off-site response forces 

to supplement the on-site guard force to contain, locate, and neutralize 

adversaries before they can successfully steal nuclear material or sabotage 

the reactor. 

The focus of NNSA’s program has been on protecting reactors that use or 

store HEU fuel that could potentially be used in an improvised nuclear 

device where security does not meet IAEA guidelines. In addition, some 

research reactors using LEU fuel—which cannot be used to make a 

Source: NNSA.

Page 11 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

nuclear bomb but are potential targets of sabotage to release radioactivity 

into the area surrounding a reactor—have received security upgrades 

because of high levels of terrorist activities in regions where the reactors 

are located or because of their proximity to U.S. installations. 

The foreign research reactors we visited that have received NNSA 

assistance generally met IAEA physical protection guidelines; however, in 

some cases, critical security weaknesses remained. The focus of the GRRS 

program is to make physical security upgrades in accordance with IAEA 

guidelines. For example, IAEA guidelines recommend that nuclear 

facilities possessing the highest-risk nuclear materials have intrusion 

detection equipment and that all intrusion sensors and alarms should be 

monitored in a central alarm station that is staffed continuously to initiate 

appropriate responses to alarms. At all four of the research reactors we 

visited where NNSA upgrades have been completed, NNSA installed 

intrusion detection sensors on all entrances and infrared motion detectors 

in areas where nuclear material is stored to detect unauthorized access. In 

addition, at these reactors NNSA provided assistance to construct fortified 

central alarm stations that are staffed continuously by on-site security 

personnel to monitor alarms triggered by these sensors. NNSA is in the 

process of providing these same upgrades at the fifth reactor we visited. 

Despite these upgrades, the GRRS program has not focused on whether 

security planning, procedures, and regulations meet IAEA guidelines at 

international research reactors. In contrast, in the United States, the GRRS 

program has assisted research reactors to ensure that security planning, 

procedures, and regulations meet IAEA guidelines. For example, to meet 

IAEA’s guidelines that emergency plans be regularly exercised, the 

program has provided emergency first responders with training and 

conducted table top exercises simulating emergency conditions. At four of 

the five reactors that we visited, we identified the following potential 

vulnerabilities that can undermine NNSA-funded upgrades. Specifically, 

Although Reactors We 

Visited Generally Met 

IAEA Guidelines, 

Some Security 

Weaknesses Remain 

That Could 

Undermine NNSAFunded Upgrades 

• IAEA security guidelines state that coordination between on-site guards 

and off-site response forces should be regularly exercised. At two reactors, 

however, no emergency response exercises had been conducted between 

the on-site guard force and off-site response forces, such as the national 

police, potentially limiting the effectiveness of these forces in an actual 

emergency. In addition, one of these reactors lacked any formal plans for 

emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel or to sabotage reactors. 

• IAEA security guidelines state that all persons entering or leaving reactor 

inner areas should be subject to a search to prevent the unauthorized 

Page 12 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

removal of nuclear material. However, personnel at one research reactor 

we visited did not search visitors or their belongings before granting them 

access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present, thereby 

potentially compromising the security upgrades made through NNSA 

assistance. 

• IAEA security guidelines also state that all vehicles entering or leaving the 

protected areas should be subject to search. However, at another reactor 

that we visited personnel did not search vehicles that were allowed onto 

the site or vehicles exiting the site for potentially stolen nuclear material 

or other contraband. 

• IAEA security guidelines state that the ceilings, walls, and floors of areas 

containing vulnerable nuclear material should be constructed to delay 

potential adversaries from accessing the material. However, at one facility, 

we discovered that protective covers over storage pools that contain HEU 

were not being used. These covers, which typically weigh hundreds of 

kilograms and must be moved using a crane, provide important protection 

for stored HEU by significantly increasing the time required for a potential 

adversary to access nuclear material. Although NNSA officials told us that 

these covers are not part of the security system, the covers would delay 

potential adversaries from accessing the HEU stored in the pool. 

