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45–256 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–143] 

THE STATUS OF THE WAR AND 

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 9, 2008 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 9, 2008, The Status of the War and Political Developments 

in Iraq ................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 9, 2008 ....................................................................................... 55 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008 

THE STATUS OF THE WAR AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Crocker, Hon. Ambassador Ryan, United States Ambassador to Iraq ................ 11 

Petraeus, Gen. David, USA, Commander, Multi-National Forces, Iraq ............. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Crocker, Hon. Ambassador Ryan .................................................................... 78 

Petraeus, Gen. David ....................................................................................... 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Charts submitted by Mr. Spratt beginning on page ...................................... 95 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. Drake ........................................................................................................ 103 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 107 

Dr. Gingrey ....................................................................................................... 101 

Mr. Hayes .......................................................................................................... 111 

Mr. McIntyre ..................................................................................................... 111 

Mr. Murphy ....................................................................................................... 102 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 110 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 105 

(1) 

THE STATUS OF THE WAR AND POLITICAL 

DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 9, 2008. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Today the House Armed Services Committee 

meets in open session for an update on Iraq from two of America’s 

finest, General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. 

Gentlemen, we thank you for appearing. I am glad to see you 

both and believe that our Nation is well served by your leadership. 

This committee does not forget all the personnel who serve valiantly under General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker and who 

work day and night on our behalf. They and their families have 

sacrificed tremendously in an effort to carry out a most challenging 

mission. Where there has been progress, it is due to their efforts, 

and we thank them. 

We shall now begin this hearing with recalling how we got here. 

Iraq was invaded on incorrect information. The turbulent aftermath following the initial victory was not considered despite warnings of the aftermath, including two such warnings from me. Now 

we are in our sixth year of attempting to quell this horrendous 

aftermath. 

Preparing for this hearing, I went back and read my opening 

statement for our last hearing with you in September. I think I 

could have delivered the same statement as I did then, which 

means I either repeat myself or things haven’t changed that much 

in Iraq. 

One thing I do think worth repeating here is to remind members 

and everyone watching the hearing that all of us, everyone, desires 

to bring the war in Iraq to a close in a way that will best preserve 

our national security in this country. We must approach Iraq by 

considering our overall national security. Iraq is clearly an important piece of that puzzle, but only one piece. 

Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs and General Hayden, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), have 

both said publicly that the next attack on our homeland will likely 

come from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border where Osama bin 

Laden is hiding. Troops in Iraq or those in units recovering from 
2 

being in Iraq cannot be sent to Afghanistan to apprehend bin 

Laden. Protecting this Nation from direct attack is job number one, 

yet our allocation of forces does not match this imperative. Yesterday Senator Warner asked whether our efforts in Iraq are making 

this Nation safer. When looking at the needs in Afghanistan, the 

effort in Iraq, however, is important as putting at risk our ability 

to decisively defeat those most likely to attack us. 

Iraq is also preventing us from effectively preparing for the next 

conflict. We have had 12 military contingencies in the last 31 

years. Some of them major and most of them unexpected. The 

Army would face a steep climb in trying to respond to another contingency. Readiness for most nondeployed units has fallen to unprecedented levels, and nearly all training is focused on counterinsurgency operations. Those contingencies have come on average 

about every five years. We are due for another. In my view, we are 

not doing what we must to prepare. 

Turning back to Iraq itself, we should all recall that the surge 

is just the latest in a line of plans, and we are in our sixth year 

of war in Iraq. We have seen just about everything from Secretary 

Rumsfeld’s denial that there was an insurgency to Ambassador 

Bremer’s throwing fuel on the fire by firing every Baathist and 

member of the Iraqi army. We tried assaulting Fallujah twice. We 

tried rushing the Iraqi army into combat only to watch it fail. 

We tried pretty much everything before we got to trying a counterinsurgency doctrine backed by increased forces. That worked 

tactically. Our forces have helped reduce violence. In my view, we 

cannot call the surge a strategic success without political reconciliation. The objective of the surge was to create the political space 

for the Iraqis to reconcile. Our troops have created that space, but 

the Iraqis have yet to step up. There have been some local gains 

and some legislative accomplishments, but those mostly haven’t 

been implemented, so we don’t know if those will really help or not. 

And a reconciliation based on a sharing of resources, a guarantee 

of political participation, equal treatment under the law and protection from violence, regardless of sect, simply hasn’t happened. 

The United States has poured billions of dollars into Iraqi reconstruction, and yet our senior military leadership considers an Iraqi 

commitment of a mere $300 million for the reconstruction as a big 

deal. This Nation is facing record deficits, and the Iraqis have 

translated their oil revenues into budget surpluses rather than effective services. Under these circumstances and with a strategic 

risk to our Nation and our military readiness, we and the American people must ask, why should we stay in Iraq in large numbers? 

Some of our witnesses want to argue for keeping large numbers 

in Iraq. I hope you can also explain the next strategy. The counterinsurgency strategy worked tactically, but the surge forces are 

going home. Political reconciliation hasn’t happened, and violence 

has levelled off and may be creeping back. So how can we encourage and not force the intransigent political leaders of Iraq to forge 

a real Nation out of the base sectarian instincts. 

So what is the new strategy? Last time you were here, General, 

you spoke of speeding up the Baghdad clock while putting more 

time on the Washington clock. You have succeeded in putting more 
3 

time on the Washington clock, but the strategic failure is that the 

Iraqi politicians don’t seem to have picked up a sense of urgency. 

In my view, that sense of urgency will only come when we take the 

training wheels off and let the Iraqis begin to stand on their own 

two feet. While we hold them up, there is no real incentive for 

them to find their balance. 

In closing my comments in the September hearing, I quoted Tom 

Friedman, a journalist, saying that he would be convinced of 

progress in Iraq by the various sectarian leaders stepping forward, 

declaring their willingness to work out their differences on a set 

timeline and asking us to stay until they do. They hadn’t done that 

by last September, and I don’t see a lot of change on that front. 

So, ladies and gentlemen, I now turn to my good friend and ranking member, Mr. Duncan Hunter, for any comments that he might 

have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

And gentlemen, I think when I see this team of leaders together 

appearing before us as they did last year, I think of the words 

duty, honor, and country because you represent I think great models for young Americans who would go into public service, either 

on the State Department side or on the military side. And behind 

you are lots and lots of family members representing all of the 

thousands of people in the military and in foreign service, thousands of family members who haven’t seen their loved ones for a 

long time. And I know you have endured some big separations, as 

have your personnel. We want to thank you for your service to this 

country. 

You know, Mr. Chairman, it was 15 months ago when the President announced the surge. And even a few days after it had been 

announced, some Members of Congress were declaring failure of 

this increase in American forces going into the country. And yet I 

think by all metrics it has been a success. And I am reminded that 

in Anbar Province where you had by some accounts and by statistics the most dangerous of situations, the situation is extremely benign. In fact, I have seen Marines coming back in large numbers 

from Anbar Province without combat action ribbons for a simple 

reason: they didn’t make contact with the enemy because there 

isn’t contact and contention to be had at most parts of that province now. And generally the violence level has dropped throughout 

Iraq as a result of the surge operation. 

Now, you know, we have looked at this initial foray of the Iraqi 

army undertaken under the leadership of this newly formed Iraqi 

Government in Basra. And that has been described by some critics 

as a failure because they didn’t complete all the objectives that 

they undertook. 

Mr. Chairman, I see it exactly the opposite. I see this as inevitable and necessary of the engagement on the field of combat by 

the Iraqi military undertaking their own operations. And as I understand it, and I hope you would elaborate and explain today your 

evaluation of the performance of the Iraqi army, but only with a 
4 

few enablers being contributed by the United States, they undertook their own operations, meaning they had to stand on the field 

of battle. They had to face bullets. They had to utilize their own 

chain of command, their own logistics capability and their own battlefield effectiveness in this operation. 

And, General, I remember when we had the first battle of 

Fallujah and green Iraqi troops were rushed to that battle to participate with Marines in that operation, and the next day, those 

troops did not show up. They weren’t trained. They didn’t have discipline, and they moved out of that battle area very quickly and 

very abruptly. And today, while we see Iraqi forces which are 

standing and fighting, which are exercising that chain of command 

and that logistical capability, and I would hope that today you 

could give us your unvarnished opinion on the stand up of the Iraqi 

military, because, in my estimation, a reliable Iraqi military is a 

key to the United States leaving Iraq in victory. 

So I would hope that we would have some detail devoted to your 

evaluation of how they are doing. They have now stood up 134 battalions. A number of them have been engaged in some fairly heavy 

warfare. Others are located in more benign regions of the country 

and haven’t been engaged in extensive operations. But I would 

hope you could give us today your testimony and your description 

and your evaluation of how well the Iraqi army is standing up. 

Also, I hope, General, that you will go into the issue of desertions. I have seen that one figure was that there was four percent 

desertions in the Basra operations. I would hope you could tell us 

to what extent those were members of the military police or to 

what extent those were members of the Iraqi army, so we can get 

an understanding of, in your estimation, what that is attributable 

to and what kind of a grade you would give them on that particular 

operation. 

Mr. Chairman, there is a lot of dissent as to whether or not the 

Iraqi Government has utilized this space that has been given to 

them by the surge operation and this quelling of violence, whether 

they have utilized that to their best advantage in terms of political 

reforms that will move this country down the road. 

I would hope also, Ambassador Crocker, you can give us your 

best evaluation as to how far down the road they have moved, 

whether you think they have made reasonable progress, inadequate 

progress, and what you expect them to do in the future, and the 

extent of engagement that you think we should undertake to ensure that they continue to improve. 

Also, I would hope both gentlemen could comment today on the 

extent of Iranian participation in the Iraqi situation, and particularly, General Petraeus, with respect to Iran’s training and equipping of the antigovernment forces in Basra, to what extent you 

think that will now shape the security situation, whether Iran is 

backing off or going in full force with their special operations and 

their intel in trying to train and equip and effect the military situation inside Iraq. So if you could touch on that, I think that is very 

important to us. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I think we have before us today two outstanding leaders who really represent the best in a model of service 

to this great country. I think they have made enormous advances 
5 

and improvements since this last hearing that we held. And I look 

forward to the hearing today and to learning especially your unvarnished take on the standup of the Iraqi military apparatus. Thank 

you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter, thank you. 

Gentlemen, again, we are very, very pleased that you are here 

today and look forward to your testimony. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES, IRAQ 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an 

update on the situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations 

I recently provided to my chain of command. 

Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven 

months ago, there has been significant but uneven security 

progress in Iraq. Levels of violence and civilian deaths have been 

reduced substantially. Al Qaeda, Iraq (AQI) and a number of other 

extremist elements have been dealt serious blows. The capabilities 

of Iraqi security force (ISF) elements have grown, and there has 

been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis and local security. 

Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory, 

and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover as events in the 

past two weeks have reminded us, the progress made since last 

spring is still fragile and reversible. Nonetheless, security in Iraq 

is better than it was when we reported to you last September, and 

it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was 

on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional U.S. forces to Iraq. 

A number of factors have contributed to the progress. First has 

been the impact of increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces. 

You are well aware of the U.S. surge. Less recognized is that Iraq 

has also conducted a surge, adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to its security force ranks in 2007 and slowly increasing its capability to deploy and employ these forces. 

A second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi 

forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people; to pursue al Qaeda Iraq; to 

combat criminals and militia extremists; to foster local reconciliation; and to enable political and economic progress. Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among certain elements of the Iraqi population. 

Since the first Sunni awakening in late 2006, Sunni communities 

in Iraq increasingly have rejected al Qaeda Iraq’s indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. Over time, awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis, some former insurgents, to contribute to local security as so-called Sons of Iraq (SOI). With their 

assistance and with relentless pursuit of al Qaeda Iraq, the threat 

posed by AQI, while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced 

significantly. 

The recent flare-up in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscoring the importance of the ceasefire declared by Muqtada al- 
6 

Sadr last fall, is another factor in the overall reduction in violence. 

Recently, of course, some militia elements have become active 

again. Though a Sadr stand-down order resolved the situation to 

a degree, the flare-up also highlighted the destructive role Iran has 

played in funding, training, arming, and directing the so-called special groups and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds 

of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked, the special groups pose the 

greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic Iraq. 

As we look to the future, our tasks together with our Iraqi partners will be to build on the progress achieved and to deal with the 

many challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this 

while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces. 

In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict 

in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities 

for power and resources. This competition continues, influenced 

heavily by outside actors, and its resolution remains the key to producing long-term stability in Iraq. Various elements push Iraq’s 

ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, 

militia extremists, and criminal gangs all pose significant threats. 

Al Qaeda’s senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front 

in their global strategy, send funding, direction, and foreign fighters to Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound the challenges. 

Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters 

through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network 

that supports AQI. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way through its lethal support to the special 

groups. 

These challenges in recent weeks, violence notwithstanding, 

Iraq’s ethno-sectarian competition in many areas is now taking 

place more through debate and less through violence. In fact, the 

recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was 

dealt with temporarily at least by most parties acknowledging that 

the rational way ahead is political dialogue rather than street 

fighting. 

Though Iraq obviously remains a violent country, we do see 

progress in the security arena. As this chart illustrates, for nearly 

six months security incidents have been at a level not seen since 

early to mid 2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as 

a result of the violence in Basra and Baghdad but has begun to 

turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one. 

As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we 

closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence. 

As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past 

year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra Mosque 

bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the 

very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007. 

Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq as it is 

a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box in 

the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of deaths due to 

ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A big factor has been the reduction of that violence in 

Baghdad. Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian 

hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is only 

a partial explanation, as numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist. 
7 

In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused along the fault lines 

to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shi’a leaders to begin 

the long process of healing in their local communities. 

As the next chart shows, even though the number of high-profile 

attacks increased in March as al Qaeda lashed out, the current 

level of such attacks remains far below its height a year ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy 

networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence in particular, as I noticed, has remained relatively low, illustrating the 

enemies’ inability to date to reignite this cycle of ethno-sectarian 

violence. 

The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local 

communities has been an important development. As this chart depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq, Shi’a as well as 

Sunni, under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect 

their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These 

volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the 

savings and vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to 

mention the priceless lives saved, far outweigh the cost of their 

monthly contracts. 

Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) and weapons and explosive caches. As this 

next chart shows, in fact, we have already found more caches in 

2008 than we found in all of 2006. Given the importance of the 

Sons of Iraq, we are working closely with the Iraqi Government to 

transition them into the Iraqi security force or other employment. 

And over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police or army 

or other government jobs. This process has been slow, but it is taking place. 

Al Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and 

al Qaeda Iraq elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, 

these attacks, in addition to al Qaeda Iraq’s use of women, children 

and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further alienated 

AQI from the Iraqi people. And the tenacious pursuit of al Qaeda 

Iraq together with AQI’s loss of local support in many areas has 

substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and freedom of movement. This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort against 

AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we have reduced considerably the areas in which AQI enjoys support and sanctuary, 

though there clearly is more to be done. 

Having noted that progress, al Qaeda Iraq is still capable of lethal attacks, and we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on 

the resource flows that sustain it. This chart lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis and our interagency and 

international partners are employing to reduce what AQI needs. As 

you can see, defeating al Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions 

by our elite counterterrorist forces but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs information, operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of 

counterinsurgency principles and detainee operations, and many 

other actions. 
8 

Related to this effort, I applaud Congress’s support for additional 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the upcoming supplemental as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissnce 

(ISR) is vital to the success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere. As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not 

only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens 

an organization that al Qaeda senior leaders view as a tool to 

spread its influence and foment regional instability. Osama bin 

Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen al Qaeda Iraq involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mideast region. 

Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on 

the special groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed and 

directed by Iran’s Quds force with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. 

It was these groups that have launched Iranian rockets and mortar 

rounds at Iraq’s seat of government in the international zone. Iraqi 

and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran 

live up to promises made by President Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the special groups. 

However, nefarious activities by the Quds force have continued, 

and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize a threat they pose to Iraq. 

We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and 

months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran 

wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq. 

We have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted. Currently, as this chart shows, half of Iraq’s 18 provinces are under 

provisional Iraqi control. Many of these provinces, not just the successful ones in the Kurdish regional government area, but also a 

number of southern provinces, have done well. Challenges have 

emerged in some others, including of course Basra. Nonetheless, 

this process will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah 

Provinces to transition in the months ahead. 

Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 

540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraqi Security Forces. The 

number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 

a hundred. These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi force losses have recently 

been three times our own. We will of course conduct careful afteraction reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders found wanting in some 

cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a result. Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they got their footing and gained a degree of confidence. 

And certain Iraqi elements proved very capable. 

Underpinning the advances of the past year have been improvements in Iraq’s security institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqirun training base enabled the Iraqi Security Forces to grow by over 

133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months. And the still 

expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 

73,000 soldiers and police through the rest of 2008. 
9 

Additionally, Iraq’s security ministries are steadily improving 

their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart shows, in 2007 

as in 2006, Iraq security ministries spent more on their forces than 

the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund 

(ISFF). We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year. And this projection enabled 

us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund 

request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion. 

While improved Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to defend 

Iraq or maintain security throughout the country on their own. Recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the ability of 

the Iraqi Security Forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, 

supplies and replacements on very short notice. They certainly 

could not have deployed a division’s worth of army and police units 

on such short notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored the considerable work to be done in the 

areas of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff development 

and command and control. 

We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military 

Sales Program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi Government has purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of American 

origin through the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS). Since 

September, and with your encouragement of the organizations in 

the FMS process, FMS deliveries have improved. 

While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi Security Forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq 

is exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a resurgence of AQI or additional Shi’a groups could violate Sadr’s 

ceasefire order. External actors like Iran could stoke violence within Iraq. And actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well. 

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the 

State Department’s Quick Response Fund, and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) programs enable us to help 

Iran deal with these and other challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us, by June, the additional CERP funds 

requested by the supplemental. 

Encouragingly, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 

million for us to manage as Iraqi CERP to perform projects for 

their people while building their own capacity to do so, recognizing 

our capacity to help them. The Iraqi Government has also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts; 

$510 million for small business loans; and $196 million for a joint 

training education and reintegration program. The Iraqi Government pledges to provide more as they execute their budget passed 

two months ago. 

Nonetheless, it is hugely important to have our resources continue, even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours. Last month I 

provided my chain of command recommendations for the way 

ahead in Iraq. During that process I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains while we draw 

down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams. I emphasize the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure 

the population and to transition responsibilities to the Iraqis as 
10 

quickly as conditions permit but without jeopardizing the security 

gains that have been made. 

As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations 

include recognition that the military surge has achieved progress 

but that that progress is reversible. Iraqi Security Forces have 

strengthened their capabilities but still must grow further. The 

provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases 

and efforts to resolve provincial boundary disputes will be challenging. The transition of Sons of Iraq will require time and careful 

monitoring. Withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year. And performing the necessary 

tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces as well as 

Special Operations forces and advisor teams. The strategic considerations include recognition that the strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable. A number of 

the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global threats. And a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against al Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in 

Iraq, and for the effort to counter malign Iranian influence. 

After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the draw down of the surge forces and that 

upon the withdrawal the last surge brigade combat team in July, 

we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At 

the end of that period, we will assess the conditions on the ground 

and determine where and when we can make recommendations for 

further reductions. This process will be continuous with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit. 

The approach does not, to be sure, allow establishment of a set 

withdrawal timetable. However, it does provide the flexibility those 

of us on the ground need to preserve the still fragile security gains 

our troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to achieve. 

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 

2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq. 

This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it 

is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens 

of the United States and to the global community. It is clearly in 

our national interest to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of al 

Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world; to help Iraq resist Iranian 

encroachment on its sovereignty; to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian 

violence that could spill over Iraq’s borders and make the existing 

refugee crisis even worse; and to enable Iraq to expand its role in 

the regional and global economies. 

In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation 

in Iraq. We have asked a great deal of them and of their families, 

and they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been 

an important factor in my recommendations. The Congress, the executive branch and our fellow citizens have done an enormous 

amount to support our troopers and their loved ones, and all of us 

are grateful for that. Nothing means more to those in harm’s way 

than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices 
11 

and those of their families. Indeed, all Americans should take great 

pride in the men and women serving our Nation in Iraq, civilian 

as well as military, and in the courage, determination, resilience, 

and initiative they demonstrate each and every day. It remains the 

greatest of honors to soldier with them. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus can be found in the 

Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, I certainly thank you for your testimony 

and for being with us today. 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMBASSADOR RYAN CROCKER, UNITED 

STATES AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, 

Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today to provide my assessment of political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq. When General Petraeus and I reported 

to you in September, I gave my considered judgment as to whether 

our goals in Iraq were attainable. Can Iraq develop into a united 

stable country with a democratically elected government operating 

under the rule of law? 

Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of political, 

economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq was upwards, although the slope of that line was not steep. Developments over the 

past seven months have strengthened my sense of a positive trend. 

Immense challenges remain, and progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is progress. Sustaining that progress will 

require continuing U.S. resolve and commitment. What has been 

achieved is substantial, but it is also reversible. 

Five years ago today, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled 

in Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But 

as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early 

part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the 

enormous investments we have made both in the lives of our young 

brave men and women and our resources. 

Let me describe the developments upon which I base such a judgment. The first is at the national level in the form of legislation 

and the development of Iraq’s parliament. In September, we were 

disappointed that Iraq had not yet enacted some key pieces of legislation. In the last several months, Iraq’s parliament has formulated, debated vigorously and, in many cases, passed legislation 

dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation-building. A 

pension law extended benefits to individuals who had previously 

been denied them because of their service under the former regime. 

The accountability and justice law, de-Baathification reform, 

passed after lengthy and often contentious debate reflecting a 

strengthened spirit of reconciliation as does a far-reaching amnesty 

law. The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in defining 

the relationship between the Federal and provincial governments. 

Passage of this legislation requires debate about the fundamental 

nature of the state similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and 

difficult debate over States’ rights. The Provincial Powers Law also 

called for provincial elections by October 1st of this year, and an 

electoral law is now under discussion that will set the parameters 
12 

for these elections. All major parties have announced their support 

for elections, and these will be a major step forward in Iraq’s political development, setting the stage for national elections in late 

2009. In January, a vote by the Council of Representatives to 

change the design of the Iraqi flag means the flag now flies in all 

parts of the country for the first time in years. The passage of the 

2008 budget with record amounts for capital expenditures ensures 

that the Federal and provincial governments will have the resources for public spending. 

Mr. Chairman, all of this has been done since September. These 

laws are not perfect, and much depends on their implementation, 

but they are important steps. Also important has been the development of Iraq’s Council of Representatives as a national institution. 

Last summer, the Council of Representatives suffered from persistent and often paralyzing disputes over leadership and procedure. Now it is successfully grappling with complex issues and producing viable tradeoffs and compromised packages. As debates in 

Iraq’s parliament become more about how to resolve tough problems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have become more fluid. 

While these politics still have a sectarian bent and basis, cross-sectarian coalitions have formed around issues, and sectarian political 

groupings, which often were barriers to progress, have become 

more flexible. 

Let me also talk about the intangibles, attitudes among the Iraqi 

people. In 2006 and 2007, many of us understandably questioned 

whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian backgrounds 

was so deep that a civil war was inevitable. The Sunni awakening 

movement in al Anbar which so courageously confronted al Qaeda 

continues to keep the peace in the area and keep al Qaeda out. 

Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one of Iraq’s 

safest cities. The Shi’a holy cities of an-Najaf and Karbala are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake of popular rejection of extremist militia activity. The Shi’a clerical leadership, the 

Marjaiyyah, based in an-Najaf, has played a quiet but important 

role in support of moderation and reconciliation. In Baghdad, we 

can see the Iraqis are not pitted against each other purely on the 

basis of sectarian affiliation. The security improvements of the past 

months have diminished the atmosphere of suspicion and allowed 

for acts of humanity that transcend sectarian identities. When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago my first visit to a city district was to 

the predominantly Sunni area of Dora. Surge forces were just moving into neighborhoods still gripped by al Qaeda. Residents also 

were being terrorized by extremist Shi’a militias. Less than a year 

later, at the end of February, tens of thousands of Shi’a pilgrims 

walked through those streets on the way to Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Sunni residents offered food 

and water as they passed through, and some joined the pilgrimage. 

News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation in Basra. Taken as a snapshot with scenes of increasing violence and masked gunmen in the streets it is hard to see how this 

situation supports a narrative of progress in Iraq. And there is still 

very much to be done to bring full government control to the 

streets of Basra and eliminate entrenched extremist, criminal and 

militia groups. When viewed with a broader lens, however, the 
13 

Iraqi decision to combat these groups in Basra has major significance. First, a Shi’a majority government led by Prime Minister 

Maliki has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals 

and extremists regardless of sectarian identity. Second, Iraqi Security Forces led these operations in Basra and in towns and cities 

throughout the south. British and U.S. elements played important 

roles, but these were supporting roles, as they should be. The operation in Basra has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The prime minister returned to Baghdad from Basra shortly before General 

Petraeus and I left for Washington, and he is confident in his decision and determined to press the fight against illegal groups but 

also determined to take a hard look at lessons learned. The efforts 

of the government against extremist militia elements have broad 

political support as a statement April 5th by virtually all of Iraq’s 

main political leaders—Sunni, Shi’a and Kurd—made clear. A wild 

card remains the Sadrist Trend, and whether the Iraqis can continue to drive a wedge between other elements of the trend and 

Iranian supported Jaysh al-Mahdi special groups. A dangerous development in the immediate wake of the Basra operation was what 

appeared to be a reunification between special groups and the main 

line Jaysh al-Mahdi. We also saw a potential collapse of the Jaysh 

al-Mahdi freeze in military operations. As the situation unfolded, 

however, Muqtada al-Sadr issued a statement that disavowed anyone possessing heavy weapons which would include the signature 

weapons of the special groups. This statement can further sharpen 

the distinction between members of the Sadrist Trend who should 

not pose a threat to the Iraqi state and members of the special 

groups who very much do. 

One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the 

strategy that began with the surge is working. This does not mean, 

however, that U.S. support should be open-ended or that the level 

and nature of our engagement should not diminish over time. It is 

in this context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship and agreement between Iraq and the United States. In August, Iraq’s five principal leaders requested a long-term relationship with the United States to include economic, political, diplomatic and security cooperation. The heart of this relationship will 

be a legal framework for the presence of American troops similar 

to that which exists in nearly 80 countries around the world. The 

Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a strong affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty placing Iraq on par with other U.S. allies 

and removing the stigma of Chapter VII status under the U.N. 

Charter pursuant to which coalition forces presently operate. Such 

an agreement is in Iraq’s interest and ours. U.S. forces will remain 

in Iraq beyond December 31, 2008, when the U.N. Resolution presently governing their presence expires. Our troops will need basic 

authorizations and protections to continue operations, and this 

agreement will provide those authorizations and protections. 

The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and 

we anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement 

will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the 

next administration. Our aim is to ensure that the next President 

arrives in office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy 

decisions, and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Con-
14 

gress will remain fully informed as these negotiations proceed in 

the coming weeks and months. 

Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A reinvigorated cabinet is necessary both for political balance and to improve 

the delivery of services to Iraq’s people. Challenges to the rule of 

law, especially corruption, are enormous. Disputed internal boundaries, the Article 140 process, must be resolved. The return of refugees and the internally displaced must be managed. The rights of 

women and minorities must be better protected. Iraqis are aware 

of the challenges they face and are working on them. Iraq’s political progress will not be linear. Developments which are on the 

whole positive can still have unanticipated or destabilizing consequences. The decision to hold provincial elections, vital for Iraq’s 

democratic development and long-term stability, will also produce 

new strains. Some of the violence we have seen recently in southern Iraq reflects changing dynamics within the Shi’a community as 

the political insecurity context changes. Such inflection points underscore the fragility of the situation in Iraq, but it would be wrong 

to conclude that any eruption of violence marks the beginning of 

an inevitable backslide. 

In terms of economics and capacity building, in September I reported to you that there had been some gains in Iraq’s economy 

and in the country’s efforts to build capacity to translate these 

gains into more effective governance and services. Iraqis have built 

on these gains over the past months, as is most evident in the revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the reopening of long-shuttered businesses. According to a Center for International Private 

Enterprise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners surveyed expect the Iraqi economy to grow in the next 2 years. With 

the improving security and rising government expenditures, the 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that Iraq’s GDP will 

grow seven percent in real terms this year, and inflation has been 

tamed. The dinar remains strong, and the Central Bank has begun 

to bring down interest rates. Iraq’s 2008 budget has allocated $13 

billion for reconstruction, and a $5 billion supplemental budget this 

summer will further invest export revenues in building the infrastructure and providing the services that Iraq so badly needs. 

This spending also benefits the United States. Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial aircraft from the 

U.S. at an estimated cost of $5 billion. As Iraq is now earning the 

financial resources it needs for brick-and-mortar construction 

through oil production and export, our assistance focus has shifted 

to capacity development and an emphasis on local and post-kinetic 

development through our network of provincial reconstruction 

teams and ministerial advisors. The era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. We are seeking to ensure that our assistance in partnership with the Iraqis leverages Iraq’s own resources. 

Our 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout Iraq 

have been working to improve provincial and local governance capabilities, particularly in budget design and execution. They are 

also helping to establish critical linkages between provincial and 

Federal Governments. Our PRTs are great enablers, and we are 

working to ensure their continued viability as our forces redeploy. 

The relatively small amounts they disperse through Quick Re-
15 

sponse Funds have major impacts in local communities, and congressional support is important as it is for other vital programs in 

the fiscal year 2008 supplemental request. Iraq increasingly is 

using its own resources to support projects and programs that we 

have developed. It has committed nearly $200 million in support of 

a program to provide vocational training for concerned local citizens who stood up with us in the awakening. 

Our technical assistance advisors have helped design new procurement procedures for Iraq’s oil ministry. We developed the technical specifications from which Iraq’s state-owned oil company will 

build new oil export platforms and underwater pipelines worth over 

$1 billion. And in Baghdad, in the last three months, the municipality has stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that we have been covering under the community stabilization 

program. Like so much else, Iraq’s economy is fragile, the gains reversible and the challenges ahead substantial. Iraq will need to 

continue to improve governmental capacity, pass national-level hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical production and distribution, improve the climate for foreign and domestic investment, create short- and long-term jobs and tackle the structural and economic problems of the vital agricultural sector. We will be helping 

the Iraqis as they take on this challenging agenda along with other 

international partners, including the United Nations and the World 

Bank. 

Along with the security surge last year, we also saw a diplomatic 

surge focused on enhancing U.N. Engagement in Iraq, anchoring 

the international compact with Iraq and establishing an expanding 

neighbors process which serves as a contact group in support of 

Iraq. The United Nations has taken advantage of an expanded 

mandate granted to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, 

UNAMI, to increase the scope of its activities and the size of its 

staff. Under dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is playing a key role 

in preparing for provincial elections and in providing technical assistance to resolve disputed internal boundaries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has returned 

international status to Iraq to assist with the return of internally 

displaced persons and refugees. The international compact with 

Iraq provides a five-year framework for Iraq to reform its economy 

and achieve economic self-sufficiency in exchange for long overdue 

Saddam-era debt relief. Preparations are under way for a ministerial level compact meeting in Sweden next month; 74 nations were 

represented at last year’s gathering in Egypt. 

Iraq’s neighbors also understand they have a major interest in 

Iraq’s future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting of 

Iraq’s neighbors in November, and Kuwait will host a third meeting later this month. In addition to all of Iraq’s neighbors, these 

expanded conferences also include the permanent five members of 

the Security Council, the Arab League and G–8. Support from Arab 

capitals has not been strong and must improve for the sake of Iraq 

and the sake of the region. Bahrain’s recent announcement that it 

will return an ambassador to Baghdad is welcome, and other Arab 

states should follow suit. 

Iraq is a multi-ethnic state but it is also a founding member of 

the Arab League and an integral part of the Arab world. Last 
16 

month Iraq hosted a meeting of the Arab Parliamentary Union 

bringing the leaders of Arab parliaments and consultative councils 

to Iraq for the first major inter-Arab gathering since 1990. It is 

noteworthy that the meeting was held in the Kurdish city of Irbil, 

under the recently redesigned Iraqi flag highlighting both the remarkable prosperity and stability of Iraq’s Kurdish region and the 

presence of the Iraqi Federal state. We hope that this event will 

encourage more active engagements with Iraq, and we expect that 

Prime Minister Maliki’s efforts against Shi’a extremist militias in 

Basra will also receive Arab support. 

The presence of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist organization in the remote mountains of Iraq along the Turkish border has produced tension between Turkey and Iraq and led to a 

Turkish cross-border operation in February, including movement of 

Turkish ground forces into Iraq. At the same time, both governments are working to strengthen their ties, and Iraqi President 

Talabani made a successful visit to Turkey in March. 

Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of efforts 

to interdict some foreign fighters seeking to transit Syria to Iraq, 

but others continue to cross the border. Syria also harbors individuals who finance and support the Iraqi insurgency. Iran continues 

to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government to establish a stable secure state through the army and training of militia elements 

engaged in violence against Iraqi Security Forces, coalition forces 

and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran’s malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when these militia elements clashed with 

Iraqi Government forces in Basra and Baghdad. When the President announced the surge, he pledged to seek out and destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know more about 

these networks and their Quds Force sponsors than ever before, 

and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them. At 

the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran and 

Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make. 

Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is hard. It will continue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma 

inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule. But hard does 

not mean hopeless. And the political and economic progress of the 

past few months is significant. 

I must underscore, however, that these gains are fragile, and 

they are reversible. Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq 

in blood as well as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let 

the Iraqis fend for themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop 

into a stable secure multi-ethnic multi-sectarian democracy under 

the rule of law. Whether it realizes that potential is ultimately up 

to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue to be critical. I said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. 

That is still the case, although I think we are now closer. 

I do remain convinced that a major departure from our current 

engagement would bring failure, and we have to be clear with ourselves about what failure could mean. Al Qaeda is in retreat in 

Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al Qaeda’s leaders are looking for 

every opportunity they can to hang on. Osama bin Laden has called 
17 

Iraq the perfect base, and it reminds us that a fundamental aim 

of al Qaeda is to establish itself in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in Iraq. We cannot allow it a second chance. And it is not 

only al Qaeda that would benefit. Iran has said publicly it will fill 

any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shi’a militias would reassert 

themselves. We saw them try in Basra and Baghdad over the last 

several weeks. And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on 

a scale far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflicts 

could draw in neighbors with devastating consequences for the region and the world. 

Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last 5 years 

have been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans and the world ultimately will 

judge us far more on the basis of what will happen than what has 

happened. In the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will 

be more important than how we came. Our current course is hard, 

but it is working. Progress is real, although fragile. We need to 

stay with it. 

In the months ahead, we will continue to assist Iraq as it pursues further steps toward reconciliation and economic development. 

Over time this will become increasingly an Iraqi process, as it 

should be. Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq’s integration regionally and internationally, assisting Iraqi institutions locally and 

nationally to strengthen the political process and promote economic 

activity and supporting the efforts of the United Nations as Iraq 

carries out local elections toward the end of the year. These efforts 

will require an enhanced civilian commitment and continued support from the Congress and the American people. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all 

those who serve our country in Iraq, both military and civilian. 

Their courage and their commitment at great sacrifice has earned 

the admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine, and it 

is an honor to serve there with them. Thank you sir. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker can be found in 

the Appendix on page 78.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. 

Mr. Ambassador, in your comments, you said that U.S. support 

should not been open-ended. I certainly agree with that. You also 

point out that whether Iraq realizes its potential is ultimately up 

to the Iraqi people. Is that not correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. You point out in your testimony the need for a 

reinvigorated cabinet, for political balance; the need for delivery of 

services to the Iraqi people; the need for the rule of law, the problems of corruption, which are enormous, you say; the disputed internal boundaries, return of refugees, return of internally displaced 

people; the rights of minority and women all must be protected. All 

of this is part of what needs to be done in what is being called reconciliation. 

Am I not correct, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The surge in forces and the counterinsurgency 

doctrine has led to reduced violence. Its purpose was to create political space for the Iraqis to move forward on reconciliation within 

its government and within its people. 
18 

Now we know there has been some incremental progress. But 

there has not been this fundamental reconciliation, the list of 

which you just gave us. So where do we go from here? We will be 

returning the surge forces, redeploying them. So what is our strategy for the future? What leverage do you have on the Iraqi Government to take the training wheels off and to get on with its task? 

We have been at this now for years. How do you do that? 

General, Mr. Ambassador. 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would point out 

that they want to do that as much as we do. Indeed, they have put 

themselves under enormous personal pressure and collective pressure of the various political elements in Iraq to increasingly exercise their sovereignty. In fact, that is exactly what Prime Minister 

Maliki did, of course, when he decided as the constitutional commander in chief of the armed forces of Iraq to deploy forces on 

short notice to Basra and then to enter into operations against militia elements down there that were the source of crime and other 

security challenges. That was not something that we pushed him 

to do, candidly. That was something that they wanted to do. They 

feel that pressure themselves. 

So, again, it is not about us twisting their arm, I don’t think, to 

exercise their sovereignty. It is truly about us enabling that and 

trying to support it as much as we can while keeping as light a 

hand on the bicycle seat as possible. There are numerous provinces 

throughout Iraq in which we have no forces, or virtually no forces, 

perhaps a Special Forces team or not much more than that. By the 

way, these were challenged, some of these provinces were challenged during the outbreak of violence that accompanied the start 

of the Basra operation. In the bulk of those southern provinces, 

Iraqi forces proved up to the task. 

The CHAIRMAN. At what point, General, will you recommend redeployment of additional forces beyond the several brigades that 

are a part of the so-called surge? 

General PETRAEUS. As I have laid out, Mr. Chairman, we will be 

reducing by over one quarter of our ground combat powers. 

The CHAIRMAN. From what to what, sir? 

General PETRAEUS. From 20 brigades to 15 brigade combat 

teams, and also taking out two Marine battalions and the Marine 

Expeditionary Unit. That is a substantial amount. At the end of 

that, we think it makes sense to have some time to let the dust 

settle, perhaps to do some adjustment of forces. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is my question, General. At what point do 

we—do you make recommendations to start going into the 15 brigades? 

General PETRAEUS. As the conditions are then met, and we look 

at the security and local governance conditions that allow us to 

thin out our forces and thereby to redeploy additional elements. 

The CHAIRMAN. What will be those conditions? 

General PETRAEUS. As I said, it is essentially what we have used 

in the past. We are thinning out very substantially right now. And 

we had to decide where to do that. We looked at primarily the security and local governance conditions, the enemy situation, the ability of Iraqi Security Forces to take on more of a load and us to take 

on a less of a load. The ability, again, of the local authorities to 
19 

carry on and perform tasks in some cases that we were helping or 

perhaps performing. 

Again, those are the conditions that we examine. That is exactly 

the process that has guided us as we have determined which forces 

to take out and where to move them during the course of the reduction of the surge forces. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you foresee the reduction beyond the 15? 

General PETRAEUS. I can foresee the reduction beyond the 15, 

yes, sir. Again, the key is in fact we are looking at four or five locations already that we have an eye on, looking to see if those conditions can be met there. Again, we have a number of months and 

a number of substantial actions to take before then. But we are already identifying areas that we think are likely candidates for that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a judgment as to how many brigades of that 15, as you look at those certain areas, could be redeployed? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I am not sure. Again, what we are doing 

is looking at these different areas. Over time, I think all of them. 

Again, the question is at what pace that will take place. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, outside businesses, mostly 

American contractors, have been substantial employers in Iraq. 

Can you tell us, beyond the American contractual employment, how 

many market sustainable jobs have been created in the last 12 

months? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I can’t give you a reliable figure. 

The CHAIRMAN. What is your best judgment? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thousands and thousands of jobs, Mr. 

Chairman. 

I referred in my testimony to one district of Baghdad, the district 

of Dora. A year ago, there were no markets. There was no economic 

activity at all. The Dora market today has something like 1,000 

separate shops that are open and doing business. This has been 

replicated throughout the country in Ramadi and Fallujah, Anbar, 

and other parts of Baghdad. There has been a very substantial increase in economic activity and job creation as a result. 

The Iraqi Government is also moving forward to create more 

jobs. The Council of Ministers yesterday passed a support program 

for development in Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, all three areas affected by conflict, $350 million for reconstruction and for job creation. So this is an ongoing process. 

