J-S50017-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARK ANDREW RIVERS, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 9 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 4, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0005845-2010

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2019

Mark Andrew Rivers, Jr. (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following revocation of his probation. Upon review, we 

affirm. 

On August 24, 2011, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of 

possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, possession of 

a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana,1 as well as two summary 

traffic offenses. Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/19, at 2. The trial court sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate 2 to 4 years of incarceration, followed by 3 years 

of probation. Trial Court Order, 8/24/11, at 1. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (16), and (31), respectively. 
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On December 4, 2018, the trial court found Appellant to be “both a 

convicted and technical violator of the terms of his probation.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/17/19, at 2. The trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and 

resentenced him to an aggregate 2.5 to 6 years of incarceration. Id. In 

addition, the court ran Appellant’s sentence consecutive to the sentence he 

received for new convictions at criminal docket number 7465-2017. Id. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court 

denied on December 10, 2018. Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. 

Appellant presents two issues for our review: 

1. In revoking and re-sentencing [Appellant] to 21⁄2-6 years’ total 

statement [sic] confinement, whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to consider the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the underlying offenses and violation, and the character, 

personal history, and rehabilitative needs of [Appellant], as 

required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)? 

2. In ordering [Appellant’s] sentence of 21⁄2-6 years’ total state 

confinement at CC 201005845 to be served consecutively to his 

sentence of 3-6 years’ incarceration at CC 201707465, whether 

the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an unduly 

excessive sentence, particularly when the requirements of 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) were not met? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s brief fails to conform with 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), which requires the argument section of an appellate brief 

to “be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued[.]” Id.;
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see Appellant’s Brief at 23 n.4 (“[B]ecause [Appellant’s] two discretionaryaspect-of-sentencing claims are substantially intertwined, they will be argued 

together in this brief for [A]ppellant[.]”). However, Appellant’s error does not 

impair our ability to review his issues. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

985 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also LSI Title Agency, Inc. v. 

Evaluation Services, Inc., 951 A.2d 384 (Pa. Super. 2008). Further, we 

agree that Appellant’s sentencing claims are “substantially intertwined,” and 

therefore we address them together.

“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

“An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction 

when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id. We conduct 

this four-part test to determine whether:

(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the 

time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the 

appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth 

a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises 

a substantial question for our review. 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a 

plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing 

code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” 
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Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

omitted).

Appellant has complied with the first three prongs of this test by raising 

his discretionary sentencing claims in a timely post-sentence motion, filing a 

timely notice of appeal, and including in his brief a Rule 2119(f) concise 

statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-22. Therefore, we examine whether 

Appellant has presented substantial questions.

The Commonwealth argues that Appellant has failed to present a 

substantial question. Commonwealth Brief at 5-9. We agree that Appellant’s 

second claim, in which he avers that the trial court erred in imposing his 

revocation sentence consecutive to his new sentence at docket number 7465-

2017, does not raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 469 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[A] claim that a sentence is 

excessive due to it[s] consecutive nature generally does not raise a substantial 

question for purposes of Section 9781(b) of the Sentencing Code.”). 

However, in his first claim, Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to 

consider the factors delineated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). See Appellant’s 

Brief at 15-22. This claim raises a substantial question. Commonwealth v. 

Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 995 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“[An appellant] presents a 

substantial question for our review . . . to the extent that he challenges the 

sentencing court’s failure to consider Section 9721(b) factors.”) (citation 

omitted).
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We review Appellant’s claim mindful of the following: 

The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation 

is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which, 

absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. 

An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment — a 

sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless the record 

discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Simmons, 56 A.3d 1280, 1283-84 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations omitted). “Also, upon sentencing following a revocation of 

probation, the trial court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could 

have imposed originally at the time of the probationary sentence.” Id. at 

1286-87 (citation omitted).

Upon revoking probation, a sentencing court may choose from any 

of the sentencing options that existed at the time of the original 

sentencing, including incarceration. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). 

However, the imposition of total confinement upon revocation 

requires a finding that either “(1) the defendant has been 

convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant 

indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is 

not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate 

the authority of the court.” 42 Pa.C.S. 9771(c).

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote 

omitted). 

