NO. 07-02-0329 -CV IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L A AUGUST 8, 2002

______________________________ IN THE INTE REST OF T. W., A MINOR CHILD

_________________________________ FROM THE 32 0TH DIST RICT COURT OF POTT ER COUNTY; NO. 62,556-D; H ONORAB LE DON E MERS ON, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ. Appellant Holly W estfiled a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order term inating her parental rights to her m inor son, T. W . The order was signed on March 26, 2 002, and the notice of appeal was filed on July 23, 2002. Based u pon the rationale expressed herein, we dism iss the purported appeal for want of j urisdiction.
An appeal from a n order term inating the parent-child relati onship is accelerated and govern ed b y th e ru les f or a cce lera ted app ealsin c ivil cases. SeeTex. Fam . Code Ann. §§ 109.002(a) and 263.405(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Rule 26.1(b) of the Texas Rules of2

Appellate Proce dure provides that in an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal m ust be filed within 20 days after the order is signed. M oreover, neither a m otion for new trial, a request for findings of fact and conclusion of law , nor any other post-trial m otion w ill extend the deadline for fili ng a notice of appeal under Rule 26.1(b). SeeTe x. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405(c) (Vernon S upp. 2002).
The term ination order was signed by the trial court on March 26, 2002, and a m otion for new trial wa s filed on April 25, 2002. Howe ver, the notice of appeal was not filed unt il July 23, 2002. Pursua nt to Rule 42.3(a) of the T exa s Rules of Appellate Procedure, by letter dated July 25, 2 002, this Cour t requested that a ppell ant show cause why th e purported app eal s hou ld not be dism issed for want of jurisdiction. Counsel for appellant filed a response in which she candidly concedes that the notice of appeal was due to be filed within 20 days after t he order was signed. However, counsel argues that appellee (the Te xas De partme nt of Protective and Regulatory Services) has not been p rejudiced by the untim ely notice of appeal and contends that harm , if any, has been waived by the Department’s failure to object to t he late filing of the notice o f appeal. Counsel further argues that the use of the word “m ay”in R ule 4 2.3govern ing in volu nta ry d ism iss als i n civ il cases confers discretion on this Cou rt not to dism iss the appeal. W e disagree.
Rule26.1(b) specifically requires a notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal to be filed within 20 days from the date the order is signed. Although the Suprem e Court has directed us to construe theRules of Appellate Procedure reasonably and liberall y so that3

the right to app eal is n ot lost by imposing requi rements not absolutel y necessary to effect the p urpose of a rule, Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997), regar ding ou r jurisdiction, we are prohibited from en larging thetim e fo r pe rfe ctin g an app eal in a c ivil
case. Tex. R. App. P. 2 ; s ee generally Denton County v . Hut her, 43 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. App.– Fort

W orth 2001, no pe t.) (dismissin g an acce lera ted appeal for want of jurisdiction where appellants failed to file their notice of appeal within 20 days after the date th e order w

as signed ). Accordingly, this purported appeal is dismissed f or want of jurisdiction.

Don H. Rea vis Justice Publish.