GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

RESERVE FORCES

Army Needs to 

Reevaluate Its 

Approach to Training 

and Mobilizing 

Reserve Component 

Forces 

July 2009 

GAO-09-720 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2009

RESERVE FORCES

Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training

and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces

Highlights of GAO-09-720, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Army’s strategy for training its 

reserve component calls for units 

to conduct training on the primary 

missions for which they were 

organized and designed as well as 

the missions units are assigned in 

support of ongoing operations. The 

training is to be conducted over a 

5-year cycle with a focus on 

primary missions during the early 

years and assigned missions during 

the later years. In response to 

mandates, GAO assessed the extent 

to which (1) the Army is able to 

execute its strategy for training 

reserve component forces for their 

primary and assigned missions; (2) 

mobilization and deployment laws, 

regulations, goals, and policies 

impact the Army’s ability to train 

and employ these forces; and (3) 

access to military schools and skill 

training facilities and ranges affects 

the preparation of reserve 

component forces. To address 

these objectives, GAO analyzed 

relevant training strategies and 

policies, laws, and data and 

surveyed 22 Army reserve 

component units returning from 

deployments in the past 12 months. 

What GAO Recommends

To help assure that the Army 

maximizes the efficiency and 

effectiveness of its training, GAO 

recommends that DOD and the 

Army evaluate and adjust its 

training strategy and mobilization 

policy, and determine the range of 

resources and support necessary to 

fully implement the training 

strategy. DOD generally concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations. 

The Army is able to execute the portion of its reserve component training 

strategy that calls for units to effectively train for their assigned missions in 

support of ongoing operations, but faces challenges in executing the portion 

of the strategy that calls for units to effectively train on primary missions. Unit 

training for assigned missions, which is conducted in the later years of the 5-

year training cycle, is generally effective because the Army prioritizes its 

available resources to support units that are preparing to deploy for ongoing 

operations—units receive increased training time; mission requirements and 

personnel levels are stabilized; and personnel and equipment shortages are 

addressed while support is increased. Conversely, units training for their 

primary missions in the early years of the cycle receive less time to train and 

experience equipment and personnel shortages, which adversely affect 

teamwork and unit cohesion. Also, support for their training is limited. These 

challenges limit the effectiveness of primary mission training and could 

impact their ability to conduct their primary missions within the current 

strategy’s time frames. 

While DOD’s current 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the 

Army’s overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced 

the length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended purpose of 

reducing stress on the force by providing predictability to soldiers. Because 

units must spend part of their mobilization periods in training, they are 

actually deploying for about 10 months under this 12-month mobilization 

policy, whereas they typically deployed for periods of 12 to 15 months under 

the previous policy. Under the current policy, the Army’s reserve component 

forces are deploying more frequently and spending more time away from 

home in training when they are not mobilized. Moreover, unit leaders and 

personnel GAO interviewed said that the 12-month mobilization policy has 

decreased predictability and increased stress for individuals. GAO noted 

alternate approaches that can improve predictability. For example, the Air 

Force recently developed a deployment model categorizing five grouped 

occupational specialties based on operational requirements and length of time 

home between deployments. The model is intended to increase predictability 

for its forces and thus reduce their stress. 

Reserve component forces are generally receiving access to training facilities 

necessary to prepare them for their assigned missions, but the Army lacks 

capacity to prepare all of its forces for the full range of training requirements. 

In addressing capacity shortages, the Army has given priority to deploying 

units and personnel. As a result, active and reserve component forces without 

assigned missions often experience delays in accessing training for their 

primary missions. Although the Army is reviewing some aspects of its training 

capacity, it has not fully identified its training requirements and capacity and 

therefore will not have a sound basis for prioritizing available resources and 

cannot be assured that the initiatives it has under way will fully address gaps 

in its training capacity. 

View GAO-09-720 or key components.

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup 

at (202)512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-720 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 7 

The Army Faces Challenges in Executing Its Reserve Component 

Training Strategy 11 

DOD’s Mobilization Policy Has Presented Challenges as the Army 

Trains and Deploys Its Reserve Component Forces 17 

Reserve Component Forces Assigned Missions in Support of 

Ongoing Operations Have Access to the Training Needed, But 

Constraints Delay and Limit Training Opportunities for Some 

Forces 20 

Conclusions 27 

Recommendations for Executive Action 28 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 33 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 35 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39 

Tables 

Table 1: Percentage of Army National Guard Soldiers Awaiting 

Individual Training 22 

Table 2: Number of Schools Where Required Seats Exceed 

Reserved Seats 24 

Figures 

Figure 1: Reserve Component Training Strategy under the Army’s 

Traditional Mobilize-Train-Deploy Model 9 

Figure 2: Reserve Component Training Strategy under the Army’s 

current Train-Mobilize-Deploy Model 10 

Figure 3: Status of Resources and Support During a Reserve 

Component 5-year Cycle 13 

 Reserve Forces 
Figure 4: Deployment Rotation Requirements Based on 12- and 9-

Month Deployments 18 

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Page ii GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
Page 1 GAO-09-720 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

July 17, 2009 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the involvement 

of large numbers of Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel 

and demands on the Army’s reserve component forces are expected to 

continue for the foreseeable future.1

 In addition, the high demand for 

ground forces has led DOD to retrain some units for missions that are 

outside of their core competencies.2

 Our past reports have noted a number 

of personnel, equipment, and training challenges that the Army’s reserve 

component forces have faced since the start of the global war on terrorism 

in 2001.3

 For example, we have noted that preparation for ongoing 

operations has often required different types of training as units are being 

tasked to perform assigned missions such as convoy security or detainee 

operations, which may differ significantly from their primary missions, 

such as artillery. 

1

 The Army’s reserve component forces include the part-time forces of both the U.S. Army 

Reserve and the Army National Guard. Army Reserve forces support federal missions while 

Army National Guard forces support both federal and state missions. 

2

 In this report we refer to training that supports the core competencies that the units are 

organized and designed to perform as “primary” mission training, and we refer to training 

that is conducted to support the specific requirements of an upcoming mission as 

“assigned” mission training. In some cases, assigned mission training may closely resemble 

primary mission training, particularly for combat support and combat service support 

forces. 

3

 For example, see GAO, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, GAO-06-1109T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006). 

 Reserve Forces 
 

The Army has changed the approach it uses to train its reserve component 

forces. The Army had traditionally viewed its reserve component forces as 

a strategic reserve, and its training strategy called for 39 days of training 

per year,4

 which was to be followed by extensive training after 

mobilization and prior to deployment.5

 All of this training was supposed to 

prepare units for the primary missions they were designed or organized to 

perform. In the last two decades, the Army’s reserve component forces 

have been called upon to support operational requirements in the Balkans 

and then the Middle East. The Army now views the reserve component as 

an operational reserve that regularly supports deployment requirements. 

Furthermore, the Army has made adjustments to its actual training of 

reserve component forces in order to support operational requirements. 

Specifically, it increased the amount of time forces spend in training prior 

to mobilization, referred to as pre-mobilization training, and training 

became more focused on units’ assigned missions (i.e., missions that units 

are assigned to perform in support of current or ongoing operations) 

rather than their core or primary missions. In 2008, the Army issued two 

updated field manuals—3-0 Operations and 7-0 Training for Full 

Spectrum Operations—which called for units to be trained and ready to 

operate across a full spectrum of operations. In accordance with that 

guidance, the Army’s reserve components developed strategies that called 

for their forces to conduct training on both primary and assigned missions 

in order to progressively build capabilities across a 5-year cycle. During 

the early years of the cycle, the strategy calls for training which is similar 

to the traditional strategy—39 days of training focused on primary 

missions. However, in the later stages of the cycle, the current strategy 

calls for training that differs from the traditional strategy. Specifically, the 

new strategy calls for increased training—up to 109 days a year—prior to 

unit mobilizations and decreased training after units are mobilized. In 

addition, both the increased pre-mobilization training and the decreased 

post-mobilization training are to focus on assigned missions rather than 

units’ primary missions. 

 

4

 Army National Guard forces typically trained 39 days per year—one weekend per month 

and 15 days of annual training per year. Army Reserve forces typically trained 38 days per 

year—one weekend per month and 14 days of annual training per year. 