Furthermore, the four entrance doors to another research reactor—which 

still had HEU fuel at the time that we visited, but has subsequently 

returned its HEU fuel—were not upgraded and provided only limited 

access delay. These doors were made of wood that is only approximately 1 

inch thick. In addition, the locks on these doors are not designed to 

prevent a determined attempt to access the research reactor facility. 

Officials at this facility told us that they had requested NNSA funding to 

replace the doors with hardened steel doors. However, NNSA did not 

agree to pay for hardened steel doors because it decided that the HEU fuel 

was sufficiently secured in a storage pool with heavy concrete covers. 

• NNSA program guidance states that establishing and maintaining a reliable 

nuclear material inventory and tracking system are important elements for 

ensuring adequate security for these materials. However, at one reactor we 

learned that the operators of the reactor did not have an effective system 

of nuclear material control and accounting for the HEU fuel. For example, 

the operators of this reactor neither performed routine inventory checks 

on HEU fuel, nor had an exact accounting of the spent HEU fuel stored at 

the facility. In this case, NNSA officials told us that a lack of effective 

nuclear material accounting at this facility is due to the poor condition of 

the reactor fuel storage pool, which is contaminated with cesium that has 

leaked from fuel. These officials told us that an inventory will be 

Page 13 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

conducted as HEU fuel is prepared for shipment back to its country of 

origin. 

• IAEA security guidelines state that unescorted access to protected areas 

should be limited to those persons whose trustworthiness has been 

determined. However, at another reactor we visited, background checks 

were not conducted on personnel with access to areas where nuclear 

materials are present. 

• At the same reactor, according to foreign government officials, the 

government agency charged with regulating the operation of the research 

reactor had neither developed safety and security regulations, nor had the 

country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear 

facilities—including licensing, inspections, and emergency exercise 

procedures—as called for by IAEA guidelines. 

NNSA and Sandia officials responsible for making security upgrades at 

these reactors acknowledged that, even with NNSA-funded upgrades, 

these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security. These 

officials stressed the importance of NNSA continuing to work with these 

countries to ensure that research reactors have effective and 

comprehensive physical protection systems and procedures consistent 

with IAEA guidelines. Furthermore, they expressed the need to eventually 

convert these reactors to LEU and return the HEU fuel to its country of 

origin, as well as to develop national laws and regulations to ensure the 

safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. In addition, Sandia officials 

commented that there is no substitute for NNSA and Sandia visits to 

reactors that have received physical security upgrades to determine 

whether the upgrades have been installed, function as designed, and are 

properly maintained. However, these visits generally have not been used 

to assist the facilities in developing security policy and procedures that 

comply with IAEA security guidelines, and there are no specific plans to 

continue these visits after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are 

completed in 2010. 

Page 14 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

NNSA Coordinates 

Security Upgrades 

with Other Countries 

and IAEA, but 

Additional 

Cooperation is 

Needed to Implement 

Security Procedures 

Provided for in IAEA 

Guidelines 

NNSA coordinates with research reactor operators to design, install, and 

sustain security upgrades. However, because the GRRS program is 

voluntary, NNSA faces challenges in obtaining consistent and timely 

cooperation from other countries to address remaining security 

weaknesses. With regard to IAEA, NNSA coordinates with the agency to 

identify research reactors that are in need of security upgrades and 

assistance. In addition, NNSA and IAEA have begun coordinating on a 

sustainability project to help ensure that research reactor operators 

adequately maintain NNSA funded upgrades by assisting in the 

development of equipment testing and maintenance procedures and the 

development of emergency response plans. 

NNSA Coordinates with 

Other Countries to 

Implement Upgrades but 

Faces Challenges in 

Addressing Security 

Weaknesses at Some 

Research Reactors 

NNSA officials and the physical security experts at Sandia coordinate with 

foreign government research reactor operators to design, install, and 

sustain physical security upgrades. To design security systems, NNSA and 

Sandia officials assess a research reactor’s current security condition to 

identify security weaknesses and verify the amount, type, and location of 

nuclear material at the facility. The officials then work with foreign 

research reactor operators to design upgrades and use either the DBT 

established by the foreign government or a DBT developed by NNSA if the 

country has not developed its own DBT for nuclear facilities. Security 

upgrades are generally focused on the electronic elements of the security 

system used to detect unauthorized access and alert response forces, as 

well as access delay features such as hardened steel doors and storage 

vaults, instead of on the development of security policies and procedures 

provided for in IAEA guidelines. 

