GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Science and Technology, House of 

Representatives 

NASA

Constellation Program 

Cost and Schedule 

Will Remain Uncertain 

Until a Sound 

Business Case Is 

Established 

August 2009 

GAO-09-844 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

August 2009

NASA

Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will 

Remain Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case Is

Highlights of GAO-09-844, a report to the Established 

Chairman, Committee on Science and 

Technology, House of Representatives 

NASA’s Constellation program is 

developing the Ares I Crew Launch 

Vehicle and the Orion Crew 

Exploration Vehicle as the agency’s 

first major efforts in a plan to 

return to the moon and eventually 

send humans to Mars. GAO has 

issued a number of reports and 

testimonies on various aspects of 

this program, and made several 

recommendations. GAO was asked 

to assess NASA’s progress in 

implementing GAO’s 

recommendations for the Ares I 

and Orion projects, and identify 

risks the program faces. GAO 

analyzed NASA plans and 

schedules, risk mitigation 

information, and contract 

performance data relative to 

knowledge-based acquisition 

practices identified in prior GAO 

reports, and interviewed 

government officials and 

contractors. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that as NASA 

addresses the findings and 

recommendations of an ongoing 

review of U.S. human space flight 

being conducted per direction from 

the President, the new NASA 

Administrator direct the 

Constellation program, or its 

successor, to develop a sound 

business case before proceeding 

into its next phase. NASA 

concurred with our 

recommendation. 

NASA is still struggling to develop a solid business case—including firm 

requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a 

realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time—needed to justify 

moving the Constellation program forward into the implementation phase. 

Gaps in the business case include 

• significant technical and design challenges for the Orion and Ares I 

vehicles, such as limiting vibration during launch, eliminating the risk of 

hitting the launch tower during lift off, and reducing the mass of the Orion 

vehicle, represent considerable hurdles that must be overcome in order to 

meet safety and performance requirements; and 

• a poorly phased funding plan that runs the risk of funding shortfalls in 

fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being 

completed to support schedules and milestones. This approach has 

limited NASA’s ability to mitigate technical risks early in development and 

precludes the orderly ramp up of workforce and developmental activities. 

In response to these gaps, NASA delayed the date of its first crewed-flight and 

changed its acquisition strategy for the Orion project. NASA acknowledges 

that funding shortfalls reduce the agency’s flexibility in resolving technical 

challenges. The program’s risk management system warned of planned work 

not being completed to support schedules and milestones. Consequently, 

NASA is now focused on providing the capability to service the International 

Space Station and has deferred the capabilities needed for flights to the moon. 

Though these changes to the overarching requirements are likely to increase 

the confidence level associated with a March 2015 first crewed flight, these 

actions do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that 

deadline. Nevertheless, NASA estimates that Ares I and Orion represent up to 

$49 billion of the over $97 billion estimated to be spent on the Constellation 

program through 2020. While the agency has already obligated more than $10 

billion in contracts, at this point NASA does not know how much Ares I and 

Orion will ultimately cost, and will not know until technical and design 

challenges have been addressed. 

Artist’s Rendition of Ares I and Orion 

Ares I

Crew Launch Vehicle

Orion Crew

Exploration

Vehicle

Source: GAO analysis and presentation of NASA photos and data.

View GAO-09-844 or key components.

For more information, contact Cristina 

Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

ChaplainC@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-844 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 4 

The Constellation Program Has Not Yet Developed the Sound 

Business Case Needed to Justify Entry into the Implementation 

Phase 10 

Conclusion 18 

Recommendations 19 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 21 

Appendix II Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 23 

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 26 

Related GAO Products 27 

Figures 

Figure 1: Constellation Program Schedule 5 

Figure 2: Artist Conception of Constellation Elements 7 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

 NASA's Constellation Program 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

August 26, 2009 

The Honorable Bart Gordon 

Chairman 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) 

Constellation program is approaching a crossroads in development as it 

nears entry into the implementation phase. The Constellation program is 

developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew 

Exploration Vehicle, the agency’s first major efforts to support 

implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration.1

 These efforts 

represent a substantial investment for NASA. Over $10 billion has already 

been obligated and NASA budget estimates indicate that over $97 billion is 

to be spent on the Constellation program through 2020.2

 NASA initiated the 

Constellation program in November 2005 and expected the program to 

enter implementation in 2009. The program has delayed its entry into 

implementation, however, and is still modifying its overall architecture 

and specific requirements. Our previous work on best practices and 

NASA’s own acquisition policies indicate that the program’s architecture 

and requirements should be finalized and system designs expected to meet 

requirements in hand before a program enters the implementation phase.3

NASA recognized that the program faces challenges and in December 2008 

reported that the current program was high risk and unachievable within 

NASA's Constellation Program

 

1

In 2004, President George W. Bush established a new space exploration policy— A 

Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for U.S. Space Exploration 

(Vision)— which calls for the retirement of the space shuttle and development of a new 

family of exploration systems to facilitate a return of humans to the moon and eventual 

human spaceflight to Mars. NASA estimates that implementing this policy will cost nearly 

$230 billion through 2025. This estimate includes programs such as the Commercial Crew 

and Cargo program that are separate from the Constellation program. 