The CHAIRMAN. My understanding is that some people within our 

government state that the unemployment rate in Iraq is between 

25 percent and 50 percent. If that is the case, can you predict what 

the unemployment rate will be one year from now, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Again, I cannot predict what it will be exactly because, frankly, we don’t have a great deal of confidence in 

figures that indicate what it is now. There is both unemployment 

and underemployment. What I would be confident in, with the continuation of the security improvements we have seen, is that in 

conditions of better security, you are going to see more economic 

activity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree, Mr. Ambassador, that jobs and 

economic security are the basis of a strong Iraq? 
20 

Ambassador CROCKER. That is absolutely the case, Mr. Chairman. That is why both we and the Iraqi government put so much 

emphasis on job creation and economic development. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for this hearing. 

Gentlemen, excellent testimony. I think you gave us a good broad 

brush of how things are going. 

A reliable, effective military is produced by military operations. 

A number of us have recommended that the Iraqi battalions now 

numbering 134, I believe, be rotated into combat operations on a 

regular basis so that they all achieve a certain competency, able to 

develop their logistics chains, exercise their chain of command, develop battlefield effectiveness. 

I know we have done that in the Baghdad operations on a regular basis. So, General Petraeus, could you give us your take on 

the combat experience of the Iraqi army. How many battalions now 

have a modicum of combat experience, and how do you rate them? 

You might speak to the Basra experience as well as the Baghdad 

experience. 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Congressman, I think that just 

about all of the battalions in the Iraqi army at this point have been 

in some form of combat, with perhaps a few exceptions of units 

that have just come out of basic training and units fielding and 

that have deployed areas now relatively peaceful, let’s say a place 

like Anbar Province. Although, even there what we are doing is 

pushing them farther out from Anbar to pursue the enemy, try to 

keep our hooks into him. So, again, they are getting tested in combat and, by and large, have done well. 

Again, in the southern provinces in which they were tested recently, virtually all of them, Karbala Hill, Wasit, Qadisiyyah, 

Muthanna, and Dhi Qar, there were various challenges to them, 

and forces responded to those effectively. In Basra, unfortunately, 

one of the units that was thrust right into it very quickly was a 

unit that was just out of its unit set fielding. Others were local police who are intimidate-able, if you will, because of coming from 

local areas, and conditions were not set for them as they might 

have been, frankly, so that they could get overwhelmed, could get 

intimidated by individuals who are actually well equipped and well 

trained. 

As, however, conditions have been established, as they have now 

got their footing, as additional experienced forces have flowed into 

Basra, it is very much an ongoing operation. They have then moved 

on. They have secured the ports. They have secured some key 

checkpoints and routes through which smuggling flows and so 

forth. 

All of this is still very much ongoing there, as it is in some of 

the other areas where the violence has gone up in recent weeks. 

The units that rotated through Baghdad did well. In fact, the 

Iraqis now are able to move them back to the locations from which 

they came. In several cases, they were from Ninawa province from 

Mosul. They can go back and help with the effort there to keep the 

pressure on al Qaeda Iraq. 

As you know, the violence by al Qaeda Iraq has gone down significantly across the board, with the one exception of Ninawa prov-
21 

ince. As we focused on the Euphrates River Valley, the Basra 

neighborhoods north and south of Baghdad, Diyala River Valley, 

Baqubah, literally moved on up. However, it has not gone up nearly the way it came down across the board in the other provinces. 

Again, up there they are very much in the lead. 

As I mentioned, there are over 100 battalions assessed to be in 

the lead, regardless of whether they are operational readiness assessment one or not. Frankly, the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) is difficult for the Iraqis because it is a very mechanical assessment. You either have the right number of leaders or you 

don’t; right number of troopers, noncommissioned officers, equipment, maintenance, and so forth. What they do is they tend to pull 

leaders out once they have proven themselves in these units to 

form new units. So it is very difficult to keep the manning level to 

literally keep the arithmetic right to achieve ORA one status. 

What we tend to look at more is, are they capable of being in the 

lead, which is more based on demonstrated performance? And as 

I mentioned, there are over 100 of those units. In fact, it appears 

we are looking now to confirm that versus their recent performance, and it appears that that generally was an accurate assessment. 

Mr. HUNTER. Give us your take, if you could, on the success or 

the degree of success or failures in the Basra operation. What do 

you see there, General? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, the deployment was very impressive. As 

I mentioned in my statement, there is no way they could have deployed about a division’s worth. Over time, it was three brigades 

equivalent of forces plus division headquarters and a lot of 

enablers. That never could have happened a year ago. In fact, they 

didn’t have the capability to do that. They then used their C–130’s 

cycled through multiple sorties a day to bring in supplies, reinforcements, medical, Black Hawk casualties, and so on to deploy 

their various other elements. 

The Iraqi special operations forces elements across the board, all 

of them were involved, from the army, the police, and various provincial SWAT teams as well. It was actually SWAT battalions in 

some cases. Needless to say, those tended to perform better than 

the brand new unit that I mentioned, and better than local police 

in, again, very, very contentious areas where they could get overwhelmed quickly and where the conditions weren’t set. That is the 

area where there has to be some serious after-action review work 

done. That has to do with the setting of conditions with the planning, the detailed planning and preparation before going right into 

combat. 

There was, candidly, an expectation that there was going to be 

more of that done. There were lines of operation, political, tribal, 

security, and so forth, and what happened in the end was there 

was a pretty precipitous entry into combat operations before, again, 

some of these units were set the way they should. Again, the operation very much still ongoing. 

Mr. HUNTER. What is the state of play right now in Basra in 

terms of territory held by the antigovernment forces? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, as I mentioned, the Iraqi Security 

Forces took control of the ports, which is very, very important be-
22 

cause some of those were in the grip of militias or smugglers. They 

have also taken control of some key areas through which smuggling 

and weaponry supply took place. 

On the other hand, there are still some militia strongholds that 

they will have to deal with over time. Some of this in the end is 

going to end up being political probably more than it will be military. There is a lot of discussion. The president of Iraq yesterday 

issued a statement, or today I guess it was, issued a statement 

about militias, and as has Prime Minister Maliki and others. 

Again, I think some of this is going to have to be sorted out in that 

end so that they don’t end up in a real pitched battle in some of 

these very densely packed neighborhoods and cause untold damage. 

Mr. HUNTER. Just a last question on that. General, if you were 

to give a grade or a status report on the maturation and the reliability of the Iraqi army, where do you put them right now? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, it is a very, very mixed bag across the 

board, ranging from exceedingly good units in the Iraqi special operation force brigade, down to some of these very new units. So you 

have to end up somewhere in the middle. So I think it is somewhere in the B minus, B range, with recognition that there is a lot 

of work needed to be done still in the so-called expeditionary logistics and a variety of different command and control systems, staff 

planning, and so forth. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter, thank you very much. 

Under the five-minute rule, we will proceed with Mr. Spratt. 

Mr. SPRATT. General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, we are fortunate to have two men of your character, commitment and caliber 

in the tough assignments that you have got. We appreciate your 

service to our country. 

The cost of our deployment is not the determining factor in deciding how we size our forces or how long we stay engaged there. But 

when the cost is $600 billion dollars and rising and there is no exit 

sign in sight, it has to be a consideration. As odd as it may seem, 

it is a rare briefing, believe me, on the Hill that makes any mention of the cost of the war in Iraq as widely discussed outside that 

context, at least not since Secretary Wolfowitz ventured the prediction that this deployment would last no more than 6 to 12 

months and that the Iraqis, with their vast amount of wealth, 

would be able to shoulder most of the cost. 

To put this decision that faces us, you and us, in context, the 

chairman has asked me just to give you, give us all a brief overview of what the cost of the commitment has been, the cost to date 

of what we have incurred, and what is the cost to go. 

The first chart we have got is a very simple table which simply 

shows that, from 2001 through this fiscal year, $608 billion has 

been provided for Iraq; $771 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan together. The next chart shows that the cost is climbing every year. 

Beginning with 2003, there is a steady, steady relentless increase 

in the cost of the war. The total cost there is shown as $608 billion. 

We have been unable to induce the Department of Defense to do 

us a projection of the likely cost to go. So we asked our own budget 

shop, the CBO, the Congressional Budget Office, to do such a projection. The next chart shows CBO’s estimate of the cost from 2009 
23 

through 2018. This series of bar graphs assumes that there will be 

a drawn down to 75,000 troops in both theaters, Iraq and Afghanistan, a very questionable assumption, but that there will be a draw 

down to 75,000 troops by 2013, and thereafter sort of a steady state 

at this level, 75,000 troops over the next 5 years, through 2018. 

So, the total cost from 2009, if these projections are anything 

close to accurate, the total cost from 2009 to 2018 will come to 

about $1 trillion. If you add this $1 trillion for the outyear costs 

to the $608 billion already appropriated, the total comes to about 

$1 trillion 600 billion. If you adjust that for debt service—and we 

are borrowing every dime of this, so you may as well add the interest to it—it is well over $2 trillion. 

I have run these numbers past the Pentagon—they are not complicated—and asked them for their projections if they consider ours 

wrong or at least their corrections to our projections. They have not 

validated these numbers, but neither have they invalidated these 

numbers. 

Here is what we do have from the Department of Defense (DOD). 

We have a request from the Department of Defense for Iraq and 

Afghanistan in 2009, the next fiscal year, the budget year we are 

about to begin work on, of $70 billion. I don’t think either one of 

you would support that number. Indeed, the Pentagon says it is a 

place holder. It is a place holder. But given the supplemental request for this year, which has not been fully appropriated yet, it 

is $196 billion. It is hard to believe that we will fall or drop from 

$196 billion to $70 billion between 2008 and 2009. So one thing we 

don’t have yet, even though we are about to begin the budget season, is a real number for 2009. 

Second, we don’t have a realistic number for the out years beyond 2009. We have instead, believe it or not, an actual decline in 

real dollars in the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year Defense Plan (FYDP). We 

have a decline in real dollars for 2005 for the Department of Defense budget over the next five—over the four years following 2009. 

I think you would agree that these are consequential numbers, 

whether you agree with them exactly or not. Whenever you spend 

$2 trillion on one thing, you don’t have $2 trillion to spend on 

something else. A good example is Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen 

sat where you sat just last week and said: We are under sourcing, 

under resourcing, undermanning Afghanistan. But to move the resource levels up to where they ought to be, our allies are not coming through with any big numbers. To do that would require that 

we detract from Iraq. And as long as Iraq is the number one objective and Afghanistan the subordinate objective, we don’t have the 

wherewithal to do that. There is an opportunity cost to be paid. 

So my basic question is this, look at these costs. As you make 

your assessment of the situation after the five brigade combat 

teams have been withdrawn, are considerations like this a factor, 

the tradeoffs, the effectiveness in stretching out the Army, the priorities? Is this something you two will weigh in your consideration 

as to what we should do for our continued deployment? 

[The charts referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning 

on page 95.] 
24 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, Congressman. In fact, as I mentioned in my statement, that is one of the major strategic considerations that I offered. 

Mr. SPRATT. Could you tell us, what your—with the $70 billion, 

what the likely supplemental request for this year is? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, as you know, that is a service responsibility. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir. 

I think I have been overruled. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask, Mr. Chairman, if the 

five-minute rule, as the way it has played out here in the last few 

minutes, somehow we need to permit I would think General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to answer questions. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Certainly. If you have an answer to that last 

question, feel free to do so. Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, what I was going to say, Mr. Chairman, 

is merely, again, we work very closely with the services. But at the 

end of the day, as you well know, it is the services that provide the 

input to the department and provide those numbers. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, General, Ambassador Crocker. 

First, let me thank you for your great candor here this morning 

in explaining what you see as progress, as well as what you see as 

challenges for the future. I think it is important that we understand that, we understand your perspective, and that the American 

people have an opportunity to understand your perspectives, particularly with regard to their concerns about the future. 

General Petraeus, in your testimony you note your recommendation for a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation followed by 

a process of assessment to determine possible further reductions in 

U.S. force levels in Iraq. I believe that it is very important that we 

understand that process and that the American people have an opportunity to understand that process as well. 

So if you could each take whatever time you need to describe 

that assessment process, including some of the factors which you 

will be tracking. 

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, essentially, it is hard. This is 

looking at the security and local government conditions in a particular area to determine where and how we can thin out our forces 

rather than completely handing off. That is what we have done already. In Anbar Province, for example, we are in the process of 

going from 14 battalions down to about 6 battalions. That is part 

of the ongoing process. 

So this is really an assessment process that we have used repeatedly as we have looked at where we should end up, if you will, in 

doing the so-called battlefield geometry of determining troop-totask analysis and where you want to position forces, again, when 

the dust settles. That is the same process that we will do in the 

future. 

As I mentioned earlier, there are already several areas that we 

have identified that are the candidate locations for further reductions. In each case, we sit down with the commanders, with their 
25 

staffs. We walk the ground. We work with the local authorities. 

Again, at the heart of it, it has to do with the security situation. 

What is the enemy situation? What is the Iraqi capability to deal 

with that? What are the factors in terms of local governance, basic 

services, and other factors that feed into the sense that the population will support their legitimate forces? And then we determine 

where we want the forces to end up and what strength, and that 

allows you to withdraw certain forces over time. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, there is also what we call a politicalmilitary calculus that we have to take into account, as well as the 

battlefield geometry. One element of that is assessing not only 

what the conditions are with our current force presence, but how 

things change as we redeploy, how various elements on the scene 

may reposition their selves because we are no longer there. So it 

is a complex evaluation both of current conditions but also projecting how our redeployment will change future conditions. 

Mr. SAXTON. It sounds to me like you are saying that this process 

of assessment has been used in the past and it has resulted, at 

least in one result, at least, has been that we are now talking and 

projecting that we are going to reduce forces, bring the surge folks 

home, if you will. So this assessment process is not something that 

you are creating for the future, it is something that has actually 

been used in the past to arrive at the decisions that you have now 

made. 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir. In fact, we are certainly 

well over halfway through the reduction of the surge forces, and 

that is exactly the process that we have used as we have sat down 

and worked this out. Obviously, I sit a good bit with the Multinational Corps Iraq commander, previously General Odinero, now 

General Austin, as we do that process and work that out. 

As I mentioned, we also certainly sit down with the commanders 

in those areas, walk the streets, talk to local Iraqis, look at the 

trends, look at the metrics. I showed you some of the metrics today, 

that if you look at them on a local basis, again, guide the assessment that I have described to you. Again, it is exactly the process 

that we have used to examine where we could in fact draw our 

forces down as we bring the surge forces home. 

It has not been just mechanical. We haven’t just pulled one out 

that we put in. We actually will look a good bit different at the end 

of this than we did before. As an example, far fewer forces in Anbar 

Province because of the progress that has been made there. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of 

you gentlemen for your service and sacrifices that you have made. 

We appreciate both of you being with us today. 

General Petraeus, the human cost of the war is a loss of 4,000 

American lives. The security gains of this surge are, in my opinion, 

arguable, as evidenced by the recent fighting in Baghdad and 

Basra. Another cost is the significant decrease in our current military readiness. In fact nearly all Stateside units are unable to complete all of their assigned worked if called upon or for contingency 

combat operations. I firmly believe that we have to be prepared to 
26 

fight yesterday, today and tomorrow. I am afraid that we are running out of options should another contingency arise requiring the 

use of our ground forces. 

Now how long do you believe the ground forces can sustain the 

current operational tempo and the pace of deployment? And how 

much of a strategic risk to America should we expect to assume before we see real progress? 

I ask these questions because we have had different hearings 

where we see that our equipment is being destroyed. We have too 

many deployments. The troops are tired. Maybe you can enlighten 

the committee as to how long can the ground forces sustain the 

current operational tempo, and the risk to us Americans we expect 

to assume before we see real, real progress in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, as I mentioned in my statement and in response to an earlier question, I am keenly aware of 

the strain. I can tell you that there is nothing that a commander 

feels more than, in fact, the losses that we have sustained over 

there. 

As I mentioned yesterday, I have been deployed personally for 

four-and-a-half years since 2001. So this is something that my family and I do know a great deal about personally. The forces that 

are in Iraq are the ones that I can talk to. I can tell you that those 

forces are better prepared to do what we are doing there now than 

they ever have been at any time that I have been in Iraq. 

I have mentioned several times that there were two huge facts 

that were different when I returned to Iraq in February 2007. One 

was the damage done by sectarian violence, which was horrific, 

which we were going to try to stop and, by and large, have 

achieved great progress in stopping. The second was how much 

more our troopers get it about what it is they are doing. The counterinsurgency is not just stability-and-support, hearts-and-minds 

operations. It includes by doctrine, by definition, offense, defense, 

as well as stability and support. They are conducting big operations 

on occasion or have in the course of the past year in places like 

Ramadi, south Baghdad, Baqubah, and others and have done a 

magnificent job in that, thanks in large measure to the equipment 

and to the vast improvements that have been paid in what our soldiers have down range now. 

When I look at what we had when I was a division commander 

and went through the berm in the fight to Baghdad, and what divisions have now, it is extraordinary. We are very grateful. I would 

like to single out particularly the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have already saved countless lives in Iraq. 

And the speed with which you made that happen, together with the 

department, was very impressive. 

Again, having said all that, I am aware keenly of the strain and 

stress on the force, on the individuals, on the equipment, on readiness and so forth. Having noted that, paradoxically, our troopers 

have incredible resilience. The reenlistment of the Third Infantry 

Division, which is completing its third tour in Iraq now, they have 

already met halfway through the year their reenlistment goal for 

the entire year. 
27 

So there is something special about what it is our men and 

women are doing in their minds and about the cause that they are 

serving. It is something larger than self. It is something that is 

very important. And of course, ultimately, on the battlefield, it is 

about the soldier on their right and left. But they have continued 

to raise their right hand. 

There is one segment of the population that we are concerned 

about, and that is the young captains. Some of them have been in 

the cycle where we have asked an extraordinary amount of them 

in particular, and I know the Army is working very hard to look 

at the issues involving them. 

We should note, and I am sure the Army has explained, there 

is also a different readiness model. There is no question but that 

the strategic reserve right now is, as General Cody rightly pointed 

out, the lowest he has seen in his time. But also it is programmed 

that when units come back, that they will refit and all the rest of 

that. 

That will be rebuilt over time. I think that over time, I am hopeful, I have certainly given my support to 12-month deployments. 

Operationally, we would welcome that, both because of the strain 

and stress and really just the general recognition of the value in 

that. Hopefully, this reduction can allow that over time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Along that same line, General, do you take into 

account the strain on the American forces in your recommendations 

to redeploy from Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McHugh from New York. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for being here. Over 10 hours 

yesterday over the United States Senate. God knows how many 

hours today before the House. Your courage, your commitment has 

been well underscored. We appreciate your being here and all that 

you do. 

I guess the big debate right now, the big question is, what, if 

anything, happens through a precipitous withdrawal? Both of you 

have spoken about Basra. I guess we will be learning lessons there 

for some time. But as I look at the lead up to Basra, as I look to 

what conditions were on the ground there that created the opportunity for the Quds force to come in to become involved with the 

so-called special groups, with the criminal elements that operated 

out of the port, taking revenues that should have gone to the Iraqi 

people and instead directing them into illegal activities, all of the 

nefarious elements that came to fore there, is there a lesson to us 

about precipitous withdrawal? 

We have been blessed with great coalition partners. But in the 

south I think there is some reason to be concerned that perhaps 

the turnover there happened without proper conditions on the 

ground. Am I totally wrong there, or are there some lessons we can 

learn about why we need to be prudent in the days ahead? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, there are lessons to be learned. But it 

is also very important to recognize that, again, this was sought by 

the Iraqis. They very much wanted to have Basra shift to provincial Iraqi control. There were a number of measures taken to shore 
28 

up their police and soldiers in the months prior to the handoff. But 

there is also no question that there were some of these criminal 

elements that were able to get their tentacles into port operations 

and some other areas and that were then leading to bigger problems in Prime Minister Maliki’s mind and threatening the security 

of the area that produces some 90-plus percent of the revenue for 

Iraq. 

But it is, again, why the commanders on the ground, why I have 

recommended that our reductions be conditions-based. As the Ambassador and I both mentioned, there are enormous implications 

here for really the safety and security of our own country with respect to al Qaeda, with respect to the spread of sectarian conflict, 

regional stability, and, again, a region that is obviously of vital importance to the global economy, Iranian influence, and so forth. 

So there have been gains. We both mentioned that they were 

fragile gains. We want to see those hard-won gains preserved by 

ensuring that conditions are present, albeit with some risk, certainly. We are going to have to take some risks. Again, I am keenly 

aware that there are some other risks in Iraq out there. 