Section 9721(b) provides:

In selecting from the alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the 

court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed 

should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection 

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . . In every case in which 

the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor . . . the 

court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court 
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at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons 

for the sentence imposed.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). We have explained: 

The [trial] court is not required to parrot the words of the 

Sentencing Code, stating every factor that must be considered 

under Section 9721(b). However, the record as a whole must 

reflect due consideration by the court of the statutory 

considerations enunciated in that section. 

Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 145-46 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citations omitted). In addition, “[w]hen a sentencing court has reviewed a 

pre[-]sentence investigation report, we presume that the court properly 

considered and weighed all relevant factors in fashioning the defendant’s 

sentence.” Baker, 72 A.3d at 663 (citing Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 

A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006)).

In imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the 

particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the 

defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior 

criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for 

rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing judge had the 

benefit of a presentence investigation report, it will be presumed 

that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding 

the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along 

with mitigating statutory factors. Additionally, the sentencing 

court must state its reasons for the sentence on the record. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The sentencing judge can satisfy the 

requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the 

record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the presentencing report; thus properly considering and weighing all 

relevant factors.

Fowler, 893 A.2d at 767-68 (citing Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 

154 (Pa. Super. 2004)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Here, the trial court noted on the record that it had reviewed both an 

original and updated pre-sentence investigation report. N.T., 12/4/18, at 2. 

In its opinion, the court recognized the law and explained its reasoning: 

When imposing a sentence, this [c]ourt is required to 

consider, among other things, the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victims and 

community and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Appellant’s mere unhappiness with his 

sentence does not constitute grounds for relief. . . . 

This [c]ourt considered these statutory factors in sentencing 

Appellant, and was aided in doing so by having the benefit of an 

original and an updated Pre-Sentence Investigation Report 

(“PSI”). . . . 

In sentencing Appellant, this [c]ourt considered, in addition 

to the Pre-Sentence Report, the fact that Appellant reoffended and

chose not to avail himself of treatment or supervision in the 

community. Initially, in order to allow Appellant an opportunity 

to avail himself of the State Boot Camp Program, this [c]ourt gave 

Appellant a below the mitigated range sentence of two to four 

years with a recommendation for boot camp, and consecutive 

probation. This [c]ourt imposed the original sentence despite 

Appellant’s status as an RFEL, with a Prior Record Score of five, 

the maximum possible score possible. Since that sentence, 

Appellant has had three new convictions, the most recent being a 

violent home invasion burglary and robbery. Appellant’s criminal 

behavior has escalated from stealing a purse and fleeing from the 

police to planning and executing a home invasion burglary with 

his wife. Appellant has demonstrated that he is not willing or able 

to follow the reasonable rules of society. Therefore, this [c]ourt 

did not err in imposing a sentence of 2.5 to 6 years of 

incarceration. 

Next, Appellant asserts that this Court abused its discretion 

in imposing a sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed at 

CP-02-CR-7465-2017, resulting in an unduly excessive sentence. 

. . . The aggregation of the two sentences imposed by this [c]ourt 

reflects both the serious nature of the offense involved as well as 

the separate victims of those offenses and Appellant’s failure to 

comply with community supervision conditions. Moreover, the 

two crimes are entirely separate offenses, and Appellant is not 
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entitled to a volume discount at sentencing. Commonwealth v. 

Belsar, 676 A.2d 632, 634 (Pa. 1996). 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/19, at 5-6 (some citations omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no error. In addition to 

reviewing Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation reports, the trial court, at 

the sentencing, noted Appellant’s repeated probation violations, his multiple 

criminal convictions since his original sentencing, the severity of the behavior 

attendant to his new criminal convictions, and the escalating nature of the

behavior. N.T., 12/4/18, at 4, 6, 10-11, 13. Also, while Appellant argues that 

he received an “excessive” sentence, the trial court imposed a mitigated-range 

sentence. Id. at 18 (“That is still a mitigated range sentence, even in light of 

everything else.”). Ultimately, and in its discretion, the trial court ran

Appellant’s sentence consecutive to the sentence he received for the more 

recent convictions at 7465-2017. See Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 

127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“We have stated that the imposition of 

consecutive rather than concurrent sentences lies within the sound discretion 

of the sentencing court.”) (citations omitted). In sum, the record reflects that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/30/2019