Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Harris, 2015 IL App (1st) 132162

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

AARON HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Third Division

Docket No. 1-13-2162

Filed June 17, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CR-3946; the 

Hon. Evelyn B. Clay, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Michael Gentithes, all of 

State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and 

Aaron R. Bond, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the 

People.

Panel JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Lavin and Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Aaron Harris was convicted of possession of cannabis and 

sentenced to 24 months of probation. On appeal, Harris argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his pretrial motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an 

anticipatory search warrant. Specifically, Harris contends that the police improperly executed 

the search by arresting him before he opened a package containing narcotics that had been 

fitted by law enforcement with an electronic monitoring and breakaway filament device. 

Additionally, Harris claims that the State did not prove his knowing possession beyond a 

reasonable doubt and that the trial court improperly assessed fees with respect to credits 

accrued during incarceration. Finding that the trial court improperly denied the motion to 

quash defendant’s arrest and suppress evidence, we reverse.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On February 21, 2011, Harris was charged with possession of between 500 and 2,000 

grams of cannabis and possession with intent to deliver the same after an arrest based on an 

anticipatory search warrant. Prior to trial, Harris filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress 

evidence, alleging that the execution of the anticipatory search warrant was not supported by 

probable cause because the warrant’s triggering event–the opening of the package–had not 

occurred. 

¶ 4 The parties proceeded directly to legal argument in support of their written memoranda 

without calling any witnesses or introducing any evidence. The undisputed facts of Harris’s 

arrest are as follows. 

¶ 5 On February 21, 2011, law enforcement officers working on the Chicago police 

department’s narcotics section package interdiction team intercepted a FedEx package that had 

been shipped priority overnight from California and required no signature upon receipt. The 

package was addressed to “S. Harris, 6629 North Kolmar, Lincolnwood, Illinois.” Harris’s 

grandmother owned this single-family home, but she had lived in a nursing home for several 

years. After a canine’s behavior indicated the presence of narcotics in the package, officers 

obtained a search warrant to open the package. The four heat-sealed plastic bundles inside the 

package tested positive for cannabis. At 1 p.m., the officers obtained an anticipatory search 

warrant to search: 

“S. Harris or anyone taking possession of the Fed Ex Priority Overnight Parcel *** 

and to enter and search 6629 North Kolmar Ave *** or any premises or vehicle that the 

Fed Ex Parcel *** is brought into once the parcel has been delivered by law 

enforcement personnel and seize Cannabis, proof of residency, *** and any other 

evidence which have been used in the commission of or which constitutes evidence of 

the Possession of Cannabis.”

¶ 6 The complaint for the anticipatory search warrant stated that “this search warrant will only 

be executed if the above described Fed Ex parcel *** is accepted into a location or vehicle” 

(emphasis added). The complaint explained that based on the officer’s experience with 

hundreds of package interdiction search warrants, the parcel would likely move to another 

location or be received by a person other than the person to whom it was addressed. 
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¶ 7 At the same time they obtained the anticipatory search warrant, the officers obtained an 

order to install an electronic monitoring and breakaway filament device in the package. The 

device sends an electronic signal when the package is standing still, moving, or opened. The 

order approving the warrant stated that the petition and attached affidavit explained facts 

sufficient to show probable cause that placement and monitoring of this device “will produce 

evidence of a crime and assist in the identification of a perpetrator and possible 

co-conspirators.” The face of the search warrant did not mention the order or installation of the 

device. 

¶ 8 After obtaining the warrant, the officers repackaged the box and made a controlled delivery 

at approximately 2:10 p.m. the same day. Officer Sterling Terry, working in an undercover 

capacity as a FedEx employee, brought the package to the front door of the residence, rang the 

doorbell, and left the package on the front porch while other officers maintained surveillance 

of the location. 

¶ 9 Less than an hour later, Harris pulled into the driveway of the residence, exited the vehicle 

while it was running, picked up the package, and immediately returned to his vehicle. He 

placed the package in the rear passenger seat of his otherwise empty vehicle. The officers did 

not monitor or receive a signal from the breakaway filament that the package had been opened 

or that it was moving. 

¶ 10 By radio communications, the officers then decided to execute the warrant. Two officers 

approached the vehicle, arrested Harris, and retrieved the package. After he was given 

Miranda warnings, Harris said he understood them and made statements to the officers 

regarding his knowledge of the contents of the package and its place of origin. The officers 

made no recording or memoranda of these statements, and the officers did not include the 

statements in their police report. The police report recited that Harris was “arrested after he 

took into his possession a Fed Ex parcel that he knew contained cannabis and placed it into his 

vehicle and attempted to drive away” (emphasis added).

¶ 11 In support of his motion to suppress, Harris argued that the officers who arrested and 

searched him did not have probable cause to do so prior to the anticipatory warrant’s triggering 

event. Specifically, Harris maintained that the warrant’s triggering event, in light of the 

installation of the electronic monitoring and breakaway filament, was the opening of the 

package. Harris contended that because he did not open the package, the evidence, statements, 

and witnesses obtained as a result of the premature execution of the warrant should be 

suppressed. 

¶ 12 According to the State, the anticipatory search warrant’s triggering condition was the 

delivery of the package to the listed address. Further, the State contended that the warrant 

merely required acceptance and that this condition was satisfied when Harris retrieved the 

package, placed it in his vehicle, and put his vehicle in reverse. Additionally, the State argued 

that even if the search was not lawful pursuant to the warrant, the good-faith exception applied, 

precluding the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the search. 

¶ 13 The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court agreed that the search warrant 

expressly authorized a search once the package had been accepted into a location or vehicle. 

The court found that the warrant’s requirements were met because the officers observed the 

delivery of the package at the address set forth in the warrant and because the order for the 

electronic monitoring device was a separate addendum to the warrant. The trial court also 

found that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Harris satisfied the warrant’s triggering 
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condition when he picked up the package from the single-family home and brought it into his 

vehicle “as if in the manner [of] expecting the delivery.”

¶ 14 Harris also filed a pretrial motion to suppress his statements to police, alleging that he 

requested the assistance of an attorney before making inculpatory statements to the police 

regarding the package. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied this motion as well, 

a ruling Harris does not challenge on appeal. 

¶ 15 The matter proceeded to a jury trial. During trial, the witnesses, including Harris, testified 

consistently with the stipulated facts above. The following additional evidence was presented. 

¶ 16 Officer Terry testified that a field test of the intercepted package indicated that it contained 

approximately 1,350.5 grams of cannabis with a street value of approximately $16 per gram. 

Officer Terry observed Officer Jeffrey Show draft the anticipatory warrant, which was a type 

he had used in past investigations. Officer Terry and his partners placed the monitoring device 

within the package because “it alerts us to when the box is sitting still, or when it’s moving, or 

when it’s opened.” Each of the six officers on the team then took a role for making a 

“controlled delivery” of the package. The officers had no prior information suggesting that 

Harris unlawfully possessed drugs or engaged in drug-related activities. 

¶ 17 Officer Nick Lymperis, one of the six officers surveying the scene, observed a man, later 

identified as Harris, exit his vehicle after pulling into the driveway. Officer Lymperis did not 

observe Harris examine the package itself, knock on the door, or look around the house before 

bringing the package back to his running vehicle. The distance between Harris’s vehicle and 

house was about 20 feet, and Harris held the package for about 30 seconds. After Harris put his 

vehicle in reverse, the officers decided by radio communications to converge almost 

immediately by pulling their vehicles into the driveway. The filament device never indicated 

that the package had been opened. The officers decided to arrest Harris because they did not 

want to get into a car chase in an unfamiliar area around school dismissal time. No evidence 

was presented as to the proximity of any schools to the site of the arrest. 

