U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

28–949 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. HRG. 115–395 

NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL 

PAUL M. NAKASONE, U.S. ARMY, TO BE 

DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

AND CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2018 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

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(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

KAMALA HARRIS, California 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk 

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CONTENTS 

MARCH 15, 2018 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia ........................ 2 

WITNESS 

Nakasone, Lieutenant General Paul M., U.S. Army, Nominated to be Director 

of the National Security Agency and Chief of the Central Security Service ... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 26 

Additional Prehearing Questions ........................................................................... 42 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 59 

Statement from the Electronic Privacy Information Center ................................ 71 

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NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL 

PAUL M. NAKASONE, U.S. ARMY, TO BE 

DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

AGENCY AND CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL 

SECURITY SERVICE 

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2018 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, 

Wyden, King, and Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call this hearing to order. Lieutenant 

General Paul M. Nakasone, President Trump’s nominee to be the 

next Director of the National Security Agency, General Nakasone, 

congratulations on your nomination. 

I’d like to start by recognizing your wife Susan. She’s here with 

us today and your four children: David and Joseph, who are both 

high school juniors; Sarah, who’s studying at the University of Chicago; and Daniel who is at the University of Virginia. You’ve got 

them geographically spread around. I know from personal experience just how important a supportive family is. And to each of 

you—and, Susan, I hope you pass it on to the kids—thank you. 

Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the committee 

to consider the nominee’s qualifications and to allow for thoughtful 

deliberation by our members. Lieutenant General Nakasone has 

provided substantive written responses to over 45 questions presented by the committee. And today, of course, committee members 

will be able to ask additional questions and hear from him in open 

session. 

General Nakasone graduated from Saint John’s University and 

earned a master’s degree from the University of Southern California, the National Defense Intelligence College, and the United 

States Army War College. He served honorably in the United 

States Army for over 30 years, including deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Republic of Korea. Prior to leading the United 

States Army Cyber Command, General Nakasone commanded the 

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Cyber National Mission Force at the United States Cyber Command. 

General Nakasone, you are being asked to lead the National Security Agency during a period of significant debate about what authorities and tools are lawful and appropriate. I’m hopeful that, 

moving forward, you will be an influence and an influential and 

forceful advocate for those foreign intelligence tools you believe are 

necessary to keep the citizens of this country safe while protecting 

Americans’ privacy. 

As I have mentioned to others during their nomination hearing, 

I can assure you that this committee will faithfully follow its charter and conduct a vigorous and real-time oversight of the intelligence community, its operations and its activities. We’ll ask difficult and probing questions of you and your staff and we will expect honest, complete and timely responses. 

You’ve already been reported favorably out of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee on 6 March of this year, and I look forward to 

supporting your nomination and ensuring its consideration without 

delay. 

I want to thank you again for being here. I look forward to your 

testimony. 

Finally, yesterday the committee received a statement from the 

Electronic Privacy Information Center and asked that it be entered 

into the hearing record. I would ask members for unanimous consent that that statement be entered into today’s open record. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

I now recognize the Vice Chairman for his lengthy comments. 

[Laughter.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since no one 

is here, I’m sure people are going to be hanging on my every word. 

General Nakasone, it’s great to see you again and welcome. I believe actually, since you’re the first director as—as Director of NSA 

and CYBERCOM, this is the first time, though, as NSA Director 

that you’ve appeared before the committee. So a bit of a historic 

hearing; and, consequently, slightly extended remarks of mine. 

Obviously, General, if you are confirmed you will take charge of 

one of the most important assignments in our government and in 

the intelligence community. You will be entrusted to lead thousands of dedicated men and women of the NSA. It will be your job 

to ensure accurate and timely signals intelligence is provided to our 

Nation’s leaders and warfighters. 

You’ll be responsible for protecting our military networks, safeguarding the unique capabilities and assets of the United States, 

and outsmarting our adversaries. And, as Commander of U.S. 

CYBERCOM, you will also be responsible to—for responding to 

threats and conduct operations when ordered to do so. 

At the same time, as we’ve discussed again, you must ensure 

that the NSA operate within the law and that it continues to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. The NSA’s activities must continue to operate within the parameters of that law, 

particularly the FISA law, with foolproof mechanisms for ensuring 

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that no Americans are targeted without warrant, and will continue 

to be subject to robust oversight by this committee. 

Your nomination I believe comes at a critical time. As I look 

around the world, I see threats and challenges to our country, to 

our systems of international institutions and alliances, that frankly 

have maintained peace and prosperity since World War II. We’ve 

also seen domestic threats to the NSA’s ability to execute on its 

mission, with a series of leaks that have challenged the agency and 

at times undermined the morale of your workforce. 

The NSA must provide the best intelligence on terrorists and extremist groups, rogue regimes, nuclear proliferation, and regional 

instability. I’m concerned about the rise of potential nation-state 

adversaries and their policies which aim to disrupt the international order. 

In particular, we should all be alarmed by the destabilizing role 

played by Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which threatens both the 

United States and our allies and, as we’ve seen by their recent activities in the U.K., there are very few restrictions that Mr. Putin 

has put on his agent’s actions. Matter of fact, the heads of our intelligence agencies were here a month ago and all indicated that 

Russia will continue to try to interfere in our elections, activities 

that demand a strong United States response. 

Our country I believe must develop a whole-of-government response to strengthen our defenses. I believe—and we’ve again discussed this, we’d like to hear more about this today—that we need 

a clearly articulated cyber doctrine that will deter nations like Russia from going after our crucial institutions, whether they be civilian, military, or in the private sector. We’ve got to make sure they 

know, whether it’s Russia or other near-peer adversaries, that 

there will be consequences to their actions. 

I believe that our lack of action to date has, frankly, encouraged 

nations not only like Russia, but China and others, frankly to act 

with impunity. I also worry that we’re on the cusp of what I would 

call a paradigm shift in the technological development, and not one 

which we’re well-poised to prevail against well-resourced competitors, who are willing to engage not only in a whole-of-government, 

but particularly a whole-of-society effort, to obtain economic advantages and access to our most sensitive technologies. 

The top dozen Chinese technology firms that have already entered or are poised to enter the United States and Western markets, in stark contrast to our country, these firms maintain relationships with and provide access to the Chinese government that 

is unlike anything we’ve seen with other developed nations. While 

we want to encourage an open economy, what are the potential 

risks to our society from these developments? 

Now, China is still behind the United States in R&D expenditures, but, with the current spend lines, not for long. China’s R&D 

spending is increasing by about 20 percent a year. By comparison, 

our R&D expenditures are increasing about 4 percent a year. 

Frankly, the lines will shortly cross; and China is positioning 

itself to be a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and bioengineering, and that brings serious implications for 

our privacy, economic and national security. I believe the NSA will 

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continue to play a critical role in keeping our country ahead in this 

ever-changing world of emerging technologies. 

Finally, I’d like to hear your thoughts about the dedicated men 

and women of the NSA, your workforce of dedicated intelligence 

professionals. These are men and women who work in silence to 

keep America safe. Now, they’ve taken a beating sometimes recently from those who falsely call into question their motivations, 

their dedication and their honesty. I know that these attacks obscure the truth. 

My colleagues on this committee and I know that at the NSA 

headquarters the Memorial Wall lists the names of 176 NSA 

cryptologists, military and civilian, who made the ultimate sacrifice 

for their country while serving in silence. I’d like to hear your 

plans on how we maintain that world-class workforce going forward. 

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and I 

look forward to the General’s comments. 

Chairman BURR. I thank the Vice Chairman. 

General, if you would stand and raise your right hand. Do you 

solemnly swear to tell—to give this committee the truth, the full 

truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

General NAKASONE. I do. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, 

U.S. ARMY, NOMINATED TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL 

SECURITY AGENCY AND CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL SECURITY 

SERVICE 

Chairman BURR. Please be seated. 

General, before we move to your statement, I’ll ask you to answer five standard questions the committee poses to each nominee 

who appears before us. They require a simple yes or no response 

for the record. 

Do you agree to appear before the committee here or in any other 

venue when invited? 

General NAKASONE. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from 

your office to appear before the committee and designated staff 

when invited? 

General NAKASONE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to provide documents or any other 

materials requested by the committee in order for it to carry out 

its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

General NAKASONE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Will you ensure that your office and your staff 

provide such materials to the committee when requested? 

General NAKASONE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to the 

fullest extent possible, all members of this committee on all intelligence activities, rather than only the Chair and the Vice Chair? 

General NAKASONE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you very much for your answers. We’ll 

now proceed to your opening statement, after which I’ll recognize 

members by seniority for up to five minutes. General, the floor is 

yours. 

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General NAKASONE. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, and 

distinguished members of the committee: I am honored to testify 

here today for my nomination as Director of the National Security 

Agency and Chief, Central Security Service. I want to thank President Trump, Secretary Mattis, Director Coats, and General 

Dunford for their confidence in nominating me for these important 

positions. 

I’d also like to thank my wife Susan for being here. I owe much 

of my success to her love and support throughout nearly 25 years 

of marriage. Today, our children, Sarah, Daniel, David and Joseph, 

are all in school and will be unable to be with us. We’re tremendously proud of them and thankful for their selflessness and support. 

I’d also like to thank Admiral Mike Rogers for his 36 years of 

commissioned service for the Nation, and for leading NSA during 

a time of incredible transformation and tremendous growth. I 

thank him and his wife Dana for all they have done in service to 

our Nation. 

I commissioned in the Army over 31 years ago as an intelligence 

officer and for the past three decades, have served in intelligence 

and in leadership positions both at home and abroad, in peace and 

in war. 

If confirmed for this position, this will be my fourth assignment 

to NSA. In my previous assignments to the agency, I’ve always 

been impressed by the phrases that greet everyone who enters that 

building: ‘‘Defend the Nation, secure the future.’’ These simple directives captured the critical role the NSA plays in supporting our 

military and senior policymakers while safeguarding our freedoms. 

I know that the National Security Agency is a special member 

of our intelligence community and of unique importance in the defense of our Nation. Throughout the agency’s 65 years of service, 

one constant has remained—the quality of the people. These men 

and women are national treasures and they’re engaged in missions 

that can only be called one of a kind. If confirmed, I know this 

workforce will be the foundation of NSA’s future and continued 

success. My focus will begin and end with them. 

Throughout my career, I’ve been both a generator and consumer 

of NSA intelligence products and know first-hand the critical role 

the agency plays, both as a combat support and signals intelligence 

agency. The importance of delivering accurate, reliable and timely 

intelligence products cannot be overstated. And, if confirmed, I 

commit to upholding the high reputation of the agency as a provider of objective, mission-critical signals intelligence in support of 

our military and our government. 

I recognize that our Nation’s adversaries continue to pose threats 

and posture themselves to reduce our global advantage. In light of 

this, the importance of an effective National Security Agency continues to be paramount to our national defense. 

I also recognize that we are at the edge of the technological frontier for our Nation. The future that the next director will face presents challenges and opportunities from rapid technological evolution, including machine learning, artificial intelligence and quantum computing, as well as the growing capabilities of the technological industry. If confirmed, I know that a strong public-private 

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partnership will be needed to ensure this country benefits from the 

leading-edge technology being developed and implemented today 

and into the future. 

Finally, I recognize that this nomination is to lead both U.S. 

Cyber Command and the NSA. Although the co-location and cooperation of the two powerful organizations has been critical to 

their growth, I also see them as two unique entities with their own 

identities, authorities, and oversight mechanisms. I am committed 

to assessing the needs of both to optimize their individual success 

in the best defense of our Nation. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that the agency’s intelligence customers can continue to rely upon timely and accurate products, delivered with integrity, to ensure we maintain an advantage over increasingly adaptive adversaries. Equally, I will always ensure the 

National Security Agency upholds full compliance with our laws 

and the protection of our constitutional rights. 

I am deeply honored to be considered for these leadership positions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the committee and the entire Congress to ensure we leverage our opportunities and also address our challenges. Chairman Burr, thank you 

for this opportunity to be here this morning. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:] 

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15 MARCH 2018 

LTG PAUL M. NAKASONE 

SSCI NOMINATION HEARING- OPENING REMARKS 

Chairman Burr, Vice-Chairman Warner, and distinguished members of the Committee, I 

am honored to testify here today for my nomination as Director of the National Security 

Agency, and Chief, Central Security Service. 

1 want to thank President Trump, Secretary Mattis, Director Coats, and General Dunford 

for their confidence in nominating me for these important positions. 

I'd like to also thank my wife Susan for being here. I owe much of my success to her 

love and support throughout nearly 25 years of marriage. Susan and I are joined today 

by our children David and Joseph. We're tremendously proud of them, as well as our 

children Sarah and Daniel, who are away at college and couldn't make it here today. 

I want to thank Admiral Michael Rogers for his 36 years of commissioned service to our 

Nation, and for leading NSA during a time of incredible transformation and rapid growth. 

I thank him and his wife Dana for all they have done in service to our Nation. 

I commissioned in the Army over 31 years ago as an intelligence officer, and for the 

past three decades have served in intelligence and leadership positions both at home 

and abroad, in peace and in war. 

If confirmed for this position, this will be my fourth assignment to NSA. In my previous 

assignments at the Agency, I have always been impressed by the phrases that greet 

everyone who enters the building: "Defend the Nation; Secure the Future." These 

simple directives capture the absolutely critical role the National Security Agency serves 

to support our military and senior policy makers while safeguarding our freedoms. 

I know that the National Security Agency is a special member of our Intelligence 

Community and of unique importance in the defense of our Nation. Throughout the 

Agency's 65 years of service, one constant has remained-the quality of the people 

who work there. These men and women are national treasures and they are engaged in 

missions that can only be called, one-of-a-kind. If confirmed, I know this workforce will 

be the foundation of the NSA's future and continued success. My focus will begin and 

end with them. 

Throughout my career, I have been both a generator and consumer of NSA intelligence 

products, and know first-hand the critical role the Agency plays as both a combat 

support and signals intelligence agency. The importance of delivering accurate, reliable, 

and timely intelligence products cannot be overstated, and if confirmed I commit to 
8 

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upholding the high reputation of the Agency as a provider of objective, mission-critical 

signals intelligence in support of our military and our government. 

I recognize that our Nation's adversaries continue to pose threats and posture 

themselves to reduce our global advantage. In light of this, the importance of an 

effective National Security Agency continues to be paramount to our national defense. 

I also recognize that we are at the edge of the technology frontier for our Nation. The 

future that the next Director will face presents challenges and opportunities from rapid 

technological evolution including machine learning, artificial intelligence, and quantum 

computing, as well as the growing capabilities of the technology industry. If confirmed, I 

know that a strong public-private partnership with our Nation's private sector will be 

needed to ensure this country benefits from the leading-edge technology being 

developed and implemented today and into the future. 

Finally, I recognize that this nomination is to lead both U.S. Cyber Command and the 

NSA. Although the co-location and cooperation of the two powerful organizations has 

been critical to their growth, I also see them as two unique entities, with their own 

identities, authorities, and oversight mechanisms. I am committed to assessing the 

needs of both to optimize their individual success in the best defense of our Nation. 

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Agency's intelligence customers can continue to rely 

upon timely and accurate products, delivered with integrity, to ensure we maintain an 

advantage over increasingly adaptive adversaries. Equally, I will always ensure the 

National Security Agency upholds full compliance with our laws and the protection of 

our Constitutional rights. 

In closing, I am deeply honored to be considered for these leadership positions. If 

confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee and the entire Congress 

to ensure we leverage our opportunities and also address our challenges. Chairman 

Burr, thank you for the opportunity to be here this morning. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 
9 

Chairman BURR. General, thank you for that statement. Thank 

you for your service to the country. One could leave with what you 

have accomplished, with a great career; but I think greater things 

are ahead of us for you and for this country. And we’re grateful for 

your willingness and your family’s willingness to take this next 

chapter. 

Before we begin, I’d like to advise members that, pursuant to 

Senate Resolution 400, the committee received this nomination on 

referral from the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 March 

2018 and we have 30 calendar days within which to report this 

nomination to the full Senate. It is my intention to move to a committee vote on this nomination as soon as we possibly can. Therefore, for planning purposes, if any members wish to submit questions for the record after today’s hearing, please do so by close of 

business today. 

With that, we will go into the five-minute round by seniority, and 

I’ll recognize myself first. 

General, leaks of classified information this committee takes very 

seriously; and we believe it puts sensitive sources and methods at 

risk and can in many cases cause irreparable damage to our national security. Our committee has already taken action in the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018 by imposing enhanced penalties on those convicted of unauthorized disclosures. If 

confirmed, how do you plan to address the security of sensitive and 

classified information at the agency? 

General NAKASONE. Mr. Chairman, the safeguard of our national 

secrets, the safeguard of our capabilities, is one of the most important things the next director will continue to address. If confirmed, 

my intent is to look to make sure that the ‘‘Secure the Enterprise’’ 

and the ‘‘Secure the Network’’ initiatives that NSA has undertaken 

to date are timely, are accurate, are on target, to ensure that we 

continue to have the safeguard and security of our national treasures. 

With that being said, I would also add, Mr. Chairman, that there 

are two elements that I see as we look long-term to this issue. First 

of all is continuing to hire great people that work at the NSA, not 

only hiring them but also training them, developing them, and ensuring that their long-term careers with the NSA are well tended 

to. 

The second thing, though, is we need to also understand that 

there are control mechanisms that we as an agency need to continue to look at to ensure that we have the ability to not only safeguard our network, but also secure our environment. 

Chairman BURR. General, do I have your commitment that, if 

such a leak happens, that you will, as timely as you can, notify the 

committee? And will you continually notify the committee on 

progress that NSA makes towards preventing and deterring unauthorized leaks? 

General NAKASONE. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you. 

General, the committee Intel Authorization Act of 2018 and fiscal 

year 2017 included provisions to enhance NSA’s ability to recruit 

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pensated less than their private sector counterparts. How do you 

plan to recruit and retain those top STEM candidates, especially 

given that there is that compensation gap between government and 

the private sector? 

General NAKASONE. Mr. Chairman, first of all thank you to the 

committee for the Intelligence Authorization Act. I think that is a 

very, very important element, important ability for the next director to be able to leverage in the future. 

As I take a look at NSA’s workforce and my previous experience, 

the one thing that sets NSA apart is their mission. I believe the 

most critical thing that we have to continue to do at the National 

Security Agency is to ensure our people understand and are able 

to work this very important mission: Defend the Nation, secure the 

future. This is what I think is essential for us and is our advantage 

as we look to the future. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also say as we look to the future we have 

to continue broad abilities to recruit from a very, very diverse population, academia, industry, inside our government. I think this is 

critical that we can continue to attract our best and brightest people. 

Chairman BURR. General, are you familiar with NSA21? 

General NAKASONE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am. 

Chairman BURR. Would you just briefly comment on your views 

on that initiative, which is to prepare for the 21st century a more 

efficient, effective NSA? 

General NAKASONE. Mr. Chairman, NSA21, as I understand it, 

the largest reorganization of the agency since 2000. And that’s significant if you consider the fact that 70 percent of the agency has 

been hired since 9/11. It was designed to improve, obviously, and 

focus on people, integration, and innovation. It was designed to address a number of changes in our environment, changes to our networks, changes to competition for our workforce, changes to our 

budget. 

I would say to date, it has just been instantiated at the end of 

2017. And so, if confirmed, I would ask if I could have a bit of time 

to take a look, evaluate what has been done, look at what has been 

successful and what may need assessment and continue that dialogue with the committee. 

Chairman BURR. You’ve got a commitment to do that. 

With that, my time’s expired. The Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, General, congratulations on your nomination and 

thank you for your service. One of the things I think this committee prides itself on is our strong working relationship with all 

components of the intelligence community. And as you’re aware, we 

have had an ongoing investigation into Russian activities stemming 

from the 2016 election. For the record, will you commit to ensuring 

that this committee will be provided with all the information requested pursuant to our ongoing Russia investigations? 

General NAKASONE. I will, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you. 

At our last open hearing, we had all of the heads of all the principal intelligence community agencies. Every one of them, including 

your predecessor Admiral Rogers, reconfirmed their support for the 

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January 2017 assessment that Russia interfered in our last elections. 

I want to get in, for the record: Do you agree with that January 

2017 IC assessment, that Russia interfered in our 2016 elections? 

And the second part, editorial comment here: In light of their success in those efforts, do you expect further interference by Russia 

in our elections and, for that matter, the elections of our allies? 

General NAKASONE. Mr. Vice Chairman, I agree with the 2017 

assessment. I think the Director of National Intelligence has said 

it best with regards to future actions of the Russians. And that is, 

‘‘Unless the calculus changes, that we should expect continued 

issues.’’ 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, we would look forward to working 

with you on making sure—this committee is going to have a public 

hearing next week on this issue of election security, and I’m very 

proud of members of both sides of the aisle and how hard they’ve 

worked on that. And we, if confirmed, would look forward to working with you on this issue of election security. 

One of the things that I’ve found and believe is that we don’t 

have, I think, a clearly articulated cyber doctrine at this point that 

not only defends our government, but also deters particularly nearpeer adversaries. I think I could better articulate our strategy visa`-vis second-level states like North Korea, Iran, and terrorist 

threats like ISIS. But I am concerned with near-peer adversaries 

we don’t have that clear cyber doctrine. 

And I know you’re just coming into this position, but who do you 

think in the Administration is in charge of developing a cyber doctrine policy that would deter, whether it’s Chinese theft of our intellectual property or Russia misinformation and disinformation 

campaigns. Who’s going to be in charge of developing that doctrine 

and where do you think it stands at this point? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, ultimately I would anticipate that 

strategies such as this would come from the Executive Branch, perhaps the National Security Council. However, I would anticipate 

that all elements of the government would contribute to the strategy. 

In terms of, if confirmed, my role, I would anticipate that I would 

provide my insights to both the Joint Staff and the Department of 

Defense as this strategy is developed. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, with your strong intelligence 

background, I hope we can count on you to be part of that. I think 

it is time that we have that clearly articulated doctrine. And again, 

this is not a criticism in this case of the current Administration. 

This has been a problem, I think, that has plagued our Nation for 

more than a decade. 

One of the areas that I constantly come back to and I think is 

an example of where we need a doctrine is with how we deal with 

the dramatic increases of devices that are connected to the internet, the so-called Internet of Things. We’re roughly at about 10 billion devices connected now. That number is estimated to go to 20 

to 25 billion within the next five or six years. Matter of fact, the 

Director of the DIA, General Ashley, emphasized that our weakest 

technology components, mobile devices and the Internet of Things, 

was an area of exploitation for potential adversaries. 

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How do you think we would go about securing devices connected 

to the internet? And do you think that there ought to be at least 

a basic policy put in place that would say that the Federal Government’s purchasing power ought to be used with some determination 

that we only would buy devices that, for example, are patchable or 

don’t have embedded pass codes so that we don’t, frankly, embed 

within our Federal Government enormous new vulnerabilities? 

General NAKASONE. So, Senator, certainly awareness, as you talk 

about, the Internet of Things is very important for all of us to understand both the opportunities and certainly the challenges here. 

I think there will likely be, obviously, movement that will have to 

come from the private sector on this. 

In terms of policy decisions, I would defer that to the Department of Defense as they weigh in to this. But my sense is that we 

have to have a very candid discussion about the growth, the explosion of the Internet of Things, and most importantly the impact 

that it could have on our economy and certainly our national security. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, again, I think you can play a critically important role here. I just would hate for us five years from 

now to realize we’ve bought literally billions of devices, just within 

the Federal Government, and they have actually increased our vulnerability. Thank you for your responses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. General, let’s just start where Senator Warner 

did. You know, Admiral Rogers, who we all have great respect for, 

got a lot of attention recently, I believe on the House side, saying 

he’d been given no new directions as to how to deal with things like 

Russian interference in the elections. So let’s—let’s take that in 

two directions. 

One is, do you need any new direction, in your view, to deal with 

defending against those kinds of attacks? Do you have all the defensive authorization you need? Not whether you have all the 

equipment and staff you need, but do you—do you have all the authorization you need to defend our institutions against outside aggression? 

General NAKASONE. So, Senator, certainly in terms of defending 

the Department of Defense networks, I think that there are all the 

authorizations and policies and authorities that are necessary. 

Senator BLUNT. What do you need about the non-department? 

NSA, what if somebody’s attacking the—the State Department or 

some other? 

General NAKASONE. So certainly, if confirmed as the Director of 

the National Security Agency, the authorities for the national security systems falls within the purview of the Director of NSA and 

I believe has the authorities on which he would be able to execute 

that defense. 

Senator BLUNT. Do you need more authorities to work with State 

and local election officials? 

General NAKASONE. So certainly, there would need to be a policy 

decision, Senator, that would indicate that that there would be, you 

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13 

know, more authorities for—for Cyber Command or NSA to be able 

to do something like that. 

Senator BLUNT. But for the Federal Government and for the military, your defensive role is clearly understood? 

General NAKASONE. So certainly for—on the NSA side for the national security systems, it is understood; and on the CYBERCOM 

side for the defense of DOD networks, certainly understood. 

Senator BLUNT. And I think we all, and I believe this was Senator Warner’s question, well, worded maybe a little bit differently: 

How do we develop a more well-understood response, an offensive 

guideline, if you would? How do we—what do we need to do to be 

sure that our adversaries know that there’s a price to be paid, beyond just us trying to subvert their efforts to get into our networks? Do we have an offensive strategy and do we need one? 

General NAKASONE. So, Senator, I think both Vice Chairman 

Warner and yourself speak to this idea of a strategy: What is the 

strategy for the Nation in terms of cyberspace? I think that strategy being developed in terms of how we defend ourselves, certainly, 

is important, and it would lay out roles, responsibilities, functions 

of the major elements of our government. 

And I think that that is obviously one of the things that would 

help both internally for the elements of our government, but also 

externally, as you say, to provide a set of left and right boundaries 

perhaps for our adversaries to understand. 

Senator BLUNT. Well, I think a determination to create where 

those boundaries are and what we might do may need to be made 

outside of your agency. But inside your agency, I can’t imagine a 

more important person to be at the table when we try to determine 

what—how that—how that determination could actually be implemented. I think there’s a strong sense that there’s too much of no 

price to be paid at this point by people who try to either steal our 

intellectual property, or interfere with elections, or whatever else 

they might try to do. 

The other area where I think you may have to look for an even 

more expansive role is the acquisition of equipment, signal intelligence equipment, by other agencies. I think you have a role to 

play there in one of the many hats you’ll be wearing in this job. 

Do you have concerns that other Federal agencies may be buying 

equipment that could in the future be troublesome for us? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I certainly have concerns. I think 

the recent statements by the Department of Homeland Security 

and their directives with regards to select antivirus companies 

throughout the world and the ensuing National Defense Authorization Act that prohibited the use of select antivirus products within 

our government is very, very important for the future. 

Senator BLUNT. Well, again, I think you bring the information to 

the table on that. 

And my last question would be something we’ve talked about before. Particularly at the Cyber Command level, what’s the value of 

the Reserve force or the National Guard? I know Missouri has a 

really good cyber unit. I think cyber units in the Reserves, back to 

maybe the Chairman’s question about how we have the talent we 

need: How do we bring that part-time talent to use to our benefit, 

if that’s a good idea in your opinion? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

14 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I think it’s a tremendous idea. In 

my current role as the Commander of Army Cyber, our Army is 

building 21 cyber protection teams, 10 in the U.S. Army Reserve 

and 11 in the National Guard. What you indicate is critical for us 

as we look to increase the best and brightest of our Nation being 

able to commit to the defense of our Nation in cyberspace. The 

Guard, the Reserve, have tremendous talent that we look to in the 

future to provide us what we often term the strategic depth for our 

Nation. And so very, very pleased to serve with those fine Americans and hopefully in the future continue to be able to incorporate 

and to promote their service for our Nation. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 

Chairman and colleagues, just a quick comment before we go to our 

nominee. The nomination of Gina Haspel to head the CIA comes 

at an especially momentous time. Senator Heinrich and I have 

asked that certain aspects of her background be declassified so that 

the American people can see what sort of person might head the 

agency at a particularly important time. I’ll just wrap up this point 

by saying I hope members will support what Senator Heinrich and 

I are calling for with respect to declassification. 

Mr. Nakasone, a historic day because, as I understand it, you are 

the first nominee from the NSA to be considered at this committee; 

and we welcome you; and let me begin with some questions. 

In 2001, then-President Bush directed the NSA to conduct an illegal, warrantless wiretapping program. Neither the public nor the 

full Intelligence Committee learned about this program until it was 

revealed in the press. Speaking personally, I learned about it from 

the newspapers. 

So there is a lot riding on how you might address a similar situation, and we’ve already noted the history of your being here. If 

there was a form of surveillance that currently requires approval 

by the FISA Court and you were asked to avoid the court based 

on some kind of secret legal analysis, what would you do? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, thank you for that question. First, 

I would offer, with regards to the situation that you describe, I 

would obviously have a tremendous amount of legal advice that 

would be provided to me, if confirmed, by those in the agency, by 

those in the department, by those obviously that are in the Director 

of National Intelligence. 

At the end of the day, I think that one of the most important 

things is that we have the conversation between the National Security Agency and this oversight committee to understand—— 

Senator WYDEN. Let me just stop it right there, so I can learn 

something that didn’t take place before. You would, if asked, tell 

the entire committee that you had been asked to do that? 

General NAKASONE. So, Senator, I would say that I would consult 

with the committee. I would obviously ensure—— 

Senator WYDEN. Would you inform—when you say ‘‘consult,’’ you 

would inform us that you had been asked to do this? 

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General NAKASONE. So, again, Senator, I would consult with the 

committee and have that discussion. I think that one of the important things that I have seen is the relationship between the National Security Agency and this committee. My intent would continue that, that discussion. 

But at the end of the day, Senator, I would say that there are 

two things that I would do: I would follow the law; and I would ensure, if confirmed, that the agency follows the law. 

Senator WYDEN. First of all, that’s encouraging, because that was 

not the case back in 2001. In 2001, the President said: We’re going 

to operate a program that clearly was illegal, illegal. You’ve told us 

now you’re not going to do anything illegal. That’s a plus. And 

you’ve told us that you would consult with us if you were ever 

asked to do something like that. So I appreciate your answer. 

Now let me move next to encryption. The widespread consensus 

from encryption experts is that tech companies can’t modify their 

encryption to permit law enforcement access to Americans’ private 

communications and data without also helping sophisticated foreign government hackers get in. You are as familiar with the capabilities of our adversaries as anybody. Do you agree or disagree 

with those experts? 

General NAKASONE. So, Senator, in terms of encryption I would 

begin with saying this is something that for 65 years NSA has been 

at the forefront of doing, encrypting our national security systems, 

our data, our information, our networks. What has changed these 

days is the fact that the power of encryption, particularly in the 

private sector, has put law enforcement at times, even with a court 

order, at risk of being able to—be able to investigate or perhaps 

even prosecute a crime. 

I would offer that for the future this is one of those areas that, 

if confirmed, I have much to learn and—— 

Senator WYDEN. My time—my time is up, General. Just a yes or 

no answer to the question with respect to what experts are saying. 

Experts are saying that the tech companies can’t modify their 

encryption to permit law enforcement access to America’s private 

communications without the bad guys getting in, too. Do you disagree with the experts? That’s just a yes or no. 

General NAKASONE. So I would offer, Senator, that it’s a conditional yes; that there are times when—— 

Senator WYDEN. Right. That is—that’s encouraging as well. I 

look forward to working with you in the days ahead. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. General, thank you. Thanks for your service 

in the past and I appreciate you stepping up into this role. The 

nomination process is not a fun process. It’s not someone, anyone, 

wakes up and says: Gosh, I’d like to go through Senate confirmation, because of the length of the investigation, the information 

you’ve already put out, and the questioning time. So I just want 

to tell you, I appreciate you doing it and stepping up to work 

through the long, difficult process. 

Help me understand the role of collaboration between the NSA 

and commercial entities and their networks, critical infrastructure 

and their networks, just the communication in trying to be able to 

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determine real threats that are there that we may face domestically or internationally? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, in terms of collaboration, so NSA 

for many, many years has been at the forefront obviously of understanding advances of our—of our adversaries. That reporting, that 

communication with other elements of our government, whether or 

not it’s the Federal Bureau of Investigation or it’s the Department 

of Homeland Security, has been critical to inform other members 

of our critical infrastructure and key resources. 

I see this as an element that must continue into the future and 

a sharing and integration that’s important for the overall defense 

of our Nation. 

Senator LANKFORD. How do we get that faster? What does it take 

to have faster collaboration? 

General NAKASONE. So I think faster collaboration is driven by, 

you know, several things. One is a demand signal, a demand signal 

that’s coming from not only other elements of our government, private sector. I would also say that it’s—it’s also part of supply, being 

able to grow a number of analysts and an ability to continue to report. I think those are two of the key elements, Senator. 

Senator LANKFORD. So let’s talk about this wonderful term that’s 

thrown around NSA all the time, the ‘‘dual hat,’’ working with U.S. 

Cyber Command and then also directing the NSA. You made a 

comment in your opening statement about that, that that has been 

and will continue. But you also made a comment that you see those 

as unique entities. 

Help me understand a little bit. Are there walls between those 

two entities, or are they just distinct roles, or how do you see them 

as unique entities? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, if I might begin with the dual hat 

discussion. In terms of the dual hat arrangement, I’m not predisposed in terms of whether that arrangement stays or ends. 

Senator LANKFORD. Right. 

General NAKASONE. I know that the President and Congress both 

have spoken on it, the President in August of 2017 and then Congress in the NDAA that listed a series of six conditions that both 

the Secretary and the Chairman must attest to before the dual hat 

is terminated. 

It’s my assessment that what we should do at the end of the day 

is make a determination that is in the best interest of the Nation. 

That’s the key, critical piece of it. If confirmed, my intent would be 

to spend the first 90 days looking at that, providing an assessment 

to both the Secretary and the Chairman, and then moving forward 

from there. 

Senator LANKFORD. Okay. Would you allow us to be in that conversation as well, as far as your assessment? 

General NAKASONE. Certainly, after talking with the secretary 

and the Chairman, yes, Senator. 

Senator LANKFORD. That’s fine. That’d be just fine. 

So talk to me a little bit about this issue about cyber doctrine. 