5

 Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and equipment, 

activating or federalizing units and members of the National Guard and Reserves for active 

duty, and bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness for war or other national 

emergency. Demobilization is the process necessary to release from active duty units and 

members of the National Guard and Reserve ordered to active duty. 

Page 2 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Several variables can affect the numbers of forces that are available to 

support ongoing operations, including the size and structure of active and 

reserve component forces and policies concerning the length of 

deployments and reserve component mobilizations. On January 19, 2007, 

the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum6

 that changed DOD’s 

mobilization and deployment policies. It eliminated a previous policy that 

had limited involuntary mobilizations to 24 cumulative months and thus 

made virtually all reserve component personnel available on an indefinite 

recurrent basis. However, the policy also limited involuntary mobilizations 

to a maximum of 12 months at a time.7

Section 344 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2009 directed GAO to report on the correlation between the 

preparation and operational use of the Army’s reserve component forces 

to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of 

Representatives.8

 This report addresses that mandate and also responds to 

a portion of Section 343 that directs GAO to report on training constraints 

that limit access to military schools and skill training as well as facilities 

and ranges, including the combat training centers, and that could provide 

challenges to the reserve components in their role as an operational 

reserve. In responding to both mandates, our objectives are to determine 

the extent to which 1) the Army is able to effectively implement its 

strategy for training reserve component forces for their primary and 

assigned missions, 2) mobilization and deployment laws, regulations, 

goals, and policies impact the Army’s ability to train and employ reserve 

component forces, and 3) access to military schools and skill training, 

facilities, and ranges affect the preparation of reserve component forces. 

To address these objectives we obtained and analyzed documentation 

concerning reserve component training strategies, policies, laws, and 

 

6

 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force (Jan. 19, 2007). The 

policy set out by the Secretary is implemented by the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, Revised Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel 

and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to 

the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks (Mar. 15, 2007). The authority for mobilizing 

servicemembers under these policies is granted by 10 U.S.C. §12302. 

7

 Although DOD’s mobilization policy limits mobilizations to 12 months, it allows for some 

exceptions to be made, at the service’s discretion, for individual skill training required for 

deployment and post-mobilization leave. 

8

 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-

417 (2008). 

Page 3 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

goals, and data associated with the mobilizing, and deploying of the 

Army’s reserve component forces. We also interviewed Army and other 

DOD officials concerning the impact of the current strategies, guidance, 

and goals. We surveyed 22 Army National Guard or Army Reserve units 

who returned from deployments in the last 12 months and conducted 

follow-up interviews with officials from 15 of these units. Our survey, 

based on a non-probability sample, and interviews addressed a range of 

issues including deployment notification time lines; the timing and 

effectiveness of pre-deployment, post-deployment, and in-theater training; 

and access to training facilities, schoolhouses, and ranges. Additionally, 

we interviewed leaders and personnel from two Army National Guard 

brigade combat teams during their training exercises at the National 

Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and at Camp Blanding, Florida. 

We assessed the reliability of training, mobilization, and attrition data used 

in this report and determined the data was sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. We conducted this performance audit from 

September 2008 through May 2009 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The 

scope and methodology used for this audit are described in further detail 

at appendix I. 

The Army is able to execute the portion of its reserve component training 

strategy that calls for units to effectively train for their assigned missions 

in support of ongoing operations, but it faces challenges in executing the 

portion of the strategy that calls for units to effectively train for their 

primary missions. The Army’s Field Manual 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum 

Operations defines effective training as that which builds proficiency, 

teamwork, confidence, cohesiveness, and allows organizations to achieve 

their training objectives. The manual also specifies that organizations 

should train the way they intend to operate and efficiently make the best 

use of available training resources, including training time. The Army 

currently prioritizes its available training resources and time to support 

units that are preparing to deploy to meet operational requirements. As a 

result, the unit training for assigned missions, which is conducted in the 

later stages of the Army’s 5-year training cycle, is generally effective. Units 

conduct up to 109 days training in the year prior to mobilization. Personnel 

levels are stabilized through policies that prevent personnel from leaving 

units and transfer additional personnel into the deploying units. 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Equipment shortages are addressed, and units receive additional training 

support including personnel who support unit training events by acting as 

observers, controllers, and trainers. Conversely, units which are training 

for their primary missions in the early years of the cycle face challenges, in 

part, because they do not receive prioritized support. They conduct 39 

days of training per year. In addition, annual reserve component attrition 

rates that typically approach 20 percent limit the effectiveness of unit 

training that is conducted to build teamwork and unit cohesion. Because 

the training strategy calls for a 5-year training cycle and attrition occurs 

each year, unit training that is conducted early in the cycle and designed to 

build teamwork and unit cohesion will become less beneficial with each 

passing year, as team members depart the unit. Units that are training for 

primary missions during the early stages of the cycle also experience 

personnel and equipment shortages, often because they are tasked to give 

up personnel and equipment to support deploying units. Finally, they 

receive less support for their training. For example, the Army’s active 

component does not provide observers, controllers, and trainers for these 

units to support their training events. All these challenges have limited the 

effectiveness of the collective training for primary missions, which is 

conducted during the early years of the cycle. They also make it unlikely 

that units would be adequately prepared to deploy and conduct their 

primary missions following a reduced post-mobilization training period 

that is called for under the current reserve component training strategy. To 

ensure the Army has an executable strategy for effectively training its 

reserve component forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate and adjust the Army’s 

reserve component training strategy to fully account for the factors that 

limit the effectiveness of unit training for primary missions in the early 

years of the 5-year cycle. 

While DOD’s 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army’s 

overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced the 

length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended purpose of 

reducing stress on the force by providing predictability. Because units 

must spend part of their mobilization periods in training, they are actually 

deploying for shorter periods of about 10 months under the current 12-

month mobilization policy, whereas they typically deployed for periods of 

12 to 15 months under the previous policy. However, under the current 

policy, the Army’s reserve component forces are deploying more 

frequently and spending more time away from home in training when they 

are not mobilized in order to meet combatant commanders’ requirements 

for forces. Leaders and soldiers in one of the larger units we contacted 

said that the 12-month mobilization policy, which has led to more frequent 

Page 5 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

deployments and training periods, has actually increased stress and 

decreased predictability. DOD’s mobilization policy includes a goal of 

eventually achieving a tempo of 1-year mobilized to 5-years demobilized; 

however, for the foreseeable future, this goal will be difficult to achieve 

because operational demands for reserve component forces are expected 

to remain high and force structure levels are expected to remain relatively 

constant. We found that alternate approaches can improve predictability. 

For example, the Air Force recently developed a flexible deployment 

model that grouped occupational specialties into five different “tempo 

bands” based on ongoing operational requirements. Personnel in the first 

band should expect to be deployed about the same length of time as they 

are home between deployments. Personnel in the fifth band can expect to 

be home 5 times longer than they are deployed. The Air Force expects this 

model to increase predictability for its forces and thus reduce their stress. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate DOD’s 

mobilization policy for Army reserve component personnel to determine 

whether there should be a more flexible policy that allows variations in 

the length of mobilizations or that establishes deployment goals based on 

occupational specialty or unit type in order to better meet the policy’s 

goals of increasing predictability and reducing stress on the force. 

In accordance with DOD Directive 1200.17, which states that training 

facilities should be available to support reserve component training 

requirements, reserve component forces are generally receiving the access 

to training facilities that is necessary to prepare them for their assigned 

missions. However, the Army’s training facilities lack the capacity 

necessary to prepare all of the Army’s forces for the full range of 

individual and unit training requirements, including those associated with 

primary as well as assigned missions. In addressing its capacity shortages, 

the Army has given priority access to personnel and units that have 

established mobilization dates or assigned missions. As a result, active and 

reserve component forces without assigned missions often experience 

delays in gaining access to training needed to prepare them for their 

primary missions. For example, the Army prioritizes access to its 

collective training sites that are used for unit training based on units’ 

assigned mission requirements. It also prioritizes access to individual 

training sites based on missions and mobilization dates. As a result of the 

individual training capacity limitations, 22 percent of the Army National 

Guard’s soldiers were awaiting individual training in March 2009, 

compared to a goal of 15 percent. While the Army is exploring or has 

several initiatives under way to address training constraints, it has not 

identified the total requirements associated with its reserve component 

training strategy or the training capacity necessary to support the strategy. 

Page 6 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

In November 2008, the Secretary of Defense directed the Secretaries of the 

military departments to review the capacity of their training institutions to 

determine if they were properly resourced to prepare all military members 

to meet mission requirements.9

 However, the Army’s ongoing reviews do 

not fully account for personnel and equipment constraints that have 

limited individual training in the past, and the Army’s range requirements 

have been understated because they were based on planned mobilizations 

that have been lower than actual mobilizations. Until the Army fully 

identifies its training requirements and available training capacity, it will 

not know whether it has the resources needed to fully execute its reserve 

component training strategy, and it will not have a sound basis for 

prioritizing available resources. In addition, it cannot be assured that the 

initiatives it has under way will fully address any gaps in current training 

capacity. Therefore, we are recommending that the Army determine the 

range of resources and support that are necessary to fully implement its 

reserve component training strategy including personnel, equipment, and 

facilities and their costs. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially 

concurred with all of our recommendations. A discussion of DOD’s 

comments and our evaluation of those comments appears later in this 

report. Additionally, the full text of DOD’s written comments is included at 

appendix II. 

The Army has two reserve components, the Army National Guard and the 

Army Reserve. Both reserve components are composed primarily of 

citizen soldiers who balance the demands of civilian careers with military 

service on a part-time basis. During the Cold War, it was expected that the 

reserve forces would be a strategic reserve to supplement active forces in 

the event of extended conflict. However, since the mid-1990s, the reserves 

have been continuously mobilized to support operations worldwide, 

including those in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. In today’s strategic environment, the Army’s reserve components 

have taken on a variety of different overseas missions as well as traditional 

and emerging domestic missions. 

Background 

 

9

 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Recommendations of the Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves, (Nov. 24, 2008). 

Page 7 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are part of the total Army, 

which also includes the active component. The Army Reserve is a federal 

force that is organized primarily to supply specialized combat support and 

combat service support skills to combat forces. The Army National Guard 

is composed of both combat forces and units that supply support skills. 

The Army National Guard, when mobilized for a federal mission, is under 

the command and control of the President. When not mobilized for a 

federal mission, Army National Guard units act under the control of the 

governors for state missions, typically responding to natural disasters and 

more recently protecting state assets from terrorist attacks. 

Individual training is a building block of the Army training process. It 

includes basic military training as well as occupational specialty training. 

Acquiring advanced individual skills enables a soldier to move into a unit, 

but acquisition of such skills does not necessarily equate with operational 

preparedness. It must be integrated with unit training in a group situation, 

which is referred to as collective training, to achieve operational 

objectives. 

Traditionally, the Army used a mobilize-train-deploy strategy to prepare its 

reserve component units to act as a strategic reserve that was available to 

augment active forces during a crisis. Figure 1 shows that the traditional 

reserve component strategy called for a constant level of training until a 

unit was mobilized and underwent extensive post-mobilization training to 

prepare for deployment. 

Page 8 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Figure 1: Reserve Component Training Strategy under the Army’s Traditional Mobilize-Train-Deploy Model 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Reserve component training strategy under the Army’s traditional Mobilize-Train-Deploy model

Total training for 4 years prior to mobilization 156 days

Undefined time frame 

Months

Yearly period 

1 year

prior to mobilization 

2 years

prior to mobilization

Mobilization &

deployment

3 years

prior to mobilization 

4 years

prior to mobilization 

Post

mobilization

training

up to

180 days

Unit learns

that the 

Army plans

to mobilize 

and deploy

the unit in the

future in order

to meet

operational

requirements.

Deployment

Deploy for

up to the

remainder of

the allowable

24-month

mobilization

period.

Yearly

military

training

39 days

Yearly

military

training

39 days

Yearly

military 

training

39 Days

Yearly

military 

training

39 Days

Mobilization

Primary mission training

End of

deployment

Under the traditional training strategy, all training was focused on a unit’s 

primary missions and units were to be deployed to perform their primary 

missions. 

As reserve component requirements increased in recent years, the Army 

began to move away from its traditional strategy and began adopting a 

train-mobilize-deploy strategy that prepares reserve component forces to 

serve as an operational reserve, which regularly supports deployment 

requirements. Figure 2 shows that the Army’s current reserve component 

training strategy is based on a 5-year cycle during which training is 

increased to build capabilities.10

 

10 This strategy was formalized with the issuance of HQ Department of the Army Executive 

Order 150-8, Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre- and PostMobilization Training Strategy (March 2008). 

Page 9 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Figure 2: Reserve Component Training Strategy under the Army’s current Train-Mobilize-Deploy Model 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Reserve component training strategy under the Army’s current Train-Mobilize-Deploy model

Total training for 4 years prior to mobilization up to 232 days

Months Yearly period 

Primary mission training Assigned mission training 

1 year

prior to mobilization 

2 years

prior to mobilization

3 years

prior to mobilization 

4 years

prior to mobilization 

Mobilization

followed by

up to 60

days of

post - 

mobilization

training.

Deploy

for the

remainder

of the

12 - month

mobilization

period.

Yearly

military

training

38 - 39

days

Yearly

military

training

39 days

Unit learns

that the 

Army plans

to mobilize 

and deploy

the unit in the

future in order

to meet

operational

requirements.

Yearly

military 

training

45 - 48.5

days

Yearly

military 

training

50 - 109

days

Mobilization &

deployment

End of

deployment

The current train-mobilize-deploy strategy is designed to train individuals 

and units to a prescribed level of readiness prior to mobilization in order 

to limit post-mobilization training. 

Several variables can affect the numbers of forces that are available to 

support ongoing operations, including the size and structure of active and 

reserve component forces and policies concerning the length of 

deployments and reserve component mobilizations. On January 19, 2007, 

the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that changed DOD’s 

mobilization and deployment policies.11 It eliminated a previous policy that 

had limited involuntary mobilizations to 24 cumulative months and thus 

made virtually all reserve component personnel available on an indefinite 

recurrent basis. However, the policy also limited involuntary mobilizations 

to 12 months at a time.12 It also established a reserve component unit 

planning objective of 1 year mobilized to 5 years demobilized, and created 

 

11 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force (Jan. 19, 2007). The 

policy set out by the Secretary is implemented by the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, Revised Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel 

and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to 

the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks (Mar. 15, 2007). The authority for mobilizing 

servicemembers under these policies is granted by 10 U.S.C. §12302. 

12 Although DOD’s mobilization policy limits mobilizations to 12 months, it allows for some 

exceptions to be made, at the service’s discretion, for individual skill training required for 

deployment and post-mobilization leave. 

Page 10 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

a requirement for mobilizations, including training and deployment, to be 

managed on a unit basis. 

In January 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense ensure that training 

institutions and facilities were resourced to meet the needs of the total 

force.13 In particular, it recommended that institutions meet the current 

training needs of the reserve component personnel and that each service 

reassess the number of training and administrative days the reserve 

component units and members need prior to activation. The Commission 

further recommended that the services fund and implement policies to 

increase pre-mobilization training and focus training on mission 

requirements. The commission also stated that training equipment should 

be sufficient to give service members regular access to modern 

warfighting equipment so that they could train, develop, and maintain 

proficiency on the same types of equipment that they would use when 

deployed. 

In February 2009, the Army Audit Agency reported that Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve units often were unable to complete premobilization training tasks because they were not able to stabilize staffing 

levels and obtain equipment needed for training.14 They further reported 

that units did not execute training requirements in the most efficient 

manner. 

The Army is able to effectively execute the portion of its reserve 

component training strategy that calls for training units on their assigned 

missions, but faces challenges in effectively executing the portion of the 

strategy that calls for training units on their primary missions. 

The Army’s new training strategy is based on a five-year cycle that mirrors 

the former strategy in the early years of the cycle, but calls for alterations 

to the type and amounts of training conducted in the later years of the 

The Army Faces 

Challenges in 

Executing Its Reserve 

Component Training 

Strategy 

 

13 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Final Report to Congress and the 

Secretary of Defense, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21stCentury Operational Force (Jan. 31, 2008). 

14 U.S. Army Audit Agency, Army National Guard Pre-Mobilization Training 

Requirements (Feb. 19, 2009) and U.S. Army Reserve Pre-Mobilization Training 

Requirements (Feb. 20, 2009). 