¶ 18 After police blocked Harris from exiting the driveway, Officer Lymperis walked up to the 

driver’s side of the vehicle and announced his office. He handcuffed Harris, brought Harris 

back to his vehicle, and gave him Miranda warnings. According to Officer Lymperis, Harris 

stated he understood his Miranda rights and then “freely” told him about the package, stating 

that “he had a friend in California who agreed to help him financially and was going to send 

him some cannabis to sell so he can make money” and that “he thought there was three ounces 

of cannabis in the box.” According to Officer Lymperis’s testimony on cross-examination, 

Officer Humpich also heard these statements. Neither Officer Lymperis nor Officer Humpich 

taped, recorded, or wrote out these statements for Harris to sign. 

¶ 19 After the State rested, Harris made a motion for a directed finding of not guilty, arguing 

that the package was not sent to him because it was addressed to “S. Harris.” The trial court 

denied the motion. 

¶ 20 The defense called Dale Harris, Harris’s father, as a witness. Dale is a Chicago police 

officer, and the home at 6629 North Kolmar belongs to Sylvia Harris, Dale’s mother and 

Harris’s grandmother. Dale keeps personal possessions at the home even though no one has 

lived there for a number of years. He stated that many people have access to and keys to the 

home, including his siblings, children, uncles, nieces, nephews, cleaning crews, and realtors. 

He and his children, including Harris, make regular trips past the house, but Harris did not have 

keys to the house. 
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¶ 21 Harris also testified. On February 21, 2011, he drove past 6629 North Kolmar on his usual 

route to the art store from his mother’s house. He noticed the package as he drove by, backed 

up, and then pulled into the driveway. Harris turned his vehicle’s engine off, went to the front 

porch, examined the package’s address, brought it back to his vehicle, and then restarted the 

engine. 

¶ 22 According to Harris, after he put the vehicle in reverse, six to eight cars pulled into the 

driveway behind him. He testified that he was put on the ground with force for about five 

minutes after officers told him to exit the vehicle. Then the officers brought him to the front 

porch, gave him Miranda warnings, and asked him about the package and about the police 

identification on his vehicle. He was next brought into Officer Lymperis’ vehicle, read his 

Miranda rights again, and questioned again. At that point, Harris said he told Officer Lymperis 

that he wanted to speak with his lawyer. 

¶ 23 Harris denied making any statements concerning the package, its contents, or its sender. He 

stated that he knew his aunt received packages at the home but that he was not expecting 

delivery of the package. Harris testified that the officers later brought him to a room at the 

Homan and Filmore organized crime division facility and handcuffed him for four to five 

hours, during which time no one questioned him. 

¶ 24 The jury found Harris guilty of possession of cannabis but not guilty of possession of 

cannabis with intent to deliver. Harris then filed a motion for a new trial, based in part on the 

trial court’s denial of the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court denied 

the motion and sentenced Harris to two years of probation. Harris timely appealed. 

¶ 25 ANALYSIS 

¶ 26 On appeal, Harris raises three issues: (i) his arrest should have been quashed and the 

evidenced obtained suppressed because it was premised upon police officers’ premature 

execution of an anticipatory warrant, (ii) his knowledge of the contents of the package was not 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and (iii) the trial court improperly assessed fees accrued 

during his incarceration. Because the first issue is dispositive, we address only that issue and 

find that the trial court erred in denying Harris’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.

¶ 27 Both parties agree that because the issue presented on appeal concerns the legal conclusion 

of whether suppression was warranted, the standard of review is de novo. People v. 

Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542 (2006); People v. Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999). 

Although a court’s ruling on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence generally is 

subject to reversal only if the ruling is manifestly erroneous, where the trial court has applied 

the law to uncontroverted facts, the case presents a question of law that is reviewed under a 

de novo standard. People v. Carrera, 321 Ill. App. 3d 582, 588-89 (2001). 

