ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana, Chairman 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

TAUNJA BERQUAM, ROBERT SHERMAN, JOSEPH LEVIN, 

JAMES WINDLE, and CASEY PEARCE, Staff Assistants 

PART 8 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

BUDGET HEARING 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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PART 8—ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 


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ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana, Chairman 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

TAUNJA BERQUAM, ROBERT SHERMAN, JOSEPH LEVIN, 

JAMES WINDLE, and CASEY PEARCE, Staff Assistants 

PART 8 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

BUDGET HEARING 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

54–227 WASHINGTON : 2010 


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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(1) 

ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 

THURSDAY, MAY 21, 2009. 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: 

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND WEAPONS 

WITNESSES 

CAPTAIN THOMAS D’AGOSTINO, USN, RETIRED, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR OF 

NNSA 

BRIGADIER GENERAL GARRETT HARENCAK, PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT 

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR MILITARY APPLICATION 

KENNETH BAKER, PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR 

FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. [Presiding.] Now that Mr. Simpson is here, we 

are ready to go. And we will call the committee to order. 

Today we are going to examine the budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration and for naval reactors. 

The 2010 fiscal year budget request for NNSA is $9.945 billion. 

The request for weapons program is about $6.4 billion, essentially 

flat. Nuclear nonproliferation request is $2.1 billion, also flat from 

previous years’ appropriations, if we discount the inclusion of the 

MOX program. 

The national security requirements for the 21st-century nuclear 

force and a threat environment driven by smaller, but very serious 

multiple threats are very different from the national security requirements of our legacy nuclear force, which is driven by a bipolar 

environment of the Cold War. 

We need to transition to a 21st-century force as soon as is economically and technically possible. And we would urge the administration to focus on this transition with a clean-sheet approach, free 

of reflective ties to past policies. 

We are waiting for the Nuclear Posture Review to set the frameworks of this transition. In the interim, NNSA is deferring a number of major capital projects in order not to risk taxpayers’ money 

on a decision that may be reversed. The delays of capital improvements programs enable you to focus your resources on maintaining 

your workforce, which is a fiscally responsible and prudent strategy. 

The committee has made clear that we recognize the need for a 

restructured weapons complex, but one commensurate with the size 

and types of weapons needed in the future, based on an overall reevaluation of our nuclear policy in the post-Cold War. 

The nonproliferation fiscal year 2010 budget request of $2.1 billion continues the progress to reduce the threat of nuclear nonproliferation. Advancing national efforts to prevent the spread of 

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2 

nuclear weapons globally is an important aspect of the NNSA mission. 

States and terrorists continue to seek nuclear weapons and materials. Nonproliferation programs that work cooperatively to secure 

and detect nuclear materials are the best to approach this threat. 

Addressing this menace in all of its dimensions, ranging from research and development and nuclear detection technologies to securing nuclear materials in far-flung locations, is one strength of 

the NNSA’s nonproliferation programs. 

Gentlemen, I thank you very much for being here. And at this 

time, before recognizing you, I will certainly recognize my friend 

and ranking member, Mr. Frelinghuysen from the Garden State. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator D’Agostino, welcome back to the committee. 

General Harencak and Administrator Baker, thank you for being 

with us this morning. We are all looking forward to your explanation of the NNSA budget request before us today. 

I do have some comments. Before I begin, let me make it clear 

I have great respect for the work of you and your colleagues at the 

NNSA. 

And I know and everyone else on this dais knows that the budget 

we will be considering today was developed under guidelines established by the White House and OMB. In other words, you are following their direction for the most part. 

However, in my view, the budget as submitted by the administration may have significant national security implications. I have 

some comments and questions along those lines and hope we will 

be able to have some frank discussions. 

Administrator D’Agostino, when you appeared before the committee to explain your position on the complex transformation, you 

asked for our patience. The administration needed time, you said, 

to run its deliberative process. 

The administration’s fiscal year 2010 request for weapons activi- ties seems to reflect the same plea. That request totals $6.3 billion, 

a mere $4 million above last year’s appropriated request. In your 

own words, this represents a treading water budget for the program. 

Frankly, I find this situation troubling. National security matters 

serve more than a placeholder budget. 

I have to wonder whether the budget analysts at OMB who put 

together this request simply do not understand what the weapons 

activities account really does. 

If the President is successful—and we want him to be successful—in his vision to promote a broad, nonproliferation, and arms 

control agenda, this is the account that will actually pay for taking 

apart those weapons. And if he wants to make sure that the weapons that we have left are really safe and reliable, this is the account that will pay for that, too. 

And in the meantime, this is the budget that ensures that our 

Navy and Air Force have the reliable weapons that they need to 

fulfill their obligations to the American people. 

And this budget request did not seem to support the President’s 

own initiatives or vision. What the administration sees as treading 

water, others will see differently. Your clients in the Navy and Air 

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3 

Force may wonder whether NNSA can fulfill its commitments, and 

I have doubts in that regard. 

Your contractors may see this as a sign that even more layoffs 

are coming to their communities. And your highly trained weapons 

specialists—and we have talked about these remarkable people— 

may see this as the last straw and may begin their exodus to more 

secure employment. 

And do I need to mention the need to recruit the next generation 

of these very qualified people? 

This committee has worked on a bipartisan basis for many years 

to rationalize activities funded by the weapons activities account. 

To have that work potentially undone by treading water—having 

a treading water budget seems unwise. 

Your nonproliferation budget is not much better, although the re- quest—$2.137 billion—is $654 million above last year’s appropriation, you have moved the MOX plant back into this account. The 

request for MOX and its related projects is $655 million. In other 

words, you are decreasing the request for the non-MOX proliferation programs by $11 million compared to last year. 

This committee and others before it have been working for years 

to secure fissile materials overseas that in some cases was secured 

by only a padlock and part-time guard with no weapons. Finally, your naval reactors request at a little over $1 billion is $175 million above last year’s level. Most of your increase is due 

to the advanced work the Navy needs for the next generation reactors for the Ohio-class submarines. 

While we may question whether this money is needed this year, 

I am encouraged that NNSA is working closely with its client, the 

Navy, and asking for reasonable resources to fulfill that mission. 

Mr. Administrator, you know I consider the department’s work to 

keep this country safe to be second to nothing. I hope you will be 

able to convince me today that this budget requests asks for the 

resources that you need to keep our weapons secure and reliable, 

to fulfill your commitments to our military and your workforce to 

make progress on fighting the spread of fissile material overseas. 

As it stands now, I am concerned with what you have proposed. 

And I hope that we can find out today exactly your rationale for 

what you have proposed. 

But, again, I thank you, gentlemen, for appearing and for the opportunity to make this statement. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Gentlemen, thank you very much. 

And before I recognize Mr. D’Agostino, because I believe you will 

have the only testimony this morning, I would recognize Brigadier 

General Garrett Harencak. He is the principal assistant deputy administrator for military applications. Brigadier General Harencak 

is the principal assistant deputy administrator for military applications in the Office of Defense Programs at the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Prior to joining NNSA, the general was the commander of the 

509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. He has 

a long and distinguished record of service to this country and, obviously, is a really smart person, because he graduated from the 

United States Air Force Academy. 

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We also have with us Mr. Ken Baker, who is the principal assistant deputy administrator for NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation. Mr. Baker is a principal assistant deputy administrator for these very important programs. 

And, again, I would point out for those in attendance that he is 

the recipient of the Defense Distinguished Service award, the Defense Superior Service award, and two Defense Meritorious Service 

awards. He has also received two President’s Distinguished Awards 

for Senior Executive Service at the Department of Energy and has 

also made a significant contribution in service to his country. 

And I am very happy that you are here. 

Mr. D’Agostino and I have a relationship. He has been introduced before, but would note again that he is a graduate of Johns 

Hopkins University, as well as the United States Naval Academy. 

I look forward to congratulating him this fall on Navy’s victory 

over Notre Dame in football—fencing is another story—and, again, 

would point out that his predecessors were all very good men. They 

were all very able and very intelligent, but from my personal perspective, not that we have agreed on every last issue, Tom has 

been the best. And I am very happy to still see you here. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Thank you very much. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So, with that, I would recognize you for your prepared statement. And all of it will be entered into the record. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 

Ranking Member Frelinghuysen, members of the subcommittee. 

I am Tom D’Agostino. I am the administrator for the National 

Nuclear Security Administration. As the chairman pointed out, I 

am fortunate to have Brigadier General Gary Harencak with me, 

running defense programs, and Mr. Ken Baker, running the nonproliferation program. These are the major elements of the NNSA. 

We have a number of other program elements, but with these two 

gentlemen, I think we are in good stead, as we get settled out on 

how things pan out politically with the political leadership out in 

the future. 

But we do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

And we sincerely thank you for your support of NNSA’s nuclear security programs, as we address challenges—addressing the Cold 

War challenges that we have had and, more importantly, shaping 

the program for the future. 