That is something this committee has talked about often. It has 

been something that has been a frustration. I’m just trying to see 

who is giving recommendations to the President on how we respond, the speed of our response. Attribution for where attacks 

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came from are difficult to do, as you know extremely well. But, if 

we don’t get a quick response to that and individuals aren’t able 

to make decisions with accurate, timely information, it makes it 

much tougher. 

So the question that we always have is who makes the call? Who 

is it that presents the set of ideas to the President to say, here are 

the options that you have? Where does—where do you expect that 

comes from? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, if I might begin with the strategy 

or the doctrine piece and then, with regard to the options, address 

that as well. I do believe that an overall strategy for how the Nation is going to defend itself in cyberspace is very important. What 

are the roles of the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation and, of course, the Department of Homeland Security? How do we ensure that there’s 

cross talk, that there’s obviously roles and responsibilities that 

are—that are fully delineated? I think that’s an important piece. 

With regards to options in the future, if confirmed I would see 

that as my role as Commander of U.S. Cyber Command to prove 

a series of options within cyberspace that the Secretary of Defense 

and the President can consider. I would offer, however, that—that 

that may not be the only set of options that are necessary. When 

we look at the strength of this Nation, the Nation has tremendous 

strengths diplomatically, informationally, economically, and those 

might also be options presented. 

Senator LANKFORD. But who’s the clearinghouse to be able to 

gather those and be the final presentation to the President? 

General NAKASONE. So, in terms of military options, Senator, I 

think that would be myself to the Secretary of Defense and then 

the President. 

Senator LANKFORD. Okay. That’s what we need to hear. Thank 

you very much. 

Chairman BURR. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Following-up on that question, I think this is one of the most important areas of policy. Just moments ago, we received information 

that the United States Government has imposed additional sanctions on Russia in response to the activities in 2016. The question 

is, are sanctions enough? Sanctions are important, but the question 

is sanctions always, by definition, occur after the attack. The best 

attack is the one that doesn’t occur. 

That gets to the question of deterrence. And I hope, as we discussed in the Armed Services Committee, one of the tasks you will 

take on is doing just what you said, of developing options that 

would be available to us, that we could talk about as deterrence. 

Your thoughts on the importance of having some deterrent capability, as well as after-the-fact punishment capability? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I agree in terms of having a range 

of options, and I would certainly see, if confirmed, my role to provide a series of cyber options that might be used in a deterrent 

role. 

But I think it’s important to state that it’s not only cyber or military options that may be the most effective. And, in fact it may be 

less effective than other options that might be considered. And so 

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I think that that’s an important piece that, you know, as we consider the future, what are the range of options that might include 

the entire government is critical for us. 

Senator KING. And I agree. I’m not—I’m not suggesting that it 

has to be cyber for cyber or military for military. But the point is, 

adversaries have to know they will pay a price for attacking us, 

whether it’s cyber or kinetic. 

General NAKASONE. I agree, Senator. 

Senator KING. And also, it was mentioned in this morning’s press 

conference apparently, and I just have one sentence on this, the 

Administration has warned the country about potential attacks on 

critical infrastructure, particularly the electric grid. My concern is 

that the electric grid is not only vulnerable; but, from public reports, that there are already efforts to plant malware or to seed 

malware in SCATA systems, et cetera. Is this something that 

you’re familiar with and are concerned about? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, certainly the entire defense of our, 

you know, electrical system within our critical infrastructures is of 

great concern to me. I am aware that there has been reporting with 

regards to elements within—within our ICS and SCATA systems. 

That’s something that should concern all of us. 

Senator KING. Do you see part of your job at NSA as working 

with the private sector? Because this is not—it’s not like there’s an 

attack on an air base. There might be an attack on the financial 

system or on the electrical system in the Midwest. And it seems to 

me this is an area, it’s sort of new territory, if you will, where there 

has to be a closer relationship between the private sector and government. 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I certainly agree with you in terms 

of the new relationship. If we consider cyberspace, 90 percent of, 

you know, our critical infrastructure is held within the private sector. 

Senator KING. Right. 

General NAKASONE. Currently right now, you know, the work 

that DHS does in terms of informing the private sector in the critical infrastructure is critical for us. In terms of the future, you 

know, I would see that in looking at, you know, if we’re understanding what’s going on in the sector, obviously a rich dialogue 

has to occur between, you know, the National Security Agency and 

those that—that have this type of technology. 

Senator KING. Does that dialogue exist today? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I would—I would have to defer on 

that. That’s something that, given my current position in Army 

Cyber, I’m not sure. 

Senator KING. But I take it if confirmed for this position, that 

dialogue is something you would seek to—to establish? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, certainly a dialogue with industry, 

but I would also say a dialogue with, you know, our universities 

and academia, our dialogue with a partnership. I think those are 

all kind of components that you have to have if you are going to 

lead a place like the National Security Agency. 

Senator KING. I’m changing the subject entirely in the few seconds I have left. I just heard a new term, ‘‘STEMorrhage.’’ That’s 

a hemorrhage of STEM people. And that that’s something that is 

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occurring at the NSA. Is this something—how can we compete to 

retain and attract the strongest STEM talent, which is what we 

need, in competition with Silicon Valley or the private sector? And 

is this a priority that you see as important in your mission? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, in terms of priorities if confirmed, 

I can’t imagine a more important priority than talent. In terms of 

STEM, again I thank the committee for their support for, you 

know, future pay increases for STEM candidates within the National Security Agency. 

The way that I would assess that we have to look at it is we have 

to begin with: What’s the mission of the agency? Because for many, 

many years the agency has been able to recruit and train and retain the best in our Nation based upon the idea of being able to 

secure our Nation and being able to defend it. I think that still is 

an advantage that the agency has. I think that appeals to people. 

And I would also offer that NSA is a place where technological 

advances in innovation occur all the time. And I think that that is 

of great interest to our young people. 

Senator KING. I hope and I understand that this will be a priority, because ultimately talent is the ultimate competitive advantage. And I commend you for your willingness to take on what is 

a very important challenge in our country. Thank you, General. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General, for your appearance. Congratulations 

on your nomination. I’d like to discuss with you the threat posed 

to the U.S. national security by Chinese telecom companies like 

Huawei, ZTE, China Unicom, China Telecom. I believe this threat 

is grave. 

I’ve introduced legislation that would prohibit the U.S. Government from using Huawei or ZTE or even companies that use them. 

I think there’s a good chance we’ll pass that into law this year. 

Last month, at our Worldwide Threats Hearing, I asked all of the 

intelligence agency directors that appeared before us—DNI Coats, 

Director Wray, General Ashley, Director Cardillo, Admiral Rogers, 

Director Pompeo, Secretary-designate Pompeo—if they would use 

Huawei, ZTE, China Unicom, China Telecom products. They all 

said they would not. Would you use any products from those companies, General? 

General NAKASONE. I would not, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. Okay. You’re a special case because you’re 

about to be the director of the signals intelligence agency of our 

government. So would you recommend to any of your family or 

friends that are just normal private citizens, that they use products 

from those companies? 

General NAKASONE. I would not, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you for that. 

President Trump two days ago, using the powers that he has 

under current law and from the CFIUS’s recommendation, stopped 

the attempted takeover of Qualcomm by Broadcom. It’s no secret 

that that’s done in part because Qualcomm and Huawei are in a 

competition to establish the worldwide standards and protocols for 

the 5G network. 

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The intelligence community, though not a member of CFIUS, is 

an ex officio member. And on something like that, it would probably be assigned to the DNI who would task it out to, most likely, 

the NSA to give advice. Do you think CFIUS and the President 

made the right decision to stop the attempted takeover of 

Qualcomm by Broadcom? 

General NAKASONE. So, Senator, I’m aware of the situation based 

upon what I’ve read in the public reports. I don’t have any other 

background on this. But what I would say is our microelectronics 

industry is critical for us for the future. If you consider what 5G 

will bring to this Nation, 100 times speeds of what we’re experiencing today, it’s hard not to imagine the importance of ensuring 

that we have confidence in our microelectronics industry for the future. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

I am somewhat concerned that some of our allies don’t share our 

concerns about Huawei and ZTE. Can I ask you, if confirmed, that 

you’ll consult with the Five Eyes partners and other partners, 

South Korea and Japan, to try to convey our government’s concerns 

about Huawei and ZTE? 

General NAKASONE. I certainly will, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. And maybe if we could talk about that, if confirmed, at one of your early hearings. I know you just committed 

90 days in to look at the dual hat issue. If maybe 90 days in we 

could talk about that in a classified setting would be fine. 

A somewhat similar topic is the counterintelligence and security 

threats that could be posed by certain GPS-reliant devices, things 

like Fitbits and smartphones. There was a recent story in The 

Washington Post I suspect you saw, about soldiers using Fitbits 

around the world. Secretary Mattis, I thought wisely, ordered a review of DOD policies and procedures regarding these devices. 

Senator Blumenthal and I also sent Secretary Mattis a letter 

asking that he include other devices, particularly Google and Android devices, as part of that review, because it appears that 

Google and Android send quite a bit of information from their devices back home to the mothership. That means they track very detailed user information and precise location in order to push people 

advertisements. So, for instance, if you drive past the same grocery 

store or department store every single day, pretty soon you are getting advertisements from those locations. 

How would you view the privacy and counterintelligence threats 

posed by devices like these Fitbits and smartphones that are tracking locations, revealing patterns of life, and send them back to 

headquarters? Privacy for our private citizens, but counterintelligence for our government employees, and especially intelligence 

officers and military personnel? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I think you accurately describe the 

environment upon which we live today. This is commander’s business with regards to, in the Army, our operational security. Ten, 

15, 20 years ago, we were concerned about what we said on phones. 

Today, we’re concerned about what our soldiers wear, where they’re 

talking, where they are able to be monitored. And I think that this 

is indicative of how we have to approach the future, which is we 

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are technologically informed; we also have to be informed for our 

operational security as well. 

Senator COTTON. Any thoughts on how we can balance the legitimate uses of those technologies? I mean, most soldiers are living 

on a limited budget, so it’s valuable for them to have advertisements pushed to them saying, you know, when a restaurant is offering a special on the way home, or if a grocery store is having— 

has some coupons, and things like that. But obviously, these do 

pose a security risk. Any thoughts on how to balance those? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I believe you—you have to begin 

with just understanding what perhaps the threats are out there, 

and understanding, you know, when is it appropriate that civilians 

that are working in a place like the National Security Agency or 

military members within their own formations have their phones 

or are wearing Fitbits. Is there—are there places where they 

shouldn’t have those things on? And, I think that that’s, perhaps, 

the most important piece that we have to have is realization, and 

then an understanding of those operational security risks. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, General. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

And to follow-up on Senator Cotton’s questions: Will you commit 

to coming back to our committee after doing an assessment of the 

vulnerabilities that are created by the use of these smart devices 

by our troops, and give us some suggestion about what might be 

a more appropriate policy? 

General NAKASONE. Certainly—I’m sorry, Senator. I would welcome the opportunity to continue this dialogue on that. 

Senator HARRIS. Okay. Thank you. 

I’d like to talk with you about insider threats. According to the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as of October of 2015 

4.3 million Americans held security clearances. Some of the most 

damaging national security breaches in recent years, however, have 

not come from traditional spies, but insiders at our own agencies. 

Unfortunately, several of these incidents happened at NSA, and I 

am thinking three in particular that received a lot of attention and 

did a lot of damage. Have you studied what happened in those 

cases? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, to date in my current role I have 

not studied. I would offer that I think what you point out here is 

very important, that we considered most of our threats from external actors. We thought that a foreign nation was, you know, our 

greatest threat. We have to reconsider that, particularly as we look 

at our networks, our data, our weapon systems. We have to have 

a whole spectrum of insider and, certainly, external threats as well. 

Senator HARRIS. And will you commit to doing an assessment 

and reporting back to us on what additional steps might be taken 

to prevent that insider threat? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I do know that the NSA has undertaken a number of different initiatives, ‘‘Secure the Network’’ and 

‘‘Secure the Enterprise.’’ If confirmed, I will certainly commit to 

digging deep into that, understanding what has been done, what 

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ture, and then continuing that dialogue with this committee, if 

that’s okay. 

Senator HARRIS. Yes. And have you had any experience dealing 

with this at Army Cyber Command? 

General NAKASONE. So, Senator, in terms of experience, I would 

say that one of the things that we have been very, very vigilant 

about is just understanding the threats, again, to our network, our 

data and our weapons systems. I can’t think of a specific example, 

but I will tell you that it is something that we are obviously 

trained on and think about very, very often. 

Senator HARRIS. And I want to talk—there’s been discussion with 

you already, but I’d like to get a little deeper into the issue of the 

talent drain issue and recruiting. There’s a report that suggests 

that since 2015, the NSA has lost several hundred employees, including engineers and data scientists. 

We know that we’re going to be outpaced by the private sector 

in terms of salaries. So to your point, people who come to us to 

serve the public will do it because they actually care about public 

service and working on behalf of our government. But have you 

given any thought to how we might engage the private sector workforce—and I’m thinking of the folks of Silicon Valley—in creative 

ways that might include, for example, bringing people on who cannot join the IC full-time? 

Have you thought about that and what would that look like? I 

think it would be challenging, but there must be some creative 

thoughts out there about we could engage folks, even if they don’t 

come full-time. 

General NAKASONE. Senator, I have thought about that. And, you 

know, I take example of what NSA has done to date with their own 

Point of Presence, which is an initiative to be in Silicon Valley and 

one of their early initiatives, even before DIUx. I think it’s a very 

good example of how we need to think about the future. 

You indicate one way that we might look at in bringing a larger 

population to our mission. I would offer, one of the things that I 

most admired about the agency is that they are looking at a very, 

very broad range of capabilities, people that have even disabilities 

that, you know, that need to be able to work, and have the infrastructure that will support that. I think that’s tremendously important for us as we look at a broader supply, a broader talent base, 

that we need to be able to prosecute our mission. 

Senator HARRIS. And I really appreciate that you mentioned the 

disabled community as part of the focus and what should be the 

focus about how we are thinking about the need to be more diverse 

in terms of our recruitment and retention policies. So, thank you 

for that. 

And then election security. Admiral Rogers recently testified, and 

I’m going to quote, ‘‘What I see on the Cyber Command side leads 

me to believe that if we don’t change the dynamic here, that this 

is going to continue and 2016 won’t be viewed as isolated.’’ And 

then he went on to add, ‘‘We’re taking steps, but we’re probably not 

doing enough’’ on the issue of election security. Do you agree with 

that statement? 

General NAKASONE. Senator, in my current role I do not have, 

obviously, the background of what Admiral Rogers was speaking to. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

23 

That’s not part of my current responsibilities, but certainly, if confirmed, one of the most important things that I would face in the 

new term, to learn more about this and make that assessment. 

Senator HARRIS. And I’d ask that you would make that a priority 

as soon as you are confirmed, expecting that you will be, because 

obviously folks are starting to vote now and the 2018 election is 

upon us. So, thank you for that. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator. 

General, we have exhausted the members that have questions 

here today. I have asked members to submit questions for the 

record by the end of business today. And I would once again say 

to designees, please try to meet that deadline. 

I would also say to you, if you would respond to those questions 

for the record as timely a manner as you can it would benefit us 

greatly to set the schedule for moving your nomination out of the 

committee and falling within the time frame that we’re working 

with with the Senate Defense Committee. 

It strikes me you’ve been nominated at a very pivotal time where 

technology, as the Vice Chairman pointed out, is changing annually 

the same way technology used to change literally decade by decade. 

And I think this is a tremendous opportunity and it is a tremendous challenge. I think you’re the right person at the right time. 

And I think your ability to understand whether that technological change is an asset to you or a liability—and I think that 

was in the crux of Senator Wyden’s question about encryption, and 

it sort of depends on which window you’re looking at in the same 

room. 

It’s tough for me to admit that you’re the right person at the 

right time because I never thought that I would say that about 

somebody that had—a soldier that had never rotated through a 

North Carolina facility. 

General NAKASONE. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman BURR. But I do want to say to you that we’re grateful 

for your service to the country. We look forward to your leadership 

at NSA. The relationship between this committee and that agency 

has never been better than it is right now, and I think that that’s 

because it’s been earned on both sides, the agency and the committee. 

The agency has provided us an unprecedented access to its products as we’ve worked for the last 14 months through a very difficult 

investigation, which is distinctly different from the oversight role, 

traditional oversight role of the committee. And I would ask you, 

as long as that investigation continues, that it’s important on your 

end that you distinguish the request for the investigative portion 

from the oversight, ongoing oversight and real-time oversight of the 

committee, because it will require us to see products that we 

wouldn’t historically ask for and, if we did, we would probably be 

refused. 

But it is essential for this committee to do a thorough and complete review of what has happened to our election system, what has 

happened from a standpoint of phishing operations—I’m not telling 

you anything that you don’t know, given your current role—that 

has been exploited, that will only get worse in the future. Our abilLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

24 

ity to understand that and to not only enhance our defensive capabilities, but to begin, as the Vice Chairman says frequently, to form 

a strategic outline of options that we have, both defensive and offensive, is absolutely important. 

So we put a tremendous amount of emphasis on our ability to get 

this right, and in large measure that’s because of the access that 

the NSA has provided us. And I’m sure that under your leadership 

that will continue. 

General, we’re proud of you. But, more importantly, we’re proud 

of the men and women that every day go to the National Security 

Agency, many of them without any public acknowledgement that 

they work there. It’s not the prettiest campus, as you know. It’s not 

in the easiest place to get to in Northern Virginia and Southern 

Maryland. 