Obviously, the earlier questioning has featured a great deal 

about that, and I mentioned that in, again, the considerations that 

I have used to guide the recommendations for the future. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I think all of us, certainly I, feel very strongly that 

the Iraqi Government needs to do more. All of us want to see further gains, even though I would certainly argue there has been a 

substantial amount of progress over the past 12 months or so. 

All of us, myself included, are disappointed in the Arab neighbors, who definitely need to do more on their own behalf and in 

terms of their own security as it is directly affected by Iraq. If that 

were all that were afoot here, I think each and every one of us 

would vote to bring our forces home as quickly as we could physically do that. 

But as I see your testimony here, when, Ambassador Crocker, 

you talked yesterday about the impact of an earlier conditional 

withdrawal, ‘‘with devastating consequences for the region and the 

world,’’ when both of you talk today, as, General Petraeus, you 

have, saying, al Qaeda’s senior leaders ‘‘still view Iraq as a central 

front in their global strategy,’’ and, Ambassador, you say Osama 

bin Laden has called Iraq the ‘‘perfect base,’’ this is not just about 

Iraq and the benefit of the Iraqi people, or even the region, is it? 

We are really talking about the primary security interest of each 

and every American. Or do I have that wrong? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct. 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is correct, Congressman. 

Al Qaeda is a strategic enemy of the United States. It was dangerously close to setting down lasting roots in Iraq in Arab territory, which as I noted in my testimony, is a main goal of this predominantly Arab terrorist organization. If it were to have succeeded, or to succeed in the future, it is certainly my judgment that 

the threat to the United States would rise considerably. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Reyes, the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
29 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service to our 

country. 

I, like my colleague, agree that all of us want to see our troops 

returned home as quickly as possible. 

General Petraeus, I know that you are knowledgeable to the findings of the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on 

Iraq. At this point in time, no portion of the most recent Iraq NIE 

has been declassified, so we can’t talk about the findings of that 

assessment, at least not in an open hearing like this. But in the 

unclassified key judgments from the August 2007 update, it stated: 

There have been measurable but uneven improvements in the Iraq 

security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on 

Iraq in January of 2007. That was the August NIE, the declassified 

portion. 

So, as someone, like many of my colleagues here today, who has 

studied the current NIE and previous intelligence estimates, I have 

to say that the situation in Iraq, as has been verified by the Director of National Intelligence, is somewhat inconsistent with the actions that you are recommending or proposing in terms of the 

drawdown of the surge. 

So my question is—and, actually, two questions. First of all, has 

the security situation on the ground in Iraq changed so much that 

we can actually start pulling back the surge forces? The second 

question is, what happens if the security situation changes during 

the so called 45-day pause? Are we going to reinstate the surge? 

And if we are, how long can such a reconstituted surge be sustained, in your opinion? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, again, I would not have recommended drawing down the surge if I did not think that the security progress enabled that, not just in terms of all the metrics that 

I have shown but also in the slowly but steadily improving capabilities of Iraqi forces, Iraqi governance, and other aspects that we 

take into account. 

Mr. REYES. Irrespective of what has happened in Basra? 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, the Iraqis are in the lead in Basra, 

Congressman. Again, they are the ones. We have some transition 

teams. We have some advisors. We have certainly provided 

enablers in the form of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, 

closed air support, which the Iraqis do not have a sufficient capability yet but are developing. 

Mr. REYES. In your statement, you also said that the current situation is fragile and reversible. You are not concerned that Basra 

could be the string that would start unraveling the rest of the fragile stability that you talked about? 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, in the other southern provinces, it is 

the reason I highlighted that, because they could succumb to the 

same kind of challenges that you have in Basra. And there were 

attempts by militia elements in these other southern provinces. 

Virtually all of them that are south of Baghdad, down to Basra, 

and, again, in all but really, Mayson, which is the Marsh Arabs 

who have always been out of control, weren’t under control under 

Saddam and aren’t under control by anybody right now either, 

frankly. The rest of those have done well. In fact, the Iraqi forces 

in those areas, with small assistance, if any, from our forces, have 
30 

been equal to the task of ensuring the continued security in those 

areas. So I do believe I think we can move this forward and continue on the course that we are on. 

Mr. REYES. So if at any point in the 45-day pause security deteriorates, what does that mean? What contingency plans do we 

have? Will you reinstate the surge? 

General PETRAEUS. That would be a pretty remote thought in my 

mind, for a variety of different reasons. One is the strategic considerations that I have explained. The other is, we do have the ability 

to move some forces around, obviously, and we would certainly 

want to do that, both Iraqi forces as well as our forces. 

Again, the Iraqis have now built some capability to respond in 

the form of the emergency response unit in the Ministry of Interior, 

this very substantial and very good Iraqi Special Operations Force 

Brigade, and a number of these so-called Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), but they are much more than SWAT teams in many 

cases. In Hillah, for example, it is a SWAT battalion. They have 

moved these around, and they have used these as required. That 

would certainly be the option that we would want to see exercised. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Everett from Alabama. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Ambassador, thank you very much for your service, for 

those that you lead. We appreciate your dedication to this country. 

General, thank you for your earlier service and some of the comments that you had observed in the way that this ought to be conducted in Iraq. 

None of us like the cost of this. If our Congressional Research Service (CRS) is correct, we are looking at $1 trillion. It is right 

that we discuss it. It is also right that we, as Mr. McHugh said, 

we are disappointed that the Iraqis and other countries over there 

are not contributing more to this campaign. But if we are going to 

look at that $1 trillion, then we probably should also ask at the 

same time, how much is 3,000 lives worth? How much is 30,000 

lives worth? 

We have all agreed that we are fighting an enemy that is determined to kill Americans, and they will continue to kill Americans. 

They have been killing Americans for 20, 25 years prior to 9/11. 

While it is fair to bring that figure up, it is also fair to ask how 

much value do we place on 3,000 American lives or 30,000 American lives. 

Mr. Ambassador, you spoke to this in your testimony. There are 

obviously countries over there who disagree with a free Iraq, disagree with free elections, disagree with the fact that all their citizens have rights. Would you discuss in a little more detail some of 

those countries that are contributing those outside actors, as you 

have said, that are contributing, and also how they are contributing, if they are contributing, the percentage of them that may be 

in the country, if they are contributing for materials, manpower, 

and exactly how they are engaged? 

I would hope members would keep in mind that these are countries that do not want us to succeed in Iraq by any method. 

Mr. Ambassador. 
31 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Congressman. 

As I noted in my testimony, as one looks at Iraq’s neighbors, the 

primary problem is with Iran, which, as both the General and I 

have said, is providing training, equipment, arms, ammunition, 

and explosives to radical militia elements that they effectively control. These are groups that target coalition forces, Iraqi forces, and 

Iraqi civilians. It is destabilizing to Iraq. 

Iran has stated that its policy is to support the Iraqi Government. In my view, if you take sort of an objective analysis of the 

Iran-Iraq relationship, that is what Iran should be doing, supporting the central government. Because the truth is no people suffered more from Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad than the 

Iranian people, with the sole exception of the Iraqis themselves. A 

vicious 8-year war from 1980 to 1988 cost hundreds of thousands 

of lives on both sides. 

So it should be in Iran’s national interest to make a sharp departure from the policies they are following into a consistency on the 

ground with their stated policy of supporting the central government. But that is not what is happening, and the events in Baghdad and Basra of recent weeks have put that into very sharp contrast. 

There was a problem with Syria, as we both noted. Foreign fighters, terrorists continue to infiltrate into Iraq through Syria. They 

have taken some steps to control this. But clearly they have not 

done enough. These individuals often are not Syrian themselves. 

They come from other countries in the region. We actually have 

seen some effective acts by these countries, in North Africa, the 

Arabian Peninsula and so forth, to take steps to ensure that their 

nationals do not have the opportunity to make that journey 

through Syria. 

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. We will call on Dr. Snyder and Mr. Bartlett and 

then take the short break. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for being here. We consider you the Dream Team. We very much 

appreciate your service. Also, we appreciate the reality of being 

away from your family and away from your personal life also. We 

appreciate you. 

General Petraeus, do you have an exact time in your mind as to 

when Iraq became the number one priority compared to Afghanistan? Is there a date in your mind that you can relate back to 

when that occurred? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, not in mind. I have been pretty head 

down inside Iraq for most of that time, and I am not sure who 

made that determination, when that was made. 

Dr. SNYDER. I think it was on March 5, Admiral Fallon was testifying, sitting about where you are sitting now, as Mr. Spratt referred to. And one of the things he said, maybe it was short-timer’s 

syndrome, I don’t know, but he said he needed 2,000 more troops 

in Afghanistan. 

You have talked a lot today and yesterday about conditionsbased. Here we have a combatant commander sitting down testifying he needs 2,000 more troops, trainers primarily, today in Af-
32 

ghanistan. How should the Congress respond to that kind of comment? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, you are asking the Commander 

in Iraq. 

Dr. SNYDER. I assume you would say you would want the troops 

today. 

General PETRAEUS. Again, obviously. I don’t know how the Congress responds. I guess the Congress weighs how much more it can 

resource. I think you are already funding an expansion of the Army 

and of the Marine Corps, I believe. Again, I have been sort of focused on another task. 

Dr. SNYDER. The reason I asked that is because I think, Ambassador Crocker, in your written statement you referred to some 

would choose to walk away from Iraq. The discussions that we 

have here is, how do we resource everything we need to do? Part 

of it is when we have Admiral Fallon saying we need 2,000 more 

troops today, not next month, not 6 months; today. But the reason 

that is not occurring is because Iraq is priority number one. Most 

of us aren’t sure when that occurred. We don’t know when this 

need for additional troops is going to be met. We consider Afghanistan also to be an utmost high priority for the United States. And 

yet it is not happening today. And we are responsible for it. You 

are not responsible for it. You are doing great at what you are 

doing. But we are responsible for it. 

I wanted to ask, in this chart here that you presented, this section over here, nonkinetics, this chart that you two presented, you 

list services and job programs. I didn’t see any charts today in 

some of the specifics with regard to services. I will list topics here 

and you tell me if such a chart would be available: electricity production availability, prenatal care for pregnant women, vaccination 

rates for children five years of age and under, neonatal deaths, 

availability of clean and safe water, availability of sewer systems, 

oil production, oil exports. 

Would you have charts available on all of those indications of 

services available to the Iraqi people? 

Ambassador CROCKER. We certainly have data available on some 

of those categories, oil production exports, electricity generation, 

and so forth. 

Dr. SNYDER. One of the frustrations we have when we hear that 

things are better in a neighborhood, generally people talk about, 

we can walk through this neighborhood. But we don’t know what 

is going on behind those doors. We are now five years plus into 

this. We don’t know where we are at with the quality of life for 

children, for health care, for prenatal care. Economics I think is a 

very hard thing to get a handle on, as Chairman Skelton was talking about. There was a paucity in your presentation, Ambassador 

Crocker, on those quality-of-life things for the Iraqi people. 

I wanted to ask, with regard to the Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRTs), which you talked about, Ambassador Crocker. We 

have a report coming out, this committee does, in the next couple 

of weeks on PRTs. I hope in your free time you will get a chance 

to read it because we would love to hear your comments on it. We 

think it is pretty thorough. What are the PRTs’ specific objectives, 
33 

and how are you measuring the performance of PRTs in meeting 

those objectives in Iraq? 

Ambassador CROCKER. The PRTs have a number of objectives: 

improving local governance, improve linkages between local governance and the Federal Government, helping local governments deliver services to the people, helping them with budget formulation 

and execution. We have established what we call a maturity model. 

All PRTs are required to report quarterly where they are in these 

various categories, these various responsibilities. And we have developed a set of criteria to ensure a reasonable uniformity of standards across the PRTs to measure this. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, could I just put in a soldier’s 

plug for the PRTs, and commander’s plug, because they have been 

of enormous value to us, and they have provided expertise to brigade and division commanders that just is not resident otherwise. 

Given even with all the tremendous talent that we have, even from 

the reserve components, they have been of just enormous help to 

us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. Then we will have a quick break. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your service and 

your honest testimony. I have a couple of brief questions that I 

hope both of you might choose to respond to. 

As we have stood up in the surge, Moqtada al-Sadr, perhaps in 

enlightened self-interest, stood down. We do not know how many 

other insurgent groups following al-Sadr’s lead also stood down. 

Clearly, this kind of violence should subside and it did. 

How much of the apparent success of the surge is attributable to 

this stand-down? 

Both of you have noted that the tenuous successes are reversible. 

Is the continued stand-down of insurgent groups essential to the 

continued political improvements, dependent on continuation of the 

surge, or has there been a fundamental cultural change so that insurgent groups’ stand-up would no longer be effective? Is our presence in Iraq equivalent to a temporary plug in a hole in the dike 

that, when removed, would result in escalating erosion and ultimate irreversible failure of the dike? 

We would appreciate your observations. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Congressman, as I mentioned in my 

statement, the stand-downs of insurgent groups are actually more 

importantly the awakening of some insurgent groups to actually, 

actively oppose al Qaeda Iraq, and the extremist ideology and violence that they had brought to these local communities has been 

a very important factor, as has certainly the stand-down of the 

Sadr militia, although we did continue to go after the special group 

elements throughout that time and, in fact, have detained a number of them along with substantial quantities of weapons and documents and so forth that very clearly lay out the role that Iran has 

played, the contribution that Lebanese Hezbollah has played, as 

well, with the Quds force. 

To come back to the insurgent groups, the key is obviously the 

transition of them into legitimate employment, legitimate Iraqi se-
34 

curity force ranks and so forth; and that process has been ongoing. 

It is most advanced in Anbar Province—still some more to be done 

there, but thousands of the Sons of Iraq, as they are now called, 

have actually transitioned in Anbar Province into the police, the 

army or into other government employment. And there is a comprehensive program, as I described, of joint Iraqi-American training 

in reintegration activities, if you will, to help them transition either 

to civilian employment, other government employment or, again, 

the 20, 30 percent or so that will end up in either the Iraqi police 

or the Iraqi army. 

But it is very important that that transition take place, and that 

was one reason that I listed as one of the factors, the operational 

considerations, as we do go forward. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, I think there has been a 

fundamental change that is of real significance, and it is a popular 

rejection of terrorism and violence. We saw it first and most clearly 

with the Sunni Arab population of Anbar and their courageous 

stance against al Qaeda. 

But we have also seen it among the Shi’a, and this goes back to 

August when Jaysh al-Mahdi militias tried to take control of one 

of Shi’a Islam’s most holy shrines in the city of Karbala. There was 

a very substantial popular backlash against that militia action, and 

that is what led Moqtada al-Sadr at the end of August to declare 

a freeze on Jaysh al-Mahdi activities. 

It wasn’t a case so much of him taking a need to kind of keep 

his powder dry during the surge. We weren’t in that area anyway. 

It was his recognition that these kinds of militia activities were distinctly unpopular with the Iraqi people; and I think we are seeing 

that same thing again in response to the actions in Baghdad and 

Basra. There is a degree of political unity behind the prime minister for taking these actions that spans the political spectrum, and 

that is because politicians understand that that is where the people 

are. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We will have a five-minute break 

and then we will take up Mr. Smith and Mr. McKeon. Let me ask 

the people in the audience to please remain seated until the two 

witnesses make their exit for a quick break. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will resume. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. I think the thing that 

we are all struggling with is the ultimate goal here is stability and 

reconciliation, and there are so many different factors going into 

that. Dr. Snyder mentioned a couple. With electricity, you have certainly mentioned a fair number. 

But ultimately, we are sort of looking at what the long-term 

goals are and how we get there. And one of the questions I had is, 

is there any way that you figure our troop presence in some ways 

contributes to instability or makes reconciliation more difficult; and 

if so, how have you factored that into your plans for getting to 

those ultimate goals? 
35 

General PETRAEUS. Well, it is very akin, Congressman, to the 

idea that in a sense we might hold them back in the security tasks 

as well. And so it is another area where we are constantly looking 

at, is this the time to allow them to get into the deep end and be 

there if necessary, but how hard do you need to hang on to the bicycle seat, that kind of measure. And we look at that across the 

board and in this area as well. 

But in the security arena and local governance and the provision 

of basic services and all the rest of that, we are keenly aware that 

there could be cases where they are going to say, well, Why should 

we do it for ourselves if they are doing it for us? 

Counter to that is this impulse that I mentioned earlier, that we 

have seen repeatedly really, which is the desire to exercise sovereignty and the desire to be in charge. And occasionally it actually 

pushes them to do—not more than occasionally; it pushes them to 

want to do something perhaps before they are completely ready to 

do that. And there have been some issues that have evolved as a 

result of that. 

Mr. SMITH. On a different issue in the same area, do you think 

our presence motivates insurgents, or I think it clearly motivates 

Iran to cause more problems in Iraq than they otherwise would, because if we are not there, as I think Ambassador Crocker mentioned, Iran doesn’t have much interest in Iraqi instability. But if 

we are there, given the conflict we have with Iran and the very 

real threats that Iran poses, they have to be worried about what 

our military would do if it got too secure in Iraq. 

So do you factor that in in terms of how we reach ultimate conciliation with Iran, and also with the various Shi’a factions? 

I want to throw one more question at you, and they are on the 

Shi’a factions. Because what happened in Basra and Baghdad recently could be simply dismissed as the government v. unlawful militias. But if you dig very deep down you find out that there is more 

to it. It is basically rival militias fighting it out. 

The Badr brigades seem to be more closely allied right now with 

the Iraqi Government, but the Badr brigades also to some extent 

are allied with Iran. So what is our long-term strategy there? Are 

we really choosing sides between the Badr brigades and the Mahdi 

army, and if so, why do we perceive that to be in our interest? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Those are two very good questions, Congressman. 

With respect to Iranian activities in Iraq, my earlier comments 

were my analysis of what I think should be Iran’s long-term strategic calculations, not what they necessarily are. Clearly, they are 

motivated to try to put pressure on us. That is obviously part of 

it. But having watched this dynamic for a number of years in the 

region, I think what the Iranians are doing is pursuing a policy, 

if you will, of Lebanonization, doing what they did in Lebanon. And 

they, in conjunction with Syria, have pursued a policy of backing 

more than one militia in Lebanon for the last quarter of a century. 

And we haven’t been there in Lebanon as a military force since 

1984. So I think they would be pursuing these kinds of efforts in 

Iraq. 
36 

Mr. SMITH. I am almost out of time. Could one of you quickly 

touch on the issue of the side that we are choosing in the Shi’a faction, and then why that is in our interest? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. That is also a very important 

point. The way Iraqis are reading the events of Basra and Baghdad 

is the government against extremist militias. That is what has 

fused political support for Prime Minister Maliki and his government in a way that we just haven’t seen, at least during the year 

I was there. So Iraqis themselves, Kurds and Sunnis, as well as 

most of the Shi’a, are perceiving this as government against Shi’a 

extremists. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General and Ambassador, for your service and that 

of all of the men and women you command that are out there fighting for our freedoms. 

You know, there is lots of discussion as to mistakes that have 

been made previously. I think those can be discussed forever. But 

what I would like to focus on a little bit is now going forward from 

here. 

I have a quote from bin Laden. You know, some people say that 

we should get out right away; some people say we should phase 

out; some people say we should set dates. There are lots of comments. But I think we have also talked about the price of being 

there and the price of leaving. And I think bin Laden puts a focus 

pretty good; he says, ‘‘The world’s millstone and pillar is in Baghdad, the capital of the caliphate.’’ 

The whole world is watching this war and the two adversaries, 

the Islamic nations on the one hand and the United States and its 

allies on the other. It is either victory and glory or misery and humiliation. I think he understands the consequences of us leaving 

early before we finish our mission. I am hopeful that the American 

people understand that, and I think they do. 

General, could you please comment a little bit on the morale of 

our troops and their families, how they feel about the mission? 

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, first of all, let me just say that 

I don’t want to start off by generalizing about morale. I want to 

start off by explaining that morale is an individual event. And morale depends from soldier to soldier, and for me as well, on the kind 

of day that you are having out there in the theater. And it is a roller-coaster existence. 

Now, having said that, there is actually something called the 

mental health assessment which is done every year. The last one 

was done in the late fall, I believe it was, and after several years 

of a generalization of morale as going down, morale actually went 

up. 