The NNSA is critical to ensuring the security of the United 

States and its allies. The President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request for NNSA is $9.9 billion, an increase of 8.9 percent over the 

fiscal year 2009 appropriated level. This budget request provides 

funding to enable NNSA leverage the science to promote U.S. national security objectives. 

NNSA programs are on the forefront of the line of a number of 

national security endeavors: first of all, maintaining a safe, secure 

and reliable stockpile and the capabilities required to do that; next, 

accelerating and expanding our efforts here and around the world 

to reduce the global threat posed by nuclear terrorism, nuclear 

nonproliferation, and unsecured nuclear materials; next, providing 

the U.S. Navy with safe, military-effective nuclear propulsion systems; and, finally, supporting U.S. leadership in science and technology. 

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5 

The President has initiated bold steps to putting an end to Cold 

War thinking that will lead to a new international effort to enhance global security. The fiscal year 2010 budget request for the 

NNSA is a step—our first step towards implementation of this new 

strategy. 

For defense nuclear nonproliferation programs, increases are requested to expand and respond to opportunities to reduce global 

nuclear threats. Increases are also requested in the naval reactors 

program to begin development of the reactor and propulsion systems for next-generation submarines, among other activities. 

For programs in the weapons activities appropriation, the budget 

strategy is to maintain capabilities and activities at the current 

level until the strategic direction is established in the upcoming 

Nuclear Posture Review. 

In President Obama’s speech in Prague, he indicated his commitment to maintaining a safe, secure and reliable stockpile while pursuing a vision of a world free from the threat of weapons. The 

NNSA maintains the unique knowledge and capabilities that are 

critical to achieving both of these objectives. 

Our nonproliferation programs are focused on securing the key 

ingredient of nuclear weapons, and that is, in essence, the weapons-usable materials and the related equipment and technologies. 

Supporting NNSA’s efforts, including the elimination of the 

weapons-grade plutonium production program, which has been 

working in Russia to shut down Russia’s plutonium production reactors, and the fissile material disposition program, which will provide a disposition path for 34 metric tons each of U.S. and Russian 

excess plutonium. 

The NNSA is a recognized leader on these and other nonproliferation initiatives to prevent proliferators or terrorists from 

acquiring a nuclear weapon. This includes our activities to secure 

and reduce weapons-grade nuclear material at sites worldwide, but 

also our efforts to detect and intercept weapons of mass destruction-related materials in transit. 

In addition, we will also work in fiscal year 2010 to support this 

president’s call to strengthen the nonproliferation treaty, support 

the International Atomic Energy Agency, and strengthen international safeguards inspection. 

To implement this comprehensive nonproliferation strategy, we 

will expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships, 

and work to secure vulnerable nuclear material worldwide and 

around the world within 4 years. This is a huge challenge; I am 

sure the committee is quite aware of the difficulty in being able to 

do that, but it is something that the president has established. 

NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the International 

Material Protection and Cooperation Programs will have a major 

role in this 4-year effort. 

The NNSA is actively participating in the national debate over 

our nation’s nuclear security and nonproliferation strategic framework. This debate is not just about the warheads and the size of 

the stockpile. It includes the inescapable obligation to transform 

our current Cold War-era nuclear weapons complex into a 21st-century nuclear security enterprise that retains the capabilities necmstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with HEARING

6 

essary to meet emerging national security threats and requirements that come from those threats. 

In a future with fewer warheads, no nuclear tests, tighter controls on nuclear weapons material worldwide, and effective counteraction of nuclear terrorist threats, the science and technology capabilities that you support in the NNSA will play an increased role 

in addressing these challenges. 

We must ensure that our evolving strategic posture and our nuclear stockpile, nonproliferation, arms control, counterterrorism 

programs are melded into one comprehensive strategy that protects 

America and its allies. 

The Department of Defense has initiated the Nuclear Posture Review, which is scheduled to culminate in a report to Congress early 

in fiscal year 2010. And we are actively participating in the Nuclear Posture Review in all of its aspects relating to our nuclear security. 

As you are well aware, the Commission on the Strategic Posture 

of the United States was established by Congress to identify the 

basic principles for re-establishing a national consensus on strategic policy. The commission has examined the role of deterrence 

in the 21st century and assessed the role of nuclear weapons in a 

U.S. national security framework. 

A final report was issued earlier this month and includes a variety of recommendations—findings and recommendations as to the 

most appropriate strategic posture for the United States. I am familiar with the commission’s report. But given the breadth and 

scope of the commission’s recommendations, the secretary and I are 

still in the process of evaluating the recommendations on a path 

forward. In the end, though, the work that the strategic commission has done will help to inform the administration as it develops 

its nuclear posture. 

As you know, we have made tremendous progress in reducing the 

size of the stockpile. The stockpile will be less than one-quarter of 

what it was at the end of the Cold War, the smallest stockpile in 

more than 50 years. These reductions send the right messages to 

the rest of the world that the U.S. is committed to Article VI of the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will help create a positive momentum heading into the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. 

Each year since the Stockpile Stewardship Program was developed, we have been able to certify the safety, the security, and the 

reliability of those warheads without the need to conduct an underground test. 

And since 1993, we have acquired a suite of capabilities determined necessary to maintain an effective deterrent. And most recently, the National Ignition Facility has come online. 

In the end, the key focus is that we need to apply these tools to 

help solve not just the current problems we have in our stockpile— 

and there are current problems that we have and we are addressing them—but, more importantly, to utilize these tools to develop 

the people that we have in our program and ensure that we are 

able to solve future problems, that we can’t anticipate all of the future problems, but we need to be ready to be able to do that. 

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The challenge for the Stockpile Stewardship Program for the future will in the end be to make full and effective use of these tools 

and capabilities. Following the completion of the Nuclear Posture 

Review, we will prepare a 5-year plan which recapitalizes our infrastructure, retains our scientific, technical and engineering base, 

and makes full use of our experimental and supercomputing capabilities. 

Chairman Visclosky, numerous external reviews have identified 

the fragile state of our technical expertise and capabilities, particularly that reside in our people. It is clear to me that our people are 

our most important resource, and we need to retain those skills 

and capabilities and develop the next generation of scientists, engineers and technicians needed to perform work in nonproliferation, 

nuclear counterterrorism, and forensics. We also need the skilled 

personnel to maintain the stockpile for the foreseeable future without the benefit of underground testing. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement, and we would be 

pleased to take any questions that you may have. 

[The information follows:] 

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Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Let me first echo the chairman’s remarks 

about you, Mr. Administrator. Thank you for your service. Having 

you here is reassuring. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Thank you. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We appreciate your professionalism and 

your knowledge. 

I know, General, you are the new man on the block. And we are 

highly appreciative of your service. 

As I said in my opening remarks, I think all of us on this committee consider the responsibility of the Department of Energy to 

maintain the safety and security and reliability of our nuclear 

weapons stockpile, that that is the most important thing. 

As I look over your budget, I notice that many of the programs 

that are involved with that responsibility have been held at the 

same funding level as previous years, although there have been 

some changes to what we call the sub-program lines. 

Obviously, taxpayer funding is a scarce commodity. Can you convince us that the amount of funding that we have in here will provide for that level of reliability? Can you talk about that, the funding we have in this budget? 

General HARENCAK. Well, I would start, sir, to say first off, this 

budget will bring us to an area after the NPR has given us the policy decisions, that we are going to be able to make much better decisions in the future on the transformation. 

While this budget is flat and, as my boss has said here, it is a 

kind of a treading water budget, what we have done aggressively 

in defense programs is ensured that we made changes inside that 

budget that fast posture us to do those important things, to increase dismantlements, to make sure that what we do have is safe, 

secure and reliable, but also protecting science, which we believe 

is fundamental to no matter what we do. 

In my short time here, I have learned two main things, one, that 

this organization is a capability-based organization. And regardless 

of future stockpile size or whatever, we have to have that capability. And that capability comes at a price, regardless of how big 

the stockpile is. So we are being very aggressive that we maintain 

that capability for whatever may come out of NPR. 

Also, one thing that I have learned in my short time here is that 

this is really a system. In fact, it is a system of systems. And any 

one decision on any particular sub-bullet could have effects across 

the complex. So it is not going to be possible, I think, just to pick 

and choose some things and say, ‘‘Well, we are going to do without 

this. We are not going to do this,’’ and then hope that it doesn’t 

have an effect throughout. 

Even some of our defense program things have very real effects 

on what Mr. Baker does, what Ken does. So even outside of defense 

programs, everything we do actually affects the greater system. 

So I am—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you have a fairly high confidence level? 

General HARENCAK. Yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have enough resources? Of course, 

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tions. I don’t think there is a lot of public credit given for what has 

been done. And in all likelihood, the Nuclear Posture Review notwithstanding, but perhaps inherent in what we will see will that 

there will be substantial reductions. 

There is sort of a perception, though, in some quarters that, because the nuclear stockpile has been reduced, that somehow there 

is less money needed for whatever else is needed, in terms of making sure of issues of reliability. 

General HARENCAK. Okay, exactly, sir. It can’t be further from 

the truth that, as we reduce stockpile—and we do every day. I 

watched a dismantlement yesterday at Pantex. 

So we continue to reduce the stockpile. Dismantlements have 

been increased. And we are increasing that in this 2010 budget. 

But there—it is counterintuitive, but as we go down, we are 

going to still—there isn’t a huge savings that would come out from 

a smaller stockpile, because this system is capability-based, not capacity. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Could you talk about the reliability issue of 

our nuclear stockpile? You know, it is reliable? 

General HARENCAK. It is reliable, it is safe, and it is secure. But 

the challenge is to keep it so in the coming years. And that is what 

we are committed to doing. This budget guarantees you that it is 

safe, reliable and secure. We do have a lot of challenges in the future, as you know, on infrastructure, everything else that—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Infrastructure, as well, is obviously a workforce that is, you know, motivated to continue the type of difficult 

work and, obviously, the training of the next generation of a workforce. 

General HARENCAK. Absolutely. And that is all part of—I have 

put that into the human capital aspect of our science. That is 

where it resides. It absolutely is the foundation of everything else 

we do. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. Mr. Edwards. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. D’Agostino, General, Mr. Baker, thank you for what you do 

every day. 

The television cameras are probably down the hallway, Secretary 

Geithner’s testimony in another subcommittee, but I agree with 

Mr. Frelinghuysen that the work you do in protecting our country 

and our families is second to none. And if you are doing your work 

well—and you do, day in and day out—you are not in the news. 

And that is good news. 

Given the statement, Mr. D’Agostino, that you said on page six 

of your testimony—and, in fact, we know that illicit trafficking in 

nuclear and other radioactive materials continues, especially in 

Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—given that, I salute President Obama for his focus on nuclear nonproliferation programs and, over the next 4 years, getting control of all the loose 

nuclear material throughout the world. 

But given that, I do want to follow up on Mr. Frelinghuysen’s 

comments in regard to the budget, because that is where the rubber meets the road. I salute you for the significant increases in 

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nonproliferation and international security programs and in the 

international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program. I was disappointed the Senate insisted on a cut in the 2009 

budget in that. I think we had to take care of that in the supplemental. 

But I would like to ask, first, why are you proposing cuts in the 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative and in the R&D accounts, given 

the significance of the nuclear threat? While probabilities of an attack may be low, the consequences are so horrific, we ought to reduce the probabilities to as close to zero as possible. 

Why the cuts in that? Was it because there was no capacity in 

those two programs? Or was it more before you had set priorities 

within given budget constraints? 

Secondly, I would like to ask on the Megaports program, where 

are we on Megaports? And do we have enough agreements in place 

for, if you had additional funding, you could move more quickly 

ahead? 

And, finally, when President Obama meets with President 

Medvedev on July 6th to talk about nuclear cooperative programs 

with Russia and the United States, if there is an agreement that 

comes out of that that is significant and has budget implications, 

would the administration have an account from which it could 

bring funds? Or would it have to request supplemental funds in 

order to implement an agreement? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. I would be glad to take that, Mr. Edwards. 

And Mr. Baker may follow me, if you are okay, and with any supplemental information. 

First of all, there have been some changes when you compare it 

to the appropriated level for those accounts that you mentioned. 

Most of the changes have to do with work that has been completed 

in the program. Some significant completions, for example, in 

Kazakhstan, the spent fuel project on the casks and containers in 

Kazakhstan and, in effect, this in fiscal year 2009, and therefore 

it presents kind of a precipitous drop-off in the budget. 

Particularly, though, if we look at—some of the reductions from 

2009 are as a result of some congressional increases in fiscal year 

2009 in some of these programs. So as you look across over multiple years, you see there is a slight increase. 

And particularly when you are a slight—basically, leveling, if you 

will, but when you look at the work that was completed, that is the 

biggest reason on the drop-off. 

Another example would be completion of a project at Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory. Fiscal year 2009 was the last year 

for that. In the elimination of weapons-grade plutonium production 

program, we have completed—essentially we will be completing the 

work on shutting down the reactor. 

That being said, however, you know, there are opportunities to 

do more work. There always is. What we have decided in many 

cases is not to prejudge the president’s meeting, necessarily. We 

recognize that President Obama has laid out a fairly aggressive 

goal. 

What we are doing right now—and Mr. Baker’s folks are kind of 

right in the middle of this—is developing the detailed 4-year plan 

on what it would actually take to achieve that goal. 

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We didn’t presuppose we knew what it was going to be in fiscal 

year 2010. We said it is going to be more, so we are going to do 

a little bit more. But my expectation is that the program that this 

committee will see, that we are developing right now, that we are 

going to send to the White House in September, just a few months 

away from now, will be significantly different than the program before—for the public, in effect, right now in front of you. So we made 

the decision not to presuppose that. 

Certainly, with additional resources, we could do more Megaports 

work, as you know. But for now, we felt that the amount of people 

we have working on this effort—we have a balanced approach 

when going from year to year to year on the Megaports work. 

In order to convert research reactors and move the last research 

reactor conversion of HEU from 2018 down to the 2012 timeframe, 

that is one that requires significantly more work. And what it will 

mean for Mr. Baker is, he is going to need more federal employees 

to do this kind of work. 

He is going to need more contractor employees focused on that. 

We are going to need to be purchasing more equivalent. We are 

going to need to be purchasing more fuel. And then we are going 

to have to deploy ourselves out to these 100-plus countries to go 

make this happen. 

It is a huge challenge. I want to—you know, we are in the position now of trying to knock down the details of this 4-year plan and 

be ready to make sure the White House is aware of the kind of 

work that has to happen. 

Mr. EDWARDS. So to just be clear on this key point, the budget 

numbers coming out of the administration for fiscal year 2010 were 

put together before the 4-year plan was proposed and the cost implementations of it were fully considered? Is that correct? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. That is correct, sir. We have—the president’s goal for our program came through not exactly on day one 

of the administration. By then, we were working the budget. What 

we have right now—and I forget. I think it was General Harencak, 

actually, we were teeing up the program, in effect, to be ready for 

the details that Ken is putting together on the nonproliferation 

side. 

There are increases—we do have increases in our program. And 

Ken will describe some of the increases in two of our areas that we 

have before us. 

If I could just speak for a second about the upcoming meeting 

that the president has, and then I will turn it over to Ken to talk 

about some of the details with the nonproliferation. 

The president’s—our goals, in effect, are to take what we talked 

about—what the president talked about in Prague and work out 

the details with Russia on how we will, in effect, achieve these 

pretty significant goals. 

I think it will be a seminal meeting for the NNSA, for the country. I think it is an opportunity to continue on a very excellent relationship we have had with Russia in this area out into the future. 

I think what we will see is a strong, you know, bilateral relationship to tackle this problem worldwide. And, in effect, that is exactly 

what we need to do for global security. 

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So I am looking forward to it. And it will also address a few 

other concerns in plutonium disposition that I know the committee 

has had in the past. 

And, Ken, do you want to—— 

Mr. BAKER. Real quickly—Mr. D’Agostino covered a lot of it, Mr. 

Edwards—a lot of it, Mr. Edwards. The cut in the R&D program, 

we have $85 million more last year than we asked for from the 

president’s budget. And when you take that money, plus the PNNL 

work is done, that is why the—it is level or a little below in the 

R&D program. 

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative, as Mr. D’Agostino says, 

we had three metric tons of plutonium at Ocdel in Kazakhstan. We 

are moving it clear across the country. That is $100 million program, which will be done this year, so that money is gone. 

To answer your question—and the other programs have gone up. 

To answer your question on Megaports, with the budget we have 

this year, we will do 15 more Megaports, which will take us up to 

a total of 43. There are 100 on the list to be done. 

If we add more money—you asked that—how many more 

Megaports would we do with this existing staff? We could do five 

more Megaports. 

Mr. EDWARDS. [OFF MIKE] 

Mr. BAKER. With that, sir, it is about—well, it is $80 million. If 

you asked if we could do any more Megaports, we can—— 

Mr. EDWARDS. Would you name those ports? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir, I can. I have them someplace here. They are 

in—one of them is in Pakistan. One is in South Africa. One is in 

Chile. And the other two—one of them is in Israel. And the other 

one, I don’t have at the top of my head on that. 

But it is five—to answer your question on, as Mr. D’Agostino 

said, on administrative budget, what this administration did, I applaud this president. He has really taken a hold in nonproliferation. He realizes the threat that we are all facing. And it is very 

exciting to see such support at the top as we are getting from the 

White House in this job. 