2

The estimate includes development of all Constellation projects including the Ares V and 

the Altair Lunar Lander. Up to $49 billion is estimated to be spent on the Ares I and Orion 

projects. 

3

GAO, NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could Lead to 

Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, GAO-06-218 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 

21, 2005) 

Page 1 GAO-09-844 
 

current budget and schedule constraints.4 Since then, NASA has taken 

steps to decrease risk, including delaying the first crewed flight from 

September 2014 to March 2015 and deferring work on lunar requirements. 

In May 2009, the Obama Administration announced an independent review 

of U.S. human space flight plans and activities with the stated goal of 

ensuring that the nation is pursuing the best course for the future of 

human space flight. This Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans 

Committee is composed of space industry experts, former astronauts, 

government officials, and academics. It is tasked with providing a range of 

options for U.S. human space flight activities and has been examining 

ongoing and planned NASA development activities and potential 

alternatives in order to present options for advancing a safe, innovative, 

affordable, and sustainable human space flight program following the 

space shuttle’s retirement. Among alternatives that have received attention 

is the use of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, which 

already provides launch capability to the Department of Defense, the 

National Reconnaissance Office, and NASA, but has not been used to 

transport humans into space. The committee plans to complete this review 

by August 2009 and include any changes to current plans in an amended 

submission to its fiscal year 2010 budget request. NASA is continuing to 

execute the Constellation program as this review is conducted. 

We have issued a number of reports and testimonies that touch on various 

aspects of NASA’s Constellation program and in particular the 

development efforts under way for the Orion and Ares I projects. These 

reports and testimonies have questioned the affordability and overall 

acquisition strategy for each project and have stressed repeatedly NASA’s 

need to develop a sound business case — which includes firm 

requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time — to 

support the Constellation program before making long-term commitments. 

In the past, we recommended that NASA modify the Orion Crew Vehicle 

acquisition strategy to ensure the agency did not commit itself to a longterm contractual obligation prior to establishing a sound business case.5

Although initially NASA disagreed with our recommendation, the agency 

subsequently revised its acquisition strategy to address some of the 

 

4

NASA, Constellation Acceleration Study Report (Dec. 18, 2008). 

5

GAO, NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space Exploration Program 

Requires More Knowledge. GAO-06-817R (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2006). 

Page 2 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

concerns we raised. We have also recommended that NASA ensure the 

business case for the Ares I project is established before proceeding 

beyond preliminary design review.6

 NASA concurred with this 

recommendation and subsequently delayed the Ares I preliminary design 

review. In February 2009 NASA determined that the Orion project was not 

ready to begin the preliminary design review process and delayed 

initiation of the Orion review until August 2009 (see fig. 1). In response to 

your request that we review the Constellation program, this report 

assesses the extent to which NASA has implemented our prior 

recommendations, including establishing a sound business case for the 

Ares I and Orion projects, and identifies risks, if any, facing the program. 

To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed Constellation plans 

and schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data 

relative to knowledge-based acquisition practices identified in prior 

reports. We also interviewed government and contractor officials at 

relevant NASA centers and NASA headquarters. For our full scope and 

methodology, see appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from 

December 2008 through August 2009, in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 

 

6

GAO, NASA: Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for 

Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps. GAO-08-51 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 

2007). 

Page 3 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration calls for a return of humans to the 

Moon and eventual human spaceflight to Mars. In September 2005, NASA 

outlined an initial architecture for implementing the Vision in its 

Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). NASA is implementing 

this architecture under the Constellation program. Among the first major 

efforts of this program are the developments of new space flight 

systems—including the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew 

Exploration Vehicle. Ares I and Orion are currently targeted for operation 

no later than 2015 (see fig. 1). 

Background 

Page 4 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

Figure 1: Constellation Program Schedule 

Preliminary design review as of 2007

Current preliminary design review

Current non-advocate review

First crewed flight as of 2007

Current first crewed flight

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data.

Ares I

Orion

Constellation

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Julya

August August

June March

May

Formulation Implementation

September March

Note: The non-advocate review is the analysis of a proposed program or project by a team composed 

of management, technical, and resources experts from outside the advocacy chain of the proposed 

program or project. It provides agency management with an independent assessment of the 

readiness of the program/project to proceed into implementation. 

a

Ares I preliminary design review was completed in September 2008 but significant technical issues 

were deferred until the Constellation program's preliminary design review. 

As illustrated by figure 1 above, the Constellation program, including the 

Ares I and Orion projects, is approaching the end of the formulation phase 

Page 5 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

of NASA’s acquisition life-cycle for spaceflight programs and projects. The 

purpose of the formulation phase is to establish a cost-effective progra

that is demonstrably capable of meeting the agency’s objectives. The 

formulation phase concludes with the preliminary design review and a 

non-advocate review which marks the end of the formulation phase and

the beginning of the implementation phase. During the implementation 

phase, t

m 

he program will execute plans developed during the formulation 

phase. 

ould 

a 

if a 

e 

res V 

w, 

d infrastructure to support human exploration of Mars and 

beyond. 