Sandia officials also work with foreign government research reactor 

operators by overseeing the installation of security upgrades. In general, 

Sandia works with a security company that is then responsible for 

procuring and installing the designed security upgrades. To help ensure 

that the security upgrades are being installed properly, Sandia requires the 

security company and the foreign research reactor operators to 

periodically submit status reports and equipment lists for Sandia’s review. 

In some instances, countries will share the cost of installing the upgrades 

with NNSA. For example, the government of the Czech Republic provided 

$800,000 to upgrade the security at one of its research reactors. Once the 

security contractor completes the installation, NNSA and Sandia officials 

Page 15 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

and foreign government research reactor operators inspect the upgrades 

and determine if they were installed and are functioning as designed. 

To help ensure that the upgrades are sustained, NNSA and Sandia officials 

periodically visit research reactors to review the condition of upgrades 

and to determine if supplemental upgrades are needed. According to 

NNSA and Sandia officials, these visits are crucial to maintaining a 

collaborative relationship with foreign research reactor operators to help 

ensure that security upgrades are sustained over the long term. As a result 

of recent security assessment visits, NNSA officials said that they are 

planning additional upgrades at three reactors we visited where security 

upgrades had already been completed. These additional upgrades are to 

include, among other things, new closed circuit television cameras, a 

device used to provide emergency electrical power, and replacement door 

locks; they do not include assistance in developing security policies and 

procedures provided for in IAEA guidelines. NNSA officials determined 

that supplemental upgrades at the fourth reactor were not needed because 

they planned to return the reactor’s HEU to Russia in the summer of 2009, 

which was 7 months after the assessment was made.10

NNSA has also been purchasing warranty and maintenance contracts for 

recently installed upgrades and for certain reactors where upgrades are 

several years old and foreign government research reactor operators lack 

sufficient funding for maintenance activities. NNSA requires the countries 

or reactor operators who receive these warranty and maintenance 

contracts to provide written assurance that they will continue to sustain 

the upgrades at their own expense after the contract expires, although 

NNSA will consider providing additional coverage on a case-by-case basis. 

In addition, NNSA is working with IAEA and governments in each of the 

countries that received security upgrades at research reactors to develop a 

long-term sustainability plan for security systems. 

Because the GRRS program is voluntary and cooperative, NNSA officials 

told us that in some cases they face challenges in obtaining foreign 

governments’ commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely 

manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one country 

we visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years for two reasons. First, 

the country was initially reluctant to accept NNSA assistance and took 2 

years to decide whether to accept funding for security improvements. 

 

10In June 2009, NNSA announced that all HEU from this reactor was returned to Russia. 

Page 16 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

Second, security upgrades were further delayed at this reactor because of 

the country’s delay in approving the design of the security upgrades and 

authorizing contractors to work at the reactor site. As a result, a number 

of security weaknesses at this facility have not yet been addressed—some 

of which NNSA identified as early as 2002. According to NNSA officials, 

the agency has been working with the Department of State to overcome 

these obstacles. 

NNSA officials also told us that they have experienced situations where a 

foreign government has refused its assistance to make security upgrades. 