¶ 28 The fourth amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” 

U.S. Const., amend. IV. The Illinois Constitution similarly protects against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. A valid search warrant must state with 

particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. United States v. 

Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006); see also 725 ILCS 5/108-7 (West 2012) (requiring the place or 

person to be searched and the items to be seized to be “particularly described in the warrant”).
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¶ 29 As relevant to this case, an anticipatory search warrant is a warrant based upon an affidavit 

showing probable cause that at a future time certain evidence of a crime will be located with an 

identified person or in a specific place. People v. Bui, 381 Ill. App. 3d 397, 406 (2008); 

Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d at 549; 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c) (5th ed. 2012). 

The execution of an anticipatory search warrant is usually subject to a condition precedent 

other than the mere passage of time, known as a “triggering condition.” Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 

94. “The requirement that certain events must take place before the execution of an 

anticipatory search warrant assures that a search will take place only when justified by 

probable cause.” (Emphasis in original.) Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d at 554; see also People v. 

Galdine, 212 Ill. App. 3d 472, 481-82 (1991) (judge must ensure that anticipatory warrant will 

not be executed prematurely by making its execution contingent on occurrence of specific 

events or passage of specific period of time). A warrant’s triggering condition need not be 

reflected on the face of the warrant and may be included in supporting affidavits attached 

thereto. Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 96-97; accord United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 395 (6th 

Cir. 2002). However, anticipatory warrants should be narrowly drawn to “avoid premature 

execution as a result of manipulation or misunderstanding by the police.” United States v. 

Brack, 188 F.3d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1999). The purpose of defining a triggering event in an 

anticipatory warrant is to ensure that officers serve an “almost ministerial” role in deciding 

when to execute the warrant. United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1993); see 

also People v. Curry, 100 Ill. App. 3d 405, 410 (1981) (“the person to be searched must be 

described with sufficient particularity to avoid leaving the executing officer with any doubt or 

discretion”).

¶ 30 In this case, both Harris and the State agree that the search warrant’s triggering event 

required the package to be “accepted” in order for probable cause to exist. The parties’ dispute 

centers on whether the electronic monitoring and opening filament device must have been used 

to establish that the triggering event occurred. 

¶ 31 Under the circumstances here, we find that the officers were required to use the electronic 

monitoring device to identify the anticipatory warrant’s triggering event for two reasons. First, 

the device provides the necessary objective evidence to particularly identify the person or 

property to be searched, as general warrants are constitutionally prohibited. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 

at 96; Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d at 554. Additionally, the objective evidence from the device limits 

the exercise of law enforcement’s unfettered discretion to determine whether the warrant’s 

triggering event has actually occurred. See People v. Urbina, 393 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1079 

(2009) (the executing officers searched a residence not listed on the search warrant, and the 

warrant failed to describe with sufficient particularity the premises to be searched). Because, as 

we discuss in more detail below, the officers executed the warrant prior to the triggering event, 

their conduct was not authorized by the warrant and Harris’s motion to quash his arrest and 

suppress evidence should have been granted. 

¶ 32 Our decision is informed by our previous analysis in People v. Bui, 381 Ill. App. 3d 397 

(2008). In Bui, law enforcement intercepted a package containing narcotics that was addressed 

to the defendant at a nail salon. Id. at 402. Prior to seeking the warrant, officers determined the 

sender’s name and return address on the package were fictitious. Id. The officers obtained 

permission to place an electronic monitoring and filament device in the package, as well as an 

anticipatory search warrant allowing them to search “ ‘Duoc Bui or anyone taking control of 

the [package],’ ” the nail salon, “ ‘and/or any other location that the parcel is accepted into.’ ” 
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Id. at 401. During their controlled delivery of the package, the officers watched as a nail salon 

employee signed for and placed the package under a counter. Id. at 402. Nearly four hours 

later, the defendant arrived at the nail salon, picked up the package and drove away. Id. The 

officers followed the defendant as he took the package with him into a new vehicle and then 

into a private residence. Id. Shortly thereafter, the electronic monitoring and filament device 

alerted the officers that the package had been opened, and the officers executed the warrant. Id. 

at 403. They entered the home, arrested the defendant, and discovered additional narcotics in 

the defendant’s bedroom where he had opened the package. Id. 