We have talked about it, talked to the command, Sergeant Major 

Hill, my senior noncommissioned officer in Multi-National Forces 

Iraq (MNFI) and a long time as the same in the 101st Airborne Division, and a number of other commissioned and noncommissioned 

leaders and troopers; and I think it is a sense that they have had 

that they are making progress, that in a number of different areas 
37 

where they were operating they could see tangible results, and that 

they saw the reversal of the ethno-sectarian violence, the progress 

that had been made by al Qaeda and so forth and so on. 

And, of course, if you feel like you are making progress, then I 

think you obviously feel better about what it is you are engaged in. 

Beyond that, the other indicator that we look at very closely, as 

I mentioned earlier, is reenlistment. And again I focus on reenlistment in theater, and it has repeatedly been way above what the 

goals are for the units that are deployed there. 

As I mentioned, one of the units that is there, just completing its 

third tour in Iraq, has already met its reenlistment goal for the entire fiscal year. 

So, again, no question about the strain, the sacrifice of our troopers and on their families, some of them making the ultimate sacrifice. But our great young men and women continue to raise their 

right hand and want to continue to serve, by and large, with perhaps that one population that we are concerned most about, which 

is the young captains. And again, as I mentioned earlier, that is 

something that I know that my service and the other services are 

looking very hard at to try to figure out how to give them some 

breaks and how to give them additional incentives to stay with this 

very important mission. 

Mr. MCKEON. I have just a little time left. Could you expand on 

the Sons of Iraq and how that is helping us? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, sir, the Sons of Iraq are individuals. It 

really dates all the way back to Anbar Province and the first awakening which—to be fair, it started before the surge, but then was 

very much enabled by the surge because that enabled us to clear 

areas over time. 

But it started with a sheikh in Anbar Province coming to a brigade commander in Ramadi, saying back in October of 2006, Would 

you support us if we turned our weapons on al Qaeda instead of 

on you? And the brigade commander got that test question right. 

He pledged support. 

It took some time to build those forces, to get them going, to get 

it established. By mid-March they were ready to clear Baqubah, or 

I am sorry, Ramadi. Over time, this played out in other areas. 

Originally, they were not paid. Over time they did ask if we 

could pay them, because they were helping with security. We have 

lots of security contractors and now we have 91,000 more, called 

Sons of Iraq. The calculations we have done showed that this is a 

pretty good bargain, because the cost in their salaries per month 

is a lot less than the amount of vehicle losses that don’t take place 

because we have this support. They are helping us to hold areas 

that have been cleared of al Qaeda or their insurgent allies. 

So, again, they are a very, very important component of this. 

They help with local security most of all. And quantity has a quality of its own in counterinsurgency operations where the enemy can 

attack anywhere and you must guard everywhere; and they have 

helped us to do that. 

They have, by the way, been targeted very heavily by al Qaeda, 

which shows the importance that al Qaeda sees, because they are 

also a manifestation of the population rejecting al Qaeda. And their 

losses have been similar, around two and a half to three times our 
38 

losses in recent months, as al Qaeda has relentlessly tried to go 

after them, to intimidate them, to get them to desert their posts. 

And, by and large, they are very much hanging in there; they are 

fairly cohesive, tribally based elements. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today. I want to 

go back to a report that General Jones did back in September. And 

I know that the last time you were before our committee it had just 

come out and we had some discussion over it. 

But I think that some people have forgotten about this report. 

And in particular to General Petraeus I have a question or several 

questions with respect to what I call the Iraqification of Iraq, or the 

army, the fact that to a large extent it seems to me over the last 

5 years or so we have been thinking that the way to get out of Iraq 

is to set up the army and the police forces and let them take care— 

get them to a point where we leave the country in a stabilized situation, and they are able to continue that stability. 

So in the September 2007 report of the Independent Commission 

on the Security Forces of Iraq, which again was chaired by General 

Jim Jones, it painted a fairly pessimistic outlook for Iraqi security 

independence. And according to the report the national police force 

was dysfunctional and should be disbanded; the Ministry of Interior was riddled with corruption and incompetence, and that it was 

a ministry in name only according to the report. It said that the 

Iraqi army was doing better, but wouldn’t be capable of full operations for at least 12 to 18 months and was lacking in adequate 

weapons, transport, logistics, intelligence, planning capabilities. 

And, of course, I ask this question because we saw their performance, or their lack of performance, in the last couple of weeks in 

Basra and other areas—it wasn’t very encouraging. And because, 

again, our general strategy is based on the capabilities of the Iraqi 

forces, my questions would be, in particular, to you, General. 

Because you spent a year in the mission of training those forces, 

my questions are first, do you agree with the findings of General 

Jones and the Commission, and where do you disagree and why? 

Have you acted on the recommendations of the Jones Commission 

and which ones of the major recommendations have you acted on? 

The Commission found that the Ministry of Interior, the national 

police and the border guards were heavily infiltrated by sectarian 

militias and were making little or no contribution to that fight. Do 

you agree with that assessment? What have you done to address 

these problems with the Maliki government, and are there any reforms that are likely to occur because of that? 

The report also asserts that the massive troop presence of U.S. 

military and its facilities creates a perception among the Iraqis 

that the U.S. forces are a long-term occupying force. Do you agree 

with that assessment and do you agree with the recommendation 

that significant reductions, consolidations and realignments of the 

U.S. forces must happen in Iraq in order for that perception to go 

away? And what friction do you see because of the fact that we 

may be looked upon as an occupying force to the Iraqi population? 
39 

And last, in theory, reduction of U.S. forces should be possible as 

Iraqi army forces achieve the necessary state of readiness and effective independent operations. In light of this reality, what can be 

done to accelerate the process of training, equipping and transferring responsibility to the Iraqi forces? Should we devote more resources to it? What do we do about those who didn’t fight or ran 

away? 

Do you agree with the Jones Commission that the Iraqi army is 

not ready to be independent in 12 to 18 months? That would be the 

end of this year. And how much of the Iraqi army do you believe 

will really be ready to operate independently within the time 

frame, that is, by December of this year? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I have tried to write as quickly as I 

could, Congresswoman. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I can go over them again if you would like. 

General PETRAEUS. Let me try to answer them if I can. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You know what I am asking, General. 

General PETRAEUS. I do indeed. 

First of all, we have acted on a number of the recommendations 

that the Jones Commission report made, and frankly, we agreed 

with their assessment of the national police that it was. And I am 

on the record as stating repeatedly that the national police were hijacked by sectarian interests during the height of the sectarian violence and they had become a sectarian actor. And, in fact, every 

one of the brigade commanders, division commanders and overall 

commander of the national police were relieved, as were about 70 

percent of the battalion commanders. In one case, by the way, the 

relief was twice in one unit. 

And they actually have—they have become net contributors now, 

rather than net consumers or net sectarian actors. And, in fact, if 

you talk to the commanders on the ground in Baghdad or elsewhere where there are national police operating, you will find that 

in a number of cases the national police are pulling their load and 

that the commander of the national police over the course of about 

the last 8 to 10 months has made substantial progress in that it 

has been directed by the Minister of Interior. 

Each brigade has gone through a reblueing process, a period of 

training where the entire brigade goes off to a training center and 

goes through intensive training. And now the Italian carabinieri 

are actually in helping units one after another to do additional 

work. 

The Ministry of Interior has worked to reduce sectarian influence, militia influence and so forth. This is not easy when you are 

in a situation that that ministry was in at the end of the sectarian 

violence of 2006–2007, but they have indeed made progress, in our 

assessment. 

I also brought in another team to look at some specifics, based 

on General Jone’s Commission’s report, and again did follow a 

number of the steps with respect to that. As General Dubik, the 

head of the training-equip mission, has been pursuing. 

The Iraqi army has taken over numerous areas already, as I 

have mentioned in my testimony today, and although there clearly 

were units that did not measure up and leaders that did not measure up in Basra—and by the way, we then, together with our Iraqi 
40 

counterparts, provided a list of individuals that we thought didn’t 

meet the mark in Basra, as well as in Baghdad; and also a list of 

those who did very well—to provide our input. Because they do 

have a leader assessment process in the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior and they will use that; and in some cases, the Prime Minister directed their relief. 

I also mentioned that the Iraqi Security Forces did do well in the 

face of violence that sprang up at the time of the Basra operation 

start in the southern provinces; and again they did a creditable job. 

And those are areas that have been—many of those have been 

handed off to provincial Iraqi control. One of the others will be 

handed off in the next few months. 

Again, the same is playing out in Anbar Province, of all places, 

at one time the most dangerous province in Iraq, now a place 

where a unit returned to Fort Stewart from the Army, as well 

where the concern of the infantry battalion was that many of them 

had not received combat infantryman badges because they hadn’t 

been in real combat and, again, Iraqi forces stepping up in those 

locations. 

So that is, I think, a pretty quick answer, although 3 minutes 

over the time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, General. And I will submit it further 

in writing so that you can get the specifics to me, because I am interested. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, today and some yesterday, there have been calls to declassify recent Intelligence Community assessments. And kind of 

left hanging is this implication that there is something radically 

different in this assessment than in your public testimony today. 

So I guess I would just like to ask briefly, do you take Intelligence Community products into account in writing your public 

testimony, and is there something substantially different in that 

particular assessment from the thrust of your public testimony that 

you have given today? 

General PETRAEUS. We do take it into account. In fact, we draw 

very heavily, obviously, on our own intelligence assessments as 

well. But certainly take it into account. And there is not any difference that I am aware of, having looked at that fairly quickly between what that says and what we have said. And I am not the 

one who does declassification of intelligence documents. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I understand. Let me go to, I think, maybe a 

larger point. 

General, in your testimony you talked about the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq as vitally important to the 

citizens of the United States. 

And, Ambassador, in your testimony you said we have to be clear 

with ourselves about what failure would mean. The American people don’t hear that sort of talk very much. What they hear is what 

happened today on the ground with this bombing or this suicide 

bomber. And that is, if something happened on the ground; if it is 

relatively quiet, they don’t get any news. 
41 

And I think it is important for them to hear from each of you 

why Iraq is important, what we have at stake. Not just what we 

are doing for them, but why it is important for us. 

So I would invite you both to elaborate on the comments that you 

made in your written testimony. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, Congressman, I think we have 

an enormous national interest in the security instability of Iraq 

with respect, as I have mentioned, to al Qaeda Iraq and al Qaeda 

in that particular area, the possible resumption of sectarian conflict 

that could not only engulf Iraq once again, but also potentially 

spread over Iraq’s borders. 

Some of your Members have rightly noted that there is already 

a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. There are already, by most accounts, 

somewhere around two million internally displaced and two million 

others displaced out of the country. That could get far, far worse. 

In fact, we have seen some signs of a reversal of that, of the security conditions allowing some citizens to return to their homes 

and their families. 

Again, there is certainly a regional stability issue and there is 

obviously an issue in terms of the global economy with Iraq being 

the second or third most, the country with the second or third most 

oil resources in the world. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, both General Petraeus and 

I have spoken about the cost of failure. I would like to spend just 

a moment on how a stable and secure Iraq could transform the region. 

For most of Iraq’s modern history, since the 1958 revolution, Iraq 

has been a negative factor for regional stability. And, indeed, that 

revolution in 1958 and our concerns over where it was going is 

what triggered the decision to send Marines to Lebanon. So over 

the course of these years, we saw the Iran-Iraq War; we saw the 

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; the threat to Saudi Arabia; the Iraqi subversion in Syria, in Jordan, in Lebanon; kind of an unbroken saga 

of destabilizing actions or outright military invasions. 

A stable Iraq, in my judgment—and I spend a lot of time in this 

region—could be an anchor in the Arab world and the broader Middle East, and we could have a positive dynamic throughout the region that we really haven’t seen for decades. I can’t predict what 

the specific consequences of that would be, but it would be a far 

more positive dynamic than we have seen in, literally, decades. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. McIntyre from North Carolina. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for your service to our country. 

As I mentioned to General Petraeus before the hearing today, I 

was in Iraq just 10 days ago and had the opportunity to meet with 

many of our fine men and women serving our country there, including General Lloyd Austin from Ft. Bragg of whom we are particularly proud in our area of North Carolina, and had opportunities also to visit detainee centers at Cropper and Bucca. 

I wanted to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, specifically, as we measure progress in Iraq, I am struck by the fact that there has been 

no discussion really today of where we stand on the 18 benchmarks 

that were so widely discussed last September. The GAO said we 
42 

had met 3, 3 out of 18 benchmarks. Can you tell us what your assessment is as to where we stand on those benchmarks? 

Having heard the testimony today that you all do not believe 

that timelines are in order, but where do we stand on the benchmarks. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, actually, Congressman, I would 

state that in just about an eight-week period we saw benchmark 

legislation enacted on accountability and justice, that is, 

debaathification reform on amnesty and the provincial powers law 

with its stipulation for elections by this fall, I would also describe 

as significant benchmarks. 

We are actually going through this process right now of doing an 

updated assessment on the benchmarks. That is something that I 

expect we will have done in the next week or so. 

But pending that, I would say we are certainly well above three. 

I think I would say either ‘‘achieved’’ or ‘‘significant progress’’ on 

about a dozen of them. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Achieved or significant progress. But as far as 

checking off the benchmark as having been achieved, can you tell 

us about how many you think that have been done? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, again, we are going through the 

process right now and we can and will do that. 

In my testimony, as I described the legislative achievements, I 

did so in their own terms because this is something I said in September. You can have a situation in which all of the benchmarks 

are achieved and you still don’t have meaningful reconciliation. You 

can also have circumstances in which relatively few of them are 

achieved, but you are getting reconciliation anyway. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I know my time is limited. Excuse me. 

So you are saying, within next week you can provide us an assessment as to where we stand specifically on the 18 benchmarks 

that the Iraqi Government agreed to meet in working with the U.S. 

Government to make sure that we are accomplishing the political, 

economic progress that we want to see in the country, as well as 

the military progress; is that correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Will you submit that to this committee within 

the next week? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I will. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. If you will, do that in writing, please. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. 

And, General Petraeus, I just wanted to ask with regard to local 

police, following up on Ms. Sanchez’ question, I have heard a continuous concern. We talked today about national police and also the 

military, and commended you for your work with the military and 

all that you have done with the national police. 

Can you tell us your assessment of the corruption problem with 

the local police? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, Congressman if I could just 

add that everybody in the Tarheel State ought to be very proud of 

the 18th Airborne Corps headquarters, Lloyd Austin and his great 

team and all the other troopers and Marines from Ft. Bragg and 

points east, that have served so magnificently. 
43 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you for your service there, too. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Sir, with respect to the local police, they 

have again taken on more and more and more. And interestingly 

what is emerging as the poster child for this is Anbar Province. 

Fallujah again, one of the most dangerous cities in Iraq, now has 

no Iraqi army or military in it. It has 10 police precincts, each of 

which is a gated community, essentially. 

They have had a Marine squad per police precinct. They are 

gradually downsizing those, so we will probably have one for every 

two for a while and then gradually reduce those. And they are 

doing a creditable job. 

There are always temptations in Iraq and there is something cultural, frankly, about ensuring that there is not corruption ongoing, 

and there is an effort. They have, in fact, relieved police chiefs, in 

some cases detained police chiefs in Anbar among other places to 

make sure that they are not supplementing their income by illicit 

means. 

Iraq is a country with enormous oil riches and other natural 

blessings; and again, there has to be continued effort to make sure 

that local police don’t succumb to the temptations again to try to 

get their hands into some of this. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And to the two gentlemen at the desk, thank you for your leadership, your patriotism to this great Nation and all the good things 

you are trying to do for America. 

Ambassador Crocker, I want to ask you a question, but I don’t 

want you to answer it right now because I have got a second question, and you can combine them both. 

How often do you have communications with the Iraqi governmental leadership, especially Prime Minister Maliki? Second, to 

what Mr. Sproul was saying, the issue and the reasons, which you 

have nothing to do but to protect the security of this Nation, so this 

was not meant toward you, his bringing these figures up. 

The reason is that this country right now is borrowing money 

from foreign governments to pay our bills. In the year 2001 a gallon of 87 octane gas cost $1.42; today it is $3.35. In addition, in 

2001 a barrel of oil was $28; today it is over $100. 

And I am not going on and on. But the issue is that we in this 

Congress are going to be cutting programs to help our elderly with 

health care. So we do want you, as you are trying to do today, to 

give us, as you have done, the honest assessment of where everything is. But the American people do support the troops, as we support the troops. The American people want to know that the Iraqi 

Government understands that we do not have treasure and blood 

to go on and on and on. 

And, Mr. Ambassador, the reason I bring this up is that a couple 

of your statements, as well as the General’s, were very, very—you 

know, statements such as ‘‘gains are fragile and reversible,’’ ‘‘cannot guarantee success, but we are closer’’; and we appreciate those 

statements. 
44 

But recently Prime Minister Maliki demanded al-Sadr to disband 

his Mahdi army, threatened to bar al-Sadr followers from the political process if the cleric refused; and I quote, ‘‘A decision was taken 

yesterday that no longer have a right to participate in the political 

process or take part in the upcoming elections unless they end the 

Mahdi army.’’ 

My question to you because of the word ‘‘fragile,’’ which I appreciate—and you have been very honest, ‘‘fragile’’—do you have conversations with Maliki? Does he take you into discussion as it relates to political decisions that are going to be forthcoming? 

Because this is the question to you: If, by chance, that he would 

bar al-Sadr’s group from the political process, what would be the 

results of that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, General Petraeus and I see 

a great deal of the Iraqi political leadership. We met with Prime 

Minister Maliki, for example, I think just the day before we got on 

the plane to come back here. We also have extensive contacts with 

the other elements of the leadership, and we do in those contacts 

register our views. We consult. 

But at the same time Prime Minister Maliki is the leader of a 

sovereign government, and as we saw in Basra, he will take his 

own decisions. He did not extensively consult with us before that 

operation. We learned of it just a couple of days before he embarked on it. 

With respect to the Jaysh al-Mahdi, I point out that it is not just 

the Prime Minister. President Talabani, the Kurdish President of 

Iraq, yesterday also called on Moqtada al-Sadr to disband that militia and commit himself fully to the political process. And again I 

think this is one of the really positive developments we have seen 

that I referred to earlier, a popular rejection of militia, extremist 

terrorist violence, both Sunni and Shi’a. And it is reflected not only 

in the Prime Minister’s call, but a position that spans the political 

spectrum, a statement issued last Saturday specifically called for 

the disbanding of militias. And that was a collective view of all the 

major political movements. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Tauscher. 

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, thank you for your service and to your families and the people that you represent. Gentlemen, over the last few weeks some of the national polling, a CBSNew York Times poll, have increasingly larger numbers of Americans saying, for example, looking back, do you think the United 

States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq or 

should the United States have stayed out? Sixty-two percent say 

‘‘stayed out.’’ 

Do you favor or oppose the U.S. war in Iraq? Sixty-six percent 

say ‘‘oppose.’’ 

All in all, do you think this situation in Iraq was worth going to 

war over or not? Sixty-two percent, ‘‘not worth it.’’ 

Now, both of you have stated in repeated testimony that our 

withdrawal from Iraq or redeployment from Iraq is going to be conditions-based. Apparently that is a metric for Iraq. 
45 

Those are not the only conditions that we have to look at; we 

have to also look at the conditions here. My constituents in California repeatedly tell me that they don’t believe that we can sustain the number of troops or the treasure that we are expending. 

The American people, gentlemen, love their troops and appreciate their sacrifice, but they do not like this mission and they 

want to know what is going to happen. And we have an election 

coming forward in November and that is going to be significantly 

about this. On January 21st of 2009, if you report to a commander 

in chief that says that they want a plan for the withdrawal of 

troops in the next 60 days, what will you advise them? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I would sit down first, Congresswoman; 

I would try to back up and ask what the mission is, what are the 

objectives, what is the desired end state. With an understanding of 

that mission, then you can state what resources are required. 

Mrs. TAUSCHER. General, if the mission is to maintain the security gains as best we have made during the surge, but to bring our 

troops home so that they can rest, retrain and be redeployable, and 

we can fix our readiness problem and cut the amount of money 

that we are spending in Iraq, which is $600 billion now going to 

well over $1 trillion in the future, what would your response be? 

General PETRAEUS. My response would be dialogue on what the 

risk would be again. And this about risk. 