It will take a lot more money to do the 4-year plan. It will take 

a lot more people. And NNSA is giving us more people—are giving 

us more people, Mr. D’Agostino, as a matter of fact, a total of 32 

more people. So this will be—in future budgets, you will see, I 

think, the budget go up because of this 4-year plan that President 

Obama has. 

One last thing I would like to mention to you, just to tell you 

about some of the work that we have done. I just came back from 

a facility that Dr. Condoleezza Rice said was the worst facility she 

had ever seen in Russia. It has got thousands of nuclear warheads 

in it. 

I just came back. The facility, we fixed it up. It looks like Pantex. 

I was in it. I tried to get the president to go to the site when he 

goes over there for the summit on the 6th and 7th of July. They 

don’t have—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What is the site, for the record? 

Mr. BAKER. It is called West 19, which is about two miles—and 

that won’t tell you much, but it is about 2 hours out in a place 

called Samara out of Moscow. 

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What we do when we do these sites, we have three visits. And 

I went on the last visit to make sure all the work is completed. And 

then we pay them the money that has been done. 

It really, really is impressive. They took me out and showed me 

the thousands of warheads that we have there. And it is triplefenced and everything else. It would make you proud of the work 

that the NNSA does and the Russians do together to make these 

facilities more secure. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Wamp. 

Mr. WAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The attendance by the committee members speaks to the importance of this issue. Your presence here, all three of you, reminds 

me that the president has made a good decision here and that has 

kept an important team in place as we go forward. 

I was at the White House last night with a bipartisan group and, 

frankly, really thoroughly enjoyed talking to the president and the 

first lady and said to some of the senior staff there that the attention has been on the domestic agenda, mostly the economy, during 

the first 100 days, but the fact is, the economy goes up, it comes 

down, it runs in cycle. The government can cause more problems 

than they solve from time to time when they intervene. 

But on this issue and global security, foreign policy, the government is essential. It is absolutely critical. And these are the biggest 

issues. And this is where the president has the greatest opportunity to do the most good. 

Nonproliferation activities, obviously, are a focus. This committee 

has focused highly on MOX, the problems and the challenges at 

CMRR, but kind of quietly in this budget request the design funding for the UPF, the Uranium Processing Facility, has been diminished. The targets for beginning construction have been slid back 

to 2013. 

While I have limited time, I would like the administrator—who 

I, too, respect greatly—to talk about the needed investments for us 

to maintain the deterrent, maintain the capability, support a variety of other important government functions while working on nonproliferation activities. 

For example, the UPF has a nonproliferation role. It has a nuclear Navy role. It has a forensics mission. Can you tell me why 

these things are important? And I am asking you, not, frankly, the 

administration or OMB. I am asking you why these things are important, because the committee sometimes has to increase funding 

in areas that are vital to maintaining the deterrent and the capability, while also pursuing nonproliferation goals. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Wamp. I will be glad to answer that. 

The capabilities—just to talk about UPF, the capabilities that 

the Uranium Processing Facility will provide essentially are to 

maintain the capabilities we currently have at Y–12, but do it in 

a very different way, do it—I wasn’t sure if this was on—do it in 

a way, in fact, that focuses on a couple of key things, a much more 

cost-efficient way. 

Right now, our focus is for folks that have been down to Bear 

Creek Valley, they know that we are dealing with the legacy of the 

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Cold War. We are spread out over a tremendous distance. And we 

are spending a significant amount of money providing security for 

a very large area because of the amount of highly enriched uranium that we have. 

In effect, we think there is a better way. And the committee’s 

support on the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility is the 

first significant and large steps toward consolidating the amount of 

uranium we have in the country into fewer locations and fewer 

sites. 

The Uranium Processing Facility allows us to, in effect, get out 

of Cold War-era buildings, again, spread out over the complex. And 

so what we have is material storage and all of the hands-on production work that is required. 

And this isn’t just production work to build nuclear weapons. In 

fact, we need these facilities to disassemble nuclear weapons. That 

is where our disassembly is going to happen and will be happening 

out over the next 15-plus years, because we have a lot of warheads 

to take apart. 

But in essence, I am interested in driving costs down significantly. We think a move to consolidate our nuclear security footprint in Y–12 is going to save us about over $200 million a year 

not only in security costs, which are significant, but in operational 

costs, not having to move material around that whole valley area. 

We are going to be able to do it with a much smaller workforce. 

So in addition to the very important nuclear security roles that 

we have at Y–12, which is maintaining the deterrent, doing the 

surveillance work that we have, disassembling nuclear weapons, 

doing nonproliferation, you know, the research reactor conversion 

that Ken Baker’s program does, a lot of that material goes through 

Tennessee, getting ready to provide the low-enriched uranium fuel. 

All that work gets done in that area. 

And so I am interested in making sure that our workforce is in 

what I would call environmentally safe, efficient, personnel-safe 

types of facilities and not have to spend money, which I currently— 

frankly, right now, we have started a new project, it is a small 

project called risk—it is a risk reduction project at Y–12 to maintain our current old buildings. 

But that is important to do. We have to do that. But it is money 

that, in effect, would be—this is my personal view—we had better 

spend in actually getting us set up for the future. 

Mr. WAMP. May I interrupt—— 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Well, you have my assurance that I am not 

interested in the policy of neglect. And I do recognize that what we 

have here, as Mr. Frelinghuysen pointed out, is—it is a term that 

I used, which is kind of keeping things from getting worse, fixing 

what we have, not losing the scientific capability, keeping our design teams together, moving forward on the design of a couple of 

key facilities that we have to make, without committing to construction until I get the nuclear security policy lined up with the 

size of the stockpile, and I would add to that other nuclear security 

work that we have to do, and lining that up with the infrastructure 

needed to support it. 

Now, it is my considered view, as the General said, that we are, 

in effect—we are at a capabilities-based level, but what we have to 

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do—what I have to do is balance, in effect, risk across not only the 

infrastructure, but the national nuclear security programs that we 

have. 

In my view, if we do more nuclear security work, we are going 

to need to bring these programs and projects back into the fold 

from a construction standpoint. I see you—I believe you will see 

that—I apologize for saying, ‘‘Wait until the next budget,’’ but, because of timing right now, my focus was to make sure we don’t lose 

the design teams and continue to make progress on this. 

Mr. WAMP. But naval—— 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Well, naval reactors will need to—I mean, 

the existing facilities are providing the capability that we have 

right now at increased risk. And so—and cost, increased risk and 

cost. 

The question will be—and this is a technical judgment—the defense board has spoken, as you correctly pointed out, but I also— 

ultimately, in the end, it is my responsibility or whoever sits in this 

seat and the general’s seat responsibility to take a look at what is 

happening out on the strategy and policy side, meld that in with 

the requirements, and worry about safety and security and cost at 

the same time. 

The balance came out in this program—and I have called this— 

I don’t want to—a one-year budget, in effect. What we have is a 

2010 budget before you. We don’t have a 2010 to 2014 budget. We 

have a one-year budget to keep us going. 

The focus in this program was to not lose key people. It is a lot 

harder to—and it is not clear that we will be completely successful 

in that, but it is a lot harder to bring people into a program, develop them over time, than it is to build an infrastructure capability. And so our focus was to do that. 

Mr. WAMP. Well let me take a moment here, because there are 

so many people going to speak, that as the person who has represented Y–12 for 15 years, you won’t keep the key people with this 

budget request for UPF. You won’t. 

And so I hope that Mr. Baker is not right that, if the committee 

raises funding in any level, that then next year you say, ‘‘We got 

more than we asked for, so, you know, the baseline didn’t increase,’’ 

but these are important issues. There is not a more important 

issue, in my opinion, on maintaining our deterrent, as the president rightly pursues peace among the world, but you can’t go with 

that from a position of weakness or a lack of capability. 

So enough said. I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am going to recognize Mr. Salazar in a second, 

but I guess this would be the appropriate time to, Mr. D’Agostino, 

ask you about the Nuclear Posture Review and the QDR. 

There has been a number of comments and give-and-take here 

this morning about the budget, somewhat indicating that it is passive, it is one year, we are not looking ahead, there may not be 

enough money. 

For the last couple of years, it is no state secret that this committee has been very aggressive in pushing the administration, 

past and present, for having a policy on nuclear weaponry that 

makes sense in this hearing, and not just as far as the possession 

of nuclear weapons ourselves, but how conventional weapons play 

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into our defense, how non-kinetic means play into our defense, and 

then have that defined where we need to go, as far as the types 

and numbers of weapons and the—lead. 

Yesterday—and Mr. Frelinghuysen was there—we had Secretary 

of Defense Gates up here before the Defense Subcommittee. And I 

asked a question about the NPR and QDR and was heartened, I 

must tell you, that he attached urgency in moving ahead with some 

of the decision-making process and, if I remember correctly, indicated, at least for planning purposes, for the 2011 budget, he wanted to have some decisions in place so they could start having those 

embedded in that 2011 budget, as opposed to it comes in January, 

the budget is out, and now we will wait until 2011. 

