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51–790 PDF 2009

S. Hrg. 111–184 

FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: 

STRENGTHENING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

OF THE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 7, 2009 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN KILVINGTON, Staff Director 

VELVET JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

BRYAN PARKER, Staff Director and General Counsel to the Minority 

DEIRDRE G. ARMSTRONG, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 14 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 16 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 19 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 47 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 50 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009 

Hon. Mark Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado ............................. 4 

Paul W. Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

and Deputy Assisant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Office 

of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 7 

Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 25 

Nicholas Schmidle, Fellow, New America Foundation ......................................... 27 

Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council ...................... 29 

Nathaniel Fick, Chief Executive Officer, Center for a New American Security 32 

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ......................................................................................................................... 34 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Curtis, Lisa: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

Fick, Nathaniel: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75 

Jones, Paul W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51 

Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 78 

Nawaz, Shuja: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 29 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 71 

Schmidle, Nicholas: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66 

Udall, Hon. Mark: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

Questions and Answers for the Record from: 

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 81 

Ms. Curtis ......................................................................................................... 92 

Mr. Schmidle ..................................................................................................... 96 

Page

IV 

Questions and Answers for the Record from—Continued 

Mr. Nawaz ......................................................................................................... 98 

Mr. Fick ............................................................................................................. 102 

Mr. Mowatt-Larssen ......................................................................................... 104 

(1) 

FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: 

STRENGTHENING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 

TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Levin, Akaka, and Burris. 

Also Present: Senator Mark Udall. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. The Subcommittee will come to order. I want to 

welcome a very good friend—Senator Udall from Colorado. Thank 

you very much for joining us. He and I were part of a congressional 

delegation about a month and a half ago that went to Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. We learned a lot and came back with a special interest in the issues we will be discussing today. So I very much want 

to welcome you today. 

I am going to start off with a statement, and we will be joined 

by some others of our colleagues. I would like for Senator Udall to 

stay for as long as his schedule permits, and we welcome him to 

participate with us as we go through statements. 

Before I begin, I really want to give my thanks to the men and 

women serving in the U.S. embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

We certainly want to give our thanks to the men and women serving in uniform, particularly in Afghanistan today. We are grateful 

for the sacrifice both on the civilian side and on the military side 

in that country. 

We were in both countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, back in 

May. I can say with great confidence that our new Ambassador 

there, Karl Eikenberry, and his wife who has joined him there, and 

Ambassador Anne Patterson in Pakistan are very impressive people with a very highly effective staff. We commend them for their 

leadership, and all of our personnel that are serving there capably. 

An Islamic insurgency rages, as we know, in western Pakistan, 

and senior U.S. officials are concerned about the declining security 

situation and new vulnerabilities for Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal, although I must say I am pleased, I think we are encourVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:31 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 051790 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51790.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

aged, by the way the Pakistan military has turned on the Taliban 

with the strong support of all the political parties of any consequence and the strong support of the voters and the electorate 

and the population of Pakistan. 

But the insurgency, particularly in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan, the political instability in that region, the devastating humanitarian crisis as a couple million people in Pakistan have been 

dislocated from their homes, and an intensely anti-American population threaten an already fragile Pakistani Government. These 

factors present unique challenges to the United States and the 

strategy of our President laid out in late March. 

In my view, the Administration has developed a strategy that addresses the region’s concerns while understanding that the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan are indeed linked. This hearing 

will examine implementation of that new strategy. 

When we were leaving, Senator Udall and I were doing a press 

conference with our colleagues, and I was asked by one of the reporters, ‘‘What is the exit strategy for the United States?’’ And I 

said that the exit strategy is our new strategy, the new strategy 

outlined by the President in March. It has military components, 

training components, and civilian components, and we need to do 

all three. 

Our focus today will be on the hardest and most critical problem 

of the region, and that is Pakistan. Most national security experts 

agree that Pakistan is maybe the most dangerous country in the 

world today for one primary reason: Nowhere else in the world is 

there such a lethal combination of Islamic extremism, terrorist 

groups with global reach, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear weapons. 

In late March, President Obama said that Pakistan’s lawless border region has become the most dangerous place in the world for 

Americans. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of our Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, has called the border region between Pakistan and 

Afghanistan ‘‘the site of planning for the next attack’’ on the 

United States. 

General David Petraeus, who oversees the wars in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan, said recently that Pakistan has become the ‘‘nerve 

center’’ of al Qaeda’s global operations, allowing it to reestablish its 

organizational structure, build stronger ties with offshoots in Iraq, 

Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, and in parts of Europe. 

Pakistani officials acknowledge that their country is facing perhaps the greatest threat since its creation in 1947: A growing virulent threat from al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Islamic groups. 

In the months since our delegation was in Pakistan, the Pakistani military, as I mentioned earlier, has launched an offensive in 

the North-West Frontier Province, specifically in the Swat Valley, 

and in South Waziristan, an agency in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA). 

Many experts have been skeptical whether Pakistani officials understand the existential threat to their own country. But as I said 

earlier, an extraordinary thing has happened in the last month and 

a half. For the first time President Zardari, opposition leader 

Sharif, the Pakistani military, and more than 80 percent of Pakistanis view the Taliban and al Qaeda as a critical threat to PakiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:31 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 051790 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51790.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
3 

stan. Those numbers are almost double what they were about a 

year ago. 

I agree with Secretary Napolitano’s recent statement from Pakistan that the Pakistani Government’s crackdown on the Taliban 

has improved U.S. security. The Obama Administration has promised Pakistan $1.5 billion in aid for the next 5 years in humanitarian and economic assistance; and although the Senate unanimously passed the Kerry-Lugar bill that I cosponsored. The bill is 

now stuck in Congress with a list of conditions with which many 

Pakistanis are uncomfortable. This bill is both vital to the U.S. national security and to Pakistan’s 175 million people, and I urge the 

conferees to send the President a bill to sign, and soon. 

Finally, it goes without saying that the safety and security of 

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of utmost importance to all of us. As 

the insurgency spreads in Pakistan, senior American officials are 

increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, including the potential for militants to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel production facilities or to seize 

a weapon in transport. Preventing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and 

technology from falling into the wrong hands should be, must be, 

the top priority for both of our countries. 

These facts lead to a series of urgent questions. Let me mention 

a couple of them. 

One, the Obama Administration has recognized that the United 

States needs a long-term comprehensive plan to address the terrorist threats in Pakistan. How is the implementation of the President’s strategy proceeding? 

Two, there is a complex network of extremist groups operating 

in the lawless regions near the Afghanistan-Pakistan borders, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, and 

other affiliated and sectarian groups. How should policymakers 

prioritize which of these groups to target? Who is reconcilable 

among them? 

Three, since September 11, 2001, the United States has allocated 

billions of dollars to non-military assistance programming in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What should our goal be for distribution 

of the Kerry-Lugar assistance? And what should the delivery mechanisms be? 

Four, what can our government do to address the problems 

caused by anti-American sentiment in Pakistan? Does the current 

humanitarian crisis present the United States with an opportunity 

in this regard? What additional actions might reverse widespread 

distrust of the United States among Pakistanis? 

Five, in the past the Pakistani Government and army have undertaken only sporadic militarized efforts punctuated by lulls when 

truce deals allowed the militants to regroup and grow stronger. 

How should we assess what now appears to be a fairly robust Pakistani effort to combat extremism inside their country? Are current 

military operations a sign of meaningful change in this pattern? 

We sure hope so. 

And, six, some analysts argue that the Pakistani military has 

been slow to reorient itself toward modern counterinsurgency planning. How does this affect U.S. regional interests? Has our military 

4 

assistance to Pakistan sufficiently bolstered that country’s counterterrorism capabilities? 

And, finally, what is the probability of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups acquiring a warhead or enough radioactive material 

to create a dirty bomb? What is the possibility of an insider threat 

at Pakistani nuclear facilities? 

Today, with these questions in mind, I would like for us to try 

to do the following: Assess the status of the implementation of 

President Obama’s new strategy toward Pakistan; examine the 

complex set of threats from western Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan; discuss the most effective short-and long-term policy options 

regarding Pakistan; solicit ideas about how Congress can play a 

more robust role in the path forward, specifically in non-military 

assistance to Pakistan. 

If our national security is linked to the success, the security, and 

the stability of a democratic Pakistan, we have no choice but to engage in a smart, sustained, and long-term partnership. The United 

States needs and is finally on the path to achieving, a Pakistanbased policy as opposed to a leader- or government-based policy. 

Thanks again to our witnesses for taking this opportunity to talk 

with us today about the nature of the challenges before us and how 

best to address them. 

Before I introduce our first witness, I am going to call on my 

friend and colleague from Colorado, Senator Mark Udall. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK UDALL, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Senator Carper, and good afternoon 

to you, Mr. Jones, and to this very interested and interesting audience, Mr. Chairman. I note a lot of young people here interested 

in policymaking, and clearly they are going to shoulder some of the 

challenges in the near and the far term as we work in very difficult 

but important settings to overcome the threat of extremism and violence and chaos. 

I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member McCain for 

inviting me to address the Subcommittee briefly today. I was very 

honored to be a part of Chairman Carper’s congressional delegation 

trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we have memories and experiences that will stay with me forever. 

I did want to share my impressions of the trip with you here 

today and with the broader Congress. As the Chairman mentioned, 

the purpose of our trip was to get an updated view of the U.S. military and civilian operations, particularly focusing on President 

Obama’s new strategy, and we did get an updated view. I came 

away believing we have a window of opportunity to arrest deteriorating security conditions in both countries and to work with the 

civilian governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve 

stability and security in the region, which I really think is our goal. 

Let me further add some specific ideas and impressions. I think 

I will probably, for the most part, echo the Chairman’s comments, 

but perhaps I will also augment some of his insights. 

In Pakistan, our strategic challenge is different than it is in Afghanistan. We cannot allow extremists to destabilize this nuclear 

armed state that has the world’s second largest Muslim population. 

5 

By the estimation of many experts, the possibility that Islamic 

radicals could destabilize and undermine the Pakistani state has 

become, frankly, all too real. But we do not have troops on the 

ground in Pakistan, nor are Americans very popular. Mr. Chairman, a recent poll indicates that the new Administration is no 

more popular than the last, with 90 percent of the Pakistani population agreeing that the United States is trying to weaken the Muslim world. 

One difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan is that our leverage is much less in Pakistan than it is in Afghanistan, and, 

thus, our options are fewer. Yet there are a number of steps we can 

and we should take to improve our relationship with Pakistan, and 

in so doing, enhance our reputation and our influence in this critical part of the world. 

We can demonstrate an interest in a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan, a relationship that goes beyond fighting a common enemy but assisting as well with police reform and training 

and sustainable economic development. There is no better demonstration of this than the recently passed Kerry-Lugar bill, which 

will invest in non-military projects that will directly benefit the 

Pakistani people and help build—and rebuild, frankly—trust and 

cooperation. We heard quite a bit about some of these opportunities 

from the business community and other leaders in Pakistan. 

We can also continue to provide accountable military assistance—underlining ‘‘accountable’’—to ensure that Pakistan’s military and police have the training and the equipment that they 

need. And we should encourage India-Pakistan rapprochement both 

to demonstrate our commitment to the region as well as to help the 

Pakistan people and government focus on the real and imminent 

threats. 

I was, in that regard, really encouraged to hear during our visit 

that the Pakistani people, the government, the business community, and the journalists we met with are very much concerned 

with the growing insurgency on their western border and less concerned than they have been about their eastern border with India. 

There is a much larger recognition that there is an existential 

threat posed by extremism to Pakistan itself, not just to these 

ungoverned areas on the western edges of Pakistan, and a sense 

that the civilian government really has to reassert itself in this 

perilous environment. Pakistan’s recent military actions are an indication of this new commitment. 

Having said that, I still have concerns about the way forward. I 

am concerned that the Pakistani army lacks the will to sustain its 

fight against insurgents within its borders. The army has driven 

the enemy out of Swat, but unless it protects the area, the enemy 

could return for another day. It is not enough to clear; the Pakistani army also needs to hold and build. And I know Senator Carper and I are also very concerned about the 2.5 million Pakistanis 

who have been forced to flee their homes and the areas in which 

they live because of the fighting. 

Islamist groups are infiltrating the refugee camps, but at this 

point, the authorities in Pakistan will not allow American officials 

or planes to deliver aid because of anti-American sentiment and security risks. Pakistani Lieutenant General Ahmad, who heads up 

6 

the Pakistani army’s disaster management group, has said that the 

United States is seen as part of the problem. But if we cannot help 

deliver U.S. aid to the refugees, as we did in the 2005 earthquake 

in Kashmir, this is a tremendous lost opportunity for us. We are 

essentially competing with Islamist groups for the loyalty of these 

people, and we are losing, despite contributing more than any other 

country to the U.N. effort. 

So let me close by saying I believe the President’s combined civilmilitary strategies are our best hope to turn the tide in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we should not overestimate our abilities to 

rebuild broken states and transform entire regions of the world. 

Ensuring our security here at home and serving our interests 

abroad means that we need to be both tough and smart as we engage with our allies and adversaries. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for letting me have a chance 

to share my impressions in this important hearing. I am scheduled 

to preside on the Senate floor in about 15 minutes, but I am going 

to stay and listen to Mr. Jones before I am required to leave. 

One last comment. I see, again, so many young people here who 

obviously are very interested in foreign policy and how to build a 

tough and smart international security policy. I just had a chance 

to reread a book entitled ‘‘Three Cups of Tea,’’ and I would recommend it to all of you here as one of the ways forward. The author Greg Mortensen would be the first to tell you that his programs and his successes in northern Pakistan are not the only 

strategy that we ought to fund and implement. But it is a fascinating account of how to build societies in ways that let those societies then fend for themselves. So I recommend ‘‘Three Cups of 

Tea’’ to everybody here and, of course, to my fellow Senators as one 

of the ways forward. 

Thank you again. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much. Thanks again for being 

here today and for your comments. I think we are going to have 

a partnership on these issues for a long time, and I look forward 

to that. 