At the end of the day, let me just state up front, I absolutely support the principle of civilian control in the military. We are not selfemployed in uniform. We take orders and we follow them. But 

what we want to do, of course, is to have dialogue within the chain 

of command about what the mission is, what the desired end state 

is, the objectives and so forth; then be able to provide the assessment of a commander on the ground of what we believe are the resources required. If they are less than that, you know, this is the 

risk to various elements; and then it is up to other folks to determine where they want to take the risk. 

But again, as I stated, I fully believe in, subscribe to and have 

sworn an oath to the Constitution and the concept of civilian control in the military. 

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Ambassador Crocker, considering that we will 

have a new President on January 20th and our President could say 

that they want to have you give them an assessment, for example, 

on how we spread the risk, how we spread the risk away from the 

American people and our military, who in the region could step up, 

who around the world could step up to help stabilize the Iraq Government and their security situation in lieu of our departure? 

What would you advise the President as to who could be available and how we would begin that engagement? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, again Congresswoman that is looking fairly far into the future, and I have learned to keep my 

timelines pretty short when I am predicting things to do with Iraq. 

I would anticipate it would be a briefing on the efforts that are 

under way. I described, for example, the efforts we have made to 

have the United Nations more actively engaged in Iraq; they are. 

Our efforts with the international community, more broadly; 

again, it is noteworthy, I think, that Sweden is hosting this upcoming ministerial on the international compact with Iraq. It is the 
46 

first time that a European state has stepped forward that was not 

a member of the Coalition, so, you know, we are trying to broaden 

there. 

And we have constant efforts under way in the region that, 

frankly, I wish had been a little more successful, but we will keep 

at it. And I think what I would probably be doing is providing an 

update on these sorts of things. 

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hayes 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here. Please convey our 

gratitude and incredible appreciation to the men and women with 

whom you serve. 

Three questions: Number one, the Anbar model is obviously 

working, it would appear, for a number of reasons, mainly because 

tribal leaders are working with elected leaders and our military officials to come up with a plan that cooperates and works. If you 

would, comment on that. 

Number two, elected leaders and tribal leaders are the ones that 

can provide this timeline that everybody talks about. What do you 

see happening? How do we precipitate, how do we cause that to 

happen so that the Iraqis say, We are going to be ready by this 

date? Immediately then you can come up with a timeline that we 

need. 

And last, in the south, very significant, the Basra situation, you 

have Iraqi Shi’a battling Iranian-influenced Shi’a who are Moqtada 

al-Sadr. How do we work that out; and if you will, just kind of explain the dynamic of that? Because with Maliki taking on al-Sadr, 

that is pushing back on Iran, and people need to know about that. 

And the last comment: David Walker sat where you are sitting 

and said the benchmarks we have for Iraq are not the right ones. 

So the benchmarks of Iraqi spending money of their own on us, 

helping to fight the war against the terrorists, is very significant 

in the benchmark area. 

Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, if I could take the first and 

third and the Ambassador will take the second and the fourth. 

The Anbar model is a model that we have tried to apply elsewhere. It is a model that certainly works in an area that is almost 

exclusively Sunni Arab,with substantial tribal influence, and an 

area in which al Qaeda very clearly overplayed its hand, where 

again the population was devastated by what al Qaeda did to them 

in terms of violence, in terms of these oppressive practices that 

they implemented, not to mention the ideology to which they subscribe, which the people of the Euphrates River valley didn’t embrace. 

There were reasons why they were willing to support al Qaeda 

having to do with a variety of actions early on, feelings of dispossession, disrespect and the like. But over time they came to realize what al Qaeda had done to their river valley, done to business, done to basic services and so forth, and chose to reject it; and 

because, again, of the relative cohesion of the population and the 

tribal structures were able to use that, and they were able to use 

it to cobble together a fairly coherent response to al Qaeda. 
47 

We are applying that where we can. Again, the circumstances 

there are fairly unique so you have to adapt it to each area. And 

when you have a place where there are sectarian or ethnic differences, say, in Diyala Province or Ninawa, it is a bit more sensitive and you have got to be a little bit more skillful in your application perhaps, or just different in your application, because those 

in Anbar demonstrated enormous skill. 

With respect to Basra, again as the Ambassador mentioned earlier, this is, in our view, truly a decision by a prime minister to 

take on elements that were very much threatening the peace, rule 

of law, good order and so forth in Basra, that were carrying out 

acts of intimidation, including murder and so forth, and not just— 

it wasn’t a purely politically inspired activity. It does happen that 

some of the most lethal elements associated with that militia, the 

so-called ‘‘special groups,’’ are in fact backed by Iran or trained, 

equipped and funded by them. 

So again this was a fairly courageous decision. It was a fairly 

sudden decision. It was one that came after some months of preparing a more deliberate approach and is still very much playing 

out. It is far too soon to say that Basra has succeeded, or has failed 

either. It is safe to say that Basra is going to continue for months 

actually, and it is a tough nut to crack. But the fact is that the 

Prime Minister has taken it on and his forces are grappling with 

that particular issue. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, on the role of elected and 

tribal leaders, Iraqis, both Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi population 

at large, want to be in a position of taking charge of their own 

country and their own security. It is not a situation in which they 

are really all saying, well, let the Americans do it. And again, the 

Basra operation reflects that sentiment, that they should be able 

to do things for themselves. So I think clearly Iraqis are moving 

in that direction. 

But just as we look at conditions rather than timelines, so do 

thoughtful Iraqis. One thing that will be important are the provincial elections because you mentioned tribal and elected leaders. 

Many tribal leaders and their followers sat out the last election and 

are therefore not represented in government. They are not going to 

make that mistake this time; they have been very clear on that. So 

these elections are going to be important to kind of recalibrate 

through the voting booths who Iraq’s leaders are at the provincial 

level. 

With regard to the benchmarks, the benchmarks have importance. We track them, and as I undertook to Congressman McIntyre, we will provide our assessment of where they are. But what 

they don’t do, and as your suggestion implies, they simply don’t tell 

the whole story. And it is important to focus on a number of other 

things. 

A key element is that which you mentioned, the ability of Iraq 

to spend its own funds on its own reconstruction and development, 

and we place a very high emphasis on that even though it is not 

a benchmark. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Andrews from New Jersey. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the chairman. 
48 

I thank the witnesses for their service to our country. Please 

thank the people you represent as well. We are very grateful. 

Ambassador Crocker, the words I hear, ‘‘talk about transition to 

Iraqis running Iraq.’’ But the substance I see looks more to me like 

an indefinite American occupation of Iraq. I want to ask you some 

questions about that. 

A significant though not exclusive source of the hostilities in Iraq 

are Sunni resistors who do not want to live in a country that is 61 

percent Shiite. Iraq is a country where who controls the guns and 

the money and the power is going to be very, very important. 

When you were here in September, the essential argument you 

made to the American people was that General Petraeus and his 

forces would do their very best to tamp down the violence—and 

they have, and we thank them for that—and that the Iraqi politicians would then take advantage of that hiatus and do the best 

they could to reach political reconciliation. They have not. 

Let’s first talk about sharing of power with the provinces, particularly those that are majority Sunni. There have not been provincial elections yet, have there? 

Ambassador CROCKER. There have been provincial elections, one 

round, in which many Sunnis boycotted. The next elections will be 

this fall. 

Mr. ANDREWS. But there have not been meaningful provincial 

elections that vested real power in the provincial government. 

Would you agree with that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Actually, Congressman, the provincial 

governments do have significant power. That has now been codified 

in the Provincial Powers Law that was just passed by the parliament. The most important power they have is the access to resources. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Let’s talk about resources. At this point in time, 

the most important economic resource in Iraq is oil revenues. The 

Iraqi parliament has not passed a hydrocarbon law since September, has it? 

Ambassador CROCKER. No, it has not. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And, finally, a very important thing is control of 

the military and the Interior Ministry, the police. Now there was 

a deBaathification law passed by the Iraqi parliament and enacted 

into law. But it is my understanding that the terms of that statute 

say that former members of the Baathist party may not work in 

the military and may not work in the Interior of Ministry. Is that 

correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. The most senior levels of the Baath party. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Aren’t the people at the most senior levels the one 

whose participation in political negotiations is the most important? 

Ambassador CROCKER. As I said in my testimony, Congressman, 

the implementation of these laws, this one, as well as the others, 

is going to be of key importance. I would note though—and we are 

still awaiting that—but I would note that these laws were passed 

in a new spirit of reconciliation that we would expect to see also 

inform the implementation of these. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I do understand that. I do understand that there 

is a new spirit of reconciliation. But the argument that was made 

by you in September was that a reduction in violence would create 
49 

the opportunity for a period of real political reconciliation. And that 

was the rationale of the so-called surge. 

Now the record shows that there was a deBaathification law. But 

as you just said, key members, former members of the party, can’t 

work in the defense or Interior Ministry, which means they have 

no access to the guns. There have been some provincial statutes 

passed. But the meaningful elections, by my judgment, have not occurred, and we hear it will occur by October 1st. We have heard 

that for a very long time. Perhaps the most important thing, which 

is the money, the hydrocarbon law has not been passed. 

Now I am not meaning to say here that not doing all those 

things since September is a mark of abject failure. But, my goodness, not doing them since April of 2003 sure looks like that. The 

war didn’t begin in September. As far as the American people are 

concerned, it was April of 2003 when Saddam fell, and the forces 

of which General Petraeus participated did such a great job in 

making that happen. 

It is now five years. No hydrocarbon law, no meaningful distribution to the provinces, no deBaathification law. Why should the 

American people wait five more minutes for that to happen? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, while there is no hydrocarbon law and revenue-sharing law, in fact revenues are being 

shared to the provinces. This process is ongoing. It is seen as equitable both in predominantly Sunni and predominantly Shi’a provinces. The provinces have resources because the oil revenues are in 

fact being shared. That I think is the important indicator. 

You talked about Sunni resistors not wanting to be part of the 

Shi’a majority country. Well, in fact as we have seen in Anbar, 

Baghdad, and elsewhere, the Sunnis have decided they don’t want 

to have anything to do with al Qaeda and its supporters. They took 

a very courageous stand against them. That actually triggered a 

broader reconciliation process. 

Mr. ANDREWS. My time has expired. I will quickly say that not 

having anything to do with al Qaeda is one thing, wanting to have 

something to do with the new government is quite another. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, Ambassador, 

thank you so much for being here. 

The question I am going to ask you, you might not be able to answer. I just haven’t found who could articulate this answer best. So 

I am going to try it on the two of you. 

Let me set it up by saying how much I appreciate what both of 

you do. The chairman and I had the privilege of spending Christmas Eve with both of you in Iraq this year. We thank you for that 

opportunity. I know you mentioned yesterday you thought your 

men and women that were serving there were America’s newest 

Greatest Generation. That is certainly true. All the people we 

talked to, not one exception, they believed in what you are doing. 

I get frustrated sometimes, too, when I see charts coming up that 

suggest $1 trillion over the next 10 years. But I don’t see a chart 

that talks about the fact that just the deficits we will have on Social Security and Medicare will be 53 times that amount. We talked 

about borrowing money. We just borrowed $168 billion to give to 
50 

people to help feel good about the economy. All of that, put it in 

a bag, shake it up, put it on the shelf. 

I want to cut to the chase on this. When I am traveling around, 

I am looking at average homemaker, factory worker, salesman, who 

have children, and they are looking and saying some of what you 

heard today. We are having to spend $3 something for a gallon of 

gas. We have to make a tough choice. We have to spend X number 

of dollars for a gallon of milk. That is a tough choice. 

The question they are trying to grapple with inside is, how come 

it is worth $608 billion for them and their family to spend in Iraq 

for safety and security? 

General, I want to preface it by, yesterday, I think your response 

to Senator Warner was—when he asked you, were we safer in 

America because we are in Iraq, and you said, yes. The result of 

the question though, I want to also ask, if we prematurely pull out 

of Iraq, are we less safe in America? When we talk about things 

like we just mentioned earlier, enormous national interest, al 

Qaeda strengthening in Iraq, sectarian violence, all those things 

people say, that is wonderful; we support them, but is it worth 

$608 billion? How do we answer the housewife, factory worker, 

whatever, and say, this is why it is important to you that we spend 

these moneys and do this fight? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, I think that what happens in Iraq has 

ripple effects that certainly will ripple all the way right into the 

United States. If there is a disruption to the oil flow, just as an 

example—which is, by the way, flowing quite well out of Iraq, and 

they have exceeded their goals for oil export on top of course what 

they are getting paid for it—but would find an even higher price 

at the gas tank. 

If there are, again, if there is widespread regional instability and 

all the rest of that, again, the repercussions eventually will be felt 

in the United States. More immediately of course is the impact of 

al Qaeda being able to a establish a base there from which it could 

then project trained and possibly equipped terrorists that, again, 

eventually all has an impact, as it has in the past, on the United 

States and on our own citizens. 

So, as I have stated here this morning and said yesterday before 

the committees, we have an enormous interest in doing all that we 

can to get this right. It is of huge importance to our country. 

Mr. FORBES. Ambassador. 

Ambassador CROCKER. I would just add to that, Congressman, I 

was in Lebanon in the early 1980’s, and when we withdrew our 

Marines from Lebanon in early 1984 after the Marine barracks 

bombing in October of 1983, countries in the region made some 

judgments about what the United States was willing to do in Iran. 

Iran and Syria in particular made some judgments, and those judgments, which I think were incorrect judgments, continue to inform 

their actions today, over a quarter of a century later. 

Were we to take the decision to disengage from Iraq without regard to the conditions and the consequences, the region and indeed 

the world would also come to conclusions about the will of the 

United States that I think would have some very grave consequences, not just in Iraq but for U.S. interests more broadly. 
51 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We will have to close this hearing at 

12:30 for the staff to prepare for the 1 hearing that we have scheduled. We will do our best to get as many in between now and then. 

General, we thank you for your patience with us. 

Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you to you, General, Mr. Ambassador, and really to all the men and 

women who are sacrificing along with you today. 

I wanted to just ask you for a minute about the Status of Forces 

Agreement (SOFA). Mr. Ambassador, you referenced that in your 

remarks, and I know also at the Senate hearing yesterday it was 

mentioned, and that the Iraqi Parliament would have an opportunity to vote, as I understand it, on the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by the executive branch and the government of 

Iraq, while the United States Congress would not. That strikes people in our districts as strange. I wonder if you could please comment on that. Why would we not have a say in that as being proposed? 

I wonder if you could also talk about how it is being used as leverage in moving us to the outcomes that we are looking to in moving our troops out of Iraq. 

Ambassador CROCKER. It is our intention to negotiate the Status 

of Forces Agreement basically as we have done with some 80 other 

similar agreements with different countries. Each one of those 

agreements has both its unique aspects and also broadly similar 

stipulations as well that are shared among the agreements. 

This one will have as its unique aspects the authorities and protections that our forces would need to continue operations after the 

end of the year. But it is our intention that this will be negotiated 

as an executive agreement, as all the other SOFAs are. We have 

had only one SOFA, and that is with NATO, that has risen to the 

level of requiring Senate advice and consent because it does have 

explicit security commitments in it. 

We do not intend for this Status of Forces Agreement to rise to 

that level. So it will not trigger the treaty ratification process. Iraq 

has its own system, and I would say at this point it is not clear 

exactly how that will play out, whether this agreement would actually go to the Council of Representatives for a vote or whether it 

would simply be read to the Council of Representatives. We will 

handle this certainly within the context of our own system. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you see this as a vehicle for leverage that would actually bring about a result that would not occur 

were it not for the agreement? Can you think of an instance in 

which that is true, and are we using that leverage appropriately? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I am sorry, ma’am. Could you repeat 

that? 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I am interested in knowing how we 

would use that Status of Forces Agreement for leverage; that some 

Iraqi actions have to take place in order for us to move forward 

with that kind of an agreement that would provide the kind of security that they are looking for. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, I think, like other agreements, it is 

a question of mutual interest. We both have interests in this process in ensuring that our forces do have the authorities after the ex-
52 

piration of the Security Council Resolution to continue operations. 

So it is not a question I think so much of having something to give 

to them that we should expect payment, as it were, for. I think it 

is simply moving our relations to a more normal level while still 

ensuring that we have got the authorities we need. I think that is 

the benefit in it for us. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I think that people would look at 

this, and perhaps it is another way of explaining it, but this is a 

unique situation that we are in. I think that the public believes 

that there is some role that we should be playing to at least be a 

greater part on consultation on that agreement. 

I wonder, just very quickly, going back to the Awakening Councils, because I think that we have had an opportunity to look at 

that as a very positive force. You can interpret it that way, but I 

think others are concerned that the 80 percent or so of individuals 

that are not going to be included in either the army or the police, 

that that perhaps marriage of convenience that has occurred is 

going to shift back and that we are not developing the kind of strategic security there that we need. Is that a great concern to you? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Actually, Congresswoman, we have had 

that discussion with the prime minister and other senior officials. 

Twenty to thirty percent, as you say, should be integrated into the 

security forces. The prime minister is committed to ensuring that 

the remainder receive employment in the civilian sector, is committed to job training programs and employment opportunity. 

So the intention is that, over time, all of these individuals will 

be receiving gainful employment, just not all of them in the security field. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Ambassador, thank you very much for your service. It 

is with heartfelt thanks that I have for our service members and 

the civilians who are serving in Iraq and the region protecting 

American families. I say this as a veteran of 31 years in the Army 

Guard, as the parent of four sons who serve in the military, and 

as a grandparent. I am particularly grateful—my oldest son served 

for a year in Iraq. I am so grateful for him. This weekend, he and 

his wife Jennifer will have their first son. Michael McCrory Wilson 

will be born this weekend. 

Additionally, when I visited with you last month, I had the privilege of visiting with my son who is a doctor in the Navy. He arrived 

back home with his three children under five on Easter evening. 

So it has been an extraordinary time for our family. Our family understands the best way to protect American families is to beat the 

terrorists oversees. The best way to win the war is to have victory, 

and not bring the war home. 

So I really appreciate, again, what you are doing. I believe the 

enemy have a clear plan. And I really refer to Zawahiri, the al 

Qaeda spokesman for Osama bin Laden, on July 9, 2005, came up 

with the plan: The first stage, expel the Americans from Iraq. The 

second stage, establish authority in Iraq. The third stage, extend 

the jihad waive to the secular countries neighboring Iraq. That 

would mean Saudi Arabia. It would mean Turkey. It would mean 
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Egypt. It would mean the Persian Gulf states of Qatar, Bahrain, 

Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Dubai. And then the fourth 

stage, the clash with Israel, that is the extermination of the people 

of Israel. 

Now if al Qaeda achieves their goals, it is my view that they 

would, after the extermination of the people of Israel, after the conquest of the region, will they attack America again, or will they be 

satisfied with the fruits of what they have stolen? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Congressman, that is exactly why a base 

in Iraq is so important to al Qaeda, to be, as I said, and as you 

have just quoted from Zawahiri, a base in the Arab world. The reestablishment of the caliphate, according to their ideology, is an essential goal. 

I spent a lot of time thinking about al Qaeda. I was in Pakistan 

for two-and-a-half years. That is where I first had the pleasure of 

meeting you. It is my judgment that al Qaeda will seek the space 

and find the opportunity to strike again after us, if they possibly 

can. 

So while I would not disagree with Zawahiri’s analysis, I would 

not be confident that al Qaeda would take it in phases. I think once 

they have, if they can get a secure base, I would assume that they 

are going to use that to plan attacks in different spheres. They may 

not go from A to B to C to strike at us. We could come right after 

A. That is why it is so essential to see that they do not reestablish 

themselves in Iran. 

Mr. WILSON. Additionally, a statement I would like to make is, 

we have a radio talk show host at home who is extremely articulate, who is very supportive of you, General Petraeus; of you, Ambassador Crocker. His name is Keven Cohen. He has stated that 

every day that there’s not an attack on the United States is a day 

of success. 

So I want to thank you for the days, years of success that we 

have had. I believe it is because of the commitment of the American men and women, military and civilian, who have put their 

lives on the line. I have visited in the region 10 times now. Every 

time I go, I am so encouraged by the young people I meet, of all 

ranks, who are very supportive of our efforts to protect American 

families by defeating the terrorists oversees. 

I just want to thank you so much for what both of you and your 

personnel have done for our country. God bless you. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We will have to close our 

hearing out. We will begin the 1 hearing with Mr. Marshall and 

proceed from there on with those that did not have the opportunity 

to ask questions at this hearing. 

Gentlemen, we thank you for your testimony, we thank you for 

your service. We appreciate it. We appreciate your leadership, and 

those fine young people that serve under you. Thank you, again. 

