Opinion filed June 30, 2016

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

Nos. 11-15-00047-CR & 11-15-00048-CR

__________

JACOB NICHOLAS HUDSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 238th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. CR32487 & CR42956

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Jacob Nicholas Hudson pleaded guilty to two counts of the second-degree 

felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011). The trial court deferred the adjudication of his guilt 

on both offenses and placed him on community supervision for eight years for each 

 

1Cause No. 11-15-00047-CR.
2

offense. Later, Appellant pleaded guilty to another offense, a third-degree felony of 

injury to a child.2 See id. § 22.04(a)(3), (f) (West Supp. 2015). The trial court

deferred the adjudication of his guilt for the injury-to-a-child offense and placed him

on community supervision for five years. The trial court also extended Appellant’s

community supervision by two years on the aggravated assault offenses.

Eventually, the State moved to revoke Appellant’s community supervision in 

each case. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s community 

supervision in each case and adjudicated him guilty of all three offenses. The trial 

court assessed punishment at confinement for eight years for each aggravated assault 

offense and at confinement for five years for the offense of injury to a child. The 

trial court then sentenced Appellant accordingly. In two separate appeals, Appellant 

contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the hearing on the 

State’s motions to revoke Appellant’s community supervision and to adjudicate his 

guilt. We affirm.

I. Evidence at Hearing

In the State’s motions to revoke Appellant’s community supervision and to 

adjudicate his guilt, it alleged that Appellant had engaged in “injurious or vicious 

habits,” namely the use of amphetamine and methamphetamine. The State, in its 

motion in Cause No. 11-15-00048-CR, also asserted that Appellant had violated his

community supervision when he failed to report to his community supervision 

officer on eight separate occasions.

At the hearing, Appellant entered a plea of “true” to the allegations that he 

had failed to report to his community supervision officer, but he pleaded “not true” 

to the allegations regarding his use of amphetamine and methamphetamine. The 

 

2Cause No. 11-15-00048-CR.
3

State introduced a voluntary admission form signed by Appellant in which he 

“voluntarily admit[ted] that [he] used and consumed [amphetamine and 

methamphetamine] in violation of the terms and conditions of [his] community 

supervision.” Appellant admitted that he signed the admission form, but he claimed 

that he only did so because he had prescriptions from his dietician and dentist, 

respectively, for phentermine (a form of speed) and opiates, both of which he had 

consumed. Appellant never produced the prescriptions; he claimed that he had given 

them to a private investigator, but that person never testified at the hearing.

The trial court found all the allegations to be “true” and adjudicated Appellant 

guilty of both counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and of the offense 

of injury to a child. Appellant filed a motion for new trial in each case. In each of 

the motions, Appellant alleged that he was entitled to a new trial because of “[n]ewly

discovered evidence” and because the verdict was “not supported by the law of [sic]

evidence.” His motions for new trial were deemed denied by operation of law.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is well 

established. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Under that 

standard, we look to see whether trial counsel’s conduct “so undermined the proper 

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 

produced a just result.” Id.; accord Davis v. State, 278 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2009). The Strickland test has two prongs: (1) a performance standard and 

(2) a prejudice standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

For the performance standard, the complainant must show that trial counsel’s 

performance was deficient. Id. Put another way, the complainant must show that 

trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. 

at 688. For the prejudice standard, the complainant must show that there is a 
4

reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed but for trial counsel’s 

errors. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Reasonable probability is defined as a “probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A failure to make a 

showing under either prong of the Strickland test defeats a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

III. Discussion and Analysis

On appeal, Appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because trial counsel failed to introduce his drug prescriptions for 

phentermine and opiates into evidence and because his trial counsel failed to object 

to the community supervision officer’s testimony about Appellant’s drug test results.

As we explain below, we disagree with both of his contentions because Appellant 

admitted that he used amphetamine and methamphetamine, illegal drugs for which 

Appellant did not claim to have a prescription.

A. Record Must Demonstrate Alleged Deficient Performance

There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct fell within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Walker v. 

State, 406 S.W.3d 590, 594 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, pet. ref’d). To overcome 

this presumption, an allegation of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in 

the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged 

ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In 

most cases, a silent record that provides no explanation for counsel’s actions will not 

overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. Id. at 813–14. Appellant 

must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

might be considered sound trial strategy. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 
5

(Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Hayden v. State, 155 S.W.3d 640, 648 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2005, pet. ref’d). 

Generally, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to show that trial

counsel’s representation was so lacking as to overcome the presumption of 

reasonable conduct. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We 

do not inquire into trial strategy unless no plausible basis exists for trial counsel’s 

actions. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).

If trial counsel has not had an opportunity to explain the challenged actions, then we 

will not conclude that those actions constituted deficient performance unless they 

were so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in them. See

Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Rylander v. State,

101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

B. Appellant Has Failed to Establish Deficient Performance

Appellant admitted that he failed to report as required by the conditions of his 

community supervision in Cause No. 11-15-00048-CR. A single violation of the 

conditions of community supervision is sufficient cause for revocation. TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, §§ 5(b), 21(b) (West Supp. 2015);see Sanchez v. State,

603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Hart v. State, 264 S.W.3d 

364, 367 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, a plea of true alone 

is sufficient to support a trial court’s determination to revoke community 

supervision. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1979); Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); 

Lockett v. State, No. 11-10-00085-CR, 2012 WL 2989104, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Eastland July 19, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 

Because Appellant pleaded “true” to the allegations of failure to report in Cause 
6

No. 11-15-00048-CR, the trial court had the discretion to revoke his community 

supervision in that cause. 

Additionally, Appellant signed an admission form acknowledging that he had 

used “illegal drugs,” namely amphetamine and methamphetamine, which violated a 

condition of his community supervision. There is no evidence that Appellant’s 

signature on the admission form was involuntary. Appellant’s admissions were 

sufficient for the trial court to revoke his community supervision because “in the 

probation-revocation context, controlled by the lesser, ‘preponderance of the 

evidence’ burden of proof, an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession may be 

sufficient to support revocation.” Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2013); see Keelin v. State, No. 07-13-00420-CR, 2014 WL 3953191, at *2–3 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 13, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). 

Appellant claims that trial counsel should have introduced the prescriptions 

for phentermine and opiates because he signed the admission form because of his 

consumption of those prescriptions. But those were not the drugs that were the basis 

for the revocation. Whether he had a prescription for those drugs was irrelevant

because the purpose of the hearing was to determine whether his community 

supervision would be revoked because of the “illegal use” of amphetamine and 

methamphetamine, not phentermine and opiates.

Appellant contends that “[t]rial counsel obviously saw his own mistakes” and 

filed motions for new trial in which he alleged the existence of “[n]ewly discovered 

evidence.” But no evidence was described in the motions or attached to them, and 

the record does not provide what “[n]ewly discovered evidence” trial counsel sought 

to introduce. Therefore, we cannot hold that trial counsel’s performance was

deficient; the newly discovered evidence may be irrelevant or may not exist.
7

Appellant further argues that “trial counsel failed to object to the probation 

officer’s testimony regarding the drug test results, upon confrontation clause and 

hearsay reasons.” Lindy Perrin Parker, Appellant’s community supervision officer, 

testified that Appellant had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine

and had entered into, and completed, a Treatment Alternative to Incarceration 

Program (TAIP). As we previously noted, Appellant admitted that he used 

amphetamine and methamphetamine “in violation of the terms and conditions of 

[his] community supervision.” After a review of the record, we cannot say that trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient. Therefore, we need not address the prejudice 

prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue in each 

appeal.

IV. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

MIKE WILLSON

JUSTICE

June 30, 2016 

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.