But they go there and they sacrifice salary for a commitment to 

their country. And they provide the foundation for the protection 

and security of the American people. We can’t say enough times to 

them: ‘‘Thank you for what you do.’’ 

We are here as a tool for you, for your successful leadership at 

the NSA that we know will happen. And I hope you will call on 

us anytime we can enhance that role as Director of the National 

Security Agency. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(25) 

Supplemental Material 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

26 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 3 here 28949.003

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

~TED STATES SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 
27 

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SELECT COMMI'ITEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE lJNITED STATES 

SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CQMPLETJON 

BY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 

PART A· BIOGRAPWCAL INFORMATION 

1.. FULLNAME: PauiM.Nakasone 

OTHER NAMES USED: N/A 

2. DATE MID PLACB OF :SlRTa: 

19Novexnber 1963, Saint Paul, MN 

CITIZENSHIP: US 

3. MARITAL STATUS: Married 

4. SPOUSE'S NAMB: Susan S. Nllb:;one 

5. SPOUSE'S MAlDEN NAME IF·AP~LlCABIJ!: Sternberg 

6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN: 

INFORMATION REDACTED 

7. EDUCATION S~CE InGHSCHOOL: 

INS:rmmON DATESA'ITENl:>ED bEOREERECEIVEl) 

.Juo '07 
28 

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Insert offset folio 5 here 28949.005

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITlONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING 

MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITlON, ttrLB OR 

DESCR.ll'TION, LOCA1'ION,AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT). 

EMPLOYER p :.E LOCATICN ~ 

u,s.~y Commanding General, Uniti':!i States .Army Cyber Fort Belvoir, Oct 11$ • Present 

Couunand Virginia 

u.s.A.tmy Commander, Cyber National Mission Force, United FortMel!l'fe; May 14-oet 16 

States Cyber Command Maryland 

U.S.A.rmy D!lputy Comtila11din~ ~(Operations), United 

States -Ann'¥ Cyber Co!l1llllll1d 

Fort Belvoir, Aug 13 -May 14 

Viiginia 

U.S.Anny Director, ~n I>ominanCil Center, later Depu1;y Afgbl!llistan Jun 12-Jun 13 

Chief of~ In~ligence; C1-2,Jiltematiollal 

Security Assistance Force Joint Comman~ 

OPERATION ENDURING F.REEDOM 

U.S. Army Depu.tY Direetor for Infurmation and Cyb~aCil Wl!Shington, .Jun 11 - Jun 12 

Policy, later Deputy Directoi' for Trans·Re.tPonl!l DC 

Po1icv. J-5 Joint Staff 

U.S.Anny .Executive Assistant to lh!l CoiDIPande.r, Unite!i States =e, ;run.IO-JunU 

Cyber Command 

U.S .. Anny Commander, Meade 0pllt'!ltionsCenter, National Fort Meade, Jun Q7 - Jun 10 

Secw:it.v Aaency/Cenl,nil Security Service Mal'}) land 

U.S. Army Stllllent, United States Army War College Carlisle Aug 06-Jun 07 

Bl!ll'IICks, 

PellllSYlvanla 

U.S. Army Chief; In,tillligeuce Plans Division, Office ofthQDepqiy Cl!ief of Staff for Strategy, PI~ and 

Assessmllllt, Ml!lti.-National Fon;e..Jraq, OPERATION 

Intq Jul OS -Jun 06 

IRAQI FREEDOM 

U.S • .Army Assistant Chief of Staff; G-2, 24th Infantry Division Fort Riley, Jun. 04 -MI!Y 05 

<Meehani.~ Kansas 

U.S. Army Commander, 2061h Military Intelligence Bllttalion, Fort Gonion, Jun 02-Jun 04 

Intelligence Grouo. Geontia 

U.S~ .Army tanner, J-2. Joint Staff (Defense Washington, Jul 99 - MI!Y 02 

InteUige.qce Agency} DC 

u;s.Army :Plans Officer, later Operation~ Officer, 50 1st Military RepUblic of JuJ 97 -Inn 99 

Intelligenc:e Brigade, .Eighth United States.ArJIJ.Y Korea 

U.S • .Army Studont, United States Ann;y Conuna!ld and Qenera1 Fort Aug 96- Jun 97 

Staff College Leavenworth, 

Kansas 

U.S. Army Assignments Officer; Mili!ley Intelligence Branch, Alexall<lrla, Feb 94- Jun 96 

United States Total .Army Personnel Command Virginia 

U;S.Anny Collllllli,ndet, A Compan:y, 102d"Military Intelligence Republic. of Jan 93-Jan 94 

Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth Umted·states Korea 

Army 

U.S. Army ASsisUIIltOpenttions Officer, 102dMilitary Republic of Jul92 -.Jan 93 

1ntlillig_ence Battaiio!J, ld Infantry Division, Eie\lth K<ltea 

United smtes Army 

U.S. Army Plans and Operations Officer, Plans and Targets Republic of Oct 91 - Jul 9Z 

Branch, cn:2. Eimtth United Stl!tes ArmY Korea 

U.S.AriirJ Bt!ldent, Posfgtaduate Intelligence Program, Dere~ Washington, Aug 90 ~Jim 91 

Intelligence College DC 
29 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 6 here 28949.006

0 

Fort 

Huachuca. 

Arizona 

Fort Carson, Apr 89-Apr 90 

Coloraifo 

Fort Carson, Dec 87 - A!ir 89 

Co Ioredo 

Fort C!u$on, ,Mar 87-Dec 87 

Colorado 

9. GoVERNMENT EXPBI.UENCB (INPICATI\EXPBRlENCEJ,N ORASSOCIATIONWITH 

FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAl. GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, 

HONORARY, OR OTHERPART-TIMESIIRVICEORPOSITION. DO NOT REPEAT 

INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8). 

None 

10. lNDICATEANYSPECIALIZ1ID lNTELLIGENCE OR NATlONAL SECURITY EXPER.TISli YOU 

HAVE ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED. IN QUESTIONS B 

AND/OR.9. 

2011 S.ervk:e on Joint Chiem of S1aft; Regularly at11111ded National 

Security Council meetings 

2012 Director of Intelligence, IJ'C, Afgbaliistan; hitelljgenee ~enior ~r US 

and Coalition Nations supporting combat operations in AfghenistaU 

11. HONORS AND AW AR.DS (PROVIDE INFO:aMATlON ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, 

HONORARY DEGREES, MILlTAR.YDECOR.ATIONS,ClVIIJAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR 

ANY OTHBRSPEClAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTS'rANDlNG PERFORMANCE OR 

ACHIBVEMENT). 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Deflmse Superior Service Medal (with 3 BroDze OakLeaf Clu$tet11) 

Legion o!Merit 

Bronze Star Medal 

Delilnse MeritoriOIIS Service Medal {with 1 Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster) 

MerltotiollS Service Medal (with 4 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Army Commendation Medal 

Joint Semce At;hievementMedal (with 1 Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster) 

Army AehiewmentMedal (with 4Bronze Oak LeafCius!llrs) 

Combat Acf;ion Badge 

Joint Cl!iefs ofSPlff'Id\mlificatiOil Badge 

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHll'S IN AND OFFICES HBLD wrrHlN 

THE LAST TEN YEARS lN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, 

SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR O'tHBR SJMILARORGANIZATIONS). 

I OFflCEH§LD I DATES 
30 

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13. PUBIJSHBD WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LISTUffi TITLES, PUBLlSlJERS, BLOOS AND 

PUB!JCATION DA.TES OF .ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER. PUBLISHED 

MA~ YOU HAVEAUTIJORED. ALSO LIST .ANYPOB!JC SPEECHES OR REMARKS 

YOU HAVE 'MADE WlTHIN TI$ L,ASTTEN YEARS FOR WlllCH'I'Hlm.E IS A TEXT, 

TRANsCRIPT, OR VIDEO). IF' ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED 

PUBLICATION, TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO? 

.LOCATION 

Augusta, SA 

Arlington, VA 

Augusta,OA 

Washington, DC 

Augusta,GA 

Huu • AL 

Ft.Bragg.NC 

Ft. Belvoir VA 

Washington, DC 

DATE 

Januazy 17,2018 

December 13,2017 

Noveni!xlr 15, :2017 

Novcmber7 2.01'1 

November 7, 2017 

OCtober 13, 2.0~7 

October 12, 2on 

October 12 2017 

Ot:tober4 2017 

2S 2017 

6,2017 

tember: s 2017 

August$,2017 

July 13, 2017 

Juue6 2017 

JuneS,2017 

Ma 31 2017 
31 

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Insert offset folio 8 here 28949.008

EVENT LOCATION DATE 

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: Billingtoll Intem~oll!ll Cyber Washillgtcm, DC March 30; 2!ll7 

Summit 

PUBLICATION: Cyber Defense ReView-Article co- Publication :March 28,.2017 

author, "Cyberspaco m Multi-Domain Battle" 

ht1p://cyberdefetlsereView.IIIQly.J!ill/fhe• 

Ioumall.Article-Display/Artlcle/1134630/cyberspa,ce-mmulti-domain-battle/ 

~CBAOfiSet·Symposium SanFn.ocisco CA Febtuary lS 2017 

__ 

:vmw: Gov~llt Mattei1I TV; ·San Francisco, CA February 14,.2017 .._ ENS Ditmer Event San Francisco, CA Ftll:nllary 14 2017 

Public Sector Day SanFrancisco CA Febtllllt913 2017 

SPEAKER: Grol!lldbreakmg Ceremolly Ft Gordon, GA November 29. 2016 

Army Cyber Headquarters • 

i https:f/www.youtube.com/watcb?v=F:Ni'J4i72l1sg&t=>3s 

INTRODUCTORY SPEAKER: Associatioll of the Arlington, VA November lS, 2016 

United StateS Army, Hot Topics:. Cyber 

httpll:/!W~VW.youtube,comlwetch?v=yY3STh4wWk&t-364s 

PANELIST: AUSAHotTopics, ArmyNetworkS; Arlington, VA 1UI,y 14,2016 

Readiness i!lld tb,e Jomt Infonnati011 EnViroument 

bt,lps://www.yootube.com/watch?v=qnpHXSiiOCA 

PANELJST: AssociatiOlloftlJ,eUnited~Anny Washi!!gtoo, DC October 14,201$ 

Al!!rual Meeting; Army Cyber Today and TomQ.ttoW; 

' hliPs:tflvww,youtul)e.cl)IIl/watch'1v=GDOiBiey4cU 

PANELIST: Center :lbr Sirategic ud lntematiOI,llll Washillgtoll, DC October 13, 2015 

stl!dles, The Role ofthe U.S. Military in Cyberspace 

i https:/fWww;youtube.comlwatch?V"'QliK:B4ReJityow 

PANELIST: Army Cyber Institote ~ersbip 

DiScussiO,ll. Leading and Winning in a Complex World 

NewYorl<;NY SepWm,ber 30, 2015 

CLOSING REMARKS; ArmY Cyl!erTalks 2014- WestPoint, NY January 25, 201s 

.httDs:l/www.Youtube.com!Wlltch1v=uRU!nVOKZ§OQ 

MEDIA INTBRVXBW-R.eutets; Washillgton. DC Mey 13,2014 

htlps:/fm.reutms.com/VidC!l/.2014/0S/13/ermy-addingI cyber-armor·lll!llinst•inside·t?vid<!Oid=312922396 

MODERATOR: Iiltl!rnatiooal Cyber Collaboration OlUaba, NE November 16, 2011 

Panel at the 2011 Cyber 1111d S~ Symposium 

https://www.youtube,colillw4tch.'lv-QOPAT7.eHS8o 

US Aony War College Strategy Research Project, A.. Publication March2007 ~miD! fur 1ll& l!Jig ~lllil~ in lmg, available at I hl.tp://www.dtic.millltl't·tr-doc;/pdf'IAD=ADA468944 

This listieflects my best e!Ibrts to identifY all published writings and speeches. As a senior officer, I ftequelltly 

make public remarks, at tlines mscbeduled, and these rematks.may not be ~e:cte\i ln my records. 

If asked, I will provide a copy of eac!l requested publication, text, transcript, or vicieo. 
32 

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Insert offset folio 9 here 28949.009

PARI B.- OIJALDICATIQNS 

14. QUMJFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WRYYOUBELffiVE YOU .AREQUALlFffiD 'l'<) SERVE 1\S 

THE DIREO!OR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENcY). 

I ant 3 career intelligence officer. FQI" OV!lr three decades, I have served in intelligence positiona 

across Joint ll!ld.Amly furces in peace and war.. I understand. how to produce timely, accurate, 1111d 

valued intelligen'ce; 1111d wllllt consuml!l'S del)land of our intelligence products. During all of these 

tours l have ~ed fttim th11 intelligence produe~~d by the National Security Agency. 

Besides sl!l'Ving as a seniQI" intelligence officer, I have also led and commanded I~ otgallizatioll$, 

both Joint and Anny, at every level of our military. I understand the importance of strategic Vision.· 

1he Qiticality .of placing people first, and the power of a mission centered on the defen'se of our 

Nation. 

My service has also included formative assignments with the Jomt Sf~!{( Multi-Natiol!!!l FQI"Ces Iraq. US 

Forces Afghanistan, and US Cyber Command. During these tours I have serVed With and under some of 

the jjnest <:ivilian and military leaders our nation has prodllceil. these experienoe~~ have afforded Jill; 

insight into leadership at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, With broadening cxposute to die 

interagency, coalition partners, commercial indUstry, !llld academia, 

Finally, I haY!' served within the National Sewtity Agency on three S!IParate occasiollll. Oil each of these 

tours, I have admired the talent, the technological and innovative spirit, and ~e 1.tadecl;at1: oftb.il! worlcJclass intelligence Ql"gllllization. If confirmed, I believe my previous intelligence experience, my·ability .to 

lead.large organizations, and my :fumillarity with the NSA mission and ~ people woii!Q Set:ve as a :lirm 

foundation upon which to .serve as its next.Directur. · 

PART C-PQI,mcAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS 

15, POLmCAL ACTl'VlTIES(LISt ANYMEMBBRS:HIPS OR omCES HBWlN OR 

FINANCIAL C9N'I'RIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, 

ELECTION COMMITT.EE. POLITICAL ACTION COMMI'ITEE, OR INDIVIDUAL 

CANDIDATE DURINGTBBLAST TEN YEARS). 

None 

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OmCE (FURNISH DETAILS OF .ANY CANDIDACY FOR,. 

ELECTIVEPUBLICOmCE), 

None 
33 

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17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS 

(NOTE~ QUESTIONS 17A AND B ARENOTLIMITBD TO RELATIONSIDPS REQUiliDf(l 

REGISTRATION UNDER Tim FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTION~ 17A,B, 

AND COO NOT CALL FORAPOSITlVERESPONSBIF Tim REPRESENTATION OR 

TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES OOVBRNMBNTIN CONNECTION 

'WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S. EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT Sl:!.RVICE.) 

A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSEBVBRREPRESENTEDIN ANYCAPACITY(E.G. EMPLOYEE, 

ATTORNI3Y, OR POJ:.lTICAl./BUSINBSS CONSULTANT), Wl'l1i OR WJ:I'HOUT 

COMPENSATION; A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ORAN ENTITY CONTROLLED B.Y A 

FOREIGN GOVERNMEN',I'? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCHRELATIONSHIP. 

No 

B. HA VB ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY 

CAPACITY, WTI'H OR WITHOUTCOMPBNSAUON, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ORAN 

EN11rY CONTROLLBD BY A FOREIGN GOVB!U'lMENT? IF SO,PLBASEFULLY 

DESCRIBE SUCHRELATIONSHJ;P. 

No 

C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVBYOU OR YOUR SPOUSBRECEIVBD ANY 

COMPENSATION FROM, OR,BBEN1NVOLVBD IN ANY FINANCIAL 0Rl3USINESS 

TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVBRNM'SNT ORANYBNTITY CONTROLLED 

BY A FOREIGN GOVBRNME'NT'l IFSO, PLBASEPROVlDBDET..m.s, 

No 

D. HA VB YOU OR YOUR SPOUSEBVBRRBGlSTERED tiNDER THEPORBIGN 

AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDBDBTAJLS. 

No 

18. DESCRmEANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN 

AN OFFICIAL. U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOURSPOUSEHAVB 

ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY ORlNDIRECTLY INFLUENCING TilE 

PAS&.I\GE, DBFE!\.'1', ORMODlFlCATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE 

PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE A.'DMINISTRATION AND EXBCIJTION'OFFEDBRALLAW OR. 

PUBLIC}l()UCY. 

Non~r 

PARTD-FINAN<JAL DISCLOSURE ANJ> CONijLICT OF INTEREST 

19. DEsCRIBE' ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, 

lN\IESTMBNT, ASSOCL<\TION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMlT.ED TO, 

DEALINGS 'WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF 

OF A CL1BN1). WHICH COULD CREATE. OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF 

INTERESTINTHEPOSlTIONTO WH'ICHYOUIIAVB BEEN NOMINATED. 

None 
34 

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20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTI0N'S WITH YOUR. PRESENT 

EMPLOYERS, PIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/ORPARTNBRSHIPS,.OROTIIBR 

ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT YOU .ARB CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, 

PLEAS.BBXPLAIN. 

