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A F R I C A’ S G R O W I N G M A R I T I M E 

S E C U R I T Y C H A L L E N G E

In February 2008, the Nigerian Trawler Owners’ Association (NTOA) called in its fishing vessels 

and refused to go to sea. The previous year had been 

a tough one. A reported 107 armed robberies had 

reduced the fishing fleet from 250 trawlers in 2003 

to 170 by the end of 2007. January 2008 started off 

even worse, as NTOA ships suffered another 50 attacks and 10 murders in that month alone. Well 

documented among NTOA’s numerous complaints 

was that when an attack occurred, there was nobody 

to call for help.

A variety of recommendations by NTOA have 

evolved into a campaign to convince the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to establish a 

coast guard. The main argument is that the Nigerian 

navy—one of the most sophisticated navies in Africa, 

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the 

Roles of African Maritime Security Forces

By Augustus Vogel

A P U B L I C AT I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S

◆ Maritime security challenges in Africa are growing rapidly and represent an increasingly central component of the threat matrix facing the continent.

◆ African states struggle to meet these threats because their maritime security structures are misaligned 

with the challenges posed.

◆ Redressing this misalignment will require valuing the coast guard capacity demanded by these threats 

and constructing the array of intragovernmental partnerships needed to be effective in combating 

these threats.

H I G H L I G H T S

N O . 2 / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 9

with a demonstrated capability to sail to Europe and 

South America—is not designed to combat maritime 

armed robbery and piracy. It is essentially a blue water 

navy, one that was capable of shelling rebel forces in 

Sierra Leone in the 1990s but is powerless to deal 

with local crime. 

Nigeria’s experience reflects Africa’s maritime 

security environment. Of the 33 independent maritime nations in sub-Saharan Africa, only five—Cape 

Verde, Liberia (when legislation is finalized), São 

Tome and Principe, the Republic of Mauritius, and 

the Republic of Seychelles—have maritime forces 

that identify themselves as coast guards rather than 

navies. Yet Africa’s maritime security challenges are 

most often comprised of threats such as illegal fishing, 

narcotrafficking, and maritime disaster response—

threats requiring the technical skills and collaborative 
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relationships with civilian organizations typical of a 

coast guard. 

Properly meeting these threats is vitally important to Africa: illegal fishing undercuts Africa’s economic development and exacerbates its food security challenges; piracy makes badly needed trade and 

investment in Africa more risky and expensive; the 

continent is becoming an increasingly active drug trafficking hub; the growing drug trade, in turn, is giving 

international criminal syndicates a foothold within 

certain African governments, weakening their ability 

to address other national priorities; and illegal commerce (such as oil bunkering, transport of counterfeit 

materials, and theft) impacts legitimate businesses and 

world markets. In short, many of Africa’s emerging 

threats arrive by sea.

Africa’s maritime security also has direct implications for the rest of the world. In 2007, an estimated 60 percent of the cocaine in the European 

market (valued at $1.8 billion) had passed through 

West Africa. Many of these drugs arrive in Africa 

in cargo ships, are landed in small boats and fishing 

vessels, and often shipped abroad in the same. Much 

of the $775 million in smuggled cigarettes and the 

approximately $438 million in counterfeit malarial 

medication that transit West Africa annually is seaborne. Illegal fishing, primarily by European, Asian, 

and African commercial vessels, is estimated to cost 

sub-Saharan Africa more than $1 billion per year.

Adapting Africa’s maritime security capacity to 

meet these emerging challenges is an escalating priority 

with more serious implications for the continent and 

global security than is commonly recognized.

N AV Y V E R S U S C O A S T G U A R D

Navies and coast guards play fundamentally 

different, though complementary, roles. Navies are 

international operators primarily concerned with 

national defense. Coast guards, on the other hand, 

function more as maritime police, preventing crime 

and promoting public safety. Analyzed below are five 

dimensions that differentiate the two forces. While 

not universally applicable, they provide a useful 

framework for assessing the roles and contributions 

of African maritime security forces.

Mission Sets and Locations

Navies in a traditional sense are important 

instruments for implementing foreign policy: they 

fight a nation’s wars and project power beyond a 

state’s territorial boundaries. During times of peace, 

navies also play strategic and diplomatic roles. For 

example, President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched 

the “Great White Fleet” around the world in 1907 

to demonstrate the reemergence of the U.S. Navy 

as an important international player. In 2009, the 

Russian navy and China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army 

Navy held joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden. And 

the U.S. and many European navies regularly provide training for navies in Latin America, Africa, 

and Asia.

In the African context, foreign policy as a 

“navy” function is also demonstrated by deploying 

ships abroad on diplomatic and exercise-related port 

visits, such as recent visits by the South African 

navy to China, Brazil, and the United Kingdom or 

by the Nigerian navy to Brazil and the United Kingdom. Peacekeeping missions are also performed, as 

in Liberia and Sierra Leone by the Senegalese and 

Nigerian navies, respectively. Unfortunately, operational limitations prevent most African navies from 

executing international at-sea missions. Instead, 

they primarily meet their foreign policy obligations 

by serving as military diplomats at ceremonial functions and international meetings.

However, these “navy” activities represent only a 

small fraction of the commitments African maritime 

Augustus Vogel is a U.S. Naval Forces Europe and 

Africa Sixth Fleet liaison in the Africa Center for Strategic 

Studies at the National Defense University. He has been 

with Africa Partnership Station, the fleet’s flagship effort 

to support maritime security in Africa, since its inception.

“Adapting Africa’s maritime 

security capacity to meet these 

emerging challenges is an 

escalating priority with more 

serious implications for the 

continent and global security than 

is commonly recognized.”
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security forces must meet. A much larger part of their 

mission set is coast guard in nature and relates to law 

enforcement, environmental protection, and maritime 

safety obligations that occur within a nation’s territorial waters (within 12 nautical miles of the coastline) 

and exclusive economic zone (EEZ; waters within 200 

nautical miles of the coastline). African maritime security forces enforce laws combating the aforementioned illegal traffic in narcotics, cigarettes, fish, and 

other contraband that passes inside their EEZ, as well as 

support environmental protection efforts that prevent 

illegal fishing, dumping of waste, and other forms of 

destructive resource exploitation. They are also called 

on to respond to maritime disasters. For example, the 

Kenyan navy saved some passengers and recovered the 

remains of others after the Mtongwe passenger ferry 

sank in 1994, and the Senegalese navy was criticized 

for its lack of response to the sinking of the MV Joola 

in 2002 (where as many as 1,800 lives were lost).

Assets

The mission of maritime security forces is reflected in the vessels it operates. Navies, which sail 

international waters, are trained to perform war 

functions and carry troops and equipment. Amphibious landing ships will carry personnel and equipment 

for beach assaults, while surface combatants (such as 

frigates, cruisers, and destroyers) provide strike and 

logistics capabilities.

Given its law enforcement, environmental protection, and safety roles, a coast guard fleet must be 

capable of performing search and rescue (SAR) activities and patrolling coastal waters, lakes, and rivers. 

Their vessels include cutters, tugs, buoy tenders, and 

icebreakers, as well as small boats for harbor patrols 

and interception activities close to shore. Coast guard 

fleets do not include vessels as big as the larger naval 

platforms, but their cutters and enforcement platforms are equivalent in size and capability to some 

naval surface combatants like frigates.

Characterizing African maritime security forces 

according to this dichotomy is difficult. Most nations 

have a variety of inflatable boats and corvettes that 

can comfortably operate at sea for 1 to 3 days (that is, 

performing coast guard functions), but also have ships 

with navy characteristics, such as the landing craft 

owned by Senegal and Nigeria or the submarines operated by the South African navy. The assets African 

maritime security forces operate are frequently a mix 

of designs and capabilities and reflect the vagaries of 

international donations and purchases. For example, 

the Ghana navy operates buoy tenders received from 

the U.S. Coast Guard through the Excess Defense 

Articles program. The Nigerian navy has purchased 

a variety of vessels from British, French, German, 

Italian, and other shipbuilding companies. And the 

Mauritian coast guard’s flagship was built in Chile.

