**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 1881** 

In R e: ROBERT LEWIS, JR. , Appellant.

----- ------------------------------- DENNIS DARNAY WILLIAMS , Plaintiff ,

v. MARJORIE K. LYNCH , Defendant

– Appellee , JAMES B. ANGELL , Party

- in

- Interest

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:13

- cv - 00696

- BO )

Submitted : April 28, 2015 Decided: June 9, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Robert Lewis, Jr., LEWIS LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Brian C. Behr, OFFICE OF THE BANKRUPTCY2 ADMINISTRATOR, Ra leigh, North Carolina; James B. Angell, Nicholas C. Brown, HOWARD, STALLINGS, FROM & HUTSON, PA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM: Robert Lewis, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order affirming the order of the bankruptcy court partially suspending him from practicing in the bankruptcy court, ordering the disgorgement of undisclosed attorney fees received, and imposing a $2500 monetary sanction. He also appeals f rom the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s order reinstating his bar privileges after an additional term and upon Lewis’ compliance with the sanctions order. We affirm. During the investigation of a d ebtor in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Administrator (“BA”) identified several discrepancies within the d ebtor’s bankruptcy schedules and between the d ebtor’s statements and those prepared by his attorney, Robert Lewis, particularly with respect to fees paid to Lewis. After further investigat ion, the BA filed a report of Lewis’ alleged misconduct and mo ved for sanctions to be imposed against Lewis for violating the requirement of full disclosure of fees in bankruptcy cases

. The BA also asserted numerous other violations by Lewis, including th e acceptance of more than $6000 from the d ebtor , purportedly toward attorney ’s fees for prepetition civil litigation of which the d ebtor denied knowledge ; continu ing to represent the d ebtor without approval from the bankruptcy c ourt after conversion of the d ebtor’s case
to Chapter 11 ; violating the rule against “ghost

- writing” appeal4 documents for the d ebtor ; and failing to maintain copies of filed documents that contain an original signature. The Cha pter 7 Trustee also moved for sanctions on these same bases

. After holding hearings on the BA’s and T rustee’s motions for sanctions , t he bankruptcy court determined that sanctions were appropriate and temporarily suspended Lewis from initiating new bankruptcy cases on behalf of clients in the Bankruptc y Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina until December 14, 2013. With respect to existing clients, Lewis was authorized to continue his representation, but was required to submit monthly reports to the court and to the BA , certifying that he wa s the attorney of record and disclosing all compensation paid or to be paid to him for his services in connection with his pending bankruptcy cases. The court ordered Lewis to pay $2500 in sanctions and to disgorge $8400 in fees. The court additionally r uled that Lewis’ reinstatement to practice was conditioned on his full compliance with the court’s order. The court warned Lewis that failure to fully comply will result in more severe sanctions. During the hearing on Lewis’ reinstatement, the bankrup tcy court found that Lewis had not fully complied with the sanctions order . The court directed that Lew is ’ privilege to practice before the bankruptcy court would be reinstated on May 19, 2014, provided that, before that date, Lewis paid the sanctions and5 disgorged the fee amount , as required by the court’s original sanctions order. The court also ordered that the heightened reporting requirements imposed on Lewis in the original sanctions order would continue for all new bankruptcy cases filed by Lewis. Lewis appeal ed from the sanctions order and from the reinstatement order. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings. Lewis noted his appeal to this c ourt , challenging the authority of the bankruptcy court to order sanctions , the nature of the sanctions imposed , and the fact that the bankruptcy court did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law . He also argued that the district court erred by considering the A ppellees ’ brief filed in the appeal from the reinstatement order in deciding the issues in the appeal from the sanctions order and erred by affirming the bankruptcy court’s disposition without holding oral argument. Lewis contends that the bankruptcy court lacks authority to suspend the bar privileges of attorneys who practice in that court, claiming that only the district court has such authority. We do not agree. The bankruptcy court has the inherent power, “incidental to all courts” to “discipline attorneys w ho appear before it.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). Th is inherent
power i ncludes the power to suspend or disbar attorneys from6 practicing before the court. In re Snyder , 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985). Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code aut horizes the bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [Title 11] or to prevent an abuse of process.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (2012); see In re Walters , 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir. 1989) ( upholding under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) , contempt sanctions based on attorney’s failure to disclose fee s , disgorge unauthorized fees, and obtain authority to represent debtor ). We conclude that the bankruptcy court appropriately determined that it had the authority to sanction Lewis for his misconduct