I formulate that. That is kind of where I am. And my question 

is, I am assuming the Nuclear Posture Review, the QDR is not simply going to be a litany and list, ‘‘Here is where we are. Here is 

where we are going to be,’’ but that there will be more texture to 

it and that the compelling questions we have been asking here for 

the last couple of years will to some larger extent be addressed and 

we will start seeing that in those out-year budgets? 

And if you—just for a few minutes. And I hate to take it, but I 

think it is probably appropriate to ask and question the panel. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Certainly, sir, I would be glad to. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Well you know—— 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes, absolutely. As someone who has testified before this committee for a number of years now, I am very 

aware of the committee’s views with—and, frankly, logic behind establishing—consensus on a strategy, how that strategy defines and 

protects programs that need to support that strategy and how the 

infrastructure supports the programs that support the strategy and 

getting that linkage together, recognizing that we can’t do things 

in series, but there is going to be—there would have to be some 

overlap, because otherwise, you know, we will be talking about this 

until the year 2030, and our desire is to be expeditious about moving forward, because we do all do believe these are very important 

for our nation. 

The questions that were asked and put forth in the committee’s 

conference report language a number of—2 years ago, I believe— 

are forefront in my mind that need to be answered. 

This Nuclear Posture Review needs to be different, I believe, 

than last—previous Nuclear Posture Reviews. It can’t be a coffee 

table cookbook, coffee table book, you know, where you just sit it 

out there, it looks pretty. It has got to have some detail to it. 

I am particularly interested in driving that level of detail in my 

role of informing the Nuclear Posture Review, because I know that, 

if I am here next year, I will need to—I will be defending that document and defending that policy and explaining how it shapes that 

program. 

So I am particularly energized in providing as much detail as I 

can. I will say the following anecdote, if I could. And that is, I 

spent a number of time—a bit—quite a bit of time with my staff 

in formulating, what questions do I think the Nuclear Posture Review needs to answer in addition to what the committee has put 

forward? And we came up with a list of about 28 different questions, as well. 

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And so we want—we are going to—I am working hard to put detail into this. I believe what we are going—there is a bit of a time 

crunch, of course, as you pointed out, on wanting to make and 

shape our fiscal year 2011 budget. I think what we will get is 

enough information done towards the end of the summer period, 

early fall, so I can get that budget shaped and get it nailed down. 

And then, when the details come out, publicly, if you will—the 

public document later on this year—I think it is December 2010 is 

our current goal—is to have all of those pieces clearly identified, 

all those questions that you ask clearly identified. 

That is my charge, is to get that kind of detail into that document and explicitly addressed, not implicitly addressed. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Well, and I appreciate it, because a good report 

has value, but I do think we are at a tipping point here, as far as 

looking ahead. And your timetable clearly jibes exactly with what 

the secretary said, because, again, money is at some point limited 

as far as our universe. 

And if something is going to go by the board or there is something new that we do have to undertake, sooner rather than later, 

that will certainly help the decision-making process. 

So I appreciate your response very much. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Salazar. 

Mr. SALAZAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much for being here, all of you. 

I would like to talk a little bit about something that is pretty 

close to home in Los Alamos National Laboratory. In July of 2008, 

the GAO recommended that Los Alamos National Laboratory develop a comprehensive strategy, a plan for laboratory security. 

And they addressed, actually, five issues. One of them, they 

asked that you address all previously identified security breaches 

for weaknesses; number two, that it contained specific and objective measures for developing and implementing solutions to addressing previously identified security weaknesses; number three, 

that it takes an integrated view of physical and cybersecurity; and, 

number four, that it focuses on improved security program effectiveness; and, number five, that it provides for periodic reviews and 

assessment of strategic plan to ensure LANL identifies any additional security risk and addresses them. 

Have all these things been done? There are five questions in 

there, I guess. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Right, sir. They are not all completed, no, 

sir. What the laboratory’s approach right now—our approach, in effect, is to take a look at this integrated—start off with the integrated physical and cyber review—is to bring those pieces together. 

I will give you an—maybe the best thing to do is illustrate an 

example of how we are moving forward. The laboratory is spread 

out over 43 square miles. It, in effect—I mean, this is a pretty big 

piece of territory, if you will—and it is comprised of capabilities 

that are pocketed over that period of space. 

In the past, what had been done is to each of the individual organizations or departments, if you will, that ran their activities, 

whether it was high explosive activities or filling the detonators or 

doing the X-ray work that had to be done, maintain their own 

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physical—maintain their own set of documents, classified documents, disks, documents, and capabilities that all required protection. 

That was then; this is now. What we are trying to do and what 

we have done is implemented what we call a red network that allows a lot fewer documents to be had across the laboratory. And 

the laboratory has reduced its classified holdings significantly by 

many tens of thousands of documents. The same thing on what we 

called accountable—— 

Mr. SALAZAR. Are you talking paper documents? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. I am talking paper—yes, sir, paper documents, as well as—more than paper documents, though—as well as 

what we call accountable, classified, removable electronic media, in 

other words, disks, hard disks that are removed that are put in 

safes, floppy disks that have classified information on them. We are 

getting away from that. We want to go to—and we have made significant progress on going to a completely disk-less environment. 

And so these documents were kept in rooms we call vault-type 

rooms, which are in essence rooms that are safes, if you will. And 

they have had document custodians. The laboratory had over 140 

of these rooms, which is crazy to think about that, that many 

vault-type rooms. Think about how many opportunities we have to 

have security problems, not just having the guards around the 

rooms, but, in effect, losing material. 

And so they have made appreciable progress in the last year-anda-half. We have taken away 43 of those rooms. And we are going 

to consolidate to pockets of what we call super vault-type rooms 

with professional document custodians, not scientists, but document custodians that are in charge of doing that and then, while 

we transition, to have all of this material online in a separate classified area. 

So it accomplishes both the physical and the cyber elements of 

the GAO’s recommendations. You know, there is a lot more that 

has to happen on the security side of Los Alamos. 

Brad Peterson, who I recently brought on board within the past 

year, used to run the inspections and oversight area for security, 

both physical and cyber, in the department. I brought him to run 

the security organization for the NNSA, because I recognize he had 

the best experience. He has seen it all—literally, has seen it all 

with respect to physical and cybersecurity. 

He is aware of the GAO recommendations. And he is working his 

way through some improvements. 

I don’t have all of the details on what we have done on these 

other four elements you described. If I could take that for the 

record, I would be happy to provide that. 

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Mr. SALAZAR. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Simpson. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here today. 

A couple of questions about the budget. First, the increase in the 

defense nuclear nonproliferation budget is primarily a paper increase, isn’t it, because of the movement of the MOX facility into 

that line budget? So other than that, it is pretty much flat budget. 

When we look at that, what are the pension liabilities that are 

being faced by your contractors? And are any of those taken into 

account in this budget? 

Because I ask that, because in some of the other budgets that I 

have looked at in the Department of Energy, there are increased 

in a particular line, which makes it look like it is going up, and 

it is, but much of the increase is for the pension liability issue that 

we have to address. And so the overall budget to actually do the 

work is down. 

Is that the case in yours? And how does the pension liability 

issue stand in your department? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Okay, I will take that, if I could, because 

it is a little bit broader than just nonproliferation. 

We do feel we are going to likely run into a pension problem. We 

don’t know. 

What we start off—every January, we do an assessment. In fact, 

we did an assessment this past January and found out that we 

were short in fiscal year 2009 in pensions. And so we did—we 

moved—we addressed that problem in 2009. 

And as a result of that, as we were developing the 2010 budget, 

we made an appeal for and received support from the White House 

to provide an additional $122 million in this $9.9 billion that you 

have in front of you, sir, to address that. 

It is addressed in two areas. One area it is addressed in is in 

naval reactors, which I won’t get the number exactly right. It is on 

the order of $50 million to $60 million or so of a naval reactors 

piece. It goes directly into various accounts within the naval reactors program. 

The other area that there is an increase is in weapons activities 

account, largely managed by General Harencak, and that is in— 

pardon me for being too specific, but there is an RTBF account— 

within the weapons activities account, there is an RTBF line. And 

within that line, there is an institutional site support line. And 

there is about $60 million or so—that kind of gives you the $122 

million total for the NNSA. 

We think, for 2010, that this will cover a significant share of the 

expected liability in 2010, maybe not all of it. But, again, we are 

guessing what the stock market is going to be next January. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Right. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. And even my performance hasn’t been too 

good in that area, but we have gone a pretty significant step towards addressing the expected liability in 2010. We still are out 

and will—potentially up to $160 million more, but that is assuming 

we know what happens next January, and we don’t. 

