[Cite as State v. Robinson, 2017-Ohio-8162.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

 No. 104686 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

HEAVEN S. ROBINSON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-15-598777-B 

BEFORE: Kilbane, J., E.A. Gallagher, P.J., and Jones, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 12, 2017 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steve W. Canfil 

55 Public Square - Suite 2100 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

Timothy R. Troup 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center - 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Heaven S. Robinson (“Robinson”), appeals from her 

sentence for child endangering. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

{¶2} In October 2015, Robinson was indicted on five counts of child 

endangering. In April 2016, she pled no contest to the indictment, stipulating to a 

finding of guilt. The trial court found Robinson guilty, and in June 2016, imposed a 

four-year prison sentence without specifying individual prison terms for each count. In 

July 2016, Robinson filed the present appeal and later moved this court to remand to the 

trial court for resentencing under App.R. 4, arguing that the trial court’s “blanket 

sentence” did not constitute a final, appealable order. We granted Robinson’s motion 

and remanded this matter to the trial court for resentencing. 

{¶3} In December 2016, the trial court resentenced Robinson. At the 

resentencing hearing, the trial court remarked as follows: 

THE COURT: On June 2nd of this year I imposed a sentence of four years 

on [Robinson] without specifying * * * as to each count what the sentence 

was going to be. It was a universal sentence, global sentence, remanded 

from the court of appeals in order to have me reimpose a sentence on each 

count individually which I propose to do at this point. 

* * * 

Okay. Well as I explained at the outset, I’m not in the position to give a 

different sentence now. This is really just to correct an error that was made 

in June. 
* * * 

The sentence will be one year on Count 1 * * * four years each on Counts 2, 

3, 4, and 5, all sentences to be served concurrently with one another. 

{¶4} In resentencing Robinson, the trial court did not deviate from its original 

four-year sentence, imposing a one-year prison term on Count 1 and a four-year prison 

term on each of Counts 2 through 5, all counts to be served concurrently. 

{¶5} It is from this order that Robinson now appeals, raising a single assignment 

of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred in sentencing [Robinson] to lengthy terms of 

incarceration when it had jurisdiction to reconsider its original decision and 

when the sentences are not supported in the record. 

{¶6} Robinson argues the trial court erred in finding that it was without 

jurisdiction to deviate from its original “blanket” sentence and that her sentence is not 

supported by the record. 

{¶7} As an initial matter, we note that because we deemed the trial court’s 

original sentencing entry did not constitute a final, appealable order, the trial court had the 

authority to hold a de novo sentencing following our remand. State v. Houston, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga Nos. 103252 and 103254, 2016-Ohio-3319, ¶ 10. Robinson interprets the trial 

court’s remark at the resentencing hearing that it was “not in the position to give a 

different sentence” as a finding that it was without authority to conduct a de novo 

sentencing. She argues that this statement indicates that the trial court failed to conduct a 

de novo sentencing hearing and, therefore, its decision to reimpose a four-year prison 
sentence renders her sentence contrary to law. This argument is unpersuasive. We 

agree with the state’s posit that the trial court made this statement as an explanation that it 

chose not to deviate from its original four-year sentence rather than as a conclusion of its 

limitation in resentencing Robinson. 

{¶8} Our review of felony sentences is governed by R.C. 2953.08(G), which 

states in relevant part: 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence * 

* * or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing 

court for resentencing * * * if it clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat 

the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶9} “A sentence is contrary to law if (1) the sentence falls outside the statutory 

range for the particular degree of offense, or (2) the trial court failed to consider the 

purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing 

factors in R.C. 2929.12.” State v. Price, 2016-Ohio-591, 60 N.E.3d 481, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). 

{¶10} Here, Robinson’s sentence is within the statutory range for each of her 

convictions, and the trial court’s sentencing entry states that it “considered all required 

factors of the law.” This court has held that a trial court’s statement that it considered 

the required statutory factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the 

sentencing statutes. State v. Kamleh, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97092, 2012-Ohio-2061, ¶ 

61 

{¶11} Therefore, Robinson’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to 

law. Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is overruled. 
{¶12} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR