PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 10-3435

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JOSEPH BROWN,

Appellant

v.

MICHAEL ASTRUE,

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION C/O GENERAL COUNSEL

______

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-01899)

District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 21, 2011

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Before: HARDIMAN, ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, 

and RESTANI,*

 

Judge
2

(Opinion filed: July 6, 2011)

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Karen K. Weisbord, Esq.

Richard A. Weisbord, Esq.

Weisbord & Weisbord

128 Chestnut Street

Suite 201

Philadelphia, PA 19106-0000 

Counsel for Appellant

Eda Giusti, Esq.

Sandra G. Romagnole, Esq.

Social Security Administration

SSA/OGC/Region III

P.O. Box 41777

Philadelphia, PA 19101-0000 

Counsel for Appellee

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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 * Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States

Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
3

RESTANI, Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Brown appeals the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“the 

Commissioner”) denial of his application for supplemental 

security income (“SSI”). For the following reasons, we will 

affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 

HISTORY

In March 2006, Joseph Brown, a fifty-one year old man 

with a history of violent crime and drug abuse, applied for SSI 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. ' 1381 et 

seq. Despite alleging a disability beginning in April 2002 due to 

bipolar disorder and anxiety, his application was initially denied 

in October 2006 because his “condition [was] not severe enough 

to keep [him] from working.” Admin. R. 109. Upon Brown’s 

request, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”) in February 2008 (“the hearing”). At the conclusion of 

the hearing, the ALJ determined that Brown was not disabled 

because he “has been capable of making a successful adjustment 

to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy.” App. to Br. of Appellant A10. Brown then filed an 

appeal with the appeals council, but the administrative appeals 

judge concluded that there was “no reason . . . to review the 

[ALJ=s] decision.” Admin. R. 1.

In May 2009, Brown filed this lawsuit in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In 

a report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded 

that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence 

and recommended that Brown’s request for review be denied.
4

The District Court reviewed the issues raised by Brown’s 

objections, and adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation, concluding that the ALJ’s decision was indeed 

supported by substantial evidence. Brown now appeals.

JURISDICTION AND APPELLATE STANDARD OF 

REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 

' 405(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. ' 1291. “[O]ur 

review of the ALJ’s decision is more deferential as we 

determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

decision of the Commissioner.” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 

(3d Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

We begin by addressing in some detail the standard of 

review a district court should apply when reviewing a magistrate 

judge’s findings in an SSI claim.

A district court may “designate a magistrate judge to 

conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit 

to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and 

recommendations for the disposition” of certain matters pending 

before the court. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(b). In such cases, “the 

magistrate judge shall file his proposed findings and 

recommendations. . . with the court and a copy shall forthwith 

be mailed to all parties.” Id. ' 636(b)(1)(c). “Within fourteen 

days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file 

written objections to such proposed findings and 

recommendations as provided by rules of court.” Id. ' 636(b)(1). 

If a party timely and properly files such a written objection, the 
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District Court “shall make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. (emphasis 

added). We have provided that ' 636(b)(1) requires district 

courts to review such objections de novo unless the objection is 

“not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d 

Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

The District Court misapplied that framework to this 

case. Brown timely filed written objections challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Magistrate Judge’s 

findings rested. In considering these objections, the District 

Court stated that “objections which merely rehash arguments 

presented to and considered by a magistrate judge are not 

entitled to de novo review.” Morgan v. Astrue, No. 08-2133, 

2009 WL 3541001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009). That is not 

correct; any appeal to a district court based on an objection to a 

Magistrate Judge’s order will “rehash arguments presented to 

and considered by” the Magistrate Judge. That is—by 

definition—the very nature of “review.” In SSI appeals, the 

plain language of ' 636(b)(1) and our ruling in Goney, make 

clear that the standard district courts should apply to such 

objections is de novo. The District Court’s articulation of the 

standard of review was therefore erroneous.

The error, however, was harmless. An error is “harmless”

when, despite the technical correctness of an appellant=s legal 

contention, there is also “no set of facts” upon which the 

appellant could recover. Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 

341 (3d Cir. 2010). In this case, the rulings by the Magistrate 

Judge to which Brown objected were based upon facts found by 

the ALJ. Under 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g), “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 
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substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” Upon Brown=s 

appeal from the ALJ’s finding, the task of the Magistrate Judge 

was thus to determine whether the ALJ’s ruling was “supported 

by substantial evidence.” Id. And, upon Brown’s appeal from 

the Magistrate Judge’s rulings, the task of the District Court was 

to determine—de novo—whether the Magistrate Judge reached 

the correct conclusion. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1). Upon review of 

the record, we conclude that although the District Court stated 

that Brown’s objections were “not entitled to de novo review,” it 

also did consider whether each of the rulings from which Brown

appeals were supported by substantial evidence. Because, as set 

forth below, the District Court correctly found that substantial 

evidence supported the ALJ=s findings, those findings were 

“conclusive,” 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1), and bound the District 

Court, Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) 

(“We will not set the Commissioner=s decision aside if it is 

supported by substantial evidence, even if we would have 

decided the factual inquiry differently.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. 

