J-S16021-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM ALLEN WYLIE 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1708 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 14, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-08-CR-0000433-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED APRIL 02, 2018

William Allen Wylie (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed by the trial court after he pled guilty to possessing a controlled 

substance (methamphetamine), possessing drug paraphernalia, driving under 

the influence of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), person not to

possess a firearm, and possessing a firearm with an altered manufacturer’s 

number.

1

 We affirm. 

The trial court explained:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Commonwealth moved 

[Appellant] into the State Intermediate Punishment Program for 

which he would have to be evaluated by the Department of 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 6105(a)(1) and 6110.2(a). 
J-S16021-18

- 2 -

Corrections, and that [Appellant] would report to the Bradford 

County Correctional Facility on January 4, 2016, to be transported 

for that evaluation. The remaining charges would be dismissed at 

sentencing pursuant to the plea agreement. By Order dated 

November 3, 2015, [Appellant] was to report to the Bradford 

County Correctional Facility on January 4, 2016, so that he could 

then be transported to SCI Camp Hill for evaluation to determine 

suitability for the State Intermediate Punishment Program. A 

thorough written plea colloquy was completed by Appellant and 

counsel, see Plea Colloquy filed November 6, 2015, and a verbal 

plea colloquy was completed wherein Appellant admitted to 

committing the offenses and was advised of the maximum 

penalties for the offenses.

During the verbal plea colloquy, Appellant admitted as 

follows with his counsel stating the facts:

Atty. Kolcharno: My client was at the traffic light, he was

sleeping at the wheel, at the time the vehicle was running. 

Uh, at that time, the officers did further investigation and 

based on that investigation, your Honor, it was determined 

that my client was impaired. He did have in his system a 

certain quantity of methamphetamine at that time and did 

have on his person, possession of control, a quantity of 

methamphetamine, all totaling approximately seven (7) 

grams, and the corresponding drug paraphernalia. Further, 

officers patted him down and did find a handgun, your 

Honor. Due to his prior felony conviction in 1988, he was 

precluded from having that in his possession or control and 

also the officer has, the officer did indicate at that time, 

observation of the firearm did appear to be obliterated, 

scratched off, altered in some way, shape or form, your 

Honor.

[Commonwealth]: Would you require your client to 

acknowledge that your synopsis of what the officer said, 

what you said, was true?

Attorney Kolcharno: Based on what I have just indicated 

to you, is that true?

[Appellant]: Yeah, yeah.

The Court: Yes?
J-S16021-18

- 3 -

[Appellant]: Yeah.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/17, at 2-3 (citations omitted).

At the plea hearing, the Commonwealth stated that Appellant, “for 

personal reasons, [is] requesting a delay until January fourth, to begin the 

incarceration and evaluation period.” N.T., 11/3/15, at 2. The trial court, 

after accepting Appellant’s plea, stated, “[Appellant] is directed to report to 

the Bradford County Correctional Facility on January 4, 201[6] . . . at nine 

a.m. Thereafter, [Appellant] shall be transported to [the] State Correctional 

Facility at Camp Hill for a[n] SIP evaluation. The Court Administrator will 

schedule sentencing upon notice of the acceptance or non-acceptance into the 

SIP program.” Id. at 11. Appellant was released on bail. Less than two 

months later, and before January 4, 2016, when Appellant was to report to 

the Bradford County Correctional Facility:

The Commonwealth filed a Petition to Revoke Bail on 

December 30, 2015, alleging Appellant had violated bail 

conditions by being arrested by Federal authorities for illegal 

possession/conspiracy to deliver controlled substances. An arrest 

warrant was then issued. Appellant did not report to the Bradford 

County Correctional Facility on January 4, 2016 pursuant to the 

plea agreement and as directed by Order of Court. Therefore, 

sentencing was scheduled for March 10, 2016, which was 

continued upon motion of counsel to April 14, 2016.

[Appellant] filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on April 

12, 2016, claiming: that he entered the plea on the expectation 

and promise that he would be sentenced to State Intermediate 

Punishment if the evaluation deemed him a candidate; that he had 

been indicted in the US District Court for drug related offenses and 

that evaluation of these matters, the plea in the instant case would 

“severely prejudice [Appellant’s] constitutional rights as he would 
J-S16021-18

- 4 -

face an extremely harsher sentence in the United States District 

Court”; and finally making a bare assertion of being innocent. See 

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea filed April 12, 2016. A hearing was 

held prior to sentencing on April 14, 2016 and the Motion to 

Withdraw Guilty Plea was denied. Appellant was sentenced on 

April 14, 2016, to [an] aggregate sentence of a minimum of 72 

months to a maximum of 150 months. No appeal was filed.

Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely PCRA Petition alleging 

that he requested his then counsel to file an appeal which was not 

done. The Commonwealth and new counsel for Appellant agreed 

that the appellate rights should be reinstated and an Order was 

entered reinstating same.

Appellant has now appealed and filed a Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.App.Proc. Rule 1925(b) 

setting out the single issue that his motion to withdraw his guilty 

pleas should have been granted. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/17, at 4-5.