Page 11 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

cycle. Specifically, in the early years of the cycle, units conduct 39 days of 

training that is focused on their primary missions just as they did under 

the former strategy. However, under the new strategy, after a unit is 

notified—generally in the middle to later stages of the training cycle (1 or 

2 years prior to mobilization)— that it will be deploying for an operational 

mission, all the unit’s training becomes focused on that assigned mission, 

and training increases, up to 109 days in the year prior to mobilization. 

New Training Strategy 

Contains a Number of 

Assumptions 

The Army’s Field Manual 7-0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations

defines effective training as that which builds proficiency, teamwork, 

confidence, cohesiveness, and allows organizations to achieve their 

training objectives. The manual also specifies that organizations should 

train the way they intend to operate and be efficient by making the best of 

use of training resources, including training time. The Army’s reserve 

component training strategy contains a number of assumptions related to 

effective and efficient training. First, the strategy explicitly assumes that 

the amount of training conducted after mobilization can be reduced 

because of the increased training that is conducted prior to mobilization. 

Second, it implicitly assumes that the training conducted in the early years 

of the cycle lays a foundation that can be built upon throughout the later 

stages of the cycle. Third, it implicitly assumes that units will have the 

necessary time, personnel, equipment, and support to conduct effective 

training on both individual and unit tasks throughout the training cycle. 

Conditions for Effective 

Unit Training Occur Late in 

the Cycle 

The Army currently prioritizes its available training resources and time to 

support units that are preparing to deploy for ongoing operations. As a 

result, unit training for assigned missions, which is conducted in the later 

stages of the Army’s 5-year training cycle, is generally effective. Table 1 

shows the typical status of reserve component units with respect to 

available training time, personnel, equipment, and training support 

throughout the 5-year cycle. The table shows that during the later stages of 

the cycle, units have the necessary training time, and necessary personnel, 

equipment, and support to support effective unit training. 

Page 12 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Figure 3: Status of Resources and Support During a Reserve Component 5-year 

Cycle 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Army information.

a Initial notification of assigned mission is supposed to occur 2 years prior to mobilization but actual 

notification dates have varied widely. The information in this chart is tied to events rather than to 

specific dates or times.

 39

Training

days

per year

(prior to

mobilization)

Personnel 

Equipment 

Training

support 

Units receive limited

external support

from higher

headquarters and

training commands. 

External training 

support begins to

increase. 

Units receive

external training

support from 

U.S. Army Forces

Command and First 

Army. 

Units usually have

an opportunity to

review previous

training, train on

equipment that is

only available in

theater, and learn

from the unit they

are replacing. 

Units typically have

annual attrition of 

about 20 percent. 

They are also often 

tasked to provide 

personnel to 

deploying units.

Based on 

deployment

priorities, not

component status,

units have lower

priorities for

equipment and may

be tasked to give up

equipment to 

deploying units.

Stop loss has

stabilized personnel

levels and units

often receive

personnel from nondeploying units.

If additional

personnel are

required, the unit is

brought up to the

required personnel

levels prior to

assuming its

assigned mission 

in theater.

Attrition continues.

The unit’s priority

for equipment

begins to increase.

Higher headquarters

work to fill equipment 

shortages. The units

may begin receiving

new equipment from

non-deploying units.

Units deploying to

the U.S. Central

Command theater 

of operations often

receive extensive

equipment from

theater-provided

equipment stocks.

 N/A 45 - 109 N/A

Years 3 & 4

prior to

mobilization

Notification of

sourcinga

Between 

notification of

sourcing and

deployment

After

deploying

According to the reserve component training strategy, units have their 

yearly training increased during the 2 years prior to mobilization—up to 45 

days, and up to 109 days, 1 year prior to mobilization. Because this 

increased pre-mobilization training is focused on the same assigned 

Page 13 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

missions as the units’ post-mobilization training, the Army has been able to 

reduce the amount of post-mobilization training. Furthermore, in the later 

stages of the cycle, mission requirements are generally stabilized and the 

Army has traditionally stabilized unit personnel levels through the use of 

“Stop Loss” policies, which prevent personnel from leaving units. This 

stabilization allows the Army to conduct effective unit training that builds 

teamwork and unit cohesion. Units train the way they intend to operate—

with the people who will deploy and on the missions they will perform. 

Under DOD’s Stop Loss policy Army reserve component units were 

subject to stop loss 90 days prior to mobilization. However, the Army 

recently announced a comprehensive plan to eliminate stop loss, 

beginning in August 2009, while retaining the authority for future use 

under extraordinary circumstances. 

Personnel from units in our sample indicated that they preferred to 

conduct unit training later in the training cycle. They indicated that their 

units generally had increased personnel levels during the later stages of 

the cycle. Of the 22 units in our non-probability sample, 21 received 

additional personnel from other units to help them achieve the units’ 

required deployment strengths. The brigade combat teams that we met 

with also received significant numbers of personnel from other units to 

help prepare them for their deployments in 2009. In each of these cases, 

the units received the additional personnel during the later part of the 

training cycle—in the year prior to the units’ mobilizations or at the 

mobilization station. Personnel from the units we sampled also noted that 

equipment is more available in the later stages of the training cycle when 

units also receive additional training support including personnel who 

support unit training events by acting as observers, controllers, and 

trainers. Furthermore, the Army has found that the later stages of the cycle 

are the optimum times to conduct unit training. In the Army’s 2009 Posture 

Statement, the Army indicated that an extended training period close to, or 

contiguous with, mobilization station arrival, enabled commanders to 

attain the highest levels of readiness and unit capability.15 Additionally, 

two February 2009, Army Audit Agency reports on Army National Guard 

and Army Reserve pre-mobilization training found that the best practice 

for completing required pre-mobilization training tasks was to conduct the 

majority of those tasks immediately prior to mobilization when mission 

 

15 Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Chief of Staff of the Army, General George W, 

Casey Jr., statement to the committees and subcommittees of the United States Senate and 

House of Representative, May 2009. 

Page 14 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

specific equipment is more available. Finally, in a May 2009 letter to the 

Secretary of Defense, the Adjutants General Association of the United 

States stated that training late in the cycle just prior to mobilization is 

often required to enhance soldier readiness. 

Availability of Unit 

Training Enablers Varies 

throughout the Training 

Cycle 

As noted previously in table 1, the Army is unable to set the conditions 

required for effective unit training during the early years of the cycle, 

when units are focused on primary mission training. Training time, 

personnel, equipment, and training support are key enablers of effective 

unit training, but the Army faces challenges that are associated with each 

of these enablers during the early stages of the training cycle. In addition, 

our current and prior reviews have found that units that are not scheduled 

to deploy receive lower priorities for resources and training support. 

Therefore, a number of reasons make it unlikely that units would be 

adequately prepared to deploy and conduct their primary missions 

following a reduced post-mobilization training period such as the one 

called for under the current strategy. 

First, units are receiving the same level of primary mission training as they 

were under the former strategy that called for more lengthy postmobilization training periods. Second, annual reserve component attrition 

rates that typically approach 20 percent limit the effectiveness of unit 

training that is conducted to build teamwork and unit cohesion. Because 

the training strategy calls for a 5-year training cycle and attrition occurs 

each year, unit training that is conducted early in the cycle and designed to 

build teamwork and unit cohesion will become less beneficial with each 

passing year, as team members depart the unit. DOD reports indicate that 

attrition rates for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have ranged 

from 17 percent to 22 percent from fiscal years 2003 through 2007. 

Because of these attrition rates, a significant percentage of the unit 

personnel who train on the units’ primary missions during the early stages 

of the 5-year cycle will not be in the unit at the end of the cycle when the 

unit is available to deploy. Third, units that are training for primary 

missions during the early stages of the cycle also experience personnel 

and equipment shortages, often because they are tasked to give up 

personnel and equipment to support deploying units. 

Personnel shortages result from a variety of reasons. Some personnel are 

not available for training because they are recovering from injuries or 

illnesses, while others are unavailable because of pending disciplinary 

actions. In addition, many soldiers have not met individual training 

requirements. According to the Army’s 2009 Posture Statement, the Army 

Page 15 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

National Guard had 67,623 soldiers who were non-deployable in fiscal year 

2008 because of incomplete initial entry training, medical, or other 

issues.16 For the same period, the Army Reserve had 36,974 soldiers who 

were non-deployable for similar reasons.17 These personnel shortages can

directly impact the level of unit training that a unit is able to achieve p

to mobilization

rior 

. 