Yes 

21. DESCRIBE THBFINANOIALARMNGEMENTS YOU HA VB MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF 

YOU ARB CONFlR.MIID,IN CONNBCTIONWIT.H SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT 

PQ$ITJ;ON. PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, P.BNSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS; 

DEFERRED INCOMS ARRANGEMENTS", AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL 

OR MIGHT BE MCElVliD IN' THE FU'It1RE AS A RESULT OF YQUR CURRENT BUSINESS PR 

PROFESSIONAL lt£LATIONSRIP$. 

None 

22. DO YOUHAVEANY PLANS, COMMITMBNTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUtSIDE 

EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YQURSERVICE WITll 

THE GO~ IFSO, PLBASE.PROVIDBDBTAILS. 

No. 

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS .AFTER COMPLETING 

GOVERNMENT SERVICE. PLEASE S.PECWICALLYDESCRIBBANY AGREEMEN'l"SOR 

UNDERSTANDINGS, WRITTEN QR UNWRitTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYM'BNT AF.I'ER. 

LEAVING GOVERNMENT SBRVICE.INPARTICUL.Aa, DESCIUSE ANY AOREB¥ENTS, 

ONDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS TO M"l1JRNTO YOURCUlUU!N'l:"POSITIPN. 

Upon completion of my miJit!uy service, 1 ~nd to tetire, bti~b!lve no eurtent plans 1101" h~~ove I en.-d 

into. any written or unWritten agte"emelrts or understandings, concen1ing employment after lenvinlt 

govemment service. 

24- IF YOU .A1{E l'RESBN'rLY IN GOVBRNMEN'I' SERVICE, DURING THB PAST FIVE YEARS OF 

SUC,ll SERVICE, HA VB YOU RECE1VED FROMAl'ERSON OUTSIDE OF OOVBRNMENT.AN 

OFFER ORBXPRBSSION OF lNTERESI'TO EMP.LOYYOURSBRVIOBS .t\.FrER YOU LEAVE 

GOVERNMENT SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASEPROVIDEDBTAILS. 

No 

2', lS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? lFYESAND THE NA'IJJRE. OFTHIS"EMPLOYMENTIS 

RELATBD IN ..ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARB SEEKING 

CONJ1'IRMA'r,ION, l'LEASE INDlCA'lli'l("OURSPOUSE'S EMPLOYER. THE .I;'OSlTION, AND 

11IBtENGTII OF TIME THEPOSmON HAS BEENRELD.lFYOUR·SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT 

IS NOT RELATED TO TBEPOSITIONTO WHIC,llYOU HA;VEBEENNOMINA.TED, PLEASE 

SO STATE. 

No 
35 

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26. IJST:I3ELOW ALL CORPORAtiONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER. 

ENlTI'lES TOWARD WFnCHYOU OR YOlll(SPOUSEHAVB FIDUCIAR:YO:SLIGATIONSOR 

INWffiCHYOU OR YOUR. SPOUSE HA VB HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR O'IHER.POSITIONS OF 

TRUST DURING TilE PAS'r FIVE YEARS. 

NAME OF ENTITY POSITIQ'N lJA'I'ES HELD SBIJI ORSPQUSB 

None 

·21. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCBBDING $100 INV ALUERECE!IVED DURING TBE PA:ST FIVB YEARS 

BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GlFTS RECEIVE'O noM 

RELATIVESANDGIFTSGIVENTOYOUR.SPOUSBORDBPENDENTNBBDNOTBB 

INCLUDED UNLESS THE GIFT WAS GlVENWITHYOURKNOWLEDGB AND 

ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD ~ASONtO BBLmVE lltB GIFTWA-S-G!VEN BECAUSE OF 

YOUROFFICIALPOSmON.) 

None 

28. US'r ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER 

INVESTMBN'I$0RRBCBIVABLESWITiiACURRENTMARKETV.ALUB(O.R,IFMARRET 

VALUE IS NOT ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURREJ.iiT FAIR V ALOE) JN EXCESS OF 

$1,0()0. (NOTE: TIIE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE W SCIDIDULE A OF TEE 

lJISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED l3Y~CB,PROVlD.EDUiATCUR:RENTVALU.AtiONSAREUSBD..) 

DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY METHOD OF VALUATION 

See ~~~~~lion 6 of attached executive branch personnel public financial disclosure report (OGE Form 278e) 

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INlJBBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT. 

LIABILITIBS) IN EXCESS OF $10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL 

RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS RENTED OU'r, AND LOANS s:actlRBD.BY AUTOMOBlLES, . 

HOUSEHOLD FURNITIJBB, ORAPPLIANCES. (NOTa: TilE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN 

RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE COF TI!EDISCLOSURE FOJU.(Of TilE OFFICE OF 

GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAYBE INCORPORATED BY RBFE~NCE, PROVIDED THAT 

CONTINGENTLIABILITIBSARB.ALSOINCLUDED.) 

NATURE OF OBLIGATION NAME OF OBLIGEE AMOUNT 

See section 8 ofaitached executive branch }l!llSOttnel public financial disolosurewport {OGE Form 278e) 

ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, D~BT, OR O'llmR 

FINANCIAL OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR:SPOUSE:SEBN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, 

DEBT,OROTHERFINANCIALOBLIGATIONINTBRPAST.TENYBARS?HAVEYOU.ORYOUR 

SPOUSE EVERB:aBN .REFUSED CREDITOR HAD A LOANAPPLICATIONDENIED? IF 'l'.FIB 

ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES,PLEASEPROVIDEDBTAJ.LS. 

No 
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30. IJST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECBIVED DURING THE 

LAST FIVE YEARS, lNCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEBS, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, 

Rm!TS, ;R.OYALTIBS,.PA'I;ENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHBRITBMS EXCEEDING $200. 

(COPIES .OF U.S. INCOME TAX RID'URNS FOR THESE YEARS MAYBE SUBSTITUTED 

HERB, BUT THEIR SUBMISSION IS NOTRBQUlRED,) 

INFORMATION REDACTED 

31. IF ASKED, WILt. YOU PROVIDE 'I'HE COMMI'ITEE Wim COPlES OF YOUR. AND YOUR 

SPOUSE'S FliDERAL IN(:!OMB TAX RETURNS FO;R. 'fHE PAST 'll!RBaYEARSf 

32. LIST ALLJUlUSDlCTIONS IN WBICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE .ANNUAL INCOME TAX 

RETURNS. 

Federal, Virginia 

33. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE. TAXRBT'JRNS BEliN~ SUBJECT OF AN Al.JDI'l', 

INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PR'.OVIDEDE'I.'AILS, 

INCL1JDING THE RESULT OF ANY SUCHPROCl>EDING. 

No 

94. IF YOU ARB AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, ORO'fl{BRPROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST 

ALLCLlENTS AND CUSTO~ WHOJ'd YOU BILLED :M:ORB THAN $200 WORTH OF 

SERVICES DumN'G 'I'HE:PASTl'lVE YEARs. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN 

WHICH YOU Aii LICBN:SBD TO PRACTICE. 

N/A 
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3S. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACl'S YOUR FINANCW:.. HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE 

AND DEPENDENTMBMB$8 QF YOURlMMBDlATE l:lOUSEBOLDIN A BLIND TRUST? IF 

YES, PLEASE FURNISH DETAlLS.lF NO, DESCRIBE O'l:'.HBRARR:ANGEMENTS. FQR 

AVOIDING. ANY POTBNr!AL CONFLICTS OF !NTl'mllST. 

No 

36. IF APPLICABLE, IJSTTHE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 

REPORTS YOUHA VEBBBN REQUIRBD TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR 

BR4NCH OF GOVBRNM,ENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY 011 THBSE.REPORTS? 

201S,20i6,2017 

Yes 

PART E ·ETHICAL MATTERS 

37. HAVEYOUBVBRBBBNTHBSUB.JScrOFADJSClPLINARYPROCEEPINGORCITED 

FORA :BREACH OF ETHICS OR UliiPRoFBSSioNAL CoNDUCT BY, ORBBBN THE 

SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT TO, ANY CoURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, 

PROFESSIONALASSOCIATION, DJSCIPLINARY COMMl'llBE. OR O'I'HBR 

PROFESSIONAL GROpP? Jll SG.PLEASEP~OVIDEDETAILS. 

No 

33. HAVE YOU EVBRBBBN1NVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRBSTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY 

FEDERAL, STATE, OR O'I'HBRLA WBNFORCEMBNT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY 

FEDERAL STATE, COUNTY, ORMUNIClPAL LAW,. REGtlLATION, OR ORDINANCE, O'I'HBR 

THAN A MINOR TRA:FFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED ASA DEFENDANT·OR O'I'HBRwrsEIN ANY 

INDlCTMBNT ORINFORMA'J,'ION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PLEASE 

PROY.lbEDETAILS. 

No 

39: HAVE YOU EVERBBBN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO 

CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION O'I'HBR THAN AMlNOR TRAFFIC 

OFFE.NSE?JF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

40. AREYOUPRESBN'ILYORHAVEYOVEVERBEBNAPARTYININTl3RESTINANY 

ADMINlSTRATIVEAGBNCYPROCEEDIN;G OR CIVILLIDGATION? IF SO, PLEASE 

PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

41. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A 

WITNESS OR O'l:'.HBRWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY GONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, 

FEDERAL, OR STATE AGENCY PROCBliDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR 

CRIMiNAL ORCIVlL LmGATIONINTHEPASTTENYEARS? IF SO, pLEASBPROVIDE 

DETAILS. 

No 
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42. HAS ANY BUSINESS OJ!WlnCHYOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR. OR 

PARTNER. BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCBSDING OR 

ClUMINALORCIVILLITIGATION.REL'EVANTTOTHEPOSITIONTOWlnCHYOUHAVE 

BEEN'NOMINATED?IF SO,PLBASBPROVIDE DBTA1LS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS 

OFWlnCHYOU ARE OR·WERE.AN OFFICER, YOUNBBD ONLY CONSIDBRPROCBEDINGS 

ANDLITIGATIONTHATOCmJRRBDWHILEYOUWEREANOFFrCEROFTHATBUSINESS.) 

N/A 

43.. HAVE YOU EVERBBBNTHE SUBJECT OF ANYlNSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF 

SO, PLEASE PROVlDBDETAIT..S. 

No 

PART F- SECJJRITY INli'OR)fATIDN 

44. HAVE YOU EVER. BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION FOR ANY .REASON'1 IF YES, PLEASE~ INDBTAlL, 

No 

45. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH BXAMINAT.J:ONFOR.ANY SECURITY 

CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIBD INFORMATION? IF YES, Pl.BASEBXPLAIN. 

2002-Assignment To Batlalion Command, Fort Gordon, GA 

2010-As~gnment To Bx:ig3de Command, FortMeade, MD 

2016-Assignment To Army Cyber Collllllllnd, Fort Belvoir, VA 

46. HAVE YOUEVERREFUSED TO SUBMIT TO APOLYGRAPHEXAMlNATION? IF YES, PLEASE 

EXPLAIN. 

No 
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PARI G- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

47. DESCRIBE JN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. 

INTBLIJGENCE ACTIVITIBS.IN PARTICULAR, CHARAC'l'ERIZB WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BB 

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAl, SECURITY AGENCY AND Tim 

INTELLIGENCE COMMI'ITEES OF 11m CONGRESS, RESPECTIVELY, INTHB OVERSIGHT 

PROCESS 

Congressional oversight refers to the responsibility of the legislative branch, rooted In the US Constitution, 

to monitor the at<tivities of the executive 'branCh. Ovet$ight of the US Intelligence Community began in the 

late 1970sfollowi:ng the Churoh .and Pike Conll!lissions lind the discovezy of abqse& ofpower and 

violetiom; of~w by sevexallntelligeoce agencies. The role of tile Director of the National Security Agency 

is fi(stto ensure that the Agency's.~vities are .collllist¢nt with·tltolaw and with applicable policies and 

pro~ures, and to hold individuals accountable I!S necessaey. He is also responsible-for informitlg Congress 

on Agency ~vities and, when neeessary, mi!Stm~ himselfavailable to ~rquestionsand provide 

testiinony at the tequest ofCoogress. OveraU, the Ditector of the National Security Agenoy sets. the tone for 

eftl:ctive oversight throughout the entire ell!erprise by lii,s words aud his .d~. Congressional oversight 

inVQlves supervision of the Intelligence Community and Checking the potential for abuse of power. The 

intelligence committees exercise their oyersightthrough legislative hearings, specialized lnvesti_gations, 

nomination confumation hearings, directed teviews and .studies by cong.:essional Slq)pO!t agencles and 

staffs, and the. power of the purse. 

48. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDJNG OF THERESPONSffilLI.T1BS OFTHBDlRECTOROF THE 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. 

Uili!er the autbpJity, direction. and control of the Under Sec:retaey of Defense far Intelligence (USD(l)), 

the ~ct;or Qft)ie Nationii!Securit.y Agency is primarily re$ponsib1e for ensuring 1he NSA 

!;UCCeSSiiilly conduct!! two ptincipal missions: signals lntelligence.(SIGINT) ~;ollec;ti.on and information 

assorance:protection, The collec;tion ofSIGINT, under Executive Order 123~3, provides ~lligenc11 on 

America's adv~ell. Through info.rmalion assurance, conducted pritnarlly onder National Security 

Directive42, the NSA protQcts.Ametica's vilal national security information and systems ftom theft or damage. by other$, 

The Director .of the NSA alsc;> is the Chief or-the Ceotral Secun"ty Service, WhiCh iiicludes the elemeJ.Its of 

the armed furces - Army, Nl\vy, Air Force, Marine Coxps, and Coest Guard - that perform ctyptolog1c 

!ICtiv'ities, including codeinllklng and c!l(iebreakil)g, along with the NSA. 

The~rofthe NSA also is dual-hatted • the Con!mander ofUS Cyber Command, cummtly a SIJb... 

unified command under US Strategic Command, responslble·for planning, coordinating, integrating, 

synchronizing and conducting cyberspace Qperations. 
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I, LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE 

PROVIDED TO TillS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE. 

LTG NAKASONE SIGNATURE 

NOTARY SIGNATURE 

'(Notary) ( 

11\-t.) (\, a..~. ~, 0!. ~'I 
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TO THE CHA.IRMAN. SELECT COMMITTEE ONJNIBLLIGENCE: 

In connection with my nomination to be the Director of the National Sflcurity 

Agency, I hereby expr.ess my willingness to respond to requests to appear and 

testify before any duly constituted committee or the Senate. 

LTG NAKASONE SIGNATURE 

Signature 
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Additional Prehearing Questions for Lieutenant 

General Paul M. Nakasone 

Upon his nomination to be Director of the National Security Agency 
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Responsibilities o[the Director o[the National Security Agencv 

QUESTION 1: The role of Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA) has been 

performed differently depending on what the President has requested from the position. What 

do you see as your role as DIRNSA, if confirmed to this position? How do you expect it to be 

different than that of your predecessor? 

The role of DIRNSA is to ensure the successful accomplishment ofNSA's principal missions of 

protecting national security systems, and applying the capabilities of Signals Intelligence 

(SIGINT) to generate maximum insights in the areas of foreign intelligence and cyber security 

in the defense of our Nation and our friends and allies around the world within our Nation's 

legal framework and applicable policy guidance. The DIRNSA is equally responsible for the 

recruitment, training, and retention of a world-class workforce that underpins this mission. 

If confirmed, I believe what may be unique to my tenure as DIRNSA is the level of challenge 

and complexity the future holds, including: increasing difficulties with the intelligence 

collection mission given rapid technological evolution; ubiquitous encryption; the growing 

capabilities of the private sector technology industry; ensuring continued network security from 

both external and internal threats; and the continuing challenge to retain an elite workforce 

given the many opportunities in the civilian sector. 

QUESTION 2: The congressional intelligence committees have supported the Intelligence 

Community's (IC's) evaluation of dual-hatting the Commander of 

U.S. Cyber Command and DIRNSA positions. In the Joint Explanatory Statement 

accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P .L. 115- 31 ), the 

committees directed the IC to review and assess the potential impacts and effects. Specifically, 

the committees directed that the "organization ofNSA should be examined to account for the 

evolution of its mission since its establishment, the current structure of the intelligence 

community, and the fact that the NSA is predominantly funded through the NIP." In all of the 

following, please include a discussion of the NSA's structure, budgetary procedures, and 

oversight responsibilities to Congress. 

a. Which DJRNSA roles and responsibilities would be affected by a cessation 

of the dual-hat regime? 

Any decision with respect to terminating the dual-hat leadership arrangement must be made in 

the best interests of the Nation and if directed, it must be conditions based that is to say that 

processes and decisions which enable effective mutual collaboration and deconfliction are well 

established and operating. With that said, I believe terminating the dual hat leadership 

arrangement would have only minor effects on the DIRNSA's roles and responsibilities. The 

Director's primary responsibilities and NSA's mission will be largely unaffected. Given my 

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current assignment, !lack further details to discuss the NSA's budgetary structure, budgetary 

procedures and oversight responsibilities to Congress. If confirmed, this is an area that I will 

study further. 

b. What in your view are the positive and negative aspects of a dual-hat regime? 

Please include assessments of structure, budgetary procedures, and oversight of 

NSA. 