Appellant presents this Court with the following Statement of Question 

Involved:

Should [A]ppellant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in 

a case where he maintained his innocence of the firearm charges, 

where his lawyer argued he had a defense to those charges, and 

where [A]ppellant had previously stated on the record that he 

never “opened the gun,” “found it in the car,” and handed the gun 

to a police officer?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Preliminary, we note that nowhere in his argument does Appellant 

reference, cite or otherwise discuss his assertion that he “previously stated on 

the record that he never ‘opened the gun,’ ‘found it in the car,’ and handed 

the gun to a police officer.” Id. We further note that Appellant’s testimony 

in this regard occurred at the April 14, 2016 hearing prior to sentencing, but 
J-S16021-18

- 5 -

after the trial court had denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. 

N.T., 4/14/16, at 11.

Rather, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Carrasquillo, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

request to withdraw his guilty plea because he “established a colorable 

demonstration under the circumstances that allowing the plea to be withdrawn 

would not substantially prejudice the Commonwealth, and would promote 

fairness and justice.” Appellant’s Brief at 10, citing Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 

1284 (Pa. 2015). Appellant specifically asserts that “[a]s set forth in the

sentencing proceeding,” his counsel expressed concern about Appellant 

“entering a plea to something that he felt that he was not guilty of, but yet at 

the same token there was a benefit of possibly finally getting his life together. 

. .” Id. at 10-11, citing N.T., 4/14/16, at 4. Appellant also states that his 

counsel “further informed the court that he was not indicating he was not 

guilty of all five offenses, but rather he was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses 

but that he had a defense to the firearm related offenses and was not guilty 

of those.” Id. at 11, citing N.T, 11/3/15, at 4.2

This Court recently addressed our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Carrasquillo:

____________________________________________

2 Appellant erroneously attributes this second quote to counsel at page 4 of 

the guilty plea hearing on November 3, 2015. Both of the quotes cited by 

Appellant are contained in the notes of testimony from the sentencing hearing

on April 14, 2016.
J-S16021-18

- 6 -

That decision clarified the parameters of when a pre-sentence

motion to withdraw is to be granted based upon an assertion of 

innocence. Therein, our Supreme Court re-affirmed that the trial 

court is imbued with the discretion to deny a defendant permission 

to withdraw a guilty plea, whether that request is tendered before 

or after sentencing, and we, as an appellate court, can reverse its 

decision only when that discretion is abused. Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) 

(emphasis added) (“At any time before the imposition of sentence, 

the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of the 

defendant, or direct, sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty

or nolo contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty.”).

Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 38–39 (Pa. Super. 2017). We 

recognized that while a pre-sentence motion to withdraw is to be liberally

allowed, there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, and trial courts 

have discretion to determine whether a withdrawal request will be granted. 

Id. at 39. The trial court’s discretion is to be administered “liberally in favor 

of the accused, and any demonstration by a defendant of a fair-and-just 

reason will suffice to support a grant, unless withdrawal would work 

substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.” Id. citing Carrasquillo, at 

1291–92. However:

The Carrasquillo Court, breaking with prior precedent, held that 

a bare assertion of innocence is no longer a fair and just reason 

permitting a pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. Instead, a 

defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible to 

demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for 

presentence withdrawal of a plea. Our High Court outlined that the 

correct inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is 

whether the accused has made some colorable demonstration, 

under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the 

plea would promote fairness and justice.

Baez, 169 A.3d at 39 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
J-S16021-18

- 7 -

Notably, at the guilty plea hearing, Appellant’s counsel3 stated that 

Appellant would plead guilty to persons not to possess a firearm and 

possession of a firearm with an altered number. N.T., 11/3/15, at 2. Counsel 

additionally presented Appellant’s written plea colloquy to the court. Id. 

Appellant testified that he reviewed, understood, and signed the written plea 

colloquy, and that all of his responses were “true and correct.” Id. at 3. This 

exchange followed:

BY THE COURT: You’re planning to plead guilty to firearms 

not to be carried without a license and that’s defined as follows . 

. . Do you understand that as it’s defined?

A: Yes, your Honor.

[Commonwealth]: No, the felony three wasn’t one of the 

ones he’s pleading to.

[Appellant’s Counsel]: Your Honor, that would be Count number 

ten (10),-

THE COURT: Okay.

[Appellant’s Counsel]: - it’s a felony of the second degree,-

THE COURT: Okay.

[Appellant’s Counsel]: - on the information.

THE COURT: My apologies. So let me define that for 

you then.

[Commonwealth: Count ten, - the previous felony was a 

burglary.

____________________________________________

3 The same attorney, Corey Kolcharno, Esquire, represented Appellant at both 

the plea and sentencing hearings. 
J-S16021-18

- 8 -

THE COURT: Okay. So this is the definition. Person not 

to possess, use, manufacture, control or sell or transfer firearm. 

[reads definition] . . . Do you understand that as it’s defined?

[Appellant]: Yeah.

N.T., 11/3/15, at 4-5.