¶ 33 Seeking to suppress the evidence recovered in the search, the defendant argued that the 

warrant authorized a search once the package was received and that the officers exceeded the 

scope of the warrant when they searched the defendant’s bedroom at a different location hours 

after the nail salon employee accepted delivery of the package. Id. at 405-06. The State argued 

that the officers properly executed the search warrant at the defendant’s home. Id. at 409. 

Apropos of its position here, the State contended in Bui that if the package was not opened, the 

warrant did not authorize a search of any location and, in particular, that the warrant did not 

authorize police to search the nail salon and the unsuspecting receptionist who accepted 

delivery of the package. 

¶ 34 In finding that the warrant was validly executed, this court reasoned that the defendant’s 

interpretation of “accept” as used in the application for the warrant was “overly technical” and 

not consistent with the purpose of the warrant when considered in the context of the facts and 

circumstances of the case. Id. This court ruled that “accept” meant “to receive and open the 

package” because the package was addressed to a public place and because the officers 

installed the electronic monitoring device in the package precisely for the purpose of 

identifying the person who opened it. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 409-10. Therefore, the court 

held that the search was properly executed at a location other than where the package was 

delivered and upon the defendant’s opening of the package as indicated by the device. Id. at 

410. 

¶ 35 Harris argues that the officers prematurely executed the search warrant when they arrested 

him before he opened the package, as indicated by the electronic monitoring and opening 

filament device. Contrary to the position it took in Bui, the State contends here that the “overly 

technical” definition of “accept” rejected in Bui authorized the officers to execute the warrant 

when any individual brought the unopened package into a building or vehicle. The State 

further argues that “accept” includes the “intent to retain” the package and that Harris 

manifested an intent to retain the package by placing it in the backseat of his car. 

¶ 36 We reject the State’s broad interpretation of “accept” as it would cast a wide net over the 

categories of people and locations subject to search and vest equally broad discretion in the 

officers to determine when the required triggering event had occurred. If we view the 

anticipatory search warrant in this case independent of the information provided by the device, 

as the State urges us to do, we would find the required particularity lacking as the warrant fails 

to specify in any meaningful way the person or location to be searched. For example, under the 

State’s expansive definition of “accept” urged here, the officers could have arrested and 

searched (i) a next-door neighbor who, seeing the package on the front steps of the unoccupied 

home, brought it inside her home to later give to a family member, (ii) the opportunistic thief 

who, observing an unattended package on the steps, decided to make off with it with the 

obvious “intent to retain” it, or (iii) a realtor who, upon arriving with a prospective buyer, 
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brought the package inside the home for safekeeping. In other words, the State’s position is 

that the officers had broad discretion to arrest and search any number of people who might 

come into contact with the package without opening it, a result at odds with the “almost 

ministerial” role officers are intended to play in the execution of an anticipatory warrant. 

Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. As the foregoing hypotheticals illustrate, this interpretation of 

“accept” deprives the warrant of the particularity required to uphold its validity. See People v. 

Reed, 202 Ill. App. 3d 760, 763 (1990) (search warrant that mentioned only one specific name 

and then encompassed all “ ‘other persons present in a public bar’ ” held defectively 

open-ended and unconstitutional). 

¶ 37 Here Harris was in no different position than the receptionist in Bui. The package was not 

addressed to him and nothing in his conduct in putting the unopened package in the backseat of 

his car indicated that he was aware of its contents. Police further had no information about 

Harris and, in particular, no evidence of his involvement in using or selling drugs. Unlike Bui, 

the record here does not disclose that police had investigated the return name and address on 

the package to determine if they were fictitious. Thus, the only conduct on Harris’s part 

reflected in the record–picking up the package and putting it in his car–was insufficient, under 

the definition of “accept” adopted in Bui, to satisfy the warrant’s triggering event. And because 

the triggering event had not occurred, the officers lacked probable cause in executing the 

anticipatory search warrant and the evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed. See 

People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414, 448 (1994). 