 

In addition, equipment and support issues are also a concern early in the 

training cycle when units are training for their primary missions. In his 

March 2009 statement before the Senate Armed Services, Subcommittee 

on Personnel, the Director of the Army National Guard stated that the lack 

of equipment availability for training remains an issue. Further, the 2008 

Army Reserve Posture Statement noted that the Army Reserve was forced 

to expend significant resources to move equipment between units and 

training locations to address shortages. Units in our sample also 

experienced equipment challenges during the early stages of the training 

cycle when they were training for their primary missions. Specifically, 12 

of the 22 units in our sample faced equipment shortages that impacted 

their ability to train early in the cycle. Furthermore, training support is 

limited during the early years of the cycle. For example, the Army’s active 

component does not provide observers, controllers, and trainers to reserve 

component units to support their primary mission training, which is 

conducted early in the cycle.18

16 These 67,623 personnel constitute approximately 19 percent of the Army National 

Guard’s 351,300 authorized end-strength in fiscal year 2008. 

17 These 36,974 personnel constitute approximately 18 percent of the Army Reserve’s 

205,000 authorized end- strength in fiscal year 2008. 

18 First Army mobilizes, trains, validates, and deploys reserve component units in 

accordance with DOD and Army directives. During post-mobilization training, when units 

are training for their assigned missions, First Army provides extensive support to the units 

both in terms of resources and by providing observers, controllers, and trainers for 

scheduled training events. 

Page 16 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

While DOD’s 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army’s 

overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced the 

length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended purpose of 

reducing stress on the force by providing predictability. According to 

testimony by the Secretary of Defense, the intended purpose of DOD’s 

mobilization policy was to reduce stress on the force by, in part, improving 

predictability.19 While the policy has led to shorter deployments, it has also 

caused units to mobilize and deploy more frequently, and units are also 

spending more time away from home in training when not mobilized. 

DOD’s Mobilization 

Policy Has Presented 

Challenges as the 

Army Trains and 

Deploys Its Reserve 

Component Forces 

The 12-Month Mobilization 

Policy Reduces Many 

Deployments to Less Than 

10 Months 

The 12-month mobilization policy has significantly reduced the length of 

deployments for the Army’s reserve component forces. Because units must 

spend part of their mobilization periods training for their assigned 

missions, they are actually deployed for only part of the time that they are 

mobilized. Under the previous mobilization policy, reserve component 

mobilizations were limited to 24 cumulative months and many reserve 

component units were deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan for 12 to 15 

months. Under the current policy, which limits mobilizations to 12 months, 

deployments are averaging 9 to 10 months. 

Reduced Deployment 

Times Lead to More 

Frequent Deployments 

Because the demand for reserve component forces has remained high and 

reserve component force levels have remained fairly stable, the 12-month 

mobilization policy, which has resulted in shorter deployments, has also 

resulted in more frequent deployments. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship 

between the length of deployments and the number of deployments when 

requirements and force structure are steady. It shows that 12-month 

deployments, which were typical under the previous policy, result in 3 

deployments over a 36-month period. However, 9-month deployments, 

under the current policy, require 4 deployments to support the same 

requirements over a 36-month period. 

 

19 Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, January, 27, 2009. 

Page 17 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Figure 4: Deployment Rotation Requirements Based on 12- and 9-Month Deployments 

Source: GAO.

Month

First deployment Second deployment Third deployment

0 12 24 36

Month First deployment Second deployment Third deployment Fourth deployment 0 9 18 27 36

More Deployments Result 

in Less Time at Home to 

Conduct Training 

As previously noted, the Army’s reserve component strategy calls for 

reserve component units to have 4 years of training between deployments, 

but the 12-month mobilization policy, with its associated shorter 

deployments and more frequent mobilizations, has led to situations where 

units do not have 4 years available to conduct training. Demands for 

certain occupational specialties have remained particularly high. Army 

leadership recently testified that reserve component soldiers are 

experiencing less than 3 years between deployments,20 and personnel in 

some high demand units, such as civil affairs units, are receiving as little 

13 months between deployments. For example, personnel from one of the 

units in our sample, an aviation battalion, experienced frequent 

deployments. Personnel from the battalion returned from deployment in 

2008 and were notified that the unit will be mobilized again in 2011. 

Reduced Time at Home 

Leads to Additional 

Training under the Current 

Training Strategy 

As previously noted, under the Army’s reserve component strategy, unit 

training requirements build from 39 days in the first 2 years of the training 

cycle to as high as 109 days in the year prior to mobilization. However, the 

12-month mobilization policy is leading to more frequent deployments, and 

units are mobilizing and deploying after 3 years at home rather than after 

4. Because units are supposed to receive initial notification of their 

assigned missions two years prior to mobilization, the extended assigned 

 

20 Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli, testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, April 

22, 2009. 

Page 18 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

mission training that is scheduled to occur after notification is still 

maintained under the compressed schedule, but the 39 days of primary 

mission training that is scheduled to be conducted in the second year of 

the training cycle, just prior to notification, is often eliminated. Therefore, 

since the extended training periods are maintained and the shorter 

training periods are eliminated, units are required to spend a higher 

proportion of their “at home” time conducting training. 

Flexible Approaches 

Provide Better 

Predictability Than the 

Firm 12-Month 

Mobilization Policy 

As part of its mobilization policy, DOD has established a goal that calls for 

reserve component forces to be mobilized for 1 year and demobilized for 5 

years. However, the Army’s reserve component forces are not meeting this 

goal because of high operational requirements, stable force structure, and 

the 12-month mobilization policy that is causing more frequent 

deployments. When the Secretary of Defense testified that the mobilization 

policy was intended to reduce stress on the force by, in part, improving 

predictability in the mobilization and deployment process, he also noted 

that the department is not achieving its goal of 1 year mobilized to 5 years 

demobilized.21 Earlier, in September 2007, the Defense Science Board 

evaluated DOD’s mobilization policy and concluded that the goal of 1 year 

mobilized and 5 years not mobilized could not be achieved given the level 

of operational demand and the end-strength increases that had been 

planned. 22 Thus, for the foreseeable future, DOD’s goal will be difficult to 

achieve because operational demands for reserve component forces are 

expected to remain high and force structure levels are expected to remain 

relatively constant. Furthermore, the Army does not expect to reach the 

goal of 1 year mobilized and 5 years not mobilized in the near future. In its 

2009 Posture Statement, the Army indicated that it expected to progress to 

1 year mobilized to 4 years demobilized by 2011 due, in part, to the 

drawdown in Iraq. However, the statement does not address the impact 

that increased operations in Afghanistan may have on the projected 

progress. 

Leaders and soldiers in one of the larger units we contacted said that the 

12-month mobilization policy, which has led to more frequent deployments 

and training periods, has actually increased stress and decreased 

 

21 Secretary of Defense testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 

27, 2009. 

22 Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard 

and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, September 2007. 

Page 19 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

predictability. Specifically, they stated that they would prefer to be away 

from home for a single longer period of time rather than many shorter 

periods of time. However, in our other readiness work, we have found that 

the Air Force has developed an alternative approach to provide better 

predictability for its deploying active and reserve component personnel. 

The Air Force deployment model groups occupational specialties into 5 

different “tempo bands” based on ongoing operational requirements. 

Personnel in the first band should expect to be deployed about the same 

length of time as they are home between deployments. Personnel in bands 

two, three, four, and five can expect to respectively be home two, three, 

four, or five times longer than they are deployed.23 The Air Force expects 

this model to increase predictability for its forces. 

In accordance with DOD Directive 1200.17, which directs the Secretaries 

of the military departments to ensure that facilities and training areas are 

available to support reserve component training requirements, reserve 

component forces are generally receiving the access to training facilities 

that is necessary to prepare them for their assigned missions. However, 

the Army’s training facilities lack the capacity necessary to prepare all of 

the Army’s forces for the full range of individual and unit training 

requirements, including those associated with primary as well as assigned 

missions. In addressing its capacity shortages, the Army has given priority 

access to personnel and units that have established mobilization dates or 

assigned missions. As a result, active and reserve component forces 

without assigned missions often experience delays in gaining access to 

training needed to prepare them for their primary missions. While the 

Army is exploring or has several initiatives under way to address training 

constraints, it has not identified the total requirements associated with its 

reserve component training strategy or the training capacity necessary to 

support the strategy. 