My experience is that the dual-hat arrangement has enabled the operationally close partnership 

between USCYBERCOM and the NSA, which benefits both in the accomplishment of their 

respective missions. Dual-hatting optimizes the integration and synchronization of SIGINT and 

cyberspace operations. It enables decision making that balances competing equities under the 

judgment of a single individual directly responsible for both organizations critical missions. If 

terminated, such decisions will require close organizational collaboration enabled by processes 

which build upon the operational integration achieved under the dual-hat arrangement, as well 

as close working relationships between the leaders of both organizations. 

That said, I believe that any decision to maintain or terminate the dual-hat leadership 

arrangement must be conditions-based and in the best interests of the Nation. Each organization 

faces different challenges and has different mission goals a distinction that risked blurring 

under dual-hatting and required continuous reinforcement of distinct mission focus for each 

organization. Given my current assignment, I lack further details to discuss the NSA's 

budgetary structure, budgetary procedures and oversight responsibilities to Congress. If 

confirmed, this is an area that I will study further. 

c. What is your view on the dual-track supervision ofNSA by the Secretary of Defense 

and the Director of National Intelligence? 

NSA is both a Combat Support Agency and a DoD component within the Intelligence 

Community. Its mission is to help protect national security by providing both policy makers and 

military commanders with the intelligence information and cybersecurity insights they need. 

NSA has functioned effectively under this construct for decades, first, reporting to the Director 

of Central Intelligence and then to the Director of National Intelligence, once created. Dualtrack supervision is appropriate and reflects the dual nature ofNSA's mission. 

QUESTION 3: Please describe the specific experiences you have had in your professional 

career that will enable you to serve effectively as the head of the NSA. In addition, what lessons 

have you drawn from the experiences of current and former DIRNSAs? 

I am a career intelligence officer. For over three decades, I served in key intelligence 

positions across Joint and Army forces in peace and war. I understand how to produce timely, 

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accurate, and valued intelligence, and what consumers' demand of our intelligence products. 

My most recent intelligence assignment was as the Director of Intelligence, International 

Security Assistance Force Joint Command, Afghanistan. 

My service has included formative assignments with the Joint Staff, Multi-National Forces Iraq, 

U.S. Forces Afghanistan, and USCYBERCOM. These experiences have afforded me significant 

insight into intelligence support at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with broadening 

exposure to the interagency, coalition partners, commercial industry, and academia. 

Finally, I have served within the NSA on three separate occasions. This includes assignments to 

both Fort Gordon, Georgia and Fort Meade, Maryland. Over these multiple tours, I have 

developed a deep appreciation and strong commitment to the people and mission of the NSA. 

QUESTION 4: If confirmed as DIRNSA, what steps will you take to improve the integration, 

coordination, and collaboration between NSA and the other IC agencies? 

If confirmed, I will begin my analysis of the NSA's integration, coordination, and collaboration 

by looking inside the Agency. I would assess the degree of work being done by measuring the 

NSA's ability to enable SIGINT collection into other IC agency products, the placement of!C 

agency personnel within the NSA, and the degree of familiarity the workforce has for its IC 

counterparts. 

I would then continue my assessment by seeking external views of the NSA's ability to 

integrate, coordinate, and collaborate within the other IC agencies. This feedback would come 

principally from the Director of National Intelligence and his staff, the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, other members of the IC, and finally a discussion with our 

key product consumers-the DoD, the Interagency, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands. 

QUESTION 5: If confirmed as DIRNSA, how will you ensure that the tasking ofNSA 

resources and personnel to support U.S. Cyber Command do not negatively impact NSA's ability 

to perform and fulfill core missions? 

The dual hatted Director/Commander is supported by separate NSA and USCYBERCOM staffs. 

A series of interagency support agreements and memorandums of agreement are also in place to 

ensure the proper resource accounting occurs. I will make it my clear guidance that established 

business rules and processes designed to limit such impact are followed and enforced. If 

confirmed, part of my inherent responsibility under the dual-hat is to make such considerations a 

core part of my decision making and to be accountable such that negative impacts do not occur. 

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Keeping the Congressional Intelligence Committees Fullv and Currentlv Informed 

QUESTION 6: What is your understanding of DIRNSA's obligations under Title 50 of the 

National Security Act of 1947, including DIRNSA's obligation to appoint a Director of 

Compliance? 

Title 50 contains numerous obligations for the DIRNSA. If confirmed, I will work with the 

NSA's Office of General Counsel to ensure full compliance with the law. This includes 50 U.S.C. 

3602, which requires that there be a Director of Compliance for the Agency. 

QUESTION 7: Please assess how well the NSA is working with Congress and, specifically, 

with the congressional intelligence committees. 

It is my understanding that NSA works hard to keep Congress fully and currently informed. I am 

aware that NSA witnesses routinely testify before Congress and that the NSA personnel prepare 

briefings, papers, and notifications to Congress. I am also aware that at the recent hearing 

regarding the Intelligence Community's Worldwide Threat Assessment, the Chairman and Vice 

Chairman thanked the Intelligence Community for providing access to intelligence products, legal 

documents, and other materials necessary for Congress to carry out its oversight function. If 

confirmed, !look forward to continuing those efforts to keep Congress informed ofNSA's 

activities. 

a. What information should NSA share with Congress? 

I believe NSA should not only be responsive to congressional requests, but should also 

proactively notify Congress of both successes and failures so that Congress can perform its 

important oversight role. 

b. What, if any, information should NSA withhold from the congressional 

intelligence committees? Why? 

NSA should not broadly withhold information from the congressional intelligence committees. In 

some cases, as has been my understanding of past practices, it may be best to provide details 

about NSA's most sensitive sources and methods only to select congressional intelligence 

leadership. To be clear, I do not believe the need to protect sensitive sources and methods 

overrides the NSA's obligation to inform Congress about its activities in a general sense. If 

confirmed, l will work with the congressional intelligence committees and strive to provide them 

with access to any materials required for their oversight ofNSA operations. 

QUESTION 8: Please describe your view of the NSA's obligation to respond to requests for 

information from Members of Congress. 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that my team understands Congress's important role 

overseeing NSA's activities. To fulfill that oversight function, NSA is obliged to provide 

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infonnation, as appropriate, to the committees with jurisdiction over NSA' s activities. I would 

work with Members to understand the outcome they are trying to achieve, and to help get the 

infonnation that they need to fulfill this outcome. 

QUESTION 9: Does NSA have a responsibility to correct the record, if it identifies 

occasions where inaccurate information has been provided to the congressional 

intelligence committees? 

Yes. If confirmed, l will always be open with Congress and provide the best information available 

at the time, and if my subordinates or I need to correct the record, I will make sure that occurs. 

QUESTION 10: This Committee is conducting an investigation into Russia's involvement in the 

2016 U.S. election. If confirmed, will you support the Committee's oversight investigation and 

promptly provide any documents or briefings deemed necessary by the Committee? 

Yes. I fully appreciate the significance of the Committee's investigation into Russia's 

involvement in the 2016 elections. Accordingly, if confinned, I commit to continuing to support 

the Committee's need for documents and briefings relevant to the investigation in accordance 

with the procedures that have already been established. 

Functions and Responsibilities o(the National Securitv Agencv 

QUESTION 11: What do you consider to be the most important missions of the NSA? 

Both of the NSA's principal missions, protecting national security systems and collecting foreign 

intelligence infonnation, are paramount to the safety and security of our Nation. The two missions 

also go hand-in-hand. Collecting foreign intelligence infonnation on our adversaries' attempts to 

penetrate our networks infonns how best to protect national security systems, the security of 

which ensures (among other things) that adversaries remain unaware of our capabilities. Equally, 

the NSA's expertise in infonnation assurance provides their operators insights into adversary 

systems, providing new opportunities for foreign intelligence collection. Together, these selfreinforcing missions allow the collection of foreign intelligence infonnation critical to national 

security while protecting our Nation's own sensitive infonnation. 

QUESTION 12: How well do you think the NSA has performed recently in each of these 

missions? 

I have limited awareness to assess this in my current assignment. There is always room for 

improvement, but generally, I think the NSA continues to provide an extraordinary service by 

generating high quality intelligence for our Nation's leaders and cybersecurity solutions to protect 

the most sensitive national security systems. 

QUESTION 13: If confinned, what missions do you expect to direct the NSA to prioritize over 

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others? 

At a high level, it is clear that the Nation is at a growing risk from foreign malicious cyber actors, 

so I expect to emphasize increasing cyber capabilities in order to ensure NSA has awareness of 

foreign malicious cyber activities, including cyber attacks, and can provide policy makers with 

unique and timely foreign intelligence information. If confirmed, I will be in a better position to 

make fully informed assessments and establish clear priorities. 

National Securitv Threats and Challenges Facing the Intelligence Community 

QUESTION 14: What, in your view, are the current principal threats to national security most 

relevant to the NSA? 

Cyber threats, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and terrorist activities are the current 

principal threats to national security that are most relevant to the NSA. More specifically, growing 

near-peer foreign military powers powers, terrorist organizations, transnational criminal 

organizations, and other dangerous groups and individuals use cyber operations to achieve malign 

strategic objectives. North Korea, Russia, and China all have state efforts to modernize, develop, 

or acquire WMD, their delivery systems, or the underlying technologies. These efforts are a major 

threat to the United States and to our partners. Terrorist organizations also continue to expand 

their global presence, posing a persistent threat to the U.S. Homeland, its allies, and U.S. interests 

abroad. 

QUESTION 15: In your opinion, how has the NSA performed in adjusting its policies, resource 

allocations, planning, training, and programs to address these threats? 

Mindful that the NSA is a very large organization, I think the NSA has done an admirable job of 

adjusting to a rapidly changing threat landscape. The adjustment from a Cold War focus toward 

a foreign terrorism focus in the 1990s and 2000s was significant and challenging, but ultimately 

resulted in the NSA producing critical intelligence in the global war on terrorism. In the same 

manner, the Agency has made notable adjustments over the last decade to support success in the 

foreign cyber arena, while still maintaining its foreign counter-terrorism abilities. This is an area 

that I will be able to better assess, if confirmed. 

QUESTION 16: What role do you see for the NSA, in particular, and the IC, as a whole, with 

respect to the ongoing challenge of ubiquitous encryption as it pertains to foreign intelligence? 

The prevalence of encryption and the complexity of the math behind it has increased with the 

proliferation of computers, but the fundamental nature of encryption has not changed. Thus, the 

NSA's mission with regard to cryptology remains the same: develop robust encryption to protect 

national security systems and work with Intelligence Community partners and U.S. allies to 

ensure that the NSA has solutions to our adversaries' encryption and can continue to produce the 

foreign intelligence information that U.S. policymakers and military leaders rely upon. That said, 

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the Agency has previously stated publicly that the prevalence of encryption does create challenges 

and requires the NSA to focus on more resource-intensive ways to produce foreign intelligence 

information. 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

QUESTION 17: The USA FREEDOM Act will sunset on December 15,2019. What is your view 

on its reauthorization? 

I am familiar with the authority and aware the statute sunsets in less than two years, but, if 

confirmed, I want to assess NSA's use of the authority before formulating an answer. I will work 

with my team to fully understand the USA FREEDOM Act's utility, resource requirements, 

compliance controls, and privacy protections. I believe it is important for the NSA to regularly 

evaluate its collection activities and optimize the legal authorities and the resources provided by 

Congress. 

QUESTION 18: Has the transition from the NSA to the telecommunications companies 

regarding the metadata collection and retention of call detail records affected the IC's operational 

capabilities? If so, how? 

If confirmed, I will seek to understand and assess this specific issue as part of the process of 

reviewing the USA FREEDOM Act. 

Cvbersecurity 

QUESTION 19: As the nation's cyber infrastructure becomes increasingly susceptible to 

cyberattacks, can a single individual successfully execute both roles of DIRNSA and the head of 

U.S. Cyber Command? 

I believe that General Alexander and Admiral Rogers have demonstrated that a single leader can 

successfully execute the roles of DIRNSA and Commander USCYBERCOM. The 2017 NOAA, 

Section 1642 placed a limitation on termination of the dual hat arrangement unless six conditions 

have been met. If confirmed, I will evaluate these conditions and provide my assessment to the 

Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who must certify these 

conditions are met to ensure that termination does not pose risks to the operational effectiveness 

of either organization that are unacceptable to the national security interests of the United States. 

Ultimately, I believe that any decision must be conditions-based and in the best interests of the 

Nation. 

QUESTION 20: What changes to the respective cybersecurity roles would occur if the dual-hat 

regime ceased to exist? 

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None; the cybersecurity roles ofDIRNSA were not changed by the dual-hat arrangement, so 

terminating the dual hat arrangement would equally have no effect. Of course, there will be some 

practical consequences related to coordination that naturally flow from the new leadership 

arrangement, but these could be mitigated by mutual support agreements and other preparations. 

If confirmed, I would include this assessment in my recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of National Intelligence. 

QUESTION 21: What role do you see for the NSA in defensive cybersecurity policies or 

actions? What role do you see for NSA in supporting any U.S. Government offensive 

cybersecurity policies or actions? 

DIRNSA is the National Manager for National Security Systems and in this capacity works 

closely with DoD to protect the Department of Defense information network (DOD IN), as well as 

the networks of other departments and agencies that process classified information. Regarding 

defensive cybersecurity policies or actions more broadly, the NSA is a key player on a larger team 

that includes DHS, FBI, and USCYBERCOM. NSA is an agency with many unique skill sets in 

offensive cybersecurity policies and actions. NSA can and should advise on U.S. government 

offensive cybersecurity policies when directed by policymakers, consistent with its authorities. 

QUESTION 22: What should be the NSA's role in helping to protect U.S. commercial computer 

networks? 

NSA's mission is fundamentally one of collecting foreign intelligence information and protecting 

national security systems, though the NSA certainly does contribute great insights into foreign 

cybersecurity threats that help protect the private sector. Given that cyber attacks of significant 

consequence on commercial computer networks can cause the loss of life or billions of dollars in 

damage to an economy, it is paramount that the U.S. public and private sectors work together to 

create a shared understanding of the threat. If confirmed, I am eager to take part in this 

collaboration. 

QUESTION 23: What cyber threat information (classified or unclassified) should be shared with 

U.S. private sector entities, particularly critical infrastructure entities, to enable them to protect 

their networks from possible cyberattacks? 

While the responsibility for protecting privately-owned networks lies primarily with the system 

owner, the U.S. Government has the responsibility to defend national interests more broadly. If 

confirmed, my goal will be to continue to work with DHS and FBI to try to lean forward and 

provide unclassified cyber threat information so that it is available for wide public use. When 

threat information must remain classified, what is shared should depend on factors such as the 

nature, duration, and severity of the threat, and the ability of the affected entity to receive 

classified information. 

QUESTION 24: It is now well understood that America's election infrastructure is vulnerable to 

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cyber attacks. 

a. If confirmed, how will you address this threat? 

l believe this needs to be a whole-of-government solution. DHS and state and local governments 

are the primary entities leading this effort, and if confirmed I will ensure the NSA and 

USCYBERCOM continues to support this effort, consistent with their authorities. Our democracy 

depends on it. 

b. What actions should the NSA be taking to protect our election infrastructure 

for the upcoming November 2018 federal elections? 

I completely appreciate the importance of this issue to this Committee and the Nation. 

NSA will provide support to the government effort, led by DHS, to guard against outside 

interference in the November 2018 federal elections. If confirmed, I pledge that that 

effort will have the NSA's full support. 

c. How, in your view, should the NSA work with other IC elements to prevent 

and mitigate threats to our election systems? 

I completely appreciate the importance of this issue to this Committee and the Nation. 

NSA should provide support to the government effort, led by DHS, to guard against 

outside interference in the November 2018 federal elections. If confirmed, I pledge that 

that effort will have the NSA's full support, including cooperation with other members 

of the lC under coordinating direction of a lead agency. 

QUESTION 25: In December 2015, the Cybersecurity Act of20l5 was enacted and signed into 

law, thereby creating a voluntary information sharing process involving both public and private 

sector entities. 

a. In your view, is this process effective? 

The process established by the Cybersecurity Act of2015 was a great first step. I believe the key 

is bi-directional information sharing. If confirmed, I will seek to better understand the frequency 

with which this is occurring. 

b. What recommendations do you have for this process going forward? 

If confirmed, I will be better able to assess and provide more informed recommendations on this 

issue. 

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NSA Capabilities 

QUESTION 26: What is your assessment of the quality of current NSA intelligence 

analysis? If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to improve intelligence 

analysis, and what benchmarks will you use to judge the success of future NSA analytic 

efforts? 

From my previous experience at the NSA, I can say that I expect to find that the NSA presently 

bas a robust intelligence analysis program. NSA analysts are trained in the tradecraft of analysis, 

and they do it well. To ensure that this program continues to improve, I believe that continuous 

career growth is essential for current employees. The success of future NSA analytic efforts 

would be judged by the feedback of our customers, principally the Nation's policymakers and 

military commanders, on the quality and usefulness of our foreign intelligence reporting. 

QUESTION 27: What is your view of strategic analysis and its place within the NSA? Please 

include your views about what constitutes such analysis, what steps should be taken to ensure 

adequate strategic coverage of important issues, and what finished intelligence products NSA 

should produce. 

