* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-20087

Summary Calendar

CHARLES HENRY BEAN, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

MARVIN GRAY; CAMILO CARMONA RAMOS;

LEE V. VAUGHN; CYNTHIA WOODROFFE,

Plain tiffs-Appellants,

versus

THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY;

LARRY SCARBOROUGH; ROBERT TYER; DEAN

COOK,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-96-CV-773)

April 1, 1999

Before POLITZ, JOLLY, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge: *

This appeal challenges the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs

in this action brought under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act

(TCHRA). For the reasons assigned, we affirm.2 BACKGROUND

Marvin Gra y, Camilo Carmona Ramos, Lee V. Vaughn, Cynthia Woodroofe,

and six co-workers filed an action against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and

three employment superiors in Texas state court, claiming discrimination under the

TCHRA, and advancing claims for negligent supervision, d efamation, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Goodyear removed the case to the court

à quo and after it filed a notice entitled “Report to Court: Case-Dispositive Matters

Regarding Liability and Damages,” the court ordered the parties to a ttempt to

resolve their disputes through mediation . As a result, six of the plaintiffs settled

their claims; appellants pressed on.

In ensuing months, Goodyear repeatedly advised app e llants that pursuit of

groundless claims could subject them to liability for attorney’s fees and costs.

Goodye ar cautioned appellants, and informed the court, that the discrimination

claims were sufficiently frivolous to warrant the award of same.

Goodyear was granted summary judgment on the discrimina tion claims.

Some were time-barred, others had not been the subject of administrative remedies,

and, overall, appellants offered no ev idence that any employment decision had been

motivated improperly. The claims against the individual defendants and the

common law claims against Goodyear were abandoned. The trial court found the

complaints to be a list of mere grievances, not indicative of discrimination, but

more reflective of an annoyance list that might be compiled by any group of

employees who had worked for the same employer for many years.1 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C.

, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Pope v. MCI

Telecommunications Corp. , 937 F.2d 258 (5 th Cir. 1991).

2 T EX

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ABOR C ODE A

NN . § 21.259(a).

3 Compare T EX

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ABOR C ODE A

NN . § 21.259(a) (“In a proceeding under this chapter, a

court may allow the prevailing party

. . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”)

with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court,

in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party

. . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part

of the costs . . . .”).

4 Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc.

, 813 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1991); see also Pope

, 937

F.2d at 267.

5 Chri stiansburg Garment Co. , 434 U.S. at 421-22 (cautioning against post hoc

reasoning).

3 The court invited Goodyear to file for attorney’s fees and costs. Ultimately

the court issued and reaffirmed an order directing each appellant to pay $4,160.90

in costs and $24,243.70 in attorney’s fees. The total award was approximately 70%

of the amount sought by Goodyear. Appellants timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

We review challenges to awards of attorney’s fees and costs for abuse of

discretion. 1 The TCHRA provides that a court may award reasonable attorney’s

fees and costs to the prevailing party in a proceeding under the Act. 2 The parties

agree that, because the language of the TCHRA mirrors the language of Title VII, 3

precedent interpreting Title VII guides our decision. 4 Accordingly, the district

court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant upon a

finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundatio n, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after such clearly became

known. 56 Id.

7 Pope , 937 F.2d at 267 (finding no abuse of discretion by the district court in awarding

attorney’s fees to defendant because plaintiff “came to court with untimely claims ” and

“came with no evidence to support her charge”).

4 Appellants contend that th e district court abused its discretion, noting that

prior to the filing of their complaint the Department of Labor Office of Federal

Contract Compliance Program determined that Goodyear’s hiring and promotion

practices disparately impacted minorities. Appellants also seek support in the fact

that Goodyear settled the claims of six of the original ten plaintiffs.

Although appellants’ claims may not have been frivolous, unreasonable, or

without foundation when filed, we are not prepared to say that the district court

abused its discretion. Fees may be awarded when a plaintiff pursues a claim, even

one that initially appears well -founded, after it becomes clear that the claim is

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 6 The district court dismissed the

claims advanced herein because the y were time-barred or had not been

administratively exhausted, and because appellants produced no evide nce of

discri minatory motivation. In that setting an award of attorney’s fees is not

inappropriate. 7 That the Department of Labor may have determined that

Goo dyear’s hiring and promotion practices disparately impacted minorities

generally do es not necessarily speak to appellants’ specific claims. Nor do we

make any finding s or draw any conclusions from Goodyear’s settlement with

several of the original plaintiffs. We are fully cognizant that lawsuits may be and

frequently are settled f

or reasons other than the strength of a plaintiff’s claim.8 Missouri v. Jenkins

, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (interpreting the “reasonable attorney’s fee”

of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to include a separate fee for paralegals if that is the prevailing practice

in the community).

5 From the record before us, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the awarding of

attorney’s fees herein.

Alternatively, appellants challenge as excessive the attorney’s fees awarded.

First, they contend that Goodyear should not be entitled to fees for work performed

prior to its own assertion that their position was frivolous. They cite no precedent

in support of that contention and we are aware of none. We note, however, that the

trial court did not grant all of the requested fees.

Appellants next challenge the inclusion of fees for work performed by nonattorneys. An award of reasonable attorney’s fees may include fees for legal

services performed by non-attorneys if that is the prevailing practic e in the

community. 8 The record contains an affidavit by Goodyear’s counsel that such is

the prevailing practice in the relevant legal community.

Appellants contend that the fees awarded are excessive because they include

time for nonlegal work and duplicative work. Our review of the bills submitted

does not reflect any computative error nor any other abuse of discretion by the trial

court in that regard.

Finally, appellants contend that the fees awarded are excessive because they

include time associated with a tort claim and Texas precedents preclude such

inclusion. Counsel’s affidavit attests that no such time was included in their

submission. We find no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney’s fees.9 Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Mi chael F. , 931 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Tex.

1995), aff’d as modified , 118 F.3d 245 (5 th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 690 (1998).

10 T EX

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ABOR C ODE A

NN . § 21.259(c).

6 Appellants also challe n ge the award of costs generally and the

reasonableness of particular costs. They challenge specifically the costs for

copying motions for summary judgment and the fee paid an expert. As to the

co pying costs, Goodyear notes that $0.15 per page has previously been deemed

reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), which provides that fees for “copies of

papers necessarily obtained for use in the case” may be taxed as costs. 9 Goodyear

responds that its five motion s for summary judgment addressed the many issues

raised by appellants’ filings and dealt with multiple parties. As to the expert fee,

appellants make a broad contention that the fee is unreasonable. The TCHRA

provides that the prevailing party may recover reasonable expert fees, 10 and we are

not in a position to question the district court’s discretion as to the reasonableness

of such fees given onl y the vague and unsubstantiated contention by appellants.

We cannot conclude that the distri ct court abused its discretion in its award of

costs.

Concluding that no other argument advanced by appellants has any merit,

and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment assessing attorney’s fees and costs is

AFFIRMED.