¶ 38 If the existence of probable cause rested solely on the fact that some unidentified person 

retrieved the package, there would have been no reason to request the order permitting 

installation of the device. See People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 219 (2006) (noting that 

warrants and their supporting documents are not to be read in a hyper-technical manner but, 

rather, in a commonsense fashion); see also Bui, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 410 (stating that use of the 

device demonstrates that “acceptance” meant to receive and open the package because “[w]ere 

this not the case, we fail to see why police would seek to place a monitoring device inside the 

package”). The electronic monitoring device order, signed at the same time as the search 

warrant, clearly stated that “placement and monitoring of the [device] *** will produce 

evidence of a crime and assist in the investigation.” The officers’ failure to use the device for 

this purpose was contrary to the justification for the warrant. 

¶ 39 We do not hold that under any and all circumstances the opening of a package equipped 

with an electronic monitoring device must occur before an anticipatory warrant can be 

executed. Each case must be decided on its own facts. But where, as here, the package moved 

for only a few seconds, the device was not monitored at all or used to track the movement or 

opening of the package, and the officers had no prior information connecting Harris to the 

package or its contents, the officers acted on insufficient objective evidence of the warrant’s 

triggering event and prematurely executed the search without probable cause. See Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232-33, 238 (1983) (holding that a probable cause determination is a 

“practical, common-sense decision” that should be based on a “totality-of-the-circumstances 

analysis” within the “particular factual contexts”).

¶ 40 The State argues that even if we find that the warrant contemplated that the package would 

be opened prior to its execution, we should nevertheless find that the officers acted reasonably 

in executing the warrant. The State invokes the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
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and contends that the premature execution of the warrant here does not mandate suppression of 

the evidence recovered as a result. We disagree. 

¶ 41 Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search must be excluded under the “fruit of the 

poisonous tree” doctrine. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 448. But the good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule applies when law enforcement officers rely on a reasonable belief that the 

search is authorized under the warrant. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 

(1984); Bui, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 416-17. The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 

codifies this exception: 

“If a defendant seeks to suppress evidence because of the conduct of a peace officer in 

obtaining the evidence, the State may urge that the peace officer’s conduct was taken in 

a reasonable and objective good faith belief that the conduct was proper and that the 

evidence discovered should not be suppressed if otherwise admissible. The court shall 

not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding if the 

court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer who acted in good 

faith.” 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(1) (West 2010). 

¶ 42 “Good faith” is defined to encompass circumstances where a peace officer obtains 

evidence “pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained from a neutral and detached judge, 

which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-deliberate errors in preparation and 

contains no material misrepresentation by any agent of the State, and the officer reasonably 

believed the warrant to be valid.” 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(2) (West 2010). The good-faith 

exception does not apply to a search warrant that is so facially overbroad that police officers 

could not reasonably believe it was valid. Reed, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 764 (citing United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). 

¶ 43 Here, the officers could not reasonably have believed they had authority to arrest Harris 

pursuant to the anticipatory warrant because they (i) personally participated in preparing the 

application for the warrant, including its representation that installation of the electronic 

monitoring and breakaway filament devices would likely “produce evidence of a crime,” (ii) 

knew that the device had produced no information that the package had been opened, and (iii) 

possessed no prior knowledge connecting Harris to the package or its contents. The officers 

were aware of the ambiguity reflected on the face of the warrant, which broadly authorized the 

search of “S. Harris or anyone taking possession of” the package, when viewed independently 

of the complaint for the warrant and the order authorizing installation of the electronic device. 