Our first witness, panel one in its entirety, Paul Jones. Mr. Jones 

serves as both Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and 

Central Asia at the U.S. Department of State. That is quite a title. 

He is a career member of the State Department’s Senior Foreign 

Service, formerly served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. 

Embassy in Manila, Philippines; as a U.S. Representative to the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Vienna, 

Austria; and as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in 

Macedonia. While working for the State Department, Mr. Jones 

was Director of the Office of Central Europe, responsible for the 

U.S. policy in the Balkans. There is a lot more I could add to that, 

but I am going to stop right there so we will have an opportunity 

to hear from you and our other witnesses today. We are honored 

and thankful for your service and very much pleased that you could 

be here today. 

Thanks so much. Welcome. Please begin. 

7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Jones appears in the Appendix on page 51. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL W. JONES,1 DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND 

CENTRAL ASIA, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE 

FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you so much, and, 

Senator Udall, a great honor to appear before both of you and your 

Subcommittee, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the opportunity. 

I want to bring greetings from Ambassador Holbrooke who is 

currently winding his way back from consultations in Egypt to further our outreach to key countries for our strategy in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. But it is a great opportunity for us to explain a little 

bit of the strategy and get into a conversation, because we would 

really welcome your views. So I will be quite brief in my opening 

statement, and I look forward to your questions and your comments. 

Secretary Clinton and Special Representative Holbrooke are very 

much committed to working closely with Congress as we implement 

the President’s new strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We acknowledge and very much appreciate the deep interest and firsthand experience among Members of your Subcommittee. 

Since January 20, Special Representative Holbrooke has assembled a very diverse interagency team to implement this new strategy, leveraging the expertise of representatives from nine U.S. Government agencies as well as leading academics. Our early efforts 

have supported Pakistani efforts to enhance political and economic 

stability as well as Pakistani efforts to roll back the Taliban threat 

and respond to the need of the growing numbers of displaced persons. 

More specifically, the United States has, over the past couple of 

months, established regular cabinet- and summit-level trilateral 

consultations to build trust and cooperation between Afghan and 

Pakistani leaders. We have deepened relations with leading Pakistani politicians across the political spectrum. We have worked 

with Japan and Pakistan to organize a Pakistan Donors Conference in Tokyo in April of this year, resulting in $5.8 billion in 

pledges to assist Pakistan as it addresses significant macroeconomic challenges. 

We have helped rejuvenate Pakistan-Afghanistan transit trade 

negotiations, which have the potential to enhance economic opportunity in both countries. We have encouraged the first direct contacts in the context of these trilateral discussions between ministers of agriculture, interior, and finance of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And we have provided military assistance to support renewed 

Pakistani efforts to defeat insurgents, and we have led the international effort to mobilize relief for Pakistan’s internally displaced 

persons. 

At the same time, Pakistan itself has taken a number of very important steps. Pakistan has resolved a political crisis in mid-March, 

resulting in the reinstatement of the Pakistani supreme court justice. Pakistan political leaders held an All-Party Conference on 

8 

May 19, which resulted in a declaration supporting military action 

against insurgents and extremists. Pakistan has conducted a sustained counterinsurgency operation with wide public support, and 

it has assisted about 2 million displaced persons under the civilianmilitary leadership of the same Pakistani officer who directed Pakistan’s effective earthquake relief effort in 2005. 

In the coming months, we plan to enhance our support for Pakistani efforts to address significant economic and governance challenges. We deeply applaud the Senate’s unanimous passage of the 

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which authorizes $1.5 

billion per year in non-military assistance for 5 years. Final passage of this legislation will be a powerful demonstration of our 

long-term commitment to helping the Pakistani people and reinforce our desire for a long-term partnership based on common interests. 

It is vital that we help address the economic and social conditions that extremists exploit in western Pakistan with more and 

more consistent economic aid. Our assistance will support Pakistani efforts to hold and build in western Pakistan as part of its 

counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not return to fill the vacuum once military operations have ended. But more than helping 

rebuild homes and businesses, we must also enhance bilateral and 

regional trade potential by encouraging foreign investment in vital 

sectors such as energy and by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones to provide incentives for investment in critical regions 

by offering duty-free imports to certain products made in the border regions. 

Legislation before the Senate today would establish Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in areas directly affected by the fighting 

and would boost confidence in economic opportunity, including for 

displaced persons who will be returning. The President called for 

passage of this ROZ legislation when he announced his new strategy on March 27, and again during the trilateral summit meetings 

with Presidents Zardari and Karzai on May 7. It is a critical aspect 

of our strategy to bring economic opportunity to what would otherwise be the heart of al Qaeda’s safe haven, and it is vital for protecting our national interests. 

The challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are, of course, very 

complex, and we cannot expect results overnight. Signaling and 

demonstrating our long-term commitment to a true partnership is 

essential for our success. The Administration is committed to working closely with Members of this Subcommittee and Congress generally on every aspect of implementing the President’s strategy. 

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity, and 

I welcome your questions and your comments. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much for that statement and for 

the responses that we are about to receive. 

If you could just summarize for us briefly the Administration’s 

changes in strategy for Pakistan. Just go back several months, rewind and pick it up right there. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are several aspects 

that I would highlight. One is the level of political engagement. We 

are presented with an opportunity of a new civilian democratically 

elected government in Pakistan, and as the Administration came 

9 

in, very quickly we moved to engage the entire spectrum of civilian 

political leadership in addition to our ongoing conversations with 

the security sector and other sectors of society at both the summit 

and the cabinet level, and we have had a tremendous response 

from the Cabinet of the U.S. Government who are directly engaged 

with their counterparts in Pakistan and Afghanistan to raise the 

level of our dialogue. 

We have also put forward a plan and we are detailing it now in 

a series of assessments for how we would increase quite significantly our economic assistance to Pakistan, focusing more on people-to-people exchanges and efforts that have a real impact immediately for people on the ground. 

In particular, some things have changed since the strategy. Obviously, the development of the insurgency and the quite dramatic 

change, as you have highlighted, Mr. Chairman, in public opinion 

led to other challenges and opportunities that we have responded 

very quickly to in terms of assisting with displaced persons. But I 

would generally say that we are looking at increasing our engagement both in terms of assistance and in political activities, and 

also, as I had mentioned when speaking about Ambassador 

Holbrooke’s travel, we are engaging at very serious and high levels 

with all of the many countries who have relationships and interests 

in Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to get us all sort of on the 

same page politically speaking; and complementing that, we are 

engaging in a new effort to try to raise the level of our donor coordination for these countries so that we can make better use of all 

international donor assistance. 

Senator CARPER. When we were in Pakistan, I was struck—even 

now—at the enduring distrust and concern that the Pakistani political leaders and military leaders still view India with. They have 

had a change of leadership in India as you know, maybe the 

strongest central government they have had there in a long time, 

and it seems to me and to those of us who were on our delegation 

trip that this was maybe a unique opportunity—hopefully not the 

only opportunity—for some kind of rapprochement between Pakistan and India, a chance to begin to ratchet down levels of distrust, 

to be able to refocus Pakistani military preparedness not on their 

eastern borders, but where the real problems lie with respect to the 

insurgency groups that are in the western part of the country. 

I was struck by the apparent reluctance of the Pakistani Government and military leaders to accept our help, direct or indirect, 

even with respect to helicopters and the need for mobility to go 

after the bad guys in the northwestern parts of the country. They 

have in Pakistan only a handful of helicopters that apparently are 

operable. I do not know if they are willing to accept more helicopters from us. I do not know if they are even willing to accept 

our support for parts and for training their maintainers to be able 

to extend more effectively their counterinsurgency operations. 

But we have been presented—and I think the Pakistani people 

have been presented—with a great opportunity here given the fact 

that the Taliban overplayed their hand in Pakistan, there has been 

a sort of uprising, popular uprising that has led to the military taking a very strong role and I think a very successful role thus far. 

10 

But when you look at what we are trying to do to further bolster 

the Pakistani military hand in going after the bad guys, a real help 

here could be to go after once and for all this distrust—more than 

distrust between Pakistan and India, but this long-time focus almost to the exclusion of everything else on India. How do we move 

into this situation? If we cannot convince them to take our helicopters or our aid in making sure that the half-dozen or dozen helicopters they have will work, what can we do on the positive side 

with respect to ratcheting down the tension between Pakistan and 

India? Just lay that out for us if you would. Because to the extent 

that they spend less money and less time thinking about India and 

having to worry about that flank, that gives them more time and 

more resources to go after the people they really need to be going 

after. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I need to state 

clearly for the record that Ambassador Holbrooke’s mandate is for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we treat India, which has been very 

interested in—obviously, as a major neighbor, has invited Ambassador Holbrooke to visit on each occasion that he has been in the 

region and continues to be very interested in the implementation 

of our strategy. But he does not have a specific mandate for the relationship between Pakistan and India. That is handled in other 

parts of our State Department. 

I think, as you suggest, there clearly is some recognition in the 

governments that they would like to open up more dialogue. There 

was a meeting recently between President Zardari and Prime Minister Singh. 

Senator CARPER. Where did that occur? And I think there may 

be another opportunity down the road. 

Mr. JONES. Yes, that was in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on the margins of dual meetings. There was a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and what is called the BRIC—Brazil, Russia, India, China. There was a summit meeting there that presented an opportunity. 

I would like to comment about the other elements of your question. Clearly, Pakistan has laid out some very clear red lines in 

terms of the assistance that it would like to accept, and I think this 

goes to the heart of what you were discussing in terms of the distrust that has a lot of historical baggage in our relationship. But 

Pakistan actually has been welcoming helicopters and other hardware to support the counterinsurgency operations—we have made 

a huge priority in this Administration to support that request. We 

have delivered four MI–17 helicopters to Pakistan just in the last 

few weeks. We have two more coming, I believe later this month, 

and a couple more behind that. It is not a helicopter that we use 

or stock, so it is not so easy to go around and try to identify and 

find the helicopters to assist Pakistan with. We have also gone out 

to countries around the world to see who else could help with helicopters that are in their inventory, and there are other ongoing efforts in that regard. 

But I think what we will see is, as we are able to demonstrate 

both in terms of our response to the humanitarian crisis and the 

assistance that Pakistan is open to receiving our consistency and 

commitment to supporting their efforts, I think we will see graduVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:31 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 051790 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51790.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

ally greater openness, and that is, I think, how we overcome the 

distrust. But that will not be a short-term process, but it is an important one that we are embarked on. And I think really a key to 

this is the legislation that we have discussed, the commitment of 

not just $1.5 billion per year, but over a 5-year period of assistance, 

that I think will allay a lot of the concerns in the political class in 

Pakistan that we are there for short-term benefits rather than a 

long-term partnership. 

Senator CARPER. Well, I do not mean to be critical of the priorities that the Pakistanis are setting for their own military. Just 

look at our own. We are going to be debating in the next week or 

two on the Senate floor the defense authorization bill, and we are 

going to be trying to determine whether or not if we are going to 

continue to buy weapons systems, build weapons systems, very expensive weapons systems, to fight last decade’s wars instead of 

spending monies to fight this decade’s and next decade’s more likely counterinsurgencies. 

The F–22 is a perfectly good aircraft. We have been building 

them for years, flying them for years. I do not believe we have ever 

used one in combat. Now we are faced with a question of continuing to build more of them. We will see where that ends. But 

I am encouraged to hear that there is willingness to accept some 

helicopters, and maybe the willingness of some other countries to 

provide that kind of mobility. 

We are putting, as you know, 17,000 additional Marines and 

Army troops into Afghanistan. They will be aided by 150 helicopters to go after the bad guys, especially in the southern part of 

that country. I think there are four new helicopters. That is good. 

Two more after that. Well, that is good as well. A hundred and fifty 

in Afghanistan just to help the 17,000 men and women that we are 

putting into that country. 

One last thing before I move off of this. We met at a wonderful 

lunch, and I think it was hosted by the governor of Lahore, and I 

recall sitting at a table with the former Foreign Minister from 

Pakistan, and he talked to us about back-channel negotiations with 

the Indians over a decade ago which he thought led very closely to 

some kind of rapprochement between Pakistan and India. We have 

learned of a similar kind of initiative maybe 2 or 3 years ago in 

that country—the same, again, trying to find some meeting of the 

minds between Pakistan and India. I would just urge us to use 

whatever influence that we have, direct or indirect, to move that 

along. 

I think it was in April 2008, GAO reported that the United 

States lacked the comprehensive plan encompassing all elements of 

national power. What progress has been made in developing such 

a plan for addressing the situation in Pakistan? How well are the 

various agencies coordinating their efforts in developing a comprehensive plan? And what interagency agreements, if any, have 

been reached? 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. I think to start with one element, Ambassador Holbrooke’s team is, as I said, located in the State Department, but consists of representatives of nine U.S. Government 

agencies detailed out, selected by the member of Cabinet—the head 

of agency to represent in Ambassador Holbrooke’s office. So we are 

12 

not conducting this operation by an interagency committee but actually have a whole-of-government approach nested under Ambassador Holbrooke to whom President Obama entrusted the implementation of the civilian aspect of the plan. 

In addition to that quite remarkable—in my experience, the first 

in my 23 years with the government—experience of such an interagency operation, we have a tremendous level of interagency coordination and cooperation. We have instituted a weekly meeting 

that we just had last night—it goes on for about an hour and a 

half—where Ambassador Holbrooke and General Lute from the National Security Council (NSC) chair—and I co-chair in Ambassador 

Holbrooke’s absence—of very senior members from a remarkable 

number of agencies, much more than the nine represented on our 

team, with a very open and quite remarkably free-flowing conversation. 

We discuss, for example, as just referenced, the visit of Secretary 

Napolitano, and the points that she was planning to make, we were 

talking about them in terms of how do we add into her points, how 

do we reinforce the message there, how do we make it part of our 

broader context. So there is that going on, which I think is really 

quite a remarkable effort, in my experience. 

Then, finally, I would note the civ-mil coordination. General 

Petraeus, entrusted with implementing the military aspects of the 

President’s strategy, is in constant touch with our team, with Ambassador Holbrooke, and members of his team are in touch with 

ours. And our embassies, our missions in both countries are developing civ-mil implementation plans for the strategy that are quite 

detailed and expensive and bring in at the post level in our missions out there all the agencies required. 