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 9, 2008 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 9, 2008 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. GINGREY 

Dr. GINGREY. A number of Members of the House Armed Services Committee, primarily of the majority, including our distinguished Chairman, have expressed serious concerns about the adverse effects of this prolonged commitment to Operation 

Iraqi Freedom on the readiness and morale of our troops, especially in light of inevitable future military conflicts in other parts of the world. They are implying, and 

in some cases directly stating, that it is time to bring them home in mass, without 

further regard to the political or security situation in Iraq so that the troops can 

be rested, reequipped, and reset. If Congress forces this premature exit based on 

politics and public opinion at home, despite the unquestioned progress on the 

ground (which gives hope and likelihood of ultimate victory), what effect would this 

have on the morale of our troops as they are deployed into the next conflict well 

rested, well equipped, and fully reset? 

General PETRAEUS. Our troopers are rightly proud of all that they have helped 

accomplish in Iraq. They are also governed by discipline, and we can count on them 

to well and faithfully execute whatever missions they are assigned or orders they 

are given. 

Dr. GINGREY. During those two days of hearings in the Senate and House, you 

have heard time and again the concern of some Members that the reduction in violence that General Petraeus has reported has not been matched by political 

progress, and that we need to drawdown or completely withdraw in order to compel 

the Iraqis to make political progress. 

Ambassador, has there been measurable political progress—has the Iraqi government passed any laws? Do any of these laws affect political reconciliation? Are our 

troops in the way of political progress? 

Is the Iraqi political process helped or hampered by our troop presence? 

What would happen politically if our troops left tomorrow? 

Ambassador CROCKER. As of April 2008, Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) 

has formulated, vigorously debated, and passed legislation dealing with issues of 

reconciliation and nation building. These include the Accountability and Justice 

Law, the 2008 Budget, the Provincial Powers Law, and the Amnesty Law. The CoR 

is dealing with complex issues in a more practical manner, through compromise and 

greater flexibility in political groupings. 

The CoR passed the Law on Accountability and Justice (also known as the deBaathification reform law) in January 2008. This law prescribes solutions for two 

important issues for former members of the Baath party: employment and retirement. It allows an estimated 36,000 former members to return to government employment. In conjunction with amendments to the Unified Pension Law, it also restores pension rights to former civil servants and military officials without regard 

to former party affiliation. 

On February 13, the CoR passed the Provincial Powers Law, the Amnesty Law, 

and the 2008 budget in an omnibus package resulting from political compromises 

by Iraq’s main political blocs. The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward 

in defining the relationship between the federal and provincial governments. This 

law will enter into effect after provincial elections are held. Success in defining provincial powers could add momentum to the broader political process and encourage 

progress on hydrocarbons legislation and other key issues, such as constitutional reform and disputed internal boundaries. 

The Amnesty Law provides for the release of Iraqi detainees held in Iraqi government detention facilities who have not yet been charged with or convicted of a 

crime. As the majority of persons held in detention by the government of Iraq are 

Sunni, the law is widely seen as a gesture to the Sunni community intended to foster national reconciliation. On March 2, regional committees began accepting applications for amnesty releases. 

The Coalition troop presence supports the Iraqi political process and plays a crucial role in the Prime Minister’s initiative to develop Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and 

assume the lead in security for the Iraqi people. Most significantly, Coalition forces 

contribute to the security and stability that is a prerequisite for political progress 

and reconciliation in Iraq. Additionally, Coalition forces help further the political 
102 

process by preparing the Iraqi Security Forces to take on additional security responsibilities, allowing them to provide the long-term security necessary for Iraq’s continued political development. Thus, U.S. troops remain a key stabilizing factor in 

Iraq; Coalition forces also play an important role in targeting al-Qaeda in Iraq and 

other extremists. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MURPHY 

Mr. MURPHY. According to information provided by the Army and Marine Corps 

to the office of Representative Altmire, at least twelve service members have died 

in Iraq as a result of accidental electrocutions since 2003. On January 2, 2008 Staff 

Sergeant Ryan Maseth of Shaler, Pennsylvania, was electrocuted while taking a 

shower in his living quarters in the Radwaniyah Palace Complex (RPC) in Baghdad. 

Recent news reports and statements from the Department of Defense in response 

to Staff Sergeant Maseth’s death indicate that a lack of government oversight and 

poor contract management may have contributed to accidental deaths or injuries of 

U.S. personnel serving overseas. Since 2003 when the first accidental electrocution 

death was reported, how many deaths or injuries from accidental electrocutions of 

military and contract personnel in Iraq, as well as any other military installation, 

have occurred? Did the Army or Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) actually fund Kellogg, Brown and Root Services, Inc. (KBR) to perform electrical repair work at the RPC complex, prior to the death of Ryan Maseth? What were the 

dates of this contract? Did KBR submit reports documenting safety hazards relating 

to the improper grounding of electrical devices at the RPC complex? Did KBR receive 3.2 million under ACL07-139-D9-005 to repair deficiencies identified in KBR’s 

Feb. 10, 2007 technical inspection report? What measures have the Department of 

Defense and its affiliates taken to ensure proper safety and code enforcement by 

contractors operating in Iraq, specifically KBR, in eliminating issues of electrical 

safety hazard since 2003? 

General PETRAEUS. Since 2003 when the first accidental electrocution 

death was reported, how many deaths or injuries from accidental electrocutions of military and contract personnel in Iraq, as well as any other 

military installation, have occurred? According to safety records maintained by 

the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC–I) Safety Office and U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center, between September 2003 and May 2008 eleven military personnel and 

two contractor employees died due to accidental electrocutions in Iraq. The same 

records show two Soldiers died in the United States and one in Germany by accidental electrocution. The 13 recorded deaths due to accidental electrocution in Iraq 

occurred under the following circumstances: five died from contact with power distribution lines, two installing communications equipment, two performing maintenance on generators, two taking a shower, one while power washing equipment, and 

one while swimming. The only two events that occurred inside billeting facilities 

(both while taking a shower) were on different bases in Iraq and occurred 3–1/2 

years apart (May 2004 and January 2008). 

Did the Army or Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) actually 

fund Kellogg, Brown and Root Services, Inc. (KBR) to perform electrical repair work at the RPC complex, prior to the death of Ryan Maseth? Yes, the 

Army funded KBR to perform maintenance as part of a contract modification under 

the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. The funds were for limited maintenance 

to include electrical repairs initiated by customer service order requests. 

What were the dates of this contract? The contract modification was made 

using a ‘‘change letter’’ that was issued on 23 February 2007. 

Did KBR submit reports documenting safety hazards relating to the improper grounding of electrical devices at the RPC complex? Yes, KBR submitted reports documenting potential grounding issues. It is my understanding that, 

prior to the 23 February 2007 contract modification, KBR conducted only limited 

technical inspections of the RPC complex. The last inspections were performed on 

10 February 2007. These inspections revealed no deficiencies related to the water 

pump contributing to SSG Maseth’s death but did indicate other grounding issues. 

Did KBR receive $3.2 million under ACL07–139–D9–005 to repair deficiencies identified in KBR’s Feb. 10, 2007 technical inspection report? KBR 

received an estimated $3.2 million pursuant to the 23 February 2007 contract modification in order to perform maintenance services. 

What measures have the Department of Defense and its affiliates taken 

to ensure proper safety and code enforcement by contractors operating in 

Iraq, specifically KBR, in eliminating issues of electrical safety hazard 

since 2003? Multi-National Force-Iraq is currently reviewing facilities maintenance 
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electrical standards and incorporating changes into our theater support contracts to 

help insure proper electrical safety standards. The Defense Contract Management 

Agency (DCMA) has directed KBR to implement a theater-wide, full technical inspection of all maintained facilities where no prior inspection was performed. Additionally, DCMA directed KBR to perform life, health, and safety inspections on all 

other maintained buildings to begin any necessary repairs. The MNC–I Safety Office 

has issued several safety alerts on electrocution hazards. Additionally, the Army 

Sustainment Command has made annual improvements to the contract statements 

of work based on lessons learned to insure electrical safety. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DRAKE 

Mrs. DRAKE. What have the operations in Basrah done to bolster Maliki’s role as 

a nationalist leader? How have various segments of the Iraqi population—meaning, 

Shi’a, Kurdish, and particularly Sunni—reacted to his decision to take on criminal 

elements in the third largest Iraqi city? How do you think Iranian leaders have 

changed their view of Maliki, if at all? 

Can you give us your thoughts on Iran’s role/actions should American forces withdraw over the next year? How do you see that situation playing out? 

Ambassador CROCKER. The Iraqi decision to combat entrenched militia groups in 

Basrah has major significance. First, a Shi’a majority government, led by Prime 

Minister Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals and extremists regardless of sectarian identity. Second, Iraqi security forces led such operations not only in Basrah but in towns and cities throughout the South, as well as 

in Sadr City. The operation in Basrah has also improved the standing of Prime Minister Maliki as a national leader. The efforts of the government against criminal 

groups and extremist militia elements have broad political support, as a statement 

on April 5th by virtually all of Iraq’s main political leaders—Sunni, Shia and 

Kurd—made clear. 

Iran continues to pursue its goals by simultaneously providing support to the GOI 

and militant Shia groups. Predicting Iranian behavior in the event of a U.S. troop 

drawdown is difficult, and would be contingent on a number of factors, including: 

the ability of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to confront Iranian backed extremists; the 

GOI’s delivery of essential services and promotion of economic development, especially in provinces with a Shi’a majority; and, Iraq’s continued reintegration into the 

region. While the GOI has made tremendous strides on all of these fronts, a premature withdrawal of Coalition Forces could undermine these efforts. 

Mrs. DRAKE. General Petraeus, from what I have seen, the operations in Basra 

were conducted largely with Iraqi ground forces utilizing American and British air 

support. As Iraqi forces throughout the country begin to mature, how do you see 

the U.S. military role evolving? What types of support will we be asked to provide? 

What types of logistic and ‘‘enabling’’ capabilities can the Iraqi forces provide, and 

what is the timeline for development of these capabilities? 

General PETRAEUS. As Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) mature, Coalition Forces are 

transitioning from leading operations, to partnering with Iraqi Forces, to providing 

overwatch. As this evolution occurs, we are seeing the ISF assume increased responsibility, as highlighted by recent ISF security operations in Basra, Mosul, and Sadr 

City. Concurrently, the security ministries—the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau—are improving their institutional performance to enable Iraq to assume greater responsibility for force management functions, which include the generation of new forces and the replenishment and 

sustainment of forces already in the fight. Despite this progress, the ISF are still 

dependent on Coalition Forces for enabling capabilities in a number of key areas, 

including: logistics support, close air support, air weapons teams, communications, 

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. 

As we help the ISF to become more capable and more independent, our focus is 

increasingly moving beyond growing the force to the development of military and 

police enablers. In the military, the expansion of enablers will focus on logistics, 

aviation, intelligence, and command and control. In the police forces, efforts will 

center on facilities, logistics, leadership, internal affairs, and forensics. We are seeing improvement in each of these areas. As an example of progress in logistics, the 

Ministry of Defense now has at the Taji National Depot a facility to refurbish and 

repair light wheeled vehicles. Over time, this capability will extend to include heavy 

and tracked vehicles. The Depot also has a superb small arms repair and maintenance facility that will be opened in May 2008. Simultaneously, the Ministry is establishing ‘‘Location Commands’’—regional centers that will serve as both supply 

distribution hubs and maintenance and recovery centers. Though these actions rep-
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resent significant progress, more work needs to be done. The development of combat 

enablers requires complex, interrelated actions at various levels of command as well 

as across the domains of doctrine, training, organization, logistics, materiel, personnel, and facilities. In addition, progress is also dependent on the security situation and other factors. Because of this complexity, it is difficult to set a timeline on 

the attainment of complete self-sufficiency. 

Mrs. DRAKE. General Petreaus and Ambassador Crocker, What have the operations in Basra done to bolster Maliki’s role as a nationalist leader? How have various segments of the Iraqi population—meaning, Shi’a, Kurdish, and particularly 

Sunni—reacted to his decision to take on criminal elements in the third largest 

Iraqi city? How do you think Iranian leaders have changed their view of Maliki, if 

at all? 

General PETRAEUS. The Iraqi-led security operations that Prime Minister Maliki 

directed in Basra bolstered his standing as a strong, nationalist leader, as the Iraqi 

public saw him taking a decisive stand against criminal gangs and illegal militias. 

Perhaps the greatest improvement in the Prime Minister’s standing has come in the 

way in which other Iraqi political parties and leaders now view him. With the exception of the Sadrists, major Iraqi political leaders almost unanimously supported his 

move to reestablish the rule of law in Basra. The Prime Minister’s action against 

illegal elements, without regard to sectarian identity, had a significant impact on 

Shi’a, Kurdish, and Sunni leaders, and the operations led to a reopening of talks 

on stalled political issues such as the Hydrocarbons Law and the return of the 

Sunni Tawafuq Front to the government—though much work remains on both of 

these matters. Still, as Ambassador Crocker stated in his Congressional testimony 

in April, Basra operations have resulted in a significant change in tone toward 

Prime Minister Maliki and the government. 

The Iranian regime’s lack of transparency makes it difficult to know with certainty how Iranian leaders’ views of Prime Minister Maliki may have changed since 

the Basra operations. The Iranian regime’s statements indicate that the regime has 

chosen to support publicly the Prime Minister’s campaign against criminal gangs 

and illegal militias. At the same time, the Iranian Government has continued to 

provide lethal assistance to Special Groups and various reports indicate that training, funding, and arming of the Special Groups is ongoing in Iran. Given the latter, 

it is unlikely the Iranian regime has viewed the Prime Minister’s actions against 

Special Groups criminals with favor. In addition, the confrontation between the 

Iraqi Government and Iranian-backed militias in Basra and Baghdad has led Iraqi 

leaders to repeatedly and directly confront the Iranian regime regarding its support 

of illegal militias inside Iraq. This cannot be a comfortable development for the Supreme Leader and the element he employs to determine and execute policy in Iraq— 

the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force. 

Mrs. DRAKE. General Petreaus and Ambassador Crocker, Can you give us your 

thoughts on Iran’s role/actions should American forces withdraw over the next year? 

How do you see that situation playing out? 

General PETRAEUS. If U.S. forces were to withdraw from Iraq over the next year, 

Iran would likely seek to exploit gaps in security and governance capacity to achieve 

its strategic goals in Iraq. Iranian President Ahmedinejad has said that if a power 

vacuum develops in Iraq, Iran is ready to ‘‘fill the gap,’’ and we believe him. Iran’s 

goals in Iraq include a Shia-dominated government that is not a future threat to 

Iran and that is subject to influence by Iran; as Ambassador Crocker has observed, 

Iran wants to ‘‘Lebanonize’’ Iraq. Iran also seeks economic relations that benefit 

Iran and unhindered access to Shia holy sites. 

The most likely scenario over the next year is that Iran’s leaders will continue 

to covertly fund a wide array of diverse, often competing Iraqi groups and actors. 

In addition to training, arming, funding, and directing Shi’a militia ‘‘Special 

Groups,’’ Iran will likely attempt to influence Iraqi political processes and outcomes 

through funding candidates and parties. Economically, Iran will likely continue to 

exploit the lack of competition to remain Iraq’s largest trading partner. It is also 

likely Iran will attempt to increase its soft power in Iraq by further proliferating 

front companies that are clandestinely operated by elements of the Iranian regime— 

especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force—and by expanding 

its already ongoing intimidation campaign against select members of the Iraqi government and against any significant opponents of Iranian influence in Iraq. (Two 

governors and two police chiefs were assassinated in 2007 using Iranian-made explosively formed penetrators.) 

In a worst case scenario, should U.S. forces withdraw over the next year, Iraq 

would not have adequate strength in its government or security forces to resist Iranian influence and manipulation. In this context, Iran would likely seek to replicate 

the role it has played in Lebanon by funding and supporting a proxy militia that 
105 

conducts violent attacks, perpetuates political instability, and inhibits economic 

progress. It is likely to train, equip, and fund such forces in any event—and when 

the force creates problems, Iran would then rein it in. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, part of the National 

Strategy for Victory in Iraq called for an increased role in inter-agency assistance 

to the military. How satisfied are you with the inter-agency role/assistance and how 

do you measure the effectiveness? Can you share some success stories? 

General PETRAEUS. There has been significant progress in inter-agency cooperation in Iraq, but we continuously seek to develop additional mechanisms for enhancing our collaboration. The complexity of today’s national security challenges is such 

that no single agency or department has all of the requisite resources, authority, 

or expertise to single-handedly provide effective responses. Interagency collaboration 

is imperative to successfully leveraging the capabilities resident in the US government. In Iraq, we see that agencies and departments are increasingly working together to clarify lines of authority and improve coordination of interagency operations in a timely and efficient manner. We measure effectiveness in terms of both 

improved processes as well as outcomes. Examples of success stories include our 

Joint Campaign Plan, fusion cells, and reconstruction teams. Our Joint Campaign 

Plan, has helped foster collaboration and unity of effort across the four lines of operation in Iraq: security, economic, political, and diplomatic. Our periodic Campaign 

Assessment and Review Boards, which are internal reviews of the campaign plan 

with interagency participation, help us to ensure that the different components of 

our effort in Iraq are mutually reinforcing and achieve maximum effect. The creation of fusion cells has also been a success story. These entities enable the capacity 

which MNF–I can bring to bear to be combined with interagency expertise to make 

progress on a number of important issues. As an example, the focused efforts of the 

Energy Fusion Cell have helped Iraq to make significant improvements in its energy 

sector. Partially due to the efforts of this cell, oil production and exports are at 

record levels. Production in the month of May 2008 should be at the highest level 

it has been since 2004, and production over the last four months has been the highest since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The focus of this cell has also 

been key in improving Iraqi power generation, which has now increased beyond the 

level that was produced before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, 

energy production over the past year has averaged 10% higher than the previous 

year, despite a drought that has left Iraq with much less hydropower (some 450 to 

850 megawatts less). Reconstruction teams are a third success story. As a result of 

the civilian surge, there are now 31 Provincial Reconstruction and Provincial Support Teams in Iraq supporting all 18 provinces. These interagency teams play an 

invaluable role in strengthening governance at the local, municipal, and provincial 

levels by providing assistance to help create jobs, deliver basic services, and build 

up local economies. These teams are also helping Provincial governments to spend 

their money more effectively, and they are providing support to reconciliation efforts 

at all levels. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, it appears that our 

‘‘surge’’ plan has worked or progressed quite well as seen by the improvements in 

the security environment, but this increase in security can also be attributed to 

Muqtada al-Sadr keeping his Shiite militia at bay during this period. As soon as 

he turned his militia loose, the environment became dangerous, and he has since 

pulled his militia back. Is there a plan for keeping al-Sadr at bay? How do you control him? 

General PETRAEUS. Of greater long-term importance than Moqtada al-Sadr’s specific decisions are the factors that shape the environment in which his movement 

exists. The ceasefires declared by Moqtada al-Sadr have indeed contributed to a reduction in violence in Iraq, but they came after Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Groups (SG) took serious losses in combat with Iraqi and Coalition forces. Iraq 

and Coalition forces have placed intense pressure on JAM and the SG as they have 

targeted criminal elements and their mafia-like activity, and the leaders of the Iraqi 

Government have demonstrated great determination in combating militias across 

Iraq. Success by Iraqi and Coalition forces played a large role in Sadr’s decision to 

lay down arms. 

Another important factor in Sadr’s decisions is his need for popular support, and 

his desire to protect the legitimacy and reputation of his movement. Atmospherics 

in Basra and Sadr City indicate that most residents were tired of the bloodshed and 

of criminal activities by militias and desired a return to normalcy. Sadr’s decisions 
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to lay down arms in both cities were in part acknowledgments of this trend toward 

a popular rejection of violence (a trend that Iran, whose Qods Force funds, trains, 

and equips the militia Special Groups, also recognized). 

Our strategy for addressing JAM/SG violence acknowledges both of these factors. 

First, Coalition forces assist the Iraqi Government in maintaining its monopoly on 

the legitimate use of force by helping confront violent militia activity. ISF and Coalition operations continue to degrade the military capability of Sadr’s militias. Second, 

we seek to assist the government of Iraq in its efforts to draw reconcilable elements 

of the Sadrist Trend into the political process. By providing for security and improving living conditions, Iraqi and Coalition efforts reinforce and encourage the Shi’a 

population’s increasingly negative view of militias and their violence. 

Thus far, our strategy seems to be having the desired effect. Sadr continues to 

instruct his militias to lay down their arms, and he recently announced an initiative 

to redirect the majority of JAM to social services programs and peaceful resistance 

to the Coalition, while maintaining a smaller armed element. This decision highlights the pressure Sadr is under regarding militia activity. Also, many leaders of 

the Sadrist movement are leaning toward participation in the political process as 

a way to give voice to the legitimate concerns of their constituencies. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, What role does the 

United States play in the negotiations between Prime Minister Maliki and Muqtada 

al-Sadr? Should there be more oversight and involvement on the part of the United 

States? How does the State Department measure the effectiveness of their communications? 

General PETRAEUS. I respectfully defer to Ambassador Crocker and the Department of State to comment on what role, if any, the United States should play in 

negotiations between Government of Iraq leaders and Moqtada al-Sadr and on how 

they measure their effectiveness in communications. Ambassador Crocker and I 

meet regularly with Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi political leaders and representatives during the course of our duties here in Iraq. We register our views and 

concerns, and Prime Minister often consults with us on topics of interest to him. 

At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki is the leader of a sovereign government 

and, as we saw in a number of recent events, will make his own decisions, as he 

should. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Part of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq called for an increased role in inter-agency assistance to the military. How satisfied are you with 

the inter-agency role/assistance and how do you measure the effectiveness? Can you 

share some success stories? 

Ambassador CROCKER. In February 2007, the President announced the establishment of ten new State Department-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as 

a civilian complement to the military ‘‘surge.’’ In April 2007, Multinational CorpsIraq (MNC–I) requested another five teams to support the ‘‘surge.’’ By September 

2007, all of these teams had begun operations. As of April 2008, there are 31 active 

PRTs, Provincial Support Teams (PSTs), and embedded PRTs (ePRTs) staffed by 

personnel from Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency 

for International Development, the Department Of Justice, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. PRTs support the counterinsurgency strategy, build Iraqi governance and economic capacity throughout the country, and support our political engagement with provincial and municipal officials. We enjoy great cooperation from 

our interagency partners in this most successful interagency initiative. 

On April 3, General Petraeus and I requested through the National Security 

Council the assignment of experts from civilian agencies to MNF–I’s Joint InterAgency Task Force or JIATF. Representatives from the State Department, USAID, 

the Department of Homeland Security and several Department of Defense Combat 

Support Agencies arrived during the summer and are now embedded as part of the 

MNF–I operational planning staff. In addition, the Department of the Treasury and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation have designated specific personnel as liaisons 

to the JIATF. They are focused on strategic level planning using all elements of national power, not just the military, to address difficult problem sets through coordinated, inter-agency action against specific strategic threats. 

Mr. WITTMAN. It appears that our ‘‘surge’’ plan has worked or progressed quite 

well as seen by the improvements in the security environment, but this increase in 

security can also be attributed to Muqtada al-Sadr keeping his Shiite militia at bay 

during this period. As soon as he turned his militia loose, the environment became 

dangerous, and he has since pulled his militia back. Is there a plan for keeping alSadr at bay? How do you control him? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Muqtada al-Sadr called for his militia to ‘‘freeze’’ its operations because of both increasing operational losses from fighting Coalition forces 

and flagging support of the Iraqi people. As the threat from al-Qaeda and insur-
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gents continued to diminish, Sadr’s militia was increasingly perceived as an unnecessary element in Iraqi society: their extortion of money from shopkeepers, 

kidnappings for ransom, linkage to the assassinations of two southern governors 

and several police chiefs, and violence in the holy city of Karbala tarnished their 

reputation in the eyes of many Iraqis. 

Economic development and reconciliation are the best ways to prevent a resurgence of violent extremist groups like Sadr’s militia. This is accomplished chiefly by 

building on recent security gains and eliminating the need for Sadr’s militia to fill 

any security void. Better security also facilitates economic and political development, which strengthens the GOI and undermines support for extremists. Simultaneously, we will continue to offensively target extremists, including those in alSadr’s organization, further marginalizing it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. What role does the United States play in the negotiations between 

Prime Minister Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr? Should there be more oversight and 

involvement on the part of the United States? How does the State Department 

measure the effectiveness of their communications? 

Ambassador CROCKER. The relationship between Moqtada al-Sadr and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is complex. The Sadrist movement is a populist movement with 

deep roots in Iraq. In December 2005, Moqtada al-Sadr ostensibly transitioned this 

movement from armed resistance to Coalition forces to political engagement, and he 

captured 28 seats in the Iraqi legislative body, the Council of Representatives (CoR). 

Moqtada and his followers then supported Maliki’s ascension to Prime Minister. 

In a March 30, 2008 public announcement, Muqtada al-Sadr called on the Jaysh 

al-Mahdi militia to lay down arms, ending a week of violence in Basrah and the 

Sadr City area of Baghdad, as the Government of Iraq sought to bring these areas 

under its control. Prime Minister Maliki declared April 1 that the operation against 

Shia militias in Southern Iraq was a success. A statement issued by the Prime Minister’s office stated that the operation had achieved ‘‘security, stability and success’’ 

in Basrah. 

Against that background, the Government of Iraq, as a sovereign government, 

makes its own decisions about who to negotiate with, when, and under what terms. 

The U.S. government is prepared to provide advice and support to the Government 

of Iraq, but would involve itself in an internal Iraqi political matter only if invited 

to do so. We would not be in a position to measure the effectiveness of these communications. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. General Petraeus, I’d like to take a moment to consider the opportunity costs we’re faced with under the current 15 month deployment schedules. 

Many military leaders, including Admiral Mullen, have stressed the importance of 

getting back to at least a 1 to 1 ratio of deployment time to dwell time, and of 

course even more dwell time would be better. It’s important for the well-being of 

our troops, and it’s central to their ability to regroup and train. Given that our current force levels in Iraq preclude a prompt return to a 1 to 1 ratio, I’m very concerned that our troops don’t have enough time to develop skills critical to fighting 

the broader war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan. In one section of the counterinsurgency manual you helped draft, you stress that successful counterinsurgency 

operations depend on a thorough understanding of the culture within which they 

are being conducted. This makes a great deal of sense to me. I would imagine that 

it is very difficult to gain the trust and cooperation of the population if you have 

no understanding of their culture, and that it’s hard to defeat an insurgency with 

no comprehension of the cultural context that gave rise to it. But that understanding is not something that can be built overnight. As I understand from my constituents conducting cultural training down at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, developing true cross-cultural competence requires extensive training time—time that we 

don’t have right now with 15 month deployments and just a year of dwell time. Unfortunately, Admiral Fallon came before this committee just one month ago and testified that the number of personnel trained in culture and language is seriously insufficient for the missions at hand. Can you elaborate on the importance of ‘‘crosscultural competence’’ or cultural understanding in counterinsurgency operations? 

General PETRAEUS. Language and cultural training are indeed essential to the 

proper conduct of counterinsurgency operations. In Iraq, our day-to-day missions involve partnering with Iraqi counterparts, working with local govemment and religious leaders, and building trust with local citizens in the neighborhoods we patrol. 

All of these activities require communication and cultural awareness and sensitivity. Though deployment time/dwell time ratios remain a concern—a concern al-
108 

layed slightly by the President’s recent announcement of a return to 12-month 

tours—training time is not a significant inhibiting factor to the basic cultural and 

language training we provide to deploying troopers. The training we do conduct during reset cycles is very much focused on our current counterinsurgency missions and 

involves both culture and basic language training; this training is quickly reinforced 

and expanded as our troopers deploy and operate in Iraq. Between training, cultural 

immersion, and individuals’ extensive experience from past deployments, our troopers in general operate with significant cross-cultural competence in Iraq. Language 

competency throughout our forces remains a concern, since the training required is 

extensive and is provided primarily to linguist specialists. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. General Petraeus, I’d like to take a moment to consider the opportunity costs we’re faced with under the current 15 month deployment schedules. 

Many military leaders, including Admiral Mullen, have stressed the importance of 

getting back to at least a 1 to 1 ratio of deployment time to dwell time, and of 

course even more dwell time would be better. It’s important for the well-being of 

our troops, and it’s central to their ability to regroup and train. Given that our current force levels in Iraq preclude a prompt return to a 1 to 1 ratio, I’m very concerned that our troops don’t have enough time to develop skills critical to fighting 

the broader war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan. In one section of the counterinsurgency manual you helped draft, you stress that successful counterinsurgency 

operations depend on a thorough understanding of the culture within which they 

are being conducted. This makes a great deal of sense to me. I would imagine that 

it is very difficult to gain the trust and cooperation of the population if you have 

no understanding of their culture, and that it’s hard to defeat an insurgency with 

no comprehension of the cultural context that gave rise to it. But that understanding is not something that can be built overnight. As I understand from my constituents conducting cultural training down at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, developing true cross-cultural competence requires extensive training time—time that we 

don’t have right now with 15 month deployments and just a year of dwell time. Unfortunately, Admiral Fallon came before this committee just one month ago and testified that the number of personnel trained in culture and language is seriously insufficient for the missions at hand. Do you believe that you have enough troops in 

the field today who posses cross-cultural competence or have been trained in culture 

and language? 

General PETRAEUS. The pre-deployment training we conduct involves both culture 

and basic language training; this training is quickly reinforced and expanded as our 

troopers deploy and operate in Iraq. Between training, cultural immersion, and individuals’ extensive experience from past deployments, our troopers in general operate 

with significant cross-cultural competence in Iraq. Language competency throughout 

our forces remains a concern, since the training required is extensive and is provided primarily to linguist specialists. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. General Petraeus, I’d like to take a moment to consider the opportunity costs we’re faced with under the current 15 month deployment schedules. 

Many military leaders, including Admiral Mullen, have stressed the importance of 

getting back to at least a 1 to 1 ratio of deployment time to dwell time, and of 

course even more dwell time would be better. It’s important for the well-being of 

our troops, and it’s central to their ability to regroup and train. Given that our current force levels in Iraq preclude a prompt return to a 1 to 1 ratio, I’m very concerned that our troops don’t have enough time to develop skills critical to fighting 

the broader war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan. In one section of the counterinsurgency manual you helped draft, you stress that successful counterinsurgency 

operations depend on a thorough understanding of the culture within which they 

are being conducted. This makes a great deal sense to me. I would imagine that 

it is very difficult to gain the trust and cooperation of the population if you have 

no understanding of their culture, and that it’s hard to defeat an insurgency with 

no comprehension of the cultural context that gave rise to it. But that understanding is not something that can be built overnight. As I understand from my constituents conducting cultural training down at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, developing true cross-cultural competence requires extensive training time—time that we 

don’t have right now with 15 month deployments and just a year of dwell time. Unfortunately, Admiral Fallon came before this committee just one month ago and testified that the number of personnel trained in culture and language is seriously insufficient for the missions at hand. Would you agree that increased dwell time is 

required for our troops have enough time to train and develop critical skills such 

as cross-cultural competence? 

General PETRAEUS. Training time has not been a significant inhibiting factor to 

deploying units. Units arrive in theater well prepared for operations in Iraq. Indeed, 

I continue to believe that our current force is the best trained, best equipped force 
109 

in America’s history. Leaders at every level, many of whom are on their 2nd or 3rd 

combat deployments, are maximizing training time and using their experience from 

previous deployments to prepare and train their units well. The President’s recent 

announcement of a return to 12-month tours should increase dwell time for our 

troopers, allowing them to conduct even more quality training and also to enjoy additional, well-deserved time at home station between deployments. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. General Petraeus, I’d like to take a moment to consider the opportunity costs we’re faced with under the current 15 month deployment schedules. 

Many military leaders, including Admiral Mullen, have stressed the importance of 

getting back to at least a 1 to 1 ratio of deployment time to dwell time, and of 

course even more dwell time would be better. It’s important for the well-being of 

our troops, and it’s central to their ability to regroup and train. Given that our current force levels in Iraq preclude a prompt return to a 1 to 1 ratio, I’m very concerned that our troops don’t have enough time to develop skills critical to fighting 

the broader war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan. In one section of the counterinsurgency manual you helped draft, you stress that successful counterinsurgency 

operations depend on a thorough understanding of the culture within which they 

are being conducted. This makes a great deal sense to me. I would imagine that 

it is very difficult to gain the trust and cooperation of the population if you have 

no understanding of their culture, and that it’s hard to defeat an insurgency with 

no comprehension of the cultural context that gave rise to it. But that understanding is not something that can be built overnight. As I understand from my constituents conducting cultural training down at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, developing true cross-cultural competence requires extensive training time—time that we 

don’t have right now with 15 month deployments and just a year of dwell time. Unfortunately, Admiral Fallon came before this committee just one month ago and testified that the number of personnel trained in culture and language is seriously insufficient for the missions at hand. Have you done anything to raise the wider issue 

of cultural training with your superiors in the chain of command and emphasize its 

importance? 

General PETRAEUS. The importance of basic culture and language training has 

been emphasized up and down the military’s chain of command. Over the course of 

the last five years of operation in Iraq, we have worked to rapidly integrate lessons 

learned into training cycles for deploying units. Basic language and culture training 

is one of the important adjustments that we have made to pre-deployment training, 

and it has, in large part, had its intended effect. Our troopers now generally operate 

with significant cross-cultural competence in Iraq. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. General Petraeus, I’d like to take a moment to consider the opportunity costs we’re faced with under the current 15 month deployment schedules. 

Many military leaders, including Admiral Mullen, have stressed the importance of 

getting back to at least a 1 to 1 ratio of deployment time to dwell time, and of 

course even more dwell time would be better. It’s important for the well-being of 

our troops, and it’s central to their ability to regroup and train. Given that our current force levels in Iraq preclude a prompt return to a 1 to 1 ratio, I’m very concerned that our troops don’t have enough time to develop skills critical to fighting 

the broader war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan. In one section of the counterinsurgency manual you helped draft, you stress that successful counterinsurgency 

operations depend on a thorough understanding of the culture within which they 

are being conducted. This makes a great deal sense to me. I would imagine that 

it is very difficult to gain the trust and cooperation of the population if you have 

no understanding of their culture, and that it’s hard to defeat an insurgency with 

no comprehension of the cultural context that gave rise to it. But that understanding is not something that can be built overnight. As I understand from my constituents conducting cultural training down at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, developing true cross-cultural competence requires extensive training time—time that we 

don’t have right now with 15 month deployments and just a year of dwell time. Unfortunately, Admiral Fallon came before this committee just one month ago and testified that the number of personnel trained in culture and language is seriously insufficient for the missions at hand. What can we in Congress do to bolster cultural 

training efforts in the Army and across the services? 

General PETRAEUS. Before addressing cultural training, I would like to note that 

Human Terrain Teams have been valuable to our forces in Iraq, and Congressional 

support for this program is important. We are in need of more of these teams, as 

the experts serving on Human Terrain Teams provide important cultural insights 

to our combat units and can help to improve continuity through unit transitions. 

With regard to cultural training, one of the most important actions Congress can 

take is to keep resources placed against education, even given the pressures and 

constraints which come into play during wartime. Efforts worthy of support include: 
110 

initiatives to enhance cultural immersion opportunities for Reserve Officer Training 

Corps and West Point cadets; programs to provide opportunities for graduate education for our officer corps; and career management processes that incentivize and 

provide opportunities for joint and interagency assignments and education. The 

more we study and work outside of our intellectual comfort zones, the better we can 

leverage cultural understanding to succeed in today’s complex operating environments. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. The President’s most recent orders were to carry out the surge so 

that the U.S. military could help reduce the violence in Iraq and bring greater stability to the country. This stability would then create an opening for the country’s 

political leadership to achieve a similar stability in Iraq’s governance. Military 

achievements, however, have not translated to this stated political goal. The urgency the current administration felt to achieve these military goals has not been 

shared by the Iraqi government of Mr. Maliki, over whom our military leaders have 

no control. It is my belief that postponing the drawdown of our troops until ‘‘conditions permit,’’ as you stated yesterday, only highlights the military’s incapacity to 

drive the political side of the equation, and hampers our country’s ability to force 

the Iraqi governments’ long overdue political resolution. You have stated your dissatisfaction with the political progress made by the Iraqi political elites, in spite of 

our military’s best efforts. On this we both agree. I would endorse a timetable as 

a means to drive political reconciliation. General Petraeus, as a military man with 

tremendous experience, a demonstrated track record and the extraordinary power 

of the United States backing you up, what are the tactics you would employ to encourage the Iraqis to make fundamental movements towards political stability? 

General PETRAEUS. There is no purely military or purely political solution in Iraq, 

and we are using a variety of approaches to bring about political stability. All four 

lines of operation—security, economic, diplomatic, and political—are mutually reinforcing and thus must be pursued to achieve a long-term solution in Iraq. Though 

the pursuit of political reconciliation and good governance along the political line of 

operation is the main effort, success in this area depends on security conditions that 

enable and foster compromise. Enduring domestic political progress will also rest on 

supporting economic and diplomatic developments. I believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution. 

Iraq leaders have put themselves under enormous personal pressure and are also 

under the collective pressure of various political elements in Iraq to create stability 

and long-term solutions for Iraq. They have already worked together and compromised on a number of difficult issues in order to pass important pieces of legislation earlier this year—among them, a budget law, a de-Ba’athification reform law, 

a provincial powers law, and an amnesty law. They recognize that in order to succeed in a political process, they will need to produce results, and producing results 

requires compromise. With regard to expectations about the pace of progress, it is 

important to recognize that Iraq’s political leaders are still struggling with fundamental questions such as the degree of devolution to the provinces of various authorities and powers in Iraq, an issue similar to our own debate over state’s rights 

at the birth of the United States. Iraq’s political leaders have already begun to make 

progress in these areas, and they are continuing to move forward on issues such 

as the provincial elections scheduled for later this year. Supporting political solutions in Iraq is not purely a matter of convincing Iraqi leaders of the importance 

of compromise. It is also a matter of helping Iraqi leaders to set conditions that enable progress. Our leverage lies in our robust engagement, ability to work with the 

government of Iraq, and willingness to help its leaders at local as well as national 

level make and implement the hard decisions that are in the best interests of all 

the Iraqi people. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Ambassador Crocker, as someone who has spent decades developing 

relationships with diplomats throughout the Middle East, what are the tactics you 

would employ to encourage the Iraqis to make fundamental movements towards political stability? 

Ambassador CROCKER. We encourage and support Iraqi political leaders across 

the board to accelerate actions necessary to promote political stability and national 

reconciliation—by passing legislation in key areas, broadening participation by all 

of Iraq’s communities in the political process, and improving the delivery of basic 

services. We also encourage Iraq to work with its neighbors and the broader international community, including through organizations such as the United Nations 

Assistance Mission for Iraq. International agreements, like the International Com-
111 

pact with Iraq, elicit Iraqi progress in key reconciliation-related areas such as economic self-reliance, good governance, rule of law, and civil society. It is important 

that the Iraqi government and people have a strong sense of ownership over the 

projects and processes they embark on; however, the United States and 

theinternational community can contribute to helping strengthen Iraq’s institutions, 

providing technical assistance, and encouraging dialogue both on the national and 

provincial levels. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HAYES 

Mr. HAYES. Several Members of Congress have noted that the Iraqi Council of 

Representatives and some Iraqi leaders generally do not support a permanent U.S. 

military presence in Iraq. It seems to me that after the provincial elections later 

this year, some Iraqi officials may try to develop or institute a drawdown schedule. 

After provincial elections, is an Iraqi-provided timeline for U.S. withdrawal a reasonable expectation? 

General PETRAEUS. The majority of Iraqis see the benefit of the continued presence of Coalition forces in the near-term, even as they oppose a long-term presence 

or permanent US basing. Provincial elections will affect local and governorate leadership and thus would likely not lead to a change in national policy. Iraq’s national 

leaders continue to recognize the much-needed military support, in boots on the 

ground and in key combat enablers, provided by Coalition forces as key to allowing 

progress in other areas as Iraqi forces continue to develop. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE 

Mr. MCINTYRE. So you are saying, within next week you can provide us an assessment as to where we stand specifically on the 18 benchmarks that the Iraqi Government agreed to meet in working with the U.S. Government to make sure that we 

are accomplishing the political, economic progress that we want to see in the country, as well as the military progress. Is that correct? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I provided sensitive information by letter to Representative 

McIntyre on May 9, 2008. 

Æ