Strategic analysis is analysis that is generally more forward looking or that tries to take several 

pieces of intelligence analysis and examine them for themes, patterns, or concepts in order to 

address larger issues. Based on past experience, I believe the NSA must be competent in this 

discipline so that it can assess the value of its reporting at informing strategic analysis, but the 

overall role of strategic analytic reporting itself falls to all-source intelligence agencies. In this 

way, strategic analysis is occurring every day at the NSA but not in the formal sense that it does at 

all-source reporting agencies. 

QUESTION 28: What are your views concerning the quality of intelligence collection 

conducted by the NSA, and what is your assessment of the steps that have been taken to 

date to improve that collection? 

From my previous experience at the NSA, I can say that I expect to find that the quality is of very 

high value. I believe the NSA has historically succeeded in response to changes in missions and 

technology. If confirmed, I will be better able to assess and provide more informed 

recommendations on this issue. 

QUESTION 29: If confirmed, what additional steps would you pursue to improve intelligence 

collection and what benchmarks will you use to judge the success offuture collection efforts by 

the NSA? 

First, I would make a comprehensive assessment in order to better understand current challenges 

and performance and determine what actions are necessary to improve collection. The success 

of future collection efforts ultimately must be judged by the feedback of our customers, 

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principally the Nation's policy makers and military commanders, on the quality and usefulness 

of our foreign intelligence reporting that results from our collection efforts. NSA does not 

collect foreign intelligence tor its own purposes but in response to its customers' intelligence 

requirements, so ultimately, any benchmark must take into account their views. 

QUESTION 30: What are your views on the role of foundational research to NSA's mission? 

From my previous experience at the NSA, I can say that I expect to find foundational research 

remains a core component to its success. I am aware that the NSA has a robust in-house research 

organization that has conducted pioneering research since the Agency's creation. If confirmed, I 

will be better able to assess and provide more informed recommendations on this issue. 

NSA Personnel 

QUESTION 31: The Committee's most recent Intelligence Authorization bill, as well as the 

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 115-31 ), included provisions supporting 

IC employment of those with science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 

backgrounds and expertise. If confirmed, how would you undertake outreach, recruitment, and 

retention of employment candidates with STEM experience? 

Recruiting, training, retaining, and empowering the best and brightest our Nation has to 

offer is mission critical for the NSA. If confirmed, I will ensure that the NSA has a culture 

where employees can thrive and feel proud of their mission. I understand that this 

committee has led an effort in the 2018 Intelligence Authorization Act to ensure certain 

STEM employees in mission critical roles can receive more compensation, and I am 

supportive of that effort. In my experience, people who work at the NSA understand there 

is a mission side to their job and don't expect salary comparable to the private sector, but 

it's important that the Agency have some flexibility with compensation to remain as 

financially attractive as possible. 

QUESTION 32: What is your view of the principles that should guide the NSA in its use of 

contractors, rather than full-time government employees, to fulfill intelligence-related functions? 

a. Are there functions within the NSA that are particularly suited for the use of 

contractors? 

The Federal Government, including the Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community 

has long history of successfully using contractors. I will be better able to assess specific examples 

relevant to this question if confirmed, but I believe there are certainly functions for which the 

NSA can use contractors to achieve a positive outcome with savings to the taxpayer. 

b. Are there some functions that should never be conducted by contractors, or tor which 

use of contractors should be discouraged or require specific DIRNSA approvals? 

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Contractors should not perform work roles and functions that are inherently governmental in 

nature. Presently, I lack in-depth insight into specific work roles or functions; if confirmed, I 

would seek to understand this through discussions with appropriate NSA personnel. 

c. What consideration should the NSA give to the cost of contractors versus government 

employees? 

It is important to have the right workforce mix between civilian and contractor employees. If 

confirmed, I will take into account the costs associated with either role in order to ensure the 

NSA has achieved the right mix. 

d. What does the NSA need in order to achieve an appropriate balance between 

government civilians, military personnel, and contractors? 

Foremost, is careful understanding of the Agency's functional requirements. First, 

understanding which functions are inherently governmental and not appropriate for 

contract personnel. Second, determining what balance of personnel best fulfills functional 

requirements in each area and the cost tradeoffs associated with it. If confirmed, I intend 

to explore this area more. 

QUESTION 33: If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that there are equal professional 

opportunities for all members of the NSA workforce? 

If confirmed, I will ensure equal professional opportunities for all the NSA workforce through 

several important efforts. First, I will demonstrate through my words and deeds that diversity is 

a key component of the Agency's success. Second, I will support the continued work by the 

Agency to ensure facilities are available to all people, with or without disabilities. Finally, I 

will look to measure the Agency's progress with diversity, ensuring our workforce and 

leadership are reflective of both the people who work at the NSA and our Nation. 

QUESTION 34: What is your assessment of the personnel accountability system in place at the 

NSA? 

It is my understanding that the NSA has robust measures to hold personnel accountable for their 

actions. There is an independent Inspector General, confirmed with the advice and consent of 

the Senate, who identifies and investigates wrongdoing. There is a strong Equal Employment 

Opportunity program, and there are investigations, both routine and special, of security issues. 

My impressions may be dated, but as I saw during my past assignments at NSA, the Agency 

uses these programs to hold personnel accountable as appropriate. 

QUESTION 35: What actions, if any, should be considered to ensure that the IC has a fair 

process for handling personnel accountability, including serious misconduct allegations? 

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Speaking just from my previous experience at NSA, I believe equitable processes must be in place 

that ensure for appropriate due process, and the independence of the Inspector General must be 

sacrosanct. This is a very important area for further assessment, if I am confirmed. 

Securitv Clearance Reform 

QUESTION 36: What are your views on the security clearance process? 

I am aware the Director ofNationallntelligence has ongoing efforts to examine and reform the 

security clearance process. I support these initiatives as I believe the current process is 

challenged by large backlogs of unfinished background investigations, lacks the technology that 

might enhance broader data points, and takes too long to complete a background investigation 

and final clearance to empower a trusted workforce. 

QUESTION 37: If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you seek to make to this process? 

I do intend to fully support any pilot that provides the opportunity to improve the background 

investigation and security clearance process, leading to both greater effectiveness and efficiency 

to recruit and hire an elite, trusted workforce. If confirmed, I will evaluate the proposals 

presented and make an assessment of the changes that might be necessary. 

Management o(the National SecuritvAgency 

QUESTION 38: In what ways can DIRNSA achieve sufficient independence and distance from 

political considerations to serve the nation with objective and dispassionate intelligence 

collection and analysis? 

If confirmed, I pledge to this Committee that I will follow in the footsteps of my predecessors to 

ensure NSA continues its long tradition of providing professional, non-partisan intelligence to 

any administration. Specifically, I will maintain and continue to encourage an environment 

where analysts can feel comfortable creating accurate intelligence assessments, without regard 

for the policy implications of any particular assessment. 

a. If confirmed, how will you ensure this independence is maintained? 

I have spent 31 years in the United States Army, over half of which have involved providing 

intelligence to policy makers or military leaders. If confirmed, I will look to ensure the Agency's 

independent approach to analysis is maintained by dedicating the organization to effective 

collection, objective analysis, and dispassionate reporting of conclusions as part of the larger 

intelligence community. I will make it clear to leaders throughout the organization that the NSA's 

first duty is to the Nation. 

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b. What is your view of DIRNSA's responsibility to inform senior Administration 

policy officials or their spokespersons when the available intelligence either does not 

support or contradicts public statements they may have made? 

The DIRNSA, like all leaders of the intelligence community, has a responsibility to 

communicate clearly the analysis and conclusions of their organization. If there is a disconnect 

with public statements, the DIRNSA then has a responsibility to re-communicate those 

conclusions to Administration officials. 

QUESTION 39: How would you resolve a situation in which the assessments of your analysts 

are at odds with the policy aspirations of the administration? 

I do not believe there is anything to resolve in such a situation. Clearly, the responsibility of 

intelligence analysts is to make objective assessments and report their best judgment and 

conclusions independent of such considerations. If confirmed, I would communicate the Agency's 

conclusions objectively without regard to such conflicts. 

QUESTION 40: What are your views of the current NSA culture and workforce? 

a. What are your goals for NSA's culture and workforce? 

If confirmed, my goals for NSA's culture and workforce center on emphasizing the uniqueness 

and importance ofthe NSA's mission with each person who works for the Agency. The phrases 

that greet each employee as they enter into the Agency, like ''Defend the Nation" and "Secure the 

Future" capture the criticality of what the NSA does each day. I intend to make this a focal point 

of what the Agency does, in concert with upholding full compliance with our laws and the 

protection of Americans' Constitutional rights. 

b. If confirmed, what are the steps you plan to take to achieve these goals? 

I would look to achieve these goals through strong and engaging interaction with the workforce 

where I can provide my message; a continual dialogue with leaders within the Agency; a broad 

strategic messaging campaign that touches all parts of the Agency; and ways to leverage feedback 

as to the effectiveness of this message and its impact on the workforce. 

c. How will you strengthen the relationship between the civilian and military members 

of the NSA workforce? 

l believe a close working relationship between the Director and Deputy Director sets the tone for 

effective relationships between the civilian and military members of the NSA workforce. If 

confirmed, I would also look to empower both civilian and military leaders in key leadership 

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positiOns. Finally, I would seek training and education venues that explain both the similarities 

and differences of the civilian and military workforce components to ensure greater understanding 

of the important roles each plays in accomplishing the Agency's mission. 

Transparency 

QUESTION 41: Do you believe that intelligence agencies need some level of transparency to 

ensure long-term public support for their activities? 

Yes. Public trust is foundational to the Intelligence Community's ability to conduct its activities, 

and transparency to Congress and to the public is a critical part of earning and maintaining that 

trust. 

QUESTION 42: If confirmed, what would be your approach to transparency? 

Given that many details about the NSA's activities must remain classified, it is important that we 

have the public's trust in what we do. Transparency plays a vital role in gaining and maintaining 

that trust. 

My approach to transparency involves multifaceted objectives. First, the NSA must be open and 

honest with its overseers, both in Congress and across the Executive and Judicial branches. 

Because of the inherent confidentiality in much of the Agency's work, NSA's overseers act as a 

surrogate, ensuring on the public's behalf that the Agency carries out its activities in a manner 

consistent with the rule oflaw. 

Second, to the extent possible, the NSA must make available to the public information about its 

activities in a manner that enhances public understanding without jeopardizing sensitive sources 

and methods. Sharing information with the public is critical to facilitating responsible discussions 

about the manner in which the Agency executes its mission and it engenders public trust in the 

NSA. 

Disclosures of Classified InfOrmation 

QUESTION 43: In your view, does the NSA take appropriate precautions to protect classified 

information and prevent, deter, investigate, and punish unauthorized disclosures of classified 

information? 

I believe that many appropriate precautions are in place; but that recent events demonstrate a 

need to re-validate and improve in this area. Presently, I am unable to make a fully informed 

judgement of this question; therefore, if confirmed, I intend to evaluate ongoing efforts to better 

secure the network and secure the environment before providing my full assessment. 

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QUESTION 44: If confirmed, how will you ensure that appropriate and necessary precautions to 

protect classified information are maintained and improved, if necessary? 

If confirmed, I will better be able to assess what improvements, if any, are necessary. More 

broadly, protecting classified information is vital for the NSA to execute its mission successfully. 

Ensuring continuation and enhancement of the effective improvements made over the last several 

years will be a primary focus for me. 

QUESTION 45: If confirmed, how would you manage, and what priority would you give, to 

addressing the following issues: 

a. The vulnerability ofNSA information systems to harm or espionage by trusted 

insiders; 

b. The vulnerability ofNSA information systems to outside penetration; 

c. The readiness ofNSA to maintain continuity of operations; 

d. The ability ofNSA to adopt advanced information technology efficiently and 

effectively; and 

e. The NSA' s recruittnent and retention of skilled STEM and information technology 

professionals, including contractor personnel. 

If confirmed, my priorities for the NSA will be to recruit and retain top talent, improve signals 

intelligence (SIGINT) collection against critical adversaries, and ensure the security ofNSA's 

network and enterprise. Each of these above issues falls within these top priorities. I see each of 

these issues as significant components of the proposed priorities. 

QUESTION 46: How do you think that individuals who mishandle, intentionally or 

unintentionally, classified information should be dealt with? Would you draw distinctions based 

on intent? 

Mishandling classified information is an incredibly serious matter. Criminal penalties and 

workplace discipline, including termination and revocation of security clearances, are all options 

that should be considered based on the facts of the situation. Intent is certainly relevant under the 

law and certain internal procedures, but the specifics of when and how it matters are difficult to 

discuss without the facts of a particular case. 

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QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

From Senator Feinstein 

Security/Insider Threats 

I am greatly concerned about the security at NSA. Some of the worst threats 

we have had over the past decade to national security of the United States have 

come from within. In particular, two NSA contractors stand out to me - Edward 

Snowden and Hal Martin - as particularly egregious. 

1. What concrete steps will you take to address the insider threat issue at 

NSA? 

If confirmed, I will take several concrete steps, building on the extensive work 

NSA has already completed and briefed in detail to the Committee. I will look at 

potential necessary technological changes. I intend to review security clearance 

procedures, and I will seek input on whether additional authorities are required. I 

find leaks of classified information reprehensible, I consider their damage to 

national security grave and unacceptable, and I will vigorously hold all personnel 

accountable to stop leaks and compromises. Additionally, I will submit crimes 

reports to the Department of Justice when I believe an unauthorized disclosure of 

classified information, or other potential Federal crime, has occurred. 

2. What steps will you take to better secure your networks? 

I will provide a detailed answer via classified channels. 

Industry Help in Insider Threats 

Last week during a hearing on Security Clearance Reform, the Committee 

heard from Industry leaders that they continue to need better sharing of 

information from the Federal government. 

Industry leaders identified a situation where the government will tell a 

contractor, "This person is no longer suitable. Take them off the contract." But the 

government won't tell them why. They won't tell them what behavior has occurred 

or why they're no longer suitable for the contract, leaving the industry to figure out 

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3. What specific steps will you take to ensure these contractors with 

problems don't just come back on under a different contract with a 

different company? 

I believe that with greater sharing of information between the Federal government 

and the contractor base, we will be able to better ensure that contractors with 

problems do not just come back under a different contract with a different 

company. As noted below, NSA may need new authority to facilitate this sharing. 

4. Some potential solutions might require legislation. What efforts do you 

believe would be helpful? 

I am told that the Federal government is not allowed to share information 

concerning the suitability of civilian employees with contractors, and that 

contractors are barred from sharing similar information with the government. This 

inability to share is a barrier to best security practices. This is where, if confirmed, 

I may need the help of the Committee in the form of new authority. 

Use of Contractors 

I continue to be concerned about the general use of contractors in the 

Intelligence Community. Previously, I worked with Director Panetta and others to 

reduce the percentage of contractors being utilized, and I've been pleased to see 

the continued decrease of contractors as a percent of the overall workforce. 

Government contractors are supposed to be used only if they are performing 

tasks that are NOT an inherent governmental function. Intelligence collection 

clearly is an inherently governmental function. This should not be done by outside 

individuals. 

It is my view that Intelligence Community (I C) functions are largely 

inherently governmental in nature and that the IC's reliance on contractors should 

be further minimized. 

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5. Do you agree that intelligence work is clearly an "inherently 

governmental function"? 

I wholeheartedly agree that contractors may not perform any inherently 

governmental function, and the direction and control of intelligence 

operations is an inherently governmental function. However, intelligence 

work includes many activities, some of which are in support ofNSA's 

intelligence mission but do not amount to inherently governmental 

functions. I believe we should regularly look at the balance between 

government and contractors as part ofNSA's overall workforce. 

6. What is the right balance in your opinion between contractors and 

government employees? 

NSA must always have qualified and experienced government personnel in key 

roles, and government personnel should always lead mission functions. NSA must 

also ensure that it has sufficient government personnel to maintain control over 

functions that are core to the Agency's mission and operations. If confirmed, I 

will seek the specifics of the current government employee-contractor mix, and 

attempt to achieve an ideal balance. 

7. Will you commit to assuring contractors are not permitted to perform 

inherently governmental functions? 

Absolutely. 

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From Senator Collins 

Lieutenant General Nakasone, in your responses to the Committee's 

prehearing questions regarding threats to America's election infrastructure, you 

stated that it would take a "whole-of-government solution," with NSA supporting 

the effort. 

1. Please describe that effort in detail; how do you foresee the NSA engaging 

with Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, and state government 

officials to address these threats, particularly with regard to the 

upcoming the November 2018 federal elections? Will you ask Congress for 

new authorities if you determine they are needed to adequately protect 

America's election infrastructure? 

Cyber defense requires a whole-of-government effort, with DHS as the Federal 

government lead for the critical infrastructure and key resources, including U.S. 

election systems. NSA plays a significant role in helping protect election 

infrastructure by making available to DHS, and other agencies, the cybersecurity 

information NSA acquires in the course of its signals intelligence (SIGINT) and 

cybersecurity missions. Consistent with its mission, DHS can use this information, 

as well as information obtained from other sources, to assist state governments in 

their efforts to address threats to election infrastructure. 

