The Honora ble Geor g e Caram Steeh, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District * of Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. 1

F ile Nam e: 08a0766n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 17, 2008 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION No. 07-5224 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA,

P laintif f-App ellee,

v. JEF F RE Y D . R OA CH ,

Defendan t-Appellant, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UN ITED STA TES DISTRI CT CO UR T F OR THE EA STER

N D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

Before: G IBBO NS and COOK, Cir cuit Judges; STE EH, District Judge. * J ULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. De fe n d an t -ap p el l an tJ ef fr ey Roach a ppeals the district court’s sente ncingof him after the re vocation of his super v i sed re lease to a term of imp ri so nme nt gre a te r t

ha n his ini tia l te rm of su

pe rv ise d re le a se . B e c a

us e we have pr e vio us ly

he ld that a postrevoc ation sentenc e may extend for long er tha

n t h e o rig inal term of supe rvised re lease , United States v. Marlow , 278 F.3d 581 ( 6th Cir. 2002), we a ffirm the district c ourt’s dec ision. I. Roach wa s initi ally

sentenc ed on June 21, 1991 to fifteen y ear s imprisonment followed byUnited States v. Roac h , No. 07-5224

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three y ear s of supervised rele ase f or, inte r a lia , possession of a firea rm afte r having been c onvicted of a f elony . Roach ser

ved his time in prison and bega n the period of supervised r elea se on Mar ch 24, 2005. The super

vised rele ase w as re voked on Marc h 6, 2006, when Roach “stipulated t hat he [had] violated the ter

ms of his supervised re lease by his posse ssion of rock c ocaine and mar ijuana on September 15, 2005, which he ha d planned to tra de for sex.” The district c ourt consider ed the violation guideline r ang e of e ight to four teen months imprisonment, se ntencing him to eig ht months imprisonment followed by three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Roa c h s e rv e d that ter

m of impr iso nme nt an d be g an his se c on d pe ri od of su pe rv ise d r e le a se on J u n e 12, 2006. On J uly 2, 2006, L ieutenant Da

n Cliff of the Morr istown Pol ice De partment observe d an oncoming vehicle driving toward him in his lane. He le t the vehicle pa ss, and then he tur ne d h is c ar a

ro un d a nd sw itc he d on his lig hts

. He sa w Roa c h thr ow a ba g wi th whit e po wd e r i n it and some white roc ks out of the vehicle. C l i ff ra d i o ed Offic er Pete Shockley , who is a ca nine office r for

the Morristown Police De partment, a nd told him that a suspect threw “dope” out of the

v e h i c l e an d

t o l d h i mt h e l o c a t i o nt o r e t r i e v e t h e c o n tr a b an d

. S h o c k l e y r e tr i e v e d t h e b a g an d

t w e n tyfour r ocks, and the substances f ield-tested positive for coca ine. The lab r eport on the substanc es wa s also positive for cr ack c ocaine

. The Dispositional Report (“Re port”) filed by the United States Probation Off ice state d that the maxi mum statutory penalty fac ed by Roach under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (3) i f h i s s u pervised rele ase w as re voked wa s sixt y mo nth s in c a

r c eration, but because the def endant ha d previously

serve d a total of e ight mon t h s for a supervised r elea se re vocation, the maximum s entenc e that could be imposed would be fifty -two m onths incar cer ation. The Report stated that Roach ha d exhibi ted poorUnited States v. Roac h , No. 07-5224

3

b eh av i or and a

ppear ed to have “no intention of followingany conditions set by

the Court.” The Report re commended that “Mr. Roac h’s supervise d rele ase be revoke d, and that he be sentenc ed within the prescr ibed revoc ation rang e.” Roach objected to the D ispositi onal Report, ar g uing that the Six th Circuit decision in Ma rlo w conflicte d with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. U

nited States , 529 U.S. 6 9 4 (2 000), and that the court lac ked author ity to impose a post-revoc ation sentenc e long er tha n Roach’s initial three -y ear term of supe rvised re lease