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So we have made a—kind of a big step in the right direction to 

address the pension liabilities. It probably doesn’t cover it all, but 

we don’t know. When we know, when we find out next January, because we are going to do the financial actuarial drill next January, 

we will re-evaluate. We will make sure we talk to the committee 

staff and let them know what we think the liabilities and concerns 

are. 

Mr. SIMPSON. So overall in the budget about $122 billion is 

meant—— 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. [continuing]. $122 million, sir. 

Mr. SIMPSON. [continuing]. Excuse me, million—is meant to address the pension liability. I know it hasn’t gotten that bad yet if 

it is in the billions, but—and I do appreciate that. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Will the gentleman yield for a second on that? 

Mr. SIMPSON. Sure. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If I could just add on to Mr. Simpson’s observation, could you talk for a minute about the Work for Others and 

any additional liability that that may be creating for the agency? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Do you want me to do that now or 

in conjunction? 

Mr. SIMPSON. Sure. Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Or if you want to answer—but if you have something off the top of your head, that would be terrific. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Work for Others has gone up in the 

National Nuclear Security Administration. It is an example—it is 

a significant share of Sandia’s portfolio, in effect. 

These are activities that are anywhere from 6 months to 3 years, 

solve another agency’s particular problem, usually the intelligence 

community, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and others, for that matter, other intelligence groups 

in the Defense Department. 

So that has gone up because they have been able to capitalize on 

the investment that we in the—we, the committee, the country has 

made over 50 years’ worth of investments in protecting our deterrent and dealing with nuclear security issues. 

I am very keen on liability—on concerns about liabilities because 

I have seen instances in the past where we have been having to 

deal with a legacy Work for Others problem. I won’t name the 

agency, because it is not fair, but we have had one at Sandia, for 

example, where we had some sodium debris bed material that had 

been laden with some highly enriched uranium. 

And my desire was to, in effect, take all the category one and two 

nuclear material out of Sandia to reduce our security costs, and 

that was the last chunk of material. And I said, ‘‘Well, where did 

this come from? Whose program was it? Why are we doing this?’’ 

And it turned out it was a legacy from a Work for Others project. 

So, you know, one of the elements of the review process is to 

make sure that we understand and either accept or reject the longterm liability. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. [OFF MIKE] 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. So I won’t. That is right, sir, but I think, 

as with any process, whether it is run by a private company or a 

government organization, it is subjected to technical judgments. 

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Somebody makes the decision, ‘‘I am going to agree to take this 

project on or not.’’ 

I think what we have—this is the thing that we are working on 

right now with the lab directors and plant managers is, how do we 

think about Work for Others in a different way than we have in 

the past? In the past, it was kind of a marginal—something that 

is done off to the side. And if this work is going to continue to increase, then I need to get some partnership from these other federal agencies to agree to work with us on this long-term liability 

problem. 

And that is—but the secretary has actually challenged me to get 

something to him by the end of this month on that front. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you. 

One other—a couple other issues. One of them is—back to the 

MOX facility. I don’t want to beat a dead horse, but I guess it is 

not a dead horse. It is a living horse. Is—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. A growing horse. 

Mr. SIMPSON. A growing horse. The negotiations with Duke Energy over fuel have gone by the wayside. Do we have anybody that 

is lined up to purchase any of the fuels that are made by MOX? 

If not, what is the likelihood that we might get some? 

And in that same view, as long as we are talking about that, the 

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility, we are going to start constructing that. That is supposed to be a feed stock into the MOX 

facility. Is it going to be in line on time? If not, what is going to 

be the feed stock for the MOX facility if we don’t get the PDCF constructed in time? And where does all that stand down there, if you 

would? 

Mr. BAKER. First of all, Mr. Simpson, on the contractor, we have 

three candidates—and one of them is Duke—that could take over 

this contract. So we are working that right now. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Along that same line, do we subsidize the cost of 

the MOX fuel in order to use it, as opposed to buying—— 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir, we did with Duke, but that contract is over, 

so whether it be renegotiated next time, and we will see how that 

comes out. 

To answer your question on the timeline? 

Mr. SIMPSON. The timeline with PDCF and MOX. 

Mr. BAKER. We have enough plutonium to take us to 2021. The 

pit disassembly plant has got to be on in 2021. We have 9.8 metric 

tons, some of it at Los Alamos, the rest of it at Savannah River. 

So we have enough feed stock when the plutonium—when the 

MOX facility comes on, to keep it running until 2021. 

In 2021, the pit disassembly plant has got to be up and running 

or we don’t have any more feed stock to burn. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Okay, thank you. 

One brief question I will ask, and then we will have more time 

later, right? As you know, we have had some negotiations with and 

back-and-forth between NNSA and the INL on Building 651, special nuclear materials consolidation. Where are we on that? And 

any idea when—as I understand, we are kind of all on the same 

page now? 

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Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes, we are largely on the same page. Joe 

Kroll, who runs the nuclear weapons counterterrorism group, who 

is working with John Grossenbacher, Admiral John Grossenbacher, 

who is running the laboratory, and the site office manager to set 

up, you know, how we would use the facility and, you know, what 

material—I mean, our goal was—one of my goals was, the less— 

if we are going to move nuclear material, we want to know that 

it is going to be there for a mission—— 

Mr. SIMPSON. Right. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. And that it is—we are not 

moving excess material. Every time material is out and about in 

transit, you know, there is a vulnerability piece that makes—even 

though I don’t have much hair, it starts to stand up on end. 

Mr. SIMPSON. But consolidation of some of this material makes 

security and stuff a lot easier, doesn’t it? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes, but what I don’t want to do is create, 

you know, new larger groups of material. So if we have an area 

that already has that security footprint for another program—for 

N.E., for example, what have you—we ought to take advantage of 

it. I mean, it is—— 

Mr. SIMPSON. Right. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. But if not, I don’t want to create a new 

site, security site, because all of the advantages I get—me out of 

shrinking the Y–12 problem or denuking Lawrence Livermore or 

Sandia, start—go out the window. So—— 

Mr. SIMPSON. But given that we are all on approximately the 

same page now, because the committee has kind of insisted that we 

do that and has actually put in funding for it, I think, in the 2008 

or 2007 and 2009 budget, something like that—— 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes. 

Mr. SIMPSON [continuing]. NNSA hasn’t—it hasn’t released its 

sites to upgrade the facility and so forth, in fact, has wanted to reprogram that, and the committee has kind of refused to allow it to 

happen. So now that we are all on the same page, any idea when 

those funds will be released to the site for the upgrades in the facility? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. I would be guessing if I tried to answer 

that. I would like to take that for the record—— 

Mr. SIMPSON. Sure. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. And get back to you on the 

specific date and maybe some of the—more of the specifics about 

what it would be used for. That way you would have that in writing. 

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Mr. SIMPSON. Appreciate it. Thank you. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

In my real life, I am a farmer and a contractor. And as I finished 

a project, I was always happy when I saw a short wish list or what 

we call a punch list to finish a particular project that I was working on. And I would take that punch list, and I would prepare the 

workers and what we had to do to finish the work that was necessary for that building to be occupied and to the—to make someone happy or satisfied or provide a place for someone to live or 

whatever—if there is a bridge, to be sure the bridge was safe for 

folks to travel across. 

Obviously, that helped me somewhat when I became a congressman. It seems we are always working with a punch list on unfinished business, unfinished things that need to be done. I am glad 

that is the case—ever finish everything. 

But I have traveled some. And I have observed a lot of unfinished things in the world. One of the areas that I visited most recently—and you, perhaps, have been there, as well—has been facilities at Y–12. 

Having a father who went through an ordeal of having bone cancer from prostate cancer, I know that in Oak Ridge the medical isotope production there helped them be able to get nuclear medicine 

that at least made the quality of life for him his last few days at 

least more comfortable. 

As I look at all of the areas that we are engaged in at the UPF, 

the uranium enrichment therein at Y–12, I see an old, old building 

that was built about the time the Manhattan Project started, somewhere around the 1940s. 

And I know back then we have made some mistakes. And many 

of the folks who live in that area are enduring some of those mistakes today through health conditions and others. But we now have 

a lot of research and a lot of data that says this is what we need. 

And so I would look at a baseline that we have established for 

the planned operational date for a new facility at Y–12, I believe 

by 2018. I look at this year’s budget and I see even the planning 

for that building that has been cut back to $54 million when it 

should have been roughly $117 million—obviously, as requested by 

those at Y–12, that we could at least have—work. 

You would look at this and you would say, ‘‘Well, that is just 

about his own area.’’ Yes, it is all parochial, and we all have local 

issues. But my belief is this is more than just a local issue. 

Congressman Wamp has obviously asked serious questions to 

you that I would have been interested in asking. I have some others I would like to ask. 