Appellant’s counsel then stated:

Officers patted [Appellant] down and did find a handgun, your 

Honor. Due to his prior felony conviction in 1988, he was 

precluded from having that in his possession or control and also 

the officer has, the officer did indicate at that time, observation of 

the firearm did appear to be obliterated, scratched off, altered in 

some way, shape or form, your Honor. I believe I’ve provided an 

accurate synopsis of the facts in question.

Id. at 7-8.

Five months later at sentencing, Appellant’s counsel conceded that 

Appellant “entered a plea to two felony firearm related offenses and then three 

other offenses, they’re misdemeanor related.” N.T., 4/14/16, at 2. He 

acknowledged, “During that time he was directed by this Court to be evaluated 

. . . Your Honor was gracious enough to allow him out on his own, I guess, 

recognizance or at liberty during the holiday season and to report January 4th. 

. . . On or about December 21, 2015, Your Honor, it came to my attention that 

he was indicted in the Federal Court in the Middle District of Scranton for a 

drug-related offense there.” Id. at 3. The docket shows that Appellant filed 

his motion to withdraw guilty plea on April 12, 2016, two days prior to 

sentencing.
J-S16021-18

- 9 -

Appellant references his counsel’s statements at sentencing to support 

his argument. In context and as a whole, the statements of counsel in support 

of Appellant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea read: 

I think SIP was [Appellant’s] last resort and we had 

thoughtfully weighed this back and forth. And there was part of 

him that was concerned about entering a plea to something that 

he felt that he was not guilty of, but yet on the same token there 

was a benefit of possibly finally getting his life together, 

straightening his life out, and getting clean; and the SIP program, 

as this court is well aware, is one avenue to do that and sometime 

the best avenue because it does have that component of structure 

and incarceration. 

In addition to that, your Honor, I’ve spoken to his Federal 

Public Defender, I know that with regard to these charges in 

particular, I know [] the felonies in particular and the sentence 

that accompanies those will astronomically prejudice him in the 

Federal Courts, that’s just a small component. 

And finally, your Honor, as I first indicated, [Appellant] will 

tell you and I will tell you on his behalf that he and I have to sort 

of amend my averment here that he’s not indicating he is not 

guilty of all five offenses, he would agree that the Misdemeanor 

offenses he is guilty of, okay. However, when it came to the 

firearm related offenses, your Honor, that that – he does have a 

defense for those and that he feels that he is not guilty of those. 

So I would ask the Court to do it – at the very least allow those 

two charges to be withdrawn at this time, your Honor, and I know 

by way of procedure I would have to ask the Court to, if your 

Honor’s going to consider allowing the – or granting my relief, 

allowing the entire plea to be withdrawn as opposed to doing it 

sort of in a bifurcated way.

So based on those three (3) reasons, your Honor, I’m trying 

to be as candid as possible and I’m – I’m in a very precarious 

situation because I will – I’m genuinely trying to help this man 

with an addiction and I know he will readily admit that he got 

arrested and put himself in that position and yet he’s looking at 

right now on the felonies alone potentially 10 to 20 years, and also 

on top of that a federal sentence which could be probably double 

that. He could be doing the equivalent of what would be a third 

degree murder sentence. 
J-S16021-18

- 10 -

So with that being said, your Honor, I think the prejudice is 

there, the case I cited to is the key case in Pennsylvania, 

Carrasquillo, I know there’s one line in there that I believe that’s 

pertinent that the court’s – that the trial courts are to, you know, 

they have a lot of discretion, your Honor has a lot of discretion in 

evaluating these motions; but also the Court did indicate there 

that they should be liberally, you know, liberally grant in favor of 

the defendant.

N.T., 4/14/16, at 4-5.

Thereafter, the trial court stated that it had reviewed Carrasquillo and 

noted the timeframe of Appellant’s November 3, 2015 plea, his subsequent 

arrest and bail revocation in December of 2015, and the motion to withdraw 

guilty plea served on the court on April 11, 2016. The court stated that the 

“timing of it in and of itself is not really a credible assertion of innocence.” Id.

at 9. The trial court continued:

Not being eligible for the SIP Program is not a reason to withdraw 

a guilty plea because th[ere] wasn’t an agreement for that, that 

was just a recommendation.

The other charges pending and how it’s going to affect those 

other charges is not a reason – a fair and just reason for 

withdrawing a guilty plea. It certainly is a – is just a – mere 

attempt at trying to manipulate the justice system, the criminal 

justice system and trying to get the best deal and best sentencing 

. . .

So, with – with . . . the timing of it . . I don’t find the 

assertion of innocence credible at all. There hasn’t really been 

any articulate – articulation as to – as to what type of defense [to 

the firearms charges] there would be. It wasn’t in writing and it 

wasn’t asserted today.

Id.
J-S16021-18

- 11 -

In sum, the trial court found that Appellant’s assertion of innocence was 

not credible because he was facing a harsher sentence in federal court “as a 

result of his plea and conviction in this case,” which “appears to be Appellant’s 

ultimate motive for wishing to withdraw his plea.” Trial Court Opinion, 

11/21/17, at 7. The record supports the trial court’s determination that 

Appellant offered no “colorable demonstration under the circumstances” or a 

“plausible innocence claim” to support the granting of his motion to withdraw 

his plea. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/2/2018