See Urbina, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1079 (the good-faith exception did not apply because officers 

knew of ambiguity in the warrant before its execution); see also Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 

455, 463 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Where a warrant is open to more than one interpretation, the warrant 

is ambiguous and invalid on its face and, therefore, cannot be legally executed by a person who 

knows the warrant to be ambiguous.”). Further, at the time the warrant was issued, Bui had 

been the law in Illinois for several years. Thus, without any further information, officers could 

not have reasonably believed that the warrant authorized a search of anyone who picked up the 

package without opening it and the good-faith exception does not apply. 

¶ 44 Having determined that the warrant was executed without probable cause and the evidence 

obtained as a result should have been suppressed, we next turn to the appropriate remedy. 

Harris requests outright reversal because the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction 

or, alternatively, remand for a new trial with directions that the suppressed evidence not be 
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admitted on retrial. Harris discusses no authority supporting either remedy. The State does not 

take a position on this issue. 

¶ 45 The prospect of retrial raises double jeopardy concerns and requires us to assess the 

sufficiency of the evidence against Harris. People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 367 (2008). 

Although the double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial to allow the State another opportunity to 

supply evidence it failed to present in the first trial, “[i]t does not *** preclude retrial where a 

conviction has been set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to the conviction.” 

Id. (citing People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173-74 (1990) (defendant cannot be retried once a 

court has determined that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction)). As 

our supreme court observed in People v. Olivera: 

“[R]etrial is permitted even though evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict once 

erroneously admitted evidence has been discounted, and for the purposes of double 

jeopardy all evidence submitted at the original trial may be considered when 

determining the sufficiency of the evidence.” People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 

(1995) (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 (1988)). 

¶ 46 In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence here, we must determine whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 

2d 274, 278 (2004); People v. Butler, 304 Ill. App. 3d 750, 755 (1999). Although Harris’s 

statements must be suppressed in any retrial, they were sufficient, together with the other 

evidence adduced at trial, to sustain his conviction for possession of cannabis. 

¶ 47 There are several appellate cases adopting the position that if the State cannot prevail on 

retrial without the suppressed evidence, the appropriate remedy is outright reversal. See 

People v. Trisby, 2013 IL App (1st) 112552, ¶ 19 (State could not prevail on retrial without 

drugs recovered from defendant’s pocket in warrantless search unsupported by probable 

cause); People v. Leigh, 341 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497 (2003) (defendant’s conviction for 

possession of a firearm by a felon reversed without remand where State could not prevail 

without the suppressed firearm); People v. Elliot, 314 Ill. App. 3d 187, 193 (2000) (reversing 

the defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance after finding that drugs 

seized from the defendant should have been suppressed and that the State could not prevail on 

remand without this evidence). But in these cases it was evidence of the crime itself that was 

suppressed. Thus, it was appropriate to reverse outright because without evidence of the 

commission of a crime, the prosecution could not proceed. People v. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, 

¶ 17 (in criminal proceedings, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime 

was committed, the corpus delicti, and the identity of the person who committed the crime). 

¶ 48 Here, in contrast, the State obtained a warrant to open the package addressed to “S. Harris” 

prior to its delivery and determined that it contained cannabis and, therefore, the State can 

establish the corpus delicti without Harris’s suppressed statements. This evidence is 

admissible in any retrial as is evidence that Harris drove by his grandmother’s house shortly 

after the package was delivered and retrieved the package and placed it–unopened–in the 

backseat of his car. While the sustainability of a conviction based on this evidence alone is 

questionable (see People v. Hodogbey, 306 Ill. App. 3d 555 (1999) (State failed to prove 

knowing possession of a controlled substance where defendant was arrested after placing on a 

table the unopened package addressed to him and delivered to his home)), double jeopardy 
- 11 - 

does not preclude retrial and so we remand for that purpose. 

¶ 49 CONCLUSION 

¶ 50 The trial court erred in failing to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence obtained in the 

search. Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, we reverse and remand 

for a new trial. 

¶ 51 Reversed and remanded.