If confirmed, I will look to ensure that NSA is making full use of appropriate 

authorities and is thoroughly and effectively integrated with its partners to make 

available to DHS cyber threat information critical to protecting our elections. I will 

keep this Committee informed of those threats and ofNSA's efforts to assist these 

entities. As with all ofNSA's activities, ifi learn that NSA has insufficient 

statutory authority to conduct its missions I will share my findings with the 

Committee. 

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Protection of America's critical infrastructure necessitates rapid and fulsome 

sharing of cyber threat indicators between the public and private sector actors. 

2. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the NSA is doing 

everything possible to facilitate the efficient and effective sharing of cyber 

threat indicators, both within and external to the Intelligence Community, 

where U.S. critical infrastructure is at risk? 

The passage of the Cyber Information Sharing Act of2015 was an important first 

step that promotes sharing of cyber threat indicators both within the government 

and bi-directionally with the private sector. With the vast majority of the critical 

infrastructure owned or operated by the private sector, increasing this exchange of 

threat information at "cyber speed" will make these sharing efforts even more 

impactful. If I am confirmed, I will evaluate the methods and processes with 

which NSA is sharing cyber threat indicators with DOD, the IC, and DHS's 

National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center whose mission is 

to create shared situational awareness of malicious cyber activity, vulnerabilities, 

incidents, and mitigations among the public and private sector. 

In your responses to advance hearing questions from the Senate Armed 

Services Committee, you indicated that recruiting and retaining top talent will be 

among your priorities as Director of the National Security Agency. Leaders from 

across the Intelligence Community have described the commercial sector as an 

increasingly acute source of competition for the technical expertise and aptitude 

upon which NSA's success is predicated. 

3. What policies do you intend to propose to make NSA more attractive as an 

employer, particularly for technical experts who are in high demand in the 

private sector? 

I believe the solution to this issue is twofold. First and most importantly, I will 

emphasize the attraction ofNSA's unique and important mission to both the 

current and prospective workforce. For current employees, that means ensuring 

they can be proud of and feel invested in the work they are doing. For future 

employees, it means emphasizing the unique opportunities and technologies NSA 

allows its people to engage and implement in defense of the Nation. Second, I 

intend to work with this Committee to ensure that previous efforts to increase pay 

for certain high-attrition STEM roles are reinforced. While in my experience the 

mission is the most important reason people work for NSA, it is important to 

narrow the difference in pay between the public and private sector. 

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NSA is often in direct competition with other government agencies and the private 

sector for highly qualified cybersecurity professionals. While the private sector 

can offer higher compensation initiatives, NSA offers entirely unique missions 

along with a sense of serving the Nation and a greater purpose. There are other 

critical elements to retaining our STEM workforce. They must have a rewarding 

career progression and meaningful challenges to stay engaged. I believe in the need 

to offer specialized, sometimes costly, training opportunities to tie our workforce 

to retention commitments. 

From Senator Wyden 

U.S. person queries of EO 12333 collection 

1. Under what circumstances, if any, is NSA prohibited from conducting a 

warrantless U.S. person query of communications collected under EO 

12333? If the query is conducted without a warrant, what process is 

required? 

I understand that the Attorney General-approved procedures that govern NSA's 

collection, processing, and dissemination of SIGINT pursuant to EO 12333 impose 

significant restrictions on queries that are intended to retrieve the contents of 

communications to, from, or about US persons. Absent consent of the US person 

or certain emergency situations, my understanding is that such queries normally 

must be approved by the Attorney General on a case-by-case basis after a finding 

of probable cause. Metadata queries follow a different process and procedural 

requirements. In either event, however, all such queries must be undertaken for a 

foreign intelligence purpose. Redacted versions ofNSA's Attorney Generalapproved procedures are publicly available. 

PPD-28 

2. The NSA's January 12, 2015, PPD-28 Section 4 procedures are publicly 

available. Will you ensure that the NSA continues to post these procedures 

as well as any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or 

significant interpretations? 

Yes. According to Section 4(b) ofPPD-28, updated or newly issued policies and 

procedures shall be publicly released to the maximum extent possible, consistent 

with classification requirements. 

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Section 702 of FISA 

3. Will you undertake a renewed review of the feasibility of estimating the 

number of communications of Americans or persons inside the United States 

collected under Section 702 ofFISA? Will you commit to working with 

Congress and outside groups on this issue? 

I recognize the importance of this issue. I'm also aware that a significant effort was 

undertaken recently by NSA to do this. Ultimately, the DNI determined it was not 

feasible. I understand that NSA and ODNI have shared with this Committee why it 

is not feasible. If confirmed, I will want to better understand what efforts were 

explored and why answering this question was determined not feasible to ensure I 

can better work with Congress on this issue. 

Whistle blowers 

4. Please describe your commitment to ensuring that NSA personnel and 

contractor whistleblowers are encouraged, that there will be no reprisals, and 

that there will be full and timely cooperation with all investigations. 

I believe whistleblowing to appropriate entities is an important mechanism for 

accountability and ultimately strengthens the Agency and the Intelligence 

Community. If confirmed, I will not tolerate reprisals against those who make 

protected whistleblower disclosures through appropriate channels and will ensure 

that the NSA cooperates with all investigations, whether by this committee or the 

Inspector GeneraL 

False statements 

5. If you or one of your subordinates were to say something that was 

factually inaccurate in public, would you correct the public record? 

Yes. Ifl or one of my subordinates makes a materially inaccurate statement in 

public, I pledge it will be corrected or clarified in public. 

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Protecting the personal devices and accounts of senior government officials 

6. On October 27,2017, I wrote to Admiral Rogers and then-Acting 

Secretary of Homeland Security Duke, asking them to take swift action to 

protect the personal devices and online accounts of senior government 

officials from targeted cyber-attacks by foreign governments. I have yet to 

hear back from NSA or DHS about this topic. 

a. Do you agree that the personal devices and online accounts of 

senior U.S. government officials are potentially high-value cyber 

targets for foreign adversaries? 

b. Do you believe that the successful compromise of a senior U.S. 

government official's personal device or online account can 

threaten U.S. national security? 

c. If confirmed, what, if anything, will you do to protect the personal 

devices and accounts of senior government officials from cyberattacks by foreign adversaries? 

NSA has a long and successful history securing National Security Systems (NSS). 

They regularly collaborate with and support technical experts at the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) on cybersecurity issues. If personal devices and 

accounts, including those of senior government officials, contain work-related 

information, such devices and accounts would likely be of interest to our foreign 

adversaries. Successful compromise of such devices and accounts could potentially 

yield information of intelligence value to our adversaries. If confirmed, I will 

direct NSA's cybersecurity leadership to continue their cooperation with DHS and 

determine the authorities and processes under which NSA and DHS could assist 

senior government officials with personal cybersecurity best practices. 

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Relations with the FISA Court 

7. The declassified version of the April26, 2017, Memorandum and 

Opinion and Order of the FISA Court (p. 19) states: "At the October 26, 

2016 hearing, the Court ascribed the government's failure to disclose those 

IG and OCO reviews at the October 4, 2016 hearing to an institutional 'lack 

of candor' on NSA's part and emphasized that 'this is a very serious Fourth 

Amendment issue.'" 

a. What do you believe should be done to ensure that NSA provides 

to the Court complete, accurate and timely information? 

b. What accountability should apply to NSA personnel who fail to 

provide this information? 

It is paramount that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court have a complete 

and accurate understanding ofthe matters over which it has jurisdiction, and that 

information is made available to the Court in a timely manner. Accordingly, if 

confirmed, I will ensure there are rigorous processes and procedures in place to 

meet these commitments. Moreover, I can assure you that I will hold NSA 

personnel fully accountable for their failure to adhere to these processes and 

procedures. 

Information from foreign partners 

8. What limitations do you believe should apply to the receipt, use or 

dissemination of communications ofU.S. persons collected by a foreign 

partner? How should those limitations address instances in which the 

foreign partner specifically targeted U.S. persons or instances in which the 

foreign partner has collected bulk communications known to include those 

ofU.S. persons? 

When NSA obtains U.S. person information from a foreign partner, the Agency 

must handle it in accordance with U.S. law and applicable procedures, including 

Attorney General-approved procedures governing the conduct of DoD intelligence 

activities. In addition, no element of the IC may participate in or request any 

person, including a foreign partner, to undertake activities the element is itself 

forbidden to undertake. 

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Impact of foreign governments using commercial, off the shelf malware 

9. In his testimony at the March, 2013 Worldwide Threat Assessment ofthe 

U.S. Intelligence Community hearing before the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, then-Director of National Intelligence Clapper described the 

threat posed by the global market for cyber intrusion software: 

In addition, a handful of commercial companies sell computer intrusion kits 

on the open market. These hardware and software packages can give 

governments and cybercriminals the capability to steal, manipulate, or delete 

information on targeted systems. Even more companies develop and sell 

professional-quality technologies to support cyber operations--often 

branding these tools as lawful-intercept or defensive security research 

products. Foreign governments already use some of these tools to target US 

systems. (Emphasis added.) 

How significant is the threat posed by foreign governments using lawfulinterception software against targets in the U.S., including individuals, 

businesses, and U.S. government agencies? If confirmed, what will you do 

to ensure that hostile foreign governments and non-state actors are not able 

to acquire U.S. made lawful-interception software, or use that technology 

against U.S. targets? 

I certainly recognize the significance of this threat and the dangers it poses. 

Accordingly, if confirmed, I will work to ensure that NSA provides foreign cyber 

threat insights such as these to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, 

supporting their efforts to prevent the use of software to commit cyber crimes 

against Americans. 

Offensive cyber operations 

10. What responsibility does the U.S. government have if a U.S. offensive 

cyber operation inadvertently affects the computers of U.S. persons or 

corporations? 

It is critically important that our government is doing everything possible to ensure 

that our effects are limited to the intended targets. In any given case, my response 

would depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the operation. 

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From Senator King 

1. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) was 

established by the 9/11 Commission Act of2007. Its mission is to ensure 

that the federal government's counterterrorism efforts are balanced with the 

need to protect privacy and civil liberties. What are your views on the value 

of the PCLOB? 

Oversight ofNSA and the entire Intelligence Community (I C) is paramount to 

ensure, among other things, that intelligence activities are conducted in a manner 

that protects privacy and civil liberties. The current structure of oversight includes 

multiple entities across all three branches of government. I believe PCLOB, with 

its specific mission to oversee the government's adherence to the protection of 

civil liberties in efforts to prevent terrorism, is a valuable oversight capability. In 

addition, their July 2014 report on Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act illustrates how they can play an important role in promoting 

transparency, which serves to enhance the public understanding of intelligence 

activities, while continuing to protect the IC's valuable sources and methods. 

2. After CYBERCOM is elevated to unified command status, when do you 

believe it will be appropriate to end the dual hat relationship between 

CYBERCOM and NSA? Is this something that should be done 

immediately? Or, in contrast, should it be done gradually over several years 

and pursuant to meeting key milestones? 

I believe it will be appropriate to end the dual hat when it is clear that it is in the 

Nation's best interest to do so. That requires that DoD has completed its 

assessment, has concluded that separation is feasible and desirable, has made the 

certifications to Congress required by the 2017 NDAA, and has put in place the 

processes and procedures necessary to ensure that each organization can succeed in 

its assigned missions while continuing to benefit from close collaboration and 

support. A decision to terminate the dual-hat status should only be the result of a 

deliberate process with clear milestones. I project that some measures associated 

with separation might be immediately implementable while others may need to be 

accomplished gradually over time. If confirmed, my intent is to look closely at this 

and provide an assessment to both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the first 90 days of my tenure. 

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3. To what extent does CYBERCOM currently rely on NSA personnel to 

execute its mission? Once the split occurs, will CYBERCOM need to 

replicate everything that NSA has been doing? How will this work and how 

much will this cost? 

The National Security Agency (NSA) provides personnel support to 

USCYBERCOM with 454 authorizations through the Cyber Mission Partnership, 

and 69 authorizations through the Engagement and Process Coordination 

program. USCYBERCOM's requirement for NSA personnel support remains 

enduring with or without the dual-hat arrangement, and these programs have 

dedicated funding lines across the Future Years Defense 

Program. USCYBERCOM does not intend to replicate all the capabilities NSA 

provides, and continued access to NSA's high end capabilities is in the national 

interest to save the costs of building duplicative infrastructure. USCYBERCOM 

reimburses NSA for the services provided based on mutually agreed upon rates in 

Interservice Support Agreements. For Fiscal Year 2017, USCYBERCOM 

provided $99.3M in reimbursement to NSA for services rendered. Continued 

support for the Department of Defense's investment in cyberspace capabilities is 

crucial to maintaining a competitive advantage over determined adversaries in this 

domain. 

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epic.org Electronic Privacy Information Center 

March 14, 2018 

The Honorable Richard Burr, Chair 

The Honorable Mark Warner, Ranking Member 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

211 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairman Burr and Ranking Member Warner: 

In advance of the hearing regarding the nomination of Lieutenant General Paul M. Nakasone 

to be the Director of the National Security Agency, 1" we write to you again regarding the need to 

protect democratic institutions against cyber attack by foreign adversaries. 

The Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC'') is a public interest research center 

established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberties issues. 2 EPIC is 

a leading advocate for civil liberties and democratic values in the information age, and works closely 

with a distinguished Advisory Board, with specific expertise in cyber security and voting 

technology? 

After reports emerged about Russian interference with the 2016 election, EPIC launched a 

new project on Democracy and Cybersecurity.4 EPIC is currently pursuing four Freedom of 

Information Act matters to learn more about the Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential 

election. 5 One of our cases EPIC v. FBI, revealed that the FBI failed to follow the "victim 

notification procedures'' with both the DNC and the RNC. 

The Russian attacks on democratic institutions are expected to continue.6 The U.S. 

Intelligence community has reportedly shared the classified ODNI report with European 

1 Nomination of Lieutenant General Paul M Nakasone to be the Director C?f the National Securi~y Agency, 

ll5th Cong. (2018), S. Select Corum. on Intelligence, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/openhearing-nomination-lieutenant-general-pau!-m-nakasone-be-director-nationat-security (Mar, 15, 2018). 2 See EPIC, About EPIC, https://epic.org/epic/about.html. 

'See EPIC Advisol)' Board, https://epic.org/epic/advisol)' _ board.html. See, e.g., Douglas Jones and Barbara 

Simons, Broken Ballots: Will Your Vote Count? (2012); Ron Rivest and Phil Stark, Still Time for an Election 

Audit, USA Today, Nov. 18,2016. 4 See EPIC, Democracy and Cybersecurity: Preserving Democratic Institutions, https:l/epic.org/democracy/. 

'EPIC v. ODNI, No. 17-163 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 25, 2017); EPIC v. FBI, No. 17-121 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 18, 

2017); EPIC Seeks Release of FISA Order for Trump Tower, EPIC (March 6, 2017), 

https://epic.org/2017/03/epic-seeks-release-of-fisa-ord.html; EPIC v. IRS, No. 17-670 (D. D.C. Aug. 18, 

2017). 

6 Declassified ODNI Assessment, supra note 7, at 5. 

EPIC Statement 

Senate Intelligence Committee 

Privacy is a 

NSA Director Nomination 

March 14,2018 
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governments to help limit Russian interference with their elections. 7 The public has "the right to 

know" the extent of Russian interference with democratic elections in the United States and the steps 

that are being taken to prevent future attacks.8 The need to understand Russian efforts to influence 

democratic elections cannot be overstated. Midterm election campaigns in the U.S. arc underway 

and we have not taken adequate protections to ensure that Russia does not again interfere. 

Cybersecurity must be a top priority for the United States. The National Security report states 

the "government must do a better job of protecting data to safeguard information and the privacy of 

the American people.'"' Strong encryption keeps the information of the American people secure, 

which by extension makes the nation secure. And perhaps it is a firewall and not a border wall that 

the United States needs to safeguard its national interests at this moment in time. 10 

EPIC urges the Committee to ask the nominee: 

• Do you agree with the January 2017 assessment of the Intelligence Community that the 

Russians interfered with the 2016 Presidential election? 

• Do you believe that the United States ha.~ taken sufficient steps to prevent Russian 

meddling in the mid-term elections? 

• lf confirmed, what actions will you take to protect the United States against future cyber 

attacks that could destabilize our democratic institutions? 

• Do you commit to the American people to be open and transparent about the work of the 

NSA? 

We ask that this Statement from EPIC be entered in the hearing record. EPIC will keep the 

Committee apprised of the documents we receive in our FOIA cases. We look forward to working 

with you on the cybcrsecurity risks to democratic institutions. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ :Marc 1Wtenfigrg__ 

Marc Rotenberg 

EPIC President 

Is/ Teramie Scott 

Jeramie Scott 

EPIC National Security Cmmsel 

Is/ Caitriona fitzgera(c{ 

Caitriona Fitzgerald 

EPIC Policy Director 

1 Martin Matishak, U.S shares hacking intel with Europe as Russia shifts focus, POLITICO Pro (Feb. 6, 

2017). 

8 "A people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives," 

James Madison. See generallv EPIC, Open Government, https:/!epic.org/open gov/. 9 Id at 13. - - 10 Garry Kasparov (@kasparov63), "'If the US is serious about stopping a real danger from abroad, it should 

build a better firewall, not a bigger border wall." (12:34 PM- 22 Jan 2018), 

https:/ /twitter .com/Kasparov63/status/955539139121819649. 

EPIC Statement NSA Director Nomination 

Senate Intelligence Committee March 14, 2018 

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