So I submit that it is quite a remarkably successful interagency 

effort going on now, and I think we are drawing on—to cite one example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is putting forth a remarkable increase in the number of people out in Afghanistan and 

looking at a strategy for Pakistan because these are two countries 

that depend hugely on agriculture. So we are bringing in agencies 

that were not so directly involved before and marrying them up 

with the agencies that we are—— 

Senator CARPER. Good. One last question, and then I am going 

to recognize Senator Akaka and then Senator Levin, and welcome 

to you both, gentlemen. Thank you both for joining us. 

I think it was Einstein who said in adversity lies opportunity. 

We have got the Pakistani military going after Taliban and other 

extremist militant outfits in the western part of the country. That 

is the good news. The bad news is we have seen a couple million 

people displaced from their homes. I am impressed by how many 

of those displaced people are literally taken into people’s homes, as 

opposed to shuttling them off into refugee camps. 

But there is a great opportunity for us to help relocate from the 

Swat Valley and other places where people have been displaced, 

helping people get back to their homes, rebuild their homes, their 

communities, and get their lives back to something close to normal. 

I understand that there is a reluctance for the Pakistani Government to even accept U.S. aid that is clearly identified as from the 

13 

United States; perhaps we need to work maybe through nongovernmental entities, NGOs, to provide that assistance. 

But having said that, to the extent that the Pakistani military 

has driven out the bad guys and gotten them on the run—we have 

a lot of people displaced—to the extent that we can go in and be 

seen, directly or indirectly, as helping to improve that situation, it 

is a great plus for us and obviously a great plus for the Pakistani 

people. 

Your thoughts, please? How is it going? What are we doing? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. How successful are we being? 

Mr. JONES. Normally, in such humanitarian situations, most of 

our aid does go through the United Nations and nongovernmental 

organizations, and in this case it is no different. So we have 

pledged a total of $381 million, disbursed currently a little over 

$160 million, to assist the displaced people, some 2 million people. 

I think it is quite well known and recognized in Pakistan that 

we are the leader in that effort. You are quite right, some of these 

areas, in contrast to the earthquake situation, are still not secure. 

It is not a very safe situation for us to send out American personnel much beyond Peshawar. In fact, there are quite a number 

of threats right now. So we are somewhat limited by other factors 

as well. 

The Pakistani Government has said that they want to pay for 

the side that is their responsibility and, in fact, have disbursed an 

equivalent of about $380 per family to the displaced people so that 

they would have the opportunity on their own to live outside of 

their homes. 

As you mentioned, some 80-, 90-plus percent are living in people’s homes, so it is not always the easiest place to access people. 

It is much better in homes, but there are fewer central points to 

provide assistance. But we believe the U.N. and NGOs have really 

spread out their assistance in a way that is helpful. 

I would say that, as you suggest, we do want the people of Pakistan to know that America is assisting. We also want the people 

of Pakistan to know that their own government is assisting. And 

I think that is coming across quite clearly and is a very important 

effort to counter the attempts by extremists to influence displaced 

persons. It is very important for the displaced persons to see that 

their own government is actually providing assistance. And I think 

that is in one respect why Pakistan is possessive about that effort, 

and they are doing, by all accounts, quite well at it. 

I was just speaking to a member of our team who recently came 

back from Pakistan who said, in contrast—because this gentleman 

served in Pakistan a couple of years ago. He said you just flip 

through the channels on TV or you hear of what people are talking 

about on the radio and we see it in the print media, and you see 

both public service ads and editorials that very much praise the 

role of the Pakistani military and the Pakistani Government in responding to this situation, the military in terms of the offensive 

against the insurgents and the government in terms of the assistance to people. And that I would say is also very important because 

that is what is going to keep people from being influenced by exVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:31 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 051790 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51790.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
14 

tremists who are seeking to take advantage of vulnerable people 

who are displaced. So we are very pleased with that. 

You are right. It is also important for people to see the American 

Government as playing its appropriate role in assisting, and I 

think that is coming along. But I think it is also important, as I 

say, that the Pakistani Government is rightly seen as being helpful 

to the citizens. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks, Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Akaka, welcome. If you would like to 

make an opening statement, feel free. Senator Akaka, thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank you for holding this hearing. The implementation of an effective policy toward Pakistan is a very significant and important national security priority. 

I just want to mention that there are two issues in particular 

that I want to highlight. 

First, if we pursue an engagement strategy with Pakistan to reduce the threat of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, we must be 

prepared for a long-term commitment. I am pleased that President 

Obama supports efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s civil institutions 

and security. These efforts will help address the short-term and the 

long-term challenges facing Pakistan. 

Second, the United States should forge lasting, international 

partnerships to bring security and prosperity to both Pakistan and 

Afghanistan. We must listen to the needs of our partners as we define and refine the implementation of our strategies. History has 

shown us that nations working toward the same goals in a wellcoordinated manner bring a greater likelihood of success. 

I am keenly interested in Pakistan. For me, it goes back to the 

year 2000 when I visited Pakistan, and at that time President 

Musharraf was in charge there. It started for me a good relationship with Pakistan. 

Mr. Chairman, this is my opening statement. 

Senator CARPER. Fair enough. Would you like to go ahead and 

ask some questions? 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Jones, Mr. Fick’s written testimony—he is the CEO from the 

Center for a New American Security—states that the costs of the 

unmanned aerial vehicle air strikes inside Pakistan outweigh the 

benefits and these air strikes are, on balance, harmful to the U.S. 

and allied interests. 

What is your view on this issue? And, what steps should the 

United States take to reduce the potential loss of good will in Pakistan and Afghanistan if these air strikes continue? 

Mr. JONES. Senator, thank you so much. Thank you for the question. I would have to say on that particular subject I would need 

to defer speaking about that in any specific sense for a closed session, if you would understand that. I would say that a very important part of our strategy is to, with strategic communications, influence information as it is termed in various aspects. 

15 

I think that in that area overall we are making some progress. 

We have plans to increase quite significantly our assistance to 

Pakistan in terms of helping it get its own information and its own 

information out in the tribal areas and among displaced persons, 

and we are working closely with international organizations and 

with the Government of Pakistan to try to help do that through 

various means of assistance in procuring local radios and helping 

with Pakistan public service announcements, things that will help 

people understand what actually are the goals of the Pakistani 

Government and the international community and how they are 

helping the country of Pakistan. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Jones, in the President’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he stated that the United States will set 

clear metrics to measure progress and be accountable. I agree that 

metrics are important and that we need to focus on measuring effectiveness and not just effort. How are these metrics being designed and implemented? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, thank you for that. We have been working hard 

on metrics so I appreciate the question, Senator. 

There are a couple of different levels of metrics, obviously. One, 

as I was mentioning just a little bit earlier, both in Pakistan and 

Afghanistan our embassy and our military counterparts are developing implementation plans at the field level, and embedded in 

those plans will be specific metrics that we will be able to assess 

how we are doing in implementing our plans. 

Then at the higher level, at the strategic level here in Washington, the National Security Council is taking the lead in pulling 

together the higher-order metrics that we will measure against on 

a regular basis and report both to the Executive Branch and to 

Congress on how we are doing against those metrics. Our effort is 

to try to focus on metrics that there are metrics that measure inputs, metrics that measure outputs, and metrics that measure actual effects on the ground. We want to focus on the latter, recognizing that we need a certain mix of those three metrics because 

the effects on the ground are usually somewhat delayed from the 

inputs, and so you want to see that the activities that we have 

pledged to undertake are actually happening, that there is some 

output from it, and then there is effect on the ground. 

So we are heavily engaged in that process, and I think pretty 

shortly we will be able to come to Congress and explain the metrics 

that we have devised. We welcome input, and I think there has 

been quite a number of consultations at the staff level on what sort 

of metrics would be most useful. And we have also received that 

feedback in terms of appropriations legislation. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Jones, in the President’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he articulated his goal: To disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to 

prevent their return to either country in the future. A primary 

focus on al Qaeda, of course, makes sense. Are there any other significant organizations that may negatively impact regional or international security that must also be considered? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, Senator, there certainly are, and the organizations that have in the past and currently aid and abet al Qaeda, 

such as the Taliban, are of great concern to us, organizations such 

16 

as LeT and others that have been engaged in terrorist operations 

that are on sanctions lists. There is a variety of opinion about to 

what extent some of these organizations coordinate and cooperate, 

but I think it is safe to say that there is the—as long as you have 

organizations that are inclined toward extremism and terrorist acts 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan, that increases the vulnerability to cooperation with al Qaeda and organizations that actually have the 

ability to and the intent to inflict harm on the United States, on 

our allies and our interests. 

And that is clearly what we see currently as the threat in this 

region, and so we take a broader view than just al Qaeda, as you 

mentioned, Senator. 

Senator AKAKA. The President’s strategy states that the United 

States must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and 

Pakistan. This is an important issue considering the historic tensions between these two countries. 

What is the strategy for pursuing constructive diplomacy between these two countries? What steps already have been made? 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Senator. We are very encouraged to see 

some of the steps that have been taking place on their own between India and Pakistan. There has been the recent meetings we 

were discussing just a short while ago between the leaders of those 

two countries in Russia on the margins of a summit, and the possibility of future such meetings appears, according to their statements and according to their stated interests, in improving their 

relationship. 

Under Special Representative Holbrooke’s office, our primary 

responsibility is implementing the President’s strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and working with all the countries and 

neighbors that have an impact on that. Obviously, India is a very 

important neighbor, and the Indians have specifically requested 

Ambassador Holbrooke to stay in very close contact and to visit 

New Delhi whenever he can on his trips out to the region. So we 

are in very close contact. The Indians are obviously also a significant donor in Afghanistan, major players in the region. 

I think what is most encouraging is seeing the interest on both 

these countries, India and Pakistan, to improve their relationship. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Akaka, thank you very much again for 

joining us, for your statement, for your questions, and your interest 

in this issue. 

I am delighted that the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee is here. Senator Levin, please proceed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding 

this hearing. It is a very important subject, and it needs a great 

deal of attention. 

It has been my concern for a long time that unless Pakistan’s 

leaders, both civilian and military, commit in deeds and words to 

eliminating the threat from militant extremists and make clear 

that they are doing so for the sake of their country’s own security 

interests and not for the sake of the United States, then no amount 

of assistance will be effective. I raised this point directly with PakiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:31 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 051790 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51790.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17 

stan President Zardari when he was in Washington in May. If 

Pakistan makes the fight against extremists their own fight, then 

we ought to be willing to help Pakistan achieve a more stable and 

secure future. But we cannot buy their support for our cause, or 

appear to do so, since that would only play into the hands of their 

and our enemy. 

Now, in the last few weeks, Pakistan’s military operations in the 

North-West Frontier Province and more recently in the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), suggests that the Pakistan 

Government may now recognize that the terrorist threat posed by 

extremist groups in the western border region is an existential 

threat and must be confronted. 

Yesterday, it was reported that President Zardari said he wants 

to create a ‘‘Pakistan where militancy is defeated,’’ and Pakistan 

Army Chief of Staff General Kayani was quoted as saying that ‘‘the 

immediate internal threat’’ of Taliban extremism was greater than 

any external threat, which was understood to be a reference to 

India. 

Where do they make these statements? The interview yesterday, 

with the the President of Pakistan, was in the London Daily Telegraph. Is he making the same statements to the Pakistan public? 

Do you know, Mr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. Senator, thank you. I do not know specifically if he 

is saying those words. I would note that there has been, as I am 

sure you have noted, quite a change in the whole political dialogue 

in Pakistan among the leaders and among the media that have 

changed quite considerably to recognize the Taliban as an enormous threat. 

Senator LEVIN. Is that well known to the Pakistani public that 

their government considers the Taliban the major threat to their 

existence? 

Mr. JONES. According to the polling that I have seen—and I have 

not seen anything very authoritative—there has been a remarkable 

shift in public perception of the Taliban as being a threat to their 

government and society, to the order of 30 percent to 80 percent. 

I have had, as I am sure you have, the experience of meeting with 

quite a number of Pakistanis out in Islamabad who are really quite 

scared for the future of their country. And as I understand it, that 

certainly would not have been the case a year or more ago. 

So I think there has been quite a dramatic turnaround. It is an 

iterative process. I do not think we can say that has turned the corner, but it is something that I think we have a great interest in 

encouraging what we would say is the correct analysis of their national security interests. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree that unless they make it clear 

that is their view, not something that we are imposing or buying 

from them, that it is not going to be effective? 

Mr. JONES. I completely agree, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Does the Government of Pakistan have any intention of confronting the Afghan Taliban in Baluchistan to deny 

them safe haven and prevent cross-border attacks against U.S. and 

coalition forces in Afghanistan? 

Mr. JONES. Senator, the history and relationships along the border area are remarkably complex with a lot of historical baggage, 

18 

and I think what we have seen is the government and the army 

of Pakistan taking some significant steps against the Pakistani 

Taliban. I think it is in our interest to encourage those steps and 

look toward widening the aperture so that the activities go much 

broader to all the various extremist groups that threaten Pakistan 

in the region. 

So I think we are headed in the right direction. It is going to 

take some time to overcome some of the history and relationships 

that have developed since the time of the Soviet invasion. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether the Government of Pakistan has sought to prevent the Afghan Taliban leadership or the 

Shura from meeting openly in Quetta, Pakistan? 

Mr. JONES. I think in order to fully address your question, we 

would have to—I would want to go into a closed session to talk 

about what we know and on what basis. But as I say, I think the 

important statement to make in this setting is that we think that 

there are opportunities here that are being recognized in Pakistan. 

As you say, the most important part is what is being recognized 

there, but that we can encourage. 

Senator LEVIN. Are you familiar with a group that is, I think, 

called the ‘‘Nazir Group in South Waziristan? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Is it true that the Pakistan military considers 

them as a good group of Taliban? And do we? They have a goal of 

attacking us in Afghanistan, us and NATO. I am just wondering 

whether or not—what our attitude is towards that group, and what 

is the Pakistan Government’s attitude towards the Nazir Group? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. Obviously, Senator, we place an extremely high 

priority on working with Pakistan against groups that pose a direct 

threat to our troops, and there are quite a number of individual 

clans, groups, offshoots, in that region who do pose such a threat. 