. The district cour

t found by a prepondera

nce of the evidence “that the def endant c ommitt ed the offe nses of possession of a narc otic for r esale and tamper ing w i th evidence .” The ref ore, the court found that he violated Standar d Conditi on Seven of his super vised rele ase, which states that he “sha ll not purchase, posse ss, use, distribute or administer any contro l l ed s u bstance or any para pherna lia related to a

ny controlled substanc e, except as pr escr ibed by a phy sician.” A fter noting Roa c h’ s le ng thy

c ri min a l hi sto ry , inc lud ing thr e e pr ior c on vic tio ns fo r a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , and his

c ri min a l hi sto ry

c a te g or y of VI , th e c ourt

fo un d th a t Ro a c h s ho we d “ a c omp le te un wi lli ng ne ss t o abide by the terms and c onditions of supervised re lease ” as e vidence d by his pos session of illeg al

narc otics within three we eks of be ing r elea sed fr om prison. District Court Order of F eb. 7, 2007 at 6. The c ourt stated that b ec au s e o f R oach’ s prior cr iminal recor d and the f ailure of numerous incar cer ations to de ter his c riminal behavior , the public had an important need to be protec ted from his conduct. The district c ourt found R oach’ s violation g uideline rang e to be fifty -one to sixt y -three months and sentence d him to a period of fifty -two m onths incar cer ation followed by no additional term of supe rvised rele ase on Fe bruar y 7, 2007. Roach filed a timely notice of a ppeal on F ebrua

ry 7, 2007.United States v. Roac h , No. 07-5224

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II. W e r ev i ew de novo th e d e te r mi n a ti o no f

a d is tr ic t c o urt’ s a

u th o r it y to im p o s e a s e n tence following revoc ation of super vised rele ase. Un ite d S

tates v . V an Ho os e , 437 F.3d 497, 501 ( 6th Cir. 20 06 ). Roa c h do e s n ot c on te st the pr oc e dura l or su bs tanti ve re a so na

ble ne ss o f h is f

if ty -t wo month sentenc e. Roac h instead ar g ues that the district cour t erre d in sentenci n g h i m to a term of imprisonment that ex cee ds his origina l period of supe rvised re lease and that the ter m of impr is o n me n t m

u s t a ls o b e r e d

u c e d b y th e e igh t- mo n th

p o rti o no f

th e o r ig in a l t e r

m o f supervised rele ase that he alre ady

serve d beca

use of a prior violation. When Roach wa s orig inally convicted a

nd sentenc ed in 1991, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)( 3) authorized district courts t o “re voke a term of supervised relea se, and require the defendant to ser ve in prison all or part of the t erm of supe rvised re lease . . . without credit for time previously

serve d on postrelea se supervision.” The text of § 3583(e) (3) did not addre ss the issue of whether a district court c ould impose an additional term of supe rvised re lease afte r re voking the o ri gi n al term of supervised r elea se and or deringre- imprisonment. See J ohnson , 529 U.S. at 6 9 8 (stating that the po we r t o im

po se ano the r t e rm

of su pe rv ise d r e le a se fo ll owin g imp ri so nme nt w a s “ no t r e a dil y appar ent from the te x t of § 3583(e) (3)” ). Cong ress amended § 3583 in 1994 to a dd subsection (h), which explicitly

provides that courts may

impose another te rm of super vised rele ase a fter a

n initial period of supe rvised re lease has bee n revoke d and a t er m o f imprisonment imposed upon a defe ndant. Id. Sub se c tio n ( h) a lso state s that “ [t]he le ng th of su c h a te rm of su pe rv ise d r e le a se sh a ll not ex ce ed t h e term of supervised r elea se authorized by statute for the offe nse that re sulted in the orig inal term of supervised relea se, l ess any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revoc ationUnited States v. Roac h , No. 07-5224

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of super vised rele ase.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). I n Johnson, the S upreme Court held that § 3583(h) doe s not apply retroa ctively

to offense s committed be fore the eff

ective date of the amendment, September 13, 1994. Johnson , 529 U.S. at 702. Howeve r, Johnson aff irmed an additional period of supe rvised re lease imposed after the initial term of supe rvised re l ease was re voked and the defe ndant re imprisoned based upon § 3583( e)( 3). Id. at 713. The Court found that § 3583(e) (3) retained linguistic continuity from the preguidelines prac tice and that Congre ssional inten t f a v ored a llowing r eimposition of supervised re lease following reimprisonment. Id. As Roach a cknowledg es, Johnson did not specifica lly rule a bout the duration of the ne w term of supe rvised re lease

. I n United States v. Marlow , th is c ourt a pp lie d th e pr inc ipl e s f

ro m Johnson to a case wher e the def endant wa s initially sentenc ed to prison time and four y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Marlow , 278 F.3d at 582. After Marlow violated the conditions of his supervised re lease , the district court revoke d his relea se and sentence d him to serve twenty months in prison followed by a new four- y ear term of supe rvised re lease