Under the ESAS architecture, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle w

be an Apollo-like capsule capable of carrying six astronauts to the 

International Space Station (ISS) and four to the moon. It would include 

launch abort system that would allow the crew to escape unharmed 

launch fails. The Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle would be a two-stage, 

vertically stacked vehicle with the first stage derived directly from th

Space Shuttle solid rocket booster (see fig. 2). Constellation would 

develop crew and cargo capabilities for missions to the lunar surface, no 

later than 2020. As currently planned, this system will include the A

Cargo Launch Vehicle, Earth Departure Stage, Lunar Lander, and 

associated support capabilities. Further development will provide cre

cargo, an

Page 6 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

Figure 2: Artist Conception of Constellation Elements 

Source: GAO analysis and presentation of NASA photos and data.

Ares V

Cargo Launch Vehicle

Ares I

Crew Launch Vehicle

J-2X engine

tucked inside

Five segments

Launch

Abort

System

Five segments

Orion Crew

Exploration

Vehicle

Note: The Earth Departure Stage and Lunar Lander are encapsulated in the Ares V. 

Page 7 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

When it completed the ESAS study, NASA indicated it would maximize the 

use of heritage hardware and established technology in order to reduce 

cost and minimize risk. NASA also planned to retire the Space Shuttle in 

2010 to make resources available for the Constellation program. NASA 

was confident this technical approach, in conjunction with a “go as you 

can afford to pay” funding approach, would support a first crewed flight 

no later than September 2014. Furthermore, NASA indicated that it would 

strive to bring that date as close as possible to 2010—the planned 

retirement date for the Shuttle—in order to minimize the gap between the 

Space Shuttle’s retirement and deployment of new transportation vehicles. 

In fact, NASA was working to an internal date of 2013 for first crewed 

launch, with an initial flight to the Moon targeted for 2018 but no later than 

2020. 

Human spaceflight development programs are complex and difficult by 

nature. Over the past decade, there have been a number of instances 

where NASA pursued costly efforts to build a second generation of 

reusable human spaceflight vehicles without attaining critical knowledge 

about requirements and resources. These programs experienced 

significant problems—including cost and schedule delays. They include 

the National Aero-Space Plane, the X-33 and X-34, and the Space Launch 

Initiative, which were eventually canceled. While these endeavors have 

helped to advance scientific and technical knowledge, none of these 

projects accomplished NASA’s objective of fielding a new reusable space 

vehicle. By emphasizing heritage technology, the Constellation program 

was designed to avoid problems associated with the prior shuttle 

replacement efforts, which were largely rooted in the desire to introduce 

vehicles that significantly advanced technologies. Thus far, however, the 

Constellation program has encountered daunting challenges in terms of 

design, testing, manufacturing, and poorly phased funding that have led 

the program to slip its target for a first crewed flight to no later than March 

2015. 

Our Work on Best 

Practices Support 

Business Case 

Establishment Prior to 

Product Development 

Our work on best practices over the past decade has shown that success 

in large-scale development efforts like Constellation depends on 

establishing an executable business case before committing resources to a 

new product development effort. In its simplest form, a business case 

requires a balance between the concept selected to satisfy customer needs 

and the resources—technologies, design knowledge, funding, time, and 

management capacity—needed to transform the concept into a product. At 

the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach that requires 

that managers demonstrate high levels of knowledge as the program 

Page 8 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

proceeds from technology development to system development and, 

finally, production. Ideally, in such an approach, key technologies are 

demonstrated before development begins, the design is stabilized before 

prototypes are built or production begins, and testing is used to validate 

product maturity at each level. At each decision point, the balance among 

time, money, and capacity is confirmed. In essence, knowledge supplants 

risk over time. Having adequate knowledge about requirements and 

resources is particularly important for a program like Constellation 

because human spaceflight development projects are inherently complex, 

difficult, and costly. 

We have reported on several occasions that within NASA’s acquisition 

framework, the preliminary design/non-advocate review—the hurdle 

marking transition from program formulation to program 

implementation—is the point at which development projects should have 

a sound business case in hand.7

 NASA’s Systems Engineering Policy states 

that the preliminary design review demonstrates that the preliminary 

design meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the 

cost and schedule constraints. NASA realized that the Orion project was 

not ready to complete the preliminary design review process as planned 

and delayed its initiation from summer 2008 to summer 2009.8

Furthermore, although NASA officially closed the Ares I preliminary 

design review process in September 2008, it deferred resolution of the 

thrust oscillation issue until the Constellation program preliminary design 

review in March 2010. 

The business case is the essential first step in any acquisition program that 

sets the stage for the remaining stages of a program, namely the business 

or contracting strategy and actual execution or performance. If the 

business case is not sound, execution may be subpar. This does not mean 

that all potential problems can be eliminated and perfection achieved, but 

rather that sound business cases can help produce better outcomes and 

better return on investment. If any one element of the business case is 

weak, problems are more likely in implementation. Thus far in the 

Constellation program, the failure of NASA to establish a sound business 

 

7

GAO-06-218; GAO-06-817R; and GAO-08-51. 

8

NASA delayed the Orion preliminary design review in part to allow time for another design 

analysis cycle aimed primarily at improving performance against safety requirements for 

the International Space Station Mission. 