The complexity of the relationships and the historical approach 

that Pakistan has taken to this region lead to shifting alliances, 

shifting attitudes. So if the Pakistan Government is going after, for 

example, in one moment Baitullah Mehsud, one individual organization that is credited with the assassination of Prime Minister 

Bhutto, at that moment they may cooperate with other groups that 

would also be encouraged to go after that particular organization, 

while at other moments they may shift to another approach. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether or not—and I will conclude; my time is up. But just on the same subject, do you know 

whether the Pakistan military, both at this moment but also in the 

recent past, considers that group, the Nazir Group in South 

Waziristan, as a friendly, good group of Taliban? 

Mr. JONES. I do not know that. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. Fair enough. Thank you. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Levin, thank you very much for being 

here and for all those questions. 

Senator Burris has joined us from the State of Illinois. It is great 

to see you, and thank you so much for being a part of this hearing. 

Senator Burris, you are recognized. If you would like to make a 

19 

brief opening statement, feel free, and then you will have time for 

a number of questions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very interested 

in the situation and came more to listen to the testimony than to 

raise what I think would be some difficult questions. So thank you 

very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much for being a part of this. 

Let me come back to you with a couple more questions, Mr. 

Jones, and if any of my other colleagues have them, fine, and after 

that you are done. But thanks for your presence here. 

I remember, I think it was December 2007, being in Iowa. I was 

there during the run-up to the Iowa caucuses. I was there with the 

senior Senator from Delaware, who was running for President at 

the time. And I was with him the morning when former Prime 

Minister Bhutto was assassinated. I remember being with him at 

a press conference, a hastily called press conference, I believe in 

Des Moines. And I remember the words that he said that day. 

Among other things he said that what we need in Pakistan is not 

a Musharraf policy, we need a Pakistan policy. 

And what I think I heard you describing earlier today when you 

talked about the interagency cooperation on our side, I thought you 

mentioned that you co-chair this working group, and one of the 

other co-chairs you mentioned is a military leader, and certainly 

when Ambassador Holbrooke is not there, I think you fill in for 

him. 

That sounds to me a lot more like a Pakistan policy than a 

Musharraf policy. 

Mr. JONES. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more, and as 

mentioned earlier, I think Congress plays an incredibly important 

role in that in the legislation and the attention that Senators and 

Members of the House of Representatives have paid to broadening 

our engagement. And I think now when we visit Pakistan, we are 

engaging with the entire political spectrum, and also looking, as I 

referred to earlier, to deepen our engagement with the Pakistani 

people. 

We had in a recent congressional delegation—the mayor of Karachi came up. 

Senator CARPER. It was ours. 

Mr. JONES. Yes, it was yours—came up from Karachi, the head 

of the MQM party. Another great opportunity to engage across the 

political spectrum with leaders of Pakistan, which makes a more 

firm basis of a policy. And I think when you look at the different 

levels of support within Pakistan for their different leaders, obviously, as in ours, it is dynamic, it shifts, and it is to our benefit 

to really make our engagement as broad as possible. 

Senator CARPER. The last issue I want to discuss is, if you will, 

the safeguarding of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. It is a matter on 

which they certainly have a lot of interest, a lot at stake, and as 

it turns out, so does the rest of the world. Where does the United 

States rank the issue of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal 

given the numerous priorities that we have in Pakistan? And what 

20 

is the probability of militants inserting sympathizers into Pakistan’s laboratories or fuel production facilities? 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say just in a very 

general sense that, obviously, that is among our very top priorities, 

and we have within the U.S. Government and within the State Department people dedicated who are following that problem and 

working on it, following that issue very closely. We obviously pay 

attention to that on Ambassador Holbrooke’s team and work closely 

with other personnel in the State Department and other agencies 

following that. 

I think overall I can say that we have confidence that the nuclear weapons of Pakistan are being safeguarded by the Pakistani 

authorities. To go into more detail, I think we would want to bring 

the people who are particular experts on that into a closed session, 

but I completely agree with the level of interest and appreciate the 

question. 

Senator CARPER. What has been the level of cooperation between 

U.S. agencies and their counterparts in the Pakistani Government 

to ensure oversight and accountability over U.S. funds? 

Mr. JONES. The relationship between the Pakistani Government? 

Senator CARPER. Not with respect to nuclear weapons. 

Mr. JONES. Right. 

Senator CARPER. Just talk to us about the level of cooperation between our U.S. agencies and their counterparts in the Pakistani 

Government to ensure oversight and accountability over U.S. 

funds. 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. We want to know how our funds are being 

spent. 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. And I am not sure that other countries to whom 

we provide aid or assistance are all that interested in allowing us, 

through transparency, to actually know how the money is being 

spent. 

Mr. JONES. Yes. As I am sure you are aware, Mr. Chairman, in 

addition to the historical inconsistency in our levels of assistance, 

we have also shifted back and forth with the way we have delivered assistance in Pakistan. We had previously offered quite a 

great deal of budget support. We went through a period not too 

long ago of actually breaking that down into projects, projectizing 

the budget support, which allowed us to have greater oversight and 

a greater window of visibility into exactly how funds are being 

spent. 

What we are doing now is we are going to quite significantly increase the number of USAID direct hire personnel in Pakistan, consonant with the planned increases in economic assistance. But 

that, we believe, will give us a greater level of oversight into the 

assistance that we provide. 

We have some issues that are—we feel we have good cooperation 

from the government, but in any situation where one is providing 

assistance, we have to have internal controls. And we have a great 

deal of interest from the Inspector General of USAID and the State 

Department and DOD in following exactly that question. 

21 

We also have some restrictions in terms of our ability to physically get out in some insecure areas where we particularly want 

to target our assistance. But we have tried to overcome that by sort 

of a tiered approach of having local nationals who work for us, having a number of different windows into how the money is being 

spent, and getting photographic and other evidence that the 

projects that we have supported are actually coming to fruition. So 

it is a complex environment, but it is one that we follow very closely. 

I would simply add that another element of the Administration’s 

strategy is to try to reduce the large contracts, break them down 

into smaller units that can be monitored more effectively on a 

short-term basis and have more direct effect, whether it is implemented through government agencies or civil society and NGOs. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. I know you have indicated that the question of 

drone attacks, UAV attacks—much of which can only be dealt with 

in a classified setting. But something which has been in a very unclassified setting has been the attacks on us for those attacks that 

the Pakistani leaders have engaged in. And I do not doubt for one 

minute that they are aware of the fact that we are going to be 

using these attacks against targets. And yet when they attack us 

publicly for doing what I believe is obvious, they are very well 

aware of and support, what it does is make our situation a lot 

worse in Pakistan in terms of the Pakistani public view of the 

United States. And we can have all the humanitarian assistance in 

the world, hope that the Pakistani people understand the source of 

it, and that is fine, providing we are effective in that effort. But 

it just wipes out a lot of the value of that if the Pakistani leaders 

are publicly attacking us. 

I am just wondering whether or not we have raised this issue 

with the Pakistani leaders. They do not want us to use UAVs, tell 

us privately we are not going to be using UAVs in Pakistan if they 

oppose it. But for them to look the other way or to give us the 

green light privately and then to attack us publicly leaves us, it 

seems to me, at a very severe disadvantage and loss with the Pakistani people. 

I am wondering what your thoughts are on that. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. I appreciate the comment, Senator. We 

have those discussions with the leadership in Pakistan because the 

Pakistani leadership raises those issues directly with us. And I 

think it strengthens our hand to be able to refer to the comments 

that you just made and have made on other occasions, Members of 

Congress have made on other occasions to have those conversations 

in ways that will benefit both our countries. So I will take that 

comment, if I could, sir, and relay it to Ambassador Holbrooke, and 

we will factor that—— 

Senator LEVIN. I have already relayed it to Ambassador 

Holbrooke. My question is whether he has relayed it to them. 

Mr. JONES. Well, as I say, during the meetings that I have been 

in in Pakistan, the subject certainly comes up, and there is quite 

a wide-ranging discussion on it. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, I have got to tell you, if they do not want 

us to do this, they should flat out tell us privately. Do not look the 

22 

other way and then attack us publicly. It is wrong. It is not just 

wrong morally. Put aside that. It is wrong in terms of American 

security for us to be attacked by Pakistani leaders for doing something which they quite obviously know we are going to do and support, either implicitly or privately, explicitly. That affects my view, 

I have got to tell you, on the kind of support that we ought to provide to Pakistan because one of the reasons for that support is that 

hopefully the view of the Pakistani people of our motive will be improved if they see we care about their economic situation. But that 

is just wiped out if their leaders are blaming us for the loss of civilian life inside Pakistan. 

These are very difficult issues. I know they are. And they ought 

to be limited, if not eliminated, these UAV attacks. They surely 

should be limited and handled with incredible care, if they are 

going to be used at all. But it is unacceptable to me to be pilloried 

by the Pakistani leaders, criticized in their public for carrying out 

these attacks. And I just want to let you know, and you can let 

them know, if you want. That approach of theirs affects the view 

of this Senator in terms of the kind of support which I am willing 

to vote for. 

Mr. JONES. We certainly will let them know that. Thank you. 

Senator LEVIN. Thanks. 

Senator CARPER. Just a quick comment. We had rather extensive 

discussions 4 or 5 or 6 weeks ago when we were there on this subject and highly classified briefings as well. One thing I think we 

can all agree on is that to the extent that there are drones or pilotless aircraft used in these attacks, it is imperative that we minimize as greatly as we can any civilian casualties. 

A second thing, it appears to me that if we had better intelligence—and as you know, we try to use electronic intelligence, we 

try to use human intelligence to be able to verify where the most 

highly dangerous of insurgents are located, where they are operating, where they might be gathered. To the extent that we can be 

provided more accurate information and more timely information 

through the Pakistani intelligence services themselves, we can, I 

think, significantly reduce the potential that people, civilians, are 

going to be harmed in those attacks. 

Senator LEVIN. I agree. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Burris, any closing comments here before we excuse our witness? 

Senator BURRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Just one thought. 

Senator CARPER. Please. 

Senator BURRIS. It is not a question. It is just a concern in terms 

of what the Taliban are doing: That is, surrounding themselves 

with civilians, and that makes our task even more difficult when 

the evidence shows, Mr. Jones, that this does take place, where 

Taliban forces will be in homes or villages and launch their activities from those sources where there are civilians. And it makes our 

job that much harder, and then we end up launching a drone or 

a missile, and 18 or 19 civilians are killed, and then we are the 

bad guys. So in some way, we have to try to solve that situation. 

Senator CARPER. I could not agree more. 

Mr. Jones, I was meeting with some folks in Delaware the other 

day, and as we were ending our meeting, this fellow said to me, 

23 

well, I would not be doing my job if I did not give you my final 

order—not a direct but an actual request for what we might do in 

the Congress to address the concerns that were raised at our visit. 

I am going to give you an opportunity to close it out here from 

your panel. What do you need from us? Not just this Subcommittee 

or not just this Committee, but what do you need from the Congress particularly with respect to Pakistan? We will not get into Afghanistan. What do you need from us? 

Mr. JONES. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just say 

before commenting on that, I am really heartened and encouraged 

that I think we are in complete agreement between the Executive 

and Legislative Branches, as discussed in this hearing, with the 

goals of our policy, and we are really committed to working together with you to achieve them. 

The support has been tremendous. I think enactment of what is 

known as the Kerry-Lugar legislation in the Senate and the Berman bill on the House side would be very important. I think that 

is critically important to conveying the kind of strategy that you 

enunciated. 

Obviously, passing the President’s request for the 2010 budget— 

it contains significant assistance that we need to incorporate into 

our strategy. 

And then, finally, as I mentioned, the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation, which is attached to the House version, to 

the Berman legislation. Obviously, there are other vehicles, but we 

think that is something that really carries a lot of resonance in 

Pakistan, and it is particularly targeted at the border areas and 

would encourage confidence, would encourage some economic activity that we think would show people that it is not only about assistance but it is about opening up what for us is a very small opportunity of duty-free trade for the Pakistanis, a very big symbol, 

and we think it would help our mutual efforts. 

So I really appreciate this opportunity and look forward to being 

in close contact with you, Mr. Chairman, and your Subcommittee. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you so much. Thank you for joining us and for your efforts. And you are excused. 

We would like to invite the second panel to join us at this time, 

please. Thank you. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you again. 

Senator CARPER. As our second panel is joining us at the table, 

I am going to go ahead and begin some introductions of our panelists. 

I will start off with Lisa Curtis. Lisa Curtis is a Senior Research 

Fellow at the Heritage Foundation where she focuses primarily on 

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It is a great portfolio for this 

panel. From 2001 to 2003, she served as a Senior Adviser in the 

State Department’s South Asia Bureau, where she advised the Assistant Secretary on India-Pakistan relations. In the late 1990s, 

Ms. Curtis served in the CIA as a political analyst on South Asia. 

She also served as a political officer to U.S. embassies in Islamabad 

and in New Delhi from 1994 to 1998, and during her tour in 

Islamabad, she earned a Meritorious Honor Award from the State 

Department for contributions to a year-long four-nation endeavor to 

free hostages held by militants in Kashmir. 

24 

Next, welcome to Nicholas Schmidle. Mr. Schmidle is a Fellow at 

the New America Foundation. He is the author of ‘‘To Live or To 

Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years Inside of Pakistan,’’ which 

just came out, I am told, in May, about 2 months ago. My staff has 

read it and highly recommends it to me. I understand that you regularly contribute to the New York Times Magazine, to Slate, to the 

New Republic, the Washington Post, the Virginia Quarterly, and 

many other publications. In 2008, I am told Mr. Schmidle received 

the Kurt Schork Award for freelance journalism based on his reporting in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he lived throughout 

2006 and 2007 as a Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs. 