You have been there. What is the condition of 9212 facility there 

at Y–12? And, secondly, is this facility viable for long-term enrichment uranium or mission capability? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Okay, if I could—I would like to answer 

that, and I would also like General Harencak to answer. He was 

just at Y–12 just—— 

General HARENCAK. Monday. 

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Captain D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. Monday, if I could, sir. 

Mr. DAVIS. Amazing place, isn’t it? 

General HARENCAK. Yes, sir, it is. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. I think you are right. It is more than just 

local issues. This is a national security issue. It is, you know—I 

have been there a number of times. The condition is not good. It 

is safe, but only safe because we are spending money, quite frankly, every year. 

Mr. DAVIS. How much extra, would you say? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. We have a nuclear risk reduction project, 

I believe it is in the tens of millions of dollars. I can—— 

Mr. DAVIS. About $200-some-odd million, I believe, through safety and security. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. We would save, by building—once the facil- ity is completed, we believe we would be able to save about $200 

million a year, based on our current Y–12 budget. But there is a 

long way to go before we actually get there. 

I do believe that the buildings are safe now, but over the long— 

this is not a long-term solution. Fixing Cold War-era facilities—and 

I would say early Cold War-era facilities—maintaining them, in 

fact, limping them along is not a good long-term solution. 

We know it is not a good long-term solution. What we have in 

the 2010 budget right now is an effort to continue the planning 

work necessary to ultimately get to the right design, not to focus 

on not having any major impacts. 

Certainly it is not per the original plan that we had teed up to 

you last year, but it is an effort to, in effect, continue to move forward slowly, but not presume the outcome of the Nuclear Posture 

Review, because the committee has made it clear to me that there 

is a certain sequence that it would like to see. 

However, that being said, I am very confident that, once the Nuclear Posture Review is completed and it defines the total scope of 

nuclear security work that has to be done—not just weapons work, 

frankly; it is also the dismantlement work, the nonproliferation 

work, the reactor conversion work, the naval nuclear propulsion 

work that needs to be done—that we will see the right kind of bedrock, if you will, to move forward on expeditiously on the facilities. 

Now, I will have to balance that, of course, with the whole overall program. And that is something I am keenly aware that I will 

need to—we are going to need—Gary Harencak and I are going to 

need to do that probably within the next 3 months, frankly, as we 

build our fiscal year 2011 program and budget for the president 

and ultimately submit it to you, sir, next January. 

But it is not a viable, long-term solution. But I would like the 

general, if you will, to maybe provide some more recent observations and, plus, a fresh look. Having been all over the Air Force 

and around the world, he can give you his impression, sir. 

General HARENCAK. Yes, sir. First, let me say, I fully agree with 

you. It is safe now. It is. However, it is—no way can you see that 

building where you are wearing a hardhat, because you actually 

need it, that that is a long-term solution. 

There are some great Americans working, doing a wonderful job 

there, but we have to give them a better facility to do the very important work that they do. That is my best military advice. Having 

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seen that, it is—they are doing a fantastic job. But when you see 

the old machinery, you see what they are doing, that you realize 

how important UPF will be for our future. 

Now, that being said, we, of course, have to balance our budget 

proposals. I will tell you that we have already made significant savings in the design in that new UPF, in—especially in the structure. 

We have learned very valuable lessons from the structure that is 

there now that we are going to take. So we believe that the design 

has actually gotten better just in a couple of years that we did it. 

As I talked earlier about—I am convinced UPF is a key part of 

that. We cannot continue long term to operate in the present facilities with such a key area of uranium processing without it. 

So we want to maintain flexibility as we go, looking on. And that 

is what the design team—Ted Cherry and his great people there 

are very mindful that they are going to design a facility that will 

be flexible enough to give us the capability regardless of what 

comes down. And that is really what we want to be careful that we 

are doing. 

I am 100 percent sure that we won’t get it 100 percent right. We 

are going to have to make some decisions on sizing and capacity 

of that facility based on what we believe we will need to do. So 

what we are trying to do is design flexibility in it, sir. 

Mr. DAVIS. I was chosen as a contractor on many occasions because I had the staff, the workers, the professionals, the technical 

skills to be able to complete and perform on time and under budget 

for the individuals who chose my construction company. 

Are you concerned that we may lose some of the technical skill 

that we—those folks who are actually—as we see this, if we actually are not able to have $117 billion necessary to continue this 

planning, this baseline planning that we have to complete this 

project—by 2018? Are you concerned that we may lose some of 

those highly skilled and technical individuals? I am. 

General HARENCAK. Yes, sir. And as I got my briefing on Monday 

on this, that was my very first question. Can we keep those highly 

skilled people that will make that decision, that will get us 98 percent correct on the future size and capacity of this building? 

And I am convinced that we have done everything we can in this 

budget to maintain that. These people are committed to it. I do 

agree with you, Mr. Davis, though. We have to be very, very careful 

and we have to keep our eye on that ball constantly that we don’t 

drop this and that capability doesn’t lose us, because it will cost us 

a gazillion dollars to bring it back. 

Mr. DAVIS. My concern is, we may be fumbling now. And it is my 

hope that as we go through the appropriations process that we 

can—would you advise us to take another look at this amount that 

you have requested, that maybe we should raise that limit just a 

little bit up to where it would match the baseline, it would at least 

continue the design and planning for the new structure? 

Because as I look at it, we are talking about roughly a $2 billion 

cost, if we can start reasonably soon. That would be right—savings 

that we completely pay for this, plus have a safer work environment and a more secure facility. 

And I am just wondering if we should—if you would—if you have 

had any—as they say back home, any recapitalizations about your 

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request? And should we try to engage and maybe increase those 

dollars? 

General HARENCAK. Well, I will tell you what, sir. I think my 

boss wants to answer that. [Laughter.] 

So we will let him answer that. 

Mr. DAVIS. I am listening. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Well, sir, I probably won’t be as direct as 

you might like. But what I do want to say is, you know, what we 

have is a budget that doesn’t comport to the plan that we presented to you last year. We have a program that works to not grow 

the design teams more, but keep the design moving forward. 

What I am looking to do was take the output of not only this bipartisan—the strategic commission that came out, but more importantly, when I get a better idea of how much uranium work I am 

going to ultimately end up getting on the—you know, from Mr. 

Baker here coming in as a result of the president’s commission— 

president’s goals of securing material in 4 years, that is going to 

mean a lot more work, frankly, to the program, I think that is 

going to drive where we need to. 

And as you know, there is a certain amount of a tradeoff here. 

We have a couple of large facilities that are teed up in front of this 

organization and ultimately we will present to the committee. The 

plutonium capability at Los Alamos is in—has a different set of 

problems, and they are different. And in the end, it is going to require—— 

Mr. DAVIS. But isn’t that basically a lab where they are doing research, were you talking about? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. There is research. There is analytical 

chemistry and material characterization research that has to be 

done on the plutonium side. 

Just like the Y–12 capability deals, that is the place where we 

feel the nation is going to be able to do the forensics work that it 

is going to need out into the future and maintain our plutonium 

expertise, just like Y–12 on the uranium side. 

So there is a really tough choice ahead for the administration 

when we come forward. What I didn’t want—because I have also 

reduced the plutonium program, frankly, as well, and have brought 

those back to a level after talking with Mr. Harencak, and the 

plant managers, and the lab directors on, how can I slow things 

down enough to the point where I don’t get the horse too far out 

ahead of the requirement? 

In the end, the nation is going to need both of those capabilities. 

It is going to need a plutonium capability, and it is going to need 

a uranium capability. It is going to need to be in a safe area. 

You know, I think the president’s budget presents the balance of 

what we had to operate within to do that. Obviously, more resources allow us to refine the design sooner. 

And one thing I have always noticed on large projects, the more 

work you do up front in defining—you know this, sir, probably better than I do—the more work you do up front and knowing what 

your requirements are, the better chance you have of hitting your 

mark on cost, scope and schedule. 

And that is why we have so much money spent in on both of 

these projects up front to do that. 

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Mr. DAVIS. Were you given an opportunity during the writing of 

the American economic recovery and reinvestment act—some folks 

would call that a stimulus bill, but it is—were you given an opportunity to make requests for this type of facility? Because in some 

cases, those dollars have been used to actually substitute some of 

the basic budget needs for this year. Were you given that opportunity and basically did not request, or—— 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. We provided to the administration, as the 

president looked at the portfolio of the activities, these activities 

were—a set of these were put forward. I don’t know if this one specifically was, frankly. I do know that we had some from the NNSA. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thanks. I thought I had to filibuster until Mr. Chairman got back. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Calvert. 

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As been noted, the number of warheads in the stockpile continues to go down, which is a good thing. But, obviously, it becomes 

more important to have life extension on the existing stockpile. 

And with the reliable replacement warhead being set aside, the 

issue of reliability, I think, becomes extremely important to make 

sure that the president knows that they have a reliable stockpile, 

God forbid it was necessary. 