Page 9 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

case for both the Ares I and Orion projects early is manifesting itself in 

schedule delays and cost increases. 

The Constellation program has not yet developed all of the elements of a 

sound business case needed to justify entry into implementation. Progress 

has been made; however, technical and design challenges are still 

significant and until they are resolved NASA will not be able to reliably 

estimate the time and money needed to execute the program. In addition, 

cost issues and a poorly phased funding plan continue to hamper the 

program. Consequently, NASA is changing the acquisition strategy for the 

Orion project as the agency attempts to increase confidence in its ability to 

meet a March 2015 first crewed launch. However, technical design and 

other challenges facing the program are not likely to be overcome in time 

to meet the 2015 date, even with changes to scope and requirements. 

The Constellation 

Program Has Not Yet 

Developed the Sound 

Business Case 

Needed to Justify 

Entry into the 

Implementation Phase 

Constellation Faces 

Significant Technical and 

Design Challenges 

Technical and design challenges within the Constellation are proving 

difficult, costly, and time intensive to resolve. The Constellation program 

tracks technical challenges in its Integrated Risk Management Application 

(IRMA). NASA procedures recommend that programs identify and track 

risks as part of continuous risk management. As of June 9, 2009, IRMA was 

tracking 464 risks for Ares I and Orion—207 high risks, 206 medium risks, 

and 51 low risks.9

 We have reported on some of these areas of technical 

challenge in the past, including thrust oscillation, thermal protection 

system, common bulkhead, and J-2X nozzle extension. In addition to these 

challenges, our recent work has highlighted other technical challenges, 

including Orion mass control, vibroacoustics, lift-off drift, launch abort 

system, and meeting safety requirements. While NASA has made progress 

in resolving each of these technical challenges, significant knowledge gaps 

remain in each of these areas. Descriptions of these technical challenges 

follow.10

 

9

NASA is currently using IRMA as a tool for implementing continuous risk management 

within the Constellation program. IRMA identifies and documents risks, categorizes risks—

as high, medium, and low based on both the likelihood of an undesirable event as well as 

the consequences of that event to the project—and tracks performance against mitigation 

plans. 

10The technical challenges presented here do not capture all of the risks, technical or 

programmatic, facing the Constellation program. The technical challenges presented here 

represent our compiled summary of the challenges identified by, and discussed with, Ares I 

and Orion project management during the time frames of our review. 

Page 10 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

Thrust oscillation, which causes shaking during launch and ascent, occurs 

in some form on every solid rocket engine. Last year, we reported that 

computer modeling indicated that there was a possibility that the thrust 

oscillation frequency and magnitude may be outside the limits of the Ares I 

design and could potentially cause excessive vibration in the Orion 

capsule. Agency officials stated that thrust oscillation is well understood 

and they are pursuing multiple solutions. These include incorporating a 

passive damping system inside the first stage solid rocket booster aft skirt 

that will act like a shock absorber during launch; adding a composite 

structure and springs between the first and second stages to isolate the 

upper stage and crew vehicle from the first stage; and could possibly use 

the upper stage propellant fuel tanks to offset thrust oscillation in the first 

stage. Officials said that NASA will be unable to verify the success of 

solutions until thrust oscillation occurs during an integrated flight. 

Officials noted that because thrust oscillation is not expected to occur in 

every flight, it is difficult to forecast when the solutions will be verified. 

Thrust Oscillation 

The Orion vehicle requires a large-scale ablative heat shield, at the base of 

the spacecraft, to survive reentry from earth orbit. These heat shields burn 

up, or ablate, in a controlled fashion, transporting heat away from the 

crew module during its descent through the atmosphere. NASA is using an 

ablative material derived from the substance used in the Apollo program. 

After some difficulties, NASA was successful in recreating the material. 

Because it uses a framework with many honeycomb-shaped cells, each of 

which must be individually filled without voids or imperfections, it may be 

difficult to repeatedly manufacture to consistent standards. According to 

program officials, during the Apollo program the cells were filled by hand. 

The contractor plans to automate the process for the Orion Thermal 

Protection System, but this capability is still being developed. 

Thermal Protection System 

The common bulkhead separates the hydrogen and oxygen fuel within the 

Ares I upper stage fuel tank. The initial Ares I design employed a simpler 

two-tank configuration with lower manufacturing costs but did not meet 

mass requirements. According to project officials, the common bulkhead 

represents the critical path in both the development and manufacturing of 

the upper stage. Lessons learned from the Apollo program indicate that 

common bulkheads are complex and difficult to manufacture and 

recommend against their use. According to NASA officials, the difficulty of 

designing and manufacturing common bulkheads stems from the sheer 

size of components and the tight tolerances to which they must be 

Common Bulkhead 

Page 11 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

manufactured. To accelerate the manufacturing process NASA is exploring 

using an oven with a vacuum bag instead of an autoclave11 to bond and 

cure the metallic and composite materials used in the manufacture of the 

common bulkhead. If this process proves unsuccessful, the program may 

encounter schedule delays. 