This situation has created a conundrum. Maritime assets are prohibitively expensive to purchase, 

operate, and maintain, and maximizing their efficient 

use is critical. But African states lack the shipyards 

to build their own vessels and frequently depend on 

donations or purchases of used equipment. Even with 

extremely limited budgets, they rely on assets with 

hard-to-find replacement parts, operate a fleet of vessels with minimal interoperability, and use equipment 

whose operation is economically inefficient for the 

missions at hand.

Institutional Affiliation

Navies are military organizations that report to 

a ministry or department of defense. Coast guards, in 

contrast, typically function as paramilitary arms of 

civilian institutions because of their diverse responsibilities related to issues like safety and regulation 

of commerce. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard 

reports to the Department of Homeland Security 

(except in times of war), the Canadian coast guard 

reports to the department of fisheries and oceans, and 

the Malaysian coast guard is a branch of the civil 

service. When there is no cohesive mandate, many 

coast guard duties will be divided between a variety 

of services, such as in South Africa, where eight different agencies perform coast guard functions.

Since African maritime security forces (even 

those that identify themselves as coast guards) 

universally report to ministries of defense, 

institutionally they are all effectively “navies.” In many 

cases, this structure was initiated by colonial bureaucracies responsible for defending empires. The Nigerian 

navy, for example, was created in 1956 by an act of the 

British Parliament. The predecessors of the Ghana and 
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Kenyan navies were the Gold Coast Naval Volunteer 

Force and the Royal East African Navy, respectively. In 

the postcolonial period, the rationale for these forces 

has shifted from serving the needs of colonial powers 

with global ambitions to burnishing national prestige. 

The Nigerian navy, for example, asserts in its official 

Web site that Nigeria deserves “a Navy [in] which we 

can be justifiably proud and which is worthy of this 

great country” and that it would be inadequate for Nigeria to have “a token Navy which is capable of plying 

on our lagoon and River Ogun and no more!”

This perspective is emblematic of the strong 

institutional impulse by Africa’s navies to maintain 

distinctly military structures and identities. Because 

these organizations conceptualize themselves to be 

purely military, they naturally gravitate to the “navy” 

mission sets identified above, even if these missions 

are objectively not as important to the immediate 

security needs of the country. Leaders prioritize national defense mandates, and operational emphasis 

is given to performing foreign policy missions rather 

than law enforcement, environmental protection, 

and maritime safety.

Training 

Outside of basic training, mission-related training will differentiate between a navy and coast guard. 

Conventionally, a navy will train its sailors primarily 

in the skills needed to perform foreign policy missions 

and defend the nation, whereas coast guard training 

will prioritize such things as fisheries management, 

law enforcement, and SAR.

As a general rule, African maritime security 

forces are trained as navies and do not receive adequate training in the numerous coast guard missions 

with which they are tasked. Much of their training is 

focused on core seamanship and internal operations. 

When training abroad, for example, African officers 

typically visit naval colleges and receive military 

officer training. While they can get underway and 

stop suspect vessels, many African navies lack the 

nuanced and specific skills needed to perform their 

missions. Examples of these skills include crime scene 

investigative techniques during drug seizures, an upto-date understanding of legal fishing-net mesh sizes, 

and appropriate search patterns when looking for a 

vessel lost at sea.

Partnerships

As a military organization, a navy maintains 

its most active partnerships with other military 

branches (such as an army or air force). On the 

other hand, most of a coast guard’s collaborations 

are with civilian organizations. These partnerships 

include departments of fisheries, gendarmeries and 

maritime police forces, port authorities, environmental protection agencies, and international maritime regulatory bodies.

The issue of partnerships is emblematic of the 

challenges that African maritime security forces face. 