. S ee In re Johnson , 921 F.2d 85, 586 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that bankruptcy courts “have both the statutory and inherent authority to deny attorneys and others the privilege of practicing before that ba r” ). Lewis contends that, pursuant to Stern v. Marshall , 131
S. Ct. 2594 (2011), bankruptcy courts lack authority over attorney disciplinary matters. In Stern , the C ourt held that Congress exceeded the limitation of Article III by identifying
as a “core matter” a state

- law counterclaim by a debtor in bankruptcy against a creditor who had not consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 2620. Because the counterclaim was “in no way derived from or dependent upon bankruptcy law,” the Supr eme Court determined that the7 bankruptcy court could not, in compliance with the Constitution, enter a final order on that claim. Id. at 2618. We think Lewis’ situation is distinguishable. The basis upon which the bankruptcy court imposed sanctions was Lewis’ violation of bankruptcy law and procedures and his misconduct in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court clearly had jurisdiction over this matter ba sed on the fact that Lew is voluntarily presented himself in the bankruptcy court as an attorney and officer of the court , and because , unlike the counterclaim in Stern , t he bas e s upon which the sanctions were imposed arose from , and were dependent upon , th e bankruptcy proceeding. Lewis next argues that the sanctions imposed were in the nature of punishment and therefor e amounted to criminal contempt and were imposed in violation of his due process rights. We disagree. A contempt sanction is criminal if “ it is imposed retrospectively for a ‘completed act of disobedience’.” Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell , 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994). Contempt sanctions are civil in nature if the purpose is to coerce compliance with a court order or to

co mpensate another party for losses sustained. Id. Suspension of an attorney from the practice of law is generally deemed a civil penalty, imposed to coerce compliance with the rules of the court. See Ex parte Wall , 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1 88 3); In re Liotti , 667 F.3d 419, 430

- 31 (4th Cir. 2011)

. We conclude that8 the sanctions imposed on Lewis were within the bankruptcy court’s authority and that the court appropriately imposed civil sanctions partially suspending him from practicing in the bankruptcy court, requiring the disgorgement of unauthorized fees, imposing a monetary sanction, and conditioning his reinstatement upon fulfilling the sanction order. See Bagwell , 512 U.S. at 829. We also do not think the district court erred in its consideration of Lewis ’ appeal. First, Lewis ’ contention that the district court erred on appeal by not hearing oral argument is belied by the record, which evidences that the court h e ld a hearing and Lewis presen ted argument. Second, we find no abuse of discretion in the dis trict court’s consideration of the Appellees ’ b rief in the reinstatement appeal to resolve issues in the sanctions appeal. See In re Haberman , 516 F.3d 1207, 1208 n.* (10th Cir. 2008) (allowing consideration of noncompliant briefs at court’s discretion, provided that opposing party is not prejudiced); Price v. Digital Equip. Corp. , 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). Lastly, Lewis cont ends that the district court erred by upholding the bankruptcy court’s ruling where the bankruptcy court did not expressly state findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because Lewis failed to raise this argument in the district court, it is waived on ap peal. See In re Wallace &9 Gale Co. , 385 F.3d 820, 835 (4th Cir. 2004) (on appeal from bankruptcy court’s ruling, failure to raise argument before district court results in waiver of argument on appeal “absent exceptional circumstances”). In sum, we find n o reversible error by either the bankruptcy court or the district court . Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with or al argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materia ls before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRM E D