# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted March 23, 2011 * Decided May 23, 2011 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 10-2171 CHARLIE HERBST, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. MARK R. SEVIER, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:09cv143 James T. Moody, Judge

. O R D E R In a prison disciplinary action, Charlie Herbst, a former Indiana state prisoner, admitted that he provided “a little legal work” to another inmate, whose family then sent a money order to Herbst. He was found to have violated a policy of the Indiana Department of Corrections prohibiting inma tes from “giving to or accept ing from any person anything of value without proper authorization.” I ND
. D EP ’ T OF C ORR ., N O
. 02-04-101 app. I, M ANUAL OF P OLICIES AND P ROCEDURES (2004). At first the Department sanctioned Herbst with a loss NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submi tted on the briefs and the record. See F ED
. R. A PP
. P. 34(a)(2)(C).No. 10-2171 Page 2 of good-time credit and a written reprimand, but it suspended the good-time sanction after an internal appeal, and because the suspended sanction expired after six months, the Department never imposed the sanction. Afte r exhausting his admi nistrative remedies, Herbst petitioned for a writ of habeas co rpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the disciplinary determination was supported by insufficient evidence to comport with due process. He contends that the disciplinary dete rmination inevitably lengthened his period of confinement by disqualifying him from receiv ing a good-time credit for completing his associate’s degree. He cites the Department’s manual and a corresponding Indiana statutory provision, under which he contends that th e prison “may” grant to inmates one year of good-time credit for receiving the degree if they have “one (1) year clear of two (2) or more Class B conduct reports at the time of program completion.” I ND
. D EP ’ T OF C ORR ., N O
. 01-04- 101, M ANUAL OF P OLICIES AND P ROCEDURES (2009); I ND
. C ODE § 35-50-6-3.3. The district court denied Herbst’s petiti on after concluding that the disciplinary violation could not have prolonged his confinem ent, citing two other class B offenses that disqualified him from the education-based cred it. Alternatively, the court concluded that the disciplinary determination rested on suffici ent evidence to comply with the demands of due process. We requested supplemental memoranda conc erning whether Herbst’s case is now moot. Our initial review showed that he was released from prison in September 2010, and the original record did not mention if Herb st continued to suffer collateral consequences from his disciplinary conviction. See Cochran v. Buss , 381 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2004); White v. Ind. Parole Bd. , 266 F.3d 759, 762-63 (7th Cir. 2001). Herbst’s petition is moot. Article III of th e federal constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hearing cases or cont roversies that remain “live” throughout the lawsuit. See Spencer v. Kemna , 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Liner v. Jafco, Inc. , 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). Herbst’s parole supervisor explains in an affidavit that his office “discharged [Herbst] from parole on October 12, 2010, an d that Mr. Herbst is no longer under the supervision of this office.” Herbst does not di spute that he is no longer in custody. He contends, nonetheless, that his case rema ins live because the disciplinary conviction disqualified him from receiving good-time cred its for obtaining his associates degree, and those credits might have ended his incarceratio n a year earlier. But he concedes that the prison manual and state statute provide only th at he “may” receive credits for obtaining his degree. See Appellant’s Br. 2 (citing I ND
. C ODE § 35-50-6-3.3 and I ND
. D EP ’ T OF C ORR ., N O
. 01- 04-101, M ANUAL OF P OLICIES AND P ROCEDURES (2009)); Appellant’s Suppl. Mem. 1-2. The mere possibility that his senten ce “may” have been shortened had Herbst been eligible to receive discretionary credits does not revive hi s case because only decisions that “inevitablyNo. 10-2171 Page 3 affect the duration of his sentence,” Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995); Higgason v. Farley , 83 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1996), are actionable.
Because Herbst cites no other reason th at the controversy over his disciplinary conviction remains “live” despite his expired se ntence, the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss it as moot. 

### See, e.g. , Department of the Treasury v. Galioto , 477 U.S. 556 (1986); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. , 340 U.S. 36 (1950).