Specifically, one country has refused NNSA’s multiple offers to upgrade a 

research reactor facility during the past 9 years. NNSA officials said that 

they have continued to offer this assistance through both direct bilateral 

negotiations and through IAEA. However, this foreign government has yet 

to accept NNSA assistance, and NNSA has concerns that known security 

weaknesses have not been addressed. In addition, NNSA has experienced 

two situations where the foreign government would not accept security 

upgrade assistance until agreements were reached with the United States 

on other issues related to nuclear energy and security. For example, NNSA 

assistance at one research reactor was delayed until the United States 

ratified an agreement with the foreign government authorizing and setting 

the conditions for transfers of U.S. civil nuclear technology and material to 

that government.11 These issues have been resolved with both foreign 

governments. Due to the terrorist threat level in the areas where these 

reactors are located, NNSA has decided to forgo making security upgrades 

because it would take too long to design and install new security systems. 

Instead, NNSA is planning to remove the HEU fuel that is at these two 

reactors and return it to its country of origin this year. 

 

11Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended (42 U.S.C § 2153) establishes 

the requirements for the United States to engage in civil nuclear cooperation agreements 

with foreign governments. 

Page 17 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

NNSA Coordinates with 

the IAEA to Identify 

Research Reactors for the 

GRRS Program, and 

Further Cooperation Is 

Needed to Sustain 

Upgrades and Implement 

Security Procedures 

Provided for in IAEA 

Guidelines 

NNSA coordinates with the IAEA to identify research reactors in need of 

security upgrades that could be included in the GRRS program. Fourteen 

of the 19 research reactors that received NNSA-funded security upgrades 

were previously reviewed by an IAEA team, which recommended security 

improvements. According to IAEA officials, if a nation is unable to make 

the recommended security improvements itself, IAEA will recommend 

that it seek assistance from the GRRS program. In addition, NNSA works 

with IAEA to ensure security upgrades are complementary when both 

organizations are providing assistance at the same research reactor. For 

example, at one reactor we visited, NNSA upgraded the reactor’s central 

alarm station and installed new intrusion sensors and cameras. At the 

same facility, IAEA is planning to install an X-ray machine and metal 

detector at the reactor’s entrance to monitor personnel and packages 

entering and leaving the facility. In addition, NNSA officials implementing 

efforts to secure research reactors interact regularly with IAEA officials by 

holding quarterly coordination meetings. Furthermore, NNSA makes an 

annual financial pledge of between $1.6 and $1.9 million to IAEA’s Nuclear 

Security Fund, which supports IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security activities, 

such as security reviews of international research reactors and other 

nuclear facilities. 

Further cooperation is needed to sustain NNSA-funded upgrades and 

implement security procedures provided for in IAEA guidelines. While 

NNSA is planning to complete all physical protection upgrades at GRRS 

reactors by the end of 2010, GRRS officials are still concerned about the 

continued effectiveness of upgrades and any shortcomings related to 

security procedures and planning. Consequently, NNSA has recently begun 

working with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to establish a 

sustainability program. The purpose of the sustainability program is to 

help ensure that NNSA-funded security upgrades are properly maintained 

and to help research reactor operators implement security procedures and 

planning. To date, NNSA has provided IAEA with $550,000 and paid for a 

security expert from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to administer 

the sustainability program. Under the sustainability program, IAEA will 

help research reactor operators develop 

• capabilities for properly maintaining and testing installed security 

equipment, which will help ensure the future effectiveness of NNSAfunded upgrades; 

• capabilities to ensure that security procedures are designed, implemented, 

and followed by research reactor management and personnel; and 

Page 18 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

• emergency response plans and agreements and procedures with a robust 

dedicated off-site response force for assistance in responding to 

emergency situations at the research reactor. 

In addition, the sustainability program is expected to help foreign 

governments strengthen their nuclear security laws and regulations, as 

well as the nuclear security inspection process and procedures. For 

example, IAEA plans to work with a country to ensure it has an 

appropriate nuclear regulatory agency with the legal basis, as well as 

inspection and enforcement capabilities, to establish and oversee security 

requirements at nuclear facilities. IAEA plans to conduct pilot projects of 

the sustainability program at three research reactors in 2009, evaluate the 

results of the pilot projects, and then potentially expand the program in 

2010 to all reactors in the GRRS program that still possess HEU. NNSA 

will continue to support sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the 

completion of security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010. 