Reserve Component 

Forces Assigned 

Missions in Support of 

Ongoing Operations 

Have Access to the 

Training Needed, But 

Constraints Delay and 

Limit Training 

Opportunities for 

Some Forces 

 

23 For active component forces the ratios cover deployed to non-deployed time periods. For 

reserve component forces the ratios cover mobilized to non-mobilized time periods. 

Page 20 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

DOD Directive 1200.17 directs the Secretaries of the Military Departments 

to ensure facilities and training areas are available to support reserve 

component training requirements.24 It also directs the Secretaries to 

allocate resources where required to support a “train-mobilize-deploy” 

construct. As previously discussed, reserve component forces undergo 

individual training as well as collective (unit) training at various times in 

their training cycles in order to prepare them for their primary and 

assigned missions. Individual training is typically conducted at military 

schools or other specialized training sites while collective training occurs 

at larger training centers, such as the Combat Training Centers, and 

mobilization sites where units complete their final deployment 

preparations. Once units are assigned missions in support of ongoing 

operations, they are granted necessary access to training facilities. 

According to officials from the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command,25

missions and mobilization dates are two key factors that drive individual 

training opportunities and access to training facilities. U.S. Forces 

Command26 officials also said that priority access to training facilities is 

based on units’ mobilization and latest arrival in theater dates, rather than 

their status as part of the active or reserve component. 

Reserve Component 

Forces That Have Assigned 

Missions in Support of 

Ongoing Operations Have 

Necessary Access to 

Training Facilities 

Based on information from the units we contacted, we found that units 

generally had access to training facilities once they were assigned 

missions. Personnel from the units in our sample and the brigade combat 

teams we met with reported that they had been granted priority access to 

individual and collective training once their units were assigned missions. 

Specifically, in preparing for their most recent missions, 23 of the 24 units 

reported that they did not have access issues involving collective training 

facilities and 22 units reported that they did not have access issues 

involving individual training facilities. Officials from one of the units that 

reported access issues explained that this was because their soldiers did 

not receive necessary orders until a few days before they were mobilized. 

Officials from one of the other units explained that the access issues were 

because of the fact that the unit was under tight time constraints because 

it was part of the 2007 surge force that deployed to Iraq. Officials from the 

third unit that reported access issues explained that it trained using a 

 

24 Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an 

Operational Force (Oct. 29, 2008). 

25 The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command oversees individual training. 

26 U.S. Army Forces Command trains, mobilizes, deploys, and sustains Army forces in 

support of Combatant Commander requirements. 

Page 21 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

motor pool to simulate a detention facility because it could not access a 

more appropriate training facility. 

Constraints in Capacity 

Delay and Limit Training 

Opportunities for Some 

Forces at Individual and 

Collective Training 

Facilities 

Capacity constraints involving personnel, equipment, and infrastructure, 

limit training opportunities for some forces at individual and collective 

training facilities. In some cases, the Army is exploring or has ongoing 

initiatives that are intended to help address constraints on individual and 

collective training. 

Because deploying forces have higher priority and existing training 

facilities do not have sufficient capacity to accommodate all training 

needs, reserve component forces that have not been assigned missions 

often experience delays in gaining access to individual training needed to 

prepare them for their primary missions. While both the Army Reserve and 

Army National Guard are limited in their ability to fully train all soldiers on 

individual tasks within desired time frames, the effect of these limitations 

is particularly significant for the Army National Guard. The Army National 

Guard’s individual training goal is to have no more than 15 percent of its 

soldiers awaiting individual training at any given time. However, table 3 

shows that the Army National Guard has not been able to achieve this goal 

since 2001, as a result of the individual training capacity limitations. 

Individual Training Facilities 

Table 1: Percentage of Army National Guard Soldiers Awaiting Individual Training 

Fiscal year Percentage awaiting training

2001 27%

2002 24%

2003 20%

2004 17%

2005 17%

2006 23%

2007 23%

2008 22%

March 2009 22%

Source: GAO presentation based on Army National Guard data. 

Note: Individual training includes basic training, advanced individual training, and change of specialty 

training. 

Page 22 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Although the percentage of Army National Guard soldiers awaiting 

individual training declined to 17 percent in 2004 and 2005, it has remained 

at or above 22 percent since that time. Furthermore, Army National Guard 

training officials stated that they do not expect the number of soldiers 

awaiting training to change their specialty to decrease from the March 

2009 level. In March 2009, 80,000 Army National Guard soldiers were 

awaiting various types of individual training, of whom 35,000 were 

awaiting training to change their specialty, such as from aviation to 

infantry. 

In both the active and reserve components, incoming recruits often prefer 

to sign contracts to begin basic training in the summer. This Army-wide 

preference exacerbates capacity constraints at individual training facilities 

during the summer months. While the number of soldiers awaiting training 

decreases over the summer months because most soldiers begin training 

at that time, Army officials said backlog could be reduced further if the 

Army fully accounted for this summer surge during its planning process, 

but the Army plans as if individual training requirements are evenly 

distributed across the fiscal year. The Army National Guard expects to 

reduce the number of soldiers awaiting basic training from 30,000 to 

10,000 by September 30, 2009, but this number could be reduced even 

further if capacity constraints were addressed. While capacity is not an 

issue during the fall and winter months, Army officials expect the number 

of soldiers awaiting training to increase during those months because 

incoming recruits generally do not want to begin training during those 

months. Army officials said they are exploring ways to even out the 

training demand such as offering bonuses for soldiers to enlist and attend 

basic training outside of the summer months. Additionally, the Army 

formed an integrated process team specifically to develop options for 

mitigating the summer surge, including options to expand capacity. At the 

time of our review, the team’s work was ongoing, and it was too soon to 

know what, if any, actions would be taken as a result of its efforts. 

The delays in individual training opportunities that are caused by capacity 

constraints are distributed across the Army in both the active and reserve 

components. The Army has a review process that compares Army-wide 

individual training requirements to the training capacity at the Army’s 

active training facilities and allocates training quotas to the active and 

reserve components.27 The 2008 data from the process is depicted in table 

 

27 The Army’s Structure Manning Decision Review. 

Page 23 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

4 and shows that the active and reserve components have approximately 

the same level of unmet training requirements at Army Training and 

Doctrine Command schools. 

Table 2: Number of Schools Where Required Seats Exceed Reserved Seats 

Active Army Army Reserve Army National Guard

17 15 18

Source: GAO based on Army data. 

Note: Total Number of Training and Doctrine Command Schools: 54. 

Capacity constraints at collective training facilities such as the Army’s 

combat training centers28 and mobilization stations have limited training 

opportunities for both active and reserve component units. As we have 

previously reported, the Army’s strategy requires that all brigade combat 

teams be trained at the combat training centers prior to deployment.29

Because the combat training centers do not have adequate capacity, 

training opportunities are now limited to only those active and reserve 

brigade combat teams that have been assigned missions requiring them to 

control battle-space. As a result, most active and reserve components 

units, including brigade combat teams that are assigned detainee 

operations or convoy security missions, do not train at the combat training 

centers. These units conduct training at other locations such as the Army’s 

mobilization stations. 

Collective Training Facilities 

In the past, capacity constraints have also limited reserve component 

access to facilities at certain mobilization stations. For example, officials 

from First Army, which is responsible for training mobilized reserve 

component units, stated that facilities have not always been accessible at 

sites such as Ft. Bragg and Ft. Dix because they were being used by active 

component forces. Because of this, First Army is realigning its resources 

and will no longer be using the constrained facilities to train mobilized 

reserve component forces. First Army officials expect the realignment to 

increase training capacity because its resources will be concentrated at 

mobilization stations where it has greater control over scheduling. 

 

28 The Army’s combat training centers include the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, 

California and the Joint Reserve Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. 

29 GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army’s Strategy for 

Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges, GAO-07-936

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2007). 