. Id. Marlow appeale d, and thi s court held that while § 3583(e)(3) did not authorize a ne w sentenc e longer than t he ini tial term of supe rvised re lease , the district court’s g ener al sentenc ing a

uthority under § 3583( a) gav e t h e co u rt authority to impose an additional term of supervised r elea se af

ter postre vocation inca

rce ration. Id. Roach a rgues that we should overrule Marlow , rely ing on the Seventh Circuit’s re jection of the Marlow rule in Un ite d S tate s v . R us se ll , 340 F.3d 450 ( 7th Cir. 2003). I n Russell, the Se ve nth Cir c uit a c kn ow le dg ed th at “ a

c omb ine d te rm

of re inc arc e ratio n a

nd a dd iti on a l su

pe rv ise d r e le a se under § 3583( e)( 3) could not exceed the leng th of the orig inal term of supervised rele ase” and theUnited States v. Roac h , No. 07-5224

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district court could not impose a sentenc e longe r than the orig inal term of super vised rele ase unde r § 3583(a)

. Id . The Seve nth Circuit opined that the Ma rlo w court improper ly relied upon a

section of the Johnson op ini on that e xpla ine d the c on se qu e nc e s of the dis se nt’ s inte rp re tatio n o f t he statut e at issue. In addition, it found that “the plain mea ning of § 3583(a) ’s text s trong ly sug g ests that subsection applies only to the initial setti ng of a supe rvised re lease term.” Id. at 456. Finally , the Se ve nth Cir c uit fo un d th a t Marlow ’s interpre tation would allow district co u r ts to b y p a s s § 3 5 8 3 ( e ) ( 3)

an d w o u ld r e n d e r th e e xc h an g e b e tw e e n Ju s ti c e So u te r ’ s ma jo r it y o p in io n an d Ju s ti c e Scalia’s dissent in Johnson moot because the Johnson court would not have had to deter m i n e wh ether

§ 3583(e) (3) a llows the imposit ion of t he sentence if the s entenc e could simply be im posed under § 3583(a)

. Id. at 457. A panel of this court also questioned Ma rlo w in dic ta in Un ite d S tates v . V an Ho os e , 437 F.3d at 505. VanH oose was orig inally sentenc ed to imprisonment and three y ear s of supervised rele ase. Id. at 499. Upon violating the terms of his super vised rele ase, V anHoose ’s supervise d rele ase w as revoke d and he w as sentenc ed to two y ear s in pr ison and two y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Id. The panel c riticized the Ma rlo w d ec i s i o n fo rm i s r e a d i n g Johnson , fo r m ak i n g Johnson a “ po int le ss exercise,” and for

ignor ing the canon of

statutory interpre tation tha

t t he spec ific § 3583(e )(3) g overns th e g e n e r a l § 3 583(a)

. Id

. at 5 0 5

. No n et h el es s , th e p an el u p h el d Va n Ho o s e’ s s en t en ce , wr i t i n g:

“ Ev e n th ou g h it

a pp e ars that Ma rlo w was wrong ly decide d, it will continue to bind this and future panels unless a

nd until the en banc c ourt rec onsiders the question or the Supre me Court corr ects the

err or.” Id. at 505-06. Ma rlo w constitutes the law of this Circuit and ther ef o re controls the outcome of this ca se.United States v. Roac h , No. 07-5224

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Se e id

. W e a re n o ts i t t i n g en banc and have no authority to disreg ard a Six th Circuit prec edent on p o int, n o r d o e s th is is s u e seem worthy of en banc revie w. See D ingle v. Bioport Corp. , 388 F.3d 2 0 9 , 2 1 5 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Sa lm i v . S e c ’y of H e alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 7 74 F .2 d 6 85 , 6 89 (6 th Cir. 1985)). In addition, Marlow ’s re asoning has substantive merit. Sec t i o n 3 5 8 3 (a) vests in the dis tr ic t c ourt

br oa d s e nte nc inga

uth or ity to i mpo se su

pe rv ise d re le a se a ft e r imp ri so nme nt, and it i s a fa ir interpre tation of that provision to assume that § 3583(a) provides valid author ity to impose a postrevocation sentence gre at er than the orig inal period of supe rvised re lease . There fore , we conclude that the district court did n o t err in sentencingRoach to a te rm of imprisonment that exceede d his origina l period of supe rvised re lease

. Roach’s se cond conte ntion, that the district c ourt did not reduce his sentence by that portion of the or ig ina l te rm

of su pe rv ise d r e le a se wh ic h he se rv e d b y re a so n o f a

pr e vio us su

pe rv ise d r e le a se violation, has no merit. Contrary to Roa ch’s asser tion, the district c ourt did r educe his sentence by the eig ht months he previous l y s er v ed , as the Dispositional Report had re commended. Roa ch’s previous inca

rce ration of e ight months for a previous super

vised rele ase violation has alre ady been taken into ac count by

his sentence of fifty -two months incarc eration, e i gh t m onths lower than the six ty -month statutory

maxi mum. III

. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.