We have reported in prior years that although the J-2X engine is based on 

the J-2 and J-2S engines used on the Saturn V and leverages knowledge 

from subsequent engine development efforts, the number of planned 

changes is such that, according to NASA review boards, the effort 

essentially represents a new engine development. A risk within this 

development is a requirement for a nozzle extension to meet performance 

requirements. NASA originally planned to pursue a composite nozzle. 

However, NASA eliminated the composite nozzle extension from the J-2X 

design because of cost and other considerations, and went with a unique 

aluminum alloy design, which, according to agency officials, should 

reduce costs, but has the potential to decrease engine performance and 

increase mass. Analysis indicates that the alloy nozzle is more likely to be 

affected by heat than a composite nozzle. In essence, while the alloy 

nozzle should withstand the heat environment, the composite nozzle 

allowed for improved performance margins. According to officials, to 

mitigate the potential problem, NASA is using a proven aluminum alloy 

with a honeycomb design, similar structurally to the Space Shuttle 

external tank, which will reduce weight. Contractor officials stated that 

they will continue to modify the nozzle design as test results are received 

and analyzed. 

J-2X Nozzle Extension 

Controlling for mass has led to significant design changes to the Orion 

vehicle. Our previous work has shown that controlling for mass is a key 

factor in the development of space systems. As the mass of a particular 

system increases, the power or thrust required to launch that system will 

also increase. This could result in the need to develop additional power or 

thrust capability to lift the system, leading to additional costs, or to 

stripping down the vehicle to accommodate current power or thrust 

capability. For example, NASA went through the process in 2007 to zerobase the design for the Orion to address mass concerns. In its efforts to 

reduce the mass of the Orion vehicle, NASA chose to move from land 

nominal landing to water nominal landing to reduce mass by eliminating 

air bags and, according to officials, by reducing the number of parachutes. 

Orion Mass Control 

 

11An autoclave uses a combination of heat and pressure to bond dissimilar materials. 

Page 12 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

NASA also incorporated jettisonable, load-bearing fairings 12 into the 

Orion’s service module design that, according to officials, saved 1,000 

pounds. This change, however, increased development risk because the 

fairing design has no historical precedent and the fairing panels may not 

deploy properly and could recontact the Orion vehicle or the Ares I rocket 

after they are jettisoned. 

Another issue related to vibration is vibroacoustics—the pressure of the 

acoustic waves—produced by the firing of the Ares I first stage and the 

rocket’s acceleration through the atmosphere—which may cause 

unacceptable structural vibrations throughout Ares I and Orion. According 

to agency officials, NASA is still determining how these vibrations and 

acoustic environments may affect the vehicles. NASA is concerned that 

severe vibroacoustics could force NASA to qualify Ares I and Orion 

components to higher vibration tolerance thresholds than originally 

expected. For example, if current concerns are realized, key subsystems 

within the Upper Stage would be unable to meet requirements, would fail 

qualification testing, and would have to be redesigned. 

Vibroacoustics 

Analysis of the Ares I flight path as it lifts off from the launch pad indicates 

the rocket may drift during launch and could possibly hit the launch tower 

or damage the launch facilities with the rocket plume. Factors 

contributing to lift-off drift include wind speed and direction, 

misalignment of the rocket’s thrust, and duration of lift-off. NASA plans to 

establish a clear, safe, and predicted lift-off drift curve by steering the 

vehicle away from the launch tower and not launching when southerly 

winds exceed 15 to 20 knots. 

Lift-Off Drift 

NASA continues to address challenges designing the launch abort system, 

which pulls the Orion capsule away from the Ares I launch vehicle in the 

case of a catastrophic problem during launch. The Orion contractor had 

trouble finding a subcontractor who could design and build a working 

attitude control motor that steers the system during an abort. According to 

agency officials, previous attitude control motors have had 700 pounds of 

thrust, while the requirement for the attitude control motor is 7,000 

pounds of thrust. Developing an attitude control motor with high levels of 

thrust and long burn durations that is steerable is proving to be a difficult 

technical challenge. A year after the initial contract was awarded, the first 

Launch Abort System 

 

12The fairings are load-bearing in that they support the weight of the Orion capsule and 

service module. 

Page 13 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

subcontractor did not have a viable design and had to be replaced. The 

current subcontractor, however, is making progress. For example, 

although the valves used by the complex steering system failed during 

high-thrust testing in April 2008, redesigned valves have subsequently 

passed two high-thrust tests. 

Orion’s safety requirements are no more than one loss of crew event in 

1,700 flights and one loss of mission event for every 250 flights for the ISS 

mission. According to Orion officials, these requirements are an order of 

magnitude higher than the Space Shuttle’s safety requirements, were 

arbitrarily set by ESAS, and may be unattainable. According to the 

Constellation program manager, NASA has added robustness to current 

systems as well as redundant systems to increase safety margins. 

However, these added redundancies and system robustness have added 

mass to the system. 

