FILED

April 30, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

FEBRUARY SESSION, 1998

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9704-CC-00139

)

Appellee, )

 ) McNAIRY COUNTY

V. ) 

)

) HON. JON KERRY BLACKWOOD,

PAM DAVIS, ) JUDGE 

)

Appellant. ) (WORTHLESS CHECKS)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

GARY F. ANTRICAN JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter

RICKEY W. GRIGGS GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER

Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

JEANNIE KAESS 425 Fifth Avenue North 

Assistant Public Defender Nashville, TN 37243

P.O. Box 700

Somerville, TN 38068 ELIZABETH T. RICE 

District Attorney General 

ED NEAL McDANIEL

Assistant District Attorney General

 300 Industrial Drive 

Selmer, TN 38375

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Defendant, Pam Davis, appeals as of right from the judgment of the

McNairy County Circuit Court. Defendant was convicted of issuing worthless checks

following a jury trial and was sentenced to eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days

in the McNairy County Jail with the sentence to be suspended upon payment of the

check amount within thirty (30) days. On appeal, Defendant raises the following

issues:

1) Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s

conviction; 

2) Whether the trial judge abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s

motion for a judgm ent of acquittal based upon a defective indictment.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the

standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and

all inferences therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).

Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with

a presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating why the

evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v.

Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476

(Tenn. 1973).
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Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to

be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are

resolved by the trier of fact, not this court. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623

(Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987). Nor may this court

reweigh or reevaluate the evidence. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury verdict

approved by the trial judge accredits the State’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts

in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W .2d at 476. 

“A person commits an offense who, with fraudulent intent or knowingly: stops

payment on a check or similar sight order for the payment of money for the purpose

of paying any fine, fee, tax, license or obligation to any governmental entity or for the

purpose of obtaining money, services, labor, credit or any article of value; provided,

that such money, credit, goods or services were as represented at the time of the

issuance of the check or similar sight order.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-121(a)(2).

The Defendant contends that the above statute does not apply to checks written for

the services of rental accommodations. 

A statute is construed to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose

of legislation, considering the statute as a whole and giving words their common and

ordinary meaning without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the

meaning of the language. Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. Department of

Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). This court should assume that the

legislature used each word in the statute purposely and that the use of those words

conveyed some intent and had some meaning and purpose. As the language in the

statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation and we

apply the words of the statute as written. Id. 
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Under the broad definition of “services,” accommodations in hotels,

restaurants or elsewhere are included within the statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-

106(a)(35). While the definition does not specifically refer to “rent,” this check was

written for the services of monthly accommodations. The indictment specifically

charged that the Defendant stopped payment of a check for the purpose of

“obtaining services.” By use of the term “or elsewhere,” the act is written to

encompass services which are not specifically enumerated within the statute. In the

light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that there

was sufficient evidence to find the Defendant guilty under the provisions of

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-121(a)(2). The Defendant has failed to

meet her burden of proof, and this issue is without merit.

The Defendant argues that the indictment is invalid as it failed to specify the

requisite mental element of “fraudulent intent.” The indictment charged the

Defendant as follows:

Pam Davis . . . did unlawfully and knowingly stop payment of a check

for the purpose of obtaining services . . . in violation of T.C.A. 39-14-

121.

In order to be convicted under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-121(a)(2),

a defendant must act “knowingly” or “with fraudulent intent.” As the indictment

charged the Defendant with acting “knowingly,” this is sufficient to meet the

requirement that the indictment state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary

and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such a manner as to enable

a person of common understanding to know what is intended. Tenn. Code Ann. §

40-13-202. The indictment correctly informed the Defendant of the charges, enabled

the trial court to enter judgment and sentence and protected the Defendant against
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double jeopardy. State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 1996). This issue is

without merit.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge 

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOSEPH B. JONES, Presiding Judge

___________________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, Judge