Next is Shuja Nawaz. Mr. Nawaz, a native of Pakistan, was 

named the first Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic 

Council in Washington this past January. Mr. Nawaz has contributed his experience to RAND, the United States Institute of Peace, 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Atlantic 

Council, and other leading think tanks. While attending Gordon 

College, he was named the Cabot Fellow and won the Henry Taylor 

International Correspondent Award. His latest two books are 

‘‘Crossed Swords: Pakistan and Its Army, and the Wars Within’’ 

and ‘‘FATA—A Most Dangerous Place.’’ 

Next, Nathaniel ‘‘Nate’’ Fick. Mr. Fick was named Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security about a 

week ago. Congratulations. Before joining the Center for a New 

American Security, Mr. Fick served as a Marine Corps infantry officer—Semper Fi—leading a reconnaissance unit during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I understand you are the author of the 2005 

New York Times best-seller entitled ‘‘One Bullet Away.’’ The Commanding General of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command has made your book required reading for officers deploying 

to Afghanistan and to Iraq. Mr. Fick, previously an on-air national 

security consultant to CBS News, is a member of the Council on 

Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies. I understand you serve on the boards of the Marine Corps 

Scholarship Foundation, whose mission is to provide opportunities 

for children of marines killed in action. Good for you. Thanks for 

doing that. 

And, finally, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. 

Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served over 3 years as Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy. 

You served, I am told, for 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer in 

various roles, including Chief of the European Division in the Directorate of Operations, Chief of Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, and Deputy Associate Director of Central Intelligence for 

Military Support. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen’s overseas assignments include Stockholm, Moscow, Athens, Yerevan, Zurich, and Oslo. Before his career with the CIA, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served as an officer in the U.S. Army. He has been awarded the CIA Director’s 

Award, Secretary of Energy’s Exceptional Service Medal, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, among others. 

That is quite a line-up, and we are honored to have each of you 

before us this afternoon to continue this conversation. 

25 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis appears in the Appendix on page 56. 

I am going to ask you to please stick to your 5 minutes, and if 

you go much beyond that, I will have to rein you in. But I will ask 

you to stick to that so we will be sure to be able to ask you some 

good questions later on. 

Ms. Curtis, I understand you are just back from the region, having participated in a Transatlantic Opinion Leaders tour of Afghanistan, and we want to invite you to begin your testimony. Welcome 

and thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF LISA CURTIS,1 SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, 

ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Senator Levin, and 

Senator Burris. It is an honor to be here today. My remarks will 

focus on developments in both Pakistan and Afghanistan where, as 

you mentioned, I recently returned. 

Containing the global terrorist threat in South Asia requires the 

United States to forge a trusting and cooperative partnership with 

Pakistan. The future direction of the region, including the outcome 

of the war in Afghanistan, pivots on Pakistan’s ability to overcome 

multiple socioeconomic challenges as well as its willingness to fight 

terrorism in all its forms within its own borders. 

There has been a welcome change in the Pakistan military’s attitude toward confronting the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest 

part of the country in just the last 10 weeks. In late April, under 

both Pakistani public and U.S. pressure, and following Taliban advances into new districts close to Islamabad, the Pakistan army 

began an offensive that has since ousted the Taliban from the Swat 

Valley. A combination of events, including the Taliban declaring 

democracy in Pakistan as ‘‘infidel,’’ has begun to change the Pakistani public’s attitude toward the Taliban, thus prompting the 

army to take them on militarily. 

The fighting, however, has led to a severe humanitarian crisis 

with nearly 3 million people fleeing their homes. The United States 

has provided substantial aid to help relieve the crisis, $380 million, 

as we heard previously, but the United Nations is still far short of 

the funds it needs to address the crisis. There are reports that 

banned extremist organizations have access to refugee camps and 

will use the plight of the displaced people as a recruiting tool. The 

United States must insist Pakistan restrict extremist groups’ access to these camps. 

The Pakistan army also is preparing for an additional offensive 

in the tribal areas in South Waziristan. This is where insurgent 

forces of Pakistani leader Baituallah Mehsud reside. Baituallah 

Mehsud is an ally of both al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, but 

has focused his attention more recently on targeting the Pakistani 

state through a spate of suicide bombings. The United States must 

encourage Pakistan to implement hold and build strategies in the 

tribal areas following any military operations. The United States 

also should discourage the Pakistan military from striking additional peace deals, pointing out that past deals have only undermined Pakistan’s position strategically. 

26 

During my recent visit to Afghanistan, several NATO commanders expressed the view that Pakistan military operations in 

the tribal areas are helping reduce the flow of militants and insurgents into eastern Afghanistan. Still, NATO commanders acknowledge that the command and control of the Afghan Taliban resides 

in and around Quetta, Baluchistan, and provides leadership and 

critical access to money flows for insurgent operations in Afghanistan. They said that if the Taliban leadership in Quetta was neutralized, it would deal a significant blow to the insurgency in southern Afghanistan, depriving it of guidance, focus, and legitimacy. 

Therefore, the United States must convince Pakistan to crack 

down on Afghan Taliban leadership and should determine the level 

and type of further U.S. military aid to Pakistan based on 

Islamabad’s efforts in this regard. 

One of the major problems in garnering full Pakistani cooperation against the Afghan Taliban is continued paranoia among security officials about India’s role in Afghanistan. The United States 

views Indian development activities, like road and dam construction, and humanitarian assistance as helpful while Pakistan security officials view it as an attempt to encircle Pakistan. 

Let me just say a few words on Afghanistan, if I may, based on 

my observations from my trip. 

I think there has been improvement in the coordination of the 

international effort that I could perceive, and I think there is support among the NATO partners for the evolving U.S. strategy, 

namely, the focus on a population-centric approach. Allies such as 

the U.K., Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Poland are providing invaluable contributions to the fighting. 

The new push by U.S. forces into Helmand Province is part of 

a broader effort to regain the initiative from the Taliban in the 

south. The NATO commanders I met with in Regional Command 

South were enthusiastic about the arrival of the additional U.S. 

troops to southern Afghanistan. They noted that up until now they 

had lacked sufficient resources to implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy. The commanders we met with believe the U.S. 

troop influx will help shift the momentum against the Taliban, perhaps as early as late summer or early fall. 

It is important that the August 20 elections in Afghanistan are 

carried out in a credible manner and that the Afghan people believe the democratic process can bring change to their everyday 

lives. It would be devastating if, just as the international community is getting its act together and implementing a winning strategy, the Afghan people lose faith in the democratic process because 

of a flawed election. 

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, containing the global 

terrorist threat requires us to partner closely with Pakistan. In this 

regard, Congress should move quickly to reconcile the two separate 

pieces of Pakistan legislation that have recently passed the House 

and the Senate to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to a long-term 

partnership. The Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act that would provide U.S. duty-free access to items 

produced in zones in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan 

also is an integral part of changing security perceptions in the region and should be a priority for this Congress. 

27 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Schmidle appears in the Appendix on page 66. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Ms. Curtis, thank you. Mr. Schmidle, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS SCHMIDLE,1 FELLOW, NEW 

AMERICA FOUNDATION 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. First, I would like to thank you, Chairman Carper, Senator Levin, and Senator Burris. I am honored for the opportunity to share some thoughts on the subject of strengthening 

U.S.-Pakistan relations today with a specific focus on explaining 

the character and dynamics of jihadist militancy in Pakistan. 

The United States is dependent on Pakistan for accomplishing its 

objectives in Afghanistan. Many of the insurgents fighting against 

American soldiers in Afghanistan are either based in Pakistan or 

being commanded from Pakistan. Top Afghan Taliban leaders use 

Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province, as their 

headquarters from where they direct operations in southern Afghanistan. And insurgents in eastern Afghanistan are being supported and led by networks in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas and, to a lesser extent, the North-West Frontier Province. 

I am going to focus my testimony today on those insurgent and 

jihadists fighting against the Pakistani Government, however. I 

often hear U.S. military officials describe their adversaries along 

the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in general terms such as ‘‘the 

enemy,’’ while in the same sentence proposing to isolate specific ‘‘irreconcilable’’ militants from specific ‘‘reconcilable’’ ones. But what 

is the character of the jihadist threat in Pakistan? I want to take 

a few minutes to answer this question in two parts. The first part 

is who constitutes the enemy in Pakistan, and the second part is 

how does the Pakistani military conceptualize the enemy. 

So who are the jihadists and insurgents fighting against the Pakistani Government? The Pakistani militants are not a monolithic, 

disciplined entity. They are probably best understood as belonging 

to one of three categories, each with different safe havens, objectives, and vulnerabilities. Those three groups are: First, foreign al 

Qaeda elements; second, Kashmiri and sectarian militants; and, 

third, Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, or the Pakistani Taliban Movement. 

The foreign militants—which are predominantly Arabs and 

Uzbeks, with a smaller number of Turks, Chechens, Africans, and 

some Europeans—can be classified as al Qaeda and are estimated 

to account for several hundred fighters. They are suspected of 

being based in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Mohmand 

Agency, Bajour, and in Swat. Owing to their internationalist backgrounds, most of them have international aims, whether it is committing terrorism abroad; committing terrorism against international targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan; or in order to consolidate their own control over these areas, committing violence 

against the traditional tribal authorities. Of the three categories of 

militants in Pakistan, these are by far the least interested in reconciliation. 

28 

The Kashmir and sectarian groups have long enjoyed a symbiotic 

relationship with the Pakistani State. In the mid-1980s, the main 

anti-Shia outfit, Sipah-e-Sahaba, was formed with military support 

with the goal of transforming Pakistan from being a Muslim state 

into being an explicitly Sunni Muslim State. However, Sipah-eSahaba members spent a considerable amount of time in Afghanistan during the Taliban era, participating in pogroms against Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara minorities. In the early 1990s, a Sipah-eSahaba splinter group, known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, was created 

with an even more ambitious and murderous agenda and has been 

accused in the abduction and murder of Daniel Pearl and the 

bombing of a church in Islamabad in 2002 and, to some extent, the 

assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-eJhangvi are the homegrown Pakistani equivalent of the sectarian 

death squads that have terrorized Iraq for years. 

Within the second category are also the Kashmiri militant groups 

like Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harakat-ul-Jihadi-Islami, and Lashkar-eTayyiba. Most of these groups, Kashmiri and sectarian ones alike, 

are based in southern Punjab, in and around Multan, Bahawalpur, 

and Jhang. The Kashmiri groups receive substantial support from 

the Pakistani intelligence agencies to carry out attacks against Indian forces in Kashmir, and this support and training makes them 

now particularly dangerous. So unlike many of the Pashtuns who 

call themselves Taliban and are fighting against the State, these 

fighters are simply more than just disgruntled men with guns. 

The uprising at the Red Mosque in July 2007 was critical for this 

reason, for not only did it bring together sectarian and Kashmiri 

militants from southern Punjab, but it also brought together 

Pashtuns from the border and Arab jihadist ideologues. But, second, and most importantly, it exposed the limitations of the Pakistani intelligence agencies, for while senior leaders of the state-supported jihadist groups went to the mosque to plead with the brothers who were in charge to halt their activities, the foot soldiers 

from these state-supported jihadist groups had already switched 

sides. In other words, the state may have succeeded in its bid to 

reconcile the leaders of some groups, but what good is a leader with 

no one to lead? Those who survived the final raid on the mosque 

ultimately fled to the tribal areas, where they have taken up refuge 

with the Taliban. 

This brings us now to the Pakistani Taliban, which have evolved 

into the lethal force they have become primarily because they represent a fusion of al Qaeda, Kashmiri and sectarian jihadist 

groups, and Pashtun discontent. Consider the case of Baituallah 

Mehsud and his organization based in the Mehsud areas of South 

Waziristan. Mehsud’s deputy, Qari Hussein, belongs to Lashkar-eJhangvi, the anti-Shia sectarian group. When his men kidnapped 

almost 200 Pakistani soldiers in August 2007, they looked through 

the soldiers’ gear, found at least one of them who was carrying 

Shia literature, and proceeded to have his head cut off—by a teenage boy with a knife. This sectarian facet is critical to understand 

because now we see most of the fighting in the Kurram Agency of 

the tribal areas occurring between Sunni Talibs and local Shia 

fighters. 

29 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz appears in the Appendix on page 71. 

So who is reconcilable? There are two groups of combatants who 

fall into this category: Those Pashtuns currently fighting alongside 

the Taliban who joined the Taliban out of a sense of ethnic identity 

and Pashtun nationalism, and those bandits and criminals who realized that donning a turban and beard provided some legitimacy 

to actions otherwise considered ‘‘banditry.’’ But the most important 

group that the Pakistani Government should be targeting with aid 

and security are those Pashtun-populated areas in the North-West 

Frontier Province and Baluchistan where the Taliban are not a significant presence yet. The more that Islamabad can portray the insurgency as being led by foreign religious extremists and not by 

local Pashtuns, the better chance it has of success. 

Could I have two paragraphs to talk about the Nazir Group here 

in the end? 

Senator CARPER. If they are short. 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. OK. Publicly, the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment has maintained a certain amount of confidence that it can pit various groups against one another. But as 

we were mentioning, as Senator Levin was mentioning earlier, in 

the Pakistani threat perception there are ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ Taliban, 

and this case certainly applies in South Waziristan, where right 

now the military is talking about an offensive there, and we see 

Baituallah Mehsud and his fighters coming under attack, and yet 

Maulvi Nazir being seemingly unfazed. 

Now, this relationship between Maulvi Nazir and the Pakistani 

military really dates back to the spring, April 2007, when Maulvi 

Nazir drove the Uzbek foreign al Qaeda elements out of his territory with support from the Pakistani army. The general who was 

in charge of this territory later confided to me that he had commanded his soldiers to take off their uniforms, to take AK–47s, to 

look like locals, and to fight ‘‘as Taliban’’ with the Taliban against 

these foreign fighters. So this story should show that the newfound vigor on display by the Pakistani army only pertains to some 

militant factions. 

I will end on that. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. Mr. Nawaz. 

TESTIMONY OF SHUJA NAWAZ,1 DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA 

CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. NAWAZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators Levin and 

Burris. I am honored to appear before you today to share my 

thoughts with you on what works and what could work in Pakistan, and how we can make the United States a better partner in 

building Pakistan safer and stronger. I speak as a Pakistani but 

also as someone who has lived and worked in the United States 

since 1972. 

While the situation in Pakistan may appear bleak, I do not think 

it is hopeless. Pakistan is a complex country, struggling nearly 62 

years since independence to define its nationhood. Repeated military and autocratic rule, both civil and military, has left its key institutions stunted. The limitations of its military rulers have been 

matched by the short-sightedness of its civil leadership. Most politVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:31 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 051790 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51790.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
30 

ical parties are run as personal fiefdoms and family businesses or 

on feudal patterns. Rarely do they allow internal democratic systems to emerged. Ironically, only the major religious party, the 

Jamaat-i-Islami, actually holds elections at various levels and routinely elects new leaders from the rank-and-file. 

I welcome President Obama’s and the U.S. Congress’ moves to 

change the relationship with Pakistan to focus on a longer-term 

commitment to the people of Pakistan and not on an alliance with 

any single person, party, or institution. In this season of bipartisan 

support for help to rebuild Pakistan and reshape U.S. policy, I offer 

some information and suggestions. 

First, we must recognize the emerging demographic shape of 

Pakistan: Over 60 percent of its population is below 30 years. Most 

of its youth are disenfranchised, disconnected with the economy 

and polity, and unemployed. They are disaffected and vulnerable to 

the blandishments of their radical co-religionists, who have used a 

convoluted interpretation of Islam to attract Pakistani youth to 

their side. 

Yet Pakistani society has strong sinews. When given the chance, 

its people work hard and do well. They helped build Britain’s textile factories and help run the economies of the Gulf States and the 

Arabian Peninsula. They remit about $6 billion a year to their 

homeland. A recent World Bank study showed that from 1980 to 

2007, Pakistan ranked second only to China’s 9.9 percent average 

GDP growth rate with a growth rate of 5.8 percent. All this in spite 

of government. Today Pakistan has a middle class of some 30 million with an average per capita income of $410,000 a year on a purchasing power parity basis. 

So how do we engage this complex Pakistan so we can leverage 

its strengths and build a long-lasting relationship? Certainly not by 

threats or coercion, for Pakistanis are a proud people and do not 

respond well to the carrots-and-sticks approach. In any case, such 

an approach is not employed by most of us in our personal friendships. Why would we use it with another country? Rather, we need 

to build trust on the basis of understanding. 

Pakistan’s military now appears to have recognized that the internal threats are more immediate than the looming presence of a 

powerful India to the east. But it does not have the full training 

nor the equipment to fight an insurgency. When the United States 

talks of counterinsurgency training, it sounds to the Pakistanis 

that they must abandon conventional defense. We must clarify that 

this is not the case. 

Until Pakistan’s threat perceptions change, we must be prepared 

to support its military in creating a hybrid force, ranging across the 

spectrum of capabilities. This will allow them to shift from the 

Committee on Information Needs (COIN) to conventional, as needed. 

Now, how can the United States become more effective? USAID 

is broken badly by years of neglect. It must be rebuilt, empowered, 

and given the staff to strategize and manage its projects, develop 

relationships inside Pakistan, and effectively deliver aid where it 

is needed. USAID is aptly named in my view. Most of its aid money 

stays in the United States. This must stop. USAID needs to stop 

31 

being a contract management agency and become again a powerful 

partner of U.S. diplomacy, working with local counterparts. 

We must also better coordinate assistance, so DOD, State, Treasury, Commerce, USTR, DOE, and other agencies work together 

rather than autonomously or at cross purposes. So Congress needs 

to support the Special Representative’s work in this regard. 

Trade can be a huge supplement to aid. Politically difficult moves 

such as the Free Trade Agreement and removal of quotas on textile 

imports would allow Pakistan to help itself. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics supports this idea. But 

we must encourage Pakistan to move up the value-added chain towards manufacturers if it is to stay ahead of the population growth 

curve. 

The ROZs fall in the same category. It is a very expensive solution, but it is not a permanent solution to the problem. So we must 

encourage Pakistan to move up the value-added ladder towards 

manufacturers, as I said, and to have these ROZs located near population hubs and communications. 

There is a better way of creating jobs in FATA, and we have a 

calculation that if you create 300,000 jobs in FATA, you have basically eliminated the entire pool of unemployed youth in the area 

which are being recruited by the Taliban. 

On retraining the military, we must recognize that the Pakistan 

army also needs help in keeping up its conventional force even 

while we build up its mobility and ability to fight militants. Mr. 

Chairman, four helicopters will not do the trick. The United States 

can and should divert larger numbers of helicopters and COIN-oriented equipment to Pakistan as it replaces the fleets of European 

Allies, for example. 

We must also replace the coalition support funds with regular 

foreign military funding with milestones and benchmarks proposed 

by Pakistan’s military and agreed to by the United States. This 

will help transform the current patronage relationship from an 

army for hire to an army that is fighting Pakistan’s own war. 

How do we attract the aid monies and make their use transparent? I believe in accountability, Mr. Chairman, and responsible 

use of domestic and foreign funds. Pakistan does not have the ability to track its civil or military expenditures effectively; we must 

help Pakistan to create these systems. A comprehensive financial 

tracking system in the Ministry of Finance and in the Ministry of 

Defense will help strengthen civilian control and supremacy inside 

Pakistan. 

Chairman CARPER. Mr. Nawaz, I am going to ask you to wrap 

up your testimony please. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, sir. 

The Pakistani Diaspora can provide the backbone for such efforts. On its part, the U.S. Government needs to make its aid 

transparent. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I return to the complexity of 

Pakistan, its strategic choices and external and domestic challenges. The United States must work behind the scenes to understand Pakistan’s security concerns and to alleviate them, and India 

is a key player in this region. The United States must use its influence with India so that it shows, in the words of my friend Peter 

Jones at the University of Ottawa, ‘‘strategic altruism.’’ Both India 

32 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Fick appears in the Appendix on page 75. 

and Pakistan must leapfrog the hurdles of historical distrust and 

conflicts to fight the common enemies of poverty, terror, and religious extremism. There is no alternative. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. Mr. Fick, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF NATHANIEL FICK,1 CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. FICK. Thank you, Chairman Carper, distinguished Members 

of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today. 

My comments this afternoon are based largely on a research 

project I have just completed with my colleagues David Kilcullen 

and Andrew Exum. I know you are familiar with Dr. Kilcullen’s 

work in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Mr. Exum is currently 

serving on General McChrystal’s assessment team in Kabul. I have 

submitted our entire formal report as written testimony. 

Avoiding the worst outcomes in Pakistan over the coming year 

demands that we focus on securing areas that are still under government control, build up the police and civil authority, and measure progress against realistic benchmarks so that we know what is 

working and what must be changed. 

The near-term challenge for the United States and its allies is 

to stop the extremist advance, both geographically and psychologically. If the militant advance is not at least halted in the coming year in the Pakistani State, including the supply routes supporting the coalition in Afghanistan and Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal could face an existential threat. 

The first priority is to change two policies that have proven especially destabilizing: Drone strikes against targets beyond al Qaeda 

in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West 

Frontier, and unconditionally aiding the Pakistani military at the 

expense of other security forces. 

Remote attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles are currently the 

U.S.’s primary method of combating violent extremism in northwest Pakistan. The appeal of drone attacks for policymakers is 

clear, their positive effects are measurable, and they avoid coalition 

casualties. They create a sense of insecurity among militants and 

constrain their interactions with each other. 

Despite these advantages, the costs of drone attacks as they are 

currently being conducted inside Pakistan outweigh the benefits, 

and they are in the current context harmful to U.S. and allied interests. U.S. officials vehemently dispute, rightly, the civilian casualty figures used by the Pakistani press, and it seems certain that 

far more militants and far fewer civilians have been killed than is 

reported there. 

What matters as much as the real numbers, however, is the perception of these operations among the people in the FATA and the 

northwest frontier, as well as among the people of Pakistan’s other 

provinces. Even beyond the Pashtun belt, drone strikes against 

Taliban targets as opposed to al Qaeda excite visceral opposition 

across a broad spectrum of Pakistani opinion. The U.S. reliance on 

33 

drones also displays every characteristic of a tactic or, more accurately, a piece of technology substituting for a strategy. 

Currently strikes from unmanned aircraft are being carried out 

in a virtual vacuum without a concerted information operations 

campaign or an equally robust strategy to engage the Pakistani 

people more holistically. Killing terrorists is necessary. Expanding 

the target list beyond al Qaeda, as happened in the wake of 

Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, empowers the very people the coalition seeks to undermine. 

With militant attacks spreading east of the Indus River and 

threatening the urban centers of Punjab and Sindh, where much 

of the Pakistani middle class lives, the United States and its Pakistani allies should build on their strengths by drawing a notional 

line at the Indus River to defend those people already under the 

control of the central government. One element in this strategy 

should be the reallocation of funds from the Pakistani military and 

intelligence services—which continue to view India as Pakistan’s 

most pressing threat—and toward the police. 

The Kerry-Lugar Act is a welcome step in the right direction. It 

decouples military from non-military aid, triples that non-military 

aid to $1.5 billion a year, and includes increased allocations for the 

police, independent judiciary, and anticorruption efforts. It also— 

and I will cover this in more detail shortly—requires benchmarks 

and criteria for measuring the effectiveness of U.S. assistance. 

To be sure, short-term aid to the police forces is not a long-term 

fix for Pakistan. In the coming year, however, the neglected Pakistani police forces must be bolstered so that they can credibly secure the populations of Punjab and Sindh from militant attacks. 

All strategies require constant assessment, and President 

Obama’s plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan is no exception. In the 

speech unveiling his new approach, the President promised to set 

clear metrics and consistently assess the impact of U.S. policies. 

Effective benchmarks, as Mr. Jones correctly stated earlier, 

should measure outcomes for the population rather than inputs by 

governments. Too often, the international community has measured progress by tracking money raised, money spent, or troops deployed. These are inputs, not outcomes, and they measure effort 

not effectiveness. 

Better benchmarks track trends in the proportion to the population that feels safe, can access essential services, enjoys social 

justice and the rule of law, engages in political activity, and earns 

a living without fear of insurgents, drug traffickers, or corrupt officials. 

Because perception matters in politics and the coalition’s goals 

are political—to marginalize the extremists, bolster the government, and wean the population away from armed struggle—perceived outcomes matter the most. It is not enough to make people 

objectively safer and better off. Before they are willing to put down 

their weapons and support the government, the population must 

feel safer and must perceive the government as the winning side. 

Key metrics to watch in Pakistan include the rate at which 

Taliban chapters continue to open in the Punjab and whether the 

balance of 2009 sees more attacks in the urban centers of Karachi 

and Lahore. These developments would indicate that instability is 

34 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mowatt-Larssen appears in the Appendix on page 78. 

increasing in the Punjab and Sindh heartlands and would suggest 

that the situation on the ground is worsening. 

The assassination rate of maliks is another indicator. The 

Taliban have killed hundreds of maliks since 2004, a sign of intimidation and illustrating the erosion of civil society and the collapse 

of law and order. A drop in killings might simply indicate that 

most maliks have been killed or driven away from their districts, 

but continued high assassination rates would indicate ongoing insecurity. 

In closing, I would like to make an overarching suggestion. During the campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan, one slogan 

unified all efforts of the U.S. Government: ‘‘Get the Russians out.’’ 

For this campaign we should consider using ‘‘Build local capacity,’’ 

which, while maybe not as catchy, has the virtue of being clear and 

one word shorter. 

Thank you for the privilege of testifying before you today. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. 

TESTIMONY OF ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN,1 SENIOR FELLOW, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL 

AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Thank you. Good afternoon, gentlemen. 

The Subcommittee asked me to address three issues: First, to assess the security challenge to Pakistani nuclear weapons; second, 

address the nuclear terrorism threat, in other words, the terrorist 

nuclear intent and capability; and, third, to make some recommendations on what might guide stronger cooperation between 

the United States and Pakistan. 

To that end, I wrote a paper with my Harvard colleague and nuclear security expert, Matthew Bunn. I provided that paper as a restricted document to the Subcommittee so we could go in full into 

this topic, particularly the cooperation, without hyping or otherwise 

exacerbating any sensitivities, particularly when cooperation entails issues that affect national sovereignty as well as specific nuclear sensitivities that obviously, whether we are talking about 

Pakistan, the United States, or any other country, are very relevant. 

It is also, I think, for context, important to bear in mind that it 

is very dangerous to hype the issue of losing control of Pakistani 

nuclear weapons. I think any statement I have made certainly has 

stressed that the Pakistan military that protects the nuclear arsenal is a very professional organization. It takes its duties extremely 

serious, and I do not think anything I would say would question 

the degree of effort that they have put into this or their intent. 

I think the bigger question here is the problem we face itself has 

a zero tolerance standard, which applies particularly when we are 

looking at Pakistan but also globally. It is a standard that President Obama laid out very clearly in Prague, and I think changed 

the entire nuclear landscape. He described it as ‘‘a single bomb 

threshold,’’ where a bomb going off, a terrorist bomb, in any city 

of the world changes life for everybody. That is the standard that 

35 

we are worried about when we think about upgrading security in 

any country in the world and the nature of the cooperation. I think 

that demands to cooperate are enhanced. 

The essential challenge we face is that terrorists only have to be 

successful one time, we have to be successful every time. And there 

is no such thing as perfect security or perfect anything if my 36 

years in the government are of any relevance. 

I would like to summarize just a few of the highlights of things 

I think would be germane to say publicly. First, there are three 

trends that Pakistanis face that in particular affect them. They are 

not unique to Pakistan, but they are trends that are particularly 

worrisome. First is the increasing levels of extremism in the country that exacerbate the threats for insiders working with outsiders, 

the insiders in the nuclear establishment working with outsiders to 

either take out material or facilitate people’s access inside. 

Second, their program, unlike many programs in the world, is an 

expanding program, a rapidly expanding program. More weapons 

in more places means more potential for things to go wrong. 

And third is the potential threat to a change in government and 

the challenges that might pose that have not been fully considered. 

The challenge to the national command authorities who control the 

nuclear command and control is not trivial at all. Now again, I am 

sure that the Pakistani establishment is taking it extremely serious and working through all the scenarios they think could occur. 

Second area of broad interest, what can terrorists do? Can terrorists, in fact, detonate a nuclear weapon? It is very hard for a terrorist group to do this. No one is saying it is easy. Is it more than 

1 percent? If it is, it is an existential problem, and that is what we 

face. 

Terrorists have three pathways to do this. They can steal a 

bomb, they can attack a facility, or they can steal enough material 

to construct a bomb. We know since Aum Shinrikyo in the early 

1990s and al Qaeda as early as 1993 that the intent is clear, terrorist groups want to do this. The only thing we think that they 

have not been able to do, which is significant, is overcome the barriers in terms of having the capability. And that is what we are 

trying to stop by ensuring security of all nuclear facilities globally, 

but particularly in unstable areas. 

Finally, in looking at cooperation, just to discuss in a more general sense, I think one thing in particular I would stress is the insider threat. We have seen in the United States, itself, that we 

have had arrests in my time in the Department of Energy, for example, of employees that had issues. So, therefore, again, we think 

we have something to share. We think all countries should share 

more about nuclear security-related upgrading. The Pakistan-U.S. 

effort in this regard, from my standpoint, is a model for how countries need to think. And I think the International Atomic Energy 

Agency should play a bigger role. 

Second, how do they strengthen protection against outsiders, particularly outsiders who will attack a facility? 

Third, talking about winning the battle of hearts and minds— 

and I have heard some of that here today. And most notably with 

hearts and minds is making the point that Islam as a great religion 

in no way would condone the slaughtering of innocents that is part 

36 

and parcel of a nuclear terrorist attack. Groups like al Qaeda or 

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or others cannot get a free ride expressing the 

intent as a legitimate expression under Islam, and it is important 

that clerics and groups worldwide, particularly nongovernmental 

groups, work against that trend. 

Fourth, increasing threat awareness, the fact that nuclear terrorism is not still regarded as a real threat in many parts of the 

world, as I alluded to earlier. 

And, finally, the improvement of joint communications and reducing misunderstandings. If the United States and Pakistan do 

nothing else than have a robust trust and communication that is 

created through these exchanges, by my standard, again, of the 

most important things we need to do, that would be at the top of 

the list. We can resort to those mechanisms, particularly in a crisis 

where there is a suggestion—whether it has happened or not—that 

there may be a lost nuke or an attack on a facility, and we are 

dealing with reports that have to be confirmed and the only way 

we are going to really be able to do that is through trusted channels between Pakistan and the United States. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Yes, thank you for excellent testimony from all 

of you. And Senator Levin, who has been here in the U.S. Senate 

for a long time, heard a lot of witnesses, a lot of panels of witnesses, said to me just before he slipped out during Mr. MowattLarssen’s testimony, he said, ‘‘These are damn good witnesses.’’ 

And I have sat next to him in a bunch of hearings over time, and 

I do not think I have heard him ever say that. I am sure he has 

thought it. But this is really exceptionally a good panel, and thank 

you all for sharing your thoughts with us. 

I am going to yield to Senator Burris if he has any final questions or comments. I have a number of questions I want to ask before we conclude. I think we are going to vote at 4:45, about 20 

minutes from now. But I would like for us to get in more questions. 

Senator Burris, any comments or questions you would like to ask, 

feel free. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am listening to this 

excellent testimony and thought I knew a lot until now. Mr. 

Schmidle, maybe you can help me out here. I am trying now to distinguish between whether or not the Pakistanis or al Qaeda or the 

Afghans or the Talibans or each of these groups, are these Pakistanis that are what we would call militants and they are joining 

the anti-force within their own government that are now fighting 

for or against our troops that would cross over the border and go 

back into Afghanistan? Could you clear this up for me since now 

I have listened to such excellent testimony and am trying to sort 

it out? 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. Senator Burris, thank you. I am not sure that I 

can totally clarify it. I think that it is incredibly murky, as you suggested. 

Those who are fighting in Pakistan, there are very few Afghans 

who are crossing the border to fight with the Taliban against the 

Pakistani Government. There are, however, many Pakistanis who 

up until the time—really we have to look at this July 2007 government raid of the mosque in Islamabad as a turning point when the 

37 

insurgency against the government became popular for a while 

amongst the various militant groups, who up until that point, even 

though they thought that President Musharraf was doing the work 

of the Americans and there was still some opposition to him, still 

primarily focused their attention on fighting American and NATO 

forces across the border in Afghanistan. 

So since that event, though, it did attract a great amount of attention from the various militant groups. Those Pashtuns, however, 

who are fighting in the North West Frontier Province are not necessarily militants. I mean, some of them are simply tribesmen who, 

over the course of the past several years, have in an accidental 

bombing raid by the Pakistanis had their house destroyed and have 

then said, OK, well, I have now sworn the rest of my life to avenging my wife’s death, or whatever. 

It is multi-layered as to who the actual belligerents are in this 

struggle. I do not know if that clarifies things at all. 

Senator BURRIS. It does not. Can anyone help me out here? 

Ms. CURTIS. If I might? 

Senator BURRIS. Sure, please, Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. I think you have hit on a major crux of the problem, 

sir, and this has been that we have seen from the Pakistan Government, the military in particular, a dual policy of fighting some terrorists and supporting others. And it has not worked, sir. It is 

threatening to our interests in the region, threatening to their own 

interests in the region. And I think that is why we see such a confused situation—— 

Senator BURRIS. Is the Taliban—they are al Qaeda? 

Ms. CURTIS. What I am saying, sir, is that Pakistan has supported and elements of the security services probably are supporting parts of the Afghani Taliban to protect their own interests 

vis-a-vis India. They do not want India to have a foothold in Afghanistan, so this is part of the problem that we do have different 

objectives, and I think what we need to see from Pakistan is a 

more holistic approach to militancy and a willingness to confront 

the militancy and confront all militant groups on the same level 

rather than, as we heard from one of the other witnesses, shifting 

alliances, supporting some groups on one day, other groups on another day. 

It seems this policy has failed. It has failed to provide security 

in this region, and it is threatening to global national security interests. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Nawaz, can you help me out a little bit? 

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, Senator, if I can just simplify it, the Afghan 

Taliban comprised the so-called Quetta Shura and then the 

Haqqani group, which is in North Waziristan and the group belonging to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that operates in the northern regions of FATA from Nuristan and Kunar Valley. 

The Afghan Taliban have not gotten into any battles with the 

Pakistan army. They have avoided it, and the Pakistan army has 

returned the favor. They have not made it difficult for them to seek 

sanctuary in Pakistan. The local Taliban, the ones that Mr. 

Schmidle was referring to—— 

Senator BURRIS. When you say ‘‘local,’’ you mean the Afghan 

Taliban? 

38 

Mr. NAWAZ. The Pakistani Taliban. 

Senator BURRIS. Oh, the Pakistan Taliban. 

Mr. NAWAZ. They are known, in fact, as the Tehreek-e Taliban 

of Pakistan or the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. They emerged 

only in the last couple of years. They have aligned themselves as 

franchisees of al Qaeda at times as well as aligned themselves with 

the Punjabi militant groups, the Sunni groups that were previously 

supported by the Pakistan intelligence services in Kashmir against 

India. So new alliances have been formed that are now operating 

inside Pakistan against the Pakistani State. 

But just to be clear, the Afghan Taliban have not taken up arms 

generally against the Pakistan army, and the army has not, therefore, chosen to attack them. This is a sort of oversimplified view. 

There are areas where there are some crossovers, but this is probably the best that one can do in—— 

Senator BURRIS. So this is what our combatants over there are 

trying to deal with it? 

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FICK. Senator Burris, could I add one comment—— 

Senator BURRIS. Please, Mr. Fick. 

Mr. FICK [continuing]. From the perspective of a former combatant. I would suggest that one easy way to think about it is almost 

like the concentric rings of a target. And if at the center of the target you have the groups with ambitions beyond the theater, Afghanistan and Pakistan, specifically al Qaeda, an organization with 

global ambition, the next concentric ring going out would be organizations with ambitions perhaps throughout Pakistan, and then 

wider still are groups with more local and limited ambitions. 

And as you get closer to the heart of that bull’s eye, the heart 

of that target, the greater is the threat to the United States and 

the more latitude we should have to deal with it militarily. As you 

get closer out to the edges there, to the groups that have more local 

and limited ambition, we have to be much more careful militarily 

for risk of turning the people against us. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. You bet. Thank you. Thank you so much for 

joining us today, Senator Burris. 

I was just saying to Wendy Anderson, our senior staff person on 

these issues, it seems to me—and I have sort of moved toward this 

thought as I listened to the first panel and now our second panel— 

the importance of reducing tensions between Pakistan and India 

and sometimes I think in terms of a two-fer, or I think we may 

have a three-fer here in this case: One, to the extent that those 

tensions are significantly reduced; first, reduce the likelihood of a 

war between those two countries and potential for nuclear exchange. 

Second, it allows the Pakistan military to focus on counterinsurgency rather than fighting a war with the country of India. One of 

you talked about helicopters and we need more than just four helicopters. The Pakistanis need more than four or six, for that matter. 

But then it would be, folks, the kind of military equipment and capabilities that frankly have not much at all to do with India. 

The third is that one of you spoke about how the Pakistanis provide almost a safe harbor for—I think it was through the Afghan 

39 

Taliban so that the Afghan Taliban can go back and forth and really destabilize the Government of Afghanistan, keep them occupied 

in an effort to reduce the presence or the successful involvement 

of India in Afghanistan. If I were the Pakistanis, I would not want 

to be surrounded on one side by a hostile India and on the other 

side, on my other flank, by an Afghanistan that is allied with 

India. 

I think that those are potentially at least three good things that 

flow from reducing tensions. My hope going forward is that the efforts that have been started before in the 1990s and even in this 

decade that they will not just begin anew, but will begin with our 

strongest support and encouragement. 

Anybody have a thought on what I just said? You do not have 

to, but if you do I welcome it. Yes, Ms. Curtis? 

Ms. CURTIS. Yes, I think the India-Pakistan rivalry, deep-seated, 

historical, three wars, military crisis, so I think to try to say that, 

‘‘Well, if we could just get Pakistan to not have to worry about its 

border with India, then it could focus on militants,’’ is just too simplistic. We have to look at what led to the derailing of the dialogue. 

We had a very productive Indo-Pakistani dialogue from 2004 to 

2007. The Mumbai attacks, a Pakistan-based group conducting a 

rampage, killing 160 people in India in November 2008. 

Senator CARPER. Excuse me for interrupting, but do you think 

that attack had anything to do with trying to undermine the discussions that were going on? 

Ms. CURTIS. I think it probably did. I think it probably was 

aimed at causing conflict between the two countries and probably 

was aimed at taking Pakistani forces away from fighting the militants in the tribal areas to having to focus on the India border. But 

India also has to think about its security, and if it is being attacked 

and the elements are coming from Pakistan, then it has to prepare 

itself as well. So we have to keep this in mind. 

I think the role that the United States can play is to quietly encourage them to get back to talks, but talks that will really allow 

them to view the region differently, focus on non-state actors that 

destabilize both countries. Rather than trying for the United States 

to insert itself into the very sensitive Kashmir issue. 

Senator CARPER. Notice I have not mentioned Kashmir at all. 

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I think this issue has been dealt with in the 

past through the back-channel negotiations that were mentioned 

before; there has been movement. So encouraging the two sides to 

get back to those talks bilaterally I think should be the focus of the 

United States. 

Senator CARPER. Another comment? Mr. Nawaz. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, Senator. I am often referred to as an optimist. 

But then a friend—— 

Senator CARPER. So am I. 

Mr. NAWAZ. A friend reminds me that a pessimist is an optimist 

with experience. 

Senator CARPER. Yes, I think you noted that in your comments. 

I wrote that down. I hope you do not mind if I use it. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Not at all. Senator, I think the key is not simply in 

making this a linear equation between opening up the dialogue beVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:31 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 051790 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51790.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
40 

tween India and Pakistan and getting Pakistan to focus on militancy. 

The longer-term goal really must be to strengthen both Pakistan 

and India so that they can achieve their economic potential. India 

has 300 million people living at absolute poverty; Pakistan has also 

huge gaps between the rich and the poor, and the opportunity cost 

of their defense expenditures is extremely high. So whatever can 

be done by the United States and other friends of both countries 

in opening up a dialogue between the two countries, opening up 

trade, for instance, which would create vested interest groups on 

both sides, which would make war impossible, should be encouraged. 

Economics 101 dictates that neighbors should be major trading 

partners. Neither India nor Pakistan is each other’s major trading 

partners. India’s major trading partner is the United States or 

China, depending on how one counts the figures. Pakistan’s major 

trading partner is the United States. And neither are neighbors of 

the United States. 

So it is very critical to try and reopen the dialogue that had 

begun, that was near fruition, at least on three of the four key 

areas where there was conflict, with Kashmir having been decided 

as an issue that was best left to settle by itself and to grow organically so that the line of control would become irrelevant. I think 

that is the approach that needs to be encouraged. And that will 

allow Pakistan to become economically and politically stronger and, 

therefore, be able to deal with the militancy at home. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Let me return to the issue of 

security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and particularly with the 

points I think raised by Mr. Mowatt-Larssen with respect to insider 

threats at nuclear facilities. 

I am going to ask you to try and be brief; we are going to start 

voting in about 5 minutes. So please be brief in responding. But as 

I think, as you rightly point out in your testimony, the Pakistani 

military intelligence and nuclear establishment are not immune to 

rising levels of extremism in Pakistan. 