' 405(g), and Monsour Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 

1190-1191 (3d. Cir.1986)). Having found “substantial evidence”

for the ALJ=s findings, there was “no set of facts” upon which 

the District Court could find in Brown=s favor. Renchenski, 622 

F.3d at 341.

I. The ALJ=s Determination

A. The Weight Afforded to Brown=s Treating 

Psychiatrist’s Opinion 

Brown claims that the ALJ’s decision to not adopt the 

opinion of his treating psychiatrist was not supported by 

substantial evidence. This claim lacks merit.
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The ALJ determined that Brown did not qualify for SSI 

after finding that he was capable of performing simple, routine 

work despite his disability. Dr. Richard Cohen, a medical expert 

who testified at the hearing, concluded that Brown retained the 

capacity to perform “simple repetitive tasks.” App. to Br. of 

Appellant A19. The ALJ explained that Cohen’s conclusion was 

supported by record evidence from Alex Siegel, Ph.D., a state 

agency disability consultant, who advised that Brown “is able to 

meet the basic mental demands of competitive work on a 

sustained basis despite the limitations resulting from his 

impairments.” Admin. R. 272; see App. to Br. of Appellant A8.

Although there was record evidence from a treating psychiatrist 

suggesting a contrary conclusion,1 the ALJ is entitled to weigh 

all evidence in making its finding. See Kertesz v. Crescent Hills 

Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986) (providing that an 

“ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any 

medical expert, but may weigh the medical evidence and draw 

its own inferences”). As the ALJ clearly explained why she gave 

greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Cohen, her decision was 

supported by substantial evidence and was not contrary to law.2

 1 Dr. Jesus Herrera, the treating psychiatrist who saw 

Brown four times, stated that if Brown were to work, he would 

miss “12 days to 15 days” of work a month due to his mental 

impairment.

2 Brown argues that an ALJ may not disregard the 

opinion of a treating physician. The law is clear, however, that 

the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the

issue of functional capacity. See Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 

47-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (providing that “a statement by a plaintiff’s 

treating physician supporting an assertion that [plaintiff] is 

disabled or unable to work is not dispositive of the issue”
8

See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(providing that if “the opinion of a treating physician conflicts 

with that of a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ 

may choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no 

reason or for the wrong reason” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) 

(providing that an ALJ may disregard the opinion of a treating 

physician if “two physicians in the state agency evaluated the 

medical findings . . . and concluded that those findings did not 

reveal any condition that would preclude gainful employment”).

Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it affirmed the 

Commissioner’s decision in this regard.

B. Brown=s Functional Capacity

Next, Brown contends that the ALJ’s finding as to the 

credibility of his claimed limitations is not supported by 

substantial evidence. This claim also lacks merit.

An ALJ must give “subjective complaints >serious 

consideration,’ . . . and ma[k]e specific findings of fact, 

including credibility, as to [a plaintiff’s] residual functional 

capacity.” Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(citation omitted). The ALJ ultimately determined that, contrary 

to Brown’s claim, he was not disabled. As previously discussed, 

the ALJ relied on Dr. Cohen’s assessment that Brown could 

work. In further support of this conclusion, the ALJ cited record 

evidence that Brown had a good relationship with his girlfriend, 

liked to fix things around the house, was skilled at carpentry, 

and had not recently been involved in physical altercations. 

 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Medical notes on the record also indicate that Brown’s “physical 

appearance was appropriate,” his “[m]emory was good; insight 

and judgment were fair,” his “[m]otor activity was normal and 

speech was articulated,” his “[a]ttitude was polite and behavior 

was cooperative,” and that his “eye contact was good.” Admin. 

R. 238. The ALJ’s finding as to Brown=s functional capacity, 

therefore, was supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Plummer 

v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing that 

“[s]ubstantial evidence . . . means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Accordingly, the District Court did not err 

when it affirmed the Commissioner’s determination in this 

regard.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, any error in the District 

Court’s articulation of the standard of review was harmless, and 

the District Court was correct to find that the Commissioner’s 

determination was supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, the District Court’s order granting judgment to the 

defendant will be affirmed.