Page 24 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

However, DOD’s 2008 Sustainable Ranges Report identified shortfalls at a 

number of major collective training facilities, including the mobilization 

stations that First Army plans to continue to use. These shortfalls involve 

land and airspace, ranges, infrastructure and feedback/scoring systems, as 

well as a number of other resources. Four of the 24 units we contacted 

identified shortfalls at the mobilization stations where they conducted 

collective training in preparation for their most recent missions. Two of 

these units stated that their mobilization stations did not have adequate 

infrastructure, citing shortfalls in maintenance and hangar facilities 

respectively. The other two units stated that their mobilization stations 

were in geographic locations that hindered training because of the terrain, 

explaining that Mississippi and western Oklahoma did not realistically 

replicate conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. Army Reserve 

officials told us that similar shortfalls characterize many of the collective 

training facilities owned by the reserve components because the Army 

employed tiered resourcing for several years, which relegated reserve 

component requirements to a lower priority for funding than active 

component requirements. These facilities are commonly used by reserve 

component units to execute collective training prior to mobilization. 

Initiatives to Help Address Training Capacity Constraints 

The Army has several initiatives under way to help address individual and 

collective training capacity constraints. For example: 

• The Army has developed a database, which is intended to account for 

both active and reserve component individual training facilities under 

a “One Army School” system. However, the Army has not accounted 

for reserve component individual training facilities when filling 

training requirements, and in its 2007 Training Capacity Assessment,30

the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command found that a significant 

reserve component infrastructure was available to meet individual 

training requirements. 

• The Army is attempting to address individual training capacity 

constraints through the use of mobile training teams. These mobile 

training teams contain transportable training assets—facilities, 

equipment, and personnel—which deploy to units’ home stations to 

provide individual training. Mobile training teams are currently being 

 

30 Total Army Training Capacity Assessment was limited to training facilities and did not 

assess personnel and equipment requirements. 

Page 25 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

used to provide classes that are in high demand, such as professional 

military education, foreign language, and cultural awareness. These 

mobile training teams partially relieve capacity constraints resulting 

from limited infrastructure at training facilities. 

• The Army National Guard has established an Exportable Combat 

Training Center program, to address facility, personnel, and equipment 

limitations that impact pre-mobilization collective training for Army 

National Guard units. The program enhances training by providing 

instrumentation to collect and record individual and unit performance, 

exercise control personnel, opposition forces, and civilians on the 

battlefield; program officials also coordinate the use of appropriate 

facilities. Exportable Combat Training Center events are intended to 

serve as the culminating collective training event prior to a unit’s 

mobilization and are designed to validate training proficiency up to the 

company level. The Army National Guard conducted four Exportable 

Combat Training Center program training events from 2005 through 

2008, and it intends to conduct 5 training events from 2009 through 

2010. 

• The Army Reserve has a concept plan for a Combat Support Training 

Center to address capability constraints in combat support and combat 

service support collective training 1 to 2 years prior to a unit’s 

mobilization. This concept has been approved at the Department of the 

Army level but is currently unfunded. The Combat Support Training 

Center would leverage existing active and reserve component combat 

support and combat services support expertise and thus not have to 

compete with active component forces capabilities. The Combat 

Support Training Center program is expected to provide 

instrumentation, an operations group, opposition forces, civilians on 

the battlefield, interpreters, media teams, and realistic training 

environments, similar to Combat Training Centers such as the National 

Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California. The first Combat Support 

Training Center event is scheduled to occur in July 2009 at Fort 

McCoy, Wisconsin. 

Page 26 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

While the Army has a number of initiatives intended to relieve training 

capacity constraints, it has not identified the total personnel, equipment, 

and facility resources needed to support its reserve component training 

strategy. As previously discussed, DOD Directive 1200.17 directs the 

Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure facilities and training 

areas are available to support reserve component training requirements. It 

also directs the Secretaries to allocate resources where required to 

support a “train-mobilize-deploy” construct. In November 2008, the 

Secretary of Defense directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments 

to review the capacity of their training institutions to determine if they are 

properly resourced to prepare all military members to meet mission 

requirements.31

The Army Has Not 

Identified the Total 

Personnel, Equipment, and 

Facility Requirements 

Needed to Meet Reserve 

Component Training 

Requirements 

The Army has ongoing efforts to address this tasking, but these efforts do 

not fully address all individual and collective training requirements. In 

June 2009, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command is scheduled to 

produce an update to its 2007 Total Army Capacity Assessment of 

individual training requirements. However, both the 2007 and 2009 

assessments focus exclusively on training infrastructure, and neither 

assessment addresses personnel and equipment constraints that have 

limited training in the past. Further, the Army’s efforts to identify 

collective training requirements are affected by inaccurate assumptions 

regarding the use of ranges. Specifically, the Army Range Requirements 

Model, which is used to determine Army range requirements, calculates 

requirements based on an assumption that reserve component forces will 

be mobilized for 1 of 6 years. Since reserve component forces are being 

mobilized more frequently—about 1 of 3 years, according to Army 

officials—the model understates actual training requirements. The model 

also understates active component range requirements since it calculates 

requirements based on planned operational tempos rather than the actual 

higher tempos that are occurring to support ongoing operations. Because 

the model understates current requirements, it does not accurately project 

the full magnitude of capacity constraints at the Army’s ranges. 

In recent years, reserve component units have successfully deployed for a 

wide range of assigned missions, and the training and preparation for 

these assigned missions, which is conducted in the later stages of the 

Conclusions 

 

31 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Recommendations of the Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves, (Nov. 24, 2008). 

Page 27 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Army’s 5-year cycle, was generally effective. However, collective training 

for primary missions, conducted in the early stages of the 5-year cycle, 

generally is not optimized because of various challenges. Such challenges 

include limited training time, changing personnel because of attrition, 

personnel and equipment shortages, and limited training support. Given 

that ongoing operations are expected to continue for some time, it is 

imperative that the Army has a strategy that is executable and provides for 

efficient use of training resources. Otherwise, units may continue to use 

limited training time and resources to build teams that are unlikely to 

deploy together and to train units for collective tasks that they may not 

perform. In light of the continued high demand for reserve forces and the 

Army’s existing force structure levels, DOD’s 12-month mobilization policy 

is likely to continue to result in more frequent and less predictable 

deployment and training periods, particularly for personnel in high 

demand occupational specialties, raising questions about the need to 

reevaluate the policy and consider alternatives. Furthermore, without 

complete information concerning the personnel, equipment, and facilities 

support that is necessary to execute reserve component training strategy, 

the Army will not be able to identify total requirements for its strategy, 

establish priorities and related resource needs, and be assured that current 

initiatives are addressing priority needs. 

To improve the Army’s training strategy and DOD’s mobilization policy for 

Army reserve component personnel, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense take the following three actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To better ensure the Army has an executable strategy for effectively 

training its reserve component forces, we recommend the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate and adjust its 

reserve component training strategy to fully account for the factors that 

limit the effectiveness of unit training for primary missions in the early 

years of the 5-year cycle. Elements that should be considered in reevaluating the training strategy should include: 

• Whether the total training days allotted for reserve component training 

are adequate to train units for both primary and assigned missions, 

which may require significantly different resources and skill. 

• Whether consolidating collective training later in the training cycle, as 

opposed to spreading it through the cycle, would enhance the 

effectiveness of the training and increase predictability. 

Page 28 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

To better ensure DOD’s mobilization policy is having the intended effect of 

providing reserve component personnel with predictable training, 

mobilization, and deployment schedules while also improving DOD’s 

ability to effectively train and employ its reserve component forces, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate DOD’s 

mobilization policy for Army reserve component personnel and consider 

whether a more flexible policy that allows greater variations in the length 

of mobilizations or which establishes deployment goals based on 

occupational specialty or unit type would better meet DOD’s goals to 

reduce stress on the force and improve predictability for personnel. 