Do you believe that increasing levels of extremism create or exacerbate the insider threat at nuclear facilities? We will just start 

with you, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Yes, I would Mr. Chairman. In fact, I 

would describe the insider threat from the standpoint of my background in intelligence and security and counterintelligence as their 

No. 1 threat. It is a far more likely possibility than, say, the more 

hyped problems of losing control of a nuke or a convoy being ambushed. Those things are things that have to, of course, be eliminated from possibility, but the possibility of the insider who is able 

to gain access to a facility and, say, over time bring out material 

or technology, we have already seen in Pakistan. And I know it 

does not help to raise this all the time, but the A.Q. Khan network 

where, of course, the father of the Pakistan program was working 

outside the control of the Pakistan establishment, that is, of course, 

something that is always going to be there, as well as the group 

that worked with al Qaeda and bin Laden specifically after September 11, 2001, that was trying to do the same thing. So we have 

already seen very scary examples of the insider threat. 

41 

What exacerbates it even more—and I will close with this 

thought—is the fact that we know that nuclear materials have 

been out there, accessible for terrorists to buy on the black market. 

There have been 19 incidents of weapons-usable material that have 

been seized on the black markets in the last 15 years. So we know 

that there is a problem, and in all 19 of those cases, to the best 

of my knowledge, they were not reported as missing from the facilities that they started at. So we do have a problem, and it is very 

important for the Pakistanis to simply exclude the possibility that 

insiders could take material out so terrorists can construct a nuclear bomb. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. Mr. Schmidle, and then Ms. 

Curtis. 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. I just want to comment on whether the scientists, 

the army, the intelligence agencies are more or less prone to extremism than anyone else in society. I do not think that is the case. 

I think when you look at who is composed of the scientists, who 

is composed of the army, and even in the case of the ISI—which 

is often labeled as being excessively Islamist. The ISI is picked 

from the army; the army is picked from the population. The population, up until very recently, was sympathetic to the idea of the 

Taliban, was sympathetic to the idea of them as righteous Muslims, slightly misguided, but at least doing what they thought was 

in the right way. 

I think that the game has changed in the past couple of months 

with the idea of the Taliban and the reality of the Taliban have collapsed. I also do not know to what extent there was ever really 

sympathy. I never heard common sympathy from common people 

for al Qaeda. Maybe for al Qaeda leaders as symbols, but not for 

al Qaeda tactics. 

Senator CARPER. Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. Yes, I agree with Mr. Mowatt-Larssen that the biggest threat is the insider threat rather than the idea that somehow 

the government or the military is overthrown by extremists. 

But that said, I think it is important for the military leadership 

to be clear on how much of a danger extremists are posing to the 

country. And this gets back to the point—Senator Burris is not 

here—but the fact is in the past the Taliban has been seen as a 

strategic asset for Pakistan, and so it is incumbent on the military 

leadership to explain to the public that ‘‘no, these are threats to the 

country.’’ 

And we are beginning to see that General Kayani did state last 

Friday, in his speech to Staff College, to upcoming military officers, 

that while there still were external threats, the most immediate 

threat to Pakistan right now was internal. 

So I think these kinds of statements are extremely important because they do in a sense form the thinking within the military, 

which is very important. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

A question for Mr. Schmidle, if I could. Maybe two questions. 

First of all, how resilient or dedicated are the people of Pakistan 

to continue supporting the nation’s campaign in South Waziristan? 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. I think that the test case is ultimately the plight 

of the refugees. I think that the plight of the refugees is more imVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:31 Dec 10, 2009 Jkt 051790 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\51790.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
42 

portant right now than any military operation and the government 

can do because the Pashtuns on either side of the border right now 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan are watching to see whether the Pakistani army is, (A) serious about actually catching the heads of the 

Swat-based Taliban, Maulana Fazlullah and his associates, and, 

(B) serious about bringing the people back to their homes, convincing them the Pakistani army may have messed up once, but it 

will not mess up again, that it is now there for their security. 

I think this is the most critical thing. I think that if the army 

takes its eye off the ball and now goes into South Waziristan, 

leaves these 2.5 million refugees in Swat, creates another couple of 

hundred thousand refugees in South Waziristan, I think the public 

support will begin dissipating very quickly. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Fick, any thoughts on that? 

Mr. FICK. I agree. 

Senator CARPER. Short answer, isn’t it? Right to the point. That 

is good. No, you can stop right there. I have more questions, so 

thank you. 

Again back to Mr. Schmidle, if I could. Could you just elaborate 

for us, if you will, on your recommendation that Pakistan refrain 

from launching a campaign in South Waziristan? You talked about 

this in what you just said, but help me again. You may have said 

this, but again, what alternatives would you offer to that? 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. The alternatives I think are—I feel like the problem is overextension more than anything else. I feel like you fail 

to consolidate what has been a military success, to a certain degree, in Swat. 

Senator CARPER. It reminds me just a little bit of our involvement in Afghanistan—— 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. I would agree wholeheartedly, that taking the eye 

off the ball into Iraq—— 

Senator CARPER [continuing]. In 2001. 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. Definitely. But I think that it then complicates— 

I think that it also exposes the inherent incompatibilities of U.S. 

and Pakistan priorities and perhaps creates more short-term problems for collaboration, and right now there is some level of momentum, there is some level of support. I think that when the United 

States sees that the Pakistani army is only going after some of 

these Taliban leaders and leaving others to cross the border at 

ease, it then resuscitates some of these bilateral problems between 

the two countries. 

Senator CARPER. Please, Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. I would disagree somewhat, sir. I think that what 

you risk is if you are squeezing the Swat Valley, taking operations 

there, a lot of these people are going to be able to still find safe 

haven in South Waziristan—or North Waziristan for that matter. 

So I think it is important while the Pakistani public is supporting the military in these operations that they do carry the fight 

to South Waziristan as well. I understand the plight of the refugees. That has to be dealt with, but that is mainly an issue for the 

civilian government to be dealing with. 

So I have to say I see it a bit differently, and I do not compare 

it to the situation with the United States and Iraq and Afghanistan 

because I think that you would have synergy in terms of if the 

43 

Pakistanis are squeezing the militants in South Waziristan, you 

have the coalition forces on the other side in Afghanistan, and then 

we can finally have this hammer and anvil strategy that we have 

been working toward for so long. And you do have the Pakistani 

public behind these operations in Swat Valley, so I would just have 

to disagree, and I think we should be encouraging them to also 

start squeezing the militant safe haven in the tribal areas as well. 

Senator CARPER. Just very briefly, go ahead. 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. I think we should not mistake what is a change 

in will on the part of the Pakistani army with what is not a change 

in capacity. The Pakistani army does not have the ability to take 

on the entire tribal belt if it is inflamed with Taliban insurgency, 

which it would be if they went into South Waziristan. 

Senator CARPER. OK, thanks. Let me just follow up on that with 

a question of Mr. Nawaz and probably Ms. Curtis, and that is, your 

assessment, please, of the ability of Pakistan to adopt and integrate counterinsurgency doctrine. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Senator, I think there has been some attempt, but 

it is going to take a long time. The army is still very much conventional and its stance is conventional, and it is still looking at most 

of these actions as low-intensity conflict and not as counterinsurgency. They do not have the equipment nor the training. And, 

therefore, I do not think that they are quite ready. 

If you look at Swat, it was really conventional use of the military 

and it is not counterinsurgency. In my own conversation with senior military leaders, they tell me that they do not have the capacity 

to hold Swat or Bajour or other parts of FATA, that they need to 

have civilian counterparts and the police force that will be there— 

which is why the new move to induct ex-servicemen into the police 

force is probably a good idea. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Ms. Curtis and then maybe a former marine would share a thought on this. Ms. Curtis, please. 

Ms. CURTIS. Well, obviously—— 

Senator CARPER. I do not know if you are ever a former marine. 

At least I do not think so. 

Mr. FICK. Just never an ex-Marine. 

Senator CARPER. There you go. 

Ms. CURTIS. Well, obviously the capability issue is an enormous 

one, and I think the United States is going to have to play a very 

large role in assisting the Pakistanis with counterinsurgency training, with equipment, more helicopters, as you specified, and then 

also encouraging the military to work with the civilian leadership 

to develop a comprehensive approach to be able to hold and build 

areas. And this is definitely going to be an uphill battle, but I think 

it is something that has to be done. We cannot really hesitate in 

following through on this. 

But it is my understanding that there has been some measure 

of resistance within the Pakistan military to receive this kind of 

training. This may be starting to change, but I think it is something we need to keep working toward because it will be absolutely 

critical because now that they have gone in, militarily, particularly 

the Swat Valley, they will have to work on a hold and build strategy. They cannot allow the Taliban to come back in. This would be, 

44 

I think, sort of devastating for security in the country and the future stability of the rest of the country. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Fick, please. 

Mr. FICK. I would suggest that the use of heavy artillery is inversely correlated with effective counterinsurgency, and the Pakistani army right now is using a lot of heavy artillery in the west, 

which is why I am suggesting that we look at the police. And we 

should not get too wrapped up over the question of whether the 

Pakistani army can effectively conduct a counterinsurgency campaign. We should look at whether the Pakistani Government can 

do it. And that requires using different tools. 

For most people, especially in rural areas, contact with the police 

is the only contact or the most frequent contact they have with 

their government, and this is the first line of contact and defense 

for the Pakistani Government. In terms of training the police, we 

should not look to our military. Posse Comitatus works. Our military is not good at training police, so we need to find other ways 

to do it. 

Senator CARPER. Well, we have some experience in training police in Iraq. 

Mr. FICK. And Afghanistan. 

Senator CARPER. And now in Afghanistan. 

Mr. FICK. And we are much better at training militaries than we 

are at training police. 

If I could get back to your earlier question with regard to South 

Waziristan and suggest that you look at the work that then-Colonel 

Mick Nicholson, now Brigadier General in RC South—— 

Senator CARPER. We know him. 

Mr. FICK. The work he did in RC East when he was a brigade 

commander, effectively influencing tribes across the border in 

Waziristan, is another model. He had great success. 

Senator CARPER. That is a good point. Thank you. As we come 

to the end here, we have a vote underway, and so we are going to 

excuse you very shortly. 

One of the things I like to do when we have a panel this diverse, 

and frankly this well regarded and thoughtful, one of the things I 

like to do is to ask you to say—just run down the list really quick, 

Ms. Curtis, as you listened to your other four colleagues here on 

the panel, I am sure they said some things you agree with, some 

things that you do not agree with. Just think back to maybe one 

of the points or two that you most agree with, that the other panelists, your colleagues, have suggested. Anything come to mind? 

There has to be one or two. 

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think that Mr. Schmidle did an excellent job 

of explaining the different Pakistani militant groups and clarifying 

a lot of those issues. So I think I agree with everything he said in 

his oral remarks. And I think he spelled out clearly how complex 

this situation is and demonstrated from the Pakistani viewpoint 

what exactly they are dealing with. 

And Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, I think I agree with how he characterized the threat of the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons, the dangers of hyping that threat. I think too often we 

focus on that. What I say is it is a low-probability but high-risk scenario. I think the Pakistan military takes the safety and security 

45 

of its nuclear weapons very seriously, and there is no reason to 

panic, but at the same time, obviously, it is an issue that we have 

to stay attuned to. 

Senator CARPER. Great, thanks. Mr. Schmidle, among the comments of your colleagues, what really stands out in your mind that 

you want to reinforce with us? 

Mr. SCHMIDLE. Mr. Fick’s point about the police and about thinking of the Indus River as a conceptual line. I think it is a lot less 

threatening for the Pakistani Government and for the Pakistani 

military and intelligence establishment to accept American police 

trainers in the Punjab, which is a much less politically sensitive 

area to be working with police there, training, building up capacity 

in areas that have not been hit by the Taliban yet, but could be 

the next line. And I think that is a very good point and something 

that should be taken into consideration. 

Senator CARPER. OK, thanks. Mr. Nawaz, same question, please. 

Mr. NAWAZ. I agree with Mr. Fick’s point that counterinsurgencies are won by police and not by the military, and also 

that the nuclear threat will always be there because there is no 

perfect security. But there are enough very serious minded people 

in the military and in the Government of Pakistan that are devoted 

to ensuring that the Nuclear Command Authority and the Strategic 

Plans Division remains active and totally involved. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Mr. Fick. 

Mr. FICK. I like to look at things in terms of the most likely 

course of action and the most dangerous course of action. And Mr. 

Schmidle addresses the most likely course of action, one of the Pakistani army and government supporting some groups while fighting 

others; that is something I am going to take away. 

The most dangerous course of action here, the existential threat, 

if there is one, is nuclear. And Mr. Mowatt-Larssen’s point about 

the insider threat is something that I am going to look more into. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. 

Mr. MOWATT-LARSSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it has been fascinating for me just what my colleagues have discussed that directly pertains to the ultimate effectiveness of nuclear security, and 

that is my biggest takeaway. As that battle goes, particularly the 

battle for the control of the country and the hearts and minds and 

the antipathies towards the United States, lowering those reduces 

that insider threat. 

I also agree, actually, with the comment by Mr. Schmidle that 

there is no greater propensity for the use of nuclear weapons to be 

extremist than any other segment of society. I do not even know 

what the statistics are, but it is that the consequences are that 

much higher in that actuarial calculation if one or two are. 

Finally, I would have to pile on to the police equation from the 

stand point of something we have talked about as well on the nuclear security side? It is good to get out of sometimes the mentality 

of nuclear security as the nuclear security people look at that, 

whether that is in the intelligence services or in the military, and 

the police do have a role and can play a bigger role in nuclear security as well in Pakistan. 

Thank you. 

46 

Senator CARPER. All right. In closing, we have about 5 minutes 

left to vote. I just want to say to each of you, thank you for the 

work you have done with your lives to date. Thank you for sharing 

some of what you have learned with us here this afternoon. I appreciate very much where you have agreed because it is helpful to 

us to reinforce the messages that you all reinforced here, especially 

in the last several minutes. My colleagues and I are grateful for 

your work, and I want to say to our first witness from the Administration, we very much appreciate that input. 

In the next couple of weeks, we are going to have the hearing 

record open for 2 weeks—for the submission of additional statements and questions from my colleagues. If you get any of those 

questions, I would just ask for your cooperation in providing 

prompt responses to those questions that might be submitted for 

the record. 

Again, our thanks to each of you. This has just been illuminating, certainly interesting, and I think very important. Thanks 

so much. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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