Safety Requirements 

The technical challenges presented here do not capture all of the risks, 

technical or programmatic, which the Constellation program faces. As 

noted earlier, there are over 200 risks categorized as “high” for the Ares 

I/Orion programs, meaning that if not successfully mitigated, these risks 

(1) are either nearly certain, highly likely, or may occur, and (2) will have 

major effects on system cost, schedule, performance, or safety. These 

risks range in nature from highly complex technical risks, such as those 

noted above, to straightforward programmatic risks related to areas such 

as transitioning support work from the Marshall Space Flight Center to 

Michoud Assembly Facility for long-term vehicle production, compressing 

the software development cycle for the Orion vehicle, and creating a test 

program for Orion’s communication and tracking system. 

Funding Issues and Cost 

Increases Continue to 

Hamper the Program 

The Constellation program’s poorly phased funding plan has affected the 

program’s ability to deal with technical challenges. In our October 2007 

report, we noted that NASA initiated the Constellation program 

recognizing that the agency’s total budget authority would be insufficient 

to fund all necessary activities in fiscal years 2009 and 2010.13 NASA’s 

funding strategy relied on the accumulation of a large rolling budget 

reserve in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to fund Constellation activities in 

fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. Thereafter, NASA anticipated that the 

retirement of the space shuttle program in 2010 would free funding for the 

 

13 GAO-08-51. 

Page 14 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

Constellation program. In our October 2007 report, we noted that NASA’s 

approach to funding was risky and that the approved budget profile at that 

time was insufficient to meet Constellation’s estimated needs. The 

Constellation program’s integrated risk management system also identified 

this strategy as high risk and warned that funding shortfalls could occur in 

fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being 

completed to support schedules and milestones. According to project 

officials, these shortfalls limited NASA’s ability to mitigate technical risks 

early in development and precluded the orderly ramp-up of workforce and 

developmental activities. 

According to the Constellation program manager, these funding shortfalls 

are reducing his flexibility to resolve technical challenges. The 

Constellation program tracks unfunded risk mitigation—engineering work 

identified as potentially needed but not currently funded—as cost threats 

in IRMA. The Constellation IRMA system currently tracks 192 cost threats 

for the Ares I and Orion projects totaling about $2.4 billion through fiscal 

year 2015.14 Of this $2.4 billion, NASA classifies 35 threats valued at about 

$730 million as likely to be needed, 54 threats valued at about $670 million 

as may or may not be needed, and 103 threats valued at about $1 billion as 

not likely to be needed. Our analysis of the cost threats indicates these 

cost threats may be understated. For example, of the 157 threats classified 

as may or may not be needed or not likely to be needed, IRMA likelihood 

scores15 indicate that 69 cost threats worth about $789 million are either 

highly likely or nearly certain to occur. Some examples of cost threats 

include $4.7 million to develop and mature Orion’s data network 

technology and $12.5 million for an Upper Stage and First Stage separation 

test. 

The cost of the Constellation program’s developmental contracts have 

increased as NASA added new effort to resolve technical and design 

challenges. Constellation program officials and contractor cost reports 

indicate that the new effort has increased the value of the Constellation 

program’s developmental contracts from $7.2 billion in 2007 to $10.2 

billion in June 2009. Some of these modifications remained undefinitized 

for extended periods as NASA worked through design issues and matured 

 

14As of June 9, 2009. 

15Likelihood scores are assessments of the probability that a risk will actually occur. 

Page 15 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

program requirements in response to technical challenges.16 Undefinitized 

contract actions authorize contractors to begin work before reaching a 

final agreement on contract terms. By allowing undefinitized contract 

actions to continue for extended periods, NASA loses its ability to monitor 

contractor performance because the cost reports are not useful for 

evaluating the contractor’s performance or for projecting the remaining 

cost of the work under contract. With a current, valid baseline, the reports 

would indicate when cost or schedule thresholds had been exceeded, and 

NASA could then require the contractor to explain the reasons for the 

variances and to identify and take appropriate corrective actions. Yet, 

NASA allowed high-value modifications to the Constellation contracts to 

remain undefinitized for extended periods, in one instance, more than 13 

months.17

Tradeoffs Made to Address 

Cost Increases and 

Funding Shortfalls Are 

Changing Constellation 

Program Test Strategy 

In August 2008, when faced with cost increases and funding shortfalls, the 

Constellation program responded by reducing program reserves and 

deferring development effort and test activities. These changes resulted in 

a minimized flight test program that was so success oriented there was no 

room for test failures. During the course of our review, NASA test officials 

expressed multiple concerns about the test approach the program was 

then pursuing. NASA test officials also expressed concerns about the 

sufficiency of planned integrated system flight testing. NASA was planning 

only one integrated system flight test prior to the first crewed flight. 

Officials stated that while NASA would have been able to address each of 

the programs’ specific test objectives during the planned flight tests, 

additional integrated system flight tests could have provided the agency 

increased confidence that the system performed as planned and allowed 

the agency the opportunity to design and implement solutions to 

performance problems without affecting the first crewed flight. According 

to agency officials, any problems encountered during integrated system 

flight testing could lead to significant delays in the first crewed flight. 

Test officials were also concerned that the highly concurrent test schedule 

had significant overlap between component qualification and fabrication 

 

16We evaluated the contractor cost reporting data using best practice techniques found in 

the GAO Cost Assessment Guide, GAO-09-3SP, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide

(March 2009). 

17The NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 1843.7005(a) states that NASA’s 

goal is to definitize contract modifications within 180 days from date of issuance. 