To better ensure that the Army has a reserve component training strategy 

that it is able to execute, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretary of the Army to determine the range of resources and 

support that are necessary to fully implement the strategy. Elements that 

should be accounted for include: 

• the personnel, equipment, and facilities required to fully support 

individual training requirements; 

• the range space required to fully support individual and collective 

training requirements; and 

• the full support costs associated with the Army reserve component 

training strategy— including personnel, equipment, and facilities. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially 

concurred with all of our recommendations. Specifically, DOD concurred 

with the element of our first recommendation that calls for the Secretary 

of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Army to consider, when 

reevaluating the Army’s reserve component training strategy, whether the 

total training days allotted for reserve component training are adequate to 

train units for both primary and assigned missions. DOD noted that 

reserve component units do not always have sufficient time in their 

baseline training year to prepare for both a primary and assigned mission 

when those missions are substantially different. DOD also stated that 

today’s global demand for Army forces prevents reserve component units 

from sustaining their 5-year training cycle, since the Army must 

continuously balance its strategic depth against available resources to 

meet current operational requirements. DOD, however, did not state that it 

would take any action. We agree with DOD’s comments, and in fact, these 

comments reflect the same conditions that led us to conclude that current 

operational realities necessitate a reevaluation of the Army’s reserve 

component training strategy, including the adequacy of training time 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 29 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

allotted for reserve component training. Therefore, we continue to believe 

our recommendation has merit. DOD partially concurred with the second 

element of our first recommendation that the department, in reevaluating 

its training strategy, consider whether consolidating collective training 

later in the training cycle, as opposed to spreading it through the cycle, 

would enhance the effectiveness of the training and increase 

predictability. In comments, DOD noted that concentrating training later in 

the cycle compounds the existing resource-constrained environment and 

accentuates competition for limited training resources, facilities, 

equipment, and ranges. DOD, however, did not state that it plans to take 

any specific action. As noted in our report, the Army faces challenges 

associated with training time, personnel, equipment, and training support 

during the early stages of the training cycle and is, therefore, unable to set 

the conditions required for effective unit training during the early years of 

the cycle. Further, units we sampled indicated they preferred to conduct 

collective training later in the training cycle when personnel and 

equipment levels are more stable. The Army has also acknowledged, in its 

2009 Posture Statement, that an extended training period close to or 

contiguous with arriving at the mobilization station allowed commanders 

to achieve the highest levels of readiness and unit capability. We continue 

to believe that collective training should be conducted when training 

enablers such as personnel and equipment are present to ensure the 

training is most effective and that the Army should reevaluate its current 

approach. 

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense reevaluate DOD’s mobilization policy for Army 

reserve component personnel and consider whether a more flexible 

policy, which allows greater variations in the length of mobilization or 

which establishes deployment goals based on occupational specialty or 

unit type, would better meet DOD’s goals to reduce stress on the force and 

improve predictability for personnel. In DOD’s response, the department 

noted the Secretary of Defense will continue to evaluate those 

circumstances that warrant changes or exceptions to the mobilization 

policy but commented that the 1-year mobilization has reduced stress on 

service members, their families and employers. DOD also acknowledged 

the challenge associated with implementing a 5-year training and 

preparation cycle and identified several innovations designed to enhance 

predictability and reduce stress on reserve component soldiers and units 

including the Regional Training Centers developed by the Army Reserves 

to assist units in preparing for mobilization and the consolidation of its 

training support structure at six mobilization training centers to better 

support all deploying units. Our report acknowledges department 

Page 30 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

initiatives to increase training capacity and support to units through 

initiatives like those pointed out by the department. However, we also 

note that in spite of these initiatives, DOD’s mobilization policy is not 

achieving the intended purpose of reducing stress on the force by 

providing predictability. For example, our report discusses how the 1-year 

mobilization, while limiting the amount of time reserve component 

soldiers and units are deployed, is resulting in more frequent deployments 

and is, therefore, not reducing stress on soldiers and units. We continue to 

believe the mobilization policy needs to be reevaluated to determine 

whether a more flexible approach that recognizes variances in deployment 

frequency based on occupational specialty and unit type would improve 

predictability. 

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to determine the 

range of resources and support that are necessary to fully implement the 

Army’s strategy for training its reserve components. In comments, DOD 

noted that an all volunteer force trained to meet its persistent operational 

requirements will require sufficient resources in order to be trained and 

ready. To do so, DOD further noted, will require a holistic approach that 

leverages the consolidation of training locations in conjunction with the 

utilization of live, distributed learning, virtual, and constructive 

technologies to deliver more training to home station locations. DOD also 

stated the Army will need to prioritize the allocation of funds supporting 

training initiatives while embedding the costs to implement them in its 

Program Objective Memorandum. We agree that the Army’s various 

training initiatives, many of which are discussed in our report, should be 

prioritized and the costs associated with those initiatives should be 

reflected in the Army’s Program Objective Memorandum. However, we 

believe the Army must first determine the full range of resources and 

support required to implement its training strategy in order to establish 

priorities and resource needs in order to be assured that current initiatives 

are addressing priority needs. 

The full text of DOD’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 31 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
 

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributors to this 

Sharon L. Pickup 

report are listed in appendix III. 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 32 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Army is able to effectively 

implement its strategy for training Reserve Component forces, we 

reviewed documentation outlining the Army’s approach to training its 

reserve component forces such as Field Manual 7.0, Training for Full 

Spectrum Operations and Department of the Army Executive Order 150-

08, Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre-and PostMobilization Training Strategy. Additionally, we discussed the training 

strategy, factors that limit execution of the strategy, and initiatives under 

way to address any limiting factors with officials responsible for training 

including officials from the Department of the Army Training Directorate, 

U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army National Guard Readiness Center, 

First Army, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army 

Reserve Command. To determine the impact personnel levels have on 

training effectiveness, we obtained and reviewed data on attrition. To 

assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation and 

interviewed officials and determined these data to be sufficiently reliable. 

To assess the extent to which mobilization and deployment laws, 

regulations, goals, and policies impact the Army’s ability to train and 

employ Reserve Component forces, we reviewed laws, regulations, goals, 

and policies that impact the way the Army trains and employs its reserve 

component forces such as relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. 

Code and DOD’s January 2007 mobilization policy. Additionally, we 

interviewed Army officials from organizations such as U.S. Army Reserve 

Command, the National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Joint Forces Command to 

discuss the impact of mobilization and deployment documents. Lastly, we 

reviewed and analyzed data from units and various Army offices, including 

data showing trends in pre- and post-mobilization training time, to assess 

how mobilization and deployment laws, regulations, goals, and policies 

may be impacting reserve component units and personnel. 

To determine the extent to which access to military schools and skill 

training, facilities. and ranges affect the preparation of reserve component 

forces to support ongoing operations, we reviewed documentation such as 

DOD’s 2008 Sustainable Ranges Report, the 2007 Total Army Training 

Capacity Assessment, and outputs from DOD’s Structure Manning 

Decision Review. To determine how training requirements are prioritized, 

we also interviewed officials from the Army’s Training and Doctrine 

Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command. These commands 

schedule units and soldiers to attend individual and collective training. 

Further, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials to 

determine initiatives that the Army has under way to address capacity 

constraints and to assess total training requirements. We also obtained and 

Page 33 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

reviewed data on Army National Guard soldiers awaiting individual 

training. We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing existing 

documentation and interviewing knowledgeable officials and found these 

data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Lastly, we observed 

Training at the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, 

and the Army National Guard’s exportable training conducted at Camp 

Blanding, Florida. 

To inform all three of our objectives, we sent a list of questions to U.S. 

Central Command and to Northern Command and held a follow-on video 

teleconference to discuss in more detail Northern Command’s response to 

our questions. Additionally, we surveyed a non-probability sample of 22 

Army National Guard or Army Reserve units and conducted follow-up 

interviews with officials from 15 of these units. While the results of our 

survey and discussions are not projectable to the entire reserve 

component, we chose units of different types and sizes for our sample. In 

addition, we chose the proportion of Army National Guard and Reserve 

units for our sample based on the proportion of mobilized forces from 

each of the components. Our surveys and interviews addressed a range of 

issues including: deployment and notification timelines; the timing and 

effectiveness of pre-deployment, post-deployment, and in-theater training; 

and access to training facilities, schoolhouses, and ranges. Additionally, 

we interviewed commanders and personnel from two Army National 

Guard brigade combat teams that were training at the National Training 

Center at Fort Irwin, California, and at Camp Blanding, Florida. Of the 

total of 24 units in our non-probability sample, 22 had returned from 

supporting on-going operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kosovo, and 2 were 

preparing for deployment. We conducted this performance audit from 

September 2008 through June 2009 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 34 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-09-720 Reserve Forces
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 39 GAO-09-720 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov 

In addition to the individual named above, Michael Ferren, Assistant 

Director; Grace Coleman; Nicole Harms; Ron La Due Lake; Susan Tindall; 

Nate Tranquilli; and John Vallario made key contributions to this report. 

 Reserve Forces 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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