Nuclear research reactors throughout the world continue to play an 

important role in research, education, science, and medicine. However, as 

long as some of these reactors continue to use HEU fuel or have HEU fuel 

stored on-site, they must be adequately protected from terrorists targeting 

them to steal the material or sabotage the reactors. NNSA’s efforts to 

secure research reactors in the GRRS program have resulted in physical 

security upgrades such as heavily-reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel and 

new or improved alarms and intrusion detection sensors. However, 

security weaknesses remain at some research reactors in the GRRS 

program, many of which are the result of weaknesses in security 

procedures and emergency planning. NNSA’s efforts have, to date, 

generally not included encouraging the development of effective security 

procedures or the development of laws and regulations ensuring the safe 

and secure operation of nuclear facilities. 

Conclusions 

NNSA has taken the first steps toward addressing these security 

deficiencies and is starting to work with IAEA to implement a 

comprehensive sustainability program to ensure that new security 

upgrades installed at these reactors undergo periodic maintenance and 

repair. These efforts must continue, even after NNSA completes installing 

physical security upgrades at the remaining reactors and ends the GRRS 

program in 2010. Because NNSA is working with foreign countries, it is 

also important that NNSA work cooperatively with these countries’ 

governments and IAEA to develop rigorous policies and procedures 

governing security at these sites. Ultimately, the most effective security 

Page 19 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

improvement that can be made at these research reactors is to convert 

them to use LEU and to return all HEU fuel to the material’s country of 

origin, thereby eliminating the reactors’ attractiveness to terrorists seeking 

material to make an improvised nuclear device. We support the effort that 

NNSA is now taking to accelerate the schedule to convert reactors to LEU 

fuel use and return HEU fuel to its country of origin. The timely removal of 

this material from at-risk reactors will be, in the end, the most effective 

security improvement NNSA can make. 

To resolve remaining security weaknesses at foreign research reactors 

that use HEU fuel, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the 

Administrator of NNSA to take the following three actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• While continuing to emphasize and accelerate NNSA efforts to convert 

reactors to LEU fuel use and return HEU fuel to its country of origin, we 

recommend that NNSA work with foreign government officials and 

research reactor operators in countries where security upgrades are in 

progress or have been completed to (1) take immediate action to address 

any remaining security weaknesses, including those that we identified in 

this report; and (2) ensure that security policies and procedures, including 

those for emergency response to security incidents, fully meet IAEA 

guidelines. 

• In addition, in cooperation with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Safety, we 

recommend that NNSA work with foreign regulatory agencies to 

encourage the development, where needed, of national security laws and 

regulations to ensure the safe and secure operation of research reactors, 

including licensing, inspection, and emergency exercise procedures, as 

called for in IAEA guidelines. 

We provided NNSA with a draft of this report for its review and comment. 

In its written comments, NNSA states that our report is fair and properly 

reflects the progress of the GRRS program to make security upgrades at 

vulnerable, high risk research reactors worldwide. NNSA also outlined the 

actions that it plans to take to address the report’s recommendations to 

further improve research reactor security. The complete text of NNSA’s 

comments are presented in appendix I. NNSA also provided technical 

clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

To address the report’s recommendations, NNSA stated that it plans to 

assist countries in meeting security obligations by 1) ensuring that its 

security policies and procedures, including those for emergency response 

Page 20 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 

to security incidents, fully meet IAEA guidelines and 2) working in 

cooperation with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to encourage the 

development, where needed, of national security laws and regulations to 

ensure the safe and secure operation of research reactors 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator of NNSA; and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. The report will also be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in Appendix II. 

Sincerely yours, 

Gene Aloise 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

Page 21 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Appendix I: Comments from the National Appendix I: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 

Nuclear Security Administration 

Page 22 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration 

Page 23 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration 

Page 24 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Appendix II: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 25 GAO-09-949 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant 

Director; Patrick Bernard; Omari Norman; Tim Persons; Ramon Rodriguez; 

Peter Ruedel; Rebecca Shea; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Jeanette 

Soares made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360992) 
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