Page 16 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

of flight hardware. This concurrency could have resulted in schedule slips 

and increased costs if any component failed qualification tests. Our past 

work indicates that it is unlikely that the program will complete its test 

program without encountering developmental problems or test failures. 

The discovery of problems in complex products is a normal part of any 

development process, and testing is perhaps the most effective tool for 

discovering such problems. According to the Constellation program 

manager, the test plan strategy for the Constellation program is currently 

evolving as the program reshapes its acquisition strategy to defer all work 

on lunar content beyond the March 2015 first crewed flight. The test 

strategy is likely to continue to evolve until the Constellation program’s 

Systems Integration Plan18 is finalized when the project enters the 

implementation phase. 

Changing Acquisition 

Strategy 

In response to technical challenges and cost and funding issues, NASA is 

changing the Orion project acquisition strategy. In December 2008, NASA 

determined that the current Constellation program was high risk and 

unachievable within the current budget and schedule. To increase its level 

of confidence in the Constellation program baseline NASA delayed the 

first crewed flight from September 2014 to March 2015 and according to 

officials, adopted a two-phased approach to developing the Orion vehicle. 

NASA’s original strategy for the Orion project was to develop one vehicle 

capable of supporting both ISS and lunar missions. According to the 

Constellation program manager, the Constellation program is currently 

deferring work on Orion lunar content beyond 2015 to focus its efforts on 

developing a vehicle that can fly the ISS mission. This phased approach, 

however, could require two qualification programs for the Orion vehicle—

one pre-2015 Orion qualification program for ISS mission requirements 

and a second post-2015 Orion qualification program for lunar mission 

requirements. 

According to the program manager, the knowledge gained from flying the 

initial Orion to the ISS will inform the design of the lunar vehicle. The 

Constellation program manager also told us that NASA is unwilling to 

further trade schedule in order to reduce risk. He asserted that delaying 

the schedule is an inefficient means of mitigating risk because of the high 

costs of maintaining fixed assets and contractor staff. 

 

18The System Integration Plan will identify all testing and verification events needed to 

ensure the systems meet requirements. 

Page 17 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

Though these changes to overarching requirements are likely to increase 

the confidence level associated with the March 2015 first crewed flight, 

they do not guarantee that the program will conduct a successful first 

crewed flight in March 2015. For example, in May 2009 the program 

announced its plan to reduce the number of crew for the ISS mission from 

six to four. According to project officials, NASA does not plan to finalize 

the preliminary design of the four-crew ISS configuration until after the 

Orion preliminary design review. Revising the ISS design for four crew and 

optimizing the area freed up by removing two crew for the ISS mission will 

entail additional effort on the part of the Orion design team. Furthermore, 

as noted above, both the Ares I and Orion projects continue to face 

technical and design challenges that will require significant time, money, 

and effort to resolve irrespective of the decision to defer lunar 

requirements. While deferring the lunar requirement is likely to relieve 

pressure on Orion’s mass margins allowing increased flexibility to deal 

with some Orion-specific technical challenges, the lunar requirement has 

little bearing on many of the Ares I technical challenges discussed above. 

Furthermore, it is unclear how deferring the lunar requirement will affect 

the technical challenges faced in the development of the Orion launch 

abort system and in dealing with vibroacoustics. 

NASA’s human spaceflight program is at a crossroads. Efforts to establish 

a sound business case for Constellation’s Ares I and Orion projects are 

complicated by (1) an aggressive schedule, (2) significant technical and 

design challenges, (3) funding issues and cost increases, and (4) an 

evolving acquisition strategy that continues to change Orion project 

requirements. Human spaceflight development programs are complex and 

difficult by nature and NASA’s previous attempts to build new 

transportation systems have failed in part because they were focused on 

advancing technologies and designs without resources—primarily time 

and money—to adequately support those efforts. While the current 

program, Constellation, was originally structured to rely on heritage 

systems and thus avoid problems seen in previous programs, the failure to 

establish a sound business case has placed the program in a poor risk 

posture to proceed into implementation as planned in 2010. In the past, 

NASA has recognized these shortfalls and has delayed design reviews for 

both the Ares I and Orion vehicles in an effort to gain the knowledge 

needed for a sound business case. NASA’s current approach, however, is 

based on changing requirements to increase confidence in meeting the 

schedule. Nevertheless, the need to establish a sound business case, 

wherein resources match requirements and a knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy drives development efforts, is paramount to any successful 

Conclusion 

Page 18 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

program outcome. Until the Constellation program has a sound business 

case in hand, it remains doubtful that NASA will be able to reliably 

estimate cost and schedule to complete the program. 

Meanwhile, the new Administration is conducting an independent review 

of NASA’s human spaceflight activities, with the potential for 

recommendations of broad changes to the agency’s approach toward 

future efforts. While the fact that the review is taking place does not 

guarantee wholesale changes to the current approach, it does implicitly 

recognize the challenges facing the Constellation program. We believe this 

review is appropriate as it presents an opportunity to reassess both 

requirements and resources for Constellation as well as alternative ways 

for meeting requirements. 