They are uniformed and identify themselves as military organizations, but to perform their missions successfully, they must rely on relationships with civilian 

organizations. Unfortunately, when these relationships are not cultivated, they can quickly degenerate into mistrust and acrimony and limit the ability 

of African maritime security forces to perform their 

missions effectively. They may, for example, stop a 

vessel suspected of illegal fishing but not have a fisheries representative on board to help define the law. 

Notable exceptions exist. Senegalese naval officers 

are ensconced in the Fisheries Directorate’s surveillance unit and also pilot the national oceanographic 

research vessel. Likewise, the Nigerian navy and 

the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety 

Agency collaborate on electronic surveillance. These 

partnerships have proven to be an important mechanism for effectively utilizing scarce financial resources 

and maintaining skills important to the security challenges faced by these two countries. Pooling resources 

prevents duplications of effort and maximizes the efficiency of lean budgets.

“Conventionally, a navy will train 

its sailors primarily in the skills 

needed to perform foreign policy 

missions and defend the nation, 

whereas coast guard training will 

prioritize such things as fisheries 

management, law enforcement, 

and search-and-rescue.”
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A WAY F O RWA R D

African maritime security forces are currently 

misaligned to meet the security threats they face. 

They have navy bureaucratic affiliations and training programs but have a predominance of coast guard 

missions, operate in coast guard zones, and require 

coast guard partnerships (see table). Accordingly, 

they are not efficiently organized and trained to 

meet their challenges. They are also hampered by 

their dependence upon the poorly matched foreign 

equipment they purchase or are given. Inefficiency 

and small budgets reinforce each other, allowing 

maritime security challenges to remain substantially 

unchecked. Billions of dollars of fish are stolen every year from a continent facing some of the world’s 

highest levels of malnutrition. International drug 

syndicates are gaining a foothold among what are 

already some of the world’s most fragile states. 

R E C O N C I L I N G T H E D I S C O N N E C T

Match Assets to Needs. African states naturally 

have the best vantage point for planning how to address their maritime security challenges. Whether a 

maritime security force is considered a “navy” or a 

“coast guard” is secondary. More important is properly 

identifying threats and matching resources to meet 

those threats. Every bureaucracy must conduct a similar planning process. For Africa, a series of threat assessments would be highly beneficial, as no one really 

knows what is going on in African waters. Many of the 

statistics frequently advanced on drug traffic, illegal 

fishing, illicit commerce, and other prohibited activities are at best educated guesses. It is also not known 

how much activity is occurring relatively close to shore 

(within territorial waters) or over the horizon in EEZs. 

A comprehensive survey using satellite imagery to 

quantify ship traffic would be a good place to start.

Build More Interministerial Collaboration. 

Greater intragovernmental partnership and coordination are needed to achieve successful “coast guard” 

solutions, especially given the military identity of African maritime security forces. A number of countries 

have recently initiated the process of connecting the 

variety of agencies responsible for maritime security 

operations under a single coordinating body. Senegal, for example, has La Haute Autorité Chargée de 

la Coordination de la Sécurité Maritime, de la Sûreté 

Maritime et de la Protection de l’Environnement Marin 

(The High Authority Charged with Coordination of 

Maritime Security, Maritime Safety, and Protection 

of the Marine Environment). Ghana has the Ghana 

Maritime Authority. And Nigeria has the Nigerian 

Maritime Administration and Safety Agency. 

These bodies help coordinate activities of navies, coast guards, harbor authorities, transport and 

commerce ministries, fisheries agencies, and generally 

anyone involved with maritime security. Naturally, 

there is tension regarding the balance between the 

Coast Guard Navy African Maritime Forces

Missions Maritime safety, law 

enforcement, environmental 

protection, and border 

security within Exclusive 

Economic Zone

War, international sea 

lanes, and foreign policy 

on high seas/outside of 

national boundaries

Primarily maritime safety, law 

enforcement, environmental 

protection, and border security 

within Exclusive Economic 

Zone, some foreign policy and 

peacekeeping abroad

Assets Tugs, patrol cutters, aids 

to navigation, harbor patrol 

and other small boats, fixed 

and rotary wing aircraft 

for search and rescue, 

interdiction

Amphibious landing ships, 

surface combatants, 

vessels for aerial warfare, 

submarines, support 

vessels 

Hodgepodge of donations, corvettes, 

small patrol boats, some amphibious 

landing craft, and submarines

Bureaucratic 

affiliation

Various: homeland security, 

department of fisheries 

and oceans, ministry of 

infrastructure and transport

Ministry/department of 

defense

Ministry/department of defense

Training Operations of assets, coast 

guard missions

Operation of assets, war Operations of assets, war

Partnerships National (judicial, fisheries, 

ports, etc.)

Military (army, air force, 

etc.)

National (judicial, fisheries, ports, 

etc.)
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coordinating bodies’ role in organizing other agencies 

and the former’s right to mandate certain actions from 

a position of authority. Striking a balance will vary 

from country from country, but efforts should be made 

to strengthen these bodies and define their roles with 

the full support of other maritime organizations.

Engage in Capacity-building. Various countries, 

including the United States, several European nations, 

and China, are investing resources to help strengthen 

Africa’s maritime security. These supporting countries 

should work to ensure that their maritime security 

capacity-building programs help redress the misalignments noted above. Otherwise, this support risks widening the imbalance. The U.S. Navy, for example, has 

considerably more resources than the U.S. Coast Guard 

for maritime security capacity-building because it has a 

more entrenched mandate for investing resources in 

operations abroad. This is true even though the U.S. 

Coast Guard’s mission and skill set might appear to be 

a more natural fit with Africa’s maritime security challenges. Nevertheless, the following are some suggestions for the United States and international partners:

◆ Differentiate between support that focuses on 

core aspects of African naval capacity and that which 

directly concerns specific maritime security threats. 

This strategy will help bridge the current disconnect 

between training and mission requirements in Africa.

◆ In both training and provision of equipment, be responsive to specific maritime security 

challenges that African states identify. Maritime 

security in Africa will not be advanced without enthusiastic and self-motivated support from African 

states themselves. 

◆ Match donor interagency partnerships with 

what African maritime security forces must build. For 

example, when operating in U.S. waters, the U.S. 

Coast Guard partners with numerous agencies. These 

partnerships can be recreated to engage the required 

spectrum of African agencies. In this way, expertise 

can be properly paired within a unified approach.

Africa is confronted with a variety of maritime security challenges, many of which require “coast guard” 

operations. These challenges are growing exponentially and, if left unchecked, could cripple Africa’s 

recent development progress and movement toward 

democracy. They also threaten to exacerbate the level 

of instability that exists on the continent. Too often, 

Africa’s maritime security forces are not optimally 

positioned to meet these challenges. A disconnect 

between how these organizations identify themselves 

and the missions they face indicates that African states 

need to better align their national maritime security 

plans, partnerships, and assets. International partners, 

meanwhile, must calibrate their support accordingly. 

If African states can better align their maritime security capacities to their challenges, then 

Nigerian trawlers will have someone they can radio 

the next time they are faced with armed robbery at 

sea. In the process, Africa’s 26,000 kilometers of 

coastline can again be a source of prosperity rather 

than vulnerability.

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 21

Fort McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202 685-7300

Website: www.africacenter.org

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN DAKAR

Regional Manager: 

Elisabeth Feleke

Phone: 221 33 869 61 00

Email: FelekeE@ndu.edu

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN ADDIS ABABA

Deputy Regional 

Representative: 

Mahlet Yared

Phone: 251 11 517 42 08 

Email: Mahlet.Yared@ndu.edu

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202 685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the development 

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fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S. strategic priorities 

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is committed to building networks of African, American, European, 

and international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

CENTRE D’ETUDES STRATEGIQUES DE L’AFRIQUE

http://www.africacenter.org