Why don’t you explain for the committee how important NIF is 

going to be in certifying that the stockpile is reliable? And is there 

sufficient resources available at the present time to make sure that 

NIF is operating at its optimal level? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. NIF will actually be—NIF will actually be 

critical towards addressing a couple of key points. There is clearly 

our desire—we talked a little bit earlier about maintaining the best 

scientists in this country to deal with these issues, not just the 

stockpile, but nonproliferation, intelligence analysis, forensics, and 

the like. And NIF will be an incredible part of being able to maintain that capability. 

But more importantly, the reason why we wanted—we felt we 

need and we received your support for the design, development, 

construction, and ultimately use of this facility was because there 

were some very specific, classified problems that we felt that this 

was the only facility that will be able to allow us to examine those 

regions that none of the other facilities could do. 

And if we are talking about regions of burning, which is, you 

know, a physics term, if you will, of burning hydrogen—fusing hydrogen and creating that element of what happens inside a nuclear 

warhead in a laboratory. The data that is going to come out of that 

is going to allow us to explore issues that we might have with 

aging. 

If there is a crack, for example, because a high explosive—a high 

explosive is, obviously, not a metal—and it ages, just like everything else does—if a crack develops and causes a problem, does 

that cause an issue with respect to the shapes, very important 

shapes that we need to examine? 

We can only examine that in a laboratory with something like a 

National Ignition Facility. And we would use that information to 

put into our computer codes and to model what might happen out 

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over time. I would be happy to provide you, sir, with a classified 

briefing—— 

Mr. CALVERT. But staying at that—do you believe you have the 

resources available in this budget to make sure that the facility is 

operating at the level it should be? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes, this budget will operate that facility— 

the NIF is already—I always call it oversubscribed, if you will. We 

have enough experiments to keep us busy for the next 6 years, although we have, in 2010—the most important thing about this 

budget in 2010 is it provides the resources we feel that we need 

in order to conduct the ignition experiment—first ignition experiment. 

Mr. CALVERT. One other quick question. President Obama has indicated he doesn’t intend to pursue Yucca Mountain as a long-term 

repository for high-level waste. And as you know, Yucca is today 

designated by law as that high-level waste repository. 

The budget request includes $98.4 million for defense nuclear 

waste disposal. Why does the budget request include this funding, 

given the president indicated he does not intend to pursue Yucca 

Mountain? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Well—— 

Mr. RYAN. Did you think you would get away without asking a 

question about Yucca Mountain, Mr. Chairman? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Well, recognizing I am the president’s representative here, this is not my program. But, well, the approach 

the secretary has put forth is to bring together a group of people 

to address the high-level waste question. 

I talked to the secretary about the NNSA’s implications to the 

state of Idaho, if you will, on what we do with the new naval reactors material that we have in Idaho. And the ultimate disposal 

path is important for the state. 

So, you know, my sense is, when talking to the secretary, is that 

our approach is to bring together this blue-ribbon panel of people. 

I have provided some names of folks that I feel from essentially the 

national security side of this problem to add to that group, because 

it ultimately has to be an integrated solution. 

Mr. CALVERT. Well, I know, in the interest of time, this waste, 

as you know, continues to accumulate. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Mr. CALVERT. And it in itself is a national security problem. And 

I would hope that the committee can pursue this down the road, 

but there aren’t very many places to put this waste, as you know, 

and it is certainly a political issue that you probably don’t want to 

get involved in. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If the gentleman would yield—— 

Mr. CALVERT. I yield. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN [continuing]. On the NIF, the amount of 

money for NIF is maintained at the same level. Is that right? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, that is right. What we did was— 

our previous—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But that comes from an overall directed 

stockpile, you know, account, doesn’t it? 

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Captain D’AGOSTINO. It comes from two accounts. One is the experiment that the directed stockpile account would fund. The other 

one is some of the base operations that is in the ICF line. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It sort of gets back to my initial comments, 

you know, that that fund has been reduced, I think, what, by $76 

million? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. The DSW? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Directed stockpile work account has been 

reduced, some of it as a result of completion, nothing to do with 

NIF, but of the B61 life extension work that is finished up in fiscal 

year 2009 and does not exist in that particular LEP. In 2010, we 

are starting another B61 activity. 

Also, there are some increases in the DSW account for dismantlement. So it ends up being—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So is there or is there not an impact on, 

you know, what the work that needs to be continued to dismantle 

the weapons? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. There is actually an increase in the wet 

work to be done to dismantle weapons, not by a tremendous 

amount. It is about a $4 million increase after the comparables 

have been done. 

And on the NIF, we undertook some changes, my organization 

did, in the last few months to move resources into the science, into 

the NIF account in order to make sure that we weren’t continuing 

to decrease. 

The trend we had was not—we were not on the right trend as 

far as science and technology. And this budget serves to stem that 

trend and stop it from getting worse. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. [OFF MIKE] 

Mr. RYAN. You would never do that, Mr. Chairman. I know. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. [OFF MIKE] 

Mr. RYAN. I have a couple of quick questions and one that I 

would probably be willing to submit. 

One of the things I want to talk to you about, the president campaigned changing the way government runs and making it run 

more efficiently. And I know that was a very important component 

of his campaign for a lot of people who helped put him in office, 

and I think it is our responsibility to help kind of further that 

agenda. 

I want to talk to you about commodity procurement. I want to 

talk to you about third-party financing. And I want to talk to you 

about horizontal combination of contracts. 

The first is the commodity procurements. You know, there is a 

lot of respects where each site has different requirements, but 

there are some opportunities. One of the examples, the armorpiercing ammunition for protective forces. 

The ammunition is the same, but each site buys their own in 

small lots now, which increases the cost, unlike the Department of 

Defense, that buys it in huge quantities. 

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Is there any reason why you can’t purchase that jointly? And are 

there other opportunities where we can do that? I think this is lowhanging fruit. This is stuff we can take of. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. Absolutely. You hit the nail right 

on the head. 

We had four strategies for moving forward into the future. The 

first one was change the—transform the stockpile. Second was 

transform the infrastructure that supports that. The third one you 

are referring to is operate in a more integrated fashion, change the 

way we do business, in other words. 

Brad Peterson has looked at not just the ammunition, but on the 

protective vests, the equipment that the organization uses. As you 

probably know, we have different models of approaches on security 

contracting, and that has led to a lot of homegrown solutions across 

the complex. 

Brad Peterson is—because I am going to be—he knows this is 

coming—is pushing towards, how does he consolidate not just the 

equipment purchases, but have more common training, you know, 

the cognitive ops protocols? Because heaven forbid we have to move 

security forces around the country to take care of a particular problem, but if we have to, we want them to be one unit, in effect. 

Mr. RYAN. Can you provide us a list of 5 or 10 or 15, you know, 

opportunities that we have to push this along? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. I would be happy to, because 

we have a good list for you. 

Mr. RYAN. I appreciate that. And then, quickly, the third-party 

financing, as far as Y–12, for example. You have two administrative buildings built with outside funding and then leased back. 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Mr. RYAN. And, you know, we are going to have to pay for that 

at some point. I know it diminishes your upfront costs, but it seems 

like we would pay more in the long run. Is that true or not true? 

And what is to be gained by the current way of doing it? 

Captain D’AGOSTINO. What is to be gained—to answer your question on the Y–12, the exact numbers, I would like to take that for 

the record. 

I do know we have looked at 20- and 25-year looks at the resources requirement and felt that the business case worked out 

well. There are probably two main gains, if you will, as a result of 

using this approach versus having the government go through a 

traditional government procurement process. 

One is speed. And there is an example. We will provide you the 

details on the difference and time at Y–12. 

But the other one is a little bit more subtle and, frankly, you 

know, I would approach the following way. Particularly in a world 

when we can’t predict exactly where we are going with respect to 

the size of our infrastructure, how changes that future presidents 

may make may end up shaping our infrastructure, you know, there 

is a part of me that says, ‘‘Why would I want to, you know, buy 

a liability, a 50-year liability on a big building if I think I might 

need it for the next 20 years and I can get out of it, and as the 

stockpile gets smaller or as the requirements change?’’ 

And there is a real opportunity, frankly. This doesn’t relate to Y– 

12, but maybe at the Kansas City plant, as we look forward to 

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doing this. You know, could things change enough so that, 20 years 

from now, we may not need it? 

Well, the third-party finance approach provides an elegant way 

for the government to reduce its liability in a way—and work with 

the private sector in a way that is kind of nice. 

I am attracted by that benefit. I would be happy to give you some 

details for the record on the other question, sir. 

Mr. RYAN. Okay, thank you. 

We have to go vote. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. We will be back. We have two subsequent votes, 

5 minutes each, so it shouldn’t be that long. And, obviously, we 

have refreshments up here. We have coffee, Mr. Baker. 

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