Regardless of NASA’s final plans for moving forward, the agency faces 

daunting challenges developing human rated spacecraft for use after the 

Space Shuttle is retired, and it is important that the agency lay out an 

acquisition strategy grounded in knowledge-based principles that is 

executable with acceptable levels of risk within the program’s available 

budget. As NASA addresses the findings and recommendations of the 

Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, we recommend 

that the new NASA Administrator direct the Constellation program, or its 

successor, to develop a sound business case—supported by firm 

requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic cost 

estimate, and sufficient funding and time—before proceeding into 

implementation, and, if necessary, delay the preliminary design review 

until a sound business case demonstrating the program’s readiness to 

move forward into implementation is in hand. 

In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. II), NASA 

concurred with our recommendation. NASA acknowledged that, while 

substantial work has been completed, the Constellation program faces 

knowledge gaps concerning requirements, technologies, funding, 

schedule, and other resources. NASA stated that it is working to close 

these gaps before committing to significant, long-term investments in the 

Constellation program. NASA stated that the Constellation program 

manager is required to demonstrate at the preliminary design review that 

the program and its projects meet all system requirements with acceptable 

risk and within cost and schedule constraints, and that the program has 

established a sound business case for proceeding into the implementation 

phase. At this point, the NASA Agency Program Management Council will 

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 19 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
 

review the Constellation program and determine the program’s readiness 

to proceed into the implementation phase and begin detailed design. 

Separately, NASA provided technical comments, which have been 

addressed in the report, as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier, we 

will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date. At that 

time, we will send copies to NASA’s Administrator and interested 

congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or at ChaplainC@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made 

key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

ain 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Cristina T. Chapl

Page 20 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess NASA’s progress toward establishing a sound business case for 

the Ares I and Orion projects and identify key technical challenges NASA 

faces in developing the Ares I Crew Launch and the Orion Crew 

Exploration Vehicles, we obtained and analyzed Constellation plans and 

schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data 

relative to the standards in our knowledge-based acquisition practices 

including program and project plans, contracts, schedules, risk 

assessments, funding profile, budget documentation, earned value reports, 

and the results of NASA’s assessments of the program. We interviewed and 

received briefings from officials associated with the Constellation program 

office, including Exploration Systems Mission Directorate officials at 

NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Orion project and Constellation 

program officials at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas; and, 

Ares I and J-2X officials at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, 

Alabama, regarding the program and projects’ risk areas and test strategy, 

technical challenges, the status of requirements, acquisition strategy and 

the status of awarded contracts. 

We also conducted interviews and received briefings from NASA 

contractors on heritage hardware and design changes, and top risks and 

testing strategy, for the J-2X engine, Ares I First Stage, Ares I Upper Stage, 

Launch Abort System, and Orion vehicle. We analyzed risk documented 

through the Constellation program’s Integrated Risk Management 

Application and followed up with project officials for clarification and 

updates to these risks. We also attended the Constellation Program’s 

Quarterly Risk Review at the Johnson Space Center. 

In addition, we interviewed Constellation program officials from Johnson 

Space Center about program risks, requirements, and the impact of budget 

reductions. We also spoke with NASA headquarters officials from the 

Exploration Systems Mission Directorate’s Resources Management Office 

in Washington, D.C., to gain insight into the program’s top risks and the 

basis for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010 budget requests as well 

as the funding strategy employed by the Constellation program. 

Furthermore, we reviewed NASA’s program and project management 

directives and systems engineering directives. Our review and analysis of 

these documents focused on requirements and goals set for spaceflight 

systems. We compared examples of the centers’ implementation of the 

directives and specific criteria included in these directives with our best 

practices work on system acquisition. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2008 through 

August 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

Page 21 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 22 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
Appendix II: Comments from the National Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 23 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program 
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 24 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 25 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contacts and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 26 GAO-09-844 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Cristina Chaplain (202)512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov GAO Contacts 

In addition to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant Director; 

Jessica M. Berkholtz; Greg Campbell; Jennifer K. Echard; Nathaniel J. 

Taylor; John S. Warren Jr.; and Alyssa Weir made key contributions to this 

report. 

Acknowledgments 

 NASA's Constellation Program 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. GAO-09-306SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2009. 

NASA: Agency Faces Challenges Defining Scope and Costs of Space 

Shuttle Transition and Retirement. GAO-08-1096. Washington, D.C.: 

September 30, 2008. 

NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure 

Progress. GAO-08-186T. Washington, D.C.: April 3, 2008. 

NASA: Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment 

Decisions for Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps. 

GAO-08-51. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007. 

NASA: Issues Surrounding the Transition from the Space Shuttle to the 

Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems. GAO-07-595T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007. 

NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space Exploration 

Program Requires More Knowledge. GAO-06-817R. Washington, D.C.: July 

17, 2006. 

NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could 

Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes. GAO-06-218. 

Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2005. 

Defense Space Activities: Continuation of Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle Program’s Progress to Date Subject to Some Uncertainty. 

GAO-04-778R. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004. 

Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve Weapon 

Acquisition. GAO-04-386SP. Washington, D.C.: January 2004. 

(120795) Page 27 GAO-09